On religious participation and (economic) security
It is often expected that with an increasing level of education Muslim slowly or gradually will fit the secularized pattern of the dominant native Dutch people. An expectation that is part of the idea that modernization leads secularization. Modernization weakens the bond and identification with religious institutions, a relationship in particular mediated by education. In an upcoming article in the American Journal Of Sociology two Dutch sociologists, Stijn Ruiter and Frank van Tubergen, question the idea that increased education leads to decreased religiosity. In a recent article on NRC Handelsblad they discuss their findings.
nrc.nl – International – Features – Insecurity not education determines church attendance
The long-standing theory has been that the higher educated someone is the less religious he will be. But new research in 60 countries proves otherwise. It is economic security that leaves churches empty.
By Dirk VlasblomAtheist scientists have been shouting it from the rooftops: anyone who has enjoyed a higher education has no business being in a church. Many European sociologists have offered a rising level of education as the explanation for dwindling church attendance. Now two Dutch sociologists are countering this theory.
Stijn Ruiter, senior researcher at the Netherlands Institute for the Study of Crime and Law Enforcement, and Frank van Tubergen, a professor of sociology in Utrecht, compared ‘religious participation’ in 60 countries. They found no effect of education, but instead came to the conclusion that social insecurity and the environment people grow up in have a significant impact. Results of their research will be published in the American Journal of Sociology next month.
Resilience of religious America
There are two sides in the religion debate. Most European sociologists say modernisation leads to secularisation. But Peter Berger, the American who came up with that theory, later recanted it after the US proved how an economically developed society with a high level of education can indeed remain very religious.US scientists subsequently came up with the religious market theory. They say minimal regulation of religion and maximum competition between congregations make for more appealing ‘products’. The cacophony of evangelists and the radical separation of church and state would explain the resilience of religious America.
Ruiter and Van Tubergen do not choose sides in this debate. They tested elements of both theories for 60 countries listed in the World Values Survey. From the market theory they examined the idea that more state regulation of religion leads to lower church attendance. Modernisation, the central concept from the other theory, they dissected into three elements: modernisation through higher education, economic security and changes in social relationships by urbanisation and individualisation. They used church attendance as a measure of religiosity.
The focus on church attendance instead of (including) religious beliefs as a measure of religiosity can be questioned. It seems, at least, rather limited. Both researchers address that issue
Other research has shown that highly educated people are indeed less religious. But at the same time they tend to be more actively involved in political parties, associations and thus also in churches. Less educated people are more religious, but less active about it. There is a higher rate of churchgoers amongst educated believers than low-skilled believers.”
The two other elements of modernisation can be explained: economic (in)security and the nature of social relationships. “Economic uncertainty has enormous impact on church attendance. In countries with large socio-economic inequality, the rich often go to church because they too could lose everything tomorrow, as was clear from the dramatic collapse of Enron and Lehman Brothers.”
They also point to the relevance of social networks including parents, friends, neighbours and so on and a shift in social networks can lead to a change in church attendance. Their study may explain two examples of increased or persistent religiosity in ‘modern’ regions: the US and Eastern Europe. It appears that in particular welfare states leads to a decrease in church attendance (such as in the Netherlands) while economic uncertainty results in a stable or increasing church attendance. A claim that is not new by the way, also for example Erik H. Bax has proposed such a claim. It is an interesting claim also with regard to Muslims because in popular debate it is being argued that the Dutch welfare state suffocated and enclosed migrants into their own community, sometimes (together with multiculturalism) explaining why they haven’t integrated and are ‘still’ religious. It seems to me however that the ‘welfare state explanation’ takes the welfare state as a static given. The Dutch welfare state retrenchment is a fact however and I do wonder how that influences religiosity; church attendance keeps declining although cutbacks have led to a partial retreat of the welfare state.
The fact that the authors focus on church attendance makes generalizing their conclusions for Muslims difficult. Although in some studies visiting the mosque is used as an equivalent to church attendance this is problematic. In particular women and youth do not often visit the mosques but that does not mean that they are not religious. Studies find a lower attendance of religious meetings for women and men and higher educated people. It is not at all clear how this is related to social and economic security, although most studies point out that after 9/11 religiosity was increasing and Islam became more important for people; the debates on Muslims may have led to an increased experience of a lack of security and stability and more negative prospects for the future.
There is another problem with using church attendance or visiting a mosque as a measure of religiosity. Church attendance is based upon a pastoral definition of religiosity; a definition that serves what churches and religious institutions find important. Visiting the mosque is more or less the same but also based upon the image of religiosity of first generation men. Such definitions are to be explained and should not be (without questioning them) an analytical tool to measure religiosity.
Notwithstanding these objections Van Tubergen and Ruiter’s research provides interesting take in the angle of a relation between economic security and religious participation is one that (although not new) needs to be explored and discussed further.