C L O S E R

Closing the week 5 – Featuring the Tunisia & Egypt Uprising

Posted on February 6th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: anthropology, Blogosphere, Society & Politics in the Middle East.

Most popular on Closer this week

1. Two Faces of Revolution by Linda Herrera
2. Verandering komt eraan? – De ‘Arabische revolte’ in Jordanië door Egbert Harmsen
3. ‘Telefoon uit Tunesië’ – Een persoonlijk verslag van de Jasmijn-revolutie door Carpe DM

Previous roundups: Tunisia Uprising I & Tunisia Uprising II

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Essential reading
Egypt’s Class Conflict | Informed Comment

Why has the Egyptian state lost its legitimacy? Max Weber distinguished between power and authority. Power flows from the barrel of a gun, and the Egyptian state still has plenty of those. But Weber defines authority as the likelihood that a command will be obeyed. Leaders who have authority do not have to shoot people. The Mubarak regime has had to shoot over 100 people in the past few days, and wound more. Literally hundreds of thousands of people have ignored Mubarak’s command that they observe night time curfews. He has lost his authority.

LRB · Adam Shatz · Mubarak’s Last Breath

Egypt has never been a democracy. The military has always dominated its political life. Even during the age of liberal nationalism after the First World War, when it had a lively parliamentary life, popular sovereignty was sharply curtailed by British power. Since the 1952 coup which brought Nasser to power, it has been ruled by military dictatorship, although the establishment of multi-party politics in the late 1970s brought a measure of cosmetic diversification. Still, autocratic though they were, both Nasser and Sadat ensured that what Egypt did mattered. Nasser’s failures were spectacular: the aborted union with Syria in the United Arab Republic; the disastrous intervention in the civil war in Yemen; the catastrophic 1967 defeat to Israel that resulted in the destruction of three-quarters of Egypt’s air force and the loss of the Sinai; the creation of a vast and inefficient public sector which the state could not afford; the suppression of dissent, indeed of politics itself. But he also carried out land reform, nationalised the Suez Canal, built the Aswan High Dam, and turned Egypt into a major force in the Non-Aligned Movement. When Nasser spoke, the Arab world listened. Sadat broke with Nasser’s pan-Arab vision, promoting an Egypt-first agenda that ultimately led the country into the arms of the US and Israel. But, like Nasser, he was a statesman of considerable flair and cunning, with a prodigious ability to seize the initiative. By leading Egypt to a partial victory in the 1973 war, he washed away some of the shame of 1967, and eventually secured the restoration of the Sinai. And though his peace with Israel infuriated the Arabs, whom Nasser had electrified, he made Egypt a player in the world. Under Mubarak, Egypt, the ‘mother of the earth’ (umm idduniya), has seen its influence plummet. Nowhere is the decline of the Sunni Arab world so acutely felt as in Cairo ‘the Victorious’, a mega-city much of which has turned into an enormous slum. The air is so thick with fumes you can hardly breathe, the atmosphere as constricted as the country’s political life.

The dignity of Egyptian youth « The Immanent Frame

As I listened, and watched the crowds listening, there were several moments in which a sense of disbelief was discernible amid the seething, boiling anger. Midway through the speech, I think that all Egyptians were asking themselves whether it was possible that their leader of thirty years did not hear his people’s demands. Is it conceivable that, despite the whole world having heard the demand for him to go, he would assert that he will remain in his position until his present term is over (in September 2011)? In other words, is it at all comprehensible that the message he is giving to his people is: “I do not care what you want . . . you do not know what is good for you . . . you have been manipulated . . . I will do as I see fit”? Does this Egyptian Nero not realize that he is burning his people?

Myths of Mubarak « The Immanent Frame

The term ‘secular’ and its conceptual affiliates are doing a lot of work in misrepresenting the uprising in Egypt. ‘Secular’ politics has been taken to mean ‘good’ politics (limited democratization, stability, and support for the peace treaty with Israel), and ‘Islamic’ politics is being translated as ‘bad’ politics (the myriad dangers allegedly posed by the Muslim Brotherhood and its allies). Accounts of the current situation in Egypt are handicapped by an inability to read politics in Egypt and Muslim-majority societies outside of this overly simplistic and politically distorting lens.

LRB · Adam Shatz · After Mubarak

From the Obama administration we can expect criticisms of the crackdown, prayers for peace, and more calls for ‘restraint’ on ‘both sides’ – as if there were symmetry between unarmed protesters and the military regime – but Suleiman will be given the benefit of the doubt. Unlike ElBaradei, he’s a man Washington knows it can deal with. The men and women congregating in Tahrir Square have the misfortune to live in a country that shares a border with Israel, and to be fighting a regime that for the last three decades has provided indispensable services to the US. They are well aware of this. They know that if the West allows the Egyptian movement to be crushed, it will be, in part, because of the conviction that ‘we are not them,’ and that we can’t allow them to have what we have. Despite the enormous odds, they continue to fight.

LRB · Issandr El Amrani · Why Tunis, Why Cairo?

When Ben-Ali fled from Tunis, he created a vacuum at the top of the state that was imperfectly but quickly filled. The initial interim government did not please many, but a sense of civic duty appears for now to have stabilised the situation without a resort to authoritarianism. Mubarak, on the other hand, created a security vacuum in order to spread panic. In agreeing to step down, he tried to ensure that the regime would survive. Egypt is not Tunisia, at least not yet.

Uprisings: From Tunis to Cairo by William Pfaff | The New York Review of Books

Dictators do not usually die in bed. Successful retirement is always a problem for them, and not all solve it. It is a problem for everybody else when they leave. What’s to be done afterward? The popular uprising that overturned the dictatorial Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali regime in Tunisia in mid-January sent a thrill of hope through Arab populations.

Leading Egyptian Feminist, Nawal El Saadawi: “Women and Girls are Beside Boys in the Streets”

Renowned feminist and human rights activist Nawal El Saadawi was a political prisoner and exiled from Egypt for years. Now she has returned to Cairo, and she joins us to discuss the role of women during the last seven days of unprecedented protests. “Women and girls are beside boys in the streets,” El Saadawi says. “We are calling for justice, freedom and equality, and real democracy and a new constitution, no discrimination between men and women, no discrimination between Muslims and Christians, to change the system… and to have a real democracy.” [includes rush transcript]

State Culture, State Anarchy

The central tenets of the “culture and anarchy” canard may be old, but they have taken on new urgency this week and now there is nothing subtle about the message: popular desire for the regime’s removal is ripping apart the Egyptian social fabric and hurting the Egyptian economy; the revolt isn’t authentically Egyptian, but the result of foreign agitation by the likes of Aljazeera and Hamas; the Muslim Brotherhood is behind the rebellion and they are the ones who will stand to gain the most from it; Muslim Brothers are radical Islamists; radical Islam is a threat to Western civilization. And so on. It does not matter whether the pieces of the argument are true. It does not matter whether they contradict each other. What matters is that they all point in a single direction: change = chaos and ruin, the end of civilization.

Yemen is not Tunisia or Egypt – CNN.com

“Yemen is not Tunisia.” These were the words that President Ali Abdullah Saleh spoke to his people on television last Sunday.

As street protests erupt in Yemen’s capital, it is not surprising that an Arab leader who has held power since a bloodless coup in 1978 would dismiss calls for his ouster.

But he was correct.

Informed views from the ground
The Egyptian Protests: A View from the Ground (The Beginning) | Waq al-Waq | Big Think

it has been an interesting week in Cairo. What follows is not analysis or expert opinion, but my own notes from the past several days.

The Egyptian Protests: A View from the Ground (Neighborhood Watch) | Waq al-Waq | Big Think

I sat in front of the bank, which has only one private guard, who is asleep inside. Megdi the guard keeps telling us to wake him up if anything happens. Still, I’m not sure what he can do. Megdi only has six bullets.

The Egyptian Revolution: First Impressions from the Field

This revolution, too, will leave traces deep in the social fabric and psyche for a long time, but in ways that go beyond the youth. While the youth were the driving force in the earlier days, the revolution quickly became national in every sense; over the days I saw an increasing demographic mix in demonstrations, where people from all age groups, social classes, men and women, Muslims and Christians, urban people and peasants—virtually all sectors of society, acting in large numbers and with a determination rarely seen before.

Shippensburg University professor recalls a roiled Egypt – Chambersburg Public Opinion

According to Dr. Karl Lorenz, Shippensburg University professor of anthropology, the people of Egypt have waited 30 years for government reform.

Lorenz lived in Egypt with his wife from August 2009 to July on a Fulbright Scholars Grant. As part of his proposal, he studied predynastic pottery style changes. Studying the pottery styles gave Lorenz insight into the unification of upper and lower Egypt and the rise to pharaohs. His wife researched and also taught at a university.

The rich symbolism of the square in Cairo – Philly.com

When she first traveled to Cairo for fieldwork in 1993, Farha Ghannam recalled, Tahrir Square was mostly used as a bus depot.

Today, it’s the battleground on which the future of Egypt is being fought – a space rich with symbolism and meaning, held and defended by protesters at the cost of some lives.

“There’s this feeling [among demonstrators] that ‘if we lose at Tahrir Square, we’re going to lose the fight,’ ” said Ghannam, an anthropology professor at Swarthmore College who studies the use of public space in Egypt.

tabsir.net » Dawn

I find it very difficult to assemble emotions, memories and impressions to respond to the events in Tunisia and Egypt. I have been responding sharply to others who seized the moment to offer their analysis. Certain characterizations of Egyptians did not sit well with me. I also fear that specific arguments are easily manipulated — that the centers of power who have so deftly dominated the media, huge sums of money and many segments of national elites will thwart the resurgence of popular resistance and demonstration of public will. But since those consulted by Barry and Joe and their “teams” are hard at work, spreading fear of a future Egypt non-compliant with the terms of Camp David, conjuring up the Islamist bogeyman, and (one fears) holding Hosni’s hand, we too should speak.

Tunisia
One Small Revolution – NYTimes.com

Tunisia has a relatively large middle class because of something so obvious it goes unremarked upon: it is a real state, with historical and geographical legitimacy, where political arguments are about budgets and food subsidies, not the extremist ideologies that have plagued its neighbors, Algeria and Libya. It is a state not only because of the legacy of Rome and other empires, but because of human agency, in the person of Habib Bourguiba, one of the lesser-known great men of the 20th century.

Tunisia analysis: Old guard, ‘new’ government | World news | The Guardian

The prime minister himself, 69-year-old Mohamed Ghannouchi, is a Ben Ali loyalist of long standing, having served since 1999. In Tunisia, he became known as “Monsieur Oui Oui” for always saying yes to the president.

To many ordinary Tunisians, these are worrying signs. In the words of a trade unionist quoted on Twitter: “Tunisia has got rid of the dictator but hasn’t got rid of the dictatorship yet.”

Egypt
The Egyptian Uprising: Facts and Fiction | Dissident Voice

There is really only one story here and it is ever so uncomplicated. This is an uprising against an octogenarian dictator who could have done us all a favor by retiring two decades ago. After he goes, the remaining 84 million Egyptians can sort things out among themselves. Everything else is fiction.

Brian Whitaker’s blog, February 2011

The situation in Egypt, as a friend from Alexandria described it to me in an email this morning, is “quite fluid and extremely scary”. It’s also very difficult to work out what is really going on behind the scenes.

Egyptian protesters: What I’m fighting for – Egyptian Protests – Salon.com

What’s too often lost in the coverage of Egypt’s violent clashes are the stories of the people fighting. This slide show offers a look at 10 individuals who make up the crowd of thousands gathered in Tahrir Square day after day. They are students, sailors, teachers, executives, government employees and members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Meet Egypt’s protesters — the people who are behind one of the greatest moments in modern Egyptian history.

Egypt Endgame | Marc Lynch

What now? I would say that the time has come for the Obama administration to escalate to the next step of actively trying to push Mubarak out. They were right to not do so earlier. No matter how frustrated activists have been by his perceived hedging, until yesterday it was not the time to move to the bottom line. Mubarak is an American ally of 30 years and needed to be given the chance to respond appropriately. And everyone seems to forget that magical democracy words (a phrase which as far as I know I coined) don’t work. Obama saying “Mubarak must go” would not have made Mubarak go, absent the careful preparation of the ground so that the potential power-brokers saw that they really had no choice. Yesterday’s orgy of state-sanctioned violence should be the moment to make clear that there is now no alternative.

Mubarak’s phantom presidency – Opinion – Al Jazeera English

The “March of Millions” in Cairo marks the spectacular emergence of a new political society in Egypt. This uprising brings together a new coalition of forces, uniting reconfigured elements of the security state with prominent business people, internationalist leaders, and relatively new (or newly reconfigured) mass movements of youth, labour, women’s and religious groups. President Hosni Mubarak lost his political power on Friday, January 28.

The Battle for Egypt | The Courier

Kuppinger: Before the uprising happened in Tunisia earlier in January few, including myself, would have foreseen the current events in Cairo. When the protesters in Tunisia were successful and ousted their dictator in a matter of days, it was clear that people in other Arab countries and here in particular, the vast ranks of the younger generation were watching these events very carefully. They took and compared notes. At that point it became increasingly clear that Tunisia could become a model.

The henchmen | Inanities

The use of hired thugs is classic Mubarak. The regime’s relationship with its people has always depended on intimidation and violence, which proved problematic with the wave of demonstrations and labour protests that have been a growing phenomenon since 2003 – acts of public police rage tend to put the tourists off. In 2005 elections young men were paid to sexually assault female protestors. Last year during the trial of two policemen accused of involvement in the death of Khaled Said a rowdy group of teenagers stood outside the courtroom and accused anti-torture protestors of being Israeli spies, before launching missiles at them. During the elections boys in matching t-shirts danced in front of polling stations while burly colleagues intimated voters on behalf of National Democratic Party candidates.

The who’s who of the has-beens – Blog – The Arabist

I know a lot of journalists (and even some normal, decent people) out there are wondering about the who’s who of the regime. As a person with a someone unhealthy obsession with the Egyptian regime for over a decade, I have been making charts of who’s who for a while.

Rich, Poor and a Rift Exposed by Unrest – NYTimes.com

Over the past several days, hundreds of thousands of Egyptians — from indigent fruit peddlers and doormen to students and engineers, even wealthy landlords — poured into the streets together to denounce President Hosni Mubarak and battle his omnipresent security police. Then, on Friday night, the police pulled out of Egypt’s major cities abruptly, and tensions between rich and poor exploded.

Egyptian Opposition’s Old Guard Falls In Behind Young Leaders – NYTimes.com

“Most of us are under 30,” said Amr Ezz, a 27-year-old lawyer who was one of the group as part of the April 6 Youth Movement, which organized an earlier day of protests last week via Facebook. They were surprised and delighted to see that more than 90,000 people signed up online to participate, emboldening others to turn out and bringing tens of thousands of mostly young people into the streets.

What’s Happening in Egypt Explained (UPDATED) | Mother Jones

What’s happening? Inspired by the recent protests that led to the fall of the Tunisian government and the ousting of longtime Tunisian dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Egyptians have joined other protesters across the Arab world (in Algeria, notably) in protesting their autocratic governments, high levels of corruption, and grinding poverty. In Egypt, tens of thousands of protesters have taken to the streets.

ZCommunications | Whither Egypt? by Gilbert Achcar | ZNet Article

The Egyptian opposition includes a vast array of forces. There are parties like the Wafd, which are legal parties and constitute what may be called the liberal opposition. Then there is a grey zone occupied by the Muslim Brotherhood. It does not have a legal status but is tolerated by the regime. Its whole structure is visible; it is not an underground force. The Muslim Brotherhood is certainly, and by far, the largest force in the opposition. When Mubarak’s regime, under US pressure, granted some space to the opposition in the 2005 parliamentary elections, the Muslim Brotherhood––running as “independents”––managed to get 88 MPs, i.e. 20 percent of the parliamentary seats, despite all obstacles. In the last elections held last November and December, after the Mubarak regime had decided to close down the limited space that it had opened in 2005, the Muslim Brotherhood almost vanished from parliament, losing all its seats but one.

“Revolutionaries on the Roof” « zunguzungu

Al Jazeera producer Evan Hill posted a (translated) video clip called ”Revolutionaries on the Roof” that deserves wide circulation. It is described as ”Young protesters occupying an apartment building near the site of fierce battles between pro- and anti-government crowds discuss their motivations, the events of the past two weeks, and the diverse make-up of Egypt’s democracy movement. (With reporting and translation by Lara el-Gibaly)”

Freedom, Democracy and the State
Too late for reform – Blog – The Arabist

I like Michele Dunne — she has been consistent for a decade on Egypt, and strikes the right tone here. I remember we sat together a couple of months ago and she laughed at the idea that Omar Suleiman could be a transition figure for Egypt. Here she argues that the US should not be backing Suleiman, it should be backing bottom-up transition.

Egypt’s two futures: Brutality and false reforms, or democracy

OVER THE past few days the world has seen a vivid portrait of the two sides in Egypt’s crisis. There has been the orchestrated brutality and cynical facade of compromise presented by the regime of Hosni Mubarak, who while clinging to his office until September is trying to destroy the opposition and ensure the perpetuation of 50 years of autocracy. In Cairo’s Tahrir Square and in other plazas around the country is the alternative: millions of mostly secular and middle-class citizens, led by the young, who seek genuine democracy and whose regular chant is “we are peaceful.”

Supporting democracy in the Middle East requires abandoning a vision of Pax-Americana

As the Mubarak regime turns to violence in a vain attempt to repress the peaceful protests that have swept Egypt’s streets for over ten days, the risks associated with current U.S. strategy for Egypt and the wider region continue to grow. In its response to the events, the Obama administration has subtly shifted its message, incrementally increasing pressure on the regime over the last week. But the more important story is the remarkable continuities reflected in the administration’s approach.

The Duck of Minerva: Egyptian “People Power,” Civil Society, and the U.S.

Notwithstanding the uncertainties, it is worthwhile to think more about the implications. In the long term, the events of last week would seem to mean more democracy or at least more democratic input into government in Egypt. Regardless, any new government will likely mean leaders less willing to do the bidding of the U.S., whether because of their own beliefs or because of the force of popular sentiment. (Certainly an important undercurrent in the journalistic reporting has been strong anti-American sentiments expressed by many of the protesters.) It is good that American policymakers seem to realize this. President Obama is quoted as stating several times at a high level meeting yesterday that “the outcome has to be decided by the Egyptian people, and the U.S. cannot be in a position of dictating events”–or, in my view, much influencing them.

David H. Price: Challenging America’s Pharaoh

Anyone who has lived in Egypt for an extended period of time or has traveled there for extended stays over the past thirty years should not be surprised at the current uprising. The only surprising thing is that this uprising didn’t happen years or decades sooner.

Johann Hari: We All Helped Suppress the Egyptians — With Our Taxes. So How Do We Change?

The old slogan from the 1960s has come true: the revolution has been televised. The world is watching the Bastille fall on 24/7 rolling news and Tweeting the death-spasms of Mubarak-Antoinette. This elderly thug is trying to beat and tear-gas and buy himself enough time to smuggle his family’s estimated $25bn in loot out of the country, and to install a successor friendly to his interests. The Egyptian people — half of whom live on less than $2 a day — seem determined to prevent the pillage and not to wait until September to drive out a dictator dripping in blood and bad hair dye.

ETHNOGRAFIX: Power, realpolitik, and freedom: Egypt and US Ideals about Freedom

What absolutely blows me away is how quickly some folks drop their supposed ideals about freedom and democracy when the people under consideration are far away (like in Egypt, for example). It’s shocking, actually, to hear some folks out there calling for the support of Mubarak as a close ally (check the comments section). I don’t get it. Democracy, it seems, only applies here at home. When it comes to a distant population like the people of Egypt, it seems that many people are willing to sidestep all of the rhetoric about political freedom and openly advocate supporting a repressive policy state, all in the name of “our interests.” Horribly ironic, no? Granted, the situation in Egypt is far from clear, but I definitely do not think that going back to the “support the nearest dictator who will toe the line” model is the way to go. Absolutely not. Anyway, here are some quotes that are apt for folks on all sides of the political spectrum here in the US:

But what about the Muslim Brotherhood?
Concerns about the Muslim Brotherhood: Israel Fears Regime Change in Egypt – SPIEGEL ONLINE – News – International

Israel is watching developments in Egypt with concern. The government is standing by autocratic Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, out of fear that the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood could take power and start supplying arms to Hamas.

Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt Opposition Party, In The Spotlight During Protests

In media coverage of the ongoing protests rocking Egypt, the phrase “Muslim Brotherhood” has cropped up more than once. Who is this group, and what role are they playing in the protests?

Why we shouldn’t fear the Muslim Brotherhood – War Room – Salon.com

To get some hard facts and context about the controversial Islamic movement, we spoke with Nathan Brown, a political science professor at George Washington University and director of its Institute for Middle East Studies, who has written extensively on the Muslim Brotherhood. What follows is a transcript of our conversation, edited for length and clarity.

5 Reasons the Muslim Brotherhood Won’t Turn On Israel | Politics | Religion Dispatches

These days, everybody’s in the business of panicking over the potential role of the Muslim Brotherhood. But rather than discuss where the Brotherhood has been in the past, I suggest looking to the future. Events on the ground are changing every few hours, so this is an exercise in informed speculation. Here are five reasons why the Muslim Brotherhood will find it very hard to decisively determine Egypt’s relationship with Israel. These five reasons complicate the assumption that if Mubarak goes, the peace treaty with Israel will come to an end.

Islamists at the Gates – NYTimes.com

But few Israelis really believe in that hopeful outcome. Instead, the grim assumption is that it is just a matter of time before the only real opposition group in Egypt, the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, takes power. Israelis fear that Egypt will go the way of Iran or Turkey, with Islamists gaining control through violence or gradual co-optation.

Muslim Brotherhood says it is only a minor player in Egyptian protests

The Muslim Brotherhood found its first martyr in Egypt’s popular uprising Friday, when a teenager named Mustafa Sawi was shot dead in front of the Interior Ministry. But the country’s oldest and best-organized opposition group had to take a back seat at his public funeral the next day, as the Muslim Brotherhood insists it is little more than a bit player in the outpouring of resistance to the regime of President Hosni Mubarak.

Don’t Fear Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood – Brookings Institution

Don’t Fear Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood

Egypt, Middle East Unrest, Middle East, Governance, Islamic World

Bruce Riedel, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

January 28, 2011 —
The Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia has sent a shock wave through the Arab world. Never before has the street toppled a dictator. Now Egypt is shaking, Hosni Mubarak’s 30-year-old regime faces its most serious threat ever. The prospect of change in Egypt inevitably raises questions about the oldest and strongest opposition movement in the country, the Muslim Brotherhood, also known as Ikhwan. Can America work with an Egypt where the Ikhwan is part of a transition or even a new government?

Egypt’s Islamist Riddle – WSJ.com

The 83-year-old Islamic movement, Egypt’s biggest opposition bloc, played a subdued role in the uprising. But its past performance in parliamentary elections and its dedicated following mean it will be a force to be reckoned with as Egypt moves toward open elections.

Washington’s Secret History with the Muslim Brotherhood by Ian Johnson | NYRBlog | The New York Review of Books

If this discussion evokes a sense of déjà vu, this is because over the past sixty years we have had it many times before, with almost identical outcomes. Since the 1950s, the United States has secretly struck up alliances with the Brotherhood or its offshoots on issues as diverse as fighting communism and calming tensions among European Muslims. And if we look to history, we can see a familiar pattern: each time, US leaders have decided that the Brotherhood could be useful and tried to bend it to America’s goals, and each time, maybe not surprisingly, the only party that clearly has benefited has been the Brotherhood.

Scott Atran: The Muslim Brotherhood Bogey Man

As Egyptians clash over the future of their government, Americans and Europeans have repeatedly expressed fears of the Muslim Brotherhood. “You don’t just have a government and a movement for democracy,” Tony Blair, the former British prime minister, said on Monday. “You also have others, notably the Muslim Brotherhood, who would take this in a different direction.” The previous day, House speaker John Boehner expressed hope that Hosni Mubarak would stay on as president of Egypt while instituting reforms to prevent the Muslim Brotherhood and other extremists from grabbing power.

And even more urgent, what about the jihadis?
Jihadis Debate Egypt (1) — jihadica

Not surprisingly, the jihadi online community is captivated by the uprising, but many are also bewildered about what this means for their cause, and their leaders have been slow to respond. Jarret Brachman has a point when he taunts Zawahiri: “Your Silence is Deafening.” As of Thursday afternoon, the leading jihadi forum Shamikh only featured a handful of authoritative responses to the events in Egypt, from pro-jihadi pundits, a legal scholar and other participants. However, not a word from the leadership. The closest thing to an official response is AQIM’s statement on the events in Tunisia (available also in translation).

Jihadis Debate Egypt (2) — jihadica

Such a response and the mere fact that this anonymous and murky EIJ figure, issues a message, and not a leading Egyptian al-Qaida member, is significant. Again, it demonstrates the jihadis’ irrelevance to the rapidly evolving situation in Egypt.

Uprisings and (new) media
What Al Jazeera Shows and Doesn’t Show | The Middle East Channel

But what television has brought to the world is only a partial reality. There is only Tahrir; the huge metropolitan expanse of Cairo and the families at home in neighborhoods are beyond the frame, oddly irrelevant. The participants in the revolution are the hundreds of thousands of demonstrators, not the equal numbers standing unpicturesque guard by night to ensure the safety of neighborhoods. TV shows a mass, not a massive group of individuals. This televised reality has become hugely controversial.

Wallflowers at the Revolution – NYTimes.com

Perhaps the most revealing window into America’s media-fed isolation from this crisis — small an example as it may seem — is the default assumption that the Egyptian uprising, like every other paroxysm in the region since the Green Revolution in Iran 18 months ago, must be powered by the twin American-born phenomena of Twitter and Facebook. Television news — at once threatened by the power of the Internet and fearful of appearing unhip — can’t get enough of this cliché.

Cairo Activists Use Facebook to Rattle Regime

ack in March, Maher and a friend launched a Facebook group to promote a protest planned for April 6. It became an Internet phenomenon, quickly attracting more than 70,000 members. The April 6 youth movement — amorphous, lacking a clear mission, and yet a bull’s-eye to the zeitgeist — blossomed within days into something influential enough to arouse the ire of Egypt’s internal security forces. Maher is part of a new generation in the Middle East that, through blogs, YouTube, Flickr, Twitter, and now Facebook, is using virtual reality to combat corrupt and oppressive governments. Their nascent, tech-fired rebellion has triggered a government backlash and captured the world’s attention.

Egypt protests: Police use Facebook and Twitter to track down protesters | Mail Online

Gabrielle’s dilemma is shared by many others whose activism, both online and on the streets, has brought them to the attention of the state security police.

While other protesters arrive and leave freely, thousands like Gabrielle – well-educated, middle-class idealistic young Egyptians who used social networking sites to ignite this protest – are beginning to feel trapped. Some say they are fighting for their lives, though they have thus far protested peacefully.

Why Tunisia Is Not a Social-Media Revolution | The American Prospect

commentators have held back with Tunisia, emphasizing that the uprising is a product of the passions and convictions of Tunisia’s people, not a 140-character status update. That’s a good thing. It means our conversations about technology’s transformative power are maturing past assumptions that the spread of the Internet means an inexorable spread of democracy.

But now is the time, perhaps, for a little backlash against the backlash. Scrubbing the Internet from the Tunisian people’s story leaves us with less than a full picture of this moment.

We’ve waited for this revolution for years. Other despots should quail | Mona Eltahawy | Comment is free | The Observer

But here now finally are our children – Generation Facebook – kicking aside the burden of history, determined to show us just how easy it is to tell the dictator it’s time to go.

tabsir.net » Streaming Revolution, Screaming Revolution

What happens when a revolution is not only screamed but streamed live? Can we reach a point where it gets as boring as a video game that we have played far too many times? Can our eyes become so glued to the riveting skirmish scenes in Cairo that we lose sight of all the other news that still gets generated. Sudan is having a referendum to separate south from north; Lebanon’s government has emulated Italy’s governing prowess once again (and Hizbollah has no Berlusconi figure in its ranks); world markets fear a closing of the Suez canal… and the list goes on but only with a few short notes at the bottom of the screen.

On The Media: Transcript of “Tunisia’s Twitter Revolution?” (January 21, 2011)

Demonstrators flooded the streets in Tunisia this week calling for an end to corruption and ousting President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. Many have attributed the wave of protests to the rise of the internet and social media in a country notorious for its censorship but Foreign Policy blogger Marc Lynch says it’s not that simple. He says the internet, social media and satellite channels like Al Jazeera have collectively transformed the information landscape in the Arab world.

Gladwell Still Missing the Point About Social Media and Activism: Tech News and Analysis «

In other words, as far as the New Yorker writer is concerned, the use of any specific communications tools — whether that happens to be cellphones or SMS or Twitter or Facebook — may be occurring, and may even be helping revolutionaries in countries like Egypt in some poorly-defined way, but it’s just not that interesting. This seems like an odd comment coming from someone who wrote a book all about how a series of small changes in the way people think about an issue can suddenly reach a “tipping point” and gain widespread appeal, since that’s exactly what social media does so well.

Thinking about the importance of communications “revolutions.” | Savage Minds

There has been a lot of talk about the importance of social media in recent world events. See for instance, here, here, and here. Some of the more astute commentators have referred to earlier technological revolutions and their impact on television: usenet, fax machines, television, cameras, telegraph, and even the printing press. One technology, however, always seem to get left out, maybe because it seems too “obvious,” and that is literacy.

Facebook and YouTube Fuel the Egyptian Protests – NYTimes.com

“Prior to the murder of Khaled Said, there were blogs and YouTube videos that existed about police torture, but there wasn’t a strong community around them,” said Jillian C. York, the project coordinator for the OpenNet Initiative of the Berkman Center for the Internet and Society at Harvard University. “This case changed that.”

While it is almost impossible to isolate the impact of social media tools from the general swirl of events that set off the popular uprisings across the Middle East, there is little doubt that they provided a new means for ordinary people to connect with human rights advocates trying to amass support against police abuse, torture and the Mubarak government’s permanent emergency laws allowing people to be jailed without charges.

Lecture Clarifies Social Media Usage in Recent Uprisings – CUA Tower – News

While many analysts point to “tweets” as the igniters of the recent revolution in Egypt, Dr. Jon Anderson of the Anthropology Department cautioned students on Wednesday night not to let social media hype drown out the human voices at the root of revolt.

His talk, entitled “Social Media and Politics of the Middle East,” sought to clarify the conceptions surrounding what has been termed a “twitter revolution,” regarding recent popular uprisings against long-standing dictators in Yemen, Tunisia, and Egypt.

Egypt may have turned off the Internet one phone call at a time | Technology | Los Angeles Times

Egypt’s shutdown of the Internet within its borders is an action unlike any other in the history of the World Wide Web and it might have only taken a few phone calls to do it.

MediaShift . What Role Did Social Media Play in Tunisia, Egypt Protests? | PBS

As the protests are playing out in the streets of Cairo and the rest of Egypt today, I have been glued to the live-stream of Al Jazeera English as well as the Twitter hashtag #Jan25, a top trending topic based on the big protests a few days ago. The Egyptian protests come on the heels of a similar revolution in Tunisia, where a longtime dictator, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, was ousted after young people organized protests via Facebook. We’ve heard about “Twitter revolutions” before in Iran after huge protests there in 2009, but how have things changed today? How much of a role has social media played in the turmoil happening in the Middle East? Will that continue to be the case? Vote in our poll below, or share your deeper thoughts in the comments below.

Other roundups
“A wonderful development” – Anthropologists on the Egypt Uprising (updated)

As you might have noticed, Wikan is argueing along siminar lines as the Western political elite who is about to lose an important ally in the Middle East. For them, “stability” is more important than people power, as Maximilian Forte and his co-bloggers on Zero Anthropology explain in several blog posts, among others The Fall of the American Wall: Tunisia, Egypt, and Beyond and Encircling Empire: Report #11, Focus on Egypt, Encircling Empire: Report #12, FOCUS ON EGYPT: Revolution and Counter-Revolution and The Song of the Nonaligned Nile (by Eliza Jane Darling).

Registering a revolution. Hail to the brave people of Egypt. A roundup. | Erkan’s Field Diary

Too soon to analyze, so here’s my outbox

Tunisia and Egypt uprisings – selected bookmarks « media/anthropology

Highlights on media, anthropology and the Tunisia and Egypt uprisings

anthropologyworks » Understanding Egypt

Political protests in Egypt are ongoing at the time of this writing, mainly in Cairo, Alexandria and some other cities. Who knows what will unfold in the near future? What do cultural anthropologists offer to inform our understanding of this new social movement?

Misc.
Yemen’s president says he won’t seek reelection, but he said that in 2005, too | Need to Know

Reality, however, is more than what happened in the last month. While some protesters in Sanaa have said they were inspired by the protests in Egypt and Tunisia, those two revolts did not inspire the protests anymore than my breakfast burrito did. There were protests in Aden during the Gulf Cup soccer tournament last November, protests over the parcel bombs in Sanaa in October, thousands of people protesting over the most recent round of fighting between the government and the Houthi rebels in the north in March. Yemenis protest routinely, and the last several months have seen a series of increasingly violent rallies across the entire country.

Top Ten Accomplishments of Egypt Demonstrators | Informed Comment

The protest movement in Egypt scored several victories on Friday, but did not actually succeed in getting President Hosni Mubarak to step down. Their accomplishments include:

Of people and things: Egyptian protest and cultural properties « The Berkeley Blog

In a post on the Berkeley Blog, Samuel Redman makes an argument that urges protection of antiquities be emphasized in the face of current events in Egypt, arguing that mummies are “shared global heritage”.

I addressed similar questions in writing a post on my Ancient Bodies, Ancient Lives blog about unconfirmed reports of possible damage to a unique tomb, that of the woman identified as the wet nurse of Tutankhamon. But in writing my post, I subordinated questions of the destruction of antiquities to the critical moment facing Egypt today, which concerns the future of living men and women.

Dutch
Egypte, een langzame revolutie – Vrij Nederland

Opeens is iedereen Egypte­deskundige. Een van de grappigste opmerkingen die ik, via Twitter, tegenkwam, was die van Elseviers René van Rijckevorsel dat ‘een langzame evolutie naar een eerlijker Egypte’ beter is. Voor de volledigheid haalt Van Rijckevorsel er het uitgekauwde doembeeld van veertig procent analfabete Egyptenaren en de alomtegenwoordige Moslimbroederschap bij. Volgens hem zijn er twee opties: het Iran- of het Algerije-scenario.

Frontaal Naakt. » Tunesië

Het opvallende aan Tunesië is dat het in zeer korte tijd geëscaleerd is, terwijl er in Egypte al jaren protest is tegen het presidentschap van Moubarak. Het laatste half jaar zijn er regelmatig zeer grote en ingrijpende demonstraties geweest, waarbij zelfs sprake was van een coalitie van de gehele oppositie. Desalniettemin zijn de Egyptenaren er nog niet in geslaagd af te komen van La Vache Qui Rit, zoals Moubarak wordt genoemd. De vraag is of dit door steun van de VS komt, of omdat er in Egypte ondanks alles meer uitingsvrijheid en ruimte was dan in Tunesië. Een organisatie als Kifaya, die strijdt tegen de heerschappij van Moubarak, zou tot voor kort ondenkbaar zijn geweest in Tunesië.

Best of Blogs: #25jan (links galore) | DeJaap

Wellicht ter compensatie voor de maanden(jaren?)lange media-afwezigheid zond de NOS vanmiddag live uit over Egypte. Maar in tegenstelling tot de Egyptenaren (tot vanmiddag) heeft u wel toegang tot internet en daarmee toegang tot dezelfde bronnen waar de NOS-correspondenten ook gebruik van maken.

Uiteengespatte droom stimuleert Egyptische opstand – de Volkskrant – Opinie

De afgelopen jaren kenden eigenlijk geen moment zonder protesten tegen het regime, maar de huidige volksopstand is ongekend en kan onmogelijk genegeerd worden. Het Tunesische voorbeeld gaf Egyptenaren hoop en de moed het veiligheidsapparaat te trotseren en hun al jaren breed gedragen afkeer van Mubaraks regime te uiten. Jongeren zijn de stuwende kracht achter de volksopstand in Egypte. Wat zijn de achtergronden van hun frustratie, woede en moed?

Wat is er aan de hand in de Arabische wereld? | Standplaats Wereld

Door Erik van Ommering … hoor ik u denken deze dagen! Nu eens geen heibel tussen Palestijnen en Israëliërs, maar revolutie in Tunesië, opstand in Egypte, rellen in Jemen, demonstraties in Jordanië, protesten in Libanon – waar gaat dat heen? Vanuit mijn positie als onderzoeker in het laatstgenoemde land zal ik een poging in de richting van een antwoord wagen – waarbij ik me bewust ben van de snelheid waarmee de huidige gebeurtenissen mijn relaas ongetwijfeld zullen inhalen. Hierbij nu eens een macro-analyse door een antropoloog!

