C L O S E R

Joan Scott – Sexularism

Posted on May 24th, 2012 by martijn.
Categories: Gender, Kinship & Marriage Issues, Important Publications, Multiculti Issues.

In this lecture Joan Scott addresses the sharp oppositions often made these days between secularism and gender equality, on the one side, and religion (especially Islam) and the oppression of women, on the other. It argues that we need a genealogy of secularism (in the way Talal Asad has called for it) to determine what the relationship has been historically between the separation of church and state and improvements in the status of women.

You can also find her lecture on Sexularism HERE (pdf).

0 comments.

Autochtonen en allochtonen bestaan niet: ze worden gemaakt

Posted on May 19th, 2012 by martijn.
Categories: Multiculti Issues.

Broeders en zusters – De Standaard

Toen ik in Nederland kwam wonen, leerde ik denken in termen van autochtonen en allochtonen. ‘Wij’ kwamen hier vandaan en ‘zij’ moesten zich aanpassen aan ons. Maar als ik eerlijk was, had ik niet echt het gevoel dat ik hier vandaan kwam. Ik was net zo goed ‘op bezoek’ in de wereld als alle anderen.

Allochtonen en autochtonen bestaan niet, ze worden gemaakt. In de loop van de tijd kwamen we er achter dat er groepen migranten en nakomelingen waren, waarbij er problemen speelden met betrekking tot onderwijs en arbeidsmarkt. Daar bedachten we een term voor: allochtonen. Vervolgens werd er onderzoek gedaan naar allochtonen en verhip, wat bleek? Er waren problemen met betrekking tot integratie. Later bedachten we dat dat wel eens te maken kon hebben met cultuur. Want hun cultuur is nou eenmaal anders dan die van ‘ons’ en dat leidt per definitie tot problemen. Want kijk maar, die allochtonen hebben een andere cultuur en daar hebben we problemen mee.

Geen wonder dus dat er pleidooien zijn om dit oerlelijke Nederlandse woord af te schaffen en categorisering op basis van etniciteit ook weg te doen. De aanleiding van deze discussie is een advies van de RMO, waarvan minister Leers intussen al heeft laten weten het niet over te nemen zodat we beter kunnen kijken wat de problemen zijn. Dat is ook een punt waar sommige wetenschappers op wijzen:
Etnisch onderscheid: onontbeerlijk voor beleidsmakers

Ik ben daarom van mening dat etnische categorisering nodig is en nodig blijft: om achterstanden te bestrijden en om onrechtmatigheden (discriminatie) te kunnen vaststellen. Dit staat los van welk gevoerde beleid dan ook. Ongeacht of je je doelstellingen via specifieke of via generieke instrumenten wilt bereiken.

Waarom is etnische registratie een probleem in Nederland? – Nederland – TROUW

Daarbij is iedereen zich bewust van de nadelen en valkuilen. Van het risico van stigmatisering. Van het gevaar alles op het conto van de etniciteit te schrijven. En ook hoe frustrerend de categorisering voor de integratie is. Immers: een allochtoon blijft per definitie altijd een allochtoon. Maar toch.

In het ergste geval wordt het woord allochtoon een soort raciale constructie:

Er zijn geen problemen met allochtonen (update) | www.dagelijksestandaard.nl

Onderzoek na onderzoek wijst uit: Er zijn grote etnische verschillen bij immigratie. Gemiddeld genomen voeren niet-westerse allochtonen alle slechte lijstjes aan aangaande criminaliteit, schooluitvalt, lage opleiding, werkloosheid enz enz. maar daartussen zijn er opvallende verschillen. De twee generatie Chinezen bijvoorbeeld doet het zelfs beter dan de autochtonen. Onder de tweede generatie Iraniërs zijn nog maar weinig moslims, en ook zij doen het opvallend goed qua integratie. De verschillende etnische groepen onder de Surinamers doen het heel uitlopend qua integratie.

Zo is een administratieve aanduiding verworden tot een idee dat er echt zoiets is als een groep allochtonen die alle slechte lijstjes aanvoert (logisch, daarom hadden we de categorie uitgevonden).

Nu is er best iets te zeggen voor het motto meten is weten en dat je daarom de categorisering moet behouden. En dan wordt vaak de vergelijking gemaakt met de VS die dat immers ook zouden doen en bijvoorbeeld de term ‘Arab-American’ hanteren. Maar daarmee wordt wel voorbij gegaan aan het feit dat categorisering geen neutrale zaak is. Het is geen zaak van opsporen welke groepen er zijn en die vervolgens even benoemen. Zo wordt beleid vaak voorgesteld als technische oplossing voor problemen. Maar categorisering is een zaak van ‘speech act’. De term allochtoon verwijst niet naar een duidelijk afgrensbare en homogene groep, maar het aanduiden van mensen met die term is een handeling waarmee de werkelijkheid, wordt ‘gewaardeerd’ binnen een normatief, ideologisch systeem dat vooraf gegeven is. In dit geval gaat het om mensen die wel in ‘ons’ land verblijven, maar gezien worden als onaangepast mede op basis van een stereotype beeld van ‘hun’ cultuur. Zo worden moslims buitengesloten (zie ook het citaat van Niemoller hierboven) vanwege hun religie omdat die ‘nou eenmaal’ niet compatibel zou zijn aan de Nederlandse cultuur die gebaseerd zou zijn op vrijheid, scheiding kerk-staat, emancipatie van vrouwen en vrijheid van meningsuiting. Dat is een ideaalbeeld (voor sommigen althans) maar niet de werkelijkheid. Allochtonen, in populair taalgebruik en beleid steeds verder ver-engt tot moslims, wonen dus wel hier en hebben gelijke rechten maar horen niet bij de morele gemeenschap. Dat maakt de term allochtoon ook een andere dan bijvoorbeeld Arab American die geenszins Arabieren ziet als buitenstaanders vanwege een andere cultuur. Waar hier het idee bestaat dat er maar één identiteit mogelijk is, of Nederlands of Marokkaans bijvoorbeeld, is in de VS het normatieve ideaalbeeld meer gebaseerd op de eigen cultuur als mozaïek (net zo goed een ideaalbeeld aangezien de White Anglo-Saxon Protestants nog steeds dominant zijn).

Een dergelijk label is ook een machtsmiddel. Leers spreekt niet voor niets over problemen die ‘wij’ hebben met allochtonen. En wanneer we tot de ontdekking komen dat sommige allochtonen vaker verdacht worden van een misdrijf dan autochtonen dan trekken we onmiddellijk de conclusie dat dat ligt aan de allochtonen; niet aan de politie. Dat laatste zou best een rol kunnen spelen zeker als we zien dat verderop in de strafrechtketen sommige allochtonen een zwaardere straf krijgen dan autochtonen voor hetzelfde misdrijf (dat wordt al helemaal niet benoemd door Leers als reden om de term te behouden). In het debat is allochtonen ook vooral een manier om te spreken over migranten en hun nakomelingen in plaats van met hen; er zijn immers geen vertegenwoordigers van de allochtone gemeenschap (die is er namelijk niet). Peter Geschiere geeft, enige tijd terug al, een interessant antwoord op de vraag waarom deze term op een gegeven moment ingeburgerd raakte:
Antropologen.nl – Allochtoon is een problematische term

De tamelijk verrassende keuze voor deze terminologie in Nederland hing samen met de hardnekkigheid waarmee de overheid tot in de jaren tachtig vast hield aan het idee dat Nederland een emigratieland was en niet een immigratieland; het was immers overbevolkt. Vandaar dat de voor de hand liggende term ‘immigrant’ in overheidsstukken gemeden moest worden.

En:
Peter Geschiere: “Cultuur is altijd in beweging” | Standplaats Wereld

Interessant genoeg zijn deze termen in de jaren zeventig geïntroduceerd met het idee om het debat wat te verzachten. Het was een welkome vervanging van raciale termen, die gelukkig als achterhaald werden beschouwd. Maar interessant genoeg doen de termen allochtoon en autochtoon nog steeds een beroep op de natuur om onderscheid tussen mensen te maken. Daarom komen ze op mensen heel vanzelfsprekend, heel natuurlijk over. Maar dat zijn ze niet. Ze zijn uitgevonden in de context van het ontstaan van de multiculturele samenleving en ze drukken uit wie hier wel echt thuishoort en wie niet. Autochtoniteit berust op een ideaal van zuiverheid dat onmogelijk is geworden in een wereld die al zo lang en zo diep beïnvloed is door migratiestromen.

En net zo problematisch is dan ook het begrip autochtoon:
Peter Geschiere: “Cultuur is altijd in beweging” | Standplaats Wereld

Autochtoniteit wordt gepresenteerd als volkomen natuurlijk en normaal en doet een groot emotioneel beroep op mensen. Mensen vergeten heel snel dat ze kort geleden nog heel andere opvattingen hadden en op een andere manier over elkaar spraken. In Afrika gaan mensen soms hun eigen familie als allochtoon beschouwen! Dat soort denken komt niet uit de lucht vallen, maar wordt gemobiliseerd en gemanipuleerd, juist omdat het zo sterk met macht en toegang tot rijkdom verwikkeld is. Media, politici, ‘sterke’ mannen of vrouwen, bedrijven, etcetera, spelen daarom een belangrijke rol.

In Nederland gaat het deels ook om een gek soort combinatie van markt en cultuur. Wilders begon in ieder geval als een soort ultraliberaal, inclusief voorstellen voor afschaffing van het minimumloon en het progressieve belastingstelsel. Pim Fortuyn was ook een groot fan van de markt en bekritiseerde de verzorgingsstaat. Beiden combineerden dat met een omhelzing van de joods-christelijke cultuur. Dat is een vreemde ‘move’ voor liberalen, die vroeger nooit veel op hadden met religie en traditie.

Tegenwoordig zie je bij Wilders natuurlijk een verschuiving van ultra-liberale, individualistische standpunten naar het behoud van de welvaartsstaat voor de autochtone bevolking. Dat is interessant. Het suggereert dat het ook hier gaat om toegang tot middelen. Migranten worden voorgesteld als een bedreiging voor ‘onze’ verzorgingsstaat.

Zie ook: Schaf het discriminerende en stigmatiserende begrippenpaar autochtoon-allochtoon onmiddellijk af! : Ander ben Ik : Duisternis in het licht

Met alle goede bedoelingen hebben we met het begrippenpaar autochtoon-allochtoon een raciaal vertoog op basis van bloedverwantschap vervangen door een vertoog gebaseerd op cultuur en grond. Het begrippenpaar autochtoon en allochtoon zou daarom moeten verdwijnen, en als we toch groepen willen aanduiden laten we ze dan bijvoorbeeld aanduiden met Marokkaanse Nederlanders, Molukse Nederlanders en Vlaamse Nederlanders…om maar eens wat te noemen.

Overigens ben ik van mening dat ook het integratiebeleid afgeschaft dient te worden!

3 comments.

Groom, Prey, Lover boy – Sexual Violence in the Netherlands

Posted on May 17th, 2012 by martijn.
Categories: Activism, Gender, Kinship & Marriage Issues, Multiculti Issues.

An interesting report on Al Jazeera, featuring a Moroccan-Dutch Muslim in has battle against young men (and some women) and their practices of dragging women into prostitution. Lover Boys – Witness – Al Jazeera English

I got involved in the battle against human trafficking – and in particular against the young pimps sometimes referred to as ‘Lover Boys’ – in 2003.

