Uit de burgerschapskalender:

Ergens na de vakantie moeten we de draad weer oppakken. Terug naar het werk, weer naar school. En als we onze kinderen dan leren veilig te fietsen, laten we dan niet zelf door rood rijden. “Opvoeding is de basis voor het aanleren van normen en goed gedrag”, werd tijdens discussiebijeenkomsten meer dan eens gezegd. En die opvoeding is primair de verantwoordelijkheid van de ouders.

Inderdaad na de vakantie dienen we weer in het gareel te komen. En daar spelen ouders een belangrijk rol in. Bij Marokkaans-Nederlandse ouders zou de opvoeding vaak gericht op conformisme aan ‘Marokkaanse’ normen en waarden die ouder op één lijn zouden stellen met de islam. Zij voelen de druk vanuit de Nederlandse samenleving om zich aan te passen en dat conformisme juist op te geven, waardoor zij dat conformisme juist nog sterker zouden nastreven. Tegelijkertijd blijkt echter ook dat ouders hun kinderen op sommige punten juist afremmen wanneer het gaat om conformisme. Zij remmen de drang van jongeren om eerder mee te doen met bijvoorbeeld de ramadan of om in kleding en uiterlijk religieuzer te worden af. Dit kan zijn omdat ze vrezen dat jongeren op zeer jonge leeftijd niet om kunnen gaan met druk van buitenaf. Of omdat ze vrezen dat het slecht is voor de ontwikkeling van een kind (bijvoorbeeld met de vasten)als het nog te jong is.

Uit recente onderzoeken van bijvoorbeeld Trees Pels blijkt dat de nadruk in de opvoeding steeds op sociale autonomie komt te liggen in Marokkaans-Nederlandse gezinnen. Samen met de eveneens gesignaleerde afname van autoritaire opvoeding, geeft dat kinderen (vooral jongens?) meer ruimte. Van belang daarbij is de rol van de vriendengroep. Onder Marokkaans-Nederlandse jongeren is deze vriendengroep van relatief groot belang doordat zij, in vergelijking met autochtone jongens, beïnvloedbaarder zijn en sterker gehecht zijn aan vrienden. Het is vaak de vriendengroep die jongeren de mogelijkheid geeft te experimenteren (of zelfs druk kan uitoefenen daarvoor) en die hen ook steun kan geven. Het lijkt erop dat in de puberteit de invloed van de ouders toch minder groot is, terwijl we juist op dat moment van alles van hen verlangen.

En dus komen er allerlei opvoedings- en ondersteuningscursussen voor Marokkaans-Nederlandse ouders. Of dat gezien het bovenstaande zo handig is, is dus nog maar de vraag, maar er zit ook een ander probleem. Met specifieke cursussen voor specifieke groepen ga je er vanuit dat dit binnen één bepaalde groep dezelfde patronen zichtbaar zijn. Aangezien het vaak aangeduid wordt met ‘Marokkaans’ zal het dan ook wel iets ‘Marokkaans’ hebben. Wat dit is, is onduidelijk en het risico bestaat dan ook dat dit bepaald wordt door allerlei cultuursjablonen (om niet te zeggen stereotyperingen) die op de groep worden gelegd. Er zijn wel verschillen tussen opvoeding in Marokkaans-Nederlandse gezinnen en autochtone Nederlandse gezinnen, maar:

De verschillen tussen Marokkaanse ouders zijn groter dan die tussen Nederlandse ouders. Terwijl verreweg de meeste Nederlandse ouders aan de genoemde gemiddelde kenmerken beantwoorden, bestaan er onder Marokkaanse ouders duidelijke contrasten. Er zijn er nogal wat wier opvoeding bijna Nederlands lijkt en er zijn er evenveel wier opvoeding een karikatuur lijkt van de Marokkaanse, nog autoritairder, nog minder responsief en nog minder autoritatief.

De verschillen laten zich contextueel verklaren, zowel de verschillen tussen Marokkaanse en Nederlandse ouders als de verschillen onder Marokkaanse ouders.

In de eerste plaats zijn herkomst en traditie van invloed. De opvattingen en de gewoonten van de doorsnee Marokkaanse immigrant hadden hun oorsprong in een omgeving die in alle mogelijke opzichten anders was dan de Nederlandse. Ook hun opvoedingsdoelen en opvoedingspraktijken waren elders ontstaan en daar thuis: in een andere bestaanswijze (bijv. welvaartspeil en manieren van levensonderhoud), in een andere beschaving (bijv. mate en niveau van opleiding en geletterdheid, stand van techniek en wetenschap), in een andere samenleving (bijv. vormen van samenleven zoals gemeenschap en familie, hiërarchische patronen zoals man/vrouw), in andere godsdienstige verhoudingen (bijv. mate van secularisatie en pluriformiteit, status en functie van godsdienst en religie) enzovoort. De verschillen tussen Marokkaanse ouders hebben voor een belangrijk deel te maken met de toenemende afstand tot die herkomst en traditie. Hoe groter de afstand, hoe Nederlandser de opvoeding wordt. Het zijn dan ook de jongere Marokkaanse ouders die minder Marokkaans opvoeden.

In de tweede plaats speelt de actuele culturele, sociale en economische positie een rol. De omstandigheden van Marokkanen zijn door de bank genomen minder gunstig dan die van Nederlanders. Denk maar aan de kwaliteit van de huisvesting, de hoogte van het inkomen, de werkgelegenheid, de maatschappelijke kansen, de status van de eigen taal en de eigen cultuur, de toegang tot de politiek en de zorg. Ongunstige omstandigheden vragen om andere opvoedingspraktijken dan gunstige. Autoritair opvoeden kan nodig zijn om kinderen voldoende te beschermen tegen allerlei risico’s en sterke nadruk op prestatie kan nodig zijn om kinderen voldoende voor te bereiden op onderwijs, opleiding en arbeidsmarkt. De verschillen tussen Marokkaanse ouders zijn te danken aan de verbeterende omstandigheden. Langzamerhand wordt de situatie gunstiger en dat vertaalt zich in de manier van opvoeden.

Nu zijn sommige van die cursussen nog helemaal niet zo slecht; ze zouden handig zijn voor alle ouders. Maar ze zijn vooral gericht op allochtone Nederlandse ouders:Waterlandstichting » artikelen » Meedoen of normaal doen? Marokkaanse…

Het gaat in het huidig debat en beleid niet om een neutrale stimulans tot participatie, maar om sterk normatieve maatregelen die gericht zijn op hóe deze vrouwen participeren. Een Marokkaanse vrouw met kinderen en een uitkering doet, in tegenstelling tot wat vaak wordt geloofd, wel degelijk mee. Zij heeft verschillende malen per week contact met ‘street level’ bureaucraten en welwillende hulpverleners die haar controleren en van haar een goede burger willen maken. Van een gebrek aan meedoen of participatie is in de meeste gevallen op zichzelf geen sprake. Het is de manier van participeren die niet voldoet aan de maatstaven van politici en beleidsmakers. Meedoen in een netwerk met Marokkaanse vrouwen, praten met een Kaapverdiaanse buurvrouw of vrijwilligerswerk doen bij een migrantenzelforganisatie telt niet mee in het participatie-debat. Ze moeten Nederlands praten, met hun autochtone buurvrouw spreken en betaald werken. Alleen deze vorm van meedoen telt. Dat wil zeggen, voor allochtonen. Als ik, als autochtoon, alleen met andere autochtonen met een hoge opleiding communiceer, nooit investeer in de buurt waar ik woon en, wanneer ik kinderen krijg, weiger nog verder betaald te werken, is er geen gemeentelijke dienst of welzijnswerker die zich zorgen maakt over mij en mijn emancipatie en mij in een participatie-traject laat deelnemen. ‘Meedoen’ is dus normatief, specifiek en asymetrisch.

Natuurlijk participeren relatief weinig eerste-generatie Marokkaanse vrouwen op de arbeidsmarkt, spreken zij vaak weinig Nederlands en nemen zij niet altijd deel aan ouderavonden. Er zijn reële verschillen op deze vlakken tussen autochtone en Marokkaanse vrouwen. Maar daarmee staat hun leven nog niet los van de rest van de samenleving. Een dergelijke groteske en overdreven voorstelling van zaken gaat onder andere voorbij aan de dagelijkse gevolgen die de vrouwen ondervinden van het integratiedebat en de neerslag daarvan in beleid. Het leven van deze vrouwen, misschien zelfs op dagelijks niveau, wordt sterk beïnvloed door het feit dat hun gedrag door autochtone Nederlanders als problematisch wordt ervaren. Ook al kijken deze vrouwen naar Marokkaanse televisie en spreken zij Berbers of Arabisch met hun kinderen, is hun wereld veel meer verbonden met de Nederlandse samenleving dan vaak in beleid en onderzoek wordt voorgesteld. Die voorstelling van zaken legitimeert echter een indringend ingrijpen in de levens van deze vrouwen met het doel hen en hun families te disciplineren. Het devies is niet langer: ‘doe mee!’, maar: ‘doe normaal!’ Het gaat dus verder: als je meedoet, maar niet zoals politici en beleidsmakers dat willen, ‘doe je niet mee’. [...]
Indringend beleid in de persoonlijke levenssfeer (het nieuwe paternalisme), zowel als het debat over het stimuleren van ‘overbruggende contacten’ en ‘spreiding van kansarmen’ teneinde meer ‘integratie’ te bereiken, zijn onderdelen van een retoriek waarin de stad ‘heroverd’, opnieuw geclaimd, moet worden op de ‘asocialen’ en ‘kansarmen’ (1). De kansarmen (waarmee vrijwel altijd allochtonen en specifieker nog: moslims worden bedoeld) bepalen het stadsbeeld, zo is het idee. Of, om met Marco Pastors te spreken: ‘op de Lijnbaan zie ik bijna geen Nederlanders meer’. Breed gedeeld is het verlangen dat in de straten van Nederlandse steden weer ‘normale’ mensen lopen. Het stadsbeeld moet in het dominante discours kortom weer samenhangend en ‘Nederlands’ worden.

De initiatieven tot ‘overbruggende contacten’ en ‘spreiding’ worden vooral opgezet om dit te bewerkstelligen. Het gaat in eerste instantie, alle goede bedoelingen ten spijt, niet om het luisteren naar kansarmen om hen te ondersteunen en te stimuleren, maar om burgers te creëren die meer voldoen aan ‘onze Nederlandse’ waarden en normen. Het burgerschap en de positie van Marokkaanse vrouwen wijkt af van wat politici en beleidsmakers wenselijk achten. Zo zouden ze hun zoons te slap opvoeden en hun dochters te streng. Daarom worden pogingen ondernomen hen te disciplineren, hen te leren ‘goede, normale’ ouders en burgers te zijn. Omdat de focus ligt op het sterke normatieve ‘doe normaal’, en niet op een neutraler ‘doe mee’, verliezen we het zicht op de pogingen van groepen zelf aansluiting te vinden en op de manieren waarop hun wereld verbonden is met de onze. Achterstand en de etnische problematiek staan centraal, niet het potentieel van vrouwen, hun verzet en hun ervaring.

Wanneer de verschillen binnen de groep Marokkaans-Nederlandse ouders groter zijn dan die onder autochtoon-Nederlandse ouders, wat hebben dit soort cursussen dan voor zin? Onder jongeren lijkt dit overigens eveneens zo te zijn. Dit gegeven maakt ook de labels ‘Marokkaans’ (laat staan ‘allochtoon’) eigenlijk onzinnig want we weten dus niet of de vlag de lading wel dekt. Met opvoedingscursussen en speciale plannen voor Marokkaans-Nederlandse jongeren, wekken we wel de indruk iets aan de problemen te doen en er daadwerkelijk grip op te kunnen krijgen. Dat is ook wat waard, maar ik vraag me toch af of we ons niet gewoon voor de gek laten houden en of we niet vooral bezig zijn met een paternalistisch beschavingsoffensief dat losstaat van de realiteit van het alledaagse leven.

Many of you have by now read my thoughts on the Ground Zero Mosque, that is not a mosque and not at Ground Zero. Probably many of you have already seen the hilarious Daily Show episode, if not watch it HERE. Below you find a video with Keith Olbermann with a special comment on this whole issue:

Read more about this no mosque HERE. May I add that in my impression the Cordoba Initiative may thank people like Keith Olbermann and Jon Stewart for doing a much better job in media and PR than they are doing?

Hat Tip: M.B.

Uit de burgerschapskalender:

“Moed is een essentieel onderdeel van een samenleving. De overheid laat zich bij haar besluiten leiden door angst. Dat lijkt me niet het goede voorbeeld”, zegt iemand op www.handvestburgerschap.nl. Misschien moet de overheid een voorbeeld nemen aan de mensen die zijn onderscheiden door de Stichting
Carnegie Heldenfonds. Helden die kinderen redden van brandende hooizolders en bejaarden uit te water geraakte auto’s.
www.carnegiefonds.nl

Helden zijn nauw verbonden met het idee van burgerschap. In de geschiedeniscanon wordt, om een identificatie met de Nederlandse geschiedenis te scheppen, helden geschapen zoals Karel V, Willem van Oranje, Spinoza, koning Willem I, Vincent van Gogh en Willem Drees. Inderdaad vooral blanke mannen. Ook wel enkele vrouwen hoor zoals Aletta Jacobs, Anne Frank en Annie M.G. Schmidt. Niet-westerse migranten zult u niet vinden; die zijn vooral naamloos gepresenteerd als slachtoffers van de slavernij, dankbaar na de dekolonisatie van Indonesië (die niet gepaard ging met oorlog maar nog steeds met politionele acties) en pas zeer recent ge-arriveerde personen die deel uit maken van de multiculturele samenleving. De genoemde personen dienen ons te leren hoe wij ons dienen te gedragen, wat deugdzame Nederlandse personen zijn en voorbeelden voor ons allemaal. Er zit geen enkele migrant als voorbeeld in, dus daar hoeven we ons ook niet op te richten: de Surinaamse, Indonesische, Marokkaanse, Turkse, Caraïbische geschiedenis staat totaal los van de Nederlandse en we kunnen er zeker niets van leren. Nederland is een eiland in de wereld.