Turbulente week in Caïro | Standplaats Wereld

Verbaasd lees ik terug hoe één van mijn eerste veldwerknotities, van een paar weken geleden, de acceptatie en leegte in de ogen van de taxichauffeur beschrijft die me van het vliegveld naar de stad brengt. Dat lijkt een ander land een eeuwigheid geleden. Door Police Day (25 januari) begonnen dingen langzaam te veranderen met als climax en epicentrum de Miljoenen Mars op Midan Tahrir (2 februari).

4 comments.

Closing the week 5 – Featuring the Tunisia & Egypt Uprising

Posted on February 6th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: anthropology, Blogosphere, Society & Politics in the Middle East.

Most popular on Closer this week

1. Two Faces of Revolution by Linda Herrera
2. Verandering komt eraan? – De ‘Arabische revolte’ in Jordanië door Egbert Harmsen
3. ‘Telefoon uit Tunesië’ – Een persoonlijk verslag van de Jasmijn-revolutie door Carpe DM

Previous roundups: Tunisia Uprising I & Tunisia Uprising II

• If you want to stay updated and did not subscribe yet, you can do so HERE

• You can follow me on Twitter: Martijn5155

Essential reading
Egypt’s Class Conflict | Informed Comment

Why has the Egyptian state lost its legitimacy? Max Weber distinguished between power and authority. Power flows from the barrel of a gun, and the Egyptian state still has plenty of those. But Weber defines authority as the likelihood that a command will be obeyed. Leaders who have authority do not have to shoot people. The Mubarak regime has had to shoot over 100 people in the past few days, and wound more. Literally hundreds of thousands of people have ignored Mubarak’s command that they observe night time curfews. He has lost his authority.

LRB · Adam Shatz · Mubarak’s Last Breath

Egypt has never been a democracy. The military has always dominated its political life. Even during the age of liberal nationalism after the First World War, when it had a lively parliamentary life, popular sovereignty was sharply curtailed by British power. Since the 1952 coup which brought Nasser to power, it has been ruled by military dictatorship, although the establishment of multi-party politics in the late 1970s brought a measure of cosmetic diversification. Still, autocratic though they were, both Nasser and Sadat ensured that what Egypt did mattered. Nasser’s failures were spectacular: the aborted union with Syria in the United Arab Republic; the disastrous intervention in the civil war in Yemen; the catastrophic 1967 defeat to Israel that resulted in the destruction of three-quarters of Egypt’s air force and the loss of the Sinai; the creation of a vast and inefficient public sector which the state could not afford; the suppression of dissent, indeed of politics itself. But he also carried out land reform, nationalised the Suez Canal, built the Aswan High Dam, and turned Egypt into a major force in the Non-Aligned Movement. When Nasser spoke, the Arab world listened. Sadat broke with Nasser’s pan-Arab vision, promoting an Egypt-first agenda that ultimately led the country into the arms of the US and Israel. But, like Nasser, he was a statesman of considerable flair and cunning, with a prodigious ability to seize the initiative. By leading Egypt to a partial victory in the 1973 war, he washed away some of the shame of 1967, and eventually secured the restoration of the Sinai. And though his peace with Israel infuriated the Arabs, whom Nasser had electrified, he made Egypt a player in the world. Under Mubarak, Egypt, the ‘mother of the earth’ (umm idduniya), has seen its influence plummet. Nowhere is the decline of the Sunni Arab world so acutely felt as in Cairo ‘the Victorious’, a mega-city much of which has turned into an enormous slum. The air is so thick with fumes you can hardly breathe, the atmosphere as constricted as the country’s political life.

The dignity of Egyptian youth « The Immanent Frame

As I listened, and watched the crowds listening, there were several moments in which a sense of disbelief was discernible amid the seething, boiling anger. Midway through the speech, I think that all Egyptians were asking themselves whether it was possible that their leader of thirty years did not hear his people’s demands. Is it conceivable that, despite the whole world having heard the demand for him to go, he would assert that he will remain in his position until his present term is over (in September 2011)? In other words, is it at all comprehensible that the message he is giving to his people is: “I do not care what you want . . . you do not know what is good for you . . . you have been manipulated . . . I will do as I see fit”? Does this Egyptian Nero not realize that he is burning his people?

Myths of Mubarak « The Immanent Frame

The term ‘secular’ and its conceptual affiliates are doing a lot of work in misrepresenting the uprising in Egypt. ‘Secular’ politics has been taken to mean ‘good’ politics (limited democratization, stability, and support for the peace treaty with Israel), and ‘Islamic’ politics is being translated as ‘bad’ politics (the myriad dangers allegedly posed by the Muslim Brotherhood and its allies). Accounts of the current situation in Egypt are handicapped by an inability to read politics in Egypt and Muslim-majority societies outside of this overly simplistic and politically distorting lens.

LRB · Adam Shatz · After Mubarak

From the Obama administration we can expect criticisms of the crackdown, prayers for peace, and more calls for ‘restraint’ on ‘both sides’ – as if there were symmetry between unarmed protesters and the military regime – but Suleiman will be given the benefit of the doubt. Unlike ElBaradei, he’s a man Washington knows it can deal with. The men and women congregating in Tahrir Square have the misfortune to live in a country that shares a border with Israel, and to be fighting a regime that for the last three decades has provided indispensable services to the US. They are well aware of this. They know that if the West allows the Egyptian movement to be crushed, it will be, in part, because of the conviction that ‘we are not them,’ and that we can’t allow them to have what we have. Despite the enormous odds, they continue to fight.

LRB · Issandr El Amrani · Why Tunis, Why Cairo?

When Ben-Ali fled from Tunis, he created a vacuum at the top of the state that was imperfectly but quickly filled. The initial interim government did not please many, but a sense of civic duty appears for now to have stabilised the situation without a resort to authoritarianism. Mubarak, on the other hand, created a security vacuum in order to spread panic. In agreeing to step down, he tried to ensure that the regime would survive. Egypt is not Tunisia, at least not yet.

Uprisings: From Tunis to Cairo by William Pfaff | The New York Review of Books

Dictators do not usually die in bed. Successful retirement is always a problem for them, and not all solve it. It is a problem for everybody else when they leave. What’s to be done afterward? The popular uprising that overturned the dictatorial Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali regime in Tunisia in mid-January sent a thrill of hope through Arab populations.

Leading Egyptian Feminist, Nawal El Saadawi: “Women and Girls are Beside Boys in the Streets”

Renowned feminist and human rights activist Nawal El Saadawi was a political prisoner and exiled from Egypt for years. Now she has returned to Cairo, and she joins us to discuss the role of women during the last seven days of unprecedented protests. “Women and girls are beside boys in the streets,” El Saadawi says. “We are calling for justice, freedom and equality, and real democracy and a new constitution, no discrimination between men and women, no discrimination between Muslims and Christians, to change the system… and to have a real democracy.” [includes rush transcript]

State Culture, State Anarchy

The central tenets of the “culture and anarchy” canard may be old, but they have taken on new urgency this week and now there is nothing subtle about the message: popular desire for the regime’s removal is ripping apart the Egyptian social fabric and hurting the Egyptian economy; the revolt isn’t authentically Egyptian, but the result of foreign agitation by the likes of Aljazeera and Hamas; the Muslim Brotherhood is behind the rebellion and they are the ones who will stand to gain the most from it; Muslim Brothers are radical Islamists; radical Islam is a threat to Western civilization. And so on. It does not matter whether the pieces of the argument are true. It does not matter whether they contradict each other. What matters is that they all point in a single direction: change = chaos and ruin, the end of civilization.

Yemen is not Tunisia or Egypt – CNN.com

“Yemen is not Tunisia.” These were the words that President Ali Abdullah Saleh spoke to his people on television last Sunday.

As street protests erupt in Yemen’s capital, it is not surprising that an Arab leader who has held power since a bloodless coup in 1978 would dismiss calls for his ouster.

But he was correct.

Informed views from the ground
The Egyptian Protests: A View from the Ground (The Beginning) | Waq al-Waq | Big Think

it has been an interesting week in Cairo. What follows is not analysis or expert opinion, but my own notes from the past several days.

The Egyptian Protests: A View from the Ground (Neighborhood Watch) | Waq al-Waq | Big Think

I sat in front of the bank, which has only one private guard, who is asleep inside. Megdi the guard keeps telling us to wake him up if anything happens. Still, I’m not sure what he can do. Megdi only has six bullets.

The Egyptian Revolution: First Impressions from the Field

This revolution, too, will leave traces deep in the social fabric and psyche for a long time, but in ways that go beyond the youth. While the youth were the driving force in the earlier days, the revolution quickly became national in every sense; over the days I saw an increasing demographic mix in demonstrations, where people from all age groups, social classes, men and women, Muslims and Christians, urban people and peasants—virtually all sectors of society, acting in large numbers and with a determination rarely seen before.

Shippensburg University professor recalls a roiled Egypt – Chambersburg Public Opinion

According to Dr. Karl Lorenz, Shippensburg University professor of anthropology, the people of Egypt have waited 30 years for government reform.

Lorenz lived in Egypt with his wife from August 2009 to July on a Fulbright Scholars Grant. As part of his proposal, he studied predynastic pottery style changes. Studying the pottery styles gave Lorenz insight into the unification of upper and lower Egypt and the rise to pharaohs. His wife researched and also taught at a university.

The rich symbolism of the square in Cairo – Philly.com

When she first traveled to Cairo for fieldwork in 1993, Farha Ghannam recalled, Tahrir Square was mostly used as a bus depot.

Today, it’s the battleground on which the future of Egypt is being fought – a space rich with symbolism and meaning, held and defended by protesters at the cost of some lives.

“There’s this feeling [among demonstrators] that ‘if we lose at Tahrir Square, we’re going to lose the fight,’ ” said Ghannam, an anthropology professor at Swarthmore College who studies the use of public space in Egypt.

tabsir.net » Dawn

I find it very difficult to assemble emotions, memories and impressions to respond to the events in Tunisia and Egypt. I have been responding sharply to others who seized the moment to offer their analysis. Certain characterizations of Egyptians did not sit well with me. I also fear that specific arguments are easily manipulated — that the centers of power who have so deftly dominated the media, huge sums of money and many segments of national elites will thwart the resurgence of popular resistance and demonstration of public will. But since those consulted by Barry and Joe and their “teams” are hard at work, spreading fear of a future Egypt non-compliant with the terms of Camp David, conjuring up the Islamist bogeyman, and (one fears) holding Hosni’s hand, we too should speak.

Tunisia
One Small Revolution – NYTimes.com

Tunisia has a relatively large middle class because of something so obvious it goes unremarked upon: it is a real state, with historical and geographical legitimacy, where political arguments are about budgets and food subsidies, not the extremist ideologies that have plagued its neighbors, Algeria and Libya. It is a state not only because of the legacy of Rome and other empires, but because of human agency, in the person of Habib Bourguiba, one of the lesser-known great men of the 20th century.

Tunisia analysis: Old guard, ‘new’ government | World news | The Guardian

The prime minister himself, 69-year-old Mohamed Ghannouchi, is a Ben Ali loyalist of long standing, having served since 1999. In Tunisia, he became known as “Monsieur Oui Oui” for always saying yes to the president.

To many ordinary Tunisians, these are worrying signs. In the words of a trade unionist quoted on Twitter: “Tunisia has got rid of the dictator but hasn’t got rid of the dictatorship yet.”

Egypt
The Egyptian Uprising: Facts and Fiction | Dissident Voice

There is really only one story here and it is ever so uncomplicated. This is an uprising against an octogenarian dictator who could have done us all a favor by retiring two decades ago. After he goes, the remaining 84 million Egyptians can sort things out among themselves. Everything else is fiction.

Brian Whitaker’s blog, February 2011

The situation in Egypt, as a friend from Alexandria described it to me in an email this morning, is “quite fluid and extremely scary”. It’s also very difficult to work out what is really going on behind the scenes.

Egyptian protesters: What I’m fighting for – Egyptian Protests – Salon.com

What’s too often lost in the coverage of Egypt’s violent clashes are the stories of the people fighting. This slide show offers a look at 10 individuals who make up the crowd of thousands gathered in Tahrir Square day after day. They are students, sailors, teachers, executives, government employees and members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Meet Egypt’s protesters — the people who are behind one of the greatest moments in modern Egyptian history.

Egypt Endgame | Marc Lynch

What now? I would say that the time has come for the Obama administration to escalate to the next step of actively trying to push Mubarak out. They were right to not do so earlier. No matter how frustrated activists have been by his perceived hedging, until yesterday it was not the time to move to the bottom line. Mubarak is an American ally of 30 years and needed to be given the chance to respond appropriately. And everyone seems to forget that magical democracy words (a phrase which as far as I know I coined) don’t work. Obama saying “Mubarak must go” would not have made Mubarak go, absent the careful preparation of the ground so that the potential power-brokers saw that they really had no choice. Yesterday’s orgy of state-sanctioned violence should be the moment to make clear that there is now no alternative.

Mubarak’s phantom presidency – Opinion – Al Jazeera English

The “March of Millions” in Cairo marks the spectacular emergence of a new political society in Egypt. This uprising brings together a new coalition of forces, uniting reconfigured elements of the security state with prominent business people, internationalist leaders, and relatively new (or newly reconfigured) mass movements of youth, labour, women’s and religious groups. President Hosni Mubarak lost his political power on Friday, January 28.

The Battle for Egypt | The Courier

Kuppinger: Before the uprising happened in Tunisia earlier in January few, including myself, would have foreseen the current events in Cairo. When the protesters in Tunisia were successful and ousted their dictator in a matter of days, it was clear that people in other Arab countries and here in particular, the vast ranks of the younger generation were watching these events very carefully. They took and compared notes. At that point it became increasingly clear that Tunisia could become a model.

The henchmen | Inanities

The use of hired thugs is classic Mubarak. The regime’s relationship with its people has always depended on intimidation and violence, which proved problematic with the wave of demonstrations and labour protests that have been a growing phenomenon since 2003 – acts of public police rage tend to put the tourists off. In 2005 elections young men were paid to sexually assault female protestors. Last year during the trial of two policemen accused of involvement in the death of Khaled Said a rowdy group of teenagers stood outside the courtroom and accused anti-torture protestors of being Israeli spies, before launching missiles at them. During the elections boys in matching t-shirts danced in front of polling stations while burly colleagues intimated voters on behalf of National Democratic Party candidates.

The who’s who of the has-beens – Blog – The Arabist

I know a lot of journalists (and even some normal, decent people) out there are wondering about the who’s who of the regime. As a person with a someone unhealthy obsession with the Egyptian regime for over a decade, I have been making charts of who’s who for a while.

Rich, Poor and a Rift Exposed by Unrest – NYTimes.com

Over the past several days, hundreds of thousands of Egyptians — from indigent fruit peddlers and doormen to students and engineers, even wealthy landlords — poured into the streets together to denounce President Hosni Mubarak and battle his omnipresent security police. Then, on Friday night, the police pulled out of Egypt’s major cities abruptly, and tensions between rich and poor exploded.

Egyptian Opposition’s Old Guard Falls In Behind Young Leaders – NYTimes.com

“Most of us are under 30,” said Amr Ezz, a 27-year-old lawyer who was one of the group as part of the April 6 Youth Movement, which organized an earlier day of protests last week via Facebook. They were surprised and delighted to see that more than 90,000 people signed up online to participate, emboldening others to turn out and bringing tens of thousands of mostly young people into the streets.

What’s Happening in Egypt Explained (UPDATED) | Mother Jones

What’s happening? Inspired by the recent protests that led to the fall of the Tunisian government and the ousting of longtime Tunisian dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Egyptians have joined other protesters across the Arab world (in Algeria, notably) in protesting their autocratic governments, high levels of corruption, and grinding poverty. In Egypt, tens of thousands of protesters have taken to the streets.

ZCommunications | Whither Egypt? by Gilbert Achcar | ZNet Article

The Egyptian opposition includes a vast array of forces. There are parties like the Wafd, which are legal parties and constitute what may be called the liberal opposition. Then there is a grey zone occupied by the Muslim Brotherhood. It does not have a legal status but is tolerated by the regime. Its whole structure is visible; it is not an underground force. The Muslim Brotherhood is certainly, and by far, the largest force in the opposition. When Mubarak’s regime, under US pressure, granted some space to the opposition in the 2005 parliamentary elections, the Muslim Brotherhood––running as “independents”––managed to get 88 MPs, i.e. 20 percent of the parliamentary seats, despite all obstacles. In the last elections held last November and December, after the Mubarak regime had decided to close down the limited space that it had opened in 2005, the Muslim Brotherhood almost vanished from parliament, losing all its seats but one.

“Revolutionaries on the Roof” « zunguzungu

Al Jazeera producer Evan Hill posted a (translated) video clip called ”Revolutionaries on the Roof” that deserves wide circulation. It is described as ”Young protesters occupying an apartment building near the site of fierce battles between pro- and anti-government crowds discuss their motivations, the events of the past two weeks, and the diverse make-up of Egypt’s democracy movement. (With reporting and translation by Lara el-Gibaly)”

Freedom, Democracy and the State
Too late for reform – Blog – The Arabist

I like Michele Dunne — she has been consistent for a decade on Egypt, and strikes the right tone here. I remember we sat together a couple of months ago and she laughed at the idea that Omar Suleiman could be a transition figure for Egypt. Here she argues that the US should not be backing Suleiman, it should be backing bottom-up transition.

Egypt’s two futures: Brutality and false reforms, or democracy

OVER THE past few days the world has seen a vivid portrait of the two sides in Egypt’s crisis. There has been the orchestrated brutality and cynical facade of compromise presented by the regime of Hosni Mubarak, who while clinging to his office until September is trying to destroy the opposition and ensure the perpetuation of 50 years of autocracy. In Cairo’s Tahrir Square and in other plazas around the country is the alternative: millions of mostly secular and middle-class citizens, led by the young, who seek genuine democracy and whose regular chant is “we are peaceful.”

Supporting democracy in the Middle East requires abandoning a vision of Pax-Americana

As the Mubarak regime turns to violence in a vain attempt to repress the peaceful protests that have swept Egypt’s streets for over ten days, the risks associated with current U.S. strategy for Egypt and the wider region continue to grow. In its response to the events, the Obama administration has subtly shifted its message, incrementally increasing pressure on the regime over the last week. But the more important story is the remarkable continuities reflected in the administration’s approach.

The Duck of Minerva: Egyptian “People Power,” Civil Society, and the U.S.

Notwithstanding the uncertainties, it is worthwhile to think more about the implications. In the long term, the events of last week would seem to mean more democracy or at least more democratic input into government in Egypt. Regardless, any new government will likely mean leaders less willing to do the bidding of the U.S., whether because of their own beliefs or because of the force of popular sentiment. (Certainly an important undercurrent in the journalistic reporting has been strong anti-American sentiments expressed by many of the protesters.) It is good that American policymakers seem to realize this. President Obama is quoted as stating several times at a high level meeting yesterday that “the outcome has to be decided by the Egyptian people, and the U.S. cannot be in a position of dictating events”–or, in my view, much influencing them.

David H. Price: Challenging America’s Pharaoh

Anyone who has lived in Egypt for an extended period of time or has traveled there for extended stays over the past thirty years should not be surprised at the current uprising. The only surprising thing is that this uprising didn’t happen years or decades sooner.

Johann Hari: We All Helped Suppress the Egyptians — With Our Taxes. So How Do We Change?

The old slogan from the 1960s has come true: the revolution has been televised. The world is watching the Bastille fall on 24/7 rolling news and Tweeting the death-spasms of Mubarak-Antoinette. This elderly thug is trying to beat and tear-gas and buy himself enough time to smuggle his family’s estimated $25bn in loot out of the country, and to install a successor friendly to his interests. The Egyptian people — half of whom live on less than $2 a day — seem determined to prevent the pillage and not to wait until September to drive out a dictator dripping in blood and bad hair dye.

ETHNOGRAFIX: Power, realpolitik, and freedom: Egypt and US Ideals about Freedom

What absolutely blows me away is how quickly some folks drop their supposed ideals about freedom and democracy when the people under consideration are far away (like in Egypt, for example). It’s shocking, actually, to hear some folks out there calling for the support of Mubarak as a close ally (check the comments section). I don’t get it. Democracy, it seems, only applies here at home. When it comes to a distant population like the people of Egypt, it seems that many people are willing to sidestep all of the rhetoric about political freedom and openly advocate supporting a repressive policy state, all in the name of “our interests.” Horribly ironic, no? Granted, the situation in Egypt is far from clear, but I definitely do not think that going back to the “support the nearest dictator who will toe the line” model is the way to go. Absolutely not. Anyway, here are some quotes that are apt for folks on all sides of the political spectrum here in the US:

But what about the Muslim Brotherhood?
Concerns about the Muslim Brotherhood: Israel Fears Regime Change in Egypt – SPIEGEL ONLINE – News – International

Israel is watching developments in Egypt with concern. The government is standing by autocratic Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, out of fear that the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood could take power and start supplying arms to Hamas.

Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt Opposition Party, In The Spotlight During Protests

In media coverage of the ongoing protests rocking Egypt, the phrase “Muslim Brotherhood” has cropped up more than once. Who is this group, and what role are they playing in the protests?

Why we shouldn’t fear the Muslim Brotherhood – War Room – Salon.com

To get some hard facts and context about the controversial Islamic movement, we spoke with Nathan Brown, a political science professor at George Washington University and director of its Institute for Middle East Studies, who has written extensively on the Muslim Brotherhood. What follows is a transcript of our conversation, edited for length and clarity.

5 Reasons the Muslim Brotherhood Won’t Turn On Israel | Politics | Religion Dispatches

These days, everybody’s in the business of panicking over the potential role of the Muslim Brotherhood. But rather than discuss where the Brotherhood has been in the past, I suggest looking to the future. Events on the ground are changing every few hours, so this is an exercise in informed speculation. Here are five reasons why the Muslim Brotherhood will find it very hard to decisively determine Egypt’s relationship with Israel. These five reasons complicate the assumption that if Mubarak goes, the peace treaty with Israel will come to an end.

Islamists at the Gates – NYTimes.com

But few Israelis really believe in that hopeful outcome. Instead, the grim assumption is that it is just a matter of time before the only real opposition group in Egypt, the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, takes power. Israelis fear that Egypt will go the way of Iran or Turkey, with Islamists gaining control through violence or gradual co-optation.

Muslim Brotherhood says it is only a minor player in Egyptian protests

The Muslim Brotherhood found its first martyr in Egypt’s popular uprising Friday, when a teenager named Mustafa Sawi was shot dead in front of the Interior Ministry. But the country’s oldest and best-organized opposition group had to take a back seat at his public funeral the next day, as the Muslim Brotherhood insists it is little more than a bit player in the outpouring of resistance to the regime of President Hosni Mubarak.

Don’t Fear Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood – Brookings Institution

Don’t Fear Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood

Egypt, Middle East Unrest, Middle East, Governance, Islamic World

Bruce Riedel, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

January 28, 2011 —
The Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia has sent a shock wave through the Arab world. Never before has the street toppled a dictator. Now Egypt is shaking, Hosni Mubarak’s 30-year-old regime faces its most serious threat ever. The prospect of change in Egypt inevitably raises questions about the oldest and strongest opposition movement in the country, the Muslim Brotherhood, also known as Ikhwan. Can America work with an Egypt where the Ikhwan is part of a transition or even a new government?

Egypt’s Islamist Riddle – WSJ.com

The 83-year-old Islamic movement, Egypt’s biggest opposition bloc, played a subdued role in the uprising. But its past performance in parliamentary elections and its dedicated following mean it will be a force to be reckoned with as Egypt moves toward open elections.

Washington’s Secret History with the Muslim Brotherhood by Ian Johnson | NYRBlog | The New York Review of Books

If this discussion evokes a sense of déjà vu, this is because over the past sixty years we have had it many times before, with almost identical outcomes. Since the 1950s, the United States has secretly struck up alliances with the Brotherhood or its offshoots on issues as diverse as fighting communism and calming tensions among European Muslims. And if we look to history, we can see a familiar pattern: each time, US leaders have decided that the Brotherhood could be useful and tried to bend it to America’s goals, and each time, maybe not surprisingly, the only party that clearly has benefited has been the Brotherhood.

Scott Atran: The Muslim Brotherhood Bogey Man

As Egyptians clash over the future of their government, Americans and Europeans have repeatedly expressed fears of the Muslim Brotherhood. “You don’t just have a government and a movement for democracy,” Tony Blair, the former British prime minister, said on Monday. “You also have others, notably the Muslim Brotherhood, who would take this in a different direction.” The previous day, House speaker John Boehner expressed hope that Hosni Mubarak would stay on as president of Egypt while instituting reforms to prevent the Muslim Brotherhood and other extremists from grabbing power.

And even more urgent, what about the jihadis?
Jihadis Debate Egypt (1) — jihadica

Not surprisingly, the jihadi online community is captivated by the uprising, but many are also bewildered about what this means for their cause, and their leaders have been slow to respond. Jarret Brachman has a point when he taunts Zawahiri: “Your Silence is Deafening.” As of Thursday afternoon, the leading jihadi forum Shamikh only featured a handful of authoritative responses to the events in Egypt, from pro-jihadi pundits, a legal scholar and other participants. However, not a word from the leadership. The closest thing to an official response is AQIM’s statement on the events in Tunisia (available also in translation).

Jihadis Debate Egypt (2) — jihadica

Such a response and the mere fact that this anonymous and murky EIJ figure, issues a message, and not a leading Egyptian al-Qaida member, is significant. Again, it demonstrates the jihadis’ irrelevance to the rapidly evolving situation in Egypt.

Uprisings and (new) media
What Al Jazeera Shows and Doesn’t Show | The Middle East Channel

But what television has brought to the world is only a partial reality. There is only Tahrir; the huge metropolitan expanse of Cairo and the families at home in neighborhoods are beyond the frame, oddly irrelevant. The participants in the revolution are the hundreds of thousands of demonstrators, not the equal numbers standing unpicturesque guard by night to ensure the safety of neighborhoods. TV shows a mass, not a massive group of individuals. This televised reality has become hugely controversial.

Wallflowers at the Revolution – NYTimes.com

Perhaps the most revealing window into America’s media-fed isolation from this crisis — small an example as it may seem — is the default assumption that the Egyptian uprising, like every other paroxysm in the region since the Green Revolution in Iran 18 months ago, must be powered by the twin American-born phenomena of Twitter and Facebook. Television news — at once threatened by the power of the Internet and fearful of appearing unhip — can’t get enough of this cliché.

Cairo Activists Use Facebook to Rattle Regime

ack in March, Maher and a friend launched a Facebook group to promote a protest planned for April 6. It became an Internet phenomenon, quickly attracting more than 70,000 members. The April 6 youth movement — amorphous, lacking a clear mission, and yet a bull’s-eye to the zeitgeist — blossomed within days into something influential enough to arouse the ire of Egypt’s internal security forces. Maher is part of a new generation in the Middle East that, through blogs, YouTube, Flickr, Twitter, and now Facebook, is using virtual reality to combat corrupt and oppressive governments. Their nascent, tech-fired rebellion has triggered a government backlash and captured the world’s attention.

Egypt protests: Police use Facebook and Twitter to track down protesters | Mail Online

Gabrielle’s dilemma is shared by many others whose activism, both online and on the streets, has brought them to the attention of the state security police.

While other protesters arrive and leave freely, thousands like Gabrielle – well-educated, middle-class idealistic young Egyptians who used social networking sites to ignite this protest – are beginning to feel trapped. Some say they are fighting for their lives, though they have thus far protested peacefully.

Why Tunisia Is Not a Social-Media Revolution | The American Prospect

commentators have held back with Tunisia, emphasizing that the uprising is a product of the passions and convictions of Tunisia’s people, not a 140-character status update. That’s a good thing. It means our conversations about technology’s transformative power are maturing past assumptions that the spread of the Internet means an inexorable spread of democracy.

But now is the time, perhaps, for a little backlash against the backlash. Scrubbing the Internet from the Tunisian people’s story leaves us with less than a full picture of this moment.

We’ve waited for this revolution for years. Other despots should quail | Mona Eltahawy | Comment is free | The Observer

But here now finally are our children – Generation Facebook – kicking aside the burden of history, determined to show us just how easy it is to tell the dictator it’s time to go.

tabsir.net » Streaming Revolution, Screaming Revolution

What happens when a revolution is not only screamed but streamed live? Can we reach a point where it gets as boring as a video game that we have played far too many times? Can our eyes become so glued to the riveting skirmish scenes in Cairo that we lose sight of all the other news that still gets generated. Sudan is having a referendum to separate south from north; Lebanon’s government has emulated Italy’s governing prowess once again (and Hizbollah has no Berlusconi figure in its ranks); world markets fear a closing of the Suez canal… and the list goes on but only with a few short notes at the bottom of the screen.

On The Media: Transcript of “Tunisia’s Twitter Revolution?” (January 21, 2011)

Demonstrators flooded the streets in Tunisia this week calling for an end to corruption and ousting President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. Many have attributed the wave of protests to the rise of the internet and social media in a country notorious for its censorship but Foreign Policy blogger Marc Lynch says it’s not that simple. He says the internet, social media and satellite channels like Al Jazeera have collectively transformed the information landscape in the Arab world.

Gladwell Still Missing the Point About Social Media and Activism: Tech News and Analysis «

In other words, as far as the New Yorker writer is concerned, the use of any specific communications tools — whether that happens to be cellphones or SMS or Twitter or Facebook — may be occurring, and may even be helping revolutionaries in countries like Egypt in some poorly-defined way, but it’s just not that interesting. This seems like an odd comment coming from someone who wrote a book all about how a series of small changes in the way people think about an issue can suddenly reach a “tipping point” and gain widespread appeal, since that’s exactly what social media does so well.

Thinking about the importance of communications “revolutions.” | Savage Minds

There has been a lot of talk about the importance of social media in recent world events. See for instance, here, here, and here. Some of the more astute commentators have referred to earlier technological revolutions and their impact on television: usenet, fax machines, television, cameras, telegraph, and even the printing press. One technology, however, always seem to get left out, maybe because it seems too “obvious,” and that is literacy.

Facebook and YouTube Fuel the Egyptian Protests – NYTimes.com

“Prior to the murder of Khaled Said, there were blogs and YouTube videos that existed about police torture, but there wasn’t a strong community around them,” said Jillian C. York, the project coordinator for the OpenNet Initiative of the Berkman Center for the Internet and Society at Harvard University. “This case changed that.”

While it is almost impossible to isolate the impact of social media tools from the general swirl of events that set off the popular uprisings across the Middle East, there is little doubt that they provided a new means for ordinary people to connect with human rights advocates trying to amass support against police abuse, torture and the Mubarak government’s permanent emergency laws allowing people to be jailed without charges.

Lecture Clarifies Social Media Usage in Recent Uprisings – CUA Tower – News

While many analysts point to “tweets” as the igniters of the recent revolution in Egypt, Dr. Jon Anderson of the Anthropology Department cautioned students on Wednesday night not to let social media hype drown out the human voices at the root of revolt.

His talk, entitled “Social Media and Politics of the Middle East,” sought to clarify the conceptions surrounding what has been termed a “twitter revolution,” regarding recent popular uprisings against long-standing dictators in Yemen, Tunisia, and Egypt.

Egypt may have turned off the Internet one phone call at a time | Technology | Los Angeles Times

Egypt’s shutdown of the Internet within its borders is an action unlike any other in the history of the World Wide Web and it might have only taken a few phone calls to do it.

MediaShift . What Role Did Social Media Play in Tunisia, Egypt Protests? | PBS

As the protests are playing out in the streets of Cairo and the rest of Egypt today, I have been glued to the live-stream of Al Jazeera English as well as the Twitter hashtag #Jan25, a top trending topic based on the big protests a few days ago. The Egyptian protests come on the heels of a similar revolution in Tunisia, where a longtime dictator, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, was ousted after young people organized protests via Facebook. We’ve heard about “Twitter revolutions” before in Iran after huge protests there in 2009, but how have things changed today? How much of a role has social media played in the turmoil happening in the Middle East? Will that continue to be the case? Vote in our poll below, or share your deeper thoughts in the comments below.

Other roundups
“A wonderful development” – Anthropologists on the Egypt Uprising (updated)

As you might have noticed, Wikan is argueing along siminar lines as the Western political elite who is about to lose an important ally in the Middle East. For them, “stability” is more important than people power, as Maximilian Forte and his co-bloggers on Zero Anthropology explain in several blog posts, among others The Fall of the American Wall: Tunisia, Egypt, and Beyond and Encircling Empire: Report #11, Focus on Egypt, Encircling Empire: Report #12, FOCUS ON EGYPT: Revolution and Counter-Revolution and The Song of the Nonaligned Nile (by Eliza Jane Darling).

Registering a revolution. Hail to the brave people of Egypt. A roundup. | Erkan’s Field Diary

Too soon to analyze, so here’s my outbox

Tunisia and Egypt uprisings – selected bookmarks « media/anthropology

Highlights on media, anthropology and the Tunisia and Egypt uprisings

anthropologyworks » Understanding Egypt

Political protests in Egypt are ongoing at the time of this writing, mainly in Cairo, Alexandria and some other cities. Who knows what will unfold in the near future? What do cultural anthropologists offer to inform our understanding of this new social movement?

Misc.
Yemen’s president says he won’t seek reelection, but he said that in 2005, too | Need to Know

Reality, however, is more than what happened in the last month. While some protesters in Sanaa have said they were inspired by the protests in Egypt and Tunisia, those two revolts did not inspire the protests anymore than my breakfast burrito did. There were protests in Aden during the Gulf Cup soccer tournament last November, protests over the parcel bombs in Sanaa in October, thousands of people protesting over the most recent round of fighting between the government and the Houthi rebels in the north in March. Yemenis protest routinely, and the last several months have seen a series of increasingly violent rallies across the entire country.

Top Ten Accomplishments of Egypt Demonstrators | Informed Comment

The protest movement in Egypt scored several victories on Friday, but did not actually succeed in getting President Hosni Mubarak to step down. Their accomplishments include:

Of people and things: Egyptian protest and cultural properties « The Berkeley Blog

In a post on the Berkeley Blog, Samuel Redman makes an argument that urges protection of antiquities be emphasized in the face of current events in Egypt, arguing that mummies are “shared global heritage”.

I addressed similar questions in writing a post on my Ancient Bodies, Ancient Lives blog about unconfirmed reports of possible damage to a unique tomb, that of the woman identified as the wet nurse of Tutankhamon. But in writing my post, I subordinated questions of the destruction of antiquities to the critical moment facing Egypt today, which concerns the future of living men and women.

Dutch
Egypte, een langzame revolutie – Vrij Nederland

Opeens is iedereen Egypte­deskundige. Een van de grappigste opmerkingen die ik, via Twitter, tegenkwam, was die van Elseviers René van Rijckevorsel dat ‘een langzame evolutie naar een eerlijker Egypte’ beter is. Voor de volledigheid haalt Van Rijckevorsel er het uitgekauwde doembeeld van veertig procent analfabete Egyptenaren en de alomtegenwoordige Moslimbroederschap bij. Volgens hem zijn er twee opties: het Iran- of het Algerije-scenario.

Frontaal Naakt. » Tunesië

Het opvallende aan Tunesië is dat het in zeer korte tijd geëscaleerd is, terwijl er in Egypte al jaren protest is tegen het presidentschap van Moubarak. Het laatste half jaar zijn er regelmatig zeer grote en ingrijpende demonstraties geweest, waarbij zelfs sprake was van een coalitie van de gehele oppositie. Desalniettemin zijn de Egyptenaren er nog niet in geslaagd af te komen van La Vache Qui Rit, zoals Moubarak wordt genoemd. De vraag is of dit door steun van de VS komt, of omdat er in Egypte ondanks alles meer uitingsvrijheid en ruimte was dan in Tunesië. Een organisatie als Kifaya, die strijdt tegen de heerschappij van Moubarak, zou tot voor kort ondenkbaar zijn geweest in Tunesië.

Best of Blogs: #25jan (links galore) | DeJaap

Wellicht ter compensatie voor de maanden(jaren?)lange media-afwezigheid zond de NOS vanmiddag live uit over Egypte. Maar in tegenstelling tot de Egyptenaren (tot vanmiddag) heeft u wel toegang tot internet en daarmee toegang tot dezelfde bronnen waar de NOS-correspondenten ook gebruik van maken.

Uiteengespatte droom stimuleert Egyptische opstand – de Volkskrant – Opinie

De afgelopen jaren kenden eigenlijk geen moment zonder protesten tegen het regime, maar de huidige volksopstand is ongekend en kan onmogelijk genegeerd worden. Het Tunesische voorbeeld gaf Egyptenaren hoop en de moed het veiligheidsapparaat te trotseren en hun al jaren breed gedragen afkeer van Mubaraks regime te uiten. Jongeren zijn de stuwende kracht achter de volksopstand in Egypte. Wat zijn de achtergronden van hun frustratie, woede en moed?

