The Majority Strategy of the Muslim Brotherhood I: Background and Development

Guest Author: Roel Meijer

Few subjects are as controversial as the Muslim Brotherhood. During the past few decades many commentators have speculated about the nature of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Is it totalitarian, authoritarian, are there chances for it becoming democratic? What is the role of the  Tanzim (the main organization of the Brothers), the third generation, and the youth? What are its relations with the previous regime, the left,  and social movements in the first decade of the 2000s? This question has gained urgency with the fall of Mubarak and the Arab spring. Will the Brotherhood promote the goals of the 25 January revolution, expanding civil, political, economic and social rights; or will it tailor these issues for its own purposes? The past two years have provided new insights into the workings of the Brotherhood. Especially its strategy to gain power, here called the majority strategy, by means of general and presidential elections, has attracted attention. How can this strategy be explained when its slogan under Mubarak had been “participation not domination” (musharaka la mughaliba)?

In two blogposts I will explore the majority strategy of the Muslim Brotherhood. Firstly, in this blogpost,  I will delve into the background and development of the majority strategy. In the next blogpost I present an analysis of the counterforces and the failures of this strategy.  My overall argument is that rather than its ideology, it has been the political strategy that explains both the success as well as the failure of the Brotherhood after the fall of Mubarak.

 Changing views

As Nathan Brown (When Victory is not an Option: Islamist Movements in Arab Politics, New York: Cornell University Press) makes clear, the Muslim Brotherhood is not a exclusively a political organization, but one with multiple activities, diverse interests and different strategies. Having become extremely cautious under authoritarian regimes, political participation in the 1980s implied tremendous risks. The repression political participation could provoke could jeopardize the whole movement and therefore political participation remained one option among others. This does not mean that the movement did not change. Participation, the rise of the third generation and greater outreach to society, led to important ideological changes. Whereas under Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) multiparty system had been rejected, “partyism” (hizbiyya) in the 1980s became increasingly accepted as a means of expanding the influence of the Brotherhood, aside from its more traditional work of building up its infrastructure of hospitals, schools, social services.

For the first time, the Brotherhood was forced to think deeper about politics and the political process, producing in 2004 and 2007 increasingly more elaborate political programs that provided pragmatic solutions to problems society faced as a whole. In its struggle against the authoritarian regime, it saw the usefulness of citizenship rights, the independence of the judiciary, the limitations of the power of the president and the balance of powers between the legislative, the judiciary and the executive. Even if these rights were marred by religious oversight, and contained illiberal elements, especially in regard with equal rights for women, non-Muslims, and the freedom of expression, it did recognize the sovereignty of the people. In that sense, it built upon the political opening Hasan Hudaiby had set out in his Preachers not Judges in the 1960s, a trend that most recently reflected in embracing the concept of the “civil state” (al-dawla al-madaniyya) rather than the religious state (al-dawla al-diniyya).

The question, however, was not whether the Brotherhood had changed, but to what extent? As it was still mostly a semi-legal, partly underground organization, repressed by an authoritarian state, it was difficult to determine how far these reforms went. The fact that its most liberal current split-off formed the Wasat party in the 1990s did not augur well. The Wasat Party no longer promoted the implementing the shari‘a and the founding of an Islamic state. Instead it upheld the idea that Islam is a civilization and Muslims and Copts were equal because they both were participants in its history. More reassuring was that liberal figures, such as Abd al-Mun‘aym Abu al-Futuh, still remained inside the movement and were members of the Guidance Council. Hope for reform was also stimulated by the emergence of a more progressive youth. On the other hand, it seemed unlikely that the more liberal-minded forces were able to influence the Tanzim, the highly structured main organization of the movement, based on a cell structure of the “family” (‘usra), which was mostly recruited from the conservative countryside. Neither were there any signs that the hierarchical internal structure, still based on the principle of “hearing and obeying” (sam‘a wa-l-ta‘a), was seriously challenged. If anything, the multiple interests, sectors, and strategies of the movement deepened the profound ambiguity that had plagued the Brotherhood from its inception.