Persoonlijk heb ik ook een held. Heldin beter gezegd. Toen ik haar leerde kennen zo’n 15 jaar geleden was deze Marokkaans-Nederlands dame al een zeer kritische moslima. Kritisch op alles: haar eigen familie, de Marokkaanse Nederlanders in haar woonplaats, de islam, de politiek in Nederland. Noem het maar op. Zij had het plan opgevat om een bepaalde opleiding te volgen en dat zag eigenlijk niemand zitten. En toen ik haar zag ook niet. Onderuitgezakt, kauwgom kauwend, gaten in de spijkerbroek. Terwijl haar was opgedragen zich keurig netjes te vertonen alsof het om een sollicitatiegesprek ging. Objectief als ik ben, besloot ik de eerste indruk te negeren (iets waar ik vrij goed in ben) en het gesprek toch maar te doen. En dat was echt heel erg goed. Verder had ze behoorlijk wat tegen. Haar thuissituatie was beroerd, zij trok zich het veranderende klimaat ten opzichte van Marokkaanse-Nederlanders erg aan en ergerde zich tegelijkertijd kapot aan veel leeftijdgenoten, in het bijzonder jongens. Het gevolg was dat zij vrij alleen kwam te staan en eigenlijk weinig echte vriendinnen had toen. Maar ze ging de opleiding toch doen. Ondanks, opnieuw, enkele tegenslagen slaagde ze. Ze kon vrij snel aan de slag, maar het ongeluk was nog niet op. Tijdens haar werk kreeg ze een ernstig ongeluk, zo ernstig dat ze waarschijnlijk nooit meer kan werken en in ieder geval haar oude werk (haar passie) niet meer kan doen. Als ze eigenlijk sowieso nog wel wat kan doen, zo ernstig was het. Toch is het laatste wat ik gehoord heb, dat ze weer volop bezig is te revalideren en haar plaats in de samenleving te heroveren. Geen idee hoe het nu precies met haar is, maar zij is mijn heldin.

Een land dat de nodige helden kan gebruiken is Pakistan. Het is relatief stil omtrent de recente watersnoodramp in Pakistan. Dat heeft wellicht te maken met het slechte imago van Pakistan, maar misschien ook wel met de rampenmoeheid (hoewel geloof me, de Pakistani zijn veel meer rampenmoe dan wij) en het feit dat dit een zich relatief langzaam voltrekkende ramp is (dat is toch minder mediageniek denk ik). Via het onvolprezen en in Nederland niet zo bekende Antropologi.info van antropoloog Lorenz Khazaleh vond ik diverse interessante artikelen. Hoewel antropologen opmerkelijk stil lijken te zijn met betrekking tot deze ramp wijst hij op een interview op Anthropologyworks waar Maggie Ronkin Fayyaz Baqir interviewt die wijst op de volharding, inventiviteit en de capaciteit die mensen hebben om om te gaan met deze ramp dankzij de aanwezigheid van diverse formele en informele instituties en mechanismen.

In de Pakistaanse krant Dawn wijst Zeresh John op de rol van jongeren en ‘vreemden die niet langer vreemden zijn’:

The Dawn Blog » Blog Archive » Catch the spirit

In the last 10 days, I’ve seen Pakistan come together in ways never seen before. The Pakistani youth has risen and literally stepped out on the streets to help their countrymen affected by the flood. It is exhilarating to think about not what they are doing as volunteers but what they will become.

With as many as 20 million people affected, roadside relief camps have sprouted up by the dozen in Karachi. Students have taken to the streets, donation boxes in tow, physically stopping cars, requesting people to contribute.

Each day brings a relentless and constant chain of support. Where the monetary contributors stop, there is a group of people ready to take over by running to crowded bazaars everyday to buy food supplies, clean drinking water and medicines. From there yet another massive portion of the population is stepping in to pack those supplies and load them into trucks to deliver them to the affected areas.

As Pakistani authorities failed to provide the necessary leadership needed and with no proper coordination in the relief efforts, the civilian population of Pakistan has taken it upon themselves to do what they can in the face of this crisis; in the process, developing a conscientious society that we’re all proud to belong to.

Een verhaal dat, zo haalt Lorenzo aan, volgens één van de reaguurders daar niet wordt verteld door de media die alleen demoraliserende maar wel sensationele verhalen produceert. Een ander voorbeeld dat aangehaald wordt is van Shabnam Riaz in The News over de onderlinge hulp die Pakistani elkaar bieden:
The real heroes

The usual definition of being heroic is to have qualities that warrant acts of great salvation. I think somewhere along the way we made it too complicated. There are many simple acts of heroism we may encounter more regularly than we think, but are too self-absorbed in the intricacy of the daily, mundane activities to be able to recognise them.

[...]

There was, however, a spirit-lifting experience in this whole nightmare. Small, scattered groups of young boys and men had formed where the rain was the harshest and was threatening to sweep away cars along with their occupants. Soaked to the bone, these ‘by-standers’ smiled and gave a thumbs up sign.

“Hey don’t worry,” said one of them.

“It’s ok. We’ll make sure nothing happens to you,” reassured another.

About five or six of them got together and pushed the quickly submerging vehicle. They worked in unison, all of them had a single purpose and that was to rescue other human beings. With a huge shove and cries of jubilance they managed to move vehicles out of imminent danger. As we drove away, their faces flushed with enthusiasm and satisfaction that personified their absolute state of happiness.

They waved at us, hurriedly preparing to help the next hapless driver who was blindly careening into their path. We waved back with euphoric ‘thank you’ but they had already become busy in helping others.

I was touched beyond words. These young men were poor labourers who were most probably hungry as a day full of rain would not have given them a chance to earn their daily wage. I am sure that none of them were owners of a vehicle either. But their dedication to help the other members of society who definitely had more material possessions than they had, without any contempt at all, told me something. It told me that deep inside they were people of substance. Those individuals who had their moral compasses pointing in the right direction.

It also told me something else; that in fact, these were our heroes. Also, these people who slog from sun-up till sun-down for a meagre amount that could hardly put a decent meal on anyone’s table, are our actual role models.

Deze onderlinge bijstand en kracht is ook te zien in de volgende video van Al Jazeera:

Voor meer updates zie de voortreffelijke site van Dawn met een speciale sectie over de watersnoodramp, Global Voices (bijvoorbeeld over internet) en Al-Jazeera. Donaties voor de helden van de watersnoodramp: GIRO 555

Sinds enige tijd kun je via de VU repository mijn proefschrift Zoeken naar een ‘zuivere’ islam downloaden. Dat kan ook via deze site.

• Het proefschrift is online te lezen: HIER
• Samenvatting in het Nederlands lezen én downloaden: HIER
• Artikel Migrantenstudies lezen én downloaden: HIER
• Samenvatting in het Engels lezen én downloaden: HIER
• Artikel ISIM Review in het Engels lezen én downloaden: HIER

Veel leesplezier, en commentaar wordt op prijs gesteld.

Wilders drags up outdated colonial rhetoric

Guest author: Michel Hoebink

‘Why did you become anti-Islamic and what is your message to Muslims? These questions were asked by Muslimsdebate.com to the Dutch politician Geert Wilders. In his reply, Mr Wilders describes Islam as fatalist, tyrannical, violent and irrational and as such as the cause of the lack of democracy and development in the Muslim World. All this in sharp contrast to Christianity and Judaism, which religions according to Mr Wilders encourage their followers to be rational and free. Only by liberating themselves from their religion, he says, Muslims will be able to develop their real potential.

Wilders’ argument is a perfect sample of 19th century ‘orientalist’ rhetoric. Apparently, the leader of the Dutch Freedom Party is unaware of the fact that this type of reasoning was effectively defeated in the 1970s by critics such as the Palestinian Edward Said. Such critics rightfully argued that world religions such as Islam do not have an unchanging essence which is either violent or peaceful or what ever. Throughout the ages, these religions have given rise to a great variety of currents and interpretations. Sure, there are violent currents in Islam, but there have also been plenty of believers who preached pacifism in the name of the same religion. And positive, there are fatalistic tendencies in Islam but there are also currents that preach individual freedom and responsibility, basing themselves on the very same sources. The Koran and the Prophetic traditions are so rich that anybody can always find something to support his case. In short, you can’t limit Islam to one of its historical appearances.

In the academic world, essentialist arguments such as those of Wilders and his 19th century predecessors are out. Individuals who have been following this academic debate since the 1970s, are perplexed when Wilders and his fellow contemporary Islam critics start to bring up these arguments again, as if nothing ever happened.

You can say it even more simple: History decisively proves that Wilders is wrong. If Islam would necessarily lead to fatalism, tyranny and underdevelopment, how is it possible that, from the 8th to the 14th centuries, powerful empires emerged under Islam where science, philosophy, art and architecture flourished on a level that left Europe far behind? And if Judaism and Christianity necessarily produce free and rational individuals, how to explain the Crusades and Inquisition in Medieval times and Nazism and Stalinism in the modern era?

What Wilders does in his argument is applying a classical but rather cheap rhetorical trick: Comparing one’s own virtues to the vices of the other. Following the same formula, rancid islamist authors in the Middle East write books about a despicable religion called Christianity which calls for murder and bloodshed in its sacred texts and whose followers practised these calls during the Crusades and in the present wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Wilders attributes economic and social failures in the Muslim World to Islam, which he views as a religion but also as a culture. In itself there is nothing wrong with such cultural explanations. Culture and religion may very well be forwarded as causes of economic and social failures, but the discussion should always be about a particular historical appearance of the culture of religion in question, not about a culture or religion as an unchangeable essence. That is where Wilders is wrong.

Interestingly, many Muslim reformers agree with Geert Wilders when he says that Islam is a ‘backward religion’. However, they speak about the present appearance of traditional Islam and not about an a-historical essence. They believe that the dominant form of traditional Islam, as it is followed by millions of contemporary Muslims, is in need of reform and modernisation. According to Wilders this is not possible. Islam, in his view, can never be reconciled with modernity. If Muslims want to modernise, if they want to embrace democracy and human rights, they will have to give up Islam.

The irony is that Wilders in this sense completely agrees with the fundamentalists, who just like him believe that Muslims have to choose between their religion and the modern world. And indeed: for Wilders, fundamentalist Islam is the only true Islam. ‘Pure Islam’, he calls it, following his mentor the controversial Dutch arabist Hans Jansen, who in turn shamelessly took it from the fundamentalists themselves. All other currents in Islam, in particular the more moderate and modern ones, are considered by Wilders and his mentor as ‘impure’ forms of Islam they prefer not to associate with. The late Egyptian Muslim reformer Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, who pleaded for a historical reading of the Koran, was abhorrent to them.

In fact Wilders behaves like a believer. He takes side in a religious debate that as an unbeliever he could only describe. The Dutch arabist Robbert Woltering once made fun of this attitude in an ironic commentary in the Dutch daily NRC Handelsblad. It was about the Somali born Dutch MP Ayaan Hirsi Ali, who also frequently used the term ‘pure Islam’, just like Wilders following Hans Jansen.

Woltering is obviously amused. Ever since the coming of Islam, he writes, Muslims have been quarrelling about the question as to what is the correct interpretation of Koran and the Prophetic Traditions. Now, at a time that the answer seems further away than ever, this historical quest has come to an unexpected apotheosis in – of all possible places – the Dutch parliament, where Ms Hirsi Ali recently revealed that she herself has discovered the True Doctrine of Pure Islam!

Ayaan Hirsi Ali’s discovery, Mr Woltering continues, will most probably please Mohammed Bouyeri, the man who murdered film maker Theo van Gogh in the name of Islam. But it will be a disappointment for all those Muslims who mistakenly thought that Islam respects the rights of women and tells them to live in peace with their non-Muslim neighbours.

Mr Woltering, we like to hear more from you.

A well-known prophetic Tradition about fatalism versus the taking charge of one’s own fate: The prophet Mohammed was asked: ‘Should I tie my camel or should I trust God?’ The prophet answered: ‘Tie your camel and trust God.’

Michel Hoebink works for the Arabic department of Radio Netherlands World (RNW).

This article first appeared at Muslimsdebate.com. A version in Dutch can be found at Maroc.nl

Oxford University Press: Being Young and Muslim: Linda Herrera and Asef Bayat

Being Young and Muslim
New Cultural Politics in the Global South and North
Editors: Linda Herrera and Asef Bayat

In recent years, there has been a proliferation of interest in youth issues and Muslim youth in particular. Young Muslims have been thrust into the global spotlight in relation to questions about security and extremism, work and migration, and rights and citizenship. This book interrogates the cultures and politics of Muslim youth in the global South and North to understand their trajectories, conditions, and choices. Drawing on wide-ranging research from Indonesia to Iran and Germany to the U.S., it shows that while the majority of young Muslims share many common social, political, and economic challenges, they exhibit remarkably diverse responses to them. Far from being “exceptional,” young Muslims often have as much in common with their non-Muslim global generational counterparts as they share among themselves. As they migrate, forge networks, innovate in the arts, master the tools of new media, and assert themselves in the public sphere, Muslim youth have emerged as important cultural and political actors on a world stage. The essays in this volume look at the strategies Muslim youths deploy to realize their interests and aspirations.