Wat is er aan de hand in de Arabische wereld? | Standplaats Wereld

Door Erik van Ommering … hoor ik u denken deze dagen! Nu eens geen heibel tussen Palestijnen en Israëliërs, maar revolutie in Tunesië, opstand in Egypte, rellen in Jemen, demonstraties in Jordanië, protesten in Libanon – waar gaat dat heen? Vanuit mijn positie als onderzoeker in het laatstgenoemde land zal ik een poging in de richting van een antwoord wagen – waarbij ik me bewust ben van de snelheid waarmee de huidige gebeurtenissen mijn relaas ongetwijfeld zullen inhalen. Hierbij nu eens een macro-analyse door een antropoloog!

Turbulente week in Caïro | Standplaats Wereld

Verbaasd lees ik terug hoe één van mijn eerste veldwerknotities, van een paar weken geleden, de acceptatie en leegte in de ogen van de taxichauffeur beschrijft die me van het vliegveld naar de stad brengt. Dat lijkt een ander land een eeuwigheid geleden. Door Police Day (25 januari) begonnen dingen langzaam te veranderen met als climax en epicentrum de Miljoenen Mars op Midan Tahrir (2 februari).

4 comments.

Twitwa 4 – Achterlijke en barbaarse culturen

Posted on February 2nd, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: anthropology, Twitwa.

Via @bertbrussen

wat is dat toch een ACHTERLIJKE en BARBAARSE cultuur daar in Iran. Vrouwen ophangen voor “drugssmokkel”. BAH!

Zomaar een reactie op het verschrikkelijke lot van Iraans-Nederlandse Zahra Bahrami die in Iran is opgehangen. Misschien zou je verwachten dat een schrijver die stukjes bakt voor Geenstijl hier wel weer ergens de humor van zou inzien, zoals zijn companen Ambroos Wiegers en Marck Burema al eerder deden met dode Iraniërs. Zo ziek lijkt hij toch ook weer niet te zijn, maar (hoewel hij het ongetwijfeld niet zo zal bedoelen) wat hij hier in feite zegt is dat Zahra Bahrami barbaars en achterlijk is. Hij relateert het populaire cultuurbegrip aan een een afgegrensde geografische lokatie: Iran. Zonder daarbij natuurlijk onderscheid te maken tussen bijvoorbeeld mannen en vrouwen, jong en oud, Perzen en Arabieren, moslims en zoroastriërs, boeren, burgers, buitenlui en what have we more. Zahra Bahrami maakt deel uit of behoort in zo’n opvatting ook tot die cultuur, net zoals ze, in die opvatting ook deel uit maakt van de Nederlandse cultuur maar dat wordt dan of vergeten of Bahrami wordt gezien als alleen Nederlands. Verder is een dergelijke emotionele uitroep een teken dat cultuur gezien wordt als oorzaak; een soort van blaming the culture in plaats van blaming the system of blaming the victim. Dat het wellicht ook een poging is van het Iraanse regime om de bevolking te waarschuwen kan dan gemakshalve ter zijde geschoven worden.

Dit zijn vrij gebruikelijke opvattingen met betrekking tot de notie cultuur in populair taalgebruik. Het is een vrij prettige opvatting omdat het bijvoorbeeld in de zaak van Bahrami betekent dat we in ieder geval niet hoeven te kijken naar eventuele twijfels bij het optreden van de Nederlandse staat of naar de rol van mevrouw Bahrami zelf (die is immers zelf achterlijk of onmondig slachtoffer). Dergelijke ideeen over cultuur als duidelijke herkenbare, homogene systemen staan ver af van de huidige antropologie, maar zijn ook weer niet onbekend. We zien het bijvoorbeeld terug bij Talcott Parsons (die van de beroemde scheiding tussen normen en waarden). Cultuur is bij hem een domein of systeem dat onafhankelijk bestaat van andere domeinen zoals politiek en economie. In de opvatting van de beroemde antropoloog Boas was cultuur een gesloten en samenhangend geheel of systeem. Bij andere, onder meer Europese antropologen, ging het vaak meer om wat de essentie van een volk zou zijn; een unieke kern die ieder volk anders zou maken. Het populaire gebruik van cultuur lijkt op een mix van antropologische opvattingen over cultuur als samenhangende, gesloten systemen en over cultuur als essentie van een volk die dat volk anders zou maken dan andere volkeren. Bijvoorbeeld dus het idee dat Iran een eigen cultuur heeft die anders is dan die van Nederland.

Antropologen hanteren tegenwoordig een heel ander cultuurbegrip dat ervan uitgaat dat cultuur iets is dat betwist wordt (er zijn verschillende opvattingen over wat hoort en niet hoort of wat barbaars en beschaafd is of wat mooi is en lelijk), dat sterk verbonden is met macht (wie heeft de macht om te bepalen wie welke rol moet vervullen en wat de interpretatie moet zijn van bepaalde symbolen en wie controleert de instituties in een samenleving – zoals scholen – die die interpretatie beschermen en uitdragen). Culturele repertoires van symbolen, praktijken, conventies, houdingen, gezond verstand enzovoorts zijn niet strikt van elkaar gescheiden of gescheiden van mensen die uit andere ‘culturele groepen’ zouden komen, maar zijn vloeiend, lopen in elkaar over, zijn hybride en naast samenhang zit het ook barstensvol met tegenstrijdigheden. Een dergelijk cultuurbegrip legt de nadruk op het maken van cultuur, samenleving en instituties en de wijze waarop dit plaatsvindt binnen bepaalde situaties (plaats) en op bepaalde momenten (tijd). Een aardige illustratie van dit nogal complexe cultuurbegrip is het volgende.

Het Fotomuseum Rotterdam heeft een tentoonstelling: Angry over radicalisme in Nederland. Ik heb een keer met de makers van Angry gesproken en hun ideeën over radicalisme en hoe dit te verbeelden bevielen me wel en nog steeds. Het is een interessante voorstelling en zeker de moeite waard om een keer te gaan kijken.
(11 – tekst) Radicaal voelt zich…- di 18 januari 2011 | NRC Handelsblad | NRC Digitale editie

„We willen laten zien dat radicaal gedrag in alle lagen van de samenleving voorkomt. Bovendien geven mensen een verschillende invulling aan hun radicalisme: voor de een gaat het erom te leven volgens je idealen, terwijl een ander overgaat tot actievoeren of terreurdaden.”

De vraag wat is de radicaal is vergelijkbaar met de vraag wat is de Iraanse of Nederlandse cultuur. Het gaat op zoek naar de essentie van een bepaald verschijnsel. Weliswaar wordt dit positief ingevuld, maar dat gebeurt soms ook met het populaire cultuurbegrip bijvoorbeeld in wat al te idealistische multiculturele verhalen. Bij dat laatste gaat het er ook om te benadrukken dat we allemaal best vreedzaam kunnen samenleven want die Ander lijkt toch zoveel op ‘Ons’. Die gedachte lijkt er ook te zijn bij Angry. Kunstenaar Jonas Staal heeft afgehaakt bij deze voorstelling omdat:
(11 – tekst) Radicaal voelt zich…- di 18 januari 2011 | NRC Handelsblad | NRC Digitale editie

Staal had verwacht dat de expositie de mogelijkheid bood tot het tonen van „een radicaal ander wereldbeeld: de radicaal is een schepper”. Maar uiteindelijk, aldus Staal, gaat het de organisatoren er alleen om te laten zien dat de radicaal „niemand minder is dan wijzelf”.

Het gaat Staat zelf om de radicaal als betekenis gever, als cultuurmaker terwijl Angry, volgens Staal, toch nog teveel zou uitgaan van de radicaal als gevaarlijk, kwaadaardig, enzovoorts. Waar het eerste inderdaad meer te doen heeft met de uitbeelding van de radicaal die niet noodzakelijkerwijze iets zegt over de radicaal zelf, wil Staal zich juist richten op de inbeelding in de radicaal in zijn streven naar een andere rechtvaardigere wereld. Bij het populaire cultuurbegrip gaat het eveneens vooral om de uitbeelding van andere culturen en verbeelding ervan, maar niet om inbeelding in mensen die, zoals Staal benadrukt, scheppers zijn. Dat laatste is in het populaire cultuurbegrip vaak compleet afwezig en via dat begrip worden mensen dan ook gereduceerd tot willoze, machteloze en onmondige slachtoffers (vrouwen vooral) of willoze en onmondige agressievelingen (mannen, radicalen).

Een ander voorbeeld is de eeuwige discussie over de hoofddoek. Kijk wat CDA-er Schraal stelt:
Hoofddoekverbod splijt CDA – Binnenland | Het laatste nieuws uit Nederland leest u op Telegraaf.nl [binnenland]

Vorige week stak de Amsterdammer Schraal de Volendamse Don Bosco-school, die hoofddoekjes verbiedt, al een hart onder de riem. „Ik vind het heel consequent dat leerlingen die met een hoofddoekje naar school komen, worden geweigerd”, zegt hij. „Zelf ben ik geboren in Isfahan, toenmalige Perzië. Vanwege de val van de Sjah en de komst van de islamitische Republiek Iran, is in mijn geboorteland de islamitische wetgeving uitgangspunt van het staatkundige leven en zijn hoofddoeken zelfs verplicht. Waarmee de vrouw, door de verplichting een hoofddoek te dragen, als het ware verantwoordelijk wordt geacht voor de mate waarin de man in de publieke ruimte , zijn zelfbeheersing ten opzichte van vrouwen onder controle moet houden. Dat is een verwerpelijke gedachte, die achter deze symboliek schuilgaat.”

Schraal stelt hier inderdaad een belangrijk punt aan de orde. Volgens bepaalde interpretaties van de islamitische tradities is de hoofddoek verplicht om zo de lusten van de mannen te bedwingen. Dat de vrouw daarom een hoofddoek moet dragen, maakt haar inderdaad verantwoordelijk voor iets wat eigenlijk de verantwoording van man zelf zou moeten zijn is de gedachte van Schraal en vele anderen. Het idee dat het daarom gaat om een scheve verhouding tussen man en vrouw heeft dus  inderdaad enige grond, maar Schraal gaat voorbij aan de veranderingen die de betekenis van de hoofddoek krijgt door veranderingen in tijd en plaats. Er is een bepaalde druk op vrouwen om die hoofddoek te dragen, maar er is ook druk om hem niet te dragen. Zeker tegen dat laatste in benadrukken vrouwen juist dat hoofddoek (en voor niqab geldt hetzelfde) een eigen keuze is en ook moet zijn. En ook dat heeft grond in islamitische interpretaties aangezien een opvatting is dat als de hoofddoek met de verkeerde intentie gedragen wordt (omdat anderen het zeggen) de waarde ervan nul is. Jonge vrouwen hebben dit dan ook nog eens vermengd met de culturele opvatting dat men authentiek moet zijn, dat je jezelf moet zijn en uit moet gaan van jezelf. Voor de één betekent dit juist het niet dragen van een hoofddoek voor de ander juist wel (wanneer men er aan toe is, hoor je dan vaak). Wanneer men uit protest een hoofddoek dragen komt er weer een betekenis bij. Het gaat er niet om of Schraals stelling waar is en die van anderen niet (of andersom). Ook al lijken ze wellicht tegenstrijdig en zouden ze dan dus moeilijk kunnen samen gaan, de verschillende opvattingen hebben zo hun eigen plausibiliteit die niet zomaar terzijde geschoven kan worden.

Een laatste voorbeeld is de recente controverse over de docent van de Hogeschool van Amsterdam die, na terugkomst van de bedevaart naar Mekka, besloot om geen handen meer te schudden met vrouwen. Dat leverde aanvankelijk problemen op, aangezien de consensus lijkt te zijn dat handen schudden moet. In Nederland doen we dat nu eenmaal zou. Blijkbaar niet altijd dus want anders ontstaat een dergelijke discussie niet. Het weigeren van handenschudden zou een gebrek aan respect zijn. Volgens de desbetreffende docent is dat niet zo, maar hij lijkt wel te beseffen dat hij wat uit te leggen heeft; hetgeen hij heeft gedaan in een mail aan zijn collega’s.Havanaweb.nl | Nieuws / ‘Het heeft niets te maken met disrespect’

‘Nu ik terug ben gekomen van deze spirituele reis voel ik me herboren en voldaan,’ schrijft de docent aan zijn collega’s. ‘Ik denk dat dit de uitoefening van mijn functie als leraar erg ten goede komt.’

Verderop in de brief schrijft de docent: ‘Naar aanleiding van mijn ervaringen de afgelopen maand besef ik dat de profeet Mohammed in naam van de Islam verschillende zaken heeft voorgeschreven die ik nu wil gaan praktiseren. De profeet heeft nooit de hand geschud van vrouwen die huwbaar voor hem waren en hier regels over opgesteld. In dit opzicht wil ik dit ook navolgen richting mijn collega’s.’

Hij voegt eraan toe dat het niets te maken heeft met ‘disrespect of het niet waarderen’ van zijn vrouwelijke collega’s: ‘Er zal niets veranderen aan het goede contact tussen mij en mijn vrouwelijke collega’s. Het enige dat ik wil praktiseren, is dat ik mij onthoud van het schudden van handen met de vrouwelijke collega’s.’

Het gaat er voor een antropoloog niet zozeer om of de profeet daadwerkelijk nooit de handen van vrouwen heeft geschud en of het nu daadwerkelijk islamitisch gezien beter is om dat voorbeeld te volgen. Het gaat erom hoe de man tot dit idee komt of hoe anderen tot het idee komen dat zijn gedrag een teken van disrespect is. Tevens gaat het erom om te kijken hoe mensen met verschillende en soms tegenstrijdige opinies toch tot een werkbare relatie komen of juist niet. De docent in kwestie probeert de relatie overeind te houden door het respect te benadrukken. Hij wil laten zien dat hij wel degelijk respect heeft door in plaats van handen schudden een hoofdknik te geven en/of zijn hand op zijn hart te leggen bij wijze van begroeting. Geen nieuwe vondst aangezien meer mensen dat doen (ik doe dat soms zelf ook tijdens mijn onderzoekswerkzaamheden), maar wel een mooi voorbeeld van cultuur maken. De man had ook kunnen aangeven dat het weigeren van de hand juist zélf een teken van respect is, althans volgens zijn opvatting. Een teken van respect voor vrouwen tot wie hij de in zijn ogen gepaste afstand bewaart en een teken van respect voor God aangezien hij zich in zijn ogen houdt aan God’s wil. Voor anderen zal dit ongetwijfeld onzin zijn, zie bijvoorbeeld Ellian.

Juist dit soort betwistingen, conflicten en tegenstrijdigheden is waar de antropoloog oog voor heeft wanneer hij of zij naar cultuur kijkt. En dat geldt voor alle onderwerpen of het nu gaat om feesten, besnijdenis, straffen of wat dan ook.

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Closing the years 2009-2010

Posted on December 31st, 2010 by martijn.
Categories: anthropology, Headline, ISIM/RU Research, My Research.

Because I don’t exactly know anymore when I started my own website, both the years 2009 and 2010 have been labelled as celebrating 10 years of blogging. In the last two years I tried to re-direct this site into more like a public anthropology website. A process that started in 2009 with the post Public Anthropology – 10 years from Researchpages to Closer (1999/2000-2009/2010). Based upon a text of Craig Calhoun I stated:
C L O S E R » Blog Archive » Public Anthropology – 10 Years from Researchpages to Closer (1999/2000 – 2009/2010)

Calhoun continues by stating that public science and addressing public issues is not just giving answers to questions the public has. It is as much, or even more, about questioning why particular issues are addressed in the way they are addressed by particular people and what the consequences of that are. How are particular issues and the way they are debated related to (changing) historical and cultural contexts, what is taken-for-granted and what does it mean? In my opinion this is (or at least should) should be the focus of this blog and has informed the change from my website Researchpages to Closer.

Maybe the most important contribution to this is a post on Islamizing Europe in which I try to deconstruct the argument of a demographic takeover of Europe by Muslims but also trying to understand how the whole argument works. It is a post from May 2009, and was last year and this year the most popular post of my blog. A second post involves the digital re-publication of all of the issues of the ISIM Review; the magazine of the former Institute for the Study of Islam in the World (ISIM) where I worked until it was closed in 2009. The most popular issue was Newsletter 7 on confronting modernity and my own article on Moroccan-Dutch youth and Islam, based upon my PhD research. Also Welmoet Boender’s article on Imams in the Netherlands, based upon her PhD research was very popular.

When I started my current research – Understanding Islam – Salafism as a Utopian Movement – I still worked at ISIM but after it closed the whole project moved over to Radboud University Nijmegen that was already a partner in the project. The Radicalization Series on my blog is a part of this project and a preparation for articles and chapter to write. Salafism as Utopian Movement post is an attempt to bring anthropology into the social movement approach that is now sort of leading in the research on Islamic activism. Besides this Salafism research, or better more and more as a part of that project, I try to follow the current debates on Islam in Europe but sometimes also in the US given the transnational connections of both Islam and the debate about Islam. The post on the Dutch Ground Zero Mosque is the most important example of such transnational connections. An ongoing task in this is of course monitoring the debate about and with Dutch anti-Islam politician Geert Wilders for which my post on his movie Fitna is still leading. But other topics covered here have found some public as well. The post on Rebelle – Art, Feminism and Muslim Women is still very popular as well as the Orange Fever post on the Worldcup football and nationalism in the Netherlands. The post was covered in the anthropology carnival of Four Stone Hearth #97 while asking the question: Does orange truly transcend ethnic minority identities? I think it does, for a while, in a superficial but nevertheless important way. I think.

Another issue that has been covered somewhat in Dutch debate is the question whether or not society is suffering from pornofication and sexualization by commerce. When a Muslim man wanted to scratch out posters that were sexist in his view, the debate suddenly changed. Interesting enough to cover it on my blog with some …uhm… fascinating comments as well. When trying to build up some sort of public anthropology one risks to become part of the public debate on the topic one wants to study. This happened to me as well albeit that I have to admit that I did not always acted very smart. One thing I did, and I still stand by it, was to comment upon a debate about a Dutch newspaper that re-published one of the Muhammad Cartoons. One of the Salafi organizations of course was against it and protested it which led to the removal of the cartoon. This was followed by other newspapers and sites that as a protest against the removal in turn re-published that particular cartoon under the label of defending free speech. In my comment for the tv channel of the Salafi group I commented on the political use of this free speech argument. I wrote about this in the posts Cartoonesque 15 and Cartoonesque 16. When one becomes part of the public debates, the whole public anthropology idea gets a different turn of course. Together with my colleague Henk Driessen of Radboud University I organized the workshop Anthropology and/in Publicity in order to explore the idea of public anthropology further with lectures by Ulf Hannerz, Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Annelies Moors and Mathijs Pelkmans. Part of this workshop was a weblog to which several people contributed. One of the contributors, Daniel Lende, has written an excellent summary of the blogposts in Anthropology and Publicity(Thanks!). We will probably try to publish the lectures in a special issue of a journal and include material of the blog as well then (we are not yet sure how to do this). The blog will remain online for a while but in the future the blog could move entirely to this blog as a special section. Also on behalf of Henk Driessen I would like to say thanks to all the speakers of the workshop, the contributors to the blog and the discussants and participants of the workshop who made the whole endeavour succesfull.

To close this entry I would like to add that I would be a very bad public anthropologist when I did not write in Dutch anymore. Too bad for my English readers, but also in the future many posts will be in Dutch (I usually write one in Dutch and one in English every week). In Dutch I have tried to explain some of the motives of people who vote for the anti-Islam Freedom Party of Geert Wilders and try to go beyond the unsubstantiated claims that it is all about anti-islam sentiments and to take the voters seriously instead of mocking them for example in a post called Hungry Wolves – Wilders, PVV and Far Right. A similar analysis was written in English after the recent elections: Europe and Islam: Dutch Elections – Have the Dutch become intolerant? Another issue that has already been mentioned here is the instrumentalization of free speech to include and/or exclude minorities. In a Dutch post I try to extend this argument by pointing to something I coined as ‘freedomnarcissism‘: a form of behaviour that is characterized by an obsession with freedom of the self combined with egoïsm, a lack of empathy and an attempt to be the alpha male (it is often about male bloggers who fiercely attack others who take objection to their self-proclaimed freedom of speech heroism). It is about people who try to immunize themselves against critique from the outside by pointing to the freedom of speech and use the same freedom of speech to harm others. The idea is loosely based upon Christoffer Lash’s Culture of Narcissism who states that people are afraid to be meaningless and as a result develop all kinds of counter-strategies to feel real. Other popular Dutch posts are about the movie Avatar and the publication of a letter of a young Muslim, Jason Walters, convicted for terrorism. In this letter he revises his view on jihad, politics, violence and the position of Muslims in the West. Also both posts featuring my PhD (English summary HERE) are still quite popular.

A new feature on my blog in 2010 were the contributions of guest authors. Martin van Bruinessen on the Gülenmovement (in Dutch), Joas Wagemakers on the Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and Michel Hoebink of Radio Netherlands on Wilders’ outdated colonial rhetoric were the first with excellent contributions. I will certainly invite more guest authors in 2011 and people can send in their own contributions as well (those will be reviewed by another colleague and myself). I hope I can continue my line of blogging in the coming years. For now let me say thank you to all my readers, colleagues and most of all the people I work with in my research for their valuable input, comments, criticisms and jokes.

Publications

Books

2008

Zoeken naar een ‘zuivere’ islam. Geloofsbeleving en identiteitsvorming onder jonge Marokkaans-Nederlandse moslims, Amsterdam: Bert Bakker

Searching for a ‘pure’ Islam. Religious Beliefs and Identity Construction among Moroccan-Dutch Youth, Amsterdam: Bert Bakker (In Press). The Ph.D thesis will be in Dutch. The English summary is here. Read my article in the ISIM Review HERE.

Articles
2010
With Roeland, Johan, Stef Aupers, Dick Houtman, and Ineke Noomen. 2010. “Zoeken naar zuiverheid. Religieuze purificatie onder jonge new-agers, evangelicalen en moslims.” Sociologie 11-30.

‘The Quest for Religious Purity in New Age, Evangelicalism and Islam: Religious Renditions of Dutch Youth and the Luckmann Legacy’, in: Annual Review of the Sociology of Religion – 2009: Youth and Religion (with Stef Aupers, Dick Houtman, Ineke Noomen and Johan Roeland

2009

Islam is Islam. Punt uit? Marokkaans-Nederlandse moslimjongeren in Gouda en de culturele constructie van een ‘zuivere’ islam. Migrantenstudies 25, no. 1: 59-72.
Moslimjongeren. De salafi-beweging en de vorming van een morele gemeenschap. Tijdschrift voor Criminologie, no. 4: 375-385.

Chapters in edited volumes
2010

With Bartels, Edien, Kim Knibbe, and Oscar Salemink. 2010. “Cultural Identity as a Key Dimension of Human Security in Western Europe: The Dutch Case.” Pp. 116-133 in A World of Insecurity. Anthropological Perspectives On Human Security, Eds. Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Ellen Bal, and Oscar Salemink. London: Pluto Press.

“Understanding Dutch Islam: Exploring the Relationship of Muslims with the State and the Public Sphere in the Netherlands.” Pp. 181-197 in Muslim Diaspora in the West Negotiating Gender, Home and Belonging, Eds. Haideh Moghissi en Halleh Ghorashi. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing.

With Roel Meijer. “Going All the Way: Politicization and Radicalization of the Hofstad Network in the Netherlands.” Pp. 220-239 in Identity and Participation in Culturally Diverse Societies: A Multidisciplinary Perspective, Eds. Assaad E. Azzi, Xenia Chryssochoou, Bernd Klandermans, and Bernd Simon. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

With Van Dijk-Groeneboer, Monique, and Joris Kregting, en Johan Roeland. 2010. “Ze Geloven Het Wel.” Pp. 25-88 in Handboek Jongeren en Religie. Katholieke, protestantse en islamitische jongeren in Nederland, Ed. Van Dijk-Groeneboer. Amsterdam: Parthenon.

De Koning, Martijn. 2010. “Zoeken naar Zuiverheid en Authenticeit..” Pp. 159-175 in Handboek Jongeren en Religie. Katholieke, protestantse en islamitische jongeren in Nederland,Ed. Monique Van Dijk-Groeneboer. Amsterdam: Parthenon.

2009

Changing Worldviews and Friendship. An Exploration of the Life Stories of Two Female Salafists in the Netherlands. In Global Salafism. Islam’s New Religious Movement, Ed. Roel Meijer, 372-392. London: Hurst.

Netherlands. In Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, Ed. Jorgen Nielsen, Samim Akgönül, Brigitte Maréchal, en Christian Moe, 1:243-257. Leiden: Brill.

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Wikileaks: Wikivism, Anarchism and the State

Posted on December 15th, 2010 by martijn.
Categories: anthropology, Blogosphere.

The current Wikileaks affair is an interesting case that sheds some light on possibilities for global activism. As Paul Stacey (coining the term ‘wikivism‘) argued in the case of Wikipedia:
Online Deliberation » Wikipedia and the Age of Free Knowledge

The building of a network of contributors around common values and a ‘trust ethic’ are conditions that wikis necessitate and, at their fullest, encourage others to develop and build on. One might even suggest that wikis harness almost ‘revolutionary’ potential, at least in the sense that they make possible the production of new relations between communicating individuals that, in many ways, take on a future of their own (Stacy 79).

The “future” that Stacy hints at becomes particularly important in relation to deliberation. To have a functioning public sphere within our society, universal access to societal deliberation must exist.

Although the quote here pertains to Wikipedia, a similar case I think can be made for Wikileaks. What Wikileaks does is to break the secrets of states so they become open for public deliberation. This action and the counter-reaction of states therefore tell us something about the limits and extent of state power with regard to Internet activism. The accusation of the US but also of for example the Dutch government is quite simple: Wikileaks threatens ‘our’ security by releasing all these documents. It is not possible to close the borders and to seal off the national air space in order to isolate a country; nor is it sufficient to close down internet sites; mirrors seem to appear faster than they are being closed. A while ago many researchers involved in globalization and transnationalism studies more or less assumed (partly for the reasons mentioned here) that the nation-state would become less significant. What we tend to forget however is that states still have a lot of power for surveillance because they can use the same techniques to counter activism. Moreover since 9/11 states have tried to strengthen their power in a process of securitization and domestication (of Muslims and Islam but the effects extend beyond these categories):Securitisation and Domestication of Diaspora Muslims and Islam: Turkish Immigrants in Germany and Australia | United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

the disciplining and management of a social category beyond state borders. They have been increasingly constituted as a homogenised transnational object through the harmonising of public policy and law and through the creation of a Western public sphere produced by spectator-citizens witnessing mediated risk events.

We can see this transnational governmentality also in the case of the wikileaks affair where a Canadian PM advisor calls for the assassination of Assange and where apparently state pressure is enough to get companies to end their services for Wikileaks as Greenwald aptly shows in his overview of ‘the lawless Wild West Attacks Wikileaks‘. As Henry Farrell argues:
State Power and the Response to Wikileaks — Crooked Timber

states are not limited to direct regulation; they can use indirect means, pressing Internet service providers (ISPs) or other actors to implement state policy. For example, states might require ISPs to block their users from having access to a particular site, or to take down sites with certain kinds of content. More generally … a small group of privileged private actors can become “points of control”—states can use them to exert control over a much broader group of other private actors. This is because the former private actors control chokepoints in the information infrastructure or in other key networks of resources. They can block or control flows of data or of other valuable resources among a wide variety of other private actors. Thus, it is not always necessary for a state to exercise direct control over all the relevant private actors in a given issue area in order to be a successful regulator.

And, as Farrell argues, this is indeed what has been happening in the case of Wikileaks. In the Netherlands where one hacktivist was arrested after allegedly being involved in the attack against Visa, companies like Fox-IT deliver security and intelligence services for civil society organisations but also for the state. In an attempt to delegitimate these activists both the Dutch state and Fox-IT in their media appearances labelled the hacktivists as sloppy, shallow (and not very idealistic) vandals.

Although a case for the demise of the nation-state cannot be substantiated, this does not mean that digital activism is without any power or significance. Using the internet for global activism makes it more difficult for states to control the flow of information and the Internet plays a critical role in events, information and experiences being shared by people all over the world as Kevin McDonald describes in his book on Global Movements. The case of the recent Nobel Prize winner Liu Xiaobo is an example of that as well as the case of Wikileaks. According to Liu Xiaobo:
The internet is God’s present to China | Liu Xiaobo – Times Online

The internet has brought about the awakening of ideas among the Chinese. This worries the Government, which has placed great importance on blocking the internet to exert ideological control.

And in the case of Wikileaks:
WikiLeaks Shines a Light on the Limits of Techno-Politics – Whimsley

But while there are many cables in the pile that are of no interest to anyone and which seem to be marked as secret for no good reason, to focus on those is to ignore the real revelations that are coming out, day after day. The purpose of the leaks is to derail the American global agenda – if they haven’t succeeded, they will try again.

The openness question is always contingent, and to phrase political questions in terms of data is sidestepping the big issue. Your answer to “what data should the government make public?” depends not so much on what you think about data, but what you think about the government. Everyone is in favour of other people’s openness.

This openness appears to be essential for public deliberation (according to many supporters) and in the case of Wikileaks that does involve leaking cables with apparently trivial issues. As the now famous Aaron Bady explains in his reading of an essay by Assange:
Julian Assange and the Computer Conspiracy; “To destroy this invisible government” « zunguzungu

Wikileaks does not leak something like the “Collateral Murder” video as a way of putting an end to that particular military tactic; that would be to target a specific leg of the hydra even as it grows two more. Instead, the idea is that increasing the porousness of the conspiracy’s information system will impede its functioning, that the conspiracy will turn against itself in self-defense, clamping down on its own information flows in ways that will then impede its own cognitive function. You destroy the conspiracy, in other words, by making it so paranoid of itself that it can no longer conspire:

The more secretive or unjust an organization is, the more leaks induce fear and paranoia in its leadership and planning coterie. This must result in minimization of efficient internal communications mechanisms (an increase in cognitive “secrecy tax”) and consequent system-wide cognitive decline resulting in decreased ability to hold onto power as the environment demands adaption. Hence in a world where leaking is easy, secretive or unjust systems are nonlinearly hit relative to open, just systems. Since unjust systems, by their nature induce opponents, and in many places barely have the upper hand, mass leaking leaves them exquisitely vulnerable to those who seek to replace them with more open forms of governance.

The leak, in other words, is only the catalyst for the desired counter-overreaction; Wikileaks wants to provoke the conspiracy into turning off its own brain in response to the threat. As it tries to plug its own holes and find the leakers, he reasons, its component elements will de-synchronize from and turn against each other, de-link from the central processing network, and come undone. Even if all the elements of the conspiracy still exist, in this sense, depriving themselves of a vigorous flow of information to connect them all together as a conspiracy prevents them from acting as a conspiracy.

And one of the interesting things in this Wikileaks case is that, based upon Aaron Bady’s analysis, the US reaction against Assange in fact validates the leaks because they can never arrest Assange (for example for being a spy) without making clear that the cables are authentic. The counter-reaction therefore affirms the intentions of the Wikileaks activists. The case of the activists trying to support Wikileaks by attacking websites of for example Visa, may have a less clear political profile. Nevertheless, it is a little bit too simple to assume that the hactivists in the Wikileak case are mere vandals. An insider look by anthropologist (you really need an anthropologist for that…) Gabriella Coleman makes this clear:
What It’s Like to Participate in Anonymous’ Actions – Gabriella Coleman – National – The Atlantic

We see here how one participant is trying to rally the infantry to stay on target but this is followed by critical commentary on motivations behind the attacks. But is it the case that “most people here do not fight because of something?” In reality, it is hard to tell. In some ways, it may be impossible to gauge the intent and motive of thousands of participants, many of who don’t even bother to leave a trace of their thoughts, motivations, and reactions. Among those that do, opinions vary considerably.

And yet there are other statements made by Anonymous that do give a clear sense that some fight for “something” and that this is part of a larger political plan, even if surely not everyone participates in Anonymous for noble causes. Along with IRC, Anonymous have also made ample use of collaborative writing software, in this case Pirate Pad (which rose from the ashes of Etherpad) and do so to coordinate actions, pick targets, and write manifestos. If IRC is where the cacophonous side of Anonymous is most clearly manifest, then the documents and conversation on Pirate Pad reflect a calmer, more deliberate and deliberative side of Anonymous, where participants offer arguments that are picked apart or supported through reasoned debate.

As with all social movements participants have a wide variety of motivations for being involved in hactivism in favour of Wikileaks; some have idealistic motives others have not (and the distinction is not always that clear). These hactivists can perhaps be seen as modern anarchists as Farrell explains in a very good review of Under Three Flags: Anarchism and the Anti-Colonial Imagination (by Benedict Anderson, yes the one of ‘imagined communities’) and The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia (by James Scott). The lack of a clear political profile and the apparent shallow commitment of digital activists appears to limit the potential of these modern anarchists. As Farrell explains:
The State of Statelessness – Henry Farrell – The American Interest Magazine

Thanks to Noam Chomsky, the Internet and the anti-globalization protests of the late 1990s, multitudes of young activists now either see themselves as anarchists or are attracted to aspects of anarchist philosophy. Yet this hardly adds up to a coherent political movement.

While anarchism still inspires political action, anarchists do rather little to organize that action into a larger program for change. Like other activists, they have taken advantage of the Internet to organize protests, but the Internet is no substitute for a directed organization. It can create solidarities and facilitate simple forms of collective action, such as raising money or turning up in the same place for a protest. But it cannot easily sustain complex activities that require long-term commitments. Here, in particular, the Internet actually accentuates some of anarchism’s inherent weaknesses.

But maybe we need to re-visit Granovetter’s argument about the strength of weak ties in order to fully appreciate the ties that are being created online.Weak Ties, Twitter and Revolution | Wired Science | Wired.com

While Gladwell argues that the flat hierarchies of online networks are a detriment to effective activism — he cites the leaderless P.L.O. as an example — Granovetter points out that leaders of social movements often depend on weak ties to maintain loyalty. He notes that organizations dominated by strong ties tend to produce fragmentation and cliquishness, which quickly leads to the breakdown of trust.

This suggests that part of the reason Martin Luther King was able to inspire such discipline among a relatively large group of followers was that he cultivated a large number of weak ties. As a result, people felt like they trusted him, even though they barely knew him. Here’s Granovetter:

Leaders, for their part, have little motivation to be responsive or even trustworthy toward those to whom they have no direct or indirect connection. [This is what happens in a group without weak ties.] Thus, network fragmentation, by reducing drastically the number of paths from any leader to his potential followers, would inhibit trust in such leaders.

Obviously, this 1973 paper doesn’t explore the implications of weak ties that develop online. Do all those Tea Party activists feel like they have weak ties with Sarah Palin? Perhaps these online relationships are intrinsically different than those weak ties we form at the office, or the dinner party?

These are all important questions, and I don’t think we have many good answers. But I would quibble with Gladwell’s wholesale rejection of weak ties as a means of building a social movement. (I have some issues with Shirky, too.) It turns out that such distant relationships aren’t just useful for getting jobs or spreading trends or sharing information. According to Granovetter, they might also help us fight back against the Man, or at least the redevelopment agency.

Nevertheless I do share the reluctance to attribute revolutionary capacities to the Internet to easily like happened in the case of the Green Movement in Iran as the so-called Twitter Revolution. Going back to Farrell’s review:
The State of Statelessness – Henry Farrell – The American Interest Magazine

Scott’s message, if a message it is, is that the possibilities of anarchy are fundamentally limited by the modern state. We cannot get away from the state, so the best we can do is to chasten and moderate it through the institutions of representative democracy. This speaks well to the incoherencies of modern anarchists. It is difficult to imagine anarchism succeeding for the simple reason that there is no reasonable prospect that the state will wither away. The inherent vagueness of anarchism, its frequent unwillingness to articulate and interrogate its own goals and its methodologies directly, and its sometime elevation of mere action over the calculable political results of those actions are all part of the implicit tribute anarchism pays to its enemy. Anarchists even struggle to persuade themselves that they would want to live in a truly stateless society, let alone to persuade the vast majority of their fellow citizens to do so.

Anderson’s history draws us to rather different conclusions and expectations. He suggests that anarchism’s ideological weakness is connected to its very real strength; the one is the obverse of the other. […]

The network that anarchists helped sustain, which brought together insurrectionists, journalists, novelists and the odd liberal intellectual, was formed less by a common ideological project than by profound indignation and solidarity with others agitating against injustices. Here, the very incoherence and malleability of anarchism proved to be an advantage. If it did not achieve much in itself, it allowed others who were associated with it to achieve much indeed. Anarchist newspapers and journalists helped make the Montjuich prison into a source of great shame for Spain, so much so that it proved impossible successfully to prosecute the man who assassinated the prison’s chief torturer.