It is a term too lovely to convey the horror of their actions: buying girls gifts and fancy clothes with the aim of gradually establishing a tighter grip over their lives and eventually forcing them into prostitution.

In the Netherlands, many ‘Lover Boys’ – and some of their victims – are of Moroccan origin. It was this connection to the country of my own roots that inspired me to gather more information on them and their practices.

‘Lover Boys’ often seduce girls with gifts and promises of easy money. But when those girls are from their own community, they also abuse the culture of that community for their own ends. Once a girl from that community has lost her virginity to a ‘Lover Boy’ she has little choice but to stay with him for the other men in her community are unlikely to befriend or marry her.

We knew that getting a hold on these boys would not only be a task for the police, but that it would require getting the inside track on them – using the forces within their community for prevention and utilising the power of Islam and our imams, who have a strategically important position within the Moroccan community.

Wijbenga recognizes there is a risk of racialising sexual crimes but nevertheless feels it to be his duty to raise awareness about the problem and to involve Islamic organizations in his work. The ‘lover boy’ issue is part of a bigger problem perhaps with sexual violence against women in the Netherlands and although the issue is a very complicated one, it is important to do something against it.

1 comment.

Riots, Ritual and Rage – 'Salafists' and PRO-NRW in Germany

Posted on May 16th, 2012 by martijn.
Categories: Activism, Notes from the Field.

Last week several Muslims were arrested in Germany after riots during a protest against a demonstration of the German radical right wing party PRO-NRW. During the election campaign for the regional elections in Nord-Rhein Westfalen, PRO NRW organized a demonstration nearby a Salafist mosque in Solingen and in Bonn near a Saudi Arabian school whereby the demonstrators showed the Muhammad Cartoons published by the Danish Jylland-Posten a few years ago and that played a huge role in worldwide protests.

Ritual of provocation 

During their counter-protests the Salafists, according to the reports, attacked police and injured four of them. The majority of the Salafists usually do not engage in violent actions with weapens and this appears to be the first time they have let themselves to be provoked to such an extent that their leaders lost control. The next video in which we hear some of the Salafists in Bonn shout to their fellow protesters to stop throwing stones at the police, appears to confirm that (translation by Europenews.dk):

Apparently the Salafist Muslims saw the police as the protectors of the PRO NRW demonstrators while the police claimed that they only try to safeguard the Pro NRW’s right to demonstrate.

At first spreading the cartoons was forbidden but that ban been has been lifted. It is clear that showing the Muhammad Cartoons in front of the mosque served as flashpoints for these riots. Riots most often are not spontaneous, random and irrational but have specific logic and ritualized dimension. For example, Gaborieau (1985) focuses on the ‘ritual of provocations’: ‘codified procedures’ of deliberate disrespect, desecration, blasphemy, violation of sacred or symbolically charged spaces, times, or objects. First a selection is made of key symbols representing each community and as a second step the means by which symbols may be most effectively desecrated is chosen. In order for performative actions to ‘work’, they have to tap into deeply felt issues among people. The makers therefore have to be aware of their audience. It must resonate among the audiences, create and galvanize different social solidarities (that may be contentious) and the audience has to be active and participate in the ritual.

In defending such provocations often an interesting contradiction surfaces. Those defending these actions for example by referring to freedom of speech and freedom to demonstrate seem to indicate that, for example the Muhammad cartoons, are self-contained and that every action taken on by Muslims is external to it: it separates the act from its (possible) consequences. But by demonstrating in front of a mosque and then showing the cartoons it is clear that Pro NRW knows that the demonstration to be effective, it must be informed by prior knowledge about which boundaries can be or have to be transgressed to produce an effect. In this specific case the provocative nature of the demonstrations is clearly recognized in some media. The provocation however does not always result in counter-action. Pro NRW’sMuhammad cartoon contest did not yield that many reactions from Muslims or others.

Contested space

Often these rituals of provocations have a relation with contested spaces. Think for example about the marches and processions by Orange groups in Catholic areas in Northern Ireland. Van der Veer sees riots as a form of cultural antagonism, creating, expressing and reinforcing an opposition between the self and the other.

For the Pro NRW demonstrations their action seems to be designed upon and intended to reveal the picture of angry, irrational and fanatical Muslims who overreact against insults and provocations and thereby threaten the ‘absolute right of freedom of expression’. It is intended to zoom in on violence and intolerance among Muslims, and the fear for the ‘angry Muslim’. This fear combined with the frame of Islam as a threat and informed by an already biased representation of earlier events, turns these riots into an event that evokes values that are held fundamental such as the fear for a loss of social cohesion by blasphemous confrontation, for an islamization of society, blasphemy, and the freedom of speech. Or, to put simple, the Salafist affirm the negative stereotypes on which the whole action was based. Something recognized by other Muslim organizations, that condemded the Salafists actions as not according to islam.

The link between provocation and space was also clear a few weeks earlier when the Salafi organization The True Religion and its frontman Abou Nagie made headlines with the plan to distribute many copies of the Quran. At that time the Frankfurter DawaFFM was already handing out Qurans in Frankfurt. Although for a lot of people handing out Qurans was not so much the issue, the fact that it was done by Salafists (seen as intolerant and aggressive) was a problem and an attack on religious peace in public. These negative reactions were seen by some salafists as proof that the initiative was necessary in the first place (to give people first hand knowledge about Islam) and proof that society is indeed against Islam.

Although many of the Salafist Muslims appear to have a non-confrontational style and shy away from using violence, they also feel it is their duty to defend Islam and the prophet Muhammad:

Young German Muslims Defend Right to Protest – SPIEGEL ONLINE

They would never throw stones, they say, but they are furious because they perceive the cartoons as an attack on the Prophet Muhammad and, therefore, on themselves. Malik says: “The dignity of the Prophet is more important to us than our own dignity.” For this reason, he adds, they must defend themselves against this attack. They see it as their only option because they believe that no one has the right to insult their prophet, even if the perpetrators are only members of a tiny, far-right party waging an inept election campaign in the German state of North Rhine-Westphalia. A Muslim who protests against the cartoons, they say, is serving God.

Malik says: “On the Day of Judgment, perhaps the Prophet will ask: ‘Where were you when the name of the Prophet was defiled?’ I don’t want to have to reply: ‘Oh, envoy of Allah, I am one of those who looked the other way.”
[…]
Not everyone who is associated with the German Salafist scene seems as harmless and peaceful as these three young men. That afternoon, in front of the mosque, after the Pro NRW supporters had left, Martin, Malik and Koray were standing around with a group of Muslims who were incensed over Chancellor Angela Merkel. How could the chancellor allow the Muhammad cartoons to be displayed in front of mosques, they asked? One of the furious ones was Abu Abdullah, who, during the Bonn protest, had already warned the chancellor about possible attacks on Germans living abroad — unless she put an end to the anti-Islamic campaign.

Among the Salafist present were also some people from Einladung zum Paradies (Invitation to Paradise) and its leader Pierre Vogel issued a statement after the riots:

In this statement Vogel criticizes German authorities for being lax about violent against Muslims while being tough about ‘incidents’ such as these riots. One of the major risks in the rituals of provocation is overkill. Calls for banning the Salafist and equating their ideology with Al Qaeda’s could signal such overkill which often only leads to more radical answers and escalation. In particular when authorities refuse to talk with Salafists as seems the case now.

(Thanks to RS and CB).

2 comments.

Riots, Ritual and Rage – ‘Salafists’ and PRO-NRW in Germany

Posted on May 16th, 2012 by martijn.
Categories: Activism, Notes from the Field.

Last week several Muslims were arrested in Germany after riots during a protest against a demonstration of the German radical right wing party PRO-NRW. During the election campaign for the regional elections in Nord-Rhein Westfalen, PRO NRW organized a demonstration nearby a Salafist mosque in Solingen and in Bonn near a Saudi Arabian school whereby the demonstrators showed the Muhammad Cartoons published by the Danish Jylland-Posten a few years ago and that played a huge role in worldwide protests.

Ritual of provocation 

During their counter-protests the Salafists, according to the reports, attacked police and injured four of them. The majority of the Salafists usually do not engage in violent actions with weapens and this appears to be the first time they have let themselves to be provoked to such an extent that their leaders lost control. The next video in which we hear some of the Salafists in Bonn shout to their fellow protesters to stop throwing stones at the police, appears to confirm that (translation by Europenews.dk):

Apparently the Salafist Muslims saw the police as the protectors of the PRO NRW demonstrators while the police claimed that they only try to safeguard the Pro NRW’s right to demonstrate.

At first spreading the cartoons was forbidden but that ban been has been lifted. It is clear that showing the Muhammad Cartoons in front of the mosque served as flashpoints for these riots. Riots most often are not spontaneous, random and irrational but have specific logic and ritualized dimension. For example, Gaborieau (1985) focuses on the ‘ritual of provocations’: ‘codified procedures’ of deliberate disrespect, desecration, blasphemy, violation of sacred or symbolically charged spaces, times, or objects. First a selection is made of key symbols representing each community and as a second step the means by which symbols may be most effectively desecrated is chosen. In order for performative actions to ‘work’, they have to tap into deeply felt issues among people. The makers therefore have to be aware of their audience. It must resonate among the audiences, create and galvanize different social solidarities (that may be contentious) and the audience has to be active and participate in the ritual.

In defending such provocations often an interesting contradiction surfaces. Those defending these actions for example by referring to freedom of speech and freedom to demonstrate seem to indicate that, for example the Muhammad cartoons, are self-contained and that every action taken on by Muslims is external to it: it separates the act from its (possible) consequences. But by demonstrating in front of a mosque and then showing the cartoons it is clear that Pro NRW knows that the demonstration to be effective, it must be informed by prior knowledge about which boundaries can be or have to be transgressed to produce an effect. In this specific case the provocative nature of the demonstrations is clearly recognized in some media. The provocation however does not always result in counter-action. Pro NRW’sMuhammad cartoon contest did not yield that many reactions from Muslims or others.

Contested space

Often these rituals of provocations have a relation with contested spaces. Think for example about the marches and processions by Orange groups in Catholic areas in Northern Ireland. Van der Veer sees riots as a form of cultural antagonism, creating, expressing and reinforcing an opposition between the self and the other.

For the Pro NRW demonstrations their action seems to be designed upon and intended to reveal the picture of angry, irrational and fanatical Muslims who overreact against insults and provocations and thereby threaten the ‘absolute right of freedom of expression’. It is intended to zoom in on violence and intolerance among Muslims, and the fear for the ‘angry Muslim’. This fear combined with the frame of Islam as a threat and informed by an already biased representation of earlier events, turns these riots into an event that evokes values that are held fundamental such as the fear for a loss of social cohesion by blasphemous confrontation, for an islamization of society, blasphemy, and the freedom of speech. Or, to put simple, the Salafist affirm the negative stereotypes on which the whole action was based. Something recognized by other Muslim organizations, that condemded the Salafists actions as not according to islam.

The link between provocation and space was also clear a few weeks earlier when the Salafi organization The True Religion and its frontman Abou Nagie made headlines with the plan to distribute many copies of the Quran. At that time the Frankfurter DawaFFM was already handing out Qurans in Frankfurt. Although for a lot of people handing out Qurans was not so much the issue, the fact that it was done by Salafists (seen as intolerant and aggressive) was a problem and an attack on religious peace in public. These negative reactions were seen by some salafists as proof that the initiative was necessary in the first place (to give people first hand knowledge about Islam) and proof that society is indeed against Islam.

