Archive for May, 2006

May 31 2006

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ISIM/IMES: From Allah to Prada

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The International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM) and the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES) cordially invite you to a lecture by

Dr DIRK J. KORF
entitled
From Allah to Prada
Date: Friday, 9 June 2006
Time: 3.15 to 5 PM
Venue: Room D118a, Oudemanhuispoort 4-6, Amsterdam
Discussant: Martijn de Koning (ISIM)

From Allah to Prada (Forum, 2006) is the title of the first report of an ongoing research project among young Muslims in Amsterdam. From interviews with a panel of insider experts (professionals as well as young Muslims) a typology has been constructed, based on two dimensions (career and religious orientation). The aim of the study is to monitor developments in cultural identity, lifestyle and religion among young Muslims.
Dirk J. Korf, Ph.D., is associate professor in criminology at the Universities of Amsterdam and Utrecht. His main fields of research are lifestyles, patterns and trends of drug use and drug trafficking, as well as crime and crime prevention among ethnic minorities.

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May 31 2006

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The New Yorker: Oriana Fallaci directs her fury toward Islam.

Filed under Multiculti Issues

The New Yorker: Fact
THE AGITATOR
The New Yorker has a very interesting interview with Oriana Fallaci, by Margaret Talbot.

“Yesterday, I was hysterical,” the Italian journalist and novelist Oriana Fallaci said. She was telling me a story about a local dog owner and the liberties he’d allowed his animal to take in front of Fallaci’s town house, on the Upper East Side. Big mistake. “I no longer have the energy to get really angry, like I used to,” she added. It called to mind what the journalist Robert Scheer said about Fallaci after interviewing her for Playboy, in 1981: “For the first time in my life, I found myself feeling sorry for the likes of Khomeini, Qaddafi, the Shah of Iran, and Kissinger—all of whom had been the objects of her wrath—the people she described as interviewing ‘with a thousand feelings of rage.’ ”

[…]

Fallaci’s arguments appeal to many Europeans on a visceral level. The murder of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh, the “honor killings” of young women in England and Sweden, and the controversy in France over whether girls may wear head scarves to school have underscored the enormous clash in values between secular Europeans and fundamentalist Muslim immigrants. In Holland, immigration officials have begun showing potential immigrants films and brochures that detail certain “European” values, including equality of the sexes and tolerance of homosexuality. The implicit suggestion is that in order to live in Europe you must accept these ideas. Such clumsy efforts betray the frustration and confusion that many Europeans have felt since the riots that broke out in the suburbs of Paris last fall—perhaps the most spectacular sign that the assimilation of Western Europe’s fifteen million Muslims has stalled in many places, and never started in others.

Some European intellectuals have given Fallaci credit for offering an enraged, articulate voice to people who are genuinely bewildered and dismayed by the challenges of assimilating Islamic immigrants. In 2002, writing in the Italian weekly Panorama, Lucia Annunziata, a former foreign correspondent and columnist, and Carlo Rossella, then the magazine’s editor, argued that “The Rage and the Pride” had “redefined Italy’s conception of the current conflict between the Western world and the Islamic world. . . . Oriana Fallaci has confronted the issue with ironclad simplicity: We are different, she has said. And, at this point, we are incompatible.” The French philosopher Alain Finkielkraut, writing in Le Point, said that Fallaci “went too far,” reducing all “Sons of Allah to their worst elements,” yet he commended her for taking “the discourse and the actions of our adversaries” at their word and—in the wake of September 11th, the execution of Daniel Pearl, the destruction of Buddhas in Afghanistan, and other atrocities committed in the name of Islam—not being intimidated by the “penitential narcissism that makes the West guilty of even that which victimizes it.”