Here we see the links between the anarchist network of the 19th century, bound together by letters, novels and personal travel, and the anarchist network of today, bound together by the blogs, forums and listservs of the Internet. […] They create links of solidarity across borders. […]

If Scott provides good reason to believe that anarchism will never achieve its global ambitions, Anderson suggests that perhaps those global ambitions were never the most interesting thing about anarchism. Even in a world where the state is here to stay—notwithstanding all the chic nostrums and prophecies about its rapidly growing porosity and looming obsolescence—global networks founded on sympathy, solidarity and a real if diffuse sense of common purpose can help balance against the abuses inherent in the form of the state. Here, anarchists resemble the American Founders, who saw the spirit of liberty as a necessary bulwark against concentrations of power, and were themselves partly embedded in international networks preaching revolution and social upheaval. In building a truly global economy, the great states have given anarchists the opportunity to rebuild their networks of sympathy and common political purpose across borders. Today’s anarchists want to change the world through distributed action rather than a pistol shot. It seems to be working out better.

The weak ties and perhaps shallow commitments fostered on/by the Internet may generate some small-scale changes in individuals’ lives and in small groups on the longer term that may even be more important than the large scale attacks and counter-attacks that are going on now.(See also Maximilian Forte’s take on the Wikileaks Revolution) Twitter, Facebook, Wikis and other forms of digital media probably have more to do with individuals asserting their own place in the world and people trying develop their own voice, than with some revolutionary potential. At the same time however Wikileaks is an example of weak ties on which a network of contributors is build around shared values and a trust ethic (to take up Stacey’s point again). One could say that Wikileaks/Assange created weak ties making people who do not belong to the network and/or do not know Assange trust them enough to join them and stand up for them. Although in general the revolutionary potential of the Internet may seem rather limited, in this case the Internet can be a substitute for directed organization certainly (and here it comes again) in the wake of what Bady has called the ‘counter-overreaction’. The ‘counter-overreaction’ does not only validate the leaks but also directly provokes and feeds the activism against the states’ responses to Wikileaks. What the effect is in the longer term remains to be seen.

1 comment.

Closing the Week 48 – Featuring Morocco and Western Sahara

Posted on December 5th, 2010 by martijn.
Categories: anthropology, Blogosphere.

Most popular on Closer this week:

1. Award for anthropologist Jan Blommaert: Language, Asylum and the National Order
2. The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (Guest Author: Joas Wagemakers)
3. Islamizing Europe – Muslim Demographics

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Featuring Morocco and Western Sahara
Department of Anthropology at Western – Sahrawi in words and pictures

The Moroccan and Mauritanian invasion on Western Sahara in 1975 led to the mass exodus of Sahrawis towards Tindouf, a small town in the Algerian desert. Refugee oral histories and narratives recount horror stories of war, including phosphorous bombs hurled from the skies on the fleeing population. While fighting its military battles on two fronts, the Polisario helped the Sahrawi refugees find safe shelter, distributed food and water (the little that was available) and began establishing and organizing the refugee camps. In February 1976 the Polisario declared a state in exile – the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) and the refugees became ‘citizens’ who lived in ‘provinces’ the term Sahrawis use in reference to each camp named after districts, towns and areas within Western Sahara.

Pambazuka – Western Sahara and Morocco’s physical and symbolic violence

With tensions coming to a head over the past two weeks, Morocco is once again under the international spotlight for its alleged illegal territorial occupation of Western Sahara. In the wake of a raid on the Sahrawi encampment of Gdeim Izik by Moroccan forces on Monday 8 November, Konstantina Isidoros argues that such ‘events shed illuminating insights into Morocco’s illegal occupation’.

Western Sahara: Morocco incites potential for war – Afrik-news.com : Africa news, Maghreb news – The african daily newspaper

At six am on Monday 8th November, Moroccan armed military forces began a violent attack on one of the largest of Western Sahara’s three ’independence camps’, comprising a reported 8000 tents and 30,000 Sahrawi residents.

AFP: WSahara group ‘releases policeman’ held for spying

The UN refugee agency confirmed on Saturday that Western Saharan independence movement the Polisario Front had freed a policeman it detained on accusations of spying for arch-enemy Morocco.

Spain downplays row with Morocco over Western Sahara – Monsters and Critics

pain on Friday downplayed the importance of its diplomatic problems with Morocco, with Deputy Prime Minister Alfredo Perez Rubalcaba saying there was a sufficient basis of mutual ‘trust’ to solve them.

Rabat announced Thursday that it would review its relations with Madrid after the Spanish parliament adopted a motion urging the government to express its concern over alleged human rights violations in Moroccan-ruled Western Sahara.

Spain’s relations with Morocco were ‘strategic’ and ‘very important,’ Rubalcaba stressed.

As dispute over Western Sahara wears on, growing numbers of refugees journey back home

Some 90,000 Sahrawis, or native Saharans, have lived in desolate tent camps in Algeria since the late 1970s, where they fled to escape warfare between Morocco and the Algerian-backed Polisario Front. Now they are fleeing back to the Moroccan side of the Sahara in increasing numbers, according to reports from the Moroccan government and the United Nations. Most escape to reunite with their families and settle in growing Sahrawi communities; some peacefully promote independent statehood for Western Sahara, while others have planned attacks on Moroccan security forces.

Anthropology (AAA and Science)
New Orleans: 6000 anthropologists, much tweeting, some blogging, no press coverage

It has been one of the best attended conferences ever. More than 6000 anthropologists went to the 109th Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological Society (AAA) in New Orleans.

But as usual, it’s hard to find any press coverage. There are some blog posts about the conference, though, and more than 1000 tweets. “This year was a breakout year for the use of Twitter at the AAA”, Kerim Friedman writes at Savage Minds. The tweets – mostly internal conversations – aren’t of much value for us who haven’t been there, though.

News: Social Sciences and Human Decency – Inside Higher Ed

That conflict is one among many that members of the American Anthropological Association were grappling with here during several sessions of their annual meeting last week. The association is working on its first large-scale revision of its code of ethics in a decade, though some adjustments have been made in the interim, said Dena Plemmons, chair of the task force and a research ethicist at the University of California at San Diego. A new ethics statement is likely to come up for a vote among members in spring 2012.

Anthropology is not a science, says the AAA | Benson Saler’s blog

The Board of the American Anthropological Association has recently adopted a new “mission statement” that omits any reference to “science” in its characterization of anthropology. The previous mission statement contained such a reference.

A number of US anthropologists have protested the new mission statement. I paste below a recent post from Professor Eric C. Thompson of the National University of Singapore. I find Professor Thompson’s post especially interesting because it summarizes some of the data that he and his associates collected from graduate students in several leading US anthropology programs. The student respondents gave their opinions as to which anthropologists they regard as having been most influential on the development of anthropology during the last two decades.

Why anthropology is ‘true’ even if it is not ‘science’ | Savage Minds

A recent article in Inside Higher Ed documented the latest ‘issue’ in anthropology making its way around the Internet: anger amongst ‘scientific’ anthropologists that the executive board of the American Anthropological Association has rewritten the mission statement of the association and removed language which describes anthropology as a science. Now, I have no intention to defend the executive board of the AAA, and I have no objection to labeling myself a social scientist. However, I am concerned that objections to the new statement 1) do a bad job of understanding what ‘science’ is and 2) fail to understand that the knowledge anthropology produces can still be ‘true’ even if it is not ‘scientific’.

Anthropology, Science, and Public Understanding | Neuroanthropology

During November’s annual meeting of the American Anthropological Association, the AAA executive committee made significant changes to its long-range plan statement. By choosing to drop “science” as the main qualifier of the field of anthropology, the executive committee has kicked up a firestorm among anthropologists as well as created a wider reaction in the higher education community.

Here are the old and new wordings for the first of the three sections in the American Anthropological Association’s Statement of Purpose.

Putting ‘science’ back in anthropology – This Just In – CNN.com Blogs

Remember Anthro 101? You probably learned about far-off cultures and methods of observing human social life, in addition to some human evolution, perhaps. Your professor likely referenced published research, and the course catalog said it was a “social science.”

The Social Construction of Neighborhood Navigation… » Sociological Images

…and more in this 3-minute TED talk by Derek Sivers, sent in by AJ S. As AJ points out, the examples show that “…just because something is different doesn’t mean it is not logical in context.”

Somatosphere: Political Subjectivity / Subjectivity beyond the Subject

I have come across an interesting talk by Caroline Williams which would be of interest and relevance to those following the topic of subjectivity, and political subjectivity in specific.

How the Literary Darwinists Got it Wrong | Psychology Today

At the moment, I happen to be reading a 700-page Stephen King novel, left over from time in an airport. In Duma Key, a nasty dead person under the sea bed is able to influence events on this small but spooky island in the Florida Keys. This evil spirit works through paintings. It inspires the protagonist, a renter on the island, to create paintings that amaze and astonish and fetch admiration and high prices. But these paintings do things. They cause heart attacks, remove a bullet embedded in a friend’s skull, make another friend commit suicide, and the paintings make various other people die from various other causes.

Now this is nonsensical, isn’t it? Paintings don’t extract bullets or cause heart attacks. Paintings don’t kill people.

Why we act helpfully toward others – The Times of India

“In anthropology, they say if you are envied, you might act more socially afterward because you try to appease those envious people,” van de Ven says—by sharing your big catch of fish, for example. They wanted to know if these observations from anthropology held up in the psychology lab.

Book review of Cultural Diversity and Global Media (Siapera 2010) « media/anthropology

Review of Cultural Diversity and Global Media: The Mediation of Difference by Eugenia Siapera (2010, pubs. Wiley-Blackwell). This is a draft only, for the final version please see in due course the International Journal of Media and Cultural Politics.

Misc.
Germany’s angst about Islamists goes mainstream

The 200 robed and bearded men gathered at dusk on the market square, rolled out their prayer rugs and intoned Allah’s praises as dismayed townspeople looked on.

It was Ramadan, the Muslim fasting month, and the group that calls itself “Invitation to Paradise” was mounting a defiant response to weeks of public protests against construction of a religious school to teach its austere, militant interpretation of Islam.

In Germany, where the racial crimes of the Nazis have bred extreme sensitivity toward the rights of minorities, such confrontations would until recently have been limited to the far-right margins. The weekly rallies in this city of 250,000 near the Dutch border these days look decidedly mainstream.

Dutch
MOI Studiedag ‘Verbinding, Verbeelding en Vertier’ Moslims en Multimedia

De Nederlandse Vereniging voor de Studie van het Midden-Oosten en de Islam(MOI) organiseert op vrijdag 10 december 2010 een studiedag in Amsterdam:’Verbinding, Verbeelding en Vertier. Moslims en Multimedia’. Aan de hand van recent onderzoek zullen thema’s als methodes van internet onderzoek, salafisme, Fitna the movie en tegenfilms op Youtube, en mediagebruik onder moslims worden toegelicht.

Bruggenbouwers » Reactie liberale moslims op islamnota PKN

De islamnota ‘Integriteit en respect’ van de PKN heeft al de nodige reacties opgeroepen uit eigen geleding, getuige diverse artikelen in de media. Een bevriende dominee heeft mij geattendeerd op de nota en vroeg mij wat ik, moslim, er van vind. Hoewel de nota nog gewijzigd of aangescherpt zal worden en vooral de interne discussie binnen de PKN dient, kan het geen kwaad vanuit moslim-perspectief alvast een eerste reactie te geven.

Volgens Wilders begrijpen veel moslims de islam niet – Joop.nl

De PVV-visie op de islam kort samengevat: je kunt zeggen, wat je wilt maar Osama heeft gelijk.

Vertrouwen of beeldhouwen? : Nieuwemoskee

Eenentwintig jaar geleden besloot ik de islam tot de basis voor mijn verdere spirituele zoektocht te maken. Nu ben ik dus een soort ‘volwassen moslimvrouw’, wat niet betekent dat het leren en zoeken voorbij zijn. Dat hoop ik tot de dag van mijn vertrek uit dit aardse leven te blijven doen, God willende. Toen ik moslim werd, was er nog nauwelijks informatie over islam in de Nederlandse taal beschikbaar. En ook de ‘Rusdhie-affaire’ ging nog grotendeels aan mij voorbij. Toen bepaalden het aanleren van gebed, voedsel- en andere voorschriften, maar vooral de prachtige religieus geïnspireerde verhalen die mijn man vertelde, mijn beleving van gelovig zijn.

De pijnlijke geboorte van de Liberale Islam – Joop.nl

De dit jaar overleden Egyptische vrijdenker Abu Zaid kreeg door zijn liberale religieuze opvattingen problemen met orthodoxe moslims. Opvallend: ook hier in Nederland vielen denkers Abu Zaid af. Vrijdenkers, atheïsten en secularisten zagen niets in het idee van een liberale islam. Terecht?

Vroege Vogels: halal vlees is nog geen halal als er halal op staat

Eén miljoen Nederlandse moslims eten zonder dat ze dat weten, vlees dat eigenlijk niet halal is. Halal vlees komt vrijwel altijd uit de gangbare vee-industrie en het welzijn van de dieren en de manier van slachten is vaak in strijd met de voorschriften van de Koran. Echt halal vlees is volgens Islam deskundigen gelijk aan biologisch vlees, maar in de praktijk is dat absoluut niet het geval. Dier & Recht roept de 1 miljoen Nederlandse moslims op halal vlees uit de gangbare veehouderij (en dat is vrijwel al het halal vlees) te mijden.

‘Islamofobische hetze tegen Witte Tulp’ – AT5 Nieuws

De stichting, die huiswerkhulp geeft aan Turkse kinderen, zou nauwe banden hebben met de omstreden Islamitische Gülenbeweging. Ook zouden jongens en meisjes er gescheiden les krijgen.

Dat stond afgelopen week in een artikel in ambtenarenblad Binnenlands Bestuur. Naar aanleiding van het stuk eiste de VVD Nieuw-West opheldering van het stadsdeelbestuur.

De leiding van de Witte Tulp is uiterst verbolgen over het artikel. “Wij zien dat de hetze rond Stichting Witte Tulp ‘een islamofobisch karakter’ heeft.”

‘Ik hoor de kritische moslims te weinig’

Dat zei theoloog Ruard Ganzevoort vandaag in Dit is de Dag. Hij betreurt het dat de progressieve Nederlandse moslims zich weinig laten horen op gevoelige onderwerpen binnen de Islam. ‘Die moslims zijn er wel, maar ik hoor ze niet’.

Hoe ziet mijn toekomst eruit als ik de islam wél praktiseer? (reactie op Tofik Dibi)

Op 16 oktober publiceerde de Volkskrant een column van Tofik Dibi (tweede kamerlid GroenLinks) met de titel “Wees moslim met opgeheven hoofd!”. Dibi vertelt dat hij, net als ik overigens, sinds de verkiezingen veel vragen krijgt van jonge moslims. Zij blijken onzeker te zijn van de toekomst en vrezen de gevolgen van de monsterzege (een mooi gekozen aanduiding) van Wilders en zijn toenadering tot de macht. De kern van het betoog van Dibi komt mijns inziens tot uitdrukking in de afronding van zijn artikel, waar hij schrijft: “Wees mondig en vol zelfvertrouwen. Wees moslim met opgeheven hoofd. Word een voorbeeld voor anderen. Dát is het meest overtuigende en onweerlegbare bewijs van het ongelijk van Geert Wilders”. Tot zover geen vuiltje aan de lucht.

Nederlandse mediastilte rond Saharaconflict

Wat gek dat ik in de Nederlandse media niets terug kan vinden over de ontwikkelingen in Marokko van de laatste weken. Op de internetsites van de dagbladen ben ik in elk geval niets tegengekomen. Alleen in Het Parool stond een kort bericht: honderdduizenden protesteren in Casablanca tegen EU-resolutie, en beschuldigen vooral de Spaanse socialistische partij van vooringenomenheid.

Wat is er aan de hand?

Interview Rob Vreeken: Baas in Eigen Boerka – Wij Blijven Hier!: Het schrijversplatform van moslims

We horen veel over vrouwen en emancipatie. Vooral erg veel over moslimvrouwen (moslima’s) en emancipatie, of juist het ontbreken ervan. Volkskrantverslaggever Rob Vreeken vond het beeld van het Westen hierop eenzijdig en star. Hij ging dan ook in de moslimwereld op zoek naar vrouwen om erachter te komen hoe divers de emancipatie verloopt. Wijblijvenhier.nl stelde hem een aantal vragen over het resultaat, zijn boek: ‘Baas in eigen boerka’.

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Award for anthropologist Jan Blommaert: Language, Asylum and the National Order

Posted on November 30th, 2010 by martijn.
Categories: [Online] Publications, anthropology, Multiculti Issues.

Jan Blommaert has been awarded with the first Barbara Metzger Prize for his article Language, Asylum, and the National Order published in the journal Current Anthropology in August 2009 (vol. 50, no. 4). Jan Blommaert is professor of language, culture and globalization at Tilburg University, the Netherlands and professor in African linguistics and sociolinguistics at Ghent University in Belgium.

The prize has been established by the Wenner-Gren Foundation to be given annually to the article in Current Anthropology that:
Wenner-Gren Announces the Barbara Metzger Prize | The Wenner Gren Foundation

best represents the journal’s longstanding commitment to good writing. Sol Tax, the founding editor of the journal, emphasized that the papers published in Current Anthropology should reach and interest as wide an audience as possible within anthropology, a field with global reach that includes various sub-disciplines. To achieve this aim, Tax set high standards for prose. He sought clear and concise expression of ideas, of fact and of opinion. He welcomed the appropriate use of technical language and discouraged unnecessary jargon.

For many years, Barbara Metzger, the journal’s distinguished copy editor, worked closely with authors to promote these values. The result of her dedicated efforts has been a journal recognized around the world for the lucid and articulate presentation of a wide variety of forms of anthropological scholarship. Following her retirement, the Foundation has created the Barbara Metzger Prize to carry her work forward. It will be awarded annually to the article, report or forum that most fully embodies these standards of writing.

In his article Blommaert probes the way in which officials try to ascertain the authenticity of those seeking asylum in Western Europe:Chicago Journals – Current Anthropology

This paper discusses modernist reactions to postmodern realities. Asylum seekers in Western Europe—people typically inserted into postmodern processes of globalization—are routinely subjected to identification analyses that emphasize the national order. The paper documents the case of a Rwandan refugee in the United Kingdom whose nationality was disputed by the Home Office because of his “abnormal” linguistic repertoire. An analysis of that repertoire, however, supports the applicant’s credibility. The theoretical problematic opposes two versions of sociolinguistics: a sociolinguistics of languages, used by the Home Office, and a sociolinguistics of speech and repertoires, used in this paper. The realities of modern reactions to postmodern phenomena must be taken into account as part of the postmodern phenomenology of language in society.

Blommaert’s analysis suggests that the final decision – which may be a matter of life or death – may come down to judgments about language. His analysis is based upon the case of an asylum seeker from Rwanda, Joseph Mutingra, in the UK. Officials sometimes rely on assumptions about linguistic competence of asylum seekers that may be inaccurate when applied to citizens of often multi-lingual communities. These officials appear to rely on the assumption that the dominant language in the country of the asylum seeker is the standard by which an individual’s application to be evaluated, rendering many asylum applications futile from the start. Mutingira has a low command of Kinyarwanda (Rwanda’s dominant language) because in his childhood he spoke English at home. This is not uncommon but caused the official questioning him to identify him as a non-native speaker. The dominant language is perceived as a neutral standard but Blommaert shows it is based upon questionable assumptions. He urges instead a sociolinguistics of speech and linguistic repertoire more sensitive to the lived experience of the people who are seeking asylum and to link the language that is being used not only to a particular geographic area but also to time (and/or a personal life history) because the relationship between area of origin and use of language is far less clear than assumed – in particular in times of large migration movements and diasporas causing languages to move beyond borders and nations. Particular touching in Blommaert’s account of Mutingira’s story is how language plays an important role in people’s live and their prospects for the future. Mutingra flees after his family has been murdered and because he picks up bits and pieces of languages on the road, he is frequently seen as an enemy with terrible consequences. Mutingra does not fit into the neat categorizations of local standards of language and as a result is ‘exposed’ as suspect every time.

His article is a fine example of good anthropological research and the art of writing while being highly relevant for debates on migration, asylum and migration policies.
You can read the full article here:
Current Anthropology, vol. 50, no. 4, August 2009 – Language, Asylum, and the National Order by Jan Blommaert
Text here is based upon my impression of the article and the press release of Wenner-Gren Foundation and the Dutch press release of Tilburg University

I hereby congratulate Professor Blommaert with a wonderful and fascinating article and for winning this award.

2 comments.

Een wekelijks portie burgerschap 45 – Wanneer het echt niet meer gaat

Posted on November 10th, 2010 by martijn.
Categories: anthropology, Burgerschapserie 2010.

Uit de burgerschapskalender:

Als mantelzorger zorg je langdurig en onbetaald voor een familielid, vriend of kennis die chronisch ziek, gehandicapt of hulpbehoevend is. Heel vanzelfsprekend, vinden de 3,7 miljoen mantelzorgers in Nederland. “Maar dan wil je wel dat je goede ondersteuning krijgt, als het even niet meer gaat”, aldus een deelnemer aan de discussie in Bergen op Zoom.

10 november Dag van de Mantelzorg

Het zorgen voor kinderen (vaak overigens niet onder mantelzorg gerekend), voor ouderen, gehandicapten en mensen die getroffen zijn door calamiteiten zijn allemaal te zien als wederkerige, sociale activiteiten die zowel voor de verzorger als de verzorgde van cruciaal belang zijn. Deze zorg valt onder de populaire gezondheidszorg: niet onder de reguliere medische zorg en evenmin onder alternatieve geneeswijzen. Het lijkt wel alsof deze vorm van zorg steeds verder af komt te staan van reguliere zorg; de zorg die mantelzorgers bieden wordt immers steeds minder gedaan in ziekenhuizen en verpleegtehuizen. Praktische hulp voor alledaagse beslommeringen, emotionele steun, het uiten van morele solidariteit en verantwoordelijkheid voor de ander en een erkenning en bevestiging van die ander; het zijn zaken waar u nauwelijks nog op hoeft te rekenen in de reguliere zorg. Wanneer iemand op zijn/haar sterfbed ligt komt er nog een taak bij; één die heel simpel lijkt maar mensen heel moeilijk en zwaar vinden: het simpelweg er zijn voor en met de stervende zonder enige verwachting op herstel. Zo opgevat is mantelzorg een fundamentele en existentiële activiteit die iets zegt over de relatie met andere mensen en over andere activiteiten; het is een activiteit die er écht toe doet. Juist in een materiële samenleving als de onze is het misschien nog wel de enige activiteit die daaronder geschaard kan worden. Toch heeft het volgens mij niet zoveel status en mijn indruk is dat het toenemende belang van mantelzorg vooral een bezuinigingsoperatie is die volledig voorbij gaat aan de fundamentele en existentiële kenmerken ervan. Waarschijnlijk is één van de redenen dat het weinig status heeft het gegeven dat mantelzorg ‘nu eenmaal’ vooral door vrouwen gedaan werd en wordt wat vrijwel altijd betekent dat de status ‘nu eenmaal’ lager is.

Dit is eigenlijk het verhaal van Arthur Kleinman, één van de meest vooraanstaande medisch antropologen. Hij is psychiater en antropoloog en heeft onderzoek verricht in China en Taiwan naar depressie, epilepsie, schizofrenie en zelfmoord. Zijn belangrijkste publicaties zijn Patients and Healers in the Context of Culture; Social Origins of Distress and Disease: Neurasthenia, Depression and Pain in Modern China; The Illness Narratives; Rethinking Psychiatry; Culture and Depression (co-editor); Social Suffering (co-editor). Zijn recente boek What Really Matters gaat precies over mantelzorg. Nu doen antropologen dat over het algemeen op basis van participerende observatie, maar dit geval is iets bijzonders. In 2003 kregen hij en zijn vrouw te horen dat zijn vrouw de ziekte van Alzheimer had. What really matters is gebaseerd op zijn ervaringen, analyse en zelf-reflectie met betrekking tot de zorg voor zijn vrouw. In een artikel voor het Harvard Magazine maakt Kleinman zijn punt nog eens duidelijk:
Arthur Kleinman on the societal and medical ramifications of caregiving | Harvard Magazine Jul-Aug 2010

My own experience of being the primary caregiver for my wife, on account of her neurodegenerative disorder, convinces me yet further that caregiving has much less to do with doctoring than the general public realizes or than medical educators are willing to acknowledge. Caregiving is about skilled nursing, competent social work, rehabilitation efforts of physical and occupational therapists, and the hard physical work of home healthcare aides. Yet, for all the efforts of the helping professions, caregiving is for the most part the preserve of families and intimate friends, and of the afflicted person herself or himself. We struggle with family and close friends to undertake the material acts that sustain us, find practical assistance with the activities of daily living, financial aid, legal and religious advice, emotional support, meaning-making and remaking, and moral solidarity. About these caregiving activities, we know surprisingly little, other than that they come to define the quality of living for millions of sufferers.

In dit artikel, gebaseerd op twee artikelen die hij schreef voor de Lancet (HIER en HIER) stelt hij eigenlijk dat de hedendaagse zorg mank gaat door een paradox. De balans tussen wetenschap en technologie aan de ene kant en aan de andere kant het verzorgen is zo ver doorgeslagen naar het eerste dat het verzorgen nog maar een zwakke schaduw is van wat het eens zou zijn geweest. Sterker nog, het opleiden van medische studenten als wetenschappelijk-technische experts diskwalificeert hen eigenlijk in toenemende mate als verzorger. En nog sterker, zou ik er aan willen toevoegen, wegens het gebrek aan status voor verzorging leidt een toenemende nadruk op verzorging in de opleiding waarschijnlijk tot een diskwalificatie als technisch expert. Opvallend in het artikel en ook in het boek is dat Kleinman zeer persoonlijke, ontroerende verhalen en anecdotes afwisselt met heel afstandelijke beschouwingen en dat die over het algemeen naadloos bij elkaar passen:Arthur Kleinman on the societal and medical ramifications of caregiving | Harvard Magazine Jul-Aug 2010

I lead her across the living room, holding her hand behind my back, so that I can navigate the two of us between chairs, sofas, end tables, over Persian rugs, through the passageway and into the kitchen. I help her find and carefully place herself in a chair, one of four at the oval-shaped oak table. She turns the wrong way, forcing the chair outward; I push her legs around and in, under the table’s edge. The sun streams through the bank of windows. The brightness of the light and its warmth, on a freezing winter’s day, make her smile. She turns toward me. The uneven pupils in Joan Kleinman’s green-brown eyes look above and beyond my head, searching for my face. Gently I turn her head towards me. I grin as she raises her eyebrows in recognition, shakes her long brown hair, and the soft warmth of her sudden happiness lights up her still strikingly beautiful face. “Wonderful!” she whispers. “I’m a Palo Alto, a California, girl. I like it warm.”

In een interview op PBS geeft Kleinman nog iets meer een inkijkje in zijn persoonlijke beleving en de relatie met zijn werk als wetenschapper.
October 1, 2010 ~ Arthur Kleinman on Caregiving | Religion & Ethics NewsWeekly

KLEINMAN: I think it’s the sadness, the sense of a deepening despair—that you realize that this is not going to go away. This is going to get worse. You realize that this is a terminal illness.

ABERNETHY: As Dr. Kleinman balanced his work and his caregiving, he says he found great meaning in the Chinese Confucian tradition he and his wife had both studied.

KLEINMAN: The deep commitment to family, the idea that family was central to everything that you did. The respect you have for somebody else—that your own humanness deepens as you engage the humanness of somebody else.

I found that that relationship became increasingly tied to my moral view of things—that I had enormous respect for her, that I felt that it was crucial for me to help her maintain her dignity. There is something remarkable about that feeling of being present with someone else, and I felt that for a long time in our relationship, and I felt that deepen as there were more acts for me to do. It was in the doing that I felt I was a caregiver. Not in thinking about it, not in talking to people about it, but actually doing it. The acts themselves I saw as moral acts.

Deze artikelen en zijn boek zijn eigenlijk hedendaagse monumenten van existentiële antropologie; diep persoonlijk afgewisseld met analytische beschouwen over het mens-zijn en het in-de-wereld-zijn oftewel (en veel te kort door de bocht) hoe men zich verhoudt tot de wereld om hen in heen. De kwaliteiten die Kleinman legt bij mantelzorg maken mantelzorg voor hem misschien wel datgene wat een mens een mens maakt. En dit alles naar aanleiding van een onderzoek naar zorg voor een vrouw die misschien door Alzheimer wel een deel van dat menszijn verliest. Ik heb het idee dat Kleinman net zoals vele mantelzorgers telkens blijven zoeken naar dat kleine tekentje van menszijn. En in dit geval gaat het dus niet om zomaar een vrouw, maar om zijn vrouw met wij hij zijn leven deelt en van wie hij duidelijk erg veel houdt:
October 1, 2010 ~ Arthur Kleinman on Caregiving | Religion & Ethics NewsWeekly

The memory may go. They may not recognize who you are, may not remember from minute to minute what you said. But you can still see, in the way they respond to you, feelings, deep feelings that represent the fact that they know you’re important in their life even though they’re not quite sure whether you’re the husband or the son or what your name is and the like.

En net als zovelen kwam ook Kleinman voor het moment dat hij het zelf niet meer aankon:
October 1, 2010 ~ Arthur Kleinman on Caregiving | Religion & Ethics NewsWeekly

But by last summer Kleinman had come to realize that his wife needed more care than he could give. So, reluctantly, he moved her to a nursing home.

KLEINMAN: That was the most difficult thing. That is, that I had made up my mind that I would take care of my wife until the end, and I did it for seven to eight years until a point at which I recognized I couldn’t do it anymore. I couldn’t handle—and I’m a psychiatrist—I could not handle the agitation part of it, where she became so agitated and so distressed, and she really needed a safe place to be, etc., where she would be less paranoid and less threatened by things.

De quote van de burgerschapskalender dat we toch wel wat hulp willen, is een meer dan een kostenpost zoals het zo vaak gezien wordt. Het is een worsteling van enerzijds toe te moeten geven dat het echt niet meer anders kan en anderzijds ook dat dan vaak toch écht het laatste stadium ingaat. October 1, 2010 ~ Arthur Kleinman on Caregiving | Religion & Ethics NewsWeekly

KLEINMAN: When you’ve been deeply in love with someone for 45 years and greatly enmeshed together, that issue of distance is a recognition that someone is dying, that this is approaching the end, that you yourself are preparing yourself for the end, and I think it’s very difficult. I think it’s very, very difficult. I found it to be extremely, extremely difficult.

0 comments.

Cartoonesque 17: That is (not) funny!

Posted on November 9th, 2010 by martijn.
Categories: anthropology, ISIM/RU Research, Public Islam.

Jokes can be funny, or not. What matters is who has the power to define what is funny and what the position of the target of the joke is. It is the transgressive quality of jokes that makes them funny but also very suitable for political uses. Which jokes are made and the responses to these jokes reveal important processes, hierarchies and discourses in society.

In the next video you will see a famous (at least in the Netherlands) Dutch speed skater: Sven Kramer. He, of course, wins the race and then rips his suit so you can see his behind. The video is in Dutch, but is nevertheless comprehensible for non-Dutch speaking as well, I think. Try it:

The pizza guy in the last scene of the commercial says ‘What a failure’ and then the other people stop laughing. What is happening here? First you see how Kramer’s girlfriend laughs at him and then she plays the video again for her friends and then, I think, for the entire neighbourhood. All of them sort of belonging to the ingroup; friends, neighbours laughing amongst each other because of the failure of one them. The pizza guy who is there can laugh with them but he is an outsider and when in the end he says a little too loud ‘What a failure’ he transgresses the line. According to anthropologist Radcliffe-Brown the best joking relationship exists when two groups have ‘both attachment and separation, both social conjunction and social disjunction’. Take for example the Dutch jokes on the Belgians in which the latter group usually features as the dumb ones. The Dutch and Belgians are neighbours, they share each others language (between the Dutch and the Flemish anyway), they share a large part of history that still lives in on both countries. Nevertheless, or maybe because of those shared features, they also are separated and occupy different political and cultural positions nowadays. In the Belgian jokes, the Belgians become the stupid and funny versions of the Dutch.
Anthropology of Laughter and Humor – Open Anthropology Cooperative

Carty & Musharbash (2008) call a ‘sense of humour’ the “strangely nebulous heart of understanding, and belonging, within social relationships” (p. 209). Humour is seen as a boundary between in- and outgroups: “Laughter is a boundary thrown up around those laughing, those sharing the joke. Its role is demarcating difference, of collectively identifying against an Other, is as bound to processes of social exclusion as to inclusion” (p. 214, emphasis by the authors). And although humour and laughter are universals, “they remain intimately and often elusively localised in their nuance and content” (p. 213).

The video shows both: humor as a way to demarcate difference between the pizza guy as an outsider and the others as insiders. And among the insiders humor as a way to bond: they even get some food to share with each other and watch the video. Humor also draws people together. Depending on the context humor can be offensive (and in fact the offense is often part of the joke as it is intended to ridicule a particular group) but humor can also be protective against outsiders (when intended to protect the group from ridicule) and can be both at the same as well.

Humor is often build on stereotypes:
European Heaven And Hell

In Heaven…

* the mechanics are German
* the chefs are French
* the police are British
* the lovers are Italian
* and everything is organized by the Swiss.

In Hell…

* the mechanics are French
* the police are German
* the chefs are British
* the lovers are Swiss
* and everything is organized by the Italians.

And consider the next joke used by Don L.F. Nilsen in a class about humor:

Why aren’t Jews concerned about the abortion controversy?

Because they don’t consider a fetus viable until after it graduates from medical school.

According to Nilsen if the tellers or listeners of this joke are gentiles, it may be anti-semitic, criticizing Jews as being overly ambitious and arrogant. But if the tellers or listeners are Jews, it may be an expression of Jewish pride and the extraordinarily high standards of child rearing. Nilsen goes on by saying:

When a group member tells an ethnic or religious joke, it opens the door for inner-group communication and invites group members to examine their attitudes and behavior.

But if outsiders tell the same joke, the effect is the opposite, because the outsider focuses on the group’s most obvious characteristics and implies that these characteristics belong to everyone in the group.

This is something that directly pertains to the video as well of course. And as mentioned before ridicule is often part of the joke because the ridicule is what makes it funny for one and offensive for the other. What is funny for one crosses the boundary of what is acceptable for the other. This means that power is also part of joking. Usually the targets of jokes are those groups that are at the periphery of society as Nilsen explains: migrants, ‘white trash’, mentally ill and so on. If these outsiders feel offended and complain about the jokes they ‘just can stand a joke’ sometimes attributed to their lack of integration, education or individual pathology. We could witness this phenomenon during the Muhammad Cartoons affair in which during the debates Muslims were sometimes envisaged as the ultimate Other and backward because they lack any sense of humor, fun and joy and therefore cannot laugh at themselves. Such a discourse makes people blind to the long standing traditions of jokes and humor that every group has, including Muslims with regard to religious matters but also in relation to politics. The discourse about Muslims without humor therefore served to strenghten the Muslims as being outside our ‘normal”secular’ ‘rational’ ‘modern’ public sphere. At the same time among the opponents of the cartoons often all of the cartoons were seen as offensive while in reality many people exhibit different responses to the different cartoons; some were really funny others were offensive and most of them are ambiguous. It shows the political uses of humor. Giselinde Kuipers in a very interesting exposé on the Muhammad Cartoons (asking herself why is it that cartoons are so important in this case) for example shows how every society knows it past controversies about humor going to far, social movements using humor and mockery to state their claims or opposing to particular forms of humor that transgres the boundaries of what, according to them, should be acceptable. In another article Asef Bayat shows how islamists use humor (or forbid or regulate fun) for their political messages.

Humor is a powerful political tactic because, as Kuipers explains, it leaves the target with only few elegant responses. In the above mentioned video skater Sven Kramer chooses to laugh along with the joke that is at his expense. What else can he do? An angry reaction would have made it only more funny, a violent reaction or forcing to not show the video anymore would have made the situation only more ridiculous for him. Because it is a joke people can say, come on this is only a joke, don’t take it so personally. If he objects he makes clear that is not ‘in on the joke’ the same way as some Muslims made clear that they were not in on the joke of the Muhammad cartoons. Not in on the joke results in saying I’m not in to your social conventions. And why are they not in to ‘our’ social conventions? Because they have a strict religiosity and religiosity is at odds with fun and humor according to some Islam pundits but also according to some religious puritans. Ignoring and laughing along are, according to Kuipers, the typical reactions of those with little power and objecting to humor by demonstrations, going to court or whatever, is the strategy of groups that aim to empower their constituency and at the same time a sign of a growing consciousness about themselves as part of a group that is being mocked. Responding, in particular by joking back, requires power as Kuipers explains, also because apparently some people have the power define what is humor and what is not, while others are in a subaltern position.