Although many of the Salafist Muslims appear to have a non-confrontational style and shy away from using violence, they also feel it is their duty to defend Islam and the prophet Muhammad:

Young German Muslims Defend Right to Protest – SPIEGEL ONLINE

They would never throw stones, they say, but they are furious because they perceive the cartoons as an attack on the Prophet Muhammad and, therefore, on themselves. Malik says: “The dignity of the Prophet is more important to us than our own dignity.” For this reason, he adds, they must defend themselves against this attack. They see it as their only option because they believe that no one has the right to insult their prophet, even if the perpetrators are only members of a tiny, far-right party waging an inept election campaign in the German state of North Rhine-Westphalia. A Muslim who protests against the cartoons, they say, is serving God.

Malik says: “On the Day of Judgment, perhaps the Prophet will ask: ‘Where were you when the name of the Prophet was defiled?’ I don’t want to have to reply: ‘Oh, envoy of Allah, I am one of those who looked the other way.”
[…]
Not everyone who is associated with the German Salafist scene seems as harmless and peaceful as these three young men. That afternoon, in front of the mosque, after the Pro NRW supporters had left, Martin, Malik and Koray were standing around with a group of Muslims who were incensed over Chancellor Angela Merkel. How could the chancellor allow the Muhammad cartoons to be displayed in front of mosques, they asked? One of the furious ones was Abu Abdullah, who, during the Bonn protest, had already warned the chancellor about possible attacks on Germans living abroad — unless she put an end to the anti-Islamic campaign.

Among the Salafist present were also some people from Einladung zum Paradies (Invitation to Paradise) and its leader Pierre Vogel issued a statement after the riots:

In this statement Vogel criticizes German authorities for being lax about violent against Muslims while being tough about ‘incidents’ such as these riots. One of the major risks in the rituals of provocation is overkill. Calls for banning the Salafist and equating their ideology with Al Qaeda’s could signal such overkill which often only leads to more radical answers and escalation. In particular when authorities refuse to talk with Salafists as seems the case now.

(Thanks to RS and CB).

2 comments.

Ayaan Hirsi Ali: Haat, Ongelijkheid en Vrijheidfetisjisme

Posted on May 13th, 2012 by martijn.
Categories: Multiculti Issues.

Ayaan Hirsi Ali is weer even in de Nederlandse pers.

Vrijheidsretoriek

Een tijdje terug schreef ze een stuk in Newsweek (The War on Christians) dat wat aandacht kreeg in Nederlandse media en nu is ze in Duitsland om de Axel Springer prijs te ontvangen ‘for her courage and commitment to freedom.‘ Het is opmerkelijk hoe makkelijk Hirsi Ali’s vrijheidsretoriek kritiekloos wordt aangenomen en in verband wordt gebracht met het verdedigen van Westerse vrijheden tegenover de islam. Zo stelde journalist Kustaw Bessems onlangs in zijn lezing voor 5 mei:
‘Voor een vrijheid die te ver gaat’ – China – VK

Wij zijn het land dat Ayaan Hirsi Ali uitkotste, omdat zij – zoals Laurens Jan Brinkhorst dat noemde – de vrouw was die een sigaret opstak in een munitiedepot.
Ik noem haar naam expres, omdat je die nooit meer hoort. Omdat ie irriteert. Geen credits voor het feit dat zij het taboe op geloofsdwang heeft doorbroken. Evenmin voor het feit dat zij ruimte maakte in het debat over de islam, waardoor andere moslims en ex-moslims, ook of juist zij die zich van haar distantiëren, daar in grotere vrijheid over kunnen spreken.
Ze is een van de vele lastige vlekjes die we hebben weggepoetst.

Hirsi Ali was één van degenen die pleiten voor een einde aan de pacificatie politiek ten opzichte van etnische minderheden, in het bijzonder islam en moslims. Zij pleitte voor een confrontatiepolitiek. En confrontatie doe je op twee manieren in haar optiek. Allereerst door te benoemen. Maar benoemen is natuurlijk geen neutraal proces. We noemen Marokkaans-Nederlandse jongeren bijvoorbeeld ‘Marokkanen’, maar zij zijn hier geboren en opgegroeid. We benoemen ze als Marokkaan en stellen vervolgens dat ze er niet bijhoren, dat ze moeten integreren. Maar we hebben ze net buiten de morele gemeenschap gezet door ze aan te duiden als Marokkaan. De kracht van dergelijke etiketten komt voort uit de macht om over de ander een waardeoordeel te creëren en daardoor een identiteit op te leggen. Vervolgens wordt er beleid op gemaakt. Met andere woorden vervolgens wordt er macht uitgeoefend over de persoon achter dat label. Hirsi Ali doet hetzelfde met moslims en deinsde er niet voor terug om haar boodschap zodanig te verpakken dat het moslims beledigde. Hoe zich dat verhoudt tot haar visie op benoemen, integratie en assimilatie werd misschien wel het duidelijkst toen haar om een reactie werd gevraagd naar aanleiding van de rustige reactie van moslims op het verschijnen van Fitna, de film van Geert Wilders:
Fitna is een blamage voor kabinet – Archief – VK

Het kabinet mag de 6 procent van de moslims, die als gevaarlijk wordt aangemerkt, niet bij voorbaat verwarren met die andere 94 procent. Het moet moslims de woorden voorleggen, die staatssecretaris Ahmed Aboutaleb, een moslim, sprak bij Pauw & Witteman: ‘Moslims moeten nadenken over de angst die heerst voor hun geloof. De meerderheid zwijgt en dat is niet goed. Wij hebben voor Nederland gekozen, juist vanwege de vrijheid hier. Dit moet uitgesprokenworden. Ik mis de stem die afstand neemt van het extremisme.’ Dit is de passende reactie op de kernvraag van Fitna.

De officiële verklaring van het kabinet, dat de film geen enkele bijdrage levert aan het debat, is dus ronduit onjuist. Fitna heeft zijn waarde al bewezen. En het blijft niet bij de wijze woorden van Aboutaleb alleen; andere islamitische groepen in Nederland zijn al bezig een tegenfilmte maken. Een tegenfilm, geen bloedvergieten! Woorden met woorden, beelden met beelden. Provocatie werkt dus. Zes jaar geleden vond Aboutaleb kritische vragen over de islam ‘pis – sen in het eigen nest’. En nu spreekt hij de enige juiste woorden. Zonder provocerende vragen te stellen, hadden we dit nooit bereikt.

Met andere woorden moslims moet door middel van verbaal geweld geleerd worden hoe zij zich moeten gedragen. Het is een poging tot onderwerping door middel van vernedering, netjes verpakt in vrijheidsretoriek en met een strikje verlichting eromheen. Gewoonlijk heeft ze in haar stukken niet heel veel behoefte om een en ander te onderbouwen en strooit ze vrij willekeurig met verschrikkelijke anecdotes uit haar eigen leven of incidenten van elders. Het is een beetje het niveau van Bart Schut die op basis van persoonlijke anecdotes weet te melden dat racisme in Marokko een groot probleem is en dat dat dus ook geldt voor Marokkaanse Nederlanders hier (of in een mildere vorm de kritiek van Said el Hajji op Schut).

Islamofobie

De retoriek van Hirsi Ali kent drie islamofobische elementen die de laatste jaren gemeengoed zijn geworden (ten dele ook bij ‘links’):
1) Culturalisme: Problemen met migranten worden benoemd op basis van cultuur. Migranten hebben een andere cultuur die anders is dan die van ‘ons’ en daarom per definitie conflicten veroorzaakt. Als er dan problemen zijn, dan hebben die te maken met cultuur. Een cirkelredenering waar je u tegen zegt en waarbij ervan uit gegaan wordt mensen dragers zijn van bepaalde culturele elementen en dat datgene wat men doet per definitie veroorzaakt wordt door die cultuur. Je zou dit een geculturaliseerde versie van racisme kunnen noemen. Cultuur heeft daarbij altijd betrekking op die Ander en is vrijwel altijd negatief en/of exotiserend en leidt tot conflicten. Dit zien we ook terug in het interview van vandaag van Eva Jinek met Ayaan Hirsi Ali en waarin ze zegt dat alle dialogen met islam onmogelijk zijn als de leiders de islam niet veranderen. In het geval van moslims en Arabieren spelen specifiek beelden over het Midden-Oosten een rol (‘orientalisme’ ja daar is het weer, en ja ‘occidentalisme‘ bestaat ook). In orientalisme is de ‘oosterse vrouw’ vaak onderdrukt, onmondig enzovoorts. De man heeft ook maar één optie: namelijk het onderdrukken van de vrouw.
2) Een populaire mythe in de Nederlandse samenleving is dat ‘we’ ons in de jaren 60 los hebben gemaakt van de kerk en dat we een tolerante en seculiere morele gemeenschap zijn gebaseerd op seculiere en seksuele vrijheden. Dat is niet alleen een mythe in de zin dat het niet (helemaal) klopt, maar ook in de zin dat het een belangrijke norm is die door linkse elite tot nationaal zelfbeeld is verheven en door mensen als Hirsi Ali en Wilders verder is verheven tot manier om mensen proberen uit te sluiten of tot assimilatie te dwingen. Dat er wel degelijk mensen zijn die dat secularistische project niet onderschrijven wordt vergeten. Zo stelt Hirsi Ali recentelijk het volgende:
Hirsi Ali: Breivik is product van politieke correctheid – Joop.nl

Ik denk dat landen die het wel hebben aangekaart, zoals Denemarken, dat de integratie daar beter gaat dan elders. Ik denk dat ook Nederland door Geert Wilders, door Pim Fortuyn en daarvoor mijn bijdrage, de bijdrage van mensen zoals Frits Bolkestein, het steeds maar het onderwerp uit de doofpot halen, dat heeft er toe geleid dat er geen geweld is tegen de islamitische minderheid.

V: Geen geweld tegen de islamitische minderheid?
A: Ja, dat is niet het geval.

Dat is natuurlijk onzin. Er is aantoonbaar wel geweld tegen moslims in Nederland en Denemarken zoals aangetoond in rapporten van het EUMC en anderen. Het verheffen van dit ideaalbeeld tot norm leidt ertoe dat onder meer orthodoxe religieuzen buiten spel worden gezet en de eigen samenleving schoon gewassen. In het geval van SGP-ers wordt geprobeerd hen aan te pakken door middel van het recht of men wordt geridiculiseerd of gedemoniseerd door hen te vergelijken met de taliban. In het geval van moslims komt daar een extra sausje bij door het culturalisme. Daardoor zijn moslims namelijk per definitie outsiders, mensen van buiten. Moslims hebben weliswaar gelijke rechten, dus formeel burgerschap, maar men behoort niet bij de morele gemeenschap want islam kent geen scheiding kerk-staat, geen gelijkheid mannen en vrouwen en (omdat moslims nu eenmaal volgens de culturalistische logica) gedreven worden door hun cultuur is er per definitie een probleem met die moslims.
3) Bovenstaande twee elementen kunnen we al in de jaren negentig terugvinden, maar hebben een scherper randje gekregen door 9/11, London bombings, moord op Theo van Gogh, enzovoorts. Islam is namelijk een veiligheidsvraagstuk geworden. Dat richt zich niet alleen niet op een dreiging van geweld, maar ook op het beschermen van waarden, normen, sociale cohesie en dergelijke. Het is deze securitisering die doorslag geeft in debatten over moslims en de maatregelen die tegen hen moeten worden genomen ten einde onze ‘way of life’ te beschermen.