The volume explores the ways in which the young, both in Muslim majority societies and Muslim communities in the West, negotiate their Muslim identity in relation to their youthful desires – their individuality, the search for autonomy and security for the future. Due to a combination of the shifting moral politics at home, the relentless process of cultural and economic globalization, the rise of a civilizational discourse in which “Islam” is positioned in opposition to the “West,” sluggish economies and wide scale unemployment, youth cultures and politics are developing in novel yet little understood ways. Their interests, aspirations, and socioeconomic capacities appear to be producing a new cultural politics: the cultural behavior of Muslim youths, the authors say, must be understood as located in the political realm and representing a new arena of contestation for power. While often referred to as the “builders of the future” by the power elite, the young are also stigmatized and feared as disruptive agents who are prone to radicalism and deviation. The essays in this volume look at the strategies Muslim youths deploy to realize their interests and aspirations, including music and fashion, party politics, collective violence, gang activities, religious radicalism and other forms of expression.

Linda Herrera, Senior Lecturer in International Development Studies, is Convenor of the Children and Youth Studies M.A. specialization at the International Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University Rotterdam.

Asef Bayat , Professor of Sociology and Middle East Studies, holds the chair of Society and Culture of the Middle East and Leiden University, The Netherlands. He is the author of Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn (2007) and Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East (2010).

Table of Contents

• Acknowledgements
• 1. Introduction: Being Young and Muslim in Neoliberal Times by Asef Bayat and Linda Herrera

• Politics of Dissent
• 2. Muslim Youth and the Claim of Youthfulness by Asef Bayat
• 3. The Drama of Jihad: The Emergence of Salafi Youth in Indonesia by Noorhaidi Hasan
• 4. Moroccan Youth and Political Islam by Mounia Bennani-Chraibi
• 5. Rebels without a Cause? A Politics of Deviance in Saudi Arabia by Abdullah al-Otaibi and Pascal Menoret
• 6. The Battle of the Ages: Contests for Religious Authority in The Gambia by Marloes Janson
• 7. Cyber Resistance: Palestinian Youth and Emerging Internet Culture by Makram Khoury-Machool

• Livelihoods and Lifestyles
• 8. Young Egyptians’ Quest for Jobs and Justice by Linda Herrera
• 9. Reaching a Larger World: Muslim Youth and Expanding Circuitries of Operation by AbdouMaliq Simone
• 10.Being Young, Muslim and American in Brooklyn by Moustafa Bayoumi

• Strivings for Citizenship
• 11. ‘Also the School Is a Temple’: Republicanism, Imagined Transnational Spaces, and the Schooling Of Muslim Youth in France by Andre Elias Mazawi
• 12. Avoiding Youthfulness? Young Muslims Negotiating Gender and Citizenship in France and Germany by Schirin Amir-Moazami
• 13. Struggles over Defining the Moral City: Islam and Urban Public Life in Iran by Azam Khatam

• Navigating Identities
• 14. Securing Futures: Youth, Generation, and Muslim Identities in Niger by Adeline Masquelier
• 15. “Rasta” Sufis and Muslim Youth Culture in Mali by Benjamin F. Soares
• 16. Performance, Politics and Visceral Transformation: Post-Islamist Youth in Turkey by Ayse Saktanber
• 17. Negotiating with Modernity: Young Women and Sexuality in Iran by Fatemeh Sadeghi

• Musical Politics
• 18. Fundamental’s Jihad Rap by Ted Swedenburg
• 19. Maroc-Hop: Music and Youth Identities in the Netherlands by Miriam Gazzah
• 20. Heavy Metal in the Middle East: New Urban Spaces in a Translocal Underground by Pierre Hecker
• 21. Music VCDs and the New Generation: Negotiating Youth, Femininity and Islam in Indonesia by Suzanne Naafs
• 22. Conclusion: Knowing Muslim Youth by Linda Herrera and Asef Bayat

• References

“This is an excellent collection of essays on youth in a number of Muslim majority (and minority) societies in the context of globalization and modernity. A particular strength of this volume is its ability to highlight the multiple and contested roles of religion and personal faith in the fashioning of contemporary youthful Muslim identities. Such insights often challenge secular Western master narratives of modernity and suggest credible reconceptualizations of what it means to be young and modern in a broad swath of the world today.”

– Asma Afsaruddin, Professor of Islamic Studies, Indiana University

Knowing the work of both editors and having read some of the early versions of different chapters, I would highly recommend this book. It engages with important questions, challenges existing definitions and interpretations without being apologetic. The variety in topics and regions provides the reader with a very rich source of contemporary debates, repertoires and interpretations of being young and Muslim.

Uit de burgerschapskalender:

Meneer van hiernaast
Heb geen tijd, heb geen tijd
Meneer van hiernaast heb geen tijd voor ontbijt
En hij eet maar helemaal niet meer
Want dat zal hem zoveel tijd besparen
En dat scheelt hem in het geheel zeven jaren
Ongeveer, ongeveer, ongeveer
Dus hij eet niet meer
Die meneer
Annie M.G. Schmidt, 1911-1995, Tot hier toe, 1986, Querido.

Recent organiseerde de jeugdafdeling van de FIOE/FION een jeugdkamp bij Eindhoven. Daar sprak onder meer de Chinees-Maleisische prediker Mohammad Hussain Yee die de Al Khaadem stichting leidt. Yee pleitte er daar voor dat moslims zouden participeren in de samenleving en zich niet zouden isoleren, zo vertelde hij aan de Kuwait News Agency (KUNA). Hij stelde daar wel bij dat dat niet betekent dat moslims hun waarden zouden moeten verloochenen en er een on-islamitische leefwijze op na zouden moeten houden. Hij verwees naar bij naar een hadith van de profeet Mohammed:

a true believer is a person who mixes around with the people and has all the patience to handle the problems that come from the people. He is better than the believer who isolates himself and does not face the problems that come from the community

Volgens Yee, die op 18 jarige leeftijd bekeerde van boeddhisme naar islam, heeft de islam al 1400 jaar de juiste waarden zoals de vrijheid voor iedere individu en het idee dat er geen dwang is in het geloof. Islam promoot volgens hem de basale mensenrechten die het Westen de laatste decennia promoot. Hij riep regeringen op om predikers niet te beperken in hun activiteiten of zelfs de toegang tot het land te weigeren. Predikers hebben volgens hem als doel dat moslims hun godsdienst op de correcte wijze verstaan, gebaseerd op de Quran en de Soenna, zodat zij vrede zullen beijveren en hun buren zullen liefhebben en respecteren. Hij bekritiseerde bijvoorbeeld de weigering van Engeland en Canada om Zakir Naik toe te laten op basis van ‘onacceptabel gedrag’. Hij stelde dat ze er zijn om vrede te bewerkstelligen en de correcte boodschap af te geven niet om politiek te bedrijven met een verborgen agenda. Tegelijkertijd riep hij predikers op om zich zorgvuldiger uit te drukken en terughoudendheid aan de kant van politici om de woorden van die predikers te interpreteren terwijl ze ze eigenlijk niet begrijpen zonder de juiste context.

Je kunt je afvragen wat deze prediker nu precies onder integratie verstaat. Aangezien onze eigen politici dat niet eens helder kunnen omschrijven is dat misschien wat veel gevraagd. In het algemeen echter heeft participatie betrekking op het hebben van een opleiding, werk en het accepteren, onderschrijven of zelfs volledig overnemen van waarden die als centraal gezien worden voor het samenleving in een pluralistische samenleving. Yee hierboven is geen uitzondering. Wat meestal vergeten wordt is dat mensen ook mee moeten (willen ze kunnen functioneren althans) in het tempo en de tijd van de hedendaagse samenleving. Een belangrijk aspect van de moderne samenleving is de compressie van tijd en ruimte: nieuwe technologie maakt het mogelijk dat alles van ver dichterbij is en dat alles wat veel tijd kost veel sneller gaat. Dit opent nieuwe mogelijkheden, maar betekent ook een nieuwe vorm van disciplinering: tijd is geen excuus net zomin als afstand. Veel dingen kunnen simultaan gedaan worden en moeten dat ook want anderen verwachten dat: je hebt immers toch de technologie ervoor?

Antropoloog Thomas Hylland Eriksen schreef daar een mooi boek over:
Eriksen: Tirannie van het moment

Alles gaat sneller, maar we hebben steeds minder tijd. We worden getiranniseerd door het moment waarin we nog even dit en nog even dat willen doen. In dit prettig leesbare boek schetst Eriksen een herkenbaar beeld van het ademloze informatietijdperk waarin we leven. Daarbij betrekt bij de invloed van televisie, Internet, en onze hedendaagse fascinatie voor snelheid.

Wie kent het niet. Op je werk komen en meteen even de mail checken, de voicemail afluisteren. post wegwerken en voor je het weet ben je een paar uur verder voor je toekomt aan wat je eigenlijk van plan was te doen. We worden overspoeld met nieuws en kennis. maar het wordt steeds moeilijker daaruit te selecteren. Over deze paradoxen en hun oorzaken gaat het boek van Eriksen. In een meeslepend betoog schetst hij de ontwikkelingen in de manier waarop de moderne mens omgaat met tijd, snelheid, groei en informatie. De ervaring dat de tijd steeds sneller gaat, wordt door vele mensen in het Westen gedeeld. Eriksen pleit daarom in de conclusie van zijn boek voor een bewuste herintroductie van wat hij noemt ‘langzame tijd’ als tegenpool voor de tirannie van het moment.

De maand Ramadan is een mooie gelegenheid om deels uit de tredmolen te stappen. Niet helemaal natuurlijk: de samenleving draait gewoon door en natuurlijk is voor veel mensen in een tijd van vasten het eten het allerbelangrijkst. Maar toch, voor velen is het een moment om even stil te staan bij andere dingen, andere personen (in het bijzonder familie en vrienden). In tegenstelling tot de rest van het jaar zijn er meer mensen die bidden op de geeigende tijdstippen. Dat betekent, zo heb ik uit eigen ervaring gemerkt, dat de dagindeling toch echt een andere is dan wanneer je die tijden niet aanhoudt. Veel mensen hebben (of maken?) toch meer tijd voor vrienden en familie dan in andere periodes van het jaar wanneer men druk is met andere verplichtingen. Karin van Nieuwkerk heeft in een artikel over tijd en migratie ook duidelijk gemaakt dat kennis van tijd, beschikbaarheid van tijd, ritme en ervaring van tijd kunnen veranderen tijdens en door migratie. Er treedt een scheiding op tussen vrije tijd en werktijd en dit loopt niet langer synchroon met spirituele tijd. Onder meer omdat mensen in een omgeving terecht komen waarin anderen andere markeringen hebben gemaakt met betrekking tot tijd en anderen de kalender bepalen. Zoals Van Nieuwkerk stelt, wie de kalender beheert, beheert de tijd. Dit zien we ook terug bij het jaarlijkse gesteggel over wanneer de Ramadan nu precies begint en eindigt en wie dat moet beslissen en op basis van welke criteria dat moet gebeuren. Antropoloog John Postill geeft ook enkele fascinerende voorbeelden en een mooie analyse van tijdstructurering en beleving.

Uiteindelijk krijgt de Ramadan door de verschillende tijdstructureringen en belevingen een hybride en pluralistisch karakter dat tevens het voortdurende proces van onderhandelingen over identiteit weerspiegelt. De nationale, multiculturele iftars zijn daar een voorbeeld van en we zien ook dat rondom het suikerfeest zoiets als pakjesavond en maken van surprises voor vrienden en vriendinnen hun intrede gedaan hebben. Het jaarlijkse rituele debat over het suikerfeest als nationale feestdag (2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009), past in het idee dat groepen weerspiegeld moeten zijn in de nationale kalender en het debat zelf maakt misschien inmiddels ook wel deel uit van een rituele omgang met islam in Nederland.

De gedachte van de Ramadan in meer seculier opzicht als een tijd van bezinning en gas terug nemen is nog niet zo slecht lijkt mij. Een iets andere tijdsbeleving omdat je een ander dagdoel hebt (dat kan God aanbidden zijn, maar ook de maaltijd bij zonsondergang), iets meer aandacht voor eten (slow food), een iets andere structurering van de dag, kan je even uit de tredmolen van het alledaagse leven halen. Vandaar, voor iedereen moslim en niet-moslim: Ramadan Mabrouk!

Muslim Anime ID by SHSN on DeviantArt

Anime is an old drawing style from Japan coming from the word ‘animation’ and manga is the comics and cartoons where this style is used. The oldest animation is from 1917 and since then the tradition has gotten a large audience in Japan and outside with for example Pokémon, Only Yesterday and Jin-Roh. Anime does not by definition mean one specific style but in general one could argue that the drawings have exaggerated psycial features such as large eyes, big hair, elongated limbs combined with dramatically shaped speech bubbles and exlamatory typography influenced by Japanese calligraphy and painting but also by American cartoons. Anime and also manga are often called Japanese animation but the Japanese view it as a general name for animation.

Anthropologist Mizuko Ito (H/T Antropologi.info) has done research on transnational anime fandoms and amateur cultural production:
Transnational Anime Fandoms and Amateur Cultural Production | DIGITAL YOUTH RESEARCH

Anime fandoms and transnational otaku groups represent a unique case study in youth activism and remix cultures, providing examples of creativity and social mobilization as ignited by passion for particular forms of cult media. Anime fans have constructed a grass roots movement to make Japan-origin media available to an English-speaking public. Further, they construct derivative works of fan art, video, and fiction that represent emergent forms of communication and creativity keyed to the digital age. These networks of amateur cultural production exhibit unique forms of learning, sharing, and reputation systems that can inform our understanding of how digital media can facilitate lateral and peer-to-peer knowledge communities.

According to Mizuko Ito:
Chanpon: entry 2005?10?11?

While anime is not the only type of Japanese popular culture that has gotten interest among American children and youth, it is probably the most dominant. Annie’s thesis makes a strong case about these trends. She also argues that it is high time we took anime seriouly in the academy as an ambassador for Japanese culture. She notes that anime continues to be marginalized in the US despite its broad appeal among young people. “Because of this many young people are not encouraged to pursue their interest in anime, and it is still uncommon for anime to be used in formal classroom settings as a means to teach about Japan.” As a member of the academy who is researching and teaching about anime, I couldn’t agree more.