[…]

Fallaci sees the threat of Islamic fundamentalism as a revival of the Fascism that she and her sisters grew up fighting. She told me, “I am convinced that the situation is politically substantially the same as in 1938, with the pact in Munich, when England and France did not understand a thing. With the Muslims, we have done the same thing.” She elaborated, in an e-mail, “Look at the Muslims: in Europe they go on with their chadors and their burkas and their djellabahs. They go on with the habits preached by the Koran, they go on with mistreating their wives and daughters. They refuse our culture, in short, and try to impose their culture, or so-called culture, on us. . . . I reject them, and this is not only my duty toward my culture. Toward my values, my principles, my civilization. It is not only my duty toward my Christian roots. It is my duty toward freedom and toward the freedom fighter I am since I was a little girl fighting as a partisan against Nazi-Fascism. Islamism is the new Nazi-Fascism. With Nazi-Fascism, no compromise is possible. No hypocritical tolerance. And those who do not understand this simple reality are feeding the suicide of the West.”

Fallaci refuses to recognize the limitations of this metaphor—say, the fact that Muslim immigration is not the same as an annexation by another state. And although European countries should indeed refuse to countenance certain cultural practices—polygamy, “honor killings,” and anti-Semitic teachings, for example—Fallaci tends to portray the worst practices of Islamic fundamentalists as representative of all Muslims. Certainly, European countries have made some foolish compromises in the name of placating Muslim residents. In Germany, where courts have ordered that Muslim religious instruction be offered in schools, just as Christian instruction is, critics have complained that the Islamic teaching often perpetuates a conservative version of Islam. The result, the historian Bernard Lewis argued, in a recent talk in Washington, is that “Islam as taught in Turkish schools is a sort of modernized, semi-secularized version of Islam, and Islam as taught in German schools is the full Wahhabi blast.” (This is a good reminder of why the American model of keeping religious instruction out of public schools facilitates assimilation.) Many of Fallaci’s objections, however, have more to do with her aesthetic sensibilities. For her, hearing Muslim prayers in Tuscany—she does her own wailing imitation—is a form of oppression. Yet such examples do not rise to the level of argument that she wants to make, which is that the native culture of Italy will collapse if Muslims keep immigrating.
[…]

And it is well known . . . that I do not accept the mendacity of the so-called Moderate Islam. I do not believe that a Good Islam and a Bad Islam exist. Only Islam exists. And Islam is the Koran. And the Koran says what it says. Whatever its version. Of course there are exceptions. Also, considering the mathematical calculation of probabilities, some good Muslims must exist. I mean Muslims who appreciate freedom and democracy and secularism. But, as I say in the ‘Apocalypse,’ . . . good Muslims are few. So tragically few, in fact, that they must go around with bodyguards.” (Here she mentioned Ayaan Hirsi Ali, the Somali-born former member of the Dutch parliament, whom Holland, shamefully, declared last month that it would strip of her citizenship, citing an irregularity in her 1997 asylum application.) She wrote that she found my question about whether she would tolerate any mosques in Europe “insidious” and “offensive,” because it “aims to portray me as the bloodthirsty fanatics, who during the French Revolution beheaded even the statues of the Holy Virgin and of Jesus Christ and the Saints. Or as the equally bloodthirsty fanatics of the Bolshevik Revolution, who burned the icons and executed the clergymen and used the churches as warehouses. Really, no honest person can suggest that my ideas belong to that kind of people. I am known for a life spent in the struggle for freedom, and freedom includes the freedom of religion. But the struggle for freedom does not include the submission to a religion which, like the Muslim religion, wants to annihilate other religions.

[…]

Fallaci’s virtues are the virtues that shine most brightly in stark circumstances: the ferocious courage, and the willingness to say anything, that can amount to a life force. But Fallaci never convinced me that Europe’s encounter with immigration is that sort of circumstance. Not that it would matter to her. “You’ve got to get old, because you have nothing to lose,” she said over lunch that afternoon. “You have this respectability that is given to you, more or less. But you don’t give a damn. It is the ne plus ultra of freedom. And things that I didn’t used to say before—you know, there is in each of us a form of timidity, of cautiousness—now I open my big mouth. I say, ‘What are you going to do to me? You go fuck yourself—I say what I want.’ ”

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May 30 2006

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IHRC - Islamic Human Rights Commission: British Muslims’ Expectations of the Government Project

Filed under Multiculti Issues

IHRC - Islamic Human Rights Commission

The Islamic Human Rights Commission is “an independent, not-for-profit, campaign, research and advocacy organization based in London , UK” . They work in partnership with different organizations from all backgrounds, to campaign for justice for all peoples regardless of their racial, confessional or political background.

