Radicalization Series VI – Muslims and Radicalization – What do we know?

Since 9/11 the issue of radicalization of Muslims is top priority on many policy and research agenda’s. A large industry of research, policy making and advising, counter-radicalization programs and so on has emerged. In this post I will focus on research and the very basic question of what we know by now about radicalization.

This overview is based upon two review articles. Violent radicalization in Europe: What we know and what we do not know. This article focuses on French sociology studies (in particular Kepel, Roy, and Khosrokhavar), social movement theory (Sageman, Bakker, Wiktorowicz, and others) and empirical studies (Buijs, Slootman and Tillie, Nesser, and others). The second article is by Donatella della Porta and is an overview Research on Social Movements and Political Violence. I’m not going to summarize the whole articles but give you the main conclusions.

1. Many studies on radicalisation focus on processes of “alienation”, “marginalisation”, “fragmentation”, “individualisation”, and “deterritorialisation”. Others have sought to identify ‘motivational factors’ to (partly) explain terrorist acts, or looked for factors pertaining to relative deprivation or groupthink to account for violent and non-violent radical activism.
2. It is not possible to identify one single socio-economic profile or set of motivations that characterizes radical individuals. Socio-economic profiling is therefore a waste of time (see in particular Sageman). There seem to be a few reasons as to why people might end up on a radical path: search for meaning, search for a new start, search for community and belonging and radicalization as the product of an intellectual process driven by ideology, religion and political grievances.
3. Important influences in the sense of significant others point to two categories: the peer group and a charismatic leader (within the peer group or someone from the outside). One of the reasons this leader is important appears to be that overt and topdown recruitment has been made difficult by restrictive government policies. What exactly motivates the leader remains blurred. Many of them justify themselves on religious grounds but in many cases political radicalization seems to be primary to religious radicalization (in particular Roy). In particular online propaganda and or internet preachers can prime the individuals way of thinking but nevertheless remain secondary to real life relationships.
4. Progressive isolation is an important producer and product of radicalization
5. Radicalization as a response to political structures: Factors such as discrimination, stigmatization, but also the rise of extreme anti-islam nativism politicians contribute to radicalization indirectly because political context allows existing grievances to be heard. Exclusive political systems and unstable democracies produce more radical opposition and violent escalation. Transnational aspects of radicalization however are often left out of the equation since the nation-state is the basic unit of analysis. Nevertheless it is important to remember that (political) context in itself does not explain anything. Both the context and its relation with radicalization need to be analyzed and explained.
6. Radical groups are characterized by network structures and typically show both fission and fusion. The traditional image of strong hierarchical organizations does not fit (anymore).
7. Ideology and religion are often reduced to frames by the radicals that explain, justify, and mobilize support for their actions of choice. A frame defines the problem (the war against Islam), the protagonists (the radicals) and the antagonists (the infidels – a category that is extended to encompass even Muslims; partly in response to their growing isolation and the state’s repression).
8. Violence is not directly the product of ideologies that justify violence but ideology, religion and culture do provide a ‘tool kit’ of concepts, myths, and symbols, goals, and programs for actions that activists can selectively draw upon to construct strategies of actions. The content of religions and ideologies can inform and shape conflict behaviour both in the direction of escalation and de-escalation of violence.
9. Jihad, Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden are often considered as important symbols and sources of inspiration in terms of empowerment and an aspirational but utopian lifestyle; more as a ‘global fad’  and less as a source for militant revolutionary action in much the same way as Che Guevara and Malcolm X are for others (taken from Kurzman). It is also clear from other studies that many people had and still have the same grievances with regard to local and international politics as the Hofstad Network but opted for a democratic way to bring about change.
10. State repression has very strongly janus-faced. It creates ‘martyrs’ and/or creates status for the ‘victims’. It can lead to individuals leaving the radical network but in many cases in strengthens the commitment of the individual who was targeted by the state but also may further the commitment by people in his environment. Similar mechanisms may however also influence de-radicalization.
11. The state is often left out of the equation. Much of the research on radicalization is policy-oriented and problem-driven; radicalization is something that needs to be countered. Radicalisation is viewed purely as a problem of security and social cohesion; the development of radical identities is considered a signifier of a larger radicalisation problem and of a lack of social cohesion; radical impetuses are deemed merely a pre-cursor to radical actions.
12. There is a lack of empirical studies on radicalization. This is not surprising of course given the difficulties in accessing (violent) radical milieus for field research due to their hostile perpection of the world, their isolation and their categorization as illegal (or at least suspect).

In particular the last points lead to the conclusion that a very specific type of knowledge is generated from research. In particular the political and social dimension of people’s subjective investment in radical movements is overlooked and implicitly delegitimised. Another thing missing is the opposition radical groups encounter from fellow Muslims. Not only after a violent action, but already before. It is my impression, albeit based upon somewhat anecdotal evidence, that in the Netherlands the strongest opposition against the people of the Hofstad Network prior to the killing of Van Gogh, came from pietist Salafis who felt the Hofstad members were distorting the image of true (in their view) Salafi Islam. In upcoming posts I will try to provide some more information on both issues.