And in a lecture she stated:
Anime’s ‘Transnational Geekdom’, UCLA Asia Institute

Ito believes the Japanese share little of Westerners’ concerns about sexuality and violence in the media, preferring at least to “have sexuality dealt with in the open.” But they abhor the anti-social characters in the anime series, not wanting kids to grow into the Otaku of the future. The anti-anti-social sentiment drives many parents to cough up the 180 yen for the card packs so their kids can play with their friends, Ito said. At least that way they aren’t always fighting against the computer.

Overall, then, the cards are seen as facilitating social behavior. In fact, after many hours poring over the card-game manual and searching the Internet, Ito and her fellow researchers learned that they needed tutelage from a more experienced player—a young boy in this case.

And there’s a lot to learn beyond the basic dynamics of the card game, since this genre of anime involves vast “domains of esoteric knowledge that some gain expertise in.” The kids express themselves with the monsters and heroes they choose.

Girls aren’t as interested in the heroics and villainy, Ito said, but go for the kawaii cartoons, which are all about cuteness. Like the boys, girls identify with dolls and other merchandise of the characters they like. All good for business.

Older fans in other countries, Otaku abroad, have created fan art as their mode of expression. Drawing is of course common among fans, but lately large conventions and amateur anime music videos have begun to pick up popularity. Some fans spend hundreds of hours splicing together scenes from Yugioh to go along with music of their choice.

Recently I received a link to the Deviant Art website containing some Muslim anime drawings. Deviant Art is perhaps one of the most important sites for distributing art on the internet. Anime itself apparently had some Muslim characters or so they are claimed such as Setsuna F. Seiei born as Soran Ibrahim and Sousuke Sagara who appears to be raised as a Muslim and soldier in Afghanistan but doesn’t follow the strict interpretations of the people who raised him and his distaste for pork and alcohol seems to be based not upon religious ideas but combat efficiency logic. He also is able to recite the Quran:

The Deviant Art site contains for example flash images with which you can play a Muslim Dress Up Game, Ramadan drawings, and the ‘cute Miss Noor’.

Miss Noor by Fullwhitemoon on Deviant Art

Some, in particular the drawings with females, are clearly kawaii-ish style; a more friendly and cute style (often using really big, friendly, sometimes seductive eyes) that cleary constrasts with the sometimes expressive, violent style of anime (although I haven’t seen much of that among Muslim anime). Deviant Art also covers manga of course and for example on this blog HERE by Muslim Manga (Miiz Mei) with several contests.

There is some debate going on about whether or not this art style is allowed according to Islam or not and of course what the favorite characters are. It is not entirely clear how big this anime or manga scene is among Muslim but it seems to widespread from China to the Gulf to Europe. An important European Muslima manga and amine artist is Asia Alfasi who designed the ‘feisty Arabian hero’ Monir and Facebook has a fan page for Muslim manga. Occasionally anime also features in more political expressions

Not all anime and manga by Muslims of course is considered to be Islamic; the interesting thing is that while anime is in itself already a mix of different styles and genres it gets re-appropriated by people who give meaning to it throughout the world and by making new drawings and comics themselves with both global and local influences. It is in fact a continuing story of production, reproduction and re-appropriation by mixing styles and personal experiences under the label of anime. Much like life in fact.

Sousuke Sagara on Wikipedia

International Conference – 27 & 28 January 2011 – University of Amsterdam
Sexual Nationalisms
Gender, Sexuality and the Politics of Belonging in the New Europe
Since 1989, and even more so after 9/11, the rise of new nationalisms has been inextricably linked to a refashioning of the politics, identities and imaginaries of gender and sexuality in Europe. The old virile nationalism analyzed by George Mosse is now being reinvented in the light of a new brand of sexual politics. Feminist demands and claims of (homo)sexual liberation have moved from the counter-cultural margins to the heart of many European countries’ national imaginations, and have become a central factor in the European Union’s production of itself as an imaginary community. Rhetorics of lesbian/gay and women’s rights have played pivotal roles in discourses and policies redefining modernity in sexual terms, and sexual modernity in national terms. How are these baffling shifts in the cultural and social location of sexuality and gender to be understood?

In Europe and beyond, the refashioning of citizenship contributes to the redefinition of secular liberalism as cultural whiteness. Homophobia and conservatism, gender segregation and sexual violence have been represented as alien to modern European culture and transposed upon the bodies, cultures and religions of migrants, especially Muslims and their descendants. In the process, the status of Europe’s ethnic minorities as citizens has come under question. How can the entanglement of sexual and gender politics, anti-immigration policies, and the current reinvention of national belonging be analyzed? How are we to understand the appropriation of elements of the feminist and sexual liberation agenda by the populist and Islamophobic right?

The prominence of sexual democracy in the remaking of European national imaginaries requires bringing the critique of gender and sexuality beyond second-wave feminism and post-Stonewall liberationist perspectives. In late-capitalist, post-colonial Europe, struggles for sexual freedom and gender equality no longer necessarily challenge dominant formations; on the contrary, they may be mobilized to shape and reinforce exclusionary discourses and practices. The new politics of belonging is thus inseparable from the new politics of exclusion. This shift has not been without consequences for progressive social movements. Whereas in social and cultural analysis, nationalism has long been associated with male dominance, sexual control and heteronormativity, certain articulations of feminism and lesbian/gay liberation have now become intimately entwined with the reinforcement of ethnocultural boundaries within European countries.

As feminist historian Joan W. Scott recently argued when she coined the provocative notion of ‘sexularism’, new forms of sexual regulation have been introduced, especially targeting migrants, their descendants, and other ‘non-whites’. Discursively defining the new national common sense, sexularism also operates at the level of the visceral, reaching deep into the sexual and racial politics, habits and emotions of everyday life. A required allegiance to sexual liberties and rights has been employed as a technology of control and exclusion – what could be called a ‘politics of sexclusion’. Symmetrically, the Europeanization of sexual politics has entailed counter-reactions both inside and outside Europe. In Eastern Europe admission to the European Union has been conditioned on the acceptance of the new standards of sexual democracy, which sometimes led anti-European reactions to also frame themselves in sexual terms. In Western Europe ‘non-‘whites can sometimes be tempted to identify with the caricatures imposed upon them.

An increasing number of scholars in the humanities and social sciences have begun to investigate the important shifts taking place in discourses of sexual freedom and gender equality across the continent. These shifts open up new arenas for ethnographic and other empirical research. What role do sex and gender play in various European nationalisms? In which cultural terms are sexual and gender boundaries articulated? What different trajectories can be discerned, and how can differences between countries be explained? What are the effects of these transformations at the level of the formation of community and subjectivity? How do these discursive shifts become tangible in everyday life? And how can sexual politics avoid the trap of exclusionary instrumentalization without renouncing its emancipatory promise?

In order to discuss such questions, we invite contributions grounded in ethnography and other empirical research along the five following themes:

1. The Nationalization of Gender Equality – In secular European imaginations of immigrants and their descendants, the Islamic headscarf in particular has been perceived as an axiomatic signifier of religious and gender oppression. It has been listed along other ‘uncivilized’ ills also attributed to ethnic minorities and disadvantaged neighborhoods, whether they be domestic violence, forced marriage, or female genital mutilations. In contrast, recently acquired milestones in gender equality, like the legal right to abortion, have been adopted by Left and Right politicians alike as new symbols of timeless national essences. What representations of gender have been conveyed by contemporary constructions of the nation? How have forms of domination between men and women been challenged and/or reproduced in neonationalist and secularist projects? In what ways are migrant women’s lives affected by the entwinements of feminist discourses and movements with these projects? How have those women experienced and handled being framed as simultaneously the main victims and the main accomplices of the new Islamic threat? Whereas religion is understood as operating at the level of the embodied, the habitual, material and visceral aspects of secularism are generally ignored or obscured. But what is the secular counterpart of the religious body? What does a gendered politics of secularism look like? At times, restrictive policies against women wearing headscarves have been justified in terms of the necessary limitation of religion to the private sphere; at other times, they have been framed in terms of gender equality and feminist ideals. Should this justificatory plurality be taken at face value, or does it point to deeper and more complex resentments against postcolonial and other ‘non-white’ migrants?
2. The National Politics of Sexual Freedom – In Europe, ideals and practices of sexual freedom have mostly been experienced as a tangible break with formerly hegemonic religious traditions and the restraints of community and family. In particular, gay people have sometimes been framed as the very embodiment of modern liberalism, as self-fashioning, unattached, and autonomous subjects. Why have such representations been so effectively tied to the nationalization of modernity in some countries but not in others? What have been the specific trajectories of such representations, and how have they affected lesbian/gay/bisexual/transgender identified people in everyday life? What new normativities have been shaped in the process? And what have been the consequences of these discourses for those who have been framed as the ‘others’ of sexual democracy – Muslims and ethnic minorities? What have been the implications of such reinventions of sexual whiteness for everyday life in the global cities of Western Europe, and the sexual, cultural, religious and political diversity they offer? How have feminist and lesbian/gay movements been affected by these shifts in the social location of sexual and gender politics? What does ‘race’ have to do with the refashioning of sexual politics and identities? If sexual freedom and gender equality are being mobilized in a culturalist re-enactment of European racism, how does this affect white imaginaries and subjectivities? How are those (historically) excluded from whiteness affected by it? Which bodies come to be constructed in the sexual politics of neonationalisms? Which forms of ‘queerness’ are being authorized and which articulations of sexual otherness are being ‘queered’ and thus excluded from sexual normality? On what grounds does this occur, and how do these processes materialize in everyday life?
3. The Urban Geographies and Class Politics of Sexual Democracy – The interweaving of urban governance with sexual politics has been normalizing certain sexual spaces at the exclusion of others. In the context of an emergent urban entrepreneurialism and as part of gentrification processes, sexual others have been conscripted into urban politics and spatial renewal, while new hetero- and homonormativities have taken shape in the process. Gender representations have also played important roles in framing and representing cities as aesthetically and commercially attractive for business, tourists and aspiring residents. Simultaneously, certain brands of urban theory have celebrated gay men and women as the avant-garde of urban change, hence of the conquest of formerly working class and ethnic minority neighborhoods by bohemian middle and upper classes. What roles have sexuality and gay urban presence played in processes of gentrification? How have sex and gender been articulated in the urban governance of social marginalization? How are the sexual politics of neoliberalism to be understood? What role does the market play in the sexual reinvention of nationalism and citizenship and in shaping new (homo)normativities? Is the stigmatization of Muslim migrants as sexually conservative a reenactment of discourses that in the past stigmatized working class communities as immoral, archaic or authoritarian? What do the class politics of ‘sexularism’ look like? What kinds of subjectivities are produced in new regimes of sexual progress?
4. The Sexual Politics of Immigration Policies – The ever-stricter immigration policies of Europe – both at national levels and at the level of the E.U. – have often been justified in terms of sexual democracy: migrants, especially from Africa or other Islamic countries, have been ostensibly kept out, not on racial, but on sexual grounds, in order to preserve the hard-won democratic values of Europe in the treatment of sexual minorities, and even more crucially, of women. As a consequence, these same migrants, whose matrimonial (forced, fake, etc.) or sartorial (hijab, niqab, etc.) practices have thus been under constant scrutiny, are expected to demonstrate a sincere adhesion to sexual democracy that is presumed inherent to European cultures, despite its very recent history and contemporary limitations. How does such a constraint redefine the subjectivities of migrants – as well as that of their European partners? What does it mean for a woman of Islamic culture to be encouraged to reject her family’s expectations in order to express her sexual modernity? What are the strategies available to migrant women and sexual minorities who attempt to resist oppression, even violence, while refusing to be co-opted by anti-immigrant, if not xenophobic or racist, politics? In other words, what are the interactions between the sexual logic of immigration policies and the sexual imaginaries and practices of the migrants thus targeted?
5. European Sexual Modernization and Its Discontents – Today, the borders of Europe are also sexual boundaries. Admission into the E.U. requires identifying with the agenda of sexual democracy. At the same time, almost by definition, non-European countries are suspect. Turkey’s tradition of secularism largely inspired by the French historical model has not been sufficient to dispel the suspicion that this Muslim country is alien to European sexual democracy – as evidenced by the visible presence of the Islamic headscarf. In the same way, international campaigns against homophobia have largely been about the homophobia of others: the logic of human rights has focused more on legal repression than on legal discrimination – the penalization of homosexuality outside Europe rather than the exclusion of gays and lesbians from rights of marriage and adoption within Europe. Conversely, the Europeanization of sexual democracy has fueled reactive nationalisms, not only in those countries that are bound to remain on the margins of Europe, such as the Maghreb, but also in recent E.U. members – regarding homosexuality in particular, for example, in Poland or Lithuania. How are European and non-European sexual politics reconfigured in this new context, i.e. what are the political consequences, in various countries within and outside of Europe, of this geopolitical context?