Of course, jokes can be used as well against people in power for example in the past when in the Netherlands humor was used to disparage the churches or, still, people in government. In that sense humor also has the quality the empower and is also a sign of already apparent self-respect and confidence. The difference is that the latter is part of a countermovement against those in power while Muslims in the West opposing to the Muhammad cartoons are the outsiders targeted by those who belong to the dominant majority. Now the Muhammad cartoons were, partly, produced as a result of an attempt to teach Muslims a lesson: that they should comply do the Danish standards of humor and religion criticism. But as Nilsen explains “because outsiders have little power to bring about internal change, the effect is to stereotype the group, and this lessens the chances for change”. If that is correct, the cartoons produced the opposite of what was intended actually by the pundits which as a result (for them) proves their point once more.

Nilsen, Alleen Pace, and Don L. F. Nilsen. “Just How Ethnic is Ethnic Humour?” Canadian Ethnic Studies/Études Ethniques au Canada 38.1 (2006): 131-139.
Nilsen, Alleen Pace, and Don L. F. Nilsen. “Ethnic Humor.” Encyclopedia of 20th Century American Humor. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2000, 115-118.

Nilsen, Alleen Pace, and Don L. F. Nilsen, Eds. “Names and Ethnicity.” a Special Issue of Names 56.1 (March 2008): 1-54.

Nilsen, Don L. F. “Ethnic Humor.” New Mexico English Journal 6.2 (1991): 20-25.

Nilsen, Don L. F. Humor in Irish Literature: A Reference Guide. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996.

Rappoport, Leon. Punchlines: The Case for Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Humor. Westport, CT: Prager, 2005.

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Closing the week 44 – Featuring Roshonara Choudry, Al-Awlaki and Online Radicalisation

Posted on November 7th, 2010 by martijn.
Categories: anthropology, Blogosphere.

Most popular on Closer this week:

1. Nu online: Zoeken naar een ‘zuivere’ islam
2. Islamizing Europe – Muslim Demographics
3. Introducing Anthropology and Publicity

Notes:

• I’m honored that my blog Closer is nominated for the Annual Brass Crescent Awards. You can see the full list of nominees and vote at Brasscrescent.org
• Last week was quiet here because I was very busy with the Seminar Anthropology and/in Publicity. Also on behalf of my colleague Henk Driessen I would like to thank the speakers, discussants and participants of the seminar and the writers at the Antpub blog for their stimulating and thought provoking contributions.

• If you want to stay updated and did not subscribe yet, you can do so HERE

• If you want to stay updated about the ISIM Review pages I suggest you do subscribe
  

• You can follow me on Twitter: Martijn5155

Featuring: Roshonara Choudry, Al-Awlaki and online self-radicalisation
Roshonara Choudhry, Stephen Timms Stabber Radicalized By Anwar al-Awlaki, Gets 15 Years

A British university student radicalized by online sermons from an al-Qaida-linked Muslim cleric was sentenced Wednesday to at least 15 years in prison for trying to murder a lawmaker because he supported the Iraq war.

Roshonara Choudhry: Police interview extracts | UK news | The Guardian

This interview was conducted four hours after Choudhry’s arrest for stabbing Stephen Timms. Choudhry was interviewed by Simon Dobinson, a detective sergeant from Newham police, with detective constable Syed Hussain. Choudhry says she was studying English and Communications at King’s College London, but dropped out on 27 April 2010, in her third year.

Scott Atran: Understanding How the Privileged Become Violent Fanatics

If so many millions support jihad, why are only relatively few willing to kill and die for it? Although heroic action for a great cause is the ultimate end, the path to violent extremism is mostly a matter of individual motivations and small group dynamics in a specific historical context.

How much can we blame al-Awlaqi? | Indigo Jo Blogs

So, Roshonara Choudhary, the stupid woman who tried to murder the MP, Stephen Timms, has received a 15-to-life sentence. Today, the Guardian (and probably other papers) printed transcripts of her interviews with the police after the stabbing, in which she came across as calm and seemed to accept the consequences of what she had done.

The finger is, once again, being pointed at “Shaikh” Anwar al-Awlaqi, the American preacher currently living in Yemen, whose videos were found on Choudhary’s home computer. They didn’t say what the “hate videos” consisted of, but it’s widely known that he has begun to openly advocate violence since his imprisonment in Yemen a few years ago. Before that, he was best known for his Sirah tapes, which many young Muslims listened to keenly. His recent turn means that anyone who ever shared a platform with him or sells his old CD’s is presumed in some places to be a fellow traveller with him now.

‘Radicalisation via YouTube’? It’s not so simple | Jonathan Githens-Mazer | Comment is free | guardian.co.uk

Segments of the media and thinktank land have proclaimed that this was ‘radicalisation through the internet’, that Choudhry acted because radical preaching on the internet told her to. This is an oversimplified explanation that offers more populist hot air than meaningful insight.

To claim that the lectures ‘radicalised’ her into committing violence makes no sense.

Talking to the Enemy by Scott Atran – review | Books | The Observer

Rather than being brainwashed by militant recruiters, terrorists tend to be ordinary people driven by their peer group, argues anthropologist Scott Atran

C L O S E R » Blog Archive » ISET Working Paper Series: Identity in transition. Connecting online and offline internet practices of Moroccan-Dutch Muslim youth

In the last 5 years the Internet has become the principal platform for the dissemination and mediation of the ideology of Islamic movements, ranging from purist (non-violent) to politically engaged movements to Jihadi networks. Certainly in intelligence and security circles the Internet is considered the single most important venue for the radicalization of Muslim youth. On the other hand the Internet is seen as a means for people to transcend ethnic and religious divisions that are pervasive in other spheres of life.

In this paper I will argue that both premises seem to result from a lack of understanding of the relationship between online and offline realities and still more from the difficulty of ascertaining the extent to which websites influence wider audiences and users. In order to understand the reception of Internet messages the local context and the way global narratives are appropriated in the local context, should be taken into account.

My argument will be based on my empirical study of the practices of Muslim youth with regard to the Internet; I will explore how they act simultaneously as performers and observers in these virtual spaces.

Gender

Beyond the veil: London’s burka wearers go on the defensive | Life & Style

But just what is it about the burka and the niqab — two types of face veil, the terms are often used interchangeably — that has so captured public and political attention?

Right Answer, Wrong Reason: Why “Muslim” Is Not A Halloween Costume » Muslimah Media Watch

Just in time for Halloween, the Toronto Star’s ethics columnist, Ken Gallinger (whose columns I enjoy), received a question from a parent:

We are a Christian family. Our daughter, 7, goes to a school where there are many Muslim kids. Some of their moms walk them to school in burqas. My daughter is fascinated by these mysterious “costumes” and says she wants to go out on Halloween as a “Muslim lady.” Do I let her?

Is Muslim Feminism More Than Just a Hijab Defense? » Muslimah Media Watch

There may be 1,001 Muslim feminist critiques on the European burqa ban and its attendant jokes and jibes, insults, and ridiculousness. But what should remain clear is that we Muslim feminists are not just about the hijab. The recent discussion on LGBT acceptance on MMW revealed the cracks in the Muslim “sisterhood” and it began with a post on gay Muslim women in Indonesia.

Othering
Five Chinese Crackers: ‘Muslims tell British: Go to Hell!’ Should Bill Maher be alarmed?

Yesterday, the case of the attempted murder of Stephen Timms MP was in court for sentencing. One lone weirdo, inspired apparently by extremist websites, attempted to murder an MP and was sentenced to life with a minimum of 15 years. The judge only took 14 minutes to reach a decision.

From a tabloid perspective, this just won’t do. There’s no involvement with a shadowy, many-tentacled international organisation of evil cackling baddies, and 15 to life isn’t exactly a low sentence.

This leaves the tabloids in a quandary.

The ‘us and them’ tactic « Enemies of Reason

And the message is clear. Muslims are not us. Muslims are not you. Muslims are not British. Beyond that, Muslims are just one great big homogenous lump of humanity, which ‘we’ – nice, white Express and Star-reading folk – should probably be afraid of.

Islamophobia Watch – Documenting anti Muslim bigotry – Does Mr Justice Cooke think Islam is a religion of hate?

If Cooke was saying that Timms’ interpretation of his faith led him to do good, whereas Choudhry’s interpretation of hers led her to an act of attempted murder, that would be fair enough. All faiths are open to conflicting interpretations. But Cooke’s words could also be taken as arguing that Christianity is a religion of love and peace whereas Islam is a religion that inspires violence. Trying to be charitable, I initially concluded that his statements were ambiguous.

Anthropology and the Culture of Poverty Debate
‘”Culture of Poverty” Makes a Comeback:’ New York Times « Culture Matters

I have been reading a Festschrift for Jojada Verrips, a prominent Dutch anthropologist whose house I am temporarily occupying (with his permission). Verrips contends that much of 20th-century anthropology has been complicit with the rest of social sciences in a grand exercise of rationalization, which exorcises evil from the “civilized world,” banishes the wild, and sweeps the sinister under the rug. It has focused too much, he says, on explaining and thus taming human behaviour, with the consequence that it is unable to accept irrationality. In contemporary China, the idea that some people are evil and need to be killed or put away is still more or less commonplace. Not in the West. Certainly not in Europe, where the rationalising exercise has gone farther than in the United States.

How does this relate to the “culture of poverty?”

Culture of Poverty: From Analysis to Policy | Neuroanthropology

The Culture of Poverty. Let’s continue the debate. I’ve got some things to say myself, and I also want to round up posts on the culture of poverty concept and on the role of policy.

Misc.
Leadership and Leitkultur – NYTimes.com

SINCE the end of August Germany has been roiled by waves of political turmoil over integration, multiculturalism and the role of the “Leitkultur,” or guiding national culture. This discourse is in turn reinforcing trends toward increasing xenophobia among the broader population.

Between The Spiritual And The Material : 13.7: Cosmos And Culture : NPR

Unfortunately, we are lost in the unnecessary polarization of matter and spirit, and often go to one extreme or the other and make a mess out of it.

tabsir.net » Those Yemeni parcels

I have just finished a first reading of the three statements AQAP posted to jihadi forums earlier today. The one that is getting the most attention – not surprisingly – is the one that takes credit for two parcel bombs and the downing of a UPS plane in Dubai in September.

But for me, by far the most interesting statement is #27, which denies that AQAP had anything to do with two bombs outside a sports club in Aden on October 11. I will return to this below, and talk about why I think this statement is so significant. but first a couple of notes.

Dutch
De leugenaars: taqiyya vs de islamofoben – Wij Blijven Hier!: Het schrijversplatform van moslims

Een van de nare bijwerkingen van de suggestie van een verborgen agenda bij bepaalde moslimgroeperingen in Nederland, is dat het niet meer uitmaakt wat deze moslims voor gedrag tonen of aan daden laten zien. Uiteindelijk is de suggestie dat ze niet te vertrouwen zijn. Dit irriteerde me al rond de publicatie van het AIVD-prutswerkje “Van dawa tot jihad” uit 2004. Ik ergerde me er nog meer aan rond een oud interview van Wilders in Elsevier over de twee fundamentele redenen dat hij een probleem had met de Islam: de vermeende evangelisatiedrift van moslims (ironie aan: doen Christenen namelijk niet aan. Ironie uit.) en hun ‘taqiyya’.

Taqiyya dl 2: Wat gebeurt er nu echt? – Wij Blijven Hier!: Het schrijversplatform van moslims

Van de week schreef ik een stuk over Taqiyya en eindigde ik met twee koranverzen – eraan toevoegend dat liegen en bedriegen is toegestaan. Misschien is het handig als ik een en ander een beetje toelicht met wat geschiedenis, wat moderniteit en met een van de andere primaire bronnen van de Islam – de overleveringen.

Islamitische onbetrouwbaarheid

Martin Bosma speelt hoog spel met zijn verwijzing naar ‘taqiyya’, het islamitisch recht te doen alsof. Hij denkt dat dat ons dwingt geen enkele moslim te vertrouwen maar miskent de kracht van zijn eigen argument: als het deugt is iedereen verdacht, hijzelf incluis. Daarover zo meer. Eerst iets over ‘taqiyya’ voor wie Bosma’s verhaal gemist heeft.

Waarom moslims net zo hard liegen als Piet Paulusma | DeJaap

Schokkend nieuws! Martin Bosma van de PVV heeft ontdekt dat alle moslims liegen. En dat ze dat ontkennen, betekent dus dat dit klopt. Moslims, zo had ie namelijk ergens gelezen, kennen de term taqiyya. “Dat komt uit de Koran”, zo zei hij in Pauw & Witteman, “of eigenlijk de Hadith. Niet dat dit iets zegt, want niet-moslims kunnen ook liegen.” Waarom hij dit erbij zei werd niet echt duidelijk. Een Turkse vrouw die niets om religie gaf, maar omdat ze tegen de PVV was nu ineens weer wel, riep dat dit aanzetten tot haat was. Pauw vroeg zich af of het wel handig was moslims hier aan te herinneren. Ze zouden het immers kunnen gaan gebruiken tegen ons. De rest keek beduusd. Wat moesten ze er mee?

‘Christenasielzoekers bedreigd door moslims’ – GeenCommentaar

Dat gezegd hebbend, rezen er toch een aantal vragen. Hoe het bijvoorbeeld mogelijk was om zo’n onderzoek in asielzoekerscentra uit te voeren, terwijl het COA (Centraal Orgaan opvang asielzoekers) daar toch de eerst aangewezene voor zou zijn? Waarom hebben, terwijl we al jaren asielzoekers opvangen, ons nooit eerder dit soort signalen bereikt? Wie voerde het onderzoek uit, wie werkten eraan mee? Waarom wordt voorbij gegaan aan de omstandigheden die gebruikelijk zijn in asielzoekerscentra, een wereld die ik jaren van dichtbij heb meegemaakt?

Hoofdoekjesprobleem Rietveld bestaat niet | DNU.nu

De hele affaire over problemen met hoofddoekjes op het Utrechtse Gerrit Rietveld College dat door het Utrechtse PvdA-raadslid Gadiza Bouazani is aangeslingerd strookt volgens onderwijswethouder Jeroen Kreijkamp niet met de feiten.

It’s not your passport, it’s you stupid!

Het gemak waarmee de kersverse minister-president het argument van bemoeienis door het land van herkomst met huid en haar erbij haalt om vervolgens een volstrekt ongeoorloofd onderscheid tussen Nederlandse burgers te rechtvaardigen, is voorbij het betamelijke. Vooral als je bedenkt dat het hem helemaal niet om het paspoort is te doen.

Wervingskracht extreemrechts afgenomen omdat sommige standpunten salonfähig zijn geworden

“Voor extreemrechts geldt dat de wervingskracht in de loop der jaren is afgenomen doordat sommige van hun standpunten op de landelijke politieke agenda zijn gekomen. Zo zijn in het integratie- en islamdebat, zoals dat na de aanslagen van 11 september 2001 begon, veel van de standpunten van extreemrechts aan de orde gesteld en bespreekbaar geworden. Voorbeeld hiervan is het veronderstelde failliet van de multiculturele samenleving. Deze ontwikkeling heeft er mede toe geleid dat van de destijds bestaande extreemrechtse groeperingen en bewegingen niet veel over is.”

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Closing the week 42 – Featuring the dying of the multicultural light

Posted on October 24th, 2010 by martijn.
Categories: anthropology, Multiculti Issues.

Updated Program Anthropology and/in Publicity « Anthropology & Publicity

The focus of the Anthropology and/in Publicity meeting will be the dissemination of anthropological knowledge to relevant groups in the societies to which anthropologist belong and the societies where they conduct their research. The participants will reflect on the reasons for the underexposure of anthropological knowledge and explore ways to improve its dissemination and application in society.

Most popular on Closer this week:

1. Brief van Jason W.: Herziening
2. Een wekelijks portie burgerschap 41 – Is uw veiligheid ook de mijne?
3. Wilders on Trial Part VI – A case of killing the Messenger?

I’m honoured that my post on Orange Fever appeared in the Four Stone Hearth Anthropology Carnival, time compiled by Judith Weingarten.

• If you want to stay updated and did not subscribe yet, you can do so HERE

• If you want to stay updated about the ISIM Review pages I suggest you do subscribe
  

• You can follow me on Twitter: Martijn5155

Feature: The dying of the multicultural light
Slavoj Zizek: Far Right and Anti-Immigrant Politicians on the Rise in Europe

We turn now to Europe, where many are concerned about the growing acceptability of anti-immigrant rhetoric and policies. Far from just being expressed by the extreme right wing, the anti-immigrant trend has entered the mainstream. German Chancellor Angela Merkel told a gathering of young members of her conservative Christian Democratic Union party this weekend that multiculturalism has utterly failed. A recent German poll found 13 percent of Germans would welcome the arrival of a new “Führer,” and more than a third of Germans feel the country is “overrun by foreigners.” We speak to the world-renowned philosopher Slavoj Zizek, who has the been called “the Elvis of cultural theory.”

BBC – Gavin Hewitt’s Europe: ‘Failure’ of multiculturalism

In a speech to young members of her party, Chancellor Merkel at the weekend broke a taboo. She said multiculturalism had “utterly failed”.

Up until now mainstream politicians have largely shied away from “identity politics”. No longer. The German chancellor was explicit. “This multicultural approach, saying that we simply live side-by-side and live happily with each other has failed. Utterly failed.”

What did Angela Merkel really say?Language on the Move | Language on the Move

If you read English-language news, you could be forgiven for thinking that Germany’s chancellor Angela Merkel recently came out strongly against multiculturalism and immigration. You could be forgiven, but you’d be wrong!

Anti-Immigrant Nativism Growing in Germany :: racismreview.com

It is not just the U.S. that is seeing a significant increase in anti-immigrant sentiment in the middle of this worldwide capitalistic recession.

Debate about Islam in Germany heats up | Germany | Deutsche Welle | 20.10.2010

Germany’s top-selling non-fiction bestseller is a book that attacks Islam – and the German president can’t get the public to agree with him when he says that Islam is part of Germany.

Turks, Germany and multiculturalism in Europe

German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s statement last week that “attempts at integration have failed” came as no surprise and probably expressed a common feeling felt by many Germans and Europeans.

Dutch welcome Germans to Europe’s immigration debate (Feature) – Monsters and Critics

As far as the Dutch are concerned, the Germans – whom they consider to sometimes be politically behind the times – have finally woken up.

‘Welcome, Germany, to the European immigration debate,’ the Dutch daily newspaper Trouw proclaimed in an editorial this week.

The Netherlands’ dream of a happy, harmonious multicultural society burst on a grey autumn morning six years ago in Amsterdam.

Who’s Racist Now? Europe’s Increasing Intolerance – Joel Kotkin – New Geographer – Forbes

With the rising tide of terrorist threats across Europe, one can somewhat understandably expect a surge in Islamophobia across the West. Yet in a contest to see which can be more racist, one would be safer to bet on Europe than on the traditional bogeyman, the United States.

The Rising Tide of Ethno-Nationalism: Multiculturalism Fails in Europe

Old Europe is dying, and the populist and nationalist parties, in the poet’s phrase, are simply raging “against the dying of the light.”

Angela Merkel’s attack on “Multikulti” was misjudged: many believe it wasn’t even tried – Telegraph

Chancellor Angela Merkel claimed that Germany’s multiculturalism “utterly failed” but many Germans whose parents came from Turkey complain that they have never really been made welcome.

Anti-Immigrant Cracks In Germany’s Fragile Diversity : NPR

Across Europe, economic woes and fears of terrorism are feeding anti-immigrant — particularly anti-Muslim — sentiment. Last weekend, German Chancellor Angela Merkel added fuel to the debate when she said Germany’s attempts to build a multicultural society had “utterly failed.” Host Scott Simon talks to Josef Joffe, publisher-editor of the German newsweekly Die Zeit, about the situation.

Canada’s changing faith – The Globe and Mail

It has been elastic enough to withstand the pressures that have hounded it from birth: the skepticism of Quebec, the racial tensions brought on by non-white immigration.

Yet for multiculturalism, the rise of religion in the public sphere poses a new and more daunting challenge. Criminal prosecutions for honour killings, reports of genital mutilation and incidents of female repression have rocked many Canadians’ sense of tolerance. Across Europe, multicultural policies have crumbled as a result of deepening public suspicion of newly assertive religious groups.

Anthropology
Scholars Return to ‘Culture of Poverty’ Ideas – NYTimes.com

For more than 40 years, social scientists investigating the causes of poverty have tended to treat cultural explanations like Lord Voldemort: That Which Must Not Be Named.

George Tames/The New York Times

The reticence was a legacy of the ugly battles that erupted after Daniel Patrick Moynihan, then an assistant labor secretary in the Johnson administration, introduced the idea of a “culture of poverty” to the public in a startling 1965 report. Although Moynihan didn’t coin the phrase (that distinction belongs to the anthropologist Oscar Lewis), his description of the urban black family as caught in an inescapable “tangle of pathology” of unmarried mothers and welfare dependency was seen as attributing self-perpetuating moral deficiencies to black people, as if blaming them for their own misfortune.

Moynihan’s analysis never lost its appeal to conservative thinkers, whose arguments ultimately succeeded when President Bill Clinton signed a bill in 1996 “ending welfare as we know it.” But in the overwhelmingly liberal ranks of academic sociology and anthropology the word “culture” became a live grenade, and the idea that attitudes and behavior patterns kept people poor was shunned.

Now, after decades of silence, these scholars are speaking openly about you-know-what, conceding that culture and persistent poverty are enmeshed.

“We’ve finally reached the stage where people aren’t afraid of being politically incorrect,” said Douglas S. Massey, a sociologist at Princeton who has argued that Moynihan was unfairly maligned.

Rethinking The Roots of Poverty – The Takeaway

Forty five years ago, Daniel Patrick Moynihan introduced the idea of a “culture of poverty.” The idea has since been derided for describing the urban black family as caught in a “tangle of pathology.” But it never lost its appeal to conservative thinkers.

And wIth one in seven Americans living in poverty today, scholars are revisiting the idea.

The New York Times revisits this today with a look at the controversial idea of a “cultural” explanation for modern poverty issues.

We talk to William Julius Wilson, professor of sociology and social policy at Harvard University, who has always defended the Moynihan report, along with Mario Small, professor of sociology at the University of Chicago.

The Culture of Poverty Debate | Neuroanthropology

I want to focus on the NY Times article, and the popular portrayal of culture and poverty. Unfortunately, this work risks recycling the pernicious effects of the original “culture of poverty” debate – where wrong ideas about “culture” are used to heap blame and twist policy.[…] Culture has been turned into beliefs and perceptions, which Americans view as something highly individual. These people will simply be seen as having unacceptable beliefs.

Pakistan floods rival earthquakes, tsunamis in severity « Know

Abdul Haque Chang is a Fulbright Scholar and graduate student in the Department of Anthropology. He’s working on the issue of governance of water resources management in Pakistan. His major focus is to bring an ethnographic perspective to the issue of waste, scarcity and abundance of water resources management according to different strata of society.

Somatosphere: “Religion and mental health”: a special issue of Transcultural Psychiatry

The latest issue of Transcultural Psychiatry is devoted to “Religion and Mental Health.” Here are the titles and abstracts:

Morals Without God? – NYTimes.com

I was born in Den Bosch, the city after which Hieronymus Bosch named himself. [1] This obviously does not make me an expert on the Dutch painter, but having grown up with his statue on the market square, I have always been fond of his imagery, his symbolism, and how it relates to humanity’s place in the universe. This remains relevant today since Bosch depicts a society under a waning influence of God.

Talking to the Enemy by Scott Atran – review | Books | The Observer

Rather than being brainwashed by militant recruiters, terrorists tend to be ordinary people driven by their peer group, argues anthropologist Scott Atran

Middle East
99 Problems But a Cape Ain’t One: Conservatives Attack Islamic Superheroes – ComicsAlliance | Comics culture, news, humor, commentary, and reviews

Superhero fans, especially those old enough to have opinions, are often divided by their views on the appropriateness of real-world politics in their escapist literature. While many of us regard Dennis O’Neil and Neil Adams’ socially relevant run on “Green Lantern/Green Arrow” to be a superlative example of costumed heroes confronting the hard-hitting issues of the day, just as many readers dismiss it as didactic and inappropriate given the characters’ roots in benign adolescent power fantasies. But what about when real-world issues encroach upon the mild escapism? What happens then?

These issues are being confronted again with “The 99,” a comic about a group of multi-ethnic superheroes with a basis in Islamic culture and faith.

Al-Aqsa Intifada 10 Years Later | The Middle East Channel

This year’s 10th anniversary of the start of the second Palestinian uprising passed with barely a mention in the Israeli, Palestinian and American media. This is not surprising, considering the uprising is widely seen as a disaster for most Palestinians and Israelis, putting the Middle East peace process into a deep and perhaps permanent freeze.

In the Mideast, No Politics but God’s – NYTimes.com

A line was uttered this month by Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, that drew little notice in between his stentorian asides but said a great deal about politics today for Israelis, Palestinians and the larger Arab world.

To tens of thousands of supporters gathered here to welcome President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran, Mr. Nasrallah declared that Iran’s Islamic republic “supports the ‘no’s’ that the Arabs declared at the time of late President Gamal Abdel Nasser in Khartoum before many abandoned them. Iran renews these ‘no’s’ along with the Arab nation.”

The Netherlands
What is happening in the Netherlands? (1)- JOOST LAGENDIJK

There is no escape today. I have to write about what is taking place in the country I know best. I arrived in the Netherlands a few days ago, the same day that the new Dutch government was presented. It is the start of a political experiment that will be observed by many inside the country and abroad, out of curiosity by some, with anxiety and concern by many others. For the first time in over 50 years, the Netherlands will be ruled by a coalition government of liberals and Christian democrats that does not have a majority in parliament. It is a minority cabinet that can only survive because it has a deal with a third party, the Freedom Party of extreme-right populist Geert Wilders.

Charlemagne: A false prophet | The Economist

HIS big bleach-blond mane was unmistakable, but this time his mouth, the biggest in Dutch politics, stayed shut. Geert Wilders, leader of the anti-immigrant Freedom Party, is on trial for incitement to hatred and discrimination against Muslims. But when he appeared before judges in Amsterdam on October 4th, this champion of free speech declined to speak.

DutchNews.nl – Opinion: I treasure my heritage

At Geert Wilders trial on inciting hatred and discrimination on Monday, law student Naoual addressed the court on her experiences.

I am a Muslim. I am a Moroccan. I am Dutch. I am a product of the multicultural society. My mother is Dutch. My family on my mother’s side fought the Nazis during the Second World War. Two of my great-uncles gave their lives defending Dutch liberty.

Dutch-Iranian prisoner in isolation cell | Radio Netherlands Worldwide

A Dutch-Iranian woman, Zahra Bahrami, has recently been transferred to an isolation cell in an Iranian prison, according to her daughter.

Prominent European Islamic Terrorist Renounces Extremism – Daveed Gartenstein-Ross – International – The Atlantic

A key figure in one of Europe’s most infamous Islamic extremist networks has written a public letter renouncing whole swathes of the ideology that led him to try to murder non-believers. On Saturday a Dutch newspaper published what Jason Walters, an imprisoned member of the Netherlands-based “Hofstad Group,” calls a “review document.” The letter offers a window into the mind of a man who dedicated his life to spreading a militant version of Islam, by force when he deemed it necessary. It joins a small but important list of similar recantations, which have become a tool for counterterrorism officials seeking to understand why some people adopt terrorism and, more importantly, why they stop.

Hot in Europe: ‘Governmental Populism’

There is a populist time bomb ticking underneath all postwar political systems. This is very visible in some countries on the European Continent , where populist parties with unprecedented speed move from the margins to the political center. Everywhere new combinations of the center-right aligning with right-wing or radical-right populism pop up. The dominant style of government could be called ’governmental populism’. Governments, claiming to be the voice of (the false unity of) the people, revolt against the postwar European order. Think about Berlusconi and his all-out media war against the Italian juridical system. Think about Sarkozy, who’s presidential-populist ADHD makes the Front National redundant. Think about the anti-minaret Swiss People’s Party, SVP, which is the biggest governing party of Switzerland. Think about Denmark or Austria and Norway in past years.

Since this week, the Netherlands fits into this picture as well.

Misc.

Mass versus Minarets: The Cordoba Controversy – Europe, World – The Independent

Should Spain’s most famous mosque actually be called a cathedral? Dale Fuchs reports on the question dividing a city

Exhibit: Albanian Muslims saved Jews from Nazis – CNN Belief Blog – CNN.com Blogs

With rising anti-Muslim sentiment across the country, an untold story is raising greater awareness about the Muslim faith and the teachings of the Quran. That awareness comes from an unlikely source: a small Jewish congregation in Creve Coeur.

Is It Islamic or Islamist? – Newsweek

Now that even the tolerant, liberal Swedes have elected an anti-Islam party to their Parliament, it’s pretty clear that such controversies are mounting because both the left and the right are confused over the politics of Islam. The left is wrongly defending Islamism—an extremist and at times violent ideology—which it confuses with the common person’s Islam, while the right is often wrongly attacking the Muslim faith, which it confuses with Islamism. Western thinkers must begin to recognize the difference between Islamism and Islam, or we are headed toward an ideologically defined battle with one quarter of humanity.

Intelligent Design Trial Celebrates Fifth Year Reunion | Religion Dispatches

It’s hard to believe so much time has gone by, but this fall marks five years since the six-week trial in a Harrisburg, Pa. courtroom following which federal Judge John E. Jones struck down the teaching of intelligent design in public school science class as unconstitutional, writing that it was merely revamped creationism posing as a scientific theory.

Azizah Weighs in on African American Muslim Marriages and “Morocco is Not the Solution” From Kuwait « Margari Aziza

Sometimes I wonder why I am so preoccupied with concerns that are in the states. Right now I’m living in an alternate universe. I’m abroad in an oil rich country where “Fair” equals “Lovely.” All the way across the world, I’m not feeling the reach of many of the containment policies and strategies during this Cold War between Black Men and Black women in America. At this point, I’m joining the non-alignment movement, to focus on development. But I will have my defenses up just in case some missiles shoot my way.

Conversion Story # 643 (not a real number) | Religion Dispatches

These days, when ever you say you are Muslim by choice, you get people asking about your conversion. Mostly they want to know why. This curiosity comes equally from those who are already Muslim and those who are not. I used to tell the same basic steps—although I hardly think my own individual door lights up any bulbs of excitement. Maybe because no lightbulbs went off for me either.

The State of Liberalism – NYTimes.com

It’s a sign of how poorly liberals market themselves and their ideas that the word “liberal” is still in disrepute despite the election of the most genuinely liberal president that the political culture of this country will probably allow. “Progressive” is now the self-description of choice for liberals, though it’s musty and evasive. The basic equation remains: virtually all Republican politicians call themselves conservative; few Democratic politicians call themselves liberal. Even retired Classic Coke liberals like Walter F. Mondale are skittish about their creed. “I never signed up for any ideology,” he writes in his memoirs.

Baroness Warsi told by David Cameron not to appear at Islamic conference | Politics | The Observer

The Conservative party chair, Baroness Warsi, has been banned by David Cameron from attending a major Islamic conference today, igniting a bitter internal row over how the government tackles Islamist extremism.

Warsi, Britain’s first female Muslim cabinet minister, was told by the prime minister to cancel her appearance at the Global Peace and Unity Event, which is being billed as the largest multicultural gathering in Europe.

Dutch
Christelijke asielzoekers bedreigd en gediscrimineerd door moslim asielzoekers – Merkwaardig, onverklaarbaar en ander nieuws – Quasi Mundo

In veel asielzoekerscentra in Nederland worden christenen bedreigd of mishandeld door vaak islamitische medebewoners. Dat blijkt volgens Stichting Gave uit eigen onderzoek, waarvan de uitkomsten dinsdag waren te zien in het televisieprogramma Uitgesproken EO.

Uitzending Discriminatie Asielzoekerscentra Feitelijk Onjuist – Wij Blijven Hier!: Het schrijversplatform van moslims

De hoeveelheid feitelijke onjuistheden die in de uitzending naar voren komen, wanneer de feiten en onderbouwing nader worden onderzocht, is schrikbarend.

Gedachten over de netwerkrevolutie en gradaties van betrokkenheid | Jaap Stronks

Malcolm Gladwell serveerde sociale media af: met Twitteren in je pyama verander je de wereld niet – daarvoor is echte betrokkenheid en inzet nodig, stelde hij zo’n beetje; boe weak ties, hoera strong ties. De kritiek op zijn artikel luidde, schrijft ook Ernst-Jan Pfauth: zwakke schakels zijn ook heus belangrijk, kijk maar naar de mobiliserende kracht van Twitter.

Het belangrijkste punt wordt gemist. Sociale media zijn onderdeel van een infrastructuur die bij uitstek *gradaties* van betrokkenheid mogelijk maakt. En die mobiliteit tussen die gradaties faciliteert.

Maghreb Magazine » Netwerk van Vrijzinnige Marokkanen tegen Marokko

Een groep Marokkaanse Nederlanders heeft een organisatie opgericht waarin ze openlijk afstand nemen van de Marokkaanse overheid en pleiten voor een duidelijke keuze voor het Nederlands burgerschap. In religieus opzicht zijn ze vrijzinnig.

Open brief van islamitische CDA-raadsleden aan Coskun Cörüz

Het VVD/CDA kabinet met PVV gedoogsteun is er dan toch gekomen. En dit dan ondanks ons verzet tegen gedoogpartner PVV, een partij die kort gezegd bij de gratie van allochtonen- en moslimhaat bestaat.
Wij, CDA-moslims, zullen ook in de toekomst de uitspraken en stellingnames van de PVV kritisch blijven volgen en niet schuwen om, indien nodig, ons publiekelijk hierover uit te spreken. Het heeft ons, eerlijk gezegd, in hoge mate gestoord dat u tijdens de kabinetsformatie ook geen stelling hebt genomen tegen een gedoogpartner als de PVV.

Ahmed Marcouch over homoseksualiteit en religie

In de moskee vroeg na het gebed een jongen aan mij: ‘Jij verdedigt toch homo’s?’
‘Jongen’ heb ik gezegd, ‘als ik de vrijheid van de homo verdedig, verdedig ik ook jouw vrijheid. Want de vrijheid van de homo is de vrijheid van de moslim. Het is de vrijheid om te kunnen zijn wie je bent, zonder dubbelleven, zonder angst. De vrijheid verbindt ons allen, zoals de lucht dat doet die wij allen inademen. Vrijheid is onze zuurstof. ’

‘Moslims horen er bij, islam nog niet’ – Trouw

Moslims horen bij Nederland, maar de islam nog lang niet. Dat zegt Gert-Jan Segers, directeur van het wetenschappelijk instituut van de ChristenUnie.

Op alle rooie slakken zout

Hebt u ook zo’n zin om nu helemaal tot het gaatje te gaan? Het stopzetten van het proces tegen Geert Wilders bracht me in een overwinningsroes. Niet voor lang. Er is werk aan de winkel. De afgelopen maanden zag ik telkens opnieuw kandidaten voor een nieuwe nationale feestdag. Neem dertig juli, door anti-Bruiners juist Zwarte Vrijdag genoemd. Een ware feestdag voor moderne geuzen. De negende juni natuurlijk ook, als de nieuwe D-Day, drie dagen na de eerste. Laten we nog even wachten.

Grenzen aan overheidsbemoeienis : Nieuwemoskee

“Laat ons met rust!” was het antwoord dat met een diepe zucht uit het binnenste van mijn hart kwam op de vraag wat GroenLinks kan doen voor de emancipatie van de moslimvrouw in Nederland. Op zaterdag 9 oktober organiseerde GroenLinks met anderen een conferentie met als titel Godsdienstvrijheid of vrijheid van godsdienst? Eerlijk gezegd ging het hele debat – zoals verwacht – over de islam en over moslims. Volgens Femke Halsema bepalen deze thema’s nu eenmaal de huidige realiteit. ‘Fijn’ dat moslims de aanleiding zijn voor dit debat, maar volgens mij hebben de conclusies wel gevolgen voor alle levensovertuigingen. Het gaat niet meer om de ander, maar om ons allemaal.