Alles in Hirsi Ali’s verhaal staat ten dienste van die drie elementen. In haar recente artikel in Newsweek over Christofobie onder moslims is het doden van Kopten door Egyptische veiligheidsdiensten en het leger een aanval van moslims op christenen, mensen die Irak ontvluchten na de invasie door de VS worden christenen die vluchten voor moslims(zie Alessandrini op Jadaliyya). Iedere individuele moslim wordt in haar verhaal betrokken bij de ‘slechte’ daden van een andere moslim. Inderdaad heeft zij hiermee ruimte gemaakt in het debat zoals Bessems stelt, maar waarschijnlijk niet de ruimte die noodzakelijk was. Zij heeft ruimte gemaakt voor de radicalen, zowel onder moslims als onder anti-islam politici en opinieleiders. Waar bijvoorbeeld in de jaren’80 en ’90 al debatten werden gevoerd in sommige moskeeen over huiselijk geweld (één van de thema’s destijds van Hirsi Ali) werd dit juist na 2001 moeilijker omdat huiselijk geweld debat in politiek en media niet meer ging over huiselijk geweld maar over wij die ‘zij’ confronteerden met hun huiselijk geweld probleem. De film Submission I met haar directe link tussen de Koran en geweld en vol met orientalistische beelden (jaja) was daarvan het hoogtepunt. Dat was niet waar het probleem van huiselijk geweld behoefte aan had, maar dat maakte Hirsi Ali ook niet zoveel uit anders had zij destijds immers niet ingestemd met bezuinigingen op blijf-van-mijn-lijf-huizen.

De oorlog tegen islam

De tweede manier waarop de confrontatie met islam en moslims moet worden aangegaan is met geweld:
‘The Trouble Is the West’ – Reason.com

Do you think Islam could bring about similar social and political changes?

Hirsi Ali: Only if Islam is defeated. Because right now, the political side of Islam, the power-hungry expansionist side of Islam, has become superior to the Sufis and the Ismailis and the peace-seeking Muslims.

Reason: Don’t you mean defeating radical Islam?

Hirsi Ali: No. Islam, period. Once it’s defeated, it can mutate into something peaceful. It’s very difficult to even talk about peace now. They’re not interested in peace.

Reason: We have to crush the world’s 1.5 billion Muslims under our boot? In concrete terms, what does that mean, “defeat Islam”?

Hirsi Ali: I think that we are at war with Islam. And there’s no middle ground in wars. Islam can be defeated in many ways. For starters, you stop the spread of the ideology itself; at present, there are native Westerners converting to Islam, and they’re the most fanatical sometimes. There is infiltration of Islam in the schools and universities of the West. You stop that. You stop the symbol burning and the effigy burning, and you look them in the eye and flex your muscles and you say, “This is a warning. We won’t accept this anymore.” There comes a moment when you crush your enemy.

Reason: Militarily?

Hirsi Ali: In all forms, and if you don’t do that, then you have to live with the consequence of being crushed.

Dat is niets meer of minder dan een pleidooi voor het gebruik van geweld. Als Hirsi Ali een islamcriticus is, dan is Haitham al Haddad een criticus van de Nederlandse cultuur.

Vrijheidfetisjisme

In tegenstelling tot Al Haddad echter voert Hirsi Ali haar strijd onder de noemer vrijheid, redelijkheid en bespreekbaar maken. Dit is echter niet meer dan vrijheidsfetisjisme. Daarmee bedoel ik haar uitgangspunt dat absolute vrijheid van meningsuiting noodzakelijk is voor een open debat en dat met een absolute vrijheid van meningsuiting dat debat vanzelf komt. Overgoten met een moralistisch (we moeten voor de goeden zijn en dat zijn per definitie de mensen die dromen van vrijheid volgens hun eigen zeggen) en anti-intellectualistisch (want wetenschappers en zo zijn altijd voor nuance, stabiliteit en grijstinten en dat is verkeerd) wordt de vrijheid van meningsuiten een heilig goed met magische krachten die leidt tot meer vrijheid en democratie. Daarmee worden machtsverschillen genegeerd. Vrijheid van meningsuiting is alleen zinnig in een bepaalde politieke context. Daarom is ook de positie van chinese activisten (die Bessems noemt) niet helemaal vergelijkbaar met die van Hirsi Ali. Niet helemaal.

Want, in tegenstelling tot wat Bessems stelt, natuurlijk is Hirsi Ali niet  weggepoetst omdat ze irritant was (ook al zal dat zeker meegespeeld hebben). Nee wat er gebeurd is, is dat haar Nederlandse identiteit is afgenomen. En dat kon gebeuren omdat ze 10 jaar nadat ze in Nederland was, nog steeds gold als buitenstaander (want allochtoon). Het zou mij of Bessems nooit overkomen zijn, simpelweg omdat onze Nederlandse nationaliteit niet afgenomen kan worden. Deze vorm van structurele ongelijkheid ziet Bessems over het hoofd en Hirsi Ali overigens ook. Vrijheid van meningsuiting moet ingebed worden en gerelateerd worden aan andere rechten. Door die andere rechten (vrijheid van godsdienst, non-discriminatie, enz.) wordt de vrijheid van meningsuiting ook begrensd.

Hirsi Ali, en  ook Bessems en anderen, gebruiken vrijheid echter als een fetisj. Als er maar vrijheid van meningsuiting is dat komt het paradijs vanzelf: een open debat waar iedereen op gelijke voet meedoet en waar iedereen gehoord kan worden. Hirsi Ali gaat nog een stap verder. Doordat vrijheid in haar verhaal een ideologisch instrument is in haar islamofobische politiek, staat het niet alleen los van de context maar ook (of daardoor) wordt het gebruikt om politiek te bedrijven over de rug van groepen mensen heen. En dat is risicovol. De beperkingen op de vrijheid van meningsuiting zijn ingevoerd na de Tweede Wereldoorlog omdat men zich realiseerde propaganda die haatzaait en mensen geweld aan doet kan leiden tot daadwerkelijk geweld; vooral gericht tegen minderheden. Dat is een godwin zult u zeggen, maar daarmee niet onjuist. Uit tal van studies naar onder meer Rwanda, India, voormalig Joegoslavië, Sri Lanka blijkt dat propaganda die mensen onteert, ontmenselijkt, vernedert inderdaad vooraf gaat aan daadwerkelijk geweld. Een absolute vrijheid van meningsuiting betekent dat vooral die groepen in de samenleving die op tal van terreinen een zwakke positie innemen vogelvrij zijn voor verbaal geweld. Milde restricties van de vrijheid van meningsuiting zijn dan ook nog niet slecht. Immers, als je een dergelijke (indirecte) relatie tussen taal en actie ontkent, waarom zou je dan bedreigingen en oproepen tot geweld verbieden?

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Pop Goes Islam: Islamic Youth Channel 4Shbab

Posted on May 9th, 2012 by martijn.
Categories: Society & Politics in the Middle East.

Al Jazeera Witness – Pop goes Islam

The controversy surrounding an Islamic styled music channel for Muslim youth.
In 2009, Egyptian entrepreneur Ahmed Abu Haiba launched the world’s first-ever Islamic music channel. Based in Cairo, 4Shbab branded itself as “Islam’s Own MTV”. In its first few months on air, the channel shocked thousands of viewers and enthralled thousands more.

Abu Haiba set up the 4Shbab to provide an alternative to what he saw as the sinful nature of most music videos being broadcast to viewers in Egypt, across North Africa and the Middle East; to give Muslim youth genuine television entertainment without compromising Islamic values.

The launch money, and a substantial part of ongoing funding, came from Saudi backers. But after an initial strong start, a backlash set in. Despite winning awards, Abu Haiba increasingly had to defend his channel and its programmes against claims that it was “unIslamic”.

The Saudi backers cut their funding; his staff were unhappy about whose vision they were working to. And veiled model Yasmine Mohsen found that her attempts to launch a presenting career at 4Shbab fell in the face of conservative viewers who saw no place for women on television.

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Performing the Nation – Memory, Murder and Fortuyn

Posted on May 6th, 2012 by martijn.
Categories: Multiculti Issues.

Today it is ten years ago that Pim Fortuyn was killed. A flamboyant, openly gay, controversial politician who was the first to mobilize a constituency by connecting societal problems to immigrants. This did not only pertain to crime, low ratings in school and the labor market but also to a fear that native Dutch people would be alienated because migrants would threaten Dutch culture, in particular ‘backward culture’ from Muslim migrants would threaten to do so. He framed the problems such a way that culture seems monolithic and is based upon a negative definition imposed upon groups of migrants that are the bearers of this culture and whose actions necessarily derive from that culture; a culturized version of racism. With Fortuyn and increasingly so after his untimely death that the Netherlands was a moral community based upon citizens who find their virtue in adhering to secular and sexual liberties became dominant. Around 9/11 Fortuyn made plea for a cold war against Islam because it would threaten social cohesion and Dutch identity. In 1997 Fortuyn wrote a book called ‘Against the Islamization of Dutch Culture’ later republished as ‘The Islamization of Dutch Culture’ (note the change in the title). He combined his rhetoric of nativism with a strong anti-elitist and anti-left message.

In October 2001 I held a lecture for a group of foreign social workers on the Dutch multicultural arena. In that lecture I shared my thoughts about Fortuyn with the audience. Many of the foreign guests were shocked when I showed them quotes from Fortuyn but most of my Dutch colleagues then thought he would remain a marginal figure in Dutch politics. I told them I wasn’t so sure about that. Older studies from urban anthropology in the Netherlands already showed in the 1970s and 1980s that there was a potential for his message and it was my distinct impression then that it was gaining acceptance to state that one would vote for Fortuyn. I did not expect however that he would grow in his role as saviour of Dutch culture and society and that his constituency would grow so large. When he was killed on 6 May 2002 a nation wide mourning emerged that had no precedent in Dutch history as far as I know. Several interesting articles have been written about that. I will list three:
Peter Jan Margry, The Murder of Pim Fortuyn and Collective Emotions. Hype, Hysteria and Holiness in The Netherlands? Etnofoor: antropologisch tijdschrift 16 (2003) p. 106-131

The meteoric rise in the popularity of Pim Fortuyn and his political movement and its abrupt end, caused by his assassination on May 6 2002, was followed
by an outburst of collective emotion. These phenomena involve two waves of hype in which the media played a major role. Massive media attention for Fortuyn as a politician who was gifted with great charisma and was said to ‘speak the language of the people’, made politically-inactive social groups conscious of the potential role he could fulfill in solving the social problems with which they were confronted. His sudden death was consequently a great loss for his followers. The outpouring of public emotion that followed resulted in the creation of several spontaneous shrines, where thousands left messages, and which were visited by many thousands more. For a large part of Dutch society, the intense media coverage of this new phenomenon made these shrines preeminent
constructed foci for dealing with and processing Fortuyn’s murder. At the same time they functioned as ‘democratic’ tools in articulating criticism towards politics, and proved the hype to be an effective and meaningful one.