We invite all those interested to submit a one-page abstract and a CV by: September 1, 2010.
Abstracts as well as questions can be sent to: Robert Davidson (R.J.Davidson@uva.nl)

Organizing Committee: Laurens Buijs, Sébastien Chauvin, Robert Davidson, Jan Willem Duyvendak, Eric Fassin, Paul Mepschen, Rachel Spronk, Bregje Termeer, and Oscar Verkaaik

Organizing Institutions:
Amsterdam Research Centre for Gender and Sexuality, UvA
Institut de Recherche Interdisciplinaire Sur Les Enjeux Sociaux, EHESS, Paris
Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies, UvA
Research Cluster Dynamics of Citizenship and Culture, UvA
Research Centre for Religion and Society, UvA
Research Cluster Health, Care, and the Body, UvA

Uit de burgerschapskalender:

“Ik sta hier, net als velen van u, als een kind van Indië. Net als bij u roept deze herdenking bij mij emoties op. Herinneringen die je de rest van je leven meedraagt, maar een optimistische en toekomstgerichte levenshouding niet in de weg hoeven te staan. Immers, herdenken is, naast herinneren, ook vooruitzien.” Uit de herdenkingstoespraak van dr. Bernard Bot, voormalig minister van Buitenlandse Zaken

Enkele jaren geleden rommelde de VS zichzelf en de rest van de wereld in een oorlog gebaseerd op leugens en bedrog. Ook Nederland deed daaraan mee; men ondersteunde de Irak oorlog politiek en stuurde daarna ook troepen. Daarmee speelde Nederland voor de tweede keer een rol in massaslachtingen onder burgers: na Srebrenica, nu Irak. Waar Srebrenica nog werd veroordeeld als genocide en misdaden tegen de menselijkheid, waren de slachtingen in Irak ‘noodzakelijk’ en ‘collateral damage’ in het proces van bevrijding en democratisering van Irak. Eén van de symbolen daarbij is toch wel Fallujah. Deze Iraakse stad werd zwaar gebombardeerd, afgesloten van water, voedsel en electriciteit, vrouwen en kinderen werden zoveel mogelijk verdreven waarna men de stad platbombardeerde. De gevolgen van daarvan zijn nu nog te merken blijkbaar. Het zou bijvoorbeeld blijken dat het aantal hartafwijkingen onder babies in Fallujah, 13 keer hoger is dan in Europa en dat er veel babies worden geboren met allerlei afwijkingen.

Natuurlijk is Nederland daar niet direct bij betrokken, maar toch op z’n minst z’n politieke steun gegeven. Groter was de rol in Afghanistan en in meer in het bijzonder in de grootste slag die het moderne Nederlandse leger ooit heeft uitgevochten: de Slag bij Chora waarbij het Nederlands leger onder meer een pantserhouwitser gebruikte die veel burgerslachtoffers maakte.

En dan hebben we nog niet eens de slachtoffers van Nederlandse terreur in Indië genoemd zoals in Rawagede. Laten we vooral de oorlogsslachtoffers in Indië niet vergeten, want dat gebeurt toch al vaak, maar laten we vooral ook niet de slachtoffers vergeten die Nederland zelf heeft gemaakt en/of zijdelings bij betrokken is geweest.

Introduction
There are many different approaches for research on Salafism and they all make clear that, although Salafism has some distinguishing features, the movement is quite diverse with many doctrinary contradictions and clashes and different politico-theological tendencies. Almost all definitions emphasize that the term Salafism is derived from ‘al-salaf al-salih, (the pious predecessors); the first three generations of Muslims who are, according to tradition, the best generations of Muslims ever lived. They also emphasize that Salafists treat Quran and Sunna (the life of the prophet Muhammad) as the only legitimate sources for reason and behaviour of Muslims. It is therefore difficult to define Salafism in a clear, consistent way. One of the main frames for research on Salafism is Quintan Wiktorowicz’ work on Islamic activism; based upon social movement theory. He makes a distinction between Purists, Politicos and Jihadis. The purists, according to Wiktorowicz are not interested in politics, while Politicos (often influenced by Muslim Brotherhood networks) do engage in politics while the Jihadis see the world in such a deplorable state that only a violent Jihad can bring peace and (Islamic) justice to Muslims. Several authors in the book Global Salafism (in particular Thomas Hegghammer) have criticized his model among other things for being internal inconsistent (because jihadis should be a subsubdivision of politicos based upon him seeing political strategy as the defining issue), the definition is still too much based upon theology that does not tell us very much about people’s actual behaviour and claiming to be a-political (as purists do) is a political claim because it indirectly supports the status quo. Hegghammer propes a different typology based upon the structural presence of resources, strategies and rationales for action. Although helpful this model does not solve the problem that it cannot take into account identity, gender or the idea that security and radicalization (two angles in which both approaches fit) are themselves cultural constructions with specific local, national and transnational dimensions. Both models are also top down: they take up the official doctrines, methods and identities of spokespersons and religious authorities but ignore the perspectives, ideas and practices of participants in the movements.

In my research I choose for a more anthropological account of Salafism as a religious movement, taking seriously the political and religious subjectivities of participants. Based upon an article on Grounded Utopian Movements by Price, Nonini and Fox Tree in Anthropological Quarterly, I regard Salafism as a movement trying to revitalize Islam based upon a homogenuous ideal of Islam of the days of the first generation Muslims. The Salafi movement aims to cleanse Islam from so-called non-Islamic accretions, such as Sufism, Shi‘a Islam, or local practices and doctrines, which have sullied a “pure” Islam (Meijer, in Global Salafism). The only way to lead a pure and authentic life and to inherit paradise is to return to the period of the prophet Muhammad and his companions and to emulate their lives. The sources of the Islam, the Qur??n and the ?ad?th are seen as the written version of the authentic and pure Islam. All human action has to be covered by the sources of Islam to be legitimate, otherwise they are condemned as bid’a or worse: in some cases such illegitimate acts may lead to takfir. Moreover since the prophet Muhammad is considered to be an exemplary, perfect Muslim, the Sunna, a close reading of the Qur??n and ?ad?th are essential sources with guidelines for leading the correct life and staying on the righteous path. This applies to thought, behaviour as well as appearance. Based upon this ideal the movement tries to develop a lifestyle participants find more just and satisfying than at present. The transnational Salafi movement consists of local and global branches and is characterized by a loosely coupled network structure that is non-hierarchical and characterized by a segmentary-like mobilization and fission and fusion of several sub-networks. The different Salafi networks share the same doctrine of tawhid (the unity and uniqueness of God) as Wiktorowicz explains, but (contray to Wiktorowicz’ claim) do not agree on all aspects of this principle such as what constitutes belief and unbelief and how to interpret particular attributes of Allah. Furthermore, Salafi networks share the method of reading and interpreting the sources of Islam but they differ on the methods of worship and the manner of achieving their goals.

Utopian Movement
Just like in the case of Salafism, Price et al make clear that movements such as Global Justice, Rastafari, Maya Movement and Pentecostalism can be seen as Grounded Utopion Movements whereby grounded refers to the idea that identities, values and imaginaries are grounded in local histories and are embodied and experienced by concrete persons with their own histories. They use the term grounded to refute that we are not talking about irrational, obsolete and romantic ideas; instead they rooted, constructed and nurtured by interactions and practices binding people to the idea of being and becoming part of a community. They admit that all movements have utopian dimensions; this dimensions directs actions in terms of goals and the correct trajectory towards achieving those goals. Grounded Utopian Movements however are distinct from other movements because their utopian imaginaries pertain to the protection of the moral integrity of one’s own community and of one’s own identity against different modalities of oppression and injustice. It is in particular their capacity to create new, alternative realities that make state institutions and elites wary of them and perceive these movements as a threat for social cohesion, security and existing arrangements in society.

Establishing Utopia: politics of lifestyles, distinction and resistance
The Salafi movement is a modern social movement aimed at guarding the identity and integrity of Muslims in a world perceived to be full of seduction, oppression and injustice. Convincing and teaching Muslims to be part of common life, a common heritage and common practices determining a good and correct life is crucial for establishing a ‘true’ moral community emulating the model of the prophet Muhammad. Many activities of the Salafi movement therefore are aimed at constructing the moral community and teaching people the proper ways of being part of that community. The most important strategy of the Salafi movement for de-corrupting Islam and the Muslim community is da’wa: inviting people to Islam (mission). With their da’wa activities the movement spreads its ideas of a virtuous life based upon the idea of commanding good and forbidding evil (al-amr bi-l-ma’ruf wa nahy ‘an almunkar). We can distinguish between three different types of activities sustaining that principle: politics of lifestyles, politics of signification en politics of resistance (de Koning, 2009b).

All Salafi networks in the Netherlands and other European countries are engaged in one way or another in these type activities. Politics of lifestyles are activities aimed at shaping and nurturing the correct Islamic identity and lifestyle of participants. Preachers of the Salafi movement give lessons, lectures, organize conferences about the correct islamic lifestyle (dress, marriage, ways to interact, being Muslim in a Western society, and so on). The different networks publish books and leaflets about therse topics and every networks has its own (sometimes overlapping) circles of lectures and courses by which they aim at a moral rehabilitation of Muslim youth. This does not mean that people are passive consumers of Salafi ideas; in daily life they have to make compromises which most of them do with regard to for example dress and interaction between men and women. Also the courses and conferences are not only about transferring knowledge; they are also meant to establish a sense of belong, brotherhood/sisterhood. It is the combination of knowledge and being together that accounts for many people using the knowledge circles to boost their imaan (faith).

The politics of distinction are aimed at protecting a minority position of Muslims in a society where the majority tries assimilate them. Particular lifestyle practices such as wearing the niqab can become part of the politics of distinction when they are part of public debate or even forbidden. As a result the Salafi movement tries to engage with the public debate and at the same time such plans offer them a platform to disseminate their ideas to a larger (Muslim and non-Muslim) audience. Also self-identification is part of the politics of distinction for example pertaining to the internal quarrels over using the label Salafi method, Salafi (in Dutch also selefie) and criticizing other groups. The boundaries between different branches of the Salafi movement may appear very strong and impermeable when looking at the daily life of participants a more nuances picture emergers because for example economic motivations can lead to people of one network working in the institutes of another (antagonistic) network. And indeed, building their own institutions such as Islamic schools and home care are also part of this type of politics as well as criticizing other Muslim organisations for their allegedly complacent attitude in the Islam debate.

The third type, resistance politics, involves activities aimed against what the Salafi movement perceives as oppressive structures in Europe and Muslim countries. This can pertain to preaches about ‘zionist’ aggression against Palestinians, the necessity of fighting against injustice and severe attacks at Muslim representatives outside the Salafi movement. Travels of some youths to Chechnya, Afghanistan, Pakistan (Kashmir), Iraq and Somalia to participate in the fighting against the US, is also part of this, as well as publishing jihad texts and videos on the internet. Most networks of the Salafi movement do not differ with regard to life style politics but are in fierce disagreement over the other two types.

Welcoming utopia
The call for unity, purity and religionization coming from the Salafi movement can be seen as an attempt to establish itself as the only true representatives of ‘true’ Islam in the Netherlands protecting the Muslim communities from attacks from inside and outside. Moreover, given the practice of Salafi preachers to base their statements upon ‘evidence’ from Islamic sources and explaining them at the same time, the Salafi movement does not only provide Muslim youth a way to engage with a vision of ‘true’ Islam and create a sharp distinction between them and their parents and them and Dutch society, but also a method and path to immerse oneself into a ‘new’ tradition. As I have shown in my contribution to Global Salafism by analyzing the life-stories of two female Salafists, the process by Moroccan-Dutch youth turn to Islam after a period of ‘being not so religious’ or ‘sleeping Muslims’ and affiliate themselves with the Salafi movement can be described as a type of conversion; a re-affiliation within the same religious tradition. These women seek a strong identity, self-realisation and a symbolic transformation of a personal crisis. The Salafi doctrines enable them to rewrite their own life stories and to construct their sense of self as strong people who find their purpose of life in Islam. They have rebuild their own life-stories in the process of seeking wholeness and connected their own individual trajectories, predicaments, ideals and ideas to the Salafi interpretation of Islam.

The rigorous and sometimes rigid Salafi creed and piety creates a stark contrast with the often conflicting and troublesome experiences of daily life. This, as is the same as with the other Muslim youth searching for a ‘true’ Islam, does not mean people actually follow every aspect of the Salafi way. Many of them see it as an attempt to follow a life as a ‘true’ Muslim, as a personal project that has to be fulfilled and as a means to revive ones personal faith (imaan) without fully living up to it. The utopian Islam and the dark, messy, chaotic daily life coexist and, this contradiction is exactly what both is the strength and weakness of the Salafi movement. The utopia with its high moral standards can become an obstacle for functioning in daily life with family, work and education where other rules and loyalties exist. At the same time it gives the Salafi movement its power for it means that people can hold on to the ideal without diluting it and it makes people striving for more all the time: the utopia lies somewhere at the horizon (it is concrete) although impossible to reach. By framing the ideas about the correct lifestyle, building up a position as a minority in Europe and its fight against oppression and justice, in terms of commanding good and forbidding evil the actions of the Salafi movement become moral issues by which the Salafi movement tries to construct a moral community and emphasizes its integrity and tries to safeguard it.

Uit de burgerschapskalender:

“Ik ben opgevoed met het idee dat je een ander niet met jouw rotzooi opzadelt. Toen ik laatst zag hoe een jongen zijn lege limonadeblikje op straat gooide, heb ik er wat van gezegd. Ik vind dat logisch. Want wat zijn mijn normen waard als ik niets doe om ze te verdedigen?” Reactie op www.handvestburgerschap.nl.