British Muslims’ Expectations of the Government Project

Through extensive surveys with Muslims across the UK , IHRC set out to give voice to the expectations of Muslims and articulate them to the British government. This project hopes to bring about a truly open and beneficial discussion aimed at changing policies and perceptions of a much maligned community whose diversity and sophistication is being ignored and condemned in an alarming and dangerous manner.

Reports are already available on citizenship, discrimination, schools and hijab. Further reports on university life, the media and Muslim contribution to British society are soon to follow.

Volume 5: [download summary] [order print version] (NEW)
Volume 4: [download summary] [order print version]
Volume 3: [download summary] [order print version]
Volume 2: [download summary] [order print version]
Volume 1: [download summary] [order print version]

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May 29 2006

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Are We Really Supposed To “Kill All The Infidels”?

Filed under Internal Debates

Are We Really Supposed To “Kill All The Infidels”? - altmuslim.com
Thanks to Jamal from Opinionated Voice: I came across this article on AltMuslim.com:

The framework underlying fighting in Islam is self-defense, and all verses which call on the believers to “fight the unbelievers” must be understood in this framework.
By Hesham Hassaballa, May 19, 2005
I’m not what I seem
Time and again, over and over and over again, I either read or hear from people that Islam calls for the murder of “infidels,” or all those who are not Muslim. This perception is so pervasive, so entrenched, and I really do not know from where it comes. Yes, there are Muslims who do believe this: 19 of them crashed three planes into the World Trade Center and Pentagon, killing nearly 3,000 of my innocent American brothers and sisters. But, I don’t know from where they got this idea.

“It is the Qur’an, you idiot!!!” I am quite sure some of you just screamed that to your computer screen.

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May 28 2006

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C L O S E R - The Dhimmi Card

Terms like “dhimmitude” are often used polemically, a little bit the same like the term political correct is used. The latter term refers more to politics concerning issues of the multiculti society, while the former seems to be a psychological attitude of people that have surrendered to Muslims (gaining) dominance. This of course has triggered some muslim bloggers who now seek to explain dhimmitude for dummies. Brian Ulrich made an attempt that has been given considerable attention around the blogosphere. Some excerpts:

It is, however, important to note the Covenant of Umar, the document eventually attributed to the reign of the second rightly guided caliph which sets out the laws which dhimmis were to follow as their part of the covenant. These are not in the Qur’an, and in fact many represent continuations of Byzantine and Sassanid practices. Many others, such as the ban on Arabic inscriptions, seem to imply that at the time these regulations actually took shape, authorities were concerned to maintain social and cultural distance between a ruling elite and non-Muslims, who were then a majority of the population outside the Arabian peninsula.

A point which I emphasize to my students, however, is that the Umar document represents the theory, not the practice. Occasionally a ruler would start enforcing most or all of its prohibitions, but more often the main impediments faced by Christians and Jews were those common to all minorities, a popular prejudice against that which was different emphasized especially in times of difficulty. The stereotypes involving Jews in the Muslim Middle Ages more closely resembled that of Hispanics in the contemporary United States than the conspiracy theorizing of today. Another window into non-Muslim communities is that utilized most effectively by S.D. Goitein, the treasure trove of documents known as the Cairo Geniza. Here we see in the voluminous correspondence of medieval Egyptian Jewry that in that place and time, Jews and Christians played important social and political roles and were fully integrated into the large and prosperous economy of the Islamic world.
As might be expected, individuals whose letters are preserved in the Geniza have a variety of opinions regarding their status, but in his A Mediterranean Society, Goitein uses the analogy of “a nation within a nation,” noting that they share a common homeland and ultimate government guaranteeing justice and security, but follow different laws and answer to different religious authorities. The importance of that last should not be underestimated, for medieval Muslim rulers relied on religious leaders to govern, and just as the ulema were responsible for the Muslims, so Jewish and Christian communal leaders were responsible for their own people.