Which direction the Brotherhood would take depended on the struggle between the more outward looking political current and the more inward looking da‘wa oriented section that was focused on Islamization pof society from below. While the first current seemed to gain in influence after the Brotherhood did well in the general elections in 2005, gaining 88 of the 454 seats, the subsequent repression, during which one if its leader Khairat al-Shatir was imprisoned, worked in favor of the latter. When during the fraudulent elections of 2010 the Brotherhood failed to win a single seat, and Muhammad Badi‘ became the General Guide, its more cautious wing seemed to have gained the upper-hand. In anticipation of the succession of Gamal Mubarak of his father, even the assuring slogan of “participation without domination”, seemed too radical. The cautious attitude of the Brotherhood was also reflected in the way it took part in the many demonstrations and movements of the decade preceding the uprising: it did participate but always kept the larger interests of preserving its organization and manifold non-political interests at heart.

 The majority strategy

The predominance of the inward looking group explains why the Muslim Brotherhood was not only taken by surprise by the uprising of 25 January 2011 but was also unable to respond adequately to the subsequent events. Not until 28 of January when the regime accused the Brotherhood of instigating the uprising, did it unleash the Tanzim on Tahrir and wholeheartedly supported the demands for the fall of the regime. But even then, the risks of participation in the revolution were so high, that it negotiated with the regime.

The majority strategy emerged after the fall of Mubarak. It was not a policy that was formulated from the beginning but grew over time, depending on the politics of its adversaries and their responses to the Brotherhood’s moves. Despite the lack of evidence of a stated policy, the subsequent measures the Brotherhood took make it into a coherent strategy. It consisted of two components. The first was to maintain good relations with Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and make a tacit agreement that recognized the military’s interests while playing down its own political ambitions. To assure the military of their good intentions, for instance, the old slogan “participation not domination” was dusted off, and the announcement was made that the Brotherhood would run only in limited number the electoral districts.

The second component contradicted the first and aimed at building up the Tanzim as rapidly as possible by expanding its countrywide network. Already on 14 February it announced that it would establish a new party, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). In the following year hardly a week passed without the Brotherhood announcing the opening of another office of the FJP. To its credit it must be said that secular opposition was weak and the Brotherhood had to fill the vacuum the defunct NDP had left behind.

More damaging in the long run were the series of deals with SCAF the majority strategy entailed. One of these deals was to prevent the most urgent demands of the revolution from being met, namely to elect a Constitutional Assembly to write a new constitution that would enshrine the civil, political and social rights the revolution demanded. Instead, a constitutional committee was appointed by SCAF in February 2011, headed by the pro-Brotherhood judge Tariq al-Bishri, with the assignment to adjust a limited number articles of the 1971 Constitution. Its  assignment was to pave the way for free and fair elections, of which the Brotherhood, as the strongest movement, would benefit the most. The victory of 77,3%  in favor of the amendments during the referendum on 19 March came as a shock to the activists of Tahrir square and the liberals, whose suspicions of the Brotherhood as a thoroughly counter-revolutionary movement—never far from the surface—were re-awakened.

The Constitutional Declaration (30 March) of SCAF would enshrine the previous compromises. It laid down that first general elections would be held under the adjusted constitution of 1971 after which the newly elected parliament would appoint 100 member Constituent Assembly. In addition, it stipulated that the transitional period would only end with a referendum accepting the constitution and that a transition of power from SCAF to independent government would be appointed by the president.

Although the recognition of political rights was a dramatic step forward (recognition of political parties became a formality), the flaws of the arrangement (the sequence of steps of the transitional phase, the retention of power of SCAF) would block the fundamental transformation of Egyptian society based on civil, political and social rights Egyptians in their new awareness as citizens were claiming after the fall of Mubarak. Because they were not supported by a sympathetic government during the transitional period that could translate the revolution in law,  reformists had to fight out a prolonged battle with conservatives in each and every institution for reform, almost always leading to bitter disputes. The  “long march through the institutions” from below would clash with the Brotherhood’s attempt to gain control of society from above by means of its majority strategy.