Margry, Peter Jan, ‘Performative Memorials: Arenas of Political Resentment in Dutch Society‘, in: P.J. Margry & H. Roodenburg (eds), Reframing Dutch Culture. Between Otherness and Authenticity (Aldershot 2007)

In this contribution I will focus on the actions and practices related to the temporary and subsequently permanent commemorative monuments set up for
Fortuyn in the Netherlands and Italy. The thousands of letters and notes deposited at these sites articulate a range of visual, written and performative messages that together help interpret and explain the Fortuyn phenomenon and his political movement. The narratives in these messages shed light on the nature and force of the widespread resentment toward politicians and authorities that suddenly manifested in Dutch society during the weeks that followed 6 May 2002. I have focused not on the material monuments but on their active effect or performative nature. Based on a substantive analysis of these documents and the media coverage at the time, I relate the significance of the memorials to the performance of those who positioned and created these in the public arena. In addition, I explore in what measure the performative effect has influenced public opinion in the Netherlands about Fortuyn and with respect to several subsequent changes in politics and society. To this end, I will review various types of Fortuyn memorials and will discuss theoretical constructs relevant for interpreting the research. In the ‘Arenas of Resentment’ section, I analyse in depth the significance and content of the memorials and texts as
a foundation for my concluding observations.

Nowadays it appears to be difficult to think about Fortuyn’s death without thinking about another murder, that of Theo van Gogh. As popular narrative goes he too is killed because of the freedom of speech and he as well was seen as a champion of the freedom of speech, albeit (just like in the case of Fortuyn) this was contested.
Irene Stengs – Dutch Mourning Politics: The Theo van Gogh Memorial Space. Quotidian. Dutch Journal for the Study of Everyday Life

On November 2, 2004, the provocative film director and publicist Theo van Gogh was murdered by a Dutch-Moroccan Muslim fanatic. The assassination occurred in Amsterdam, in the context of Van Gogh’s habit of commenting bluntly on just about everything, including Muslims, and his film Submission, which highlights the relation between the abuse of Muslim women and the Koran. A large ephemeral memorial took shape on the spot where Van Gogh died in the days that followed.

Taking the Van Gogh memorial as its empirical focus, this paper attempts to broaden the prevalent perspective of ephemeral memorials as localised spatialities by approaching them as performative, mediatised spaces that supersede their material boundaries. In this perspective, ephemeral memorials appear as ritualised sites that not only ‘are’ but at the same time ‘act’ and interact with the social reality that constitutes them. This contribution highlights the interdependency between specific practices of mourning, the sites that evolve from it and the hierarchies and power relationships involved in the media coverage. The article frames the material development of the Van Gogh memorial during the one week of its existence together with its development as a medium within the contemporary Dutch public debate. It draws its major theoretical inspiration from Victor Turner’s ‘social drama’, and Nick Couldry’s ‘myth of the mediated centre’.

What one can conclude from studies like these is how these rituals are not only modern rituals of mourning but also performances of identity, a sense of community and nationalism and political critique against the elite. Participating in it, whether by visiting places of significance or by writing op-eds defending and celebrating freedom of speech, these performances affirm the hegemonic idea of a moral community based upon secular and sexual liberties, nationhood but also articulate misgivings, anxieties, frustration and anger about current society.

Important in this case is also that the commemoration of Fortuyn takes place after 4 May (the day when the victims of World War II are remembered) and 5 May (Dutch Liberation Day, when the country was liberated from the nazis). World War II is one of the most important historical events and during these the fight for liberty is remembered. A few days earlier, 30 April, Queensday is celebrated turning the week into somewhat of an secular equivalent of the Holy Week. The feelings of bereavement, belonging, heroism, commemoration, anxiety and anger are appropriated by the collectivity and reproduced in the rituals. At the same time there is always a lot of debate about who and what to include in these days (should German soldiers be remembered as well or victims of the Israeli occupation of Palestine?) which makes clear that while particular symbols and narratives are made visible, others are simultaneously excluded from the national discourse. In particular supporters of Fortuyn have tried to turn this two day event into a three day event: 4, 5 and 6 May. It is in particular the notion of freedom and freedom of speech that has become central after the murder of Fortuyn. Somewhat cynical, one could even argue that nothing has been so instrumental in affirming the value of freedom of speech as the horrible and tragic murder of Fortuyn; since then freedom of speech is celebrated, sacralized and up to a point even fetishized as an absolute right of people that should have no restrictions whatsoever. Any distinction between critique about ideas and worldviews (religious or otherwise) and critique on persons seems to have been lost. Freedom of speech has become an unreflected and unquestioned dogma; people have died for it.

For the opponents of Fortuyn the significance is not that different although they do attach different moral evaluations to it even when subscribing to the same ideal of the Dutch moral community. GreenLeft leader Jolande Sap for example declared that Fortuyn was a dangerous opportunist and harmful for Dutch politics because his his idea and styles lead to fake solutions and people will realize that, creating a space for even more radical politicians than Wilders. For Fortuyn’s supporters this meant creating insult after injury and many of them publicly loath her statements. While for Fortuyn’s supporters he was the example and hope for how the Netherlands should be and could become, for his opponents he was and his the fear of a loss of social cohesion and exactly how we should not be. While 4 and 5 May connects people with national symbols, creates and consolidates solidarity by means of contact with experiences and people from the past. Although the hype of 2001/2002 has toned down, the remembrance of Fortuyn does the same for many people.

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Vrijdagfoto: Oranje Boven – Integratie in Beeld?

Posted on May 4th, 2012 by martijn.
Categories: Multiculti Issues.

Vrijmarkt in Amsterdam. Foto: via Twitter.

Terwijl deze week Wilders’ boek ‘Marked for Death’ werd gepresenteerd, deed tegelijkertijd bovenstaande foto de ronde op Twitter. Voor veel van mijn volgers was deze foto het bewijs dat Wilders niet alleen fout zit met zijn mening over islam, maar ook dat hij eigenlijk irrelevant is. Daarnaast zou deze foto het toppunt van integratie zijn. Ik ben eigenlijk weinig kritiek tegengekomen op deze afbeelding, behalve dan dat sommige toch liever hadden dat deze weggehaald zou worden omdat de vrouw in kwestie geen toestemming gegeven zou hebben. Die privacy is wel een kwestie vind ik. Natuurlijk als je in het openbaar rondloopt kan iedereen een foto van je maken en die op het web zetten. Het is openbaar en het blijft openbaar. Maar wat nu als die vrouw helemaal niet gelabelled wil worden als het toppunt van integratie? En ieder geval niet door weet ik hoeveel mensen buiten haar eigen omgeving gezien wil worden. Om enigszins tegemoet te komen aan die bezwaren heb ik haar gezicht geblurred. (Ja, ik weet dat het onzin is omdat deze foto inmiddels ongeblurred overal op internet te vinden is, maar er is geen regel die zegt dat ik daar ook nog eens aan mee moet doen.)

Bij de volgende foto is dat minder een probleem denk ik omdat de vrouw in kwestie niet herkenbaar is:

Koninginnedag 2012. Foto: Via Twitter

Minder verspreid dan de eerste foto, maar ook voor deze foto geldt dat deze symbool staat voor integratie volgens velen op Twitter. Klaarblijkelijk kunnen mensen met de kleur oranje religieuze, etnische en nationalistische grenzen overstijgen. In ieder geval tijdelijk, zoals ik ook eerder vaststelde met betrekking tot het nationale voetbalelftal en waarbij ik de volgende foto liet zien:

Theocornelissen.sp.nl Turkish flag in Orange by Turkish Dutch men

Opvallend in de reacties op de eerste foto vond ik ook de emotionele geladenheid ervan. Alsof mensen blij waren dat Wilders (in hun ogen) ongelijk heeft en dat ze dat nu konden bewijzen. Alsof men blij was een geïntegreerde moslima te zien (ik heb nergens de opmerking voorbij zien komen dat deze vrouwen gedwongen werden oranje te dragen, ook al is er natuurlijk wel degelijk sprake van enige, vriendelijke, sociale druk hiertoe). In tegenstelling tot kwalificaties die men uitdeelt aan vrouwen met een gezichtssluier (‘spoken’) vonden velen dit mooi en prachtig en voelden zich ook geroepen om dit publiekelijk te delen. Een moslimvrouw in oranje tijdens koninginnedag is voor deze mensen klaarblijkelijk een gebeurtenis om in het openbaar de gevoelens over het islamdebat met elkaar te delen op een manier die sterk positief geladen is en ook moet en mag zijn.

Toch is het identiteitsoverstijgende aspect minder groot dan we wellicht denken. Als ik oranje zou dragen zou niemand stellen dat ik geïntegreerd ben. Dat dat in het geval van bovenstaande vrouwen wel gebeurt, geeft dus te denken. Blijkbaar hebben zij een specifieke kwaliteit die het noodzakelijk maakt om hen om te vormen tot deel van ‘ons’. Of om juist te laten zien dat zij al deel van ‘ons’ zijn; vandaar wellicht ook de gretigheid waarmee de foto op twitter en facebook is verspreid. Deze vrouwen zijn dus voor veel mensen in ieder geval geen vanzelfsprekend deel van de Nederlandse morele gemeenschap; hetzij door specifieke kenmerken van de vrouwen zelf, hetzij door het debat over islam en moslimvrouwen, hetzij door een combinatie ervan.

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Godsdienstvrijheid onder druk? Vrijheid, angst en conflict

Posted on May 3rd, 2012 by martijn.
Categories: Important Publications, ISIM/RU Research, Religious and Political Radicalization.

Op vrijdag 1 juni wordt in Amsterdam het symposium Godsdienst onder druk? Vrijheid, angst en conflict gehouden. Nederland kent een traditie van grote godsdienstvrijheid. Toch staan de laatste jaren diverse religieuze verworvenheden ter discussie. In de politiek is de praktijk van rituele slacht onderwerp van debat, maar ook is er regelmatig discussie over de vrijheid van onderwijs (acceptatieplicht), de zondagsrust, het verbod op blasfemie, de tolerantie van ‘weigerambtenaren’ die geen homoseksuelen willen trouwen en het dragen van religieuze kleding en symbolen. In het kader van haar emancipatie-, sociale cohesie- of veiligheidsbeleid lijkt de overheid zich vaker te bemoeien met religieuze groeperingen. Tevens lijken seculiere en orthodox-religieuze bevolkingsgroepen scherper tegenover elkaar te staan. Dit symposium is erop gericht dieper inzicht te krijgen in de veranderende opstelling ten opzichte van religie in Nederland. Staat religie in Nederland inderdaad onder druk? En als dit het geval is, waaraan is dat dan toe te schrijven? Moet de toenemende druk vooral gezien worden als een poging van seculiere krachten om de rechten van seculiere en gelovige burgers gelijk te trekken of is er meer aan de hand en speelt bijvoorbeeld angst voor religie een rol? En zo ja, waar heeft dat dan mee te maken? Met een groeiende onbekendheid met religie, met een sterke behoefte aan culturele homogeniteit in een globaliserende wereld, of spelen andere factoren een rol? Hoe reageren orthodox-religieuze groepen op religiekritiek? En wat zijn de maatschappelijke effecten van de toenemende druk op religie? Spelen verschillen mee tussen ‘oude’ en ‘nieuwe’ religies?