The period of the Crusades and Mongol invasions is usually considered an important turning point in this history. I know more about the Christians, but Jews were also affected by the strong sense of Muslim identity under attack from these outside powers, and subject both to government demands for money to fight these wars and the fact they were, in effect, still outsiders to the now larger, religiously defined Muslim community.

Even then, however, we still don’t have anything like the anti-Semitism seen today in much of the Muslim Middle East. When did that start to appear?

Lewis ties this into the idea that Muslims resent the inversion of the order in which their true religion was leading them into a glorious future, though since I understand that theory is riddled with holes I didn’t quote it above. The main point is that the deplorable anti-Semitism we see today in places like Iran and Syria has its origins in Europe, not the Qur’an, even if certain Qur’anic verses are occasionally ripped out of context to justify it, and those who draw comparisons between Hamas, Ahmadinejad, and the Nazis might do well to consider their own analogy and remember that “pogrom” is a European word. (As an aside, there are perhaps interesting parallels in Lewis’s depiction of the British using allegations of Muslim anti-Semitism to intervene in the Ottoman Empire and certain events in the news today.)

In another post he elaborated a little more on the topic.

The first is the “Hispanic” analogy. That was pretty off-the-cuff, and I have no doubt that a careful academic study would prove it fatuous. What I was going for was the idea that Jews were seen more as menial people associated with jobs no one else wanted to do and to some degree as a cultural threat. Despite perhaps sharing a sports loyalty, I would disagree with the tone of Mariner’s comment in the thread. On the religious point, for example, I think anti-Catholic bigotry still plays some role in how we view Hispanics, but a more relevant comparison might be to the huge backlash against flying Mexican flags. I could tackle a couple of the others, too, but really taken past the level of people’s perceptions, you’re comparing apples and oranges - a medieval religious legal system defined first and foremost by religious identity as opposed to a modern secular one based off nationality in a territorial defined space. Tomorrow I’ll try to remember to grab a copy of Goitein’s Geniza study and see what the voices of the past actually have to say for themselves.

As far as the line about anti-Semitism first appearing in the late 19th century as a European import, that was Bernard Lewis’s quote, and I guess it does seem a bit odd out of context, though people should be given pause by the fact that this is not a scholar who is given to blaming things on Europe. (That’s part of why I’m leaning on him, especially for the modern period which I don’t know very well.) I haven’t re-read his entire book carefully, but from what I’ve glanced at and remember, what he calls anti-Semitism is basically this ideology which sees Jews as evil, powerful, manipulative, and responsible for many of the world’s problems. This is clearly different than seeing them as poor souls with an inferior religion. Seriously, the fact that works like the Protocols of the Elders of Zion originated in Europe isn’t even controversial!

Some of the reactions, like those at Faithfreedom.org, are typical for those who constantly pull the ‘dhimmi-card’: putting the other one down as a person whose mental abilities are flawed out of fear for the Muslim dominance. I do not know enough about ‘dhimmi’ in the history of muslim societies and communities. Probably more is to be said about it, so I’m waiting…

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May 28 2006

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Morocco unbound: an interview with Yto Barrada - openDemocracy

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Morocco unbound: an interview with Yto Barrada Yto Barrada Charlotte Collins - openDemocracy
On openDemocracy a very interesting interview with Yto Barrada. Over the last 15 years, the Strait of Gibraltar has become one of the main gateways for illegal immigration in north Africa. Yto Barrada’s photographs, taken between 1998 - 2004, capture the temptations of leaving, and the unfulfilled hopes of escaping into Europe. Charlotte Collins talks to her.

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May 28 2006

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Boeken&cetera: ‘De’ Islam met cultureel antropologe Marjo Buitelaar

Boeken Artikelen: ‘De’ Islam
‘De’ Islam
Boeken&cetera met Marjo Buitelaar
Publicaties

Islam en het dagelijks leven

Het zou prettig zijn als een ieder die een oordeel uit wil spreken over de Islam, eerst een inburgeringscursus Islam bij Buitelaar ondergaat.Buitelaar ging naar Marokko en deed onderzoek naar de beleving van de vastenmaand ramadan en de betekenis van de ‘hammam’, het publieke badhuis. Ook in Nederland doet ze onderzoek onder vrouwen van Marokkaanse afkomst. Daarover schreef ze een genuanceerd verslag, verschenen onder de titel: “Islam en het dagelijks leven”.