Dat zou mooi zijn, een ander niet met je rommel opzadelen. En anderen erop aanspreken is natuurlijk ook goed. Aldus professor Kromzwaard. Toch is dat makkelijker gezegd dan gedaan. In een mooie column op DeJaap.nl wees Arne Mosselman er al op dat het vrijheidsfundamentalisme in dit land zover is doorgeslagen dat het moeilijk is om anderen nog aan te spreken op hun gedrag. Op z’n best negeert men je of erger je krijgt een klap voor je harses. Het lijkt er soms op dat de Marokkaans-Nederlandse hangjongeren die ons zoveel problemen zouden bezorgen op straat zich dat vrijheidsfundamentalisme eigen hebben gemaakt. Zij kunnen rotzooi maken, trappen en uitkramen en hen erop aanspreken is soms zeer lastig want dat betekent dan weer dat je geen respect hebt voor hun eigenheid. Althans dat is het beeld en uit de column van Arne wordt een soortgelijk beeld geschetst voor de autochtonen. Respect betekent daarbij onder jongeren niet alleen eerbied voor mensen uit hoogachting of angst.Het gaat bij respect ook om de eis dat anderen afstand houden en zich niet bemoeien met de eigen keuzes. Het is tevens een eis tot erkenning van de eigen waardigheid. Daarmee is respect iets wat mensen van nature moeten krijgen (zoals ouders en ouderen), maar ook iets wat mensen moeten verdienen. Tevens is de eis tot respect nauw verbonden met de opvatting dat er zoiets bestaat als een universeel recht op een eigen identiteit. Onder Marokkaans-Nederlandse jongeren is ‘respect’ gerelateerd aan noties van eer en schaamte, maar ook verbonden met gelijkheid, waardigheid, solidariteit, individueel burgerschap en persoonlijke autonomie. De Marokkaans-Nederlandse moslimjongeren uit mijn onderzoek laten zich niet zomaar vertellen dat zij zich moeten aanpassen aan de Nederlandse maatschappij of zich ‘normaal’ moeten gedragen. Zij zijn immers hier geboren en hebben net zo veel rechten als ieder ander, vinden ze. De nadruk op respect en eigenheid (authenticiteit) is een vrij recente culturele verandering in Nederland die Marokkaans-Nederlandse jongeren zich eigen hebben gemaakt. En zij niet alleen. We vinden het ook terug in de politiek met haar grote nadruk op het serieus nemen van gevoelens van ‘gewone’ mensen (waar dan weer zelden Marokkaans-Nederlandse jongeren mee worden bedoeld) en het idee dat je die dus niet zomaar kunt bekritiseren of zelfs wegwuiven.

In zo’n situatie is het dus lastig om mensen op hun gedrag en voorkomen aan te spreken want dat tast die mensen in hun gevoel van eigenwaarde en eigenheid aan. De Marokkaans-Nederlandse jongeren die overlast veroorzaken hebben dat tot in extremis doorgetrokken. En ook dat is niet typisch Marokkaans-Nederlands zoals Zembla recent liet zien in een docu over een volledig ontspoorde groep autochtoon-Nederlandse hangjongeren. En het is ook niet typisch voor jongeren. Met name op internet zien we hetzelfde terug bij zelfbenoemde bewakers van de vrijheid zoals daar zijn Bert Brussen, Robert Engel en de redactie van Geenstijl. Zij hanteren dezelfde tactiek van verbale en visuele ‘drive by shootings’ als die ontspoorde hangroepjongeren. Neem bijvoorbeeld het, op zich mooie en goed geschreven, Zuilen dagboek van Bert Brussen:
Zuilens dagboek: gedroomde positieve effecten | Bert Brussen

De bedreiging werd natuurlijk geuit door een Marokkaan. (Ik zeg natuurlijk omdat in Zuilen 99,9% van de bedreigingen worden geuit door Marokkanen. lekker correct en fatsoenlijk blijven volhouden dat het niet om de afkomst gaat maar om het individu is erg leuk als je vooral ver van die buitenwijken vol positieve effecten woont. Voor mensen die niet genoeg verdienen om GroenLinks te kunnen stemmen is de werkelijkheid een stuk banaler en grimmiger.) Omdat ik met de voorkant van mijn schoen de achterkant van het prinsje zijn schoen raakte, wat je al snel hebt in een drukke bus, werden mij ogenblikkelijk “klappen” beloofd. Ik vroeg waarom ik klappen verdiende maar dat was reden om nog meer klappen te beloven.

Het is een stuk dat vooral neerkomt op een mitrailleurvuur aan verbale frustraties. Wat niet zo vreemd is natuurlijk met dergelijk gedrag van jongeren in je eigen achtertuin. En schijnbaar vindt hij het belangrijk dat vuur te richten op ‘Marokkaanse’ jongeren. De vraag, hier al eerder gesteld, waarom het van belang is om dat te weten, leverde van hem het volgende antwoord op via zijn twitter account:

nee Martijn de Koning je krijgt geen antwoord op je zure, ultracorrecte, drammerige JOOP-vragen. Ga maar fijn lief doen voor moslims
Het is HEEL BELANGRIJK dat te weten @martijn5155 omdat softe blindemannetjes als jij anders het probleem blijven ontkennen
doeidoei, Nijmeegs stuk ellendig goedpratertje van moslimshaat, Nederlanderhaat en Marokkanenterreur.

Je kunt het vergelijken met hangjongeren die mensen uitschelden en vervolgens wegrennen als ze erop aangesproken worden (geen antwoord geven) of een manier zoeken om wel hinderlijk te blijven zonder last van jou te hebben (blocken). Zo kan Bert Brussen op twitter iemand vergelijken met een tumor, maar zodra een ander persoon de suggestie doet om zijn huisadres aan die overlastgevende jongeren in Zuilen te geven, roept hij wel om de politie. Jan Blokker wees er eerder al op hoeveel troep mensen via Twitter rondslingeren met onder meer Cornald Maas als voorbeeld:
DOE DIE TWEETS WEG! – nrc.next columnisten

Paul de Leeuw, de meest overschatte komiek van de zaterdagavondindustrie, en Cornald Maas, het vleesgeworden Songfestival, tevens kunst- en cultuurpaus van de AVRO. Paul durfde heel ver te gaan door tijdens de trouwerij van een Zweedse prinses het land in te twitteren: ‘Zit u ook stiekem te wachten op een zwarte Saab die zich in een of ander monument boort? Niet dat ik het ze gun, maar dan gebeurt er wat!’

Er gebeurde niets. Het gewaarschuwde Openbaar Ministerie oordeelde dat de uitlating voor niemand iets beledigends bevatte, en dat er evenmin sprake was geweest ‘van smadelijke, lasterlijke, bedreigende of opruiende tekst’. Men had zelfs geen humor vastgesteld. Helemaal niets – zoals altijd als Paul de Leeuw iets zegt, en vervolgens om zichzelf hinnikt.

Zieliger liep het af met Cornald Maas. Zijn actuele tweet had geluid: ‘Grappige exportprodukten heeft Nederland: Sieneke, Joran van der Sloot, de PVV’, wat door de TROS ‘onacceptabel’ werd genoemd en zijn ontslag tot gevolg had. Waarom in godsnaam? Hebben ze zich bij de TROS ooit laten voorstaan op criteria als goeie smaak, esprit, kwaliteit of niveau? Cornald zelf wel.

Mensen slingeren zaken de wijde wereld in, maar geven zich geen enkele rekenschap van de uitwerking en consequenties van hun woorden: puberaal gedrag vermengd met vrijheidsfundamentalisme en narcisme. Andere voorbeeld is een Robert Engel die het geen enkel probleem vindt om iemand die, op basis van zijn stukken, ernstig in de war lijkt te zijn, volledig af te breken op internet. Geenstijl die recent en in het verleden zonder problemen (de soms halfnaakte) uitspattingen van vooral meiden op de site plaatst zonder enig voorbehoud zelfs niet als ze minderjarig zijn. Het zijn dezelfde mensen die vervolgens iedere inperking van de vrijheid van meningsuiting bekritiseren alsof dat de ondergang van de ‘world as we know it’ zou zijn. Het publiceren van dergelijke teksten e.d. zonder enige rekenschap te geven van de eigen verantwoordelijkheid voor de gevolgen voor anderen, getuigt van een vrijheidsnarcisme dat in het geval van Bert Brussen en Robert Engel nog wel wordt gecamoufleerd door een schijnbare betrokkenheid bij maatschappelijke vraagstukken als overlast van jongeren, maar in feite daar niets mee te maken heeft.

Vrijheidsnarcisme is een vorm van gedrag dat wordt gekenmerkt door een obsessie met vrijheid van de eigen persoon zelf gecombineerd met egoïsme, gebrek aan empathie en poging om het dominante mannetje (het zijn meestal mannen) op de eigen apenrots te zijn door heel hard te brullen. In dit vrijheidsnarcisme valt voor bloggers en journalisten (of wat daar voor doorgaat) vrijheid van meningsuiting niet langer samen met het idee van zorgvuldigheid en degelijkheid en wordt hun vrijheid vooral een ijzersterk wapen om anderen te beschadigen en zichzelf te immuniseren voor alle kritiek. Iedere tegenreactie van de personen die onder vuur liggen is voor deze narcisten eerder een bevestiging van hun nogal oppervlakkige en onnozele denkbeelden dan een moment om even gas terug te nemen en te kijken of er toch iets in de kritiek zit.

Christoffer Lash beschrijft in zijn Culture of Narcissism dat mensen tegenwoordig voortdurend angstig zijn om niets te betekenen en niets voor te stellen in de wereld. Om dat tegen te gaan zouden we allerlei narcistische impulsen ontwikkelen om ons echt ‘echt’ te voelen, het idee te krijgen dat we echt leven en wel degelijk iets voorstellen. De groei van de technologische mogelijkheden om ons bestaan te documenteren en in te vullen, levert nieuwe mogelijkheden om op onszelf opnieuw te scheppen en te documenteren en nieuwe kanalen om onze waarde, ons bestaan en misschien zelfs onze onsterfelijkheid te promoten. Zelfpresentatie op het web is daarbij een strategisch spel; of het nu gaat om jezelf te presenteren op Facebook, Twitter, Flickr of met een eigen blog. Dat kan variëren van de mededeling op twitter dat men net een boterham met kaas gegeten heeft tot het openbaar rouwen om het heengaan van een geliefde op Facebook tot het masturberen op Chatroulette. De hyperfixatie op onze eigen subjectiviteit zien we terug bij de hangjongeren die rondhangen bij het winkelcentrum en allerlei beledigingen en ander overlastgevend gedrag tentoonspreiden en een nog grotere bek teruggeven (of erger) wanneer je daar iets van zegt: zij zijn een maatschappelijk probleem omdat zij met hun eigen hyperfixatie onze hyperfixatie bedreigen. Mensen als Robert Engel of Bert Brussen spelen daar op in; niet om het probleem daadwerkelijk aan de kaak te stellen maar om hun eigen subjectiviteit in een publiek domein te uiten. En, net als bij die hangjongeren, als je er iets van zegt krijg je een nog grotere bek terug. Grofheid, vulgair taalgebruik en seksisme zijn niet zomaar randverschijnselen; het is essentieel voor dit type narcisme omdat het een ideale manier is om zich krachtig te onderscheiden van anderen; iets wat Theo van Gogh al erg goed begreep. Het gaat daarbij zelden of nooit (alleen) om maatschappelijke issues waar men zich druk om maakt, maar om status en zelfverwezenlijking. Enig inlevingsvermogen in de ander die men tot de knie afzaagt, is daarbij ongewenst. Immers, je zou dan eens moeten toegeven dat je ook ongelijk kunt hebben of dat je je onsterfelijk belachelijk maakt of zelfs serieus gekwetst bent en dat je toch echt op z’n minst je eigen aandeel in de rotzooi moet opruimen.

The July 2010 issue of Contemporary Islam (editors Daniel Varisco and Gabriel Marranci) is out now. The former issue, April 2010, is available for free. It is a special issue Muslims and Media: Perceptions, Participation and Change with Cemil Aydin and Juliane Hammer as guest editors. You can find the content below with the link for downloading the articles of this interesting issue:
SpringerLink – Contemporary Islam
Volume 4, Number 1 / April, 2010
Special Issue: Muslims and Media: Perceptions, Participation, and Change / Guest Edited by Cemil Aydin and Juliane Hammer

Muslims and media: perceptions, participation, and change
Cemil Aydin and Juliane Hammer

This special issue addresses ways in which Muslims and Islam are portrayed and represented (or misrepresented in the media) as well as Muslim participation in public and independent media production. Many publications stipulate, assume, or lament stereotyping and misrepresentation of Muslims, yet we are only beginning to see specific studies that address questions such as the quantitative and qualitative reproduction of visual and other stereotypes, issues of self-representation and speaking through the media for the larger community, Muslim public intellectuals and their role in shaping and challenging public perceptions, political agendas of media outlets and the conundrum of media producers and demands from their audiences, representations of diversity of Muslims and interpretations of Islam in the public sphere. This special issue brings together articles that address the active involvement of Muslims in media production on one hand and the impact of media representations on individual Muslims and their communities on the other. Geographically, the authors present case studies from the USA, Germany, Australia, and the Philippines.

Media making Muslims: the construction of a Muslim community in Germany through media debate
Riem Spielhaus

This article focuses on the ways in which Muslims actively participate in media debates about Islam and Muslims in Germany, and how they challenge or reinforce representations of themselves. It questions the narrative of powerlessness versus dominant actors in media and politics. Even though they were already perceived as part of a Muslim community, several prominent individuals in the German cultural and political sphere took an explicit position as Muslims—some insisting on their distance to religion. This paper aims at describing the various reasons and reflections accompanying this decision and argues that media images of Muslims steered individuals, who are not members of Islamic organizations let alone representatives of them, to become active or change their self-representation and act as Muslims. By demanding recognition as active members of German society, prominent Muslim individuals are creating new images of Muslims beyond an imaginary that is reducing them to their (alleged) religiosity and positioning them outside German national identity.

Moros in the media and beyond: representations of Philippine Muslims
Vivienne SM. Angeles

Colonial constructions of the Muslim image have affected Muslim–Christian relations in the Philippines for centuries. Spanish colonizers used the term “Moro” as a derogatory term for Muslims and portrayed them in negative terms mainly because of their resistance to Spanish colonial rule and Christianity. The succeeding American administrators perpetuated the negative Muslim image through their description of Muslims in their reports and in cartoons published in the American print media. Both colonizers viewed Filipinos primarily in terms of their religious identification, and through their campaigns against the Moros, have influenced the thinking and attitudes of Christian Filipinos towards Muslim Filipinos. In recent times, ethnic Filipino Muslims have appropriated the term Moro to symbolize instead their determination to chart their destiny as a nation and their rich political and cultural heritage. This recasting of the Moro image is reflected in contemporary Muslim writings in both print and electronic media. This paper argues that the remaking of the Moro image challenges colonial misrepresentations, constitutes a redefinition of ethnic Muslim identity, and appeals to the sense of unity of Muslims.