Programma
10.00 uur – ontvangst met koffie
10.30 uur – opening
10.35 uur – mr. André Rouvoet: Overheid en godsdienst: een moeizame relatie
11.05 uur – discussie
11.20 uur – koffiepauze
11.45 uur – prof. dr. Paul Dekker: Christenen als buren? Religieuze tolerantie in Nederland in historisch en Europees perspectief
12.15 uur – discussie
12.30 uur – lunchpauze (lunch op eigen gelegenheid)
13.30 uur – parallelle workshops

Vrijheid
prof. dr. Gerard Wiegers: Religie onder druk? Reacties van islamitische en niet-islamitische organisaties in Nederland op het Zwitserse minarettenverbod
dr. Tineke Nugteren: Vuur, as en water: Grenzen aan de hindoestaanse crematierituelen in Nederland
dr. Bart Wallet: Ritueel slachten en godsdienstvrijheid in een seculiere samenleving

Angst
dr. Markha Valenta: Terror as Tsunami, Security as Dyke: Little Holland Takes on Global Religion
prof. dr. Judith Frishman: Mes en bloed: de angst voor joodse riten
dr. Martijn de Koning: ‘Salafisme is overal’ – Een radicale utopie en de constructie van angst

Conflict
dr. Sipco Vellenga: Religieuze tolerantie op retour? Hete discussies, kalme reacties en bedenkelijke effecten
prof. dr. Ruard Ganzevoort: Haatbaarden, kleuterneukers en een pannetje soep. De framing van traditioneel-religieuze groepen in het maatschappelijk domein
prof. dr. Beatrice de Graaf / prof. dr. George Harinck: Een probleem van orde. Religie op de nationale veiligheidsagenda, van 1813 tot heden

15.00 uur – koffiepauze
15.15 uur – plenaire bijeenkomst
15.55 uur – afsluiting dagvoorzitter
16.00 uur – borrel
Lokaties, aanmelding en overige info zie HIER.

‘Salafisme is overal’ – Een radicale utopie en de constructie van angst
In mijn bijdrage, die ook zal verschijnen in het tijdschrift Religie & Samenleving, zal ik in het bijzonder ingaan op de angst voor het salafisme. Ik zal dit analyseren aan de hand van het begrip islamofobie. Islamofobie beschouw ik als een structureel verschijnsel dat leidt tot het categoriseren en hiërarchiseren van groepen mensen die vervolgens de toegang tot de morele gemeenschap wordt gegund of juist ontzegd. Daarbij gaat het me niet zozeer om concrete uitingen van angst in de vorm van discriminatie en agressie (zie het rapport van Amnesty Choice and Prejudice – Discrimination against Muslims in Europe).

In mijn stuk gaat het om een analyse van verschuivingen in paradigma’s die we kunnen aantreffen in politiek, beleid en media en die betrekking hebben op migratie en het management van religie en in het bijzonder van moslims in Nederland. Vanaf het begin hebben alle natie-staten in Europa, en Nederland is geen uitzondering, programma’s om de bevolking op hun grondgebied te homogeniseren op het gebied van taal en cultuur. Iedere staat dient daarvoor insiders en outsiders aan te wijzen en deze vervolgens te reguleren. Deze categorisering en regularisering heeft met betrekking tot moslims een sterke islamofobische logica zo zal ik laten zien. Deze logica komt voort uit een drietal paradigmawisselingen. Als eerste het classificeren van migranten op basis van culturele (in plaats van sociaal-economische) kenmerken die aan hen toegeschreven worden in debat en beleid. Ten tweede de verschuiving in het idee van een morele gemeenschap. Waar dat idee voorheen gebaseerd was op het behoren bij een zuil, is er in de laatste dertig jaar een gemeenschapsidee opgekomen dat gebaseerd is op een ideaalbeeld van seculiere en seksuele vrijheden. Als derde en laatste de opkomst van het veiligheidsdenken: securitisering. Hierbij is islam tot veiligheidsissue verklaard. Die veiligheid heeft niet alleen betrekking op bescherming tegen mogelijke gewelddaden, maar richt zich ook op bescherming van het idee van de morele gemeenschap en op sociale cohesie.

Het salafisme heeft een plek heeft verworven als folk devil in de huidige morele paniek over ‘islamisering’ van de samenleving doordat het uitstekend past als exemplarisch voorbeeld van de ‘radicale islam’ tegenover de liberale islam die wel zou passen in Nederland als morele gemeenschap. Het salafisme, zo zal ik aantonen, wordt daarbij voorgesteld als een concrete manifestatie van die dreiging doordat het appelleert aan een aantal sterk gewortelde angsten die te maken hebben met migratie, etnische diversiteit en religie.

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Marked for Death – The Comfort of Wilders' War Against Islam

Posted on May 1st, 2012 by martijn.
Categories: Multiculti Issues.

Introduction

Muslims Debate asks Geert Wilders why he become anti Islam and what is his message to the Muslims | Muslims Debate

Without individual freedom, it is not surprising that the notion of man as a responsible agent is not much developed in Islam. Muslims tend to be very fatalistic. Perhaps – let us certainly hope so – only a few radicals take the Koranic admonition to wage jihad on the unbelievers seriously. Nevertheless, most Muslims never raise their voice against the radicals. This is the “fearful fatalistic apathy” Churchill referred to.
The author Aldous Huxley, who lived in North Africa in the 1920s, made the following observation:

“About the immediate causes of things – precisely how they happen – they seem to feel not the slightest interest. Indeed, it is not even admitted that there are such things as immediate causes: God is directly responsible for everything. ‘Do you think it will rain?’ you ask pointing to menacing clouds overhead. ‘If God wills,’ is the answer. You pass the native hospital. ‘Are the doctors good?’ ‘In our country,’ the Arab gravely replies, in the tone of Solomon, ‘we say that doctors are of no avail. If Allah wills that a man die, he will die. If not, he will recover.’ All of which is profoundly true, so true, indeed, that is not worth saying. To the Arab, however, it seems the last word in human wisdom. … They have relapsed – all except those who are educated according to Western methods – into pre-scientific fatalism, with its attendant incuriosity and apathy.”

Islam deprives Muslims of their freedom. That is a shame, because free people are capable of great things, as history has shown. The Arab, Turkish, Iranian, Indian, Indonesian peoples have tremendous potential. It they were not captives of Islam, if they could liberate themselves from the yoke of Islam, if they would cease to take Muhammad as a role model and if they got rid of the evil Koran, they would be able to achieve great things which would benefit not only them but the entire world.

As a Dutch, a European and a Western politician, my responsibility is primarily to the Dutch people, to the Europeans and the West. However, since the liberation of the Muslims from Islam, will benefit all of us, I wholeheartedly support Muslims who love freedom. My message to them is clear: “Fatalism is no option; ‘Inch’ Allah’ is a curse; Submission is a disgrace.

The above quote is taken from an op-ed Dutch radical nativist and anti-Islam politician Geert Wilders wrote a while ago for Muslimsdebate.com. It also sums up the way Wilders treats the relation between Islam as a set of doctrines and duties and Islam as local practice in his recently published book Geert Wilders, Marked for Death: Islam’s War Against the West and Me. (Foreword by Mark Steyn. Washington 2012, xviii + 286 pages, US$ 27.95.)

Wilders’ War

In this book he presents himself as someone who did his homework; his take on Islam is based upon his own personal experiences and research. He read books, consulted experts and so on. And all the ‘true’ experts (politicians, writers, intellectuals such Churchill and, mentioned here above, Aldous Huxley) draw the same conclusion: Islam is a backward, barbaric, violent religion and its book is written, not by God, but by an evil man: Muhammad (see also his speech). It shows Wilders as someone who is not afraid to call things by their name and who, subsequently, is the target of maltreatment by Dutch authorities and death threats. With this book Wilders attempts to insert himself in a line of ‘islamcritics’ such as Hirsi Ali who explain Islam to the audience based upon their own experiences with Muslims drawing upon and reproducing a singular narrative account of Islam whereby Islam is the monolithic system that explains the behaviour of all Muslims (albeit that Wilders is not an (ex-)Muslim). As he explains himself:

Leading a life like that got me thinking about some big questions. Western societies guarantee their citizens something that no other civilizations grant them: privacy. It’s one of those things you tend to take for granted unless you lose it. The importance of privacy is unique to Western society with its notion of the sovereign individual. In stark contrast to Western norms, Islam robs people of their privacy. Islamic societies—including Islamic enclaves in the West—exert tight social control that is indicative of the totalitarian character of Islam.

In his book Wilders calls himself one of the most pro-American Dutch politicians and in order to prove the threat of Islam he refers to the American war of independence. Like the Americans who liberated themselves from their British oppressors,the West now has to liberate itself from Islamization; the Islamic project of colonizing the West. He sees himself and his party as the enablers of a sea of change after years of ‘multicultural rotting’ and ‘parallel Islamic societies’. He criticizes American president Obama for being ‘naïve’ and in particular attacks his Cairo speech on June 4, 2009 where, according to Wilders, he showed moral weakness and appeasement and was as such furthering Islam’s political agenda and forsaking brave Muslims who stand up against the intolerant Islam.

Wilders’ message throughout the book can be easily summarized. Islam is waging a war against the West and ‘our’ individual liberties are at stake. It is a conflict between two civilizations: Europe and America on one side and Islam on the other side. At the moment Islam is trying to (re-)colonize the West with collaborating leftist multiculturalists in Europe and America who are limiting free speech in order to silence all criticism of Islam and destroying ‘our’ traditions and cultural identity’ with their cultural relativism. We are now at a final stage with Europe severely weakened and Islam as the last fortress of Western civilization being led by a weak president who has already submitted to Islam. And this threat of Islam is imminent as Mark Steyn argues in the foreword of the book:

Geert Wilders is not ready to surrender without exercising his right to know, to utter, and to argue freely—in print, on screen, and at the ballot box. We should cherish that spirit, while we can.

The widespread logic of Islamophobia

Now Wilders’ neo-fascist and islamophobic rhetoric would not deserve much attention here (and besides that, the book is rather boring and also shallow about his own personal predicaments) if it was not for three reasons. First of all he is a major politician in the Netherlands and still has a large constituency although he has suffered some setbacks recently. Secondly, although Wilders is very clear about his rejection of violence, his ideology does feed some extremists such as the Breivik case taught us. Furthermore his comparison of Islam with communism, but in particular nazism and fascism can work as an indirect call to violence; nazism and fascism were not beaten by drinking tea with nazis and fascists but by bombing the hell out of them. Thirdly, Wilders may be a radical nativist, but his islamophobic logic is widespread among a large part of the Dutch population and also among mainstream political parties. Allow me to clarify this latter point a little more.

I regard Islamophobia as a structural phenomenon producing and expressing a categorization and hierchisation of groups of people that are subsequently denied access or granted conditional access to the Dutch moral community. This Islamophobia is based upon cultural differentialism, an anxiety over the future of the Dutch moral community with its ideal of secular and sexual liberties and securitization. All three dimensions have emerged throughout the 1990s; years before Wilders launched his islamophobic campaigns and exactly when in the Netherlands a so called purple coalition was in power: conservative liberals, progressive liberals and social democrats.

1. Cultural differentialism: This is based upon and the result of ‘culture talk’, explained by Mahmood Mamdani as the idea that culture came into being
   

   […] only at the beginning of creation, as some extraordinary, prophetic act. After that, it seems Muslims just conformed to culture. According to some, our culture seems to have no history, no politics, and no debates, so that all Muslims are just plain bad. According to others, there is a history, a politics, even debates, and there are good Muslims and bad Muslims. In both versions, history seems to have petrified into a lifeless custom of an antique people who inhabit antique lands. Or could it be that culture here stands for habit, for some kind of instinctive activity with rules that are inscribed in early founding texts, usually religious, and mummified in early artifacts?

   Wilders follows this culture logic to its extreme by stating that Islam is the enemy of Western civilization in general and Dutch culture and identity in particular. This notion of a singular Islam that must be exposed and subsequently defeated is a recurring theme in his thought and that of most islamophobes. Most politicians and political parties however have a more disguised version wherein Islam is divided within itself between radicals and moderates (liberals). Nevertheless also the more subtle version sees the world as divided into monolithic culture blocs that are at odds with each other and that determine the behaviour of people who are the ‘bearers’ of that culture. It is the logic of irreducible difference that permeates almost all accounts about Islam; in that sense Islamophobia is racialized culture discourse.