Moet je schrik hebben v/d islam? « Rudi Dierick’s Blog

Als echtgenote van een moslima en als adviseur competentie- en diversiteitsbeleid leek het evidente antwoord me ontkennend. Maar een commentaar van mijn echtgenote dwong me dat te nuanceren. Zij heeft namelijk wel schrik, en zelfs grote schrik, van bepaalde stromingen in de islam. Mijn onderzoek ‘Islam, hoofddoek en democratie’ leerde dat die stromingen wereldwijd bijzonder veel macht en invloed genieten. Ze domineren alle scholen voor islamitisch recht volledig. Ze bepalen letterlijk de standpunten van de Conferentie van islamitische Staten. Ze domineren ook de reële standpunten van het Turkse staatsdirectoraat voor religieuze zaken, én haar vertegenwoordigers in Europa, inclusief in de Belgische moslim-executieve. Al die stromingen staan, als puntje bij paaltje komt, op een voorrang van de sharia op het seculier recht. Het Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens oordeelde daarover bijzonder expliciet. Het stelde dat de sharia niet verzoenbaar is met de democratische rechtsorde. Sommige moslims beweren dat er géén tegenspraak zou zijn. Maar dat lijkt me zuivere en doortrapte misleiding. Als je hen dan vraagt dat aan de hand van concrete gevallen -zoals erfenissen- te verduidelijken, dan volgt er nooit een ernstig antwoord (Yousself: aarzel niet!).

Karel Steenbrink’s Weblog: De Apen van Arabist Hans Jansen en zijn verbond met de fundi’s

Jansen benadrukt in dat pleidooi (te vinden op hoeboei.nl) wel dat vrijwel alle geleerden het er over eens zijn dat het in de vroege Medina-periode is ‘neergedaald’, dus aan Mohammed is geopenbaard. Hij zegt er niet bij, dat die hele abrogatieleer door een aantal grote geleerden wordt afgewezen: zou de van eeuwigheid bestaande Koran dan al meteen stevige vormfouten hebben? Dan lijkt het wel op een Nederlandse rechtzaak! Waarom Jansen dan toch die abrogatie zo moet verdedigen? Alsof hij een rechtzinnige moslim is?

De multiculturele samenleving als mediahype. – Leland’s infonubs.com

De multiculturele samenleving als mediahype.

Als er een gebeurtenis is in de moderne geschiedenis die z’n sporen tot op de dag van vandaag heeft getrokken in de geesten van de mensen dan is het wel de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Geen gebeurtenis is meer besproken en geanalyseerd in boeken en films dan juist deze.
Kijkt men naar de onderwerpen die vandaag het politieke debat bepalen: Islam, moslims en de multiculturele samenleving, dan liggen veel van de wortels ervan in de nawerking van de Tweede Wereldoorlog op het politieke debat, vooral voor wat betreft het gedachtegoed van de aanstichter van deze oorlog: Adolf Hitler. De angst om voor fascist te worden uitgemaakt heeft dit debat in feite vanaf het begin verlamd. Wie wil er als slecht mens worden aangewezen, dan nog liever ten onder gaan in multiculturalisme als land.
Deze problematiek, en nog veel meer betreffende het denken over de multiculturele samenleving, snijdt Peter Schlemihl aan in z’n boek Weinkrampf!.

Stille oorlog moslims en christenen in Rijssen? « TEAPACKS -An alternative view on semi-obvious issues-

‘Rijssens Stille Oorlog’, dat is de titel van de nogal eenzijdige film die documentairemaker Emile van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal in opdracht van RTV Oost maakte. De première was eind september, tijdens het Nederlands Filmfestival. De documentaire gaat over maatschappelijke, politieke en religieuze verhoudingen in Rijssen.

’Ook zonder de islam blijft zij onderdrukt’ – Trouw

Vrouwen in islamitische landen zijn tweederangsburgers, zegt journalist Rob Vreeken. Maar of dat aan de islam is te wijten? „Het gaat om een hele waaier aan factoren. Religie speelt maar een marginale rol.”

Nee, niet weer! – Trouw

Nee, driewerf nee: we willen geen nieuwe rechters, nieuw proces, nieuwe incidenten en vooral geen nieuwe ronde incompetentie en spierballentaal. Wilders-het-proces aflevering II, mag onder geen beding plaatsvinden, dacht ik gisteren vlak voor vier uur. Het is mooi geweest. Doei!

Herfstmode met ’moslima-power’ – Trouw

Jonge moslima’s gaan weinig uit, maar winkelen des te meer. Zo hebben ze een flinke invloed op het aanbod van kledingzaken. Getailleerde jasjes, fijne wollen vestjes met kralen, blouses met pofmouwtjes: de nieuwe najaarscollectie is vrouwelijker dan ooit.

Opinieblog » Wilders benoemt de ellende en de elite ontkent het

Laat Geert Wilders het maar niet horen. In de Remonstrantse Kerk aan het Museumpark in Rotterdam organiseerden cultuurcentrum Arminius en de Erasmus Universiteit woensdagavond een volledig gesubsidieerde workshop om hoogopgeleide, linkse mensen PVV-retoriek te leren bestrijden.

Hans de Bruijn, hoogleraar bestuurskunde aan de TU Delft, beet het spits af met een analyse van Wilders’ debattechnieken. Het komt neer op framing, zei De Bruijn, die hier het boek Geert Wilders in debat (2010, Boom Lemma Uitgevers) over schreef.

Noodzakelijk Kwaad

In feite komt bij die voetbalclubs het totale faillissement van de multiculturele samenleving pijnlijk aan het licht. Terwijl de autochtonen dag en nacht, bij weer en wind, bezig zijn van hun cluppie een fantastische voetbalbeleving voor jong en oud te maken loopt de moslimminderheid er de kantjes bij af. Niet of slecht betalen, allerlei misdragingen in de vorm van diefstal en geweld en geen poot uitsteken. Niet in de clubkantine (want, bij de baard van de profeet, daar schenken ze alcohol en serveren ze haram voedsel) maar ook niet als trainer, jeugdleider of wat dan ook.

Wilders-proces: herhaling van zetten | DeJaap

Het Wildersproces draait op volle toeren. En er gebeurt van alles. Ik denk dat geen enkele procedure in Nederland ooit zo van nabij is gevolgd door zoveel mensen. Dit is onze eigen OJ Simpson zaak. Bij ons alleen geen football speler die verdacht wordt van de moord op zijn vrouw, maar een politicus die terecht staat voor wat hij heeft gezegd over moslims en de islam. Het eerste dat mij opvalt in de berichtgeving over het proces, is het bij mijn weten vrijwel totale gebrek aan aandacht voor de procedure die Wilders in 2008 won over … uitlatingen die hij deed over de islam en moslims en de film Fitna. Het vonnis in die zaak is hier te vinden.

0 comments.

Introducing Anthropology and Publicity

Posted on October 17th, 2010 by martijn.
Categories: anthropology, Featured, Headline, ISIM/RU Research.

Although anthropology is by definition ‘public’, the relationship between its practitioners and society, its social relevance and its connections with the wider audience, have always been controversial and complex. This will be the general theme of the meeting on 5 November 2010 at Ravenstein. To be sure, it is a vast and multifaceted topic.

The focus is on the dissemination of anthropological knowledge to relevant groups in the societies to which anthropologists belong and those where they conduct their research. We will address the reasons for the underexposure of anthropological knowledge (albeit there is considerable variation in this regard according to national anthropological traditions) and explore ways to improve its dissemination and application in society.

Since the emergence of academic anthropology, the discipline has had the double mission of, on the one hand, describing and interpreting cultural differences and, on the other, generating cross-cultural knowledge about humankind. The inherent tension between the particular and the general requires a balancing act on the part of anthropologists and complicates the translation of anthropological knowledge for ‘consumption’ by the wider public, media and policy makers. Given the increased complexity of societies in a globalizing world, anthropological knowledge has become potentially more relevant, yet remains underexposed to wider audiences.

The meeting in Soeterbeeck will be structured by four intimately related questions. First, in which ways can anthropological knowledge be improved in order to become more relevant and accessible for non-collegial groups in their own society and in the societies where they do their fieldwork? Second, what are the pros and cons of popularizing anthropological publications and moving them to the ‘front lines’? Third, to what extent can cultural relativism play a role in the public debate on social issues? And, finally, what role can the new digital media play in enhancing the public value of anthropology?

These questions will be addressed by the following speakers: Ulf Hannerz (Stockholm University), Thomas Hylland Eriksen (University of Oslo), Jeremy MacClancy (Oxford Brookes University), Annelies Moors(University of Amsterdam), Mathijs Pelkmans (London School of Economics) and discussed in a small gathering of colleagues at the conference centre Soeterbeeck of Radboud University Nijmegen.

Henk Driessen, Martijn de Koning, 27/08/2010

You can find more information about the seminar and contributions of guest writers on the weblog Anthropology & Publicity.

0 comments.

New Book – Producing Islamic Knowledge: Transmission and dissemination in Western Europe

Posted on October 13th, 2010 by martijn.
Categories: anthropology, Important Publications.

How do Muslims in Europe acquire discursive and practical knowledge of Islam? How are conceptions of Islamic beliefs, values and practices transmitted and how do they change? Who are the authorities on these issues that Muslims listen to? How do new Muslim discourses emerge in response to the European context?

This book addresses the broader question of how Islamic knowledge (defined as what Muslims hold to be correct Islamic beliefs and practices) is being produced and reproduced in West European contexts by looking at specific settings, institutions and religious authorities. Chapters examine in depth four key areas relating to the production and reproduction of Islamic knowledge:

• authoritative answers in response to explicit questions in the form of fatwas
• the mosque and mosque association as the setting of much formal and informal transmission of Islamic knowledge.
• the role of Muslim intellectuals in articulating alternative Muslim discourses.
• higher Islamic education in Europe and the training of imams and other religious functionaries.

Featuring contributions from leading sociologists and anthropologists, the book presents the findings of empirical research in these issues from a range of European countries such as France, Italy, the Netherlands and Great Britain. As such it has a broad appeal, and will be of great interest to students and scholars of Islamic studies, anthropology, sociology and religion.

Preface

1. Producing Islamic Knowledge in Western Europe: Discipline, Authority, and Personal Quest by Martin van Bruinessen
2. Muslim Voices, European Ears: Exploring the Gap Between the Production of Islamic Knowledge and its Perception by Stefano Allievi
3. An Emerging European Islam: The Case of the Minhajul Qur’an in the Netherlands by M. Amer Morgahi
4. Religious Authority, Social Action and Political Participation: A Case Study of the Mosquée de la Rue de Tanger in Paris by Valérie Amiraux
5. The Pattern of Islamic Reform in Britain: The Deobandis Between Intra-Muslim Sectarianism and Engagement with Wider Society by Jonathan Birt and Philip Lewis
6. Transnational Ulama, European Fatwas, and Islamic Authority: A Case Study of the European Council for Fatwa and Research by Alexandre Caeiro
7. Cyber-fatwas, Sermons, and Media Campaigns: Amr Khaled and Omar Bakri Muhammad in Search of New Audiences by Ermete Mariani
8. Guénonian Traditionalism and European Islam by Mark Sedgwick

Editors:
Martin van Bruinessen holds the chair of Comparative Studies of Contemporary Muslim Societies in the Department of Theology and Religious Studies, Utrecht University. He was one of the founders and an academic staff member of the International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM), where he co-ordinated the research programme on the Production of Islamic Knowledge in Western Europe.

Stefano Allievi is researcher at the University of Padua where he also teaches sociology. He specialises in migration issues, sociology of religion and cultural change, with a particular focus on the presence of Islam in Italy and Europe.

See also: Producing Islamic Knowledge: Transmission and dissemination in Western Europe – Routledge

1 comment.

Closing the Week 39

Posted on October 3rd, 2010 by martijn.
Categories: anthropology, Blogosphere.

The official website of ISIM is closed and the repository of Leiden University works like…well it doesn’t work so well. Which is a problem if you want to read the ISIM Review articles. Therefore I’m happy to present to you: ISIM Review via Closer

Most popular on Closer this week:

1. PVV-Stemmers – Stelletje Malloten!
2. IMES Rapport – Salafisme in Nederland. Aard, omvang en dreiging
3. Image bites – The Great Burqa Robbery and other political ads

I’m honoured that my post on Orange Fever appeared in the Four Stone Hearth Anthropology Carnival, time compiled by Judith Weingarten.

• If you want to stay updated and did not subscribe yet, you can do so HERE

• If you want to stay updated about the ISIM Review pages I suggest you do subscribe
  

• You can follow me on Twitter: Martijn5155

Anthropology
Publishing in the GAY-KRANT (‘gay journal’) « Anthropology & Publicity

Over the years I have published articles on my research and that of other anthropologists in many newspapers and weeklies – in the Netherlands and abroad – but I was never sure of the social relevance of all this.

… » Idioms of Islam – idioms of consumerism… a note on Mardin

While it may be true that in a multicultural society we need to develop a religious literacy, i.e. learn to understand various religious idioms in which (ethnic) minorities define themselves in religious terms, members of religious communities cannot avoid picking up the secular idiom of consumerism and human rights. I will come back (inevitably…) to the consumerism aspect – what is normally in the foreground is the question whether Islamic politics is reconcilable with secular constitutions in liberal democracies. And it certainly looks like there is a strong current within Islamism that fairly early on learned to formulate political aims in a secular language.

Book review: Religious globalization = Engaged cosmopolitanism?

Can studying religious movements give us new insights into globalisation or even cosmopolitanism? Anthropologist Tulasi Srinivas thinks so.

How do we make culture? :: CultureBy – Grant McCracken

But of course it’s going to appeal to an anthropologist. We’re in the business of observing how cultural artifacts serve as arguments for their own reality.

But there’s still something breathtaking about the “reality argument” process.

The Joke’s on You – Society for Linguistic Anthropology

this isn’t just a story about private speech becoming public. It is also one about the very nature of meaning. Many people seem to believe that meaning resides in our heads and is merely expressed through language, which operates as a transparent medium communicating our thoughts to the outside world. Linguistic anthropologists view the construction of meaning very differently. For us the construction of meaning is a social process. It is something that is negotiated through the very act of discourse. A joke is only a joke to the extent that your audience accepts it as such. If, instead, they choose to get offended, or take it seriously, it requires a lot of work on the part of the speaker to explain that the statement was meant as a joke. In such a case there are a range of possible outcomes: the audience might accept that it was a “bad joke” and leave it at that, or they might refuse to except the claim that the statement was intended as a joke.

Fieldwork – a moveable feast?

In an unfinished post from some years back, I criticise the anthropologists Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson for their attack on what they call “the standard anthropological tropes of entry into and exit from ‘the field’” (Gupta and Ferguson 1997: 12). If I remember correctly, their point is that these stories exotize the field experience and enhance the strange- and otherness of the field site. That is probably the case in much anthropological writing (the first entry story that came to my mind is Evans Pritchard among the Azande, and there the Azande are far more alive and at least as recognisable in the intro than elsewhere in the book, so that was a bad example.) But that is surely not whole role of these stories. For me, the entry to as well as the exit from the field were surely full of existential experiences that readily can be likened to odysseyic voyages.

Analog/Digital: Why anthropology will never be obsolete

Analog/Digital: New: Anthropology Blogs via Twitter

Further to an earlier post announcing my collection of the best anthropology blogs on the web, you can now receive notifications of the latest blog updates via Twitter.

anthropologyworks » Roma: Not all alike

Since the 1990s, the people who are being displaced and resettled are the ones who are poor. These are not the migratory Roma. Much like low-income migrants from all over the world, Roma are looking to gain a better life for themselves and their children. While Roma are increasingly being organized into a mass movement within their respective countries of origins and in the European Union, local events cause them to be persecuted as a maligned, racialized, and stereotyped minority if they are lucky or as unwanted outsiders and criminals. Roma from East Europe and the Balkans are leaving their countries as a result of the persecution that is so virulent there that it has caused death and destruction of settlements not unlike pogroms of centuries past. For example, in Cluj, a university city in Romania’s multi- ethnic Transylvania region, a large Roma settlement is being displaced and moved into a more remote and environmentally marginal area. The Roma have not been given any recourse. They appear not to have any civil rights. Roma have been attacked in Hungary, the Czech Republic, and the Slovak Republic. These attacks include fire bombings, shootings, stabbings, beatings and murders.

Islamic Movements
William C. Chittick, Ph.D.: The Meaning of Islam

Scholars often distinguish between “Islam,” meaning the religion as taught and practiced over the centuries, and “Islamism,” meaning the various ideologies that have appeared over the past century claiming to speak on its behalf. As one of these scholars put it, “An ideology is a clear blueprint that requires only mechanical implementation. … It offers easy answers to the most difficult and fundamental questions. … [It] renders redundant the human processes of constantly thinking, evaluating, facing hard choices, and balancing” (Farhang Rajaee, Islamism and Modernism, p. 4).

Muslim Brotherhood expert discusses Maghreb Salafism (Magharebia.com)

Alaya Allani is a professor of contemporary history at the University of Manouba in Tunis and a specialist in political Islam. He has published several studies on the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist currents in the Arab Maghreb. Magharebia sat down with Allani in Tunis to discuss the dangers of the spread of Salafism and what he sees as the root causes of the problem.

New audio statement from Us?mah Bin L?den: “Stop the Method of Relief Work” | JIHADOLOGY

Overall, one can conclude from this that this is yet another example of al-Q?’idah’s efforts to rebrand itself in the aftermath of the slaughter in Iraq, which revulsed much of the Arab and Muslim world. Moreover, the CTC report that stated that al-Q?’idah’s attacks killed Muslims 85% of the time brought light to the hypocrisies of the organization that purported to be at war with the “Zionist-Crusaders” and not a war between al-Qaeda and Muslims. Although most Muslims did not read this report it was fairly obvious to them too who al-Q?’idah killed most of the time. Therefore, al-Q?’idah has tried to be a more inclusive organization and part of this rebranding is a softer message such as this one. At the same time, one should not be fooled by this.

A Crash Course in Jihadi Theory (Part 1) — jihadica

Throughout the years, the number of jihadi writings has grown enormously. Nowadays, books and fatwas on any given subject related to jihadi thought can easily be found and downloaded from the internet. As a service to those who can’t see the forest for the trees anymore or to those people who simply want a brief overview of what every budding jihadi theorist should know, the Shari’a Council of the Jama’at al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad in Gaza (not to be confused with the Shari’a Council of the Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad, on which I wrote previously) produced what can be described as a crash course in jihadi theory some time ago. The book, entitled The Gift of the Unifiers on the Most Important Issues of the Basics of Islam (also available here), describes the theoretical underpinnings of jihadis’ animosity towards Muslim states and their policies in a mere 273 pages. This post is the first of a series in which I discuss this book.

Misc.
Holy ground zero? « The Immanent Frame

Nine years (and a few weeks) have now passed since the events of 9/11, and as Religion in America blogger Paul Matzko noted on the attacks’ ninth anniversary earlier this month, the religious overtones of how Americans remember that day are palpable

Unfaithful Followers » Contexts

Religious conversion may seem like a personal decision, but national history and demographics also play pivotal roles. Robert Barro and his colleagues (Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, March 2010) compared conversion rates in 40 countries analyzing country-level policies and characteristics.

The Indypendent » Mom, Apple Pie and Islamophobia

The current nativist impulse is not new. The right’s anti-Muslim campaign is eerily similar to 19th-century anti- Catholic bigotry in America.

Qantara.de – Wars over Symbols

The face veil stirs up many controversies – not only in Europe, but also within the Islamic world. For Mohamed El-Moctar, an Islamic scholar and religious historian, however, it’s a practice that has nothing much to do with Islam. Stephanie Doetzer met him in Doha

U.S. Religious Knowledge Quiz

And how do you compare with the average American? Here’s your chance to find out.

We need a multiculturalism of hope | Tariq Modood | Comment is free | guardian.co.uk

We need a multiculturalism of hope

Moderate secularism and respect for religion are vital if we are to move from a multiculturalism of fear towards genuine pluralism

Continent of Fear: The Rise of Europe’s Right-Wing Populists – SPIEGEL ONLINE – News – International

All across Europe, right-wing populist parties are enjoying significant popular support. Led by charismatic politicians like Geert Wilders, they are exploiting fear of Muslim immigration and frustration with the political establishment — and are forcing mainstream parties to shift to the right.

A look inside NYC Islamic center imam’s mosques – CNN Belief Blog – CNN.com Blogs

The controversy over a proposed Islamic center in lower Manhattan has spiraled into a global debate over Islam’s place in the United States, but the arrival of a mosque a couple blocks from ground zero was driven mostly by the simple need for more space.

Doha meet discusses rise of radicalism

Researchers and experts from Europe, the US and the Arab world gathered here yesterday at a workshop to examine in depth the phenomena of terrorism and resistance.

The American Muslim (TAM)

The recent passage of the bill banning the burqa in the French Senate and the heated discussion preceding it have brought into relief a time-honored (masculine) practice of waging culture wars on the bodies of women. In this case, the bodies are those of veiled Muslim women serving as ideological sites for passionate French debates about national identity and cultural authenticity.

Different Strokes | Faisal Al-Yafai | Comments | September 2010 | emel – the muslim lifestyle magazine

The French and Syrian bans on the niqab may look the same, but underneath they are very different.

Naturally it is gratifying, for those of us who spend significant amounts of time in the Arab world, to see the region get the recognition it deserves. Last month, it was good to see commentators in Europe seize on Syria and Egypt as examples to be followed.

EXCLUSIVE A Palestinian Midwife Who Defies the Odds – WMC Blog

Feeza Shraim overcame violence and Israeli embargoes in the Gaza Strip to bring new life to her damaged homeland, as independent journalist Nida Khan recounts before Shraim receives her award from Americans for UNFPA.

In Afghanistan, Midwives ‘Are Like Guardian Angels For Infants And Mothers’ : The Two-Way : NPR

Midwife Farangis Sultani tells the story of a woman who was in a great deal of pain last winter. The woman was in labor — and her family had brought her to the Shatak village clinic after a three-hour walk on the back of a donkey.

Dutch
Parthenon – Handboek Jongeren Religie in Nederland

Zappers, relishoppers, legobouwers. Jongeren in Nederland; je ziet ze nauwelijks nog in de kerk of de moskee. Toch zijn ze wel degelijk bezig met zingeving en religieuze activiteiten. Ze bewegen zich in diffuse sociale netwerken en zijn moeilijk te traceren, laat staan langdurig te binden. Hoe stellen deze jongeren hun eigen bouwpakket van zingeving samen en waaruit kiezen ze? Uit de tradities van de grote wereldreligies? En waaruit nog meer? Welk effect heeft de religieuze erfenis van ouders op jongeren? Welke bronnen boren moslimjongeren aan voor hun religieuze zingeving? Wat voor adviezen kunnen jongerenwerkers geven aan religieuze instituten?
Het Handboek jongeren en religie toont de stand van zaken en laat zien welke rol voor godsdienstige instituten als de kerk en de moskee kan zijn weggelegd. Met behulp van een nuttige typologie van de verschillende groepen jongeren wordt het veld van religieus jongerenwerk inzichtelijk. Actueel onderzoek door verschillende specialisten in het veld van jongerenpastoraat, jeugdwerk en islamitisch jongerenwerk, wordt afgewisseld met best practices: voorbeelden van succesvolle projecten met jongeren, waaronder swingende jeugdkerken uit neo-evangelicale hoek, eucharistievieringen voor tieners, een bezoekgroep voor jonge gedetineerde moslims en een Ramadan festival. Bij de best practices worden telkens ook tips, contactgegevens én valkuilen vermeld.
Met bijdragen van Nora Asrami, Angela Berben-Schuring, Clazien Broekhoff-Bosman, Monique van Dijk-Groeneboer, Toke Elshof, Joris Kregting, Martijn de Koning, Jacques Maas, Johan Roeland en Hijme Stoffels.

Wereldjournalisten De gemiddelde salafi wil baan, baard en bruid

Hoe groot is het salafisme in Nederland en hoe gevaarlijk? 8% van de moslims noemt zichzelf orthodox c.q. salafi, maar de gemiddelde salafi vormt geen gevaar voor de democratie. Dit blijkt uit het onderzoek van de Universiteit van Amsterdam naar aard, omvang en dreiging van het salafisme in Nederland. De gemiddelde salafi is pragmatisch en wil slechts baard, baan en bruid.

Yoram Stein weblog: Is salafisme geen bedreiging voor de democratie? Lees je eigen rapport!

Volgens politicoloog Jean Tillie en volgens berichten in de media zou een onlangs verschenen wetenschappelijk rapport over het salafisme in Nederland stellen dat salafistische moslims ‘niet gewelddadig’ zijn, en dat deze stroming ‘geen gevaar vormt voor de democratie’. NRC Handelsblad en de NOS meldden dit alsof het wetenschappelijk geconstateerde feiten betrof. De journalisten namen klaarblijkelijk niet de moeite om het onderzoek zelf te lezen. Wie het onderzoek namelijk leest, komt tot een geheel andere conclusie.

Salafisme en hyperventilatie

Naar aanleiding van het jaarverslag van de AIVD, waarin werd gerept over subsidies aan salafistische organisaties, heeft de Asmetrdamse CDA-fractie gevraagd in de hoofdstad de brochure ‘Facadepolitiek van salafistische organisaties’ te gaan gebruiken. Deze brochure biedt weinig handvatten, versterkt vooral wantrouwen en draagt niet bij aan een zakelijke benadering van het salafisme.

Nederlands Marokkaans Netwerk: Kabinet van verdeeldheid en polarisatie

“In plaats van ‘vrijheid en verantwoordelijkheid’ verdient dit regeerakkoord eerder de naam ‘verdeeldheid en polarisatie’, het akkoord kenmerkt zich door maatregelen die ten doel lijken te hebben om de verschillende bevolkingsgroepen in ons land te verdelen en tegen elkaar op te zetten.”

NOS Headlines – Moslims actief met media – Nieuws

Moslimjongeren lezen vaker een krant dan niet-moslimjongeren. Dat blijkt uit onderzoek van de Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. Sowieso zijn moslim-jongeren intensievere media-gebruikers dan niet-moslimjongeren. Ze kijken bijvoorbeeld meer televisie. Alle resultaten van het onderzoek staan in het boek ‘Jong en multimediaal; mediagebruik en meningsvorming onder jongeren’ dat vandaag is uitgebracht.

Turkse moslims bidden op straat uit protest – POLITIEK – PAROOL

150 tot 200 Turkse moslims hebben vrijdagmiddag in Amsterdam-West uit protest op straat gebeden. Ze deden dit omdat de bouw van de veelbesproken Westermoskee maar niet mag beginnen. Het gebed vond plaats voor het kantoor van het stadsdeel West aan het Bos en Lommerplein.

KRO-Reporter –

Een Nederlandse militair filmde in oktober 2007 Afghaanse soldaten die gevangenen martelen. Het gebeurde tijdens ‘ Spin Ghar’, een ISAF-operatie tegen de Taliban in de Baluchi-vallei in Noord- Uruzgan onder Nederlands commando.

Zijn de Nederlandse militairen verantwoordelijk?

The walk of shame: drank kopen in Marokko | Standplaats Wereld

Moslims mogen van hun geloof geen alcohol drinken. Dit wist ik al toen ik naar Marokko ging. Ook wist ik dat ik in Arabische landen het drinken van alcohol sociaal niet geaccepteerd is en dat ik niet hoefde te verwachten dat ik in elke kroeg een biertje kon bestellen zoals in Nederland. Maar hoe sociaal onacceptabel alcohol hier is werd mij pas duidelijk toen ik zelf wijn ging kopen.

Factcheck: NCRV’s Altijd Wat – De tsunami van islamisering – GeenCommentaar

In haar uitzending van 24 september vroeg het NCRV-programma Altijd Wat zich in haar rubriek Feit of Fictie af hoe reëel de angst is voor de in 2006 door PVV-leider Geert Wilders voorspelde tsunami van islamisering. De vraag is natuurlijk of de cijfers die in de uitzending genoemd werden, inderdaad kloppen. Mijn conclusie: ondanks een enkele onzorgvuldigheid – en een fout – kan je zeggen dat de cijfers en de eindconclusie kloppen.

FORUM, FORUM Jaarlezing 2010. Waar zijn wij bang voor? De extreme ander in ons midden

In de FORUM Jaarlezing 2010 neemt historicus Beatrice de Graaf ons mee op een aanschouwelijke tocht langs de gewezen en vermeende vijanden van de Nederlandse staat en samenleving. Voor welke ‘extreme anderen’ waren en zijn wij bang?

To Jaap or not to Jaap, that is the question | DeJaap

@EdgeofEurope: Eén extreemrechtse bende, dat DeJaap.
Greta Duisenberg: DeJaap is een zionistisch blog.
Leon de Winter: DeJaap is een antisemitisch blog.
Martijn de Koning: DeJaap is mijn favoriete blog.

0 comments.

Talal Asad – Thinking About Religion, Secularism and Politics”

Posted on October 2nd, 2010 by martijn.
Categories: anthropology.

Converstations with History is a series of lively and unedited video interviews in which distinguished men and women from all over the world talk about their lives and their work. CvH is produced by the Institute of International Studies at the University of California, Berkeley. Guests include diplomats, statesmen, and soldiers; economists and political analysts; scientists and historians; writers and foreign correspondents; activists and artists. The interviews span the globe and include discussion of political, economic, military, legal, cultural, and social issues shaping our world. At the heart of each interview is a focus on individuals and ideas that make a difference.

Conversations host Harry Kreisler welcomes Professor Talal Asad, Professor of Anthropology at Graduate Center of the City University of New York, who reflects on his life and work as an anthropologist focusing on religion, modernity, and the complex relationships between Islam and the West.

1 comment.

Talal Asad – Thinking About Religion, Secularism and Politics"

Posted on October 2nd, 2010 by martijn.
Categories: anthropology.

Converstations with History is a series of lively and unedited video interviews in which distinguished men and women from all over the world talk about their lives and their work. CvH is produced by the Institute of International Studies at the University of California, Berkeley. Guests include diplomats, statesmen, and soldiers; economists and political analysts; scientists and historians; writers and foreign correspondents; activists and artists. The interviews span the globe and include discussion of political, economic, military, legal, cultural, and social issues shaping our world. At the heart of each interview is a focus on individuals and ideas that make a difference.

Conversations host Harry Kreisler welcomes Professor Talal Asad, Professor of Anthropology at Graduate Center of the City University of New York, who reflects on his life and work as an anthropologist focusing on religion, modernity, and the complex relationships between Islam and the West.

1 comment.

11 september en islam – 10 punten over religie en geweld

Posted on September 11th, 2010 by martijn.
Categories: anthropology, International Terrorism, Religious and Political Radicalization, Young Muslims.

Eén van de belangrijkste kenmerken van de nasleep van 9/11 is het gegeven dat veel moslims het gevoel hebben zich voortdurend te moeten verantwoorden over zaken waar ze part noch deel aan hebben (zie het programma ZOZ van de VPRO). Hoewel een groot deel van de aanslagplegers van 9/11 voorafgaand aan hun religieuze radicalisering al in politieke zin geradicaliseerd waren en beide vormen van radicalisering zich bij hen vooral in Europa voltrok, staat toch hun religieuze achtergrond centraal in veel discussies. Soms gebeurt als achtergrond informatie (de geschiedenis van islam, maatschappelijke positie van moslims), soms apologetisch (islam is niet gewelddadig en moslims die geweld gebruiken zijn extremistische idioten en/of begrijpen de echte islam niet goed), soms beschuldigend (islam is een license to kill). Wat het ook is, in alle gevallen wordt er direct of indirect een verband gelegd tussen geweld en islam.

“Het lijkt dan ook tamelijk zinloos om na te gaan of de islam intrinsiek criminogener is dan andere religies zoals sommige islamcritici menen.” Schrijft Bas van Stokkom in een mooi artikel. Daarmee kan ik zeggen, we zijn wel klaar en we kunnen gaan koffie drinken. Hoewel er echter geen enkele directe, dat wil zeggen causale, relatie te bewijzen valt tussen religie en geweld, is de situatie toch wat complexer. Ik wil, kort, enkele punten nalopen vanuit een antropologisch perspectief gericht op de relatie tussen religie en geweld; en dan niet crimineel geweld waar Van Stokkom zich vooral op richt, maar politiek en oorlogsgeweld. Dit is mede gebaseerd op eigen onderzoek maar vooral ook op het de studie van Eller Introducing Anthropology of Religion.

