Discussion of Habermas’ Religion in the public sphere
December 7th, 2006“As long as secular citizens are convinced that religious traditions and religious communities are to a certain extent archaic relics of pre-modern societies that continue to exist in the present, they will understand freedom of religion as the cultural version of the conservation of a species in danger of becoming extinct.” (15)
I have just read Religion in the public sphere by Jürgen Habermas. In this article Habermas discusses several views on the use of religious arguments in the public sphere. It is an interesting, but contested article.
Habermas seems to deviate from his earlier statements on religion in the sense that he is more positive about the role of religion. But Habermas still sees a limited role for religion: in the formal political media, such as the Parliament, the arguments used must be secular, because this is the only common language all participants can share.
The article probably will not go without Habermas puts belief and secularity in strong opposition to each other, as if these are all encompassing attitudes that define the political participation of individuals. I doubt this opposition. A believer can in several aspects be secular and vice versa. For example a believer who votes for tax reductions may not be inspired by evangelical ideals but by his desire to earn more money. Or to take another example: some seemingly secular arguments may be ultimately based in religious values, e.g. a plea for stricter environmental laws can be based on a interpretation of Genesis where man is called to be a good steward. It is odd to accept secular arguments but to deny deliberations on the bases of these arguments. Furthermore, what is the difference epistemologically speaking between a secularist who bases his thought on, lets say, the autonomy principle and a believer who bases his thought on the Bible or Koran? The autonomy principle can just as well function as a secular variant of an article of faith that is not shared by all participants in the public sphere. Allowing argumentations based on these ’secular’ principles while excluding religious ones seems arbitrarly at the least.
I think that Habermas needs to properly define the central concepts he uses in his article: what does he mean with neutral, secular and religious? Especially his concept of neutrality and its concatenation with secularity is problematic and contestable.
The full reference to the article: Habermas, Jürgen. 2006. Religion in the Public Sphere. European Journal of Philosophy 1 (14):1-25.