2. Secondly, what is meant with Western civilization and Dutch culture? In principal, every citizen in the Netherlands is treated equally but the idea of cultural differentialism creates a citizen trap which becomes clear when we take the idea of moral community into account. As in every nation-state the Dutch political elite had its own strategies and programs attempting to homogenize the Dutch population by linking nation, religion and virtue. The secular regimes promoted the idea of virtuous citizens realizing their moral selves by conforming to prevailing ideas of what constituted a good life and doing good acts on behalf of the welfare of the nation-state. For a long time belonging to the moral community was based upon religion and worldview, or more in particular belonging to a religious or socialist pillar in society. This changed from the 1960s onwards when, as popular belief calls it, the Dutch freed themselves from the burden of religion. Belonging to the Dutch community became increasingly based upon accepting secular and sexual freedoms. In the 1980s and 1990s Muslims were already seen as not willing to integrate, not treating women equally, being influenced by foreign powers, having a loyalty towards their country of birth instead of the Netherlands and a preference for non-democratic political rule, and not recognizing and respecting the separation of church and state; a categorization imposed upon them that became more compelling when cultural differentialism became dominant in the 1990s and more focused on Islam after 9/11. It is now in particular Muslims who are feared because of their alleged opposition to these freedoms and their religiosity, which remind native Dutch people of the (religious) constraints of the past with regard to these freedoms and creates a situation in which Muslim are Dutch citizens but not part of the Dutch moral community; they will always remain foreign to a certain degree. The idea of a Dutch moral community that is hegemonic these days celebrates an ideal of a community of citizens who adhere to secular and sexual liberties with Muslims as the ultimate other.
3. Thirdly, because Muslims are insiders and outsiders at the same time, their is distrust and anxiety because people fear they will take over society from within, allowed by the leftist elite that is too lax because of a mistaken preference for multiculturalism. This fear is exacerbated because of terrorist attacks, problems with migrant youth and so on, in particular after 9/11 and the murder on Van Gogh in 2004. The result is that Islam has become identified as a security issue and not only because of the threat of terrorism but also of radicalization of Muslims that threatens social cohesion and Dutch values. As my colleague Beatrice de Graaf points out, not only islam has become a security issue, security is also culturalized and counter-radicalization measures do not only aim at protecting people from terrorist attacks but also to protect the idea of the Dutch moral community.

Notwithstanding the differences among the political parties, but most parties to a large extent subscribe to this specific logic of Islamophobia. The main difference is that most mainstream parties choose a strategy of pacification of Muslims in order not to endanger social cohesion. In order to do this they make a distinction between a ‘good Islam’ and a ‘bad Islam’ to use Mamdani’s words. As Yahya Birt explained, based upon Mamdani, ‘Good Islam’ can be relegated to specific areas in the public sphere, but when Islam is experienced as entering into the public sphere in an assertive or even aggressive way, it can be typified as ‘bad Islam.’ ‘Radical’ Islam divides the Muslim community and separates its members from their identity as integrated, tolerant and liberal citizens (cf. Birt 2006: 294). Wilders and his Freedom Party make no such distinction and for them Islam in its essence is evil. Wilders criticizes the pacification strategy of the mainstream party (in his book he extends this argument to the US, and for example criticizes US president Obama for being ‘naive’) and opts for a strong confrontational style and defends this by referring to freedom of speech (something Islam doesn’t understand anyway). He likes to portray himself as the lone brave voice who stands up for the native Dutch and is surrounded by collaborators, useful idiots and cunning leftists who only see Muslims as victims of Islamophobia. Like in his movie Fitna Wilders does not feel the need to support his claims by facts. What he does, like in Fitna, is selectively pick and choose violent and threatening events from all over the world and more in particular threats and violence against him (even when in the book there is no proof in all cases it were Muslims and/or migrants). In his rhetoric Wilders usually makes two points: first, whatever bad Muslims do it comes from Islam and Muslims do bad things because of Islam, and second, he is out there, alone, to fight his heroic battle to rescue freedom.

Now his rhetoric is easy to dismiss and to be exposed for the nonsense it actually is. We could point to the double standards applied by the West with regard to the authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. Promoting democracy in public but also supporting the regimes and their practices against their own citizens. We could also for example point to the revolutionairies in the Middle East who stood up for freedom, hope and fair chances. Not only do they challenge Wilders’ framework but one would expect, if Wilders is that freedom loving, he would have supported them.  But no, during a meeting in the European Parliament his party refused to pay respect to those innocent civilians who died during the uprisings. This exposes maybe the most disturbing element of his rhetoric, he is not really concerned with the plight of Muslims; a dead Muslim is only a service to his politics of fear, distrust and hate.

The preferred perspective is made visible and alternatives invisible. Wilders’ verbal and visual messages are carefully constructed and interact with social and cultural environments in ways which maximize their acceptance. The images of the Quran, terrorist attacks, headlines, a woman with Quranic verses are distortions and reductions of a multidimensional Islamic tradition symbolizing the more abstract idea of the ‘threat of Islam’. The power of this rhetoric and the bias it produces is, among other things, that it makes the message almost incontestable because reality is reduced in such a way as to be seen as inherent in the way things are. This rhetoric, because it refers back to actual incidents in which Muslims played a role and is informed by the widespread logic of Islamophobia, is predictable at the same time that it provides authority to the central message that Islam is a religion that incites to violence and hatred. This way the rhetoric of Wilders creates, expresses, and validates an opposition between the enlightened, tolerant Dutch and a dangerous, irrational, foreign and violent Muslim.

The comfort of the left
It may be relaxing and rewarding for leftist intellectuals and others to debunk Wilders , for his unfounded and outrageous distortions and to see him as a sign of a rise of right wing extremism in Europe but as said the triple paradigm shift is something that no political party in the Netherlands has managed to escape, notwithstanding some important differences among them. This is why conservative liberals and christian-democrats managed to work with Wilders in the, collapsed, government. This is why immigration policy was set up and implemented by social-democrats. Why the GreenLeft party also feels the need to join the debate on headscarves. This government did not collapse over the attempts to ban face-veils, or the (failed) attempt to ban ritual slaughter or over the new integration policy that in fact lifted cultural differentialism to government policy. No it ‘only’ collapsed because of disagreement over severe budget cuts. And it is not only the former government that expresses the need for a liberal islam but also the left wing political parties. The main difference between them and Wilders’ PVV is the latter having a much more confrontational style towards Muslims while the former employ strategies of pacification in order to maintain social cohesion. A recent report by Amnesty International shows how widespread the Islamophobic logic is and, even more important, how it is part of mainstream thought and normalized (I do wish however AI was a little more critical about the polls the refer to). According to AI “Governments should not introduce general bans on religious and cultural symbols and dress, and should end the practice of restricting the right of Muslims to establish places of worship.” and in particular the Netherlands should make its anti-discrimination laws congruent with European guidelines that also forbid discrimination on political and religious grounds.

The distinction most mainstream political parties and opinion leaders make between ‘good Islam’ and ‘bad Islam’ is certainly more nuanced than the position of Wilders, but is still based upon the three paradigms that constitute the logic of Islamophobia: cultural differentialism, the idea of a secular moral community and the securitization of islam and culturalization of security. What Wilders never needed to do was to make migrants, and Muslim migrants in particular, second class citizens. They do have citizenship rights but are not regarded as part of the moral community. Could it be that the ‘polite Islamophobia‘ of the mainstream parties is more damaging in the long run than Wilders’ rhetoric?

0 comments.

Marked for Death – The Comfort of Wilders’ War Against Islam

Posted on May 1st, 2012 by martijn.
Categories: Multiculti Issues.

Introduction

Muslims Debate asks Geert Wilders why he become anti Islam and what is his message to the Muslims | Muslims Debate

Without individual freedom, it is not surprising that the notion of man as a responsible agent is not much developed in Islam. Muslims tend to be very fatalistic. Perhaps – let us certainly hope so – only a few radicals take the Koranic admonition to wage jihad on the unbelievers seriously. Nevertheless, most Muslims never raise their voice against the radicals. This is the “fearful fatalistic apathy” Churchill referred to.
The author Aldous Huxley, who lived in North Africa in the 1920s, made the following observation:

“About the immediate causes of things – precisely how they happen – they seem to feel not the slightest interest. Indeed, it is not even admitted that there are such things as immediate causes: God is directly responsible for everything. ‘Do you think it will rain?’ you ask pointing to menacing clouds overhead. ‘If God wills,’ is the answer. You pass the native hospital. ‘Are the doctors good?’ ‘In our country,’ the Arab gravely replies, in the tone of Solomon, ‘we say that doctors are of no avail. If Allah wills that a man die, he will die. If not, he will recover.’ All of which is profoundly true, so true, indeed, that is not worth saying. To the Arab, however, it seems the last word in human wisdom. … They have relapsed – all except those who are educated according to Western methods – into pre-scientific fatalism, with its attendant incuriosity and apathy.”

Islam deprives Muslims of their freedom. That is a shame, because free people are capable of great things, as history has shown. The Arab, Turkish, Iranian, Indian, Indonesian peoples have tremendous potential. It they were not captives of Islam, if they could liberate themselves from the yoke of Islam, if they would cease to take Muhammad as a role model and if they got rid of the evil Koran, they would be able to achieve great things which would benefit not only them but the entire world.

As a Dutch, a European and a Western politician, my responsibility is primarily to the Dutch people, to the Europeans and the West. However, since the liberation of the Muslims from Islam, will benefit all of us, I wholeheartedly support Muslims who love freedom. My message to them is clear: “Fatalism is no option; ‘Inch’ Allah’ is a curse; Submission is a disgrace.

The above quote is taken from an op-ed Dutch radical nativist and anti-Islam politician Geert Wilders wrote a while ago for Muslimsdebate.com. It also sums up the way Wilders treats the relation between Islam as a set of doctrines and duties and Islam as local practice in his recently published book Geert Wilders, Marked for Death: Islam’s War Against the West and Me. (Foreword by Mark Steyn. Washington 2012, xviii + 286 pages, US$ 27.95.)

Wilders’ War

In this book he presents himself as someone who did his homework; his take on Islam is based upon his own personal experiences and research. He read books, consulted experts and so on. And all the ‘true’ experts (politicians, writers, intellectuals such Churchill and, mentioned here above, Aldous Huxley) draw the same conclusion: Islam is a backward, barbaric, violent religion and its book is written, not by God, but by an evil man: Muhammad (see also his speech). It shows Wilders as someone who is not afraid to call things by their name and who, subsequently, is the target of maltreatment by Dutch authorities and death threats. With this book Wilders attempts to insert himself in a line of ‘islamcritics’ such as Hirsi Ali who explain Islam to the audience based upon their own experiences with Muslims drawing upon and reproducing a singular narrative account of Islam whereby Islam is the monolithic system that explains the behaviour of all Muslims (albeit that Wilders is not an (ex-)Muslim). As he explains himself:

Leading a life like that got me thinking about some big questions. Western societies guarantee their citizens something that no other civilizations grant them: privacy. It’s one of those things you tend to take for granted unless you lose it. The importance of privacy is unique to Western society with its notion of the sovereign individual. In stark contrast to Western norms, Islam robs people of their privacy. Islamic societies—including Islamic enclaves in the West—exert tight social control that is indicative of the totalitarian character of Islam.