Allereerst is duidelijk, maar moet nog maar eens gezegd, dat de Koran, net als de Bijbel en de Tora, multi-interpretabele werken zijn. Buitelaar maakt in deze aflevering van Boeken&cetera duidelijk dat er steeds meer aandacht is voor de religieuze identiteit van moslims en veel minder op alle andere identiteitvormende aspecten die een cultuur, een (immigrant) groep, met zich mee brengen.

Marjo Buitelaar is antropoloog en verbonden aan de faculteit Godgeleerdheid & Godsdienstwetenschap van de Rijksuniversiteit Groningen.

Voor een genuanceerd beeld met geluid kijkt u aanstaande zondag naar boeken&cetera.

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May 27 2006

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C L O S E R - MaRock!

Filed under Arts & culture, Morocco

Voor de oplettende Closer-lezer, niks nieuws, maar het schijnt dat MaRock in Marokko vooral nogal wat ophef heeft gezorgd en dat deze commotie nu ook in Nederland is doorgedrongen.

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Voor meer recente info zie ook ook de bijbehorende weblog (in het Frans).

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May 27 2006

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AD.nl - ‘Zo’n doe-het-zelf-imam, dat is pas echt gevaarlijk’

AD.nl - ‘Zo’n doe-het-zelf-imam, dat is pas echt gevaarlijk’
Dat jongeren door een moskee (Taibah-moskee) naar scholen in het buitenland gestuurd worden, is volgens mij niet zo nieuw. Wel dat deze jongeren vervolgens als imam moeten gaan fungeren. Ik kan me vergissen, maar dat lijkt me een nieuwe ontwikkeling. Voor zover ik weet, is het bij de jongens uit Gouda niet de bedoeling dat ze gaan werken als imam voor een moskee. Zij zullen, verwacht ik, eerder gaan optreden als predikers van de salafi dawa. Maar als ik het fout heb, meldt het dan vooral.

Door HENK VAN ESS PATRICK POUW
AMSTERDAM/DEN HAAG - Mohammed Junas Gaffar, secretaris van de Amsterdamse Taibah-moskee, zegt het met een van afschuw vertrokken gezicht. ,,Het was in een Turkse moskee in het zuiden van het land. Stond ineens een kantoorjochie naast me. Hij pakte uit zijn koffer een baard. Die plakte hij op zijn gezicht. Bleek het de imam te zijn! Ik heb gevloekt! Dát is geen islam.’’

Nee, in de soennitische Taibah-moskee van Mohammed Junas Gaffar doen ze dat anders. ,,Wij sturen elk jaar twee, drie, van onze beste jongens naar Pakistan. Daar kunnen ze in een koranschool, in een madrassah, doctorandus in de islam worden. Het kennisniveau is daar heel erg hoog.’’ Het is niet de enige moskee waar jongeren popelen om in het buitenland de ware islam te ontdekken. Neem de Goudse Nour-moskee.

Drie Marokkaanse jongens uit de moslimgemeenschap van de kaasstad verblijven op dit moment in Medina, Saoedi-Arabië. Ze hongeren naar kennis die in Nederland niet is te vinden, zeggen de jongeren zelf. Met het gevaar dat ze radicaliseren en worden geconfronteerd met ‘politiek-radicale indoctrinatie’, zegt de AIVD. De ambassadeur van Saoedi-Arabië wil niets weten van radicalisering en indoctrinatie in zijn vaderland.