Containing the revolution

SCAF represented the first major hindrance to the revolution. With the exit of Mubarak and the source of corruption of intermingling of politics and economic interests, it believed the revolution had ended. It literally advised the revolutionaries to go home after Mubarak had left. It blocked all reform measures that would dismantle the authoritarian state and its patronage system and prevented the Sharif government from taking any initiatives to meet civil and social demands of demonstrators, refusing to disband the Military Courts, accept the existence of independent trade unions, reform universities, let alone take on the Ministry of Interior.

Only gradually did SCAF realize that political and social unrest would not go away. The continuous Friday demonstrations and sit-ins on Tahrir square beginning a week after Mubarak’s fall and gaining in force in March and the during the summer, turning into more violent confrontations on 9 October (Maspero massacre) and November and December (Muhammad Mahmoud street clashes), would tarnish the image of SCAF as the “guardian of the revolution” and belie its pledge not to fire on civilians.

At the same time the Muslim Brotherhood organized the FJP as an instrument to pursue its majority strategy. It did this by keeping it on a tight leash and transferring the top members of the Guidance Council to lead the party although they had to relinquish their functions in the Brotherhood. It, moreover, stipulated that its members were only allowed to vote for the FJP.

As a result, liberals and groups within the movement who did not agree with the majority strategy pursued by Khairat al-Shatir either left or were purged from the movement, in turn leading to the deepening of its conservative character. For instance, Abd al-Mun‘aym Abu al-Futuh was expelled after he announced candidacy to run for presidency.  The more independent minded Brotherhood youth started to leave in March,  and were finally kicked out in May after they had taken part in unauthorized mass demonstrations on Tahrir. The few independent minds that the movement harbored, such as Muhammad al-Baltaji, who had sympathized with the Tahrir movement and constantly tried to mediate between the two, were exceptional and in the end ineffectual to broker a compromise between the two.

Aside from building up its infrastructure, purging the dissidents, blocking demands for internal reforms and adapting itself to the much more open environment after the 25 January Revolution, the majority strategy also dictated that the Brotherhood extend its power to social and civic institutions in society, further hampering the drive for change. Gaining power over these institutions was imperative as the members of the Constituent Assembly would be nominated from. Also here the vacuum left behind by the NDP, which through patronage, often had its candidate elected head of the syndicates, proved helpful.

From the fall of Mubarak to the electoral victory in the parliament and Majlis al-Shura in February 2012 the majority strategy of the Brotherhood seemed to work. In return for tenuous support for Tahrir demonstrations and major counterdemonstrations on 27 July, which showed the power of the Islamist movement,  SCAF allowed the Brotherhood to build the necessary infrastructure to win the elections, which were exceptionally successful.

At the same time, the Brotherhood benefited from the gradual erosion of the prestige of SCAF that increasingly showed that it was incapable of handling the opposition in the fall-out of Maspero and Muhammad Mahmoud street clashes. Severely weakened, the Brotherhood increasingly could challenge SCAF when it overtly tried to preserve its privileges, as was the case with the Ali Silmi document. Typical of the Brotherhood, it unleashed its troops on Tahrir in protest against SCAF, but pulled them back at the right time not to alienate SCAF, letting the activists take the brunt of clash with security forces.

For the Brotherhood, winning the elections remained the main goal of its actions. Once they had the elections through the ballot box legitimacy would be transferred from Tahrir to parliament, with the Brotherhood representing the “will of the people” (iradat al-sha‘b). Representing the majority (ghalabiyya) was the basis of taking over power from SCAF.

The even larger victory for the Senate (Majlis al-Shura) in February seemed to confirm the viability of this strategy. Emboldened the Brotherhood took the next step and launched Khairat al-Shatir at the end of March 2012 as presidential candidate. When he was rejected as candidate by the Electoral Commission in April, he was succeeded by Muhammad Mursi, another previous member of the Guidance Council who had become leader of the FJP.

Roel Meijer teaches modern Middle Eastern history at Radboud University in Nijmegen and is senior researcher at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations. He has published widely on Islamist movements: Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement and most recently, The Muslim Brotherhood in Europe.

PS

This is part one of two blogposts on The Majority Strategy of the Muslim Brotherhood. Coming Monday the second part will be published on Monday.