(Re)presenting: Muslims on North American television
Amir Hussain

This article describes and analyzes the portrayal of Muslims on several North American television shows. Greatest detail is given to the two seasons of Sleeper Cell, the first show on American television created to deal with Muslim lives post 9/11. I deal briefly with Muslim characters on Oz for a look at portrayals of Muslim life pre 9/11. I also mention Muslim characters in Lost and 24 as well as some films to add further insights to my argument. These television dramas are compared with two comedies, Aliens in America as well as Little Mosque on the Prairie, the first Canadian television show to examine Muslim lives. The conclusion is that in dramas, Muslims are not recognized on American television as citizens of their own country, but instead are portrayed as dangerous immigrants with a religion that is both alien and wicked. Moreover, the religion as it is lived out on the television drama is one of violence—there seems to be no other substantive practice that embodies Islamic faith. The case is very different with regard to the television comedy.

Imaging, imagining and representation: Muslim visual artists in NYC
Munir Jiwa

This article is based on ethnographic fieldwork I conducted with Muslim visual artists in New York City. It assumes that art is a particular medium or media form that not only gives us insight into the processes of creative expression, but helps us understand the relationship between global media events and their localized practices. For Muslim visual artists, and Muslims in general, “9/11” has become a significant marker of time in thinking about issues of identity, belonging and representation. Even in the art worlds, the larger tropes of Islam/Muslims—terrorism, violence, veiling, patriarchy, the Middle East—become the normative frames and images within and against which Muslim artists do their work. I outline the ways Muslim artists as cultural producers are not only contesting art world boundaries in terms of new and emerging forms of identification, but also the various sites where they are being forged. Muslim artists explore new ways of thinking about being Muslim, not necessarily as a theological or aesthetic unity, but as a minority identification in the West/America. I focus on the work of two artists, Nigerian-born Fatimah Tuggar and Pakistani-born Shahzia Sikander.

Performing gender justice: the 2005 woman-led prayer in New York
Juliane Hammer

On March 18, 2005, a group of American Muslim women and men participated in a Friday prayer led by Dr. Amina Wadud, who also gave the Friday sermon. Widely publicized in various media and debated among Muslims around the world, this event was hailed as a turning point in Muslim gender discourses by the organizers and many media representatives. This article describes the prayer as a performance and argues that the organizers, participants, and media representatives all participated in the production of meaning embodied by the prayer. According to the organizers, the achievement of Qur’anic gender justice required changes in Muslim communities, and various forms of media were of vital importance for the discussion and realization of this goal. As such, the prayer was an act of symbolic significance, which despite its discursive, spatial, and temporal limitations, became much more than an act of Islamic worship.

Gender and sexuality online on Australian Muslim forums
Roxanne D. Marcotte

This paper examines the e-religious discourse that Australian Muslims produce on the internet. The study of two online discussions on MuslimVillage forums—one of Australia’s largest online Muslim communities—about polygamy and homosexuality will illustrate how online interaction within virtual Islamic environments provides both greater and lesser fluidity to e-Islamic normative discourses associated with gender and sexuality. Muslim forums provide opportunities for members to display a variety of views and opinions: on the one hand, they allow Muslims to post views that may challenge, contest, or even transgress Islamic gender and sexuality norms, while equally allowing members, on the other hand, to reaffirm more authoritative normative Islamic views. The various voices that inhabit Australia’s Islamicyberspace’s new Muslim social and networked environments thus need to negotiate virtual normative representations.

Muslims, identity and multimodal communication on the internet
Kristin Zahra Sands

The Internet provides a space and medium within which Muslims can shape the relationship between their religious identity and their social and political affiliations. The subjectivities of Muslims who use online space are in turn shaped by the parameters and possibilities of the Internet’s architecture and language. The multiple linkages of online spaces and the particular vernacular spoken in these spaces, a mix of written text, imagery and sound, privilege new kinds of actors and new forms of expressive and rhetorical activities. In this new space and medium, the question of imagining (or rejecting) a global Muslim identity demonstrates the subtle interplay involved in the formation of religious and media subjectivities. Developing a critical understanding of multimodal representation and communication is an essential component in studying Muslim engagement with the Internet.

Muslims and the media in the blogosphere
Daniel Martin Varisco

In the past two decades a virtual Ummah has evolved in cyberspace. While some of these websites are targeted specifically at Muslims, others attempt to provide outreach on Islam or counter Islamophobic bias. As noted by Jon Anderson, in his pioneering work on Islam in cyberspace, Muslims were among the first engineering students to create websites at the dawn of the Internet, before mainstream Islamic organizations posted official websites. There is a wealth of material by Muslims in English and Western languages, some of it archived for research. This article explores the methodological problems posed in studying the range of Islam-content blogs, from private individuals to religious scholars, as well as Muslim websites that feature comments from readers. The focus of the paper is an analysis of blogs about Islam or by Muslims that either act as watchdogs on the media or try to provide alternative views to the mainstream media of competing Muslim groups. Researching these blogs as a form of e-ethnography calls for a rethinking and refining of anthropological methodology as e-ethnography.

Uit de burgerschapskalender:

Ieder viert feest op zijn eigen manier. De één met een kopje koffie en een gebakje, de ander met veel muziek en uitbundige dans. Zoals op het Zomercarnaval in Rotterdam. Alle kleuren vinden elkaar daar in muziek en dans. 30 en 31 juli Zomercarnaval Rotterdam
www.zomercarnaval.nl

We kunnen aardig feesten in dit land. Twee weken geleden de verloren finale van het WK voetbal. Vorige week de Vierdaagsefeesten in Nijmegen. Komende week het zomercarnaval in Rotterdam (en vergeet ook niet over een paar weken Rio aan de Rijn in Arnhem). Ik schat zo in dat het Zomercarnaval met de Tong Tong Fair (voorheen Pasar Malam) in Den Haag tot de belangrijkste publieke multiculti feesten van Nederland behoort. Dergelijke festivals vertellen ons wat over de feestcultuur in Nederland en zeker wanneer deze verbonden worden met burgerschap. De festivals worden gezien als de mogelijkheden bij uitstek om mensen van allerlei kleuren en achtergronden met elkaar te verbinden. Moslims hebben ook festivals natuurlijk: mawlids.  Maar dat staat nog een beetje in de kinderschoenen hoewel het zeker potentie heeft om uit te groeien tot iets groters. Wat er dichter bij komt zijn de nationale en lokale iftars ten tijde van de maand van Ramadan. Thijl Sunier schreef in zijn inaugurele rede hier het volgende over:

The whole scene bears a striking resemblance to the average New Year’s reception. This is actually how it has been organized. This is the ‘National Iftar’, a novelty meeting set up as a reception at the end of the holy month of Ramadan. It is organized as part of the yearly ‘Ramadan festival’ and one of the final events of the four weeks of activities that revolve around the Islamic fasting period. There are cooking competitions, public lectures, music, Islamic fashion events, film, commodity fairs for halal products, all very much designed to provide this Islamic obligation with a flavour of modern spirituality fitting to the social environment in which young Muslims in Europe function. It is also organized as a message to Dutch society at large that Muslims constitute an integral part of that society.

[...]

The organizers and participants of the National Iftar during the Ramadan festival on the other hand, are well on the way to turning their ‘problematic’ religion into a cultural relic comparable to Christmas or Easter. [...] [It is an example of] of the contemporary making of religious selves among Muslim youth in Western Europe, [...] of new modes of Islamic visibility, style and performative acting [and is a pursuit] of truthfulness.

De festivals zijn op deze manier bij het uitstek het product van een multiculturele samenleving waarin velen zoeken naar iets herkenbaars, gezamenlijks en een manier om het idee van hun eigen identiteit vorm te geven, te uiten en te beleven.  In de publieke ruimte gebeurt dat dan vaak zodanig dat het nog wel herkenbaar is als iets dat afwijkt van wat autochtone Nederlanders gewend zijn, maar dat tegelijkertijd toch ook weer zo verwaterd is dat ook autochtone Nederlanders er makkelijk bij kunnen aanhaken als deelnemer of toeschouwer.

Op zich niet zo’n slecht idee om het serieuze karakter van het integratie en islam debat in Nederland eens te doorbreken met vreugde, uitbundigheid en gezamenlijke voorstellingen (bijwonen). Tegelijkertijd staat deze festivals natuurlijk niet los van de harde realiteit van alledag. Zo kreeg enkele jaren terug de koningin van het Zomercarnaval, de Marokkaans-Nederlandse Lamya M’Haidra, klaarblijkelijk de nodige bedreigingen over zich heen hetgeen ondermeer leidde tot kamervragen van de LPF.

In een daaropvolgende editie bleek het problematisch dat de organisatie een caribisch feesttintje wilde hebben en bijvoorbeeld de Brabantse boerenkiel wilde weigeren.NWS / Hollandse feestkleding mag niet

,,In een boerenkiel meelopen, dat kan gewoon niet. Daarvoor moet je toch echt op het gewone carnaval zijn. Het verwijt dat dit discriminatie is, wijst zij van de hand: ,,Inschrijving staat open voor iedereen, dus ook voor Nederlandse carnavalsvierders. Ze moeten zich dan alleen wel een beetje aanpassen.

Tot de traditionele carnavalsverenigingen die graag zouden deelnemen aan het Zomercarnaval behoort De Keilebijters uit Rotterdam. De Hobbelende Bierviltjes uit Zwartewaal en de Boergoenzers uit Rotterdam zien samenwerking ook wel zitten. Pogingen daartoe zijn tot op heden echter op niets uitgelopen. ,,En dat is jammer, heel jammer, aldus secretaris Jo Heuvelman van de De Keilebijters. ,,Buitenlandse en Nederlandse carnavalsverenigingen samen in een optocht, dat zou pas echt multicultureel zijn geweest.

De traditionele carnavalsverenigingen begrijpen niet waarom DUCOS Productions Nederlandse invloeden buiten de deur houdt. Omgekeerd zeggen de verenigingen geen moeite te hebben met buitenlandse invloeden in het gewone carnaval. ,,We hebben vorig jaar nog via de organisatie van het Zomercarnaval geprobeerd een Antilliaanse brassband te strikken voor ons carnavalsfeest, zegt Heuvelman van De Keilebijters. ,,Maar ook dat liep op niets uit. Kennelijk willen ze niet.

Alsof die autochtone Rotterdammers uberhaupt carnaval kunnen vieren, hoor ik een Brabander achter mij zeggen. Dit jaar was er discussie toen het Radio 538 strandfestival niet doorging. Op internet waren diverse varianten op het volgende commentaar te lezen:
Streep door Radio 538 strandfestival – Binnenland – Telegraaf.nl [24 uur actueel, ook mobiel] [binnenland]

Hier in Rotterdam is het ook kommer en kwel, het ene na het andere festival komt te vervallen omdat het te gevaarlijk zou zijn. Het allochtone Zomercarnaval gaat echter wel door, terwijl daar vorig jaar iemand is doodgeschoten. Rara, hoe kan dat?
Mariken, Rotterdam | 13:18 | 15.07.10

Op deze manier gaat het om meer dan alleen feesten en vieren; een oordeel over een dergelijk festival betekent ook positie innemen in het grotere debat over religie, cultuur en etniciteit in Nederland en in de strijd om hoe ‘onze’ publieke ruimte eruit dient te zien en wie dat mag bepalen. Het is vaak snel bedacht zo’n groot feest door goedbedoelende zelforganisaties en bestuurders om zo mensen op een ongedwongen manier met elkaar kennis te laten maken. Mooi bedacht en vooral doen zou ik zeggen en daar mag best wat subsidie tegenaan. Vergeet echter niet die hele politieke polonaise die er vaak (ogenschijnlijk spontaan) achteraan komt hossen.

UPDATED 27-08-2010, see below

This can be a very short entry. There isn’t going to come a Dutch mosque at Ground Zero. Or another mosque for that matter. In fact, it is not even about a mosque. So done, next topic. But there is more to it, of course. Just to give a few facts:

1. July 2009 the real estate company Soho Properties bought a five-story building that was severely damaged during the 9/11 attacks
2. The project is called Cordoba House, set up by the Cordoba Initiative and American Society for Muslim Advancement in order to improve relations between Islam and the West.
3. It is a proposed 13-story Islamic cultural center and mosque, approved of in May 2010
4. Located near (but not at) Ground Zero.
5. The current building is used as a makeshift Muslim prayer space
6. Prayer services are led by imam Feisal Abdul Rauf

The controversy is obviously over the fact that the building is located near Ground Zero. For some apparently a ‘not just a sign that live goes on but a ’sacred site’:

The message mixes Christian symbolic references with American nationalism. Some people find the idea of the Islamic center, framed as the Ground Zero Mosque, an insult and again others point to the alleged controversial background of Feisal Abdul Rauf being a wolf in sheep’s clothing with roots in the Muslim Brotherhood and still holding on to radical dreams. Sarah Palin has stepped into the debate as well and severely criticized for it too.

Of course such allegations lead to counter-accusations of xenophobia, racism and islamophobia as well. And certainly we should not be blind about the many difficulties Muslims face when they want to establish new initiatives, even when they are not located near Ground Zero and although Islam and Muslims have a long history in the US (at near Ground Zero as well). One of the main problems of many current debates about Islam and Muslims could be that the debate is so fierce, harsh and sometimes false towards Muslims and Islam in a way that resembles a smear campaign, that many Muslims close ranks when another organization is under siege, thereby blocking any debate that might considered to be necessary. Whether one agrees or not for many 9/11 is linked to Islam and Muslims and although the whole issue has been wrongfully framed, it is necessary to acknowledge that in order to understand people’s feelings.