1. De relatie tussen religie en geweld is mede zo gecompliceerd omdat ten eerste alle religieuze groepen al eeuwenlang discussies hebben over geweld en ongeoorloofd geweld waarover ook subgroepen zich weer afgesplitst hebben wanneer zij het niet eens zijn met de (tijdelijke) consensus. Tegelijkertijd is geweld (niet alleen religieus geweld) niet zo’n overduidelijke categorie als we denken. Geweld is een praktijk die tot stand komt in specifieke tijden en plaatsen en soms zijn mensen het niet eens eens over wat nu precies geweld is of wat legitiem of illegitiem geweld is.
2. Bijdragen over de relatie tussen religie en geweld vertrekken vaak vanuit twee beperkte standpunten: óf men geeft de schuld aan religie voor het geweld óf men stelt dat religie er geen schuld aan kan hebben omdat ‘authentieke’ of ‘zuivere’ religie niet in staat is tot geweld en alleen een gecorrumpeerde versie geweld voortbrengt. Beide invalshoeken snijden geen hout. Geweld is niet het product van een ‘slechte’ of gecorrumpeerde religie en tegelijkertijd is er niets unieks aan religieus geweld dat ook niet voor andere vormen geldt, al is het maar omdat geweld (of dat criminaliteit is of andere vormen) altijd onderdeel is van een samenleving: het verschil is echter wat gelegitimeerd geweld (bijvoorbeeld van het leger) is en wat niet (bijvoorbeeld van een meute of revolutionaire groep). Wel zijn er verschillen in waardering en oordelen over legitimiteit (zie bijvoorbeeld de tweede helft van deze post over zelfmoordaanslagen).
3. We kunnen op basis van antropologische studies (onder meer van Eller) een vijftal criteria aanwijzen die basisvoorwaarden vormen voor het zich voordoen van geweld: integratie in bepaalde groepen, opkomen van een individuele en collectieve identiteit, er moet sprake zijn van institutionalisering, er moeten belangen zijn en er moet sprake zijn van een ideologie en doelen die niet of nauwelijks ter discussie staan en die absolutistisch en utopisch zijn. De ene vorm van religie komt hier dichterbij dan de de andere, maar wanneer deze voorwaarden vervuld zijn dan kan geweld door leden van een religieuze beweging als legitiem worden gezien zeker wanneer (en dat geldt vooral voor het Jodendom, Christendom en Islam) er een duidelijke scheiding is tussen wij-zij waarbij de laatste aangewezen wordt als veroorzaker van de problemen en crises van de eersten. Religie wijst namelijk aan waar het kwade zit en wie het kwade vertegenwoordigt. Dit kan leiden tot een gebrek aan empathie met het potentiële slachtoffer iets waar legers zich in specialiseren en ook dit is dus niet specifiek voor religies.
4. Religie is een verklarend system: het geeft mensen de mogelijkheid om de wereld om hen heen te interpreteren en te verklaren. Religie is ook een legitimerend system: het kan mensen (vooraf en achteraf) een reden tot geweld geven. Degenen die het geweld uitvoeren zijn dan geen agressievelingen of barbaren, maar verdedigers en strijders of zelfs martelaars. Niet vechten tegen het kwaad kan dan zelfs als immoreel bestempeld worden. Wat geweld is of wat goed of slecht geweld is, is daarmee cultureel bepaald maar ook een politieke beslissing waarbij macht en belangen komen kijken. Religie geeft een moraal kader waarmee geweld kan worden gerechtvaardigd en kan zeer intens zijn. Religie geeft ook voorstellingen en beelden van strijd en transformatie waarbinnen bestaande gevallen van ervaren onrecht hun plaats kunnen krijgen en zo bij kunnen dragen aan de idee dat de eigen morele gemeenschap onder vuur ligt. Vergelijkingen met nationalisme liggen hier zeker voor de hand en ook deze aspecten zijn niet specifiek voor islam maar gelden voor alle religies.
5. Vrijwel alle religies kennen diverse varianten van individuele (of zelfs collectieve) zelf-doding en zelfkastijding: variërend van piercings, tattoos, besnijdenis tot martelaarschap en zelfs ge-institutionaliseerde legers zoals Boeddhistische Sohei en de Ikko-Ikki (toegewijde groep). Vrijwel alle religies kennen ook doctrines die te maken hebben met geweld. Jihad is een mainstream islamitische doctrine met veel verschillende betekenissen waarbij de ‘kleine jihad’ (niet door iedereen zo ge-accepteerd, maar hier even bedoeld als de gewelddadige jihad) door de eeuwen heen zo ingeperkt dat (in mainstream) alleen geweld ter verdediging en onder leiding van een kalief nog mogelijk is. De voorwaarden die gesteld worden doen denken aan de doctrine van de rechtvaardige oorlog zoals het Christendom die kent (en voor u begint…ja er zijn ook genoeg serieuze verschillen).
6. Het is verleidelijk om het daadwerkelijk voorkomen van geweld te baseren op die ideologie of religie als die er zo vaak mee in verband wordt gebracht (onder meer door de daders zelf). Dat kunnen we, in de woorden van antropoloog Marranci, scripturegenosis noemen; een manier van denken die sterk gerelateerd is aan culturalisme waarin cultuur homogeen en duidelijk herkenbaar zou zijn en die de menselijke geest zou controleren. Bij scripturegnosis gaat om het idee dat een heilige tekst dit zou kunnen doen. De oplossing is simpel: het verwijderen van radicale, haatvolle en tot geweldoproepende passages van een religie of, het zal u niet verbazen simpelweg verbieden van deze teksten. Het omgekeerde geldt overigens ook: dat een religieuze tradities per definitie vreedzame teksten bevat en dat afwijkingen van die tekst dus makkelijk opgespoord en verwijderd kunnen worden. Beide opvattingen reduceren mensen tot robotten en het negeert de complexe cognitieve en emotionele processen van mensen. In de praktijk moeten mensen zelf de religie interpreteren of hun interpretative mede laten afhangen van religieuze gezaghebbers die, over het algemeen, de ideeen van mensen bevestigt. De vraag of er een samenhang is tussen religie en geweld kan beantwoord worden, zie het verhaal van Bas van Stokkom, de vraag of religie leidt tot geweld kan door sociale wetenschappers niet zo beantwoord worden en zou ook niet door beleidsmakers moeten gebeuren; het beantwoorden van die vraag gaat er vanuit dat religie een helder, samenhangend, homogeen verhaal is en komt uiteindelijk erop neer dat beleidsmakers religie gaan interpreteren. De vraag die wel gesteld kan worden, is hoe mensen tot het idee komen dat een bepaalde interpretatie van een religieuze traditie de correcte en authentieke interpretatie is.
7. Op basis van een stuk dat ik recent schreef samen met mijn collega Roel Meijer over de Hofstadgroep gaat het daarbij om twee belangrijke processen die kunnen leiden tot geweld: politisering en radicalisering. Politisering vindt plaats wanneer een identiteit of religie gebruikt wordt om bepaalde frustraties en gevoelens van onrechtvaardigheid onder één noemer te brengen, wanneer een outsider de schuld krijgt van die crisis en wanneer er claims ter compensatie worden gesteld om de problemen op te lossen. We krijgen dan een gepolitiseerde religie; daar is in principe niets mee aan de hand omdat een gepolitiseerde groep zal proberen meestanders te zoeken en coalities te sluiten. Wanneer de groep vervolgens echter radicaliseert, dat wil zeggen zich in woord en daad verwijdert van de maatschappelijke consensus die door bepaalde instituties en elites bewaakt wordt, kan er een isolement optreden. De overgang van gepolitiseerde naar geradicaliseerde religie is daarbij van belang en daarbij dienen we te kijken naar hoe mensen met behulp van ideologie of religie betekenis geven aan de wereld om hen heen. Religie geeft hen daarbij zoals gesteld een begrip van onrechtvaardigheid, het geeft hen een doel en programma voor actie en een sterke identiteit. De uiteindelijke beslissing om geweld te gebruiken is daarbij vaak opmerkelijk pragmatisch en niet zo principieel (dat komt pas later) en wordt mede versterkt door het opgelegde en zelfgekozen isolement van zo’n groep.
8. Geweld uitgeoefend door groepen is daarnaast slechts één van de vele verschijningsvormen van religieuze overtuigingen en interpretaties.Religies hebben hun eigen muzikale, wetenschappelijke, liefdadigheids voorstellingen en praktijken. En ook geweld heeft veel verschillende gezichten en is zeker niet alleen beperkt tot religie. Stellen dat een religie verantwoordelijk is voor geweld of zelfs intrinsiek gewelddadig is reduceert de rijke, tegenstrijdige tradities van religies tot slechts één: die van slecht geweld.
9. De wijze waarop 9/11 zou zijn uitgevoerd, zelfmoordaanslagen, zou typisch zijn voor islam. Maar dat is het niet. De wegbereiders van zelfmoordaanslagen zijn toch echt de Tamil Tijgers en pas later is dit in het Midden-Oosten overgenomen door islamitische en seculiere strijders. Wanneer we de focus leggen op martelaarschap, zoals moslims soms zelf doen, en (op-)offering dan zien we dat dat centrale begrippen zijn in alle religies voor zowel mens als dier. Denk bijvoorbeeld aan het einde van de belegering van Masada waar de gehele bevolking zich doodde in plaats van zich gevangen te laten nemen door de Romeinen.
10. Islam en cultuur van moslims zijn zo divers (zeker wanneer we sociaal-economische verschillen daar nog eens bij optellen) dat ze eigenlijk nooit een verklarende factor voor wat dan ook zijn (en dat geldt opnieuw voor religie en cultuur in het algemeen). Temeer omdat we zien dat mensen met uiteenlopende religies en etnische afkomst vaker wel dan niet vreedzaam met elkaar omgaan. Als dat niet gebeurt, zoals in het geval van 9/11 en de war on terror, dan kunnen we niet zeggen zie je wel er is een conflict dus is religie of cultuur belangrijk of is religie zelfs de unieke causale factor; dan kun je immers niet verklaren waarom mensen meestal wel vreedzaam samenleven (zie ook het artikel de Verklaringskracht van cultuur van Nan Dirk de Graaf.

6 comments.

Een wekelijks portie burgerschap 34 – Helden en Pakistan

Posted on August 25th, 2010 by martijn.
Categories: anthropology, Burgerschapserie 2010.

Uit de burgerschapskalender:

“Moed is een essentieel onderdeel van een samenleving. De overheid laat zich bij haar besluiten leiden door angst. Dat lijkt me niet het goede voorbeeld”, zegt iemand op www.handvestburgerschap.nl. Misschien moet de overheid een voorbeeld nemen aan de mensen die zijn onderscheiden door de Stichting
Carnegie Heldenfonds. Helden die kinderen redden van brandende hooizolders en bejaarden uit te water geraakte auto’s.
www.carnegiefonds.nl

Helden zijn nauw verbonden met het idee van burgerschap. In de geschiedeniscanon wordt, om een identificatie met de Nederlandse geschiedenis te scheppen, helden geschapen zoals Karel V, Willem van Oranje, Spinoza, koning Willem I, Vincent van Gogh en Willem Drees. Inderdaad vooral blanke mannen. Ook wel enkele vrouwen hoor zoals Aletta Jacobs, Anne Frank en Annie M.G. Schmidt. Niet-westerse migranten zult u niet vinden; die zijn vooral naamloos gepresenteerd als slachtoffers van de slavernij, dankbaar na de dekolonisatie van Indonesië (die niet gepaard ging met oorlog maar nog steeds met politionele acties) en pas zeer recent ge-arriveerde personen die deel uit maken van de multiculturele samenleving. De genoemde personen dienen ons te leren hoe wij ons dienen te gedragen, wat deugdzame Nederlandse personen zijn en voorbeelden voor ons allemaal. Er zit geen enkele migrant als voorbeeld in, dus daar hoeven we ons ook niet op te richten: de Surinaamse, Indonesische, Marokkaanse, Turkse, Caraïbische geschiedenis staat totaal los van de Nederlandse en we kunnen er zeker niets van leren. Nederland is een eiland in de wereld.

Persoonlijk heb ik ook een held. Heldin beter gezegd. Toen ik haar leerde kennen zo’n 15 jaar geleden was deze Marokkaans-Nederlands dame al een zeer kritische moslima. Kritisch op alles: haar eigen familie, de Marokkaanse Nederlanders in haar woonplaats, de islam, de politiek in Nederland. Noem het maar op. Zij had het plan opgevat om een bepaalde opleiding te volgen en dat zag eigenlijk niemand zitten. En toen ik haar zag ook niet. Onderuitgezakt, kauwgom kauwend, gaten in de spijkerbroek. Terwijl haar was opgedragen zich keurig netjes te vertonen alsof het om een sollicitatiegesprek ging. Objectief als ik ben, besloot ik de eerste indruk te negeren (iets waar ik vrij goed in ben) en het gesprek toch maar te doen. En dat was echt heel erg goed. Verder had ze behoorlijk wat tegen. Haar thuissituatie was beroerd, zij trok zich het veranderende klimaat ten opzichte van Marokkaanse-Nederlanders erg aan en ergerde zich tegelijkertijd kapot aan veel leeftijdgenoten, in het bijzonder jongens. Het gevolg was dat zij vrij alleen kwam te staan en eigenlijk weinig echte vriendinnen had toen. Maar ze ging de opleiding toch doen. Ondanks, opnieuw, enkele tegenslagen slaagde ze. Ze kon vrij snel aan de slag, maar het ongeluk was nog niet op. Tijdens haar werk kreeg ze een ernstig ongeluk, zo ernstig dat ze waarschijnlijk nooit meer kan werken en in ieder geval haar oude werk (haar passie) niet meer kan doen. Als ze eigenlijk sowieso nog wel wat kan doen, zo ernstig was het. Toch is het laatste wat ik gehoord heb, dat ze weer volop bezig is te revalideren en haar plaats in de samenleving te heroveren. Geen idee hoe het nu precies met haar is, maar zij is mijn heldin.

Een land dat de nodige helden kan gebruiken is Pakistan. Het is relatief stil omtrent de recente watersnoodramp in Pakistan. Dat heeft wellicht te maken met het slechte imago van Pakistan, maar misschien ook wel met de rampenmoeheid (hoewel geloof me, de Pakistani zijn veel meer rampenmoe dan wij) en het feit dat dit een zich relatief langzaam voltrekkende ramp is (dat is toch minder mediageniek denk ik). Via het onvolprezen en in Nederland niet zo bekende Antropologi.info van antropoloog Lorenz Khazaleh vond ik diverse interessante artikelen. Hoewel antropologen opmerkelijk stil lijken te zijn met betrekking tot deze ramp wijst hij op een interview op Anthropologyworks waar Maggie Ronkin Fayyaz Baqir interviewt die wijst op de volharding, inventiviteit en de capaciteit die mensen hebben om om te gaan met deze ramp dankzij de aanwezigheid van diverse formele en informele instituties en mechanismen.

In de Pakistaanse krant Dawn wijst Zeresh John op de rol van jongeren en ‘vreemden die niet langer vreemden zijn’:

The Dawn Blog » Blog Archive » Catch the spirit

In the last 10 days, I’ve seen Pakistan come together in ways never seen before. The Pakistani youth has risen and literally stepped out on the streets to help their countrymen affected by the flood. It is exhilarating to think about not what they are doing as volunteers but what they will become.

With as many as 20 million people affected, roadside relief camps have sprouted up by the dozen in Karachi. Students have taken to the streets, donation boxes in tow, physically stopping cars, requesting people to contribute.

Each day brings a relentless and constant chain of support. Where the monetary contributors stop, there is a group of people ready to take over by running to crowded bazaars everyday to buy food supplies, clean drinking water and medicines. From there yet another massive portion of the population is stepping in to pack those supplies and load them into trucks to deliver them to the affected areas.

As Pakistani authorities failed to provide the necessary leadership needed and with no proper coordination in the relief efforts, the civilian population of Pakistan has taken it upon themselves to do what they can in the face of this crisis; in the process, developing a conscientious society that we’re all proud to belong to.

Een verhaal dat, zo haalt Lorenzo aan, volgens één van de reaguurders daar niet wordt verteld door de media die alleen demoraliserende maar wel sensationele verhalen produceert. Een ander voorbeeld dat aangehaald wordt is van Shabnam Riaz in The News over de onderlinge hulp die Pakistani elkaar bieden:
The real heroes

The usual definition of being heroic is to have qualities that warrant acts of great salvation. I think somewhere along the way we made it too complicated. There are many simple acts of heroism we may encounter more regularly than we think, but are too self-absorbed in the intricacy of the daily, mundane activities to be able to recognise them.

[…]

There was, however, a spirit-lifting experience in this whole nightmare. Small, scattered groups of young boys and men had formed where the rain was the harshest and was threatening to sweep away cars along with their occupants. Soaked to the bone, these ‘by-standers’ smiled and gave a thumbs up sign.

“Hey don’t worry,” said one of them.

“It’s ok. We’ll make sure nothing happens to you,” reassured another.

About five or six of them got together and pushed the quickly submerging vehicle. They worked in unison, all of them had a single purpose and that was to rescue other human beings. With a huge shove and cries of jubilance they managed to move vehicles out of imminent danger. As we drove away, their faces flushed with enthusiasm and satisfaction that personified their absolute state of happiness.

They waved at us, hurriedly preparing to help the next hapless driver who was blindly careening into their path. We waved back with euphoric ‘thank you’ but they had already become busy in helping others.

I was touched beyond words. These young men were poor labourers who were most probably hungry as a day full of rain would not have given them a chance to earn their daily wage. I am sure that none of them were owners of a vehicle either. But their dedication to help the other members of society who definitely had more material possessions than they had, without any contempt at all, told me something. It told me that deep inside they were people of substance. Those individuals who had their moral compasses pointing in the right direction.

It also told me something else; that in fact, these were our heroes. Also, these people who slog from sun-up till sun-down for a meagre amount that could hardly put a decent meal on anyone’s table, are our actual role models.

Deze onderlinge bijstand en kracht is ook te zien in de volgende video van Al Jazeera:

Voor meer updates zie de voortreffelijke site van Dawn met een speciale sectie over de watersnoodramp, Global Voices (bijvoorbeeld over internet) en Al-Jazeera. Donaties voor de helden van de watersnoodramp: GIRO 555

0 comments.

Sexual Nationalisms – Gender, Sexuality and the Politics of Belonging in the New Europe

Posted on August 10th, 2010 by martijn.
Categories: anthropology, Gender, Kinship & Marriage Issues, Multiculti Issues.

International Conference – 27 & 28 January 2011 – University of Amsterdam
Sexual Nationalisms
Gender, Sexuality and the Politics of Belonging in the New Europe
Since 1989, and even more so after 9/11, the rise of new nationalisms has been inextricably linked to a refashioning of the politics, identities and imaginaries of gender and sexuality in Europe. The old virile nationalism analyzed by George Mosse is now being reinvented in the light of a new brand of sexual politics. Feminist demands and claims of (homo)sexual liberation have moved from the counter-cultural margins to the heart of many European countries’ national imaginations, and have become a central factor in the European Union’s production of itself as an imaginary community. Rhetorics of lesbian/gay and women’s rights have played pivotal roles in discourses and policies redefining modernity in sexual terms, and sexual modernity in national terms. How are these baffling shifts in the cultural and social location of sexuality and gender to be understood?

In Europe and beyond, the refashioning of citizenship contributes to the redefinition of secular liberalism as cultural whiteness. Homophobia and conservatism, gender segregation and sexual violence have been represented as alien to modern European culture and transposed upon the bodies, cultures and religions of migrants, especially Muslims and their descendants. In the process, the status of Europe’s ethnic minorities as citizens has come under question. How can the entanglement of sexual and gender politics, anti-immigration policies, and the current reinvention of national belonging be analyzed? How are we to understand the appropriation of elements of the feminist and sexual liberation agenda by the populist and Islamophobic right?

The prominence of sexual democracy in the remaking of European national imaginaries requires bringing the critique of gender and sexuality beyond second-wave feminism and post-Stonewall liberationist perspectives. In late-capitalist, post-colonial Europe, struggles for sexual freedom and gender equality no longer necessarily challenge dominant formations; on the contrary, they may be mobilized to shape and reinforce exclusionary discourses and practices. The new politics of belonging is thus inseparable from the new politics of exclusion. This shift has not been without consequences for progressive social movements. Whereas in social and cultural analysis, nationalism has long been associated with male dominance, sexual control and heteronormativity, certain articulations of feminism and lesbian/gay liberation have now become intimately entwined with the reinforcement of ethnocultural boundaries within European countries.

As feminist historian Joan W. Scott recently argued when she coined the provocative notion of ‘sexularism’, new forms of sexual regulation have been introduced, especially targeting migrants, their descendants, and other ‘non-whites’. Discursively defining the new national common sense, sexularism also operates at the level of the visceral, reaching deep into the sexual and racial politics, habits and emotions of everyday life. A required allegiance to sexual liberties and rights has been employed as a technology of control and exclusion – what could be called a ‘politics of sexclusion’. Symmetrically, the Europeanization of sexual politics has entailed counter-reactions both inside and outside Europe. In Eastern Europe admission to the European Union has been conditioned on the acceptance of the new standards of sexual democracy, which sometimes led anti-European reactions to also frame themselves in sexual terms. In Western Europe ‘non-‘whites can sometimes be tempted to identify with the caricatures imposed upon them.

An increasing number of scholars in the humanities and social sciences have begun to investigate the important shifts taking place in discourses of sexual freedom and gender equality across the continent. These shifts open up new arenas for ethnographic and other empirical research. What role do sex and gender play in various European nationalisms? In which cultural terms are sexual and gender boundaries articulated? What different trajectories can be discerned, and how can differences between countries be explained? What are the effects of these transformations at the level of the formation of community and subjectivity? How do these discursive shifts become tangible in everyday life? And how can sexual politics avoid the trap of exclusionary instrumentalization without renouncing its emancipatory promise?

In order to discuss such questions, we invite contributions grounded in ethnography and other empirical research along the five following themes:

1. The Nationalization of Gender Equality – In secular European imaginations of immigrants and their descendants, the Islamic headscarf in particular has been perceived as an axiomatic signifier of religious and gender oppression. It has been listed along other ‘uncivilized’ ills also attributed to ethnic minorities and disadvantaged neighborhoods, whether they be domestic violence, forced marriage, or female genital mutilations. In contrast, recently acquired milestones in gender equality, like the legal right to abortion, have been adopted by Left and Right politicians alike as new symbols of timeless national essences. What representations of gender have been conveyed by contemporary constructions of the nation? How have forms of domination between men and women been challenged and/or reproduced in neonationalist and secularist projects? In what ways are migrant women’s lives affected by the entwinements of feminist discourses and movements with these projects? How have those women experienced and handled being framed as simultaneously the main victims and the main accomplices of the new Islamic threat? Whereas religion is understood as operating at the level of the embodied, the habitual, material and visceral aspects of secularism are generally ignored or obscured. But what is the secular counterpart of the religious body? What does a gendered politics of secularism look like? At times, restrictive policies against women wearing headscarves have been justified in terms of the necessary limitation of religion to the private sphere; at other times, they have been framed in terms of gender equality and feminist ideals. Should this justificatory plurality be taken at face value, or does it point to deeper and more complex resentments against postcolonial and other ‘non-white’ migrants?
2. The National Politics of Sexual Freedom – In Europe, ideals and practices of sexual freedom have mostly been experienced as a tangible break with formerly hegemonic religious traditions and the restraints of community and family. In particular, gay people have sometimes been framed as the very embodiment of modern liberalism, as self-fashioning, unattached, and autonomous subjects. Why have such representations been so effectively tied to the nationalization of modernity in some countries but not in others? What have been the specific trajectories of such representations, and how have they affected lesbian/gay/bisexual/transgender identified people in everyday life? What new normativities have been shaped in the process? And what have been the consequences of these discourses for those who have been framed as the ‘others’ of sexual democracy – Muslims and ethnic minorities? What have been the implications of such reinventions of sexual whiteness for everyday life in the global cities of Western Europe, and the sexual, cultural, religious and political diversity they offer? How have feminist and lesbian/gay movements been affected by these shifts in the social location of sexual and gender politics? What does ‘race’ have to do with the refashioning of sexual politics and identities? If sexual freedom and gender equality are being mobilized in a culturalist re-enactment of European racism, how does this affect white imaginaries and subjectivities? How are those (historically) excluded from whiteness affected by it? Which bodies come to be constructed in the sexual politics of neonationalisms? Which forms of ‘queerness’ are being authorized and which articulations of sexual otherness are being ‘queered’ and thus excluded from sexual normality? On what grounds does this occur, and how do these processes materialize in everyday life?
3. The Urban Geographies and Class Politics of Sexual Democracy – The interweaving of urban governance with sexual politics has been normalizing certain sexual spaces at the exclusion of others. In the context of an emergent urban entrepreneurialism and as part of gentrification processes, sexual others have been conscripted into urban politics and spatial renewal, while new hetero- and homonormativities have taken shape in the process. Gender representations have also played important roles in framing and representing cities as aesthetically and commercially attractive for business, tourists and aspiring residents. Simultaneously, certain brands of urban theory have celebrated gay men and women as the avant-garde of urban change, hence of the conquest of formerly working class and ethnic minority neighborhoods by bohemian middle and upper classes. What roles have sexuality and gay urban presence played in processes of gentrification? How have sex and gender been articulated in the urban governance of social marginalization? How are the sexual politics of neoliberalism to be understood? What role does the market play in the sexual reinvention of nationalism and citizenship and in shaping new (homo)normativities? Is the stigmatization of Muslim migrants as sexually conservative a reenactment of discourses that in the past stigmatized working class communities as immoral, archaic or authoritarian? What do the class politics of ‘sexularism’ look like? What kinds of subjectivities are produced in new regimes of sexual progress?
4. The Sexual Politics of Immigration Policies – The ever-stricter immigration policies of Europe – both at national levels and at the level of the E.U. – have often been justified in terms of sexual democracy: migrants, especially from Africa or other Islamic countries, have been ostensibly kept out, not on racial, but on sexual grounds, in order to preserve the hard-won democratic values of Europe in the treatment of sexual minorities, and even more crucially, of women. As a consequence, these same migrants, whose matrimonial (forced, fake, etc.) or sartorial (hijab, niqab, etc.) practices have thus been under constant scrutiny, are expected to demonstrate a sincere adhesion to sexual democracy that is presumed inherent to European cultures, despite its very recent history and contemporary limitations. How does such a constraint redefine the subjectivities of migrants – as well as that of their European partners? What does it mean for a woman of Islamic culture to be encouraged to reject her family’s expectations in order to express her sexual modernity? What are the strategies available to migrant women and sexual minorities who attempt to resist oppression, even violence, while refusing to be co-opted by anti-immigrant, if not xenophobic or racist, politics? In other words, what are the interactions between the sexual logic of immigration policies and the sexual imaginaries and practices of the migrants thus targeted?
5. European Sexual Modernization and Its Discontents – Today, the borders of Europe are also sexual boundaries. Admission into the E.U. requires identifying with the agenda of sexual democracy. At the same time, almost by definition, non-European countries are suspect. Turkey’s tradition of secularism largely inspired by the French historical model has not been sufficient to dispel the suspicion that this Muslim country is alien to European sexual democracy – as evidenced by the visible presence of the Islamic headscarf. In the same way, international campaigns against homophobia have largely been about the homophobia of others: the logic of human rights has focused more on legal repression than on legal discrimination – the penalization of homosexuality outside Europe rather than the exclusion of gays and lesbians from rights of marriage and adoption within Europe. Conversely, the Europeanization of sexual democracy has fueled reactive nationalisms, not only in those countries that are bound to remain on the margins of Europe, such as the Maghreb, but also in recent E.U. members – regarding homosexuality in particular, for example, in Poland or Lithuania. How are European and non-European sexual politics reconfigured in this new context, i.e. what are the political consequences, in various countries within and outside of Europe, of this geopolitical context?

We invite all those interested to submit a one-page abstract and a CV by: September 1, 2010.
Abstracts as well as questions can be sent to: Robert Davidson (R.J.Davidson@uva.nl)

Organizing Committee: Laurens Buijs, Sébastien Chauvin, Robert Davidson, Jan Willem Duyvendak, Eric Fassin, Paul Mepschen, Rachel Spronk, Bregje Termeer, and Oscar Verkaaik

Organizing Institutions:
Amsterdam Research Centre for Gender and Sexuality, UvA
Institut de Recherche Interdisciplinaire Sur Les Enjeux Sociaux, EHESS, Paris
Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies, UvA
Research Cluster Dynamics of Citizenship and Culture, UvA
Research Centre for Religion and Society, UvA
Research Cluster Health, Care, and the Body, UvA

1 comment.

Closer Holiday Service – Most cited AAA Anthropology Articles Available

Posted on July 23rd, 2010 by martijn.
Categories: anthropology, Important Publications.

It’s almost holiday here and what is better than to read a good article from an anthropological journal (except swimming, riding and/or walking in the mountains or doing nothing at all)? Current Anthropology is ranked as the second most-cited journal in anthropology. I cannot find #1, what is that? Why not show who the ‘winner’ is as well? Anyway, because the AAA journals do so well, they decided to give people free access to the most cited articles of their different journals, for one one month. Here’s the overview with the links you need:
Prophecy and the near future: Thoughts on macroeconomic, evangelical, and punctuated time. JANE I. GUYER. 2008; American Ethnologist – Wiley InterScience

Prophecy and the near future: Thoughts on macroeconomic, evangelical, and punctuated time
JANE I. GUYER 1
1 Department of Anthropology, Johns Hopkins University, Macaulay Hall 111, Baltimore, MD 21218 jiguyer@jhu.edu
Copyright 2007 American Anthropological Association.
KEYWORDS
time • macroeconomics • evangelism • events • future
ABSTRACT

A view from 1950s and 1960s Britain suggests that the public culture of temporality in the United States has shifted from a consequential focus on reasoning toward the near future to a combination of response to immediate situations and orientation to a very long-term horizon. This temporal perspective is most marked in the public rhetoric of macroeconomics, but it also corresponds in remarkable ways to evangelicals’ views of time. In this article, I trace the optionality and consonance of this shift toward the relative evacuation of the near future in religion and economics by examining different theoretical positions within each domain. In conclusion, I suggest that the near future is being reinhabited by forms of punctuated time, such as the dated schedules of debt and other specific event-driven temporal frames.

Race, Ethnicity, and Racism in Medical Anthropology, 1977–2002. Clarence C. Gravlee. 2008; Medical Anthropology Quarterly – Wiley InterScience

Race, Ethnicity, and Racism in Medical Anthropology, 1977–2002
Clarence C. Gravlee 1 Elizabeth Sweet 2
1 Department of Anthropology University of Florida
2 Department of Anthropology Northwestern University
Copyright © 2008 American Anthropological Association
KEYWORDS
Race • ethnicity • racism • health disparities • systematic review
ABSTRACT

Researchers across the health sciences are engaged in a vigorous debate over the role that the concepts of “race” and “ethnicity” play in health research and clinical practice. Here we contribute to that debate by examining how the concepts of race, ethnicity, and racism are used in medical–anthropological research. We present a content analysis of Medical Anthropology and Medical Anthropology Quarterly, based on a systematic random sample of empirical research articles (n =283) published in these journals from 1977 to 2002. We identify both differences and similarities in the use of race, ethnicity, and racism concepts in medical anthropology and neighboring disciplines, and we offer recommendations for ways that medical anthropologists can contribute to the broader debate over racial and ethnic inequalities in health.

Culture and Mind: Their Fruitful Incommensurability. Jerome Bruner. 2008; Ethos – Wiley InterScience

Culture and Mind: Their Fruitful Incommensurability
Jerome Bruner 1
1 School of Law, New York University
Copyright © 2008 American Anthropological Association
ABSTRACT

Abstract I reflect here on the historical junctures where anthropology and psychology cross paths, creating foundations for a general cultural psychology in the present.1 I am particularly attuned to those points of intersection that inform understanding of mind in culture and culture in mind. I focus on institutions as means for canonizing the ordinary, on narrative as a mode of positioning the extraordinary vis-à-vis mundane expectations, and on agency, each of which entails intersections of mind and culture. Recent encounters with U.S. legal culture provide a ground for illustrating these intertwining relations of subjects and their cultural milieux. [culture, mind, law, institutions, selectivity]

Navigating Contradictory Communities of Practice in Learning to Teach for Social Justice. Maria Timmons Flores. 2008; Anthropology & Education Quarterly – Wiley InterScience

Navigating Contradictory Communities of Practice in Learning to Teach for Social Justice
Maria Timmons Flores 1
1 Lewis and Clark Graduate School of Education and Counseling
Copyright 2007 American Anthropological Association.
KEYWORDS
social justice • practice theory • new teachers • teacher socialization • teacher education
ABSTRACT

In this article, I explore the contradictions that four new teachers experienced as their commitments to social justice collide with urban school culture. Framed within Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger’s (1999) theory of situated learning and development concepts of identity, practice, and relationships illustrate how teachers’ ideals are challenged as socializing features of two communities of practice—the universities and schools—intersect in new teachers’ development. This research contributes empirical evidence of the application of critical multicultural teacher preparation into practice, a cultural representation of how educational inequities are reproduced or disrupted in the situated contexts of urban schools, an application of Lave and Wenger’s theory of Legitimate Peripheral Participation that incorporates formal and informal education across multiple activity settings, and a call for collaborative communities of practice that support teachers’ situated learning in creating transformative practices.

Critical Social Learning: A Solution to Rogers’s Paradox of Nonadaptive Culture. MAGNUS ENQUIST. 2008; American Anthropologist – Wiley InterScience

Critical Social Learning: A Solution to Rogers’s Paradox of Nonadaptive Culture
MAGNUS ENQUIST 1 KIMMO ERIKSSON 2 STEFANO GHIRLANDA 3
1 Department of Zoology, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden 11691, and Centre for the Study of Cultural Evolution, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden 11691 2 Department of Mathematics and Physics, Mälardalen University, 721 23 Västerås, Sweden, and Centre for the Study of Cultural Evolution, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden 11691 3 Department of Psychology, University of Bologna, 40127 Bologna, Italy, and Centre for the Study of Cultural Evolution, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden 11691
Copyright 2007 American Anthropological Association.
KEYWORDS
social learning • origin of culture • culture • biology • mathematical modeling
ABSTRACT

Alan Rogers (1988) presented a game theory model of the evolution of social learning, yielding the paradoxical conclusion that social learning does not increase the fitness of a population. We expand on this model, allowing for imperfections in individual and social learning as well as incorporating a “critical social learning” strategy that tries to solve an adaptive problem first by social learning, and then by individual learning if socially acquired behavior proves unsatisfactory. This strategy always proves superior to pure social learning and typically has higher fitness than pure individual learning, providing a solution to Rogers’s paradox of nonadaptive culture. Critical social learning is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) unless cultural transmission is highly unfaithful, the environment is highly variable, or social learning is much more costly than individual learning. We compare the model to empirical data on social learning and on spatial variation in primate cultures and list three requirements for adaptive culture.

ROSE-COLORED GLASSES? Color Revolutions and Cartoon Chaos in Postsocialist Georgia. PAUL MANNING. 2008; Cultural Anthropology – Wiley InterScience

ROSE-COLORED GLASSES? Color Revolutions and Cartoon Chaos in Postsocialist Georgia
PAUL MANNING 1
1 Trent University, Peterborough, Canada
Copyright 2007 by the American Anthropological Association
KEYWORDS
political oratory • images • postsocialism • revolution
ABSTRACT

The Georgian “Rose Revolution” of 2003 was preceded by events in November 2001, in which students protested against a government raid on a popular TV station, Rustavi 2, and forced then-President Shevardnadze to request the resignation of the Georgian cabinet as the students demanded. This article describes these events in detail to show how political transition in Georgia has been carried out and exemplified by new political rhetorics and metarhetoric that expressly confronted entrenched logics of reception. The article illustrates how shifts in state formation, in postsocialist contexts in particular, are tied to shifts in representational modes.

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Autumn School AISSR – Secular sounds, Islamic sounds: Politics of listening in secular-liberal nation-states

Posted on July 22nd, 2010 by martijn.
Categories: anthropology.

Autumn school at University of Amsterdam, AISSR

Secular sounds, Islamic sounds: Politics of listening in secular-liberal nation-states

Convenors: Jeanette Jouili and Annelies Moors

Much research has been done in the last decade or so on the new visible presence of Muslims in the Diaspora in the West, in Europe and in North-America. Literature has focused on issues such as veiling and other visible bodily practices or on the changing outlook of multicultural cities through mosques, halal shops, etc. While the aspect of the visible presence is crucial to understand the developments of the Islamic revival in the West as well as the ensuing (often affective, visceral) debates regarding Muslim’s access to the public sphere within the context of regimes of secularity, a crucial aspect seems to have been overlooked. It concerns the audible presence of Muslims in these contexts. Muslims have not only impacted on the visible landscape, but they also have transformed the soundscape. This autumn school aims to address this gap and focus on the audible or sonic aspects of the Muslim presence. The emphasis on the audible should, however, not be perceived as diminishing the aspect of the visual or as denying its inherent entanglement with the former. It is understood here that the perception through one sense register never occurs alone, but always co-functions with other senses.

Islamic (inspired) soundscapes have been flourishing notably within Islamic counter-publics in the recent ten years. Listening practices closely related to traditional modes of piety such as Quran recitation or khutbas have been proliferating through new media technologies. But also music practices have been flourishing, notwithstanding the contested character of music within strands of Islamic theology. From a revival of the nasheed tradition have followed the emergence of a diversified Islamic music culture, including forms of pop, country, rock and rap music. However, Islamic sounds can also potentially leave the circumscribed and somehow protected spheres of the Islamic milieu. Islamic sounds become audible in a larger public sphere when, for example, Muslim musicians perform Islamic music at multicultural festivals or mixed cultural events, they become audible on the street when cell phones resonate the call for prayer or nasheed melodies, or if a mosque has the permission to use loudspeakers for the call for prayer.

Yet, the audibility and sonic presence of Muslims raises issues similar to their visual presence in the secular public sphere (in particular in Europe) which has been subjected to stigmatizing (media) representations and governmental policies seeking to regulate and circumscribe them. Most European countries today forbid, for instance, the diffusion of the call to prayer outside mosques. ‘Screaming’ Muslims during street demonstrations, notably shouting religious slogans, are frequently shown in the media to underscore the danger of political Islam. Islamic music practices, on the other side, seem at times to be worthy of government funding, in the desire to shape particular Muslim subjectivities.

This event then wants to think through the conundrums posed not only by the visible but also by the sonic presence of Muslims in the West. It aims at understanding the issues at stake of the sensing, and more particular listening body, in connection to secular-liberal governance by post-Christian nation-states. Starting from the insights that sound and listening invoke a particular sensory register that simultaneously acts at the corporeal level and shapes subjectivites (Nancy) and that sound is “inscribed from the start within the panoply of power” (Attali), we want to tackle several questions: What does the emerging and quickly evolving Islamic soundscape and their interlinked listening practices in the West tell us about new (ethical) Muslim subjectivities? How does this relate to the ways in which sonic experiences affect the body? What kind of transformation occurs when these new practices leave the protected space of the counter-public sphere? How can these Islamic sound practices be submitted to governmental regimes? To what extent are sound policies implemented in order to securize the Western (European) secular (post-Christian) hegemonic project?

Program:

The program of summer school consists of both extensive lectures on the themes of the summer school and master-classes. These will be, organized by the senior scholars, with the latter allowing fora more thorough and interactive discussion of the themes. This will provide the participants with a context to discuss their own research linked to the theoretical and conceptual approaches mentioned above. A list of literature will be available to the participants in advance. We also intend to organize an Islamic music and poetry event which participants can attend.

The three days summer school is followed by a one-day workshop on the same topic to which a few additional researchers will be invited. All participants will be able to attend the workshop; some will also be invited to present their work there. At some of the events guests may be present.

Confirmed Lecturers to date:

Martin Stokes, Oxford; Deborah Kapchan, NYU; Veit Erlman, University of Austin, TX, Brian Larkin, Barnard/Columbia

Application and Fees:

Participation in the autumn school is limited to 20. Our target is (advanced) MA students, PhD candidates and post-doctoral fellows. Applicants commit themselves to actively participate in the full program. In order to apply, please provide a cover letter with motivation for applying, a CV and a one page abstract of your current research project.

Participants are required to pay a fee of 150 Euros, after receiving notice that they have been selected. This covers the lectures, master classes and the seminar, as well as coffee, tee and lunch meals. In exceptional cases, those without financial support can ask for a waiver. Participants need to organize their own accommodation. A list of (cheap) hotels will be provided.

Dead-line for applications is August 20, 2010.

For further questions, please contact Jeanette Jouili:  mcpamsterdam@gmail.com

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Europe and Islam: Dutch elections – Have the Dutch become intolerant?

Posted on June 12th, 2010 by martijn.
Categories: anthropology, Headline, Multiculti Issues.

The results are in
Recently voters in Switzerland issued a stop of the construction of minarets. In Italy, a Muslim woman wearing the niqab was fined for it. Belgium and France are trying to illegalize and stigmatize the burka and niqab. And the Dutch had the elections. There are many reports about ‘right wing Wilders” breakthrough, the major shift to the right. The conservative liberals (VVD) won the elections with (only) 31 out of 150 seats, the social-democrats  (PvdA) won 30 seats, the radical populist anti-Islam Party for Freedom (PVV) of Geert Wilders managed to earn 24 seats (earlier 9) and the christian-democrats (CDA)  fell back from 41 to 21 seats resulting in the end of prime minister Balkenende. The progressive liberals of D66 (see here for more on the term liberal in Dutch politics), the populist Socialist Party (SP) lost 10 of its 25 seats, the orthodox Christian party (CU) went from 6 to 5, the fundamentalist christian party (SGP) and the Animal Party (PvdD) remained stable at two seats and the progressive liberal green party GroenLinks grew from 7 to 10.