Nee, Waleed A. Elkhereiji verlangt niet naar een botsing van beschavingen, bezweert hij. Nederlanders die in zijn land zijn religie bestuderen? Hij snapt de achterdocht niet. Gezeten achter zijn bureau in Den Haag, met achter zijn rug portretten van de Saoedische koninklijke familie, steekt hij nog eens een sigaret op. ,,Wat denkt u zelf? Is het islamofobie?’’ De ambassadeur bevestigt dat zijn land de studie betaalt van Nederlandse moslimjongeren. ,,Ze zijn helemaal gescreend. Het gaat om jongeren die de Arabische taal willen leren. Nee, ik kan niet uitsluiten dat ze daarna ook de islam willen bestuderen.’’

Mohammed Cheppih, voormalig directeur van de Nederlandse afdeling van de omstreden Moslim Wereld Liga studeerde zelf ‘tot volle tevredenheid’ in Saoedi-Arabië. ,,Maar het gevaar bestaat dat je tijdens zo’n buitenlandse studie verdwaalt, dat je door de bomen het bos niet meer ziet. Vooral bij autochtonen die zich tot de islam hebben bekeerd zie je dat. Zie die jongens als droogstaande putten: ze zuigen alles op wat erin wordt gegooid.’’

Volgens Cheppih studeren op dit moment zeker veertig Nederlandse moslimjongeren aan universiteiten en koranscholen in Jordanië, Syrië, Maleisië, Egypte, Pakistan en Saoedi-Arabië. Een flink aantal ervan zegt hij persoonlijk te kennen. ,,Ze leren een Staphorst-variant van de islam. Ze lopen met oogkleppen op en zullen straks moeten rehabiliteren in de Nederlandse samenleving.’’

Maar waar Nederland zich vooral zorgen over moet maken, zijn de jongens die de studie niet afmaken, vindt Cheppih. ,,Die kunnen rare dingen gaan doen.’’ Hij noemt het voorbeeld van Abdul-Jabbar van de Ven, die verkondigde het ‘niet erg te vinden als Geert Wilders binnen twee jaar zou sterven’. ,,Zo’n jongen is daar een paar maandjes geweest. Haakte af omdat hij zogenaamd daar geen kennis kan vinden. Zo’n doe-het-zelf-imam, dat is pas echt gevaarlijk.’’

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May 26 2006

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NRC - Sheila Kamerman: Verkeerde Vrienden

NRC Krantenarchief
Verkeerde vrienden

Sheila Kamerman
Vooral jongeren uit problematische gezinnen zijn gevoelig voor groepsinvloed
De vriendengroep heeft op een tiener meer invloed dan zijn ouders. Maar wat te doen als een vriendengroep een jeugdbende wordt?
De grootste angst van ouders met tienerkinderen is dat ze verkeerde vrienden krijgen, zegt pedagoog en onderzoeker Bas Levering van de Universiteit Utrecht. Al die ouders weten hoe belangrijk vrienden zijn en hoe groot hun invloed is. Daar hebben ze geen onderzoek voor nodig.’ Vrienden openen het venster op de wereld, zegt hoogleraar jeugd en kinderstudies Wim Meeus van de Universiteit Utrecht: De vrijetijdscultuur waarbinnen tieners zich bewegen is grotendeels georganiseerd rond vrienden. Kinderen leren alles van elkaar: hoe ze contact leggen met het andere geslacht, welke films of muziek cool zijn, alcohol drinken en welke kleding ze moeten dragen om erbij te horen.’
De invloed van leeftijdgenoten (peerpressure) op jongeren is groot, vindt pedagoog en voormalig jeugdhulpverlener en maatschappelijk werker Marinus Traas. Hij promoveerde onlangs aan de Universiteit van Tilburg op een studie naar de oorzaken van jeugdcriminalteit. Peerpressure is prima als het om fijne vriendschappen gaat, maar de invloed van leeftijdgenoten wordt een probleem als tieners in een groep ongewenst gedrag van elkaar gaan overnemen. In de ernstigste vorm gaat het om kopieren van crimineel gedrag. Vooral adolescenten uit kansarme, problematische gezinnen zijn gevoelig voor de invloed van peers, stelt Traas. Bij hen vindt de socialisatie vooral buiten het gezin plaats. Zij zijn extra kwetsbaar en worden eerder meegezogen in de criminaliteit.

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