In his book Wilders calls himself one of the most pro-American Dutch politicians and in order to prove the threat of Islam he refers to the American war of independence. Like the Americans who liberated themselves from their British oppressors,the West now has to liberate itself from Islamization; the Islamic project of colonizing the West. He sees himself and his party as the enablers of a sea of change after years of ‘multicultural rotting’ and ‘parallel Islamic societies’. He criticizes American president Obama for being ‘naïve’ and in particular attacks his Cairo speech on June 4, 2009 where, according to Wilders, he showed moral weakness and appeasement and was as such furthering Islam’s political agenda and forsaking brave Muslims who stand up against the intolerant Islam.

Wilders’ message throughout the book can be easily summarized. Islam is waging a war against the West and ‘our’ individual liberties are at stake. It is a conflict between two civilizations: Europe and America on one side and Islam on the other side. At the moment Islam is trying to (re-)colonize the West with collaborating leftist multiculturalists in Europe and America who are limiting free speech in order to silence all criticism of Islam and destroying ‘our’ traditions and cultural identity’ with their cultural relativism. We are now at a final stage with Europe severely weakened and Islam as the last fortress of Western civilization being led by a weak president who has already submitted to Islam. And this threat of Islam is imminent as Mark Steyn argues in the foreword of the book:

Geert Wilders is not ready to surrender without exercising his right to know, to utter, and to argue freely—in print, on screen, and at the ballot box. We should cherish that spirit, while we can.

The widespread logic of Islamophobia

Now Wilders’ neo-fascist and islamophobic rhetoric would not deserve much attention here (and besides that, the book is rather boring and also shallow about his own personal predicaments) if it was not for three reasons. First of all he is a major politician in the Netherlands and still has a large constituency although he has suffered some setbacks recently. Secondly, although Wilders is very clear about his rejection of violence, his ideology does feed some extremists such as the Breivik case taught us. Furthermore his comparison of Islam with communism, but in particular nazism and fascism can work as an indirect call to violence; nazism and fascism were not beaten by drinking tea with nazis and fascists but by bombing the hell out of them. Thirdly, Wilders may be a radical nativist, but his islamophobic logic is widespread among a large part of the Dutch population and also among mainstream political parties. Allow me to clarify this latter point a little more.

I regard Islamophobia as a structural phenomenon producing and expressing a categorization and hierchisation of groups of people that are subsequently denied access or granted conditional access to the Dutch moral community. This Islamophobia is based upon cultural differentialism, an anxiety over the future of the Dutch moral community with its ideal of secular and sexual liberties and securitization. All three dimensions have emerged throughout the 1990s; years before Wilders launched his islamophobic campaigns and exactly when in the Netherlands a so called purple coalition was in power: conservative liberals, progressive liberals and social democrats.

1. Cultural differentialism: This is based upon and the result of ‘culture talk’, explained by Mahmood Mamdani as the idea that culture came into being
   

   […] only at the beginning of creation, as some extraordinary, prophetic act. After that, it seems Muslims just conformed to culture. According to some, our culture seems to have no history, no politics, and no debates, so that all Muslims are just plain bad. According to others, there is a history, a politics, even debates, and there are good Muslims and bad Muslims. In both versions, history seems to have petrified into a lifeless custom of an antique people who inhabit antique lands. Or could it be that culture here stands for habit, for some kind of instinctive activity with rules that are inscribed in early founding texts, usually religious, and mummified in early artifacts?

   Wilders follows this culture logic to its extreme by stating that Islam is the enemy of Western civilization in general and Dutch culture and identity in particular. This notion of a singular Islam that must be exposed and subsequently defeated is a recurring theme in his thought and that of most islamophobes. Most politicians and political parties however have a more disguised version wherein Islam is divided within itself between radicals and moderates (liberals). Nevertheless also the more subtle version sees the world as divided into monolithic culture blocs that are at odds with each other and that determine the behaviour of people who are the ‘bearers’ of that culture. It is the logic of irreducible difference that permeates almost all accounts about Islam; in that sense Islamophobia is racialized culture discourse.

2. Secondly, what is meant with Western civilization and Dutch culture? In principal, every citizen in the Netherlands is treated equally but the idea of cultural differentialism creates a citizen trap which becomes clear when we take the idea of moral community into account. As in every nation-state the Dutch political elite had its own strategies and programs attempting to homogenize the Dutch population by linking nation, religion and virtue. The secular regimes promoted the idea of virtuous citizens realizing their moral selves by conforming to prevailing ideas of what constituted a good life and doing good acts on behalf of the welfare of the nation-state. For a long time belonging to the moral community was based upon religion and worldview, or more in particular belonging to a religious or socialist pillar in society. This changed from the 1960s onwards when, as popular belief calls it, the Dutch freed themselves from the burden of religion. Belonging to the Dutch community became increasingly based upon accepting secular and sexual freedoms. In the 1980s and 1990s Muslims were already seen as not willing to integrate, not treating women equally, being influenced by foreign powers, having a loyalty towards their country of birth instead of the Netherlands and a preference for non-democratic political rule, and not recognizing and respecting the separation of church and state; a categorization imposed upon them that became more compelling when cultural differentialism became dominant in the 1990s and more focused on Islam after 9/11. It is now in particular Muslims who are feared because of their alleged opposition to these freedoms and their religiosity, which remind native Dutch people of the (religious) constraints of the past with regard to these freedoms and creates a situation in which Muslim are Dutch citizens but not part of the Dutch moral community; they will always remain foreign to a certain degree. The idea of a Dutch moral community that is hegemonic these days celebrates an ideal of a community of citizens who adhere to secular and sexual liberties with Muslims as the ultimate other.
3. Thirdly, because Muslims are insiders and outsiders at the same time, their is distrust and anxiety because people fear they will take over society from within, allowed by the leftist elite that is too lax because of a mistaken preference for multiculturalism. This fear is exacerbated because of terrorist attacks, problems with migrant youth and so on, in particular after 9/11 and the murder on Van Gogh in 2004. The result is that Islam has become identified as a security issue and not only because of the threat of terrorism but also of radicalization of Muslims that threatens social cohesion and Dutch values. As my colleague Beatrice de Graaf points out, not only islam has become a security issue, security is also culturalized and counter-radicalization measures do not only aim at protecting people from terrorist attacks but also to protect the idea of the Dutch moral community.

Notwithstanding the differences among the political parties, but most parties to a large extent subscribe to this specific logic of Islamophobia. The main difference is that most mainstream parties choose a strategy of pacification of Muslims in order not to endanger social cohesion. In order to do this they make a distinction between a ‘good Islam’ and a ‘bad Islam’ to use Mamdani’s words. As Yahya Birt explained, based upon Mamdani, ‘Good Islam’ can be relegated to specific areas in the public sphere, but when Islam is experienced as entering into the public sphere in an assertive or even aggressive way, it can be typified as ‘bad Islam.’ ‘Radical’ Islam divides the Muslim community and separates its members from their identity as integrated, tolerant and liberal citizens (cf. Birt 2006: 294). Wilders and his Freedom Party make no such distinction and for them Islam in its essence is evil. Wilders criticizes the pacification strategy of the mainstream party (in his book he extends this argument to the US, and for example criticizes US president Obama for being ‘naive’) and opts for a strong confrontational style and defends this by referring to freedom of speech (something Islam doesn’t understand anyway). He likes to portray himself as the lone brave voice who stands up for the native Dutch and is surrounded by collaborators, useful idiots and cunning leftists who only see Muslims as victims of Islamophobia. Like in his movie Fitna Wilders does not feel the need to support his claims by facts. What he does, like in Fitna, is selectively pick and choose violent and threatening events from all over the world and more in particular threats and violence against him (even when in the book there is no proof in all cases it were Muslims and/or migrants). In his rhetoric Wilders usually makes two points: first, whatever bad Muslims do it comes from Islam and Muslims do bad things because of Islam, and second, he is out there, alone, to fight his heroic battle to rescue freedom.

Now his rhetoric is easy to dismiss and to be exposed for the nonsense it actually is. We could point to the double standards applied by the West with regard to the authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. Promoting democracy in public but also supporting the regimes and their practices against their own citizens. We could also for example point to the revolutionairies in the Middle East who stood up for freedom, hope and fair chances. Not only do they challenge Wilders’ framework but one would expect, if Wilders is that freedom loving, he would have supported them.  But no, during a meeting in the European Parliament his party refused to pay respect to those innocent civilians who died during the uprisings. This exposes maybe the most disturbing element of his rhetoric, he is not really concerned with the plight of Muslims; a dead Muslim is only a service to his politics of fear, distrust and hate.

The preferred perspective is made visible and alternatives invisible. Wilders’ verbal and visual messages are carefully constructed and interact with social and cultural environments in ways which maximize their acceptance. The images of the Quran, terrorist attacks, headlines, a woman with Quranic verses are distortions and reductions of a multidimensional Islamic tradition symbolizing the more abstract idea of the ‘threat of Islam’. The power of this rhetoric and the bias it produces is, among other things, that it makes the message almost incontestable because reality is reduced in such a way as to be seen as inherent in the way things are. This rhetoric, because it refers back to actual incidents in which Muslims played a role and is informed by the widespread logic of Islamophobia, is predictable at the same time that it provides authority to the central message that Islam is a religion that incites to violence and hatred. This way the rhetoric of Wilders creates, expresses, and validates an opposition between the enlightened, tolerant Dutch and a dangerous, irrational, foreign and violent Muslim.

The comfort of the left
It may be relaxing and rewarding for leftist intellectuals and others to debunk Wilders , for his unfounded and outrageous distortions and to see him as a sign of a rise of right wing extremism in Europe but as said the triple paradigm shift is something that no political party in the Netherlands has managed to escape, notwithstanding some important differences among them. This is why conservative liberals and christian-democrats managed to work with Wilders in the, collapsed, government. This is why immigration policy was set up and implemented by social-democrats. Why the GreenLeft party also feels the need to join the debate on headscarves. This government did not collapse over the attempts to ban face-veils, or the (failed) attempt to ban ritual slaughter or over the new integration policy that in fact lifted cultural differentialism to government policy. No it ‘only’ collapsed because of disagreement over severe budget cuts. And it is not only the former government that expresses the need for a liberal islam but also the left wing political parties. The main difference between them and Wilders’ PVV is the latter having a much more confrontational style towards Muslims while the former employ strategies of pacification in order to maintain social cohesion. A recent report by Amnesty International shows how widespread the Islamophobic logic is and, even more important, how it is part of mainstream thought and normalized (I do wish however AI was a little more critical about the polls the refer to). According to AI “Governments should not introduce general bans on religious and cultural symbols and dress, and should end the practice of restricting the right of Muslims to establish places of worship.” and in particular the Netherlands should make its anti-discrimination laws congruent with European guidelines that also forbid discrimination on political and religious grounds.

The distinction most mainstream political parties and opinion leaders make between ‘good Islam’ and ‘bad Islam’ is certainly more nuanced than the position of Wilders, but is still based upon the three paradigms that constitute the logic of Islamophobia: cultural differentialism, the idea of a secular moral community and the securitization of islam and culturalization of security. What Wilders never needed to do was to make migrants, and Muslim migrants in particular, second class citizens. They do have citizenship rights but are not regarded as part of the moral community. Could it be that the ‘polite Islamophobia‘ of the mainstream parties is more damaging in the long run than Wilders’ rhetoric?

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