So now what is the Dutch connection here, besides the fact that Manhattan is part of Dutch history of course? In May 2010 the Dutch section of the International Civil Liberties Alliance revealed in an article (Een moskee te ver / A mosque too far) that Feisal Abdul Rauf’s wife, Daisy Kahn, leads the organisation Women’s Islamic Initiative in Spirituality and Equality. This organisation appears to have received 1.000.000 euro from the Dutch state:
American Society for Muslim Advancement (ASMA) – MinBuza.nl

Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
American Society for Muslim Advancement (ASMA)

Women’s Islamic Initiative in Spirituality and Equity (WISE) Compact Program.

WISE Compact will work with local and national women leaders and the organizations they work in. The programme aims to provide: a) a global infrastructure for shared work among Muslim women’s groups, organisations, institutions, and networks, b) religious context for Muslim women’s dialogue about, and advocacy for, their rights, c) an institutional voice for gender equality, and d) accessible knowledge about effective ways to promote the equitable ethic of Islam. The activities planned for each of the results include development of WISE Compact design, develop partnerships with Muslim women’s organisations to develop learning and training resources, implement training with marginalised women and girls and create a comprehensive WISE Compact sustainability plan. The programme will focus on Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Jordan, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestinian Administrative Areas, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and Turkey.
Amount granted

€ 1.000.000

Daisy Khan has received some criticism for her stance on polygamy: Some Muslims in U.S. Quietly Engage in Polygamy : NPR

According to Daisy Khan, who heads the American Society for Muslim Advancement and is married to an imam, polygamy is more common among conservative, less educated immigrants from Africa and Asia. It is rarer among middle-class Muslims from the Middle East. She adds that nowadays, imams do background checks on the grooms to make sure they’re not already married in their home countries.

Some clerics in the U.S. perform second marriage ceremonies in secret.

Khan, who does pre-marriage counseling, says she always raises the issue of polygamy with engaged couples.

“I also explain to them that as a woman, you have certain rights, and as a man, he may one day exercise his right to have a second wife,” Khan says. “And usually the man says, ‘No, no, no. I’m never going to do that.’ And I say, ‘Well, in case you ever get tempted, how about we put that in the contract?’”

Apparently she should have rejected it, full stop. The WISE project is aimed at furthering network building and exchanges and at improving the position and rights of women in conservative Islamic countries. Support for national and international religious organisations is certainly not new in the Netherlands and not only Islamic organisations receive such funding. Nevertheless since the whole secular-religious balance is under debate (not only with regard to Islam) such support at least raises eyebrows. In this case the support led to questions asked in Dutch Parliament by Dutch anti-Islam agitator Geert Wilders:
Weblog Geertwilders – Geert Wilders’ PVV discloses Dutch government support for ‘ground zero’ Mosque

Questions of the members Wilders and Fritsma (both PVV) to the Minister for WWI and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands about the co-funding of a mosque on Ground Zero.

Is it true that Dutch taxpayers’ money is used for the support of ASMA, the organization of Imam Faisal Abdul Rauf, who wants to build a mosque on Ground Zero?* If yes,

Do you acknowledge that it is absurd to build a mosque right at Ground Zero and that this is also an insult to (the families of) the victims of 9-11? If not, why not? If so,

Are you, given the offensive plan to build said mosque, willing to immediately withdraw the subsidy to ASMA? If not, why not?

Interestingly Feisal Abdul Rauf last year received the Peace Builders Award on behalf of the Alliance for International Conflict Prevention and Resolution together with a Dutch Liberal Jewish rabbi Soetendorp. Together they wrote an article in the journal Justitia et Pax (Act Now)

God speaks in the Quran of the righteous and unrighteous of the People of the Book [Christians and Jews] as well as of the Prophet Muhammad’s own followers. Spirituality is about learning to see with God’s eyes, and as we learn to do so, to recognize in this life Christians, Jews, Muslims, and others who emit the fragrance of Paradise, in whom God’s pleasure is evident, as well as people across the religious spectrum in whom we detect the odor of God’s displeasure. This simple insight brings us to the conclusion that challenges many believers: that among those who confess to be of other faiths are those who in God’s eyes
share the same ultimate destiny.
[...]
The same God created us all. And when, as human beings, we learn to recognize, identify with, and speak from the core human and spiritual values that we hold in common, we may transcend our superficial divisions and learn to embrace the cultural and theological diversity that only enriches the human family. Over time, interfaith dialogue can dissolve the concept of the ‘other’, replacing it with a deeper realization that we are all – in fact – brothers and sisters.
Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf
Rabbi Awraham Soetendorp

Wilders and, following him, much of the Dutch media has taken up the clearly false frame of ‘Ground Zero Mosque’ leading up to one Dutch columnist stating that the Ground Zero mosque crowns it all for Muslims after 9/11 and Dutch newspaper falsely stating that the Netherlands is funding the Ground Zero Mosque. It is in fact a racist frame: because Muslims did a violent thing, it is correct to criticize other Muslims for doing another (non-violent) thing. Until now Muslims in the Netherlands have remained silent on the topic although a few sites (in particular one related to my salafism research) have responded to the news and, while following the Ground Zero Mosque frame, stated (my translation):

We can see this as a true miracle because who would have ever thought that next to such a sensitive place a mosque would be build? Only one can give an answer to that, and that is Allah, the almighty, the allknowing. In the end Islam will prevail. No one, nowhere, can terminate the building of mosques.

Other Dutch Muslims, at the website Wij Blijven Hier (We are here to stay) have a more modest approach. They state (my translation):

And there you see how a center with the best of intentions, called Cordoba Initiative, will heavily invest in dialogue, community, culture, knowledge and meeting eachother, is labelled Ground Zero Mosque.

As mentioned above, it is necessary not to stop at this observation of racism. What kind of symbol is the sacred Ground Zero Mosque?

Although other atrocities in other parts of the world have caused much more in terms of human lives, such as the genocide in Rwanda (937,000 deaths ), the war and chaos in Congo (about 4 million deaths ) and the war Darfur (estimates vary between 70,0000 and 400,000 deaths ), ‘9/11’ is often considered as the event that changed the world as we knew it. The events of ‘9/11’ challenged not only the US but are seen as an attack on the Western world and all it stands for. For example in the Netherlands the Dutch government first asked for thoughtfulness but then also stated that 9-11 was tantamount to a declaration of war. Sylvain Ephimenco (a Dutch writer) pointed to Islam as the fertile ground which produces terrorists; Leon de Winter (a Dutch writer) claimed that the West was in a state of war with Islam; and Frentrop (a Dutch journalist) pleaded for a ban on Islam. The Dutch filmmaker and columnist Van Gogh would declare later that 9-11 was an eye opener for him. One of the main questions raised in many of these reactions was how ‘ordinary’ Muslims related to these extremist Muslims. Several reactions (some intended, some unintended, some distorted) added fuel to the fire: Is Islam compatible with a democracy based on the separation of church and state as well as equal rights for men and women? Though several Muslim opinion leaders tried to contribute to the debate but the scope of their contributions remained limited because they were much divided and none could be considered as truly representative of the Muslim community. Moreover, their hesitation to combine a condemnation of the attacks in support of democracy, together with solidarity with the US, worsened the situation according to many people.

In all the groups of the Ethnobarometer research ‘9/11’ stands out as the first landmark in the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims, though certainly not the last landmark and not in all cases the most important one. With regard to the latter there was some disagreement about the importance of 9/11, although most of the participants saw 9/11 as an event of major implications. Certainly in the UK but to a lesser extent also in other European countries the ‘Islamic Revolution’ of 1979 in Iran or the Rushdie Affair in 1989 (Werbner 2002) had already put the spotlight on Islam and Muslims. Criticizing Muslims was still considered taboo in for example the Netherlands – chances were you would be labelled a racist –this taboo started to erode in the aftermath of the Rushdie affair. ‘Muslims’ became increasingly distinguished from the ‘Dutch’ people (whereas previously discourse was about allochthonous or ethnic minorities) and their loyalty towards the Netherlands was called into question. Also in the Netherlands in 1996 Pim Fortuyn released his book Against the islamization of our culture in which he elaborated on the issues other politicians such as Bolkestein had addressed earlier. Muslims, including liberal Muslims, were against the separation of church and state, against equality of men and women, and the main threat for world peace from which he concluded that Islam was a backward culture. Two weeks before ‘9-11’ and the day after ‘9-11’ he pleaded for a ‘Cold War’ against Islam. Although Fortuyn’s discourse was not exclusively ‘Islam-topic’ – he had strong anti-establishment rhetoric as well – his message concerning Islam became the most visible.

These are not unrelated incidents but they same part of an important, but largely invisible, undercurrent in contemporary societies. An important issue in this regard is that in the 1980s and 1990s there was no political party in the Netherlands with a clear anti-multiculturalist stand, making it difficult if not impossible for voters to voice their opposition to multiculturalism. Much of this changed after 9/11. It is clear that for Muslims and non-Muslims ‘9-11’ is important in the social construction of a conflict. ‘9-11’ is an important part of the answer to the question how do people know that there is a conflict. Before ‘9-11’ there may have been a latent conflict, surfacing occasionally after incidents such as the Rushdie-affair. An event like that is probably seen as an incident. In the case of ‘9-11’ all participants remember very vividly the attacks, seeing the planes flying into the WTC and the collapse of the Twin Towers. ‘9-11’ serves as the exemplary event for either explaining what is wrong with Islam or explaining what is wrong with the host societies of Muslim migrants. Muslims and non-Muslims recognize that since ‘9-11’ criticizing Islam and Muslims is no longer taboo and in some cases almost custom to this in the strongest way possible. The experience of ‘9-11’ and its aftermath can be seen as one of the underlying grammars in the construction of the Self and the Other. Writings such as those of Fortuyn and Sartori, perhaps already apprarent in popular thinking, have gained, in Gramsci’s words, plausibility because of ‘9/11 and after 9/11 such national discourses have merged with global discourses of the war against terror and Islam as a threat. These powerful discourses have merged with anti-islamic ideologies from people like Wilders thereby further complicating the national and transnational mixtures of politics and religion.

Update 27-08-2010
Recently conference in Singapore organised by the official Islamic Council of Singapore and the Majlis Ugama Islam Singapore (MUIS). The conference brought together academics and activists from all over the world to discuss the issue of Islam, Muslims and multiculturalism in a globalised world. Besides people like Tariq Ramadan, Reuven Firestone and Abdullah Saeed, also Feisal Abdul Rauf participated. Below you find the link to a report about the conference by Yoginder Sikand (who also attended) with an excerpt (H/T one of my regular readers: MvB):

The American Muslim (TAM)

For me, the highlight of the conference was hearing the arrestingly charismatic Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf, head of the New York-based Cordoba Initiative, speak. The soft-spoken but extremely articulate Egyptian-born and Britain-educated Imam has been in the forefront of efforts to promote dialogue between people of different faiths, inspired by a truly universalistic—and, so, to me, powerfully attractive—understanding of religion. He began by pointing out that Muslims are today perceived as a ‘problem’ the world over. Owing to the actions of self-styled Islamists, Islam is now regarded by many as a security threat. This perception, he said, cannot be denied or wished away simply through apologetic exercises. Across the world, Muslim groups, using the vocabulary of Islam, have spearheaded violent political movements in the name of Islam. This is why, he said, many non-Muslims perceive Islam to be synonymous with violence and even terror. This undeniable fact, he went on, is a challenge to Muslims concerned about their faith, who must act to rescue it from terrorists who use it to give it a bad name.

The Imam debunked certain key myths that many Muslims, wedded to a narrow, communal understanding of Islam, zealously uphold. He pointed out that the Quran addresses itself not to Muslims as a communal group, but, rather to what it calls ‘believers’ or muminun. And this, he argued, is what the companions of the Prophet Muhammad saw themselves as. Based on his interpretation of certain key Quranic verses, the Imam pointed out that the category of muminun was not limited to those who call themselves by the Arabic term ‘Muslim’, and who generally construe the term as referring to a particular community. Rather, he persuasively argued, the muminun that the Quran talks about, for which any other suitable term could be used in other languages, included everyone, no matter what rituals he followed, what language he worshipped in, or whatever name he called himself by, who believed in the one God and in divine accountability after death and practiced good. This, he said, was the basic religion taught by all the prophets of God. Various prophets might have had their own methods of prayer and rituals, but these should be seen not as separate religions or as the bases of separate communities. Rather, they were more like different schools of thought or, in Arabic, mazhabs, of the same religion, or different sunnahs or paths. ‘The various prophets had different signatures, but they shared the same message’, he explained. All the prophets, the Quran says, were of the same status, and, critiquing Muslim claims to supremacy, he argued that nowhere does the Quran declare the Prophet Muhammad to have been the best among them or the most superior—contrary to what many Muslims contend. In actual fact, he pointed out, the Quran warns people not to make any distinction between the prophets. To imagine that the ‘believers’, in the Quranic sense, referred to a particular community that practiced a particular set of rituals in a particular language, as most Muslims do, was, the Imam argued, not at all in accordance with what the Quran says.

The universalistic understanding of religion and the notion of ‘believer’ that he argued the Quran actually preached (which is in marked contrast to how many of those who call themselves ‘Muslims’ understand them), the Imam suggested, was a powerful counter to the communalistic interpretations of Islam that have been, and still are, powerfully dominant and that inherently conduce to conflict. It was, he contended, also a firm basis to bring together the muminun in different communities, no matter what communal label they defined themselves with, to work together for a better world.