Five remarks

1. This indeed is a major shift in Dutch politics, but not for the first in recent times. In 1994 the christian democrats also lost 20 seats (then from 54 to 34) opening the era of the purple coalition: social democrats, conservative and progressive liberals. In 2002 there was another major shift after the assassination of populist leader Fortuyn, bringing the christian-democrats back into government.
2. What we can also see from 1994 onwards is a decrease in seats for the political center: the conservative liberals, social democrats and christian-democrats. The rise of populist anti-elite and anti-multiculturalism politicians such as Fortuyn, Verdonk (former minister of integration, her party did not gain any seats i this election) and Wilders together with the Socialist Party is the result of this and strengthened it.
3. Wilders’ breakthrough is not new. His popularity and anti-islam ideology have grown out of a paradoxical development in the 1990s whereby religion and ethnicity were increasingly seen as private issues while at the same time along a broad political spectrum questions arised about the lack of social cohesion in society due to cultural diversity. Conservative VVD leader Bolkestein was the first to publicly address the issue of Islam in 1991 and its alleged incompatibility with Western culture. After him it was populist leader Fortuyn who rised to the occasion just before 9/11 but after having published his book Against the Islamization of the Netherlands already in 1996. The social democrats by that had also become more focused on culture and religion as impediments for integration and social cohesion from 2000 onwards.
4. Fortuyn and Wilders did not emerge out of the traditional radical right wing parties although there is some overlap between their constituencies. They are therefore not connected with a nationalist, racist and xenophobic tradition that has had a relatively small group of supporters since World War II. In fact both strongly condemn racism, intolerance and discrimination (which is not the same as saying that they love migrants of course) and Wilders has strong philosemitic agenda. Ian Buruma suggests Fortuyn and Wilders are better perceived as the radical offspring of the reformists in the sixties. The sixties have brought many freedoms and relieved the Dutch from the burden of religion but also is perceived as the cause of losing a sense of identity because of the relavist nature of the 1960s. Wilders, and Fortuyn before him, try to revive a sense of pride about Dutch culture in a utopian way whereby Dutch culture is viewed as everything that Islam is not: peaceful, tolerant, committed to freedom of speech and sexual freedoms.
5. Although migration and integration were not dominant issues during the campaign, the first analysis show that the issue was important for most people who did vote for Wilders. But it was certainly not the only reason. Wilders has broadened his agenda against the background of economic reforms proposed by many other other parties such as the VVD; here they are more conservative and aiming at protecting the existing status quo in favour of the ‘common man’. And I think, more than other parties, they had a positive message. The last days of the campaign the PVV presented itself as the party for hope and optimism. I think this is important because in the Dutch Ethnobarometer research a few years ago it appeared that even people from the left opted for voting Wilders because they saw him as someone who could solve their problems and the problems Dutch society was facing, while seeing no credible leader on the left. These problems did not only pertain to multiculturalism and Islam but also to a political elite who appeared to be unaccountable for their mistakes (while giving way to migrants), the EU integration (and the loss of sovereignty of the Netherlands somehow extended to a loss of sovereignty of their personal lives) and so on.

Attributing Wilders’ victory to a rise of Dutch intolerance (although that may be the case) means therefore neglecting a trend that has been going on for more than a decade now and the variety in people’s motives for voting for him. It also neglects the fact that other parties have been subjected to the same trend as well while there exists at the same time a broad opposition in Dutch society against the PVV and Wilders. A recent debate after the elections is typical for both the similarities and differences of the PVV and other parties. After the elections it appeared that people discovered that the PVV proposed an ethnic registration for all citizens (except natives and including Antillians (I have written about it earlier but it took a sports journalist on TV to make the public aware of this…). Moreover, it is already standard practice that newborns from people with at least one allochtoneous (migrant) parent are registered as being allochtone (from foreign soil).

Earlier however the social democratic minister of the interior proposed an ethnic registration for criminals. While the PVV is more blunt and generalizing, the social democrats have taken up the same logic in tackling problems in society with migrants.

The logic of culture talk

What is clearly apparent in the Dutch case is that the perception of conflict follows the logic of ‘culture talk’. This means people have a sense of how the relationship between conflict and identity is created namely that putting people with different identities together, in particular the fault line between Muslim and non-Muslim, is responsible for creating competition and tension between the two groups. People seem to understand ethno-religious conflict as primarily ethno-religious in its cause and nature. The perceived differences between Muslims and non-Muslims appear to offer the explanation of the (expectation of) conflict. This resembles the ‘clash of civilization’ (Huntington 1997) where ethnic and/or religious groups are treated as homogenous, clearly demarcated groups and where the basis of conflicts lies in ethno-cultural realities. The dichotomy used here between Muslims and non-Muslims means that it is the individuals who are seen as part of the Muslim-group who have the apparently great depth of cultural attachment, loyalty to an (ancestral) community and a sacred tie that binds them. The others are lumped together under the concept of non-Muslims that is more or less an empty concept and is never defined (only by that which is not Islamic).

The logic of ‘culture talk’ with regards to the relationship between Muslim and non-Muslims is based upon three premises:

1. Cultural essentialism: Seeing human beings as ‘cultural’, the bearers of a distinct, bounded and homogeneous culture, which defines them and differentiates them from others.
2. Islam as an extreme, exceptional case
3. Anxiety: There is an anxiety about people’s loss of cultural values and a threat to their individual and collective lifestyles among minorities and majorities.

One of the most outspoken politicians using the logic of ‘culture talk’ as part of her rhetoric is Ayaan Hirsi Ali. Her recent book Nomad provides an excellent example of how Islam is perceived within this logic:
Hirsi Ali, Berman, and Ramadan on Islam : The New Yorker

she reminds her readers of the West’s tradition of intellectual revolt against clerical tyranny and warns of the insidious, intransigent enemies in their midst. “The Muslim mind today seems to be in the grip of jihad,” she writes.

She is not hopeful that Americans will heed her warning. Her initial job interviews in the United States were discouraging: the Brookings Institution, she writes, worried that she might offend Arab Muslims. (The conservative American Enterprise Institute, however, immediately appointed her as a fellow.) On college campuses, Muslim students accuse her of wanting to “trash” Islam, while Western feminists, convinced that white men are “the ultimate and only oppressors,” lack the “courage or clarity of vision” to help her knock down the mental “hovels” of the East. Pointing to Major Nidal Malik Hasan’s murderous rampage in Texas, last November, she deplores the “conspiracy to ignore the religious motivation for these killings” in America.

Muslims today, Hirsi Ali believes, must be forced to choose between the darkness of Islam and the light of the modern secular West.

Hirsi Ali and Wilders are part of a transnational discourse can be identified in the writings of, for example, Oriana Fallaci and a number of other (liberal) writers such as Paul Berman, Martin Amis, Christopher Hitchens and Bernard Henry-Levy. A whole genre of books written by liberals displaying their (essentialist) criticism towards an Islam that transcended its traditional national boundaries and today threatens European ‘tolerance’ and ‘freedom’ has emerged. They envision a sort of ‘cold war’ in which Europe in particular has to be defended against Islam and especially against Islamism, threatening the secular liberal values and freedoms of society. This discourse ties tolerance and freedom to a European lifestyle that is opposed to what is perceived as an Islamic lifestyle. It is very clear that this cultural logic has found its way into people’s lives and that they effect people’s identity and social relations and practices. How this actually works and what tactics are taken up by Muslims to respond and ‘use’ them in order to resist, accommodate or re-appropiate the public discourse on Islam and the strategies of national institutions, and how they turn these everyday experiences into public issues again (if they do), are matters that are poorly understood however and I hope I can do some research into that in the near future.

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Pedagogiek – De moskee als partner in het onderwijs

Posted on June 1st, 2010 by martijn.
Categories: [Online] Publications, anthropology, Gouda Issues, Important Publications, My Research.

Kan een moskee een partner zijn voor het voortgezet onderwijs? Dit onderwerp komt aan bod in een special van het Tijdschrift Pedagogiek. Dit themanummer is gebaseerd op de jarenlange praktijk in Gouda waar moskee An Nour een project verzorgde voor schoolloopbaanbegeleiding voor Marokkaans-Nederlandse en (later ook) autochtone Nederlandse jongens en meisjes. In dit nummer aandacht voor de debatten en conflicten door voortkwamen uit de samenwerking van deze moskee met jeugdhulpverleningsinstelling RCJ/Het Woonhuis en Goudse scholen. Vanuit antropologische, rechtsfilosofische, ethiek en godsdienstfilosofie invalshoeken wordt gereflecteerd over deze specifieke pedagogische casus.

De artikelen zijn gratis te downloaden:

Pedagogiek online

Artikelenserie
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1. Inleiding: De moskee als partner in het onderwijs? Siebren Miedema, Doret de Ruyter, Martijn de Koning
2. Moskee An Nour, Edien Bartels, Martijn de Koning

In dit artikel wordt de centrale casus weergegeven aan de hand van een reconstructie van de debatten en dilemma’s van het schoolloopbaanbeleidingsproject van moskee An Nour en RCJ/Het Woonhuis. Dit programma was zeer succesvol voor Marokkaans-Nederlandse jongeren. Moskee An Nour was een sociaal betrokken moskee al ver voordat er enige oproep was hieromtrent. De ontwikkelingen rondom deze moskee zijn niet alleen van belang voor Nederland, maar vormen een casus is die exemplarisch is voor de vele discussies omtrent de scheiding kerk-staat, religie in het publieke domein, sociaal-economische achterstanden van migrantenjongeren en de positie van islam in de samenleving. Deze casus brengt tevens enkele specifieke kwesties aan het licht die te maken hebben met de bureaucratische standaarden van het jongerenwerk. Die ontwikkelingen en kwesties vormen het uitgangspunt voor de reflectie in de hierop volgende artikelen.

3. Over de betekenis van vrijheid van godsdienst en de scheiding van kerk/moskee en staat – Arend Soeteman
4. Integreren is identiteit inleveren!? – Bert Musschenga
5. Integratie? Een pleidooi voor een alternatieve cultuurvisie – André Droogers
6. Verschil in mensbeeld – Henk Vroom

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Reflectie op publieke sociaal-wetenschappelijke kennis

Posted on May 1st, 2010 by martijn.
Categories: anthropology, Headline, ISIM/RU Research, Method, My Research, Some personal considerations.

Logboek november 2002
Jawad: Wie denk je wel niet dat je bent? Jij zegt, ja ik weet, ik snap, ik snap wat je bedoelt. Nou, je weet helemaal niks! Jij hebt niet te maken met racisme! Mensen kijken niet raar naar jou als je een winkel binnenkomt! Mensen kijken je niet aan van, daar gaat weer een terrorist. Je weet niks! Misschien ben je nog wel erger dan al die racisten. Je bent maar een witte autochtoon die ons wil vertellen hoe de dingen in elkaar zitten en rommelt met ons hoofd!

1. Inleiding
Van 1999 tot en met 2005 heb ik als coördinator en begeleider gewerkt bij de huiswerkbegeleiding en andere sociaal-culturele activiteiten in moskee An Nour in Gouda. In die periode heb ik ook mijn onderzoek verricht naar de wijze waarop Marokkaans-Nederlandse jongeren in Gouda hun moslimidentiteit construeren. Jawad is één van mijn sleutelinformanten in de moskee. Hij doet bovenstaande uitspraken tijdens een verhitte discussie met enkele Marokkaans-Nederlandse collega’s van RCJ/Het Woonhuis (een jeugdhulpverleningsinstelling die samenwerkte met moskee An Nour) en mij over uitlatingen van Hirsi Ali. Hij en de andere Marokkaans-Nederlandse collega’s wilden van mij weten of ik het met hem eens was en aan wiens kant ik stond: de moslims of de Nederlanders. Ik stelde mij op het standpunt dat ik als coördinator en onderzoeker niet wil kiezen en eigenlijk ook vindt dat er geen keuze gemaakt hoeft te worden. Op het moment dat ik na herhaald aandringen expliciet weiger om een keuze te maken wordt Jawad boos.

Zijn uitbarsting komt op een moment dat het islamdebat in Nederland in volle hevigheid woedt. De aanslagen op 11 september 2001, de verkiezingscampagne met Pim Fortuyn (en zijn moord), de bedreigingen tegen Hirsi Ali en de aanslagen op Bali hebben de verhouding tussen moslims en niet-moslims op scherp gesteld. Begrippen als cultuur en identiteit hebben in een dergelijke situatie een politieke lading doordat ze gebruikt worden door politici, opinieleiders en religieuze leiders om mensen uit te sluiten of juist in te sluiten. Uit het fragment blijkt dat hij mij op verschillende manieren ziet als buitenstaander. Allereerst gaat het daarbij om de ervaringen die hij zou hebben en ik niet. Tegelijkertijd categoriseert Jawad mij als ‘witte autochtoon’. Jawad geeft aan dat hij mij wantrouwt en hij trekt in twijfel of ik eigenlijk wel enige kennis heb over het onderwerp van mijn onderzoek: de constructie van moslimidentiteit door Marokkaanse-Nederlandse jongens en meisjes in Gouda. De wijze waarop Jawad mij categoriseert levert informatie op over de ontwikkelingen in de onderzoeksgroep, maar roept ook vragen op over de geldigheid van het materiaal dat ik via mijn onderzoek produceer. Is de kennis die ik verzamel inderdaad beïnvloed door mijn aanwezigheid, het feit dat ik met hun ‘hoofd rommel’ en dus vanalles oproep? Is mijn kennis inderdaad beperkt of vertekend doordat ik niet te maken heb met racisme of doordat ik een witte autochtone Nederlander ben?

Omgekeerd komt het natuurlijk voor bijvoorbeeld in een reactie op het artikel van Linda Duits over Wilders’ vrouwonvriendelijkheid:
Wilders misbruikt vrouwen | DeJaap

Het is volgens mij algemeen bekend hoe ontstellend variabel menselijke interpretatie van zelfs de simpelste beelden, woorden en geluiden is. De historie staat bol van de gruwelijkste misdaden die als onschuldig verschil van mening begonnen. Wat geeft je in vredesnaam het idee dat je op een eenduidige manier naar een beladen filmpje als Fitna kunt kijken, en dat ‘wetenschap’ te noemen? Het is natuurlijk leuk om Wilders een hak te zetten, en net zoals elke politicus moeten ook zijn uitspraken zorgvuldig worden getoetst aan objectieve gegevens; maar mijn hemel zeg, doe het in het vervolg alsjeblieft daarmee en niet met zo’n gekleurde bril.

En ook in een recente discussie naar aanleiding van een stuk van Joep Smaling werd ze er weer fijntjes aan herinnerd:
Ultralinkse socioloog weigert weg te kijken | DeJaap

Als ik wel reageer, wordt dat gezien als genuanceerd willen theedrinken; als ik niet reageer, onttrek ik me aan het debat en trek in me terug in de ivoren toren. ‘Damned if you do, damned if you don’t’ noem je dat. Toen ik dit voorlegde aan mijn mederedactieleden, werd ik bedolven onder precies de bespotting die ik vreesde. Nuanceren is – zo werd mij uitgelegd –een manier van geïndoctrineerde, gesubsidieerde sociaalwetenschappers om feiten te negeren dan wel te ontkennen. Het is grachtengordel-correctheid van ideaaltypische oud-linkse wegkijksoosjologen die niet verder komen dan drie vierkante meter beschermde ruimte rondom de Universiteit van Amsterdam. Zijdelings werd ik beticht van het in het zadel houden van een religieus-orthodox patriarchaat; uiteindelijk werd ik vooral beschuldigd van arrogantie vanwege het claimen van moreel gelijk.

Het recente sharia-onderzoek uitgevoerd door Laurens Bakker e.a. was zo’n voorbeeld. Zowel de redactie als Geenstijl.nl, journalist Carel Brendel en diverse andere bloggers en reaguurders waren ervan overtuigd dat ik de onderzoeker was van het onderzoek en daarmee was het onderzoek per definitie niks: als salafistenknuffelaar, links, Radboud communist moest ik wel de waarheid wel verdoezelen. Dat niemand van hen ook maar de moeite nam om het ook eens aan mij te vroegen, doet er niet veel toe. In dit stuk ga ik in op het onbehagen ten opzichte van sociaal-wetenschappelijk onderzoek, de (twijfels omtrent de) geldigheid ervan en de rol van wetenschappers.

2. Geldigheid van sociaal-wetenschappelijk onderzoek

De voorbeelden laten zien dat de vraag die Jawad aan mij stelde: ‘Wie denk je wel niet dat je bent? is van groot belang voor de geldigheid van antropologisch onderzoek en eigenlijk voor ieder sociaal-wetenschappelijk onderzoek. De vraag raakt namelijk niet alleen aan mijn positie en mijn eigen identiteit in het veld. De vraagt komt op in een situatie waarin Marokkaanse Nederlanders in de media en door politici in toenemende mate als moslims gecategoriseerd worden, waarbij steeds vaker een wij-zij discours de verhoudingen tussen moslims en niet-moslims bepaalt. In hoeverre is het materiaal dat is verzameld ook ingebed in dat discours? Is het construeren van een moslimidentiteit in 2005 (aan het einde van mijn onderzoek) nog wel hetzelfde proces als in 1999 (het begin van mijn onderzoek)? Heeft de centrale vraag van het onderzoek (hoe construeren Marokkaans-Nederlandse jongens en meisjes in Gouda hun moslimidentiteit?) nog wel dezelfde betekenis in deze snel veranderende omstandigheden? Al deze zaken kunnen van invloed zijn op de geldigheid van het onderzoek omdat ze gevolgen hebben voor de mate waarin gegevens, begrippen, beschrijvingen en analyses een goede weergave vormen van de sociale werkelijkheid van de onderzoeksgroep.

Calhoun | Public Sphere Forum

The truths are held to be certain, settled, and independent of context or formulation. Especially since Thomas Kuhn’s classic The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, however, this presumption has been widely treated with skepticism or rejected. Even those who disagree with particulars of Kuhn’s argument mostly recognize the importance of his central point: that “truths” are formulated and stabilized within scientific paradigms that allow for the “normal science” of effective testing of propositions and elaboration of theories, but that revolutionary breakthroughs in science often derive from growing recognition of contradictions and aporias within these paradigms, which in turn they shatter and replace.[4] This is not an argument against truth or for an anything goes relativism. But it is an argument for seeing science as a historical process, always open-ended in ways large as well as small. And this in turn is an argument for a more democratic vision of science, one in which possession of current “truths” is less of a trump card for certified experts to play in relation to lay people.

Social scientists engaging public questions need to offer truth. If scholarly knowledge has no authority, if it doesn’t provide good reasons to believe that some courses of action are better than others, or riskier, or less reliable, then it doesn’t have a distinctive value. But the authority of scholarly knowledge isn’t and can’t be perfect. Science is, after all, in large part a process of learning from errors, not just a process of accumulating truths. And especially in social science, truths are often highly contextual and conditional, predictions of what is more or less likely under certain circumstances, not statements of absolute and unvarying causal relationships. Social scientists bring real knowledge, but inevitably incomplete knowledge. The truths of social science are, moreover, graspable in different ways. They have to be communicated and this always means rendering them in ways that foreground certain aspects more than others, that illuminate some dimensions and leave others in the shadows. Knowledge is part of culture, not easily and fully abstractable from the rest of culture. But it is partly through the effort to communicate knowledge to non-specialists that researchers (like teachers) see new implications of what they know, new dimensions to issues they thought they understood fully, and sometimes limits to their own grasp of what they thought were established truths.

De oude positie waarbij de onderzoeker als het ware onzichtbaar was gedurende het onderzoek en zijn/haar objectieve resultaat presenteert als de waarheid, wordt binnen het etnografisch onderzoek bijna niet meer aangehangen. Er is nu meer aandacht voor subjectiviteit, de interactie met de onderzochten, machtsprocessen en de context waarbinnen het onderzoek plaatsvindt, met veel kritische aandacht voor de waarheidsclaim van de onderzoeker. De vraag daarbij is onder meer of datgene wat de onderzoeker laat zien niet een weerspiegeling is van zijn/haar achtergrond en wereldbeeld.

Reflectie kan gezien worden als een extra middel om de betrouwbaarheid van de onderzoeksgegevens te toetsen en de geldigheid ervan te verhogen. Vaak staat in een dergelijke reflectie de onderzoeker centraal. Het gaat om de bewuste en onbewuste motieven en achtergronden van de onderzoeker. Daarmee is deze zelfreflexiviteit niet meer dan een poging om de onderzoeker als objectieve wetenschapper boven het onderzoeksveld uit te tillen. In de oude objectief-positivistische onderzoekstraditie stond de onderzoeker onzichtbaar buiten het veld van onderzoek. In de kwalitatieve en reflexieve traditie wordt de onderzoeker zichtbaar. De eenzijdige focus op de onderzoeker verhult echter dat kwalitatief onderzoek een relationeel proces is: de onderzoeker gaat een relatie aan met de onderzoeksgroep en is daar slechts één van de spelers. Het moet gaan om een reflectie op de relatie tussen de onderzoeker en onderzochten en niet (alleen) om reflectie op de onderzoeker. Deze reflectie is noodzakelijk om processen te analyseren die van invloed zijn op het onderzoeksmateriaal zoals insluiting en uitsluiting, veranderingen en bredere maatschappelijke omstandigheden.

Reflectie is derhalve belangrijk, maar daarmee is nog niet aangetoond hoe reflectie een bijdrage kan leveren aan de analyse en daarmee aan de geldigheid van het onderzoek. Geldigheid heeft betrekking op de overeenstemming van de bevindingen in het onderzoek met de werkelijkheid. Zeker met betrekking tot etnografisch onderzoek zijn er de nodige vraagtekens te plaatsen of geldiger resultaten worden bereikt in vergelijking met meer positivistische onderzoeken, terwijl er ook onderzoekers zijn die beweren dat juist etnografisch onderzoek de meest geldige gegevens oplevert. Dit is niet de plaats om te beslissen wat nu de meest geldige methode is, wel zijn er met betrekking tot kwalitatief onderzoek enkele uitdagingen als het gaat om geldigheid. Wanneer met geldigheid bedoeld wordt dat de onderzoeker de werkelijkheid juist representeert, dan spelen in onderzoek dat over langere tijd plaatsvindt veranderingen een cruciale rol. Zo kunnen er veranderingen optreden in de betekenis van bepaalde begrippen (zoals identiteit) en kunnen respondenten in het onderzoek ook veranderen (zeker in het geval van jongeren). De kleine setting waarin een kwalitatief onderzoeker zich begeeft, bemoeilijkt ook het vertalen van de onderzoeksresultaten naar bredere populaties. Niettemin blijft geldigheid naar mijn mening een belangrijke zaak voor kwalitatief onderzoek.

Het vaststellen van de geldigheid van onderzoeksresultaten in mijn onderzoek betekent niet dat het gaat om het vaststellen van de geldigheid van één centraal discours in de constructie van een moslimidentiteit, of om het vaststellen of de opvattingen over moslimidentiteit in overeenstemming zijn met een normatieve islam en Nederlandse cultuur, maar om het creëren van een plausibele representatie van de verschillende manieren waarop jongeren (in mijn onderzoek althans) zoeken naar een ‘zuivere’ islam.

3. In het veld

Het verrichten van veldwerk betekent dat een onderzoeker een relatie aangaat met mensen uit de onderzoeksgroep en deelgenoot wordt van processen die zich in die groep afspelen en van allerlei lokale, nationale en internationale ontwikkelingen die daar een rol bij spelen. Een onderzoeker kan zich daar niet aan onttrekken, maar dit dient deze zichtbaar te maken om op die manier verantwoording af te leggen over het onderzoeksresultaat. Juist in een in een zeer gepolitiseerde situatie kan de positie en achtergrond van een onderzoeker grote consequenties hebben voor allerlei processen van insluiting en uitsluiting en wordt tevens de vraag opgeroepen in hoeverre de wijze waarop een onderzoeker de sociale werkelijkheid interpreteert, beïnvloed is door die processen en dominante discoursen. Zeker nu begrippen als cultuur, identiteit en radicalisering zo sterk ideologisch geladen zijn dat ze direct van invloed zijn op de uitkomsten van een onderzoek en onderzoekers zich daar zelf ook moeilijk aan kunnen onttrekken, is reflectie op de geldigheid van de uitkomsten noodzakelijk.

De relatie tussen geldigheid en reflectie komt neer op de vraag waarom een onderzoek bepaalde uitkomsten heeft. De wijze waarop jongeren mij categoriseren bepaalt de toegang tot het onderzoeksveld, bepaalt mede welke informatie zij mij wilden geven (bijvoorbeeld een positief beeld over de islam en over zichzelf als vrome moslims) en maakt mij ook onderdeel van allerlei interne verwikkelingen. Deze reflectie dient niet alleen betrekking te hebben op de achtergronden van de onderzoeker, maar vooral op de relatie tussen onderzoeker en onderzoeksgroep. In een tijd waarin het onderwerp van het onderzoek een extra lading krijgt door allerlei gebeurtenissen en het publieke debat, heeft de categorisering door de onderzoeksgroep een grote invloed op de wijze waarop materiaal kan worden verzameld en ook op de inhoud van dat materiaal en hoe het materiaal kan worden gelezen. Categoriseringen zijn niet per definitie exclusief, maar de politisering van islam en de polarisatie tussen moslims en niet-moslims, kan daartoe wel leiden. Dit heeft als consequentie gehad dat ik als onderzoeker te maken kreeg met vragen over mijn loyaliteit. Ook hoogoplopende interne conflicten (al dan niet beïnvloed door het publieke debat) dragen daar aan bij. Dergelijke aspecten negeren doet afbreuk aan de wetenschappelijke en maatschappelijke relevantie van de uitkomsten van het onderzoek. Sterker nog, het is deze reflectie in combinatie met een systematische, wetenschappelijk gefundeerde methode en onderzoek geïnformeerd door theoretische modellen en verklaringen, die maakt dat sociaal-wetenschappelijke kennis gezaghebbend is. Die combinatie zorgt er namelijk voor dat sociaal-wetenschappelijke kennis ‘truth value’ heeft. De waarheden van sociaal-wetenschappelijk onderzoek mogen weliswaar beperkt zijn, onder de nodige voorbehouden staan en in verschillende omstandigheden op verschillende manieren uitgedrukt kunnen worden, maar ze geven wel een meer accurate en beter begrip geven van de wereld om ons heen dan andere. Sociaal-wetenschappelijke kennis over islam, jongerencultuur, politieke processen is plausibeler dan vele andere verklaringen over dergelijke en andere fenomenen. Het is juist de twijfel, de reflectie en de wetenschappelijke discussies over onderzoek die wetenschappelijk onderzoek beter maken. Duits stelt terecht dat de gewone man daar niet altijd zicht op heeft en dus veel studies ook niet op waarde kan schatten. In het geval van de islam en moslims: veel lezen in de krant, het bezoeken van het Midden-Oosten, positieve of negatieve ervaringen met moslims, maakt u nog niet tot een deskundige over ontwikkelingen met betrekking tot islam in Europa of onder moslims in Europa.

4. Tot slot: Het onbehagen over sociaal-wetenschappelijk onderzoek

Het gaat denk ik nog een stap verder zoals ik recent ook betoogde in een post over de kleine recente cartoonaffaire:
C L O S E R » Blog Archive » Cartoonesque 15 – Muhammad Cartoons and Public Anthropology

I think, or like to believe anyway, that this is exactly what I’m doing and this is also exactly what is unsettling about anthropological research. I try to move back and forth in a world that is for some people dominated by us vs. them and therefore as a native man I transgress the boundaries of ‘us’. The fact that in the video I did not defend ‘freedom of speech’ against acts of ‘radical’ imams (although the team of Islaam.tv knows my views about it) or at least was not clear about own position probably contributed to that feeling of uneasiness, the fear that I secretly belong to ‘the other side’ or even the conviction that I am (which according to some makes me a ‘traitor’). For example in another post I questioned a British research about the Muslim Arbitrage Tribunals in the UK. I stated that regulating Islamic arbitration might be a good idea in order to monitor such practices and prevent problems but that religious arbitration (even when regulated) also has several problems attached to it. This comment contributed to the idea that I was in favour of sharia courts in the Netherlands, full stop. Hence, the comment quoted in the beginning of this post. What is a position of distance to me, for them is an attack and for those who objected to the cartoons it was a sign of neutral comments or maybe even friendly towards Muslims. This does not make public anthropology any easier but it does make it more necessary and relevant as Jovan Maud also stated at Culture Matters. And indeed, it will not give anthropologists a high ranking in popularity contests.

Een belangrijke taak van een sociaal-wetenschapper die zijn/haar publieke taak ook serieus neemt, is het publiekelijk ter discussie stellen van ‘aangename waarheden’: waarheden die mensen vanzelfsprekend vinden en comfortabel omdat het hen in staat stelt hun leven te leiden zonder al te pijnlijke vragen te moeten stellen. Een wetenschapper moet de vraag kunnen stellen waarom de overheid en opinieleiders het noodzakelijk vinden bepaalde groepen moslims als ‘radicaal’ te bestempelen zonder de door hun aangedragen verklaringen (ze zijn gevaarlijk, bedreigen de democratische orde, enz.) voor lief aan te nemen. De wetenschapper dient juist de eigen samenleving kritisch onder de loep te nemen ook al vind het publiek deze vragen (laat staan de antwoorden) onprettig of zelfs ronduit gevaarlijk. Als wetenschappers het dan ook nog eens onderling oneens zijn hierover, is dat natuurlijk nog eens oncomfortabeler. Het slechtste antwoord wat de wetenschapper hierop kan geven is het zich opsluiten in de ivoren toren; juist het naar buiten treden levert betere sociaal-wetenschappelijke kennis op.

Dit betekent overigens wel dat een wetenschapper zich bewust dient te zijn van zijn/haar publieke rol. Het onbehagen ten opzichte van veel sociaal-wetenschappelijk onderzoek (dat tegen de eigen mening en waarheden van de individuele burger ingaat) is niet alleen terug te voeren op een gebrek aan erkenning onder de burgers. Het is ook het onvermogen van veel wetenschappers om in begrijpelijke taal te communiceren over hun eigen onderzoek, om zich te verdiepen in dat onbehagen van de burger zonder gelijk een en ander te veroordelen en het gebrek aan waardering en erkenning voor wetenschappers die wel een publieke taak op zich durven te nemen.

Dit stuk is een bewerking van:

“’Wie denk je wel niet dat je bent?’ Etnografisch onderzoek onder moslimjongeren in Gouda.” Kwalon. Tijdschrift voor Kwalitatief Onderzoek 13(1): 81-96. 2008

Over de controverse op DeJaap.nl tussen Joep Smaling en Linda Duits zal donderdag as. nog een stukje verschijnen.

Later dit jaar vindt er op de Radboud Universiteit een internationale workshop plaats over sociale wetenschappen (antropologie) en publiciteit.

4 comments.

Cartoonesque 15 – Muhammad Cartoons and Public Anthropology

Posted on March 27th, 2010 by martijn.
Categories: anthropology, Blogosphere, ISIM/RU Research, Public Islam.

By Carel Brendel

Also on the side of Fawaz (a salafi imam, MdK) is religion researcher Martijn de Koning, anthropologist at Radboud University. Minister Hirsch Ballin trusted Radboud University to do research on sharia courts in the Netherlands. I hope Martijn de Koning is not conducting this research because one might as well let Willem Holleeder (a well known convicted leader of organized crime, MdK) do research about organized crime.

Note: all translations of Dutch quotes are mine.
As an anthropologist on Muslim youth, Salafism, public Islam, radicalization and multicultural issues I think it is important to take up a role in public as well. As I have explained earlier:C L O S E R » Blog Archive » Public Anthropology – 10 Years from Researchpages to Closer (1999/2000 – 2009/2010)

public science and addressing public issues is not just giving answers to questions the public has. It is as much, or even more, about questioning why particular issues are addressed in the way they are addressed by particular people and what the consequences of that are. How are particular issues and the way they are debated related to (changing) historical and cultural contexts, what is taken-for-granted and what does it mean?

Now as my regular readers now, last week in the Netherlands we had a mini-cartoon crisis after the publication of one of the Muhammad cartoons by a Dutch newspaper in a story about an alleged terrorist plot against Swedish cartoonist Lars Vilks. A group of Muslims protested against it and the newspaper withdrew the cartoon because they no longer deemed it relevant to publish it. Other newspapers, websites and magazines reported this withdrawal and with it published the same cartoon. This was followed by another action by the same Muslim group. One of their actions was a second video in which Salafi imam Fawaz appeared with several others, including myself.

This yielded a lot of criticism even more so because the comment above was copied by Dutch shocklog (yes that is me in the picture! like the blouse too?) in order to disqualify me:
GeenStijl : ZondagMiddagEssay: Carel Brendel over de CartoonRel

dr Martijn de Koning, the Albert Verlinde (A Dutch gossip king, MdK) van Islam.TV

.
It seems that my appearance on that video makes a me a ‘dhimmi‘ similar the newspaper AD for removing the cartoon after complaints:
The Dhimmi News From the Netherlands

This video would almost be as hilarious as a Monty Python sketch, if it were not deadly serious. No one in the video rejects the death threats against Lars Vilks, nor, most importantly, do they reject the Muslim plot to murder him.
[…]
Daily Standard comments in their article “Cowardly internet editors ofAlgemeen Dagblad remove Muhammad-cartoon after complaints by hate-imam”: “Above all, by removing the cartoon the Algemeen Dagblad reveals itself to be the Dutch version of the Danish Politiken. With the only difference being that the AD yielded to only a few angry e-mails, whereas Politiken at least was waited for some Muslim violence.”

From the same site (and also at Gates of Vienna), this is a transcript of my contribution:
The Dhimmi News From the Netherlands

01:16.00 I think the way this business is going now is a typical example of…
01:20.00 how the debate on Islam now taking shape in the Netherlands, especially also…
01:24.00 with these cartoons.
01:28.00 The AD [Algemeen Dagblad] has posted it. You may indeed wonder why…
01:32.00 and whether in any case they considered at all why they had…
01:36.00 to post that cartoon. Islam.tv and others have responded to it…
01:40.00 and partly as a result, AD removed this cartoon…
01:45.00 and now the AD gets the blame for having removed the cartoon.
01:50.00 In this way freedom of speech is placed against freedom…
01:54.00 of religion, in which the posting of this cartoon…
01:58.00 in fact only has one purpose, namely to teach the other, …
02:02.00 in this case the Muslim, a lesson about who in this country…
02:06.00 is the boss. Nah, you might wonder whether that…
02:10.00 is the meaning of freedom of speech or freedom of eh… religion.

Now according to some this is no less then a plea to limit the freedom of speech (and therefore to make that freedom void) or even more so a plea for preventive censorship. I don’t want to go into that because I think I have clarified my position already in a previous post (Cartoonesque 14), where you also can find more information about this whole event. I want to adress a few issues here that I think are relevant for debates about public anthropology.

1. First of all, it is (and should) be clear that the video of Islaam.tv was part of their campaign against these cartoons. So why did I appear in that? Well to begin with a reject the notion of ‘guilt by association’  and if I was asked for example by Elsevier to comment upon them publishing the cartoon I would have said the same. A possible appearance in that magazine does not imply that I’m in favour of publishing the cartoon (as they did), nor does my appearance in the Islaam.tv imply the opposite (and to be fair other bloggers such as Ewoud Butter and Prediker at webmagazine FrontaalNaakt recognized that and criticized me being compared to a criminal). In my opinion anyway. Of course, as said, the video was part of the campaign, and the makers of the video were very upfront about that. So I knew what I was going into. Those who have read Cartoonesque 14 carefully know that I reject the way the publication is framed by the imam (and more implicitly also stated that in the film). In the video I tried to reflect upon the issue by asking myself what does this whole chain of events say about the current Islam debate in the Netherlands. Islaam.tv gave me the opportunity to do this without any restriction or directions from their side. It should be noted that several commenters at the shocklog and also on other websites fully acknowledged that (with or without fully endorsing my view).
2. There is another good reason for me as an anthropologist to take requests such as those of Islaam.tv into consideration and to respond positively to it. The group of which Islaam.tv is part of, Muslims claiming to be part of the Salafi manhaj, is the group of my current research. The central question in this research is why do Muslims turn to Salafi sources of knowledge and take part in Salafi ‘knowledge practices’ to acquire their sense of what Islam ‘really’ is? This means I visit the mosques and other meetingplaces where lectures, courses and other types of meetings are held, I conduct formal and informal interviews with participants on a regular base and I publish in scientific magazins and editted volumes. Share my views on particular issues with them and for them is, as I see it, part as my obligation as an anthropologist. When I would by definition say no to such requests it would mean that I would not do my work properly; sharing anthropological knowledge with outsiders of the scientific community is necessary and important and people among whom I do research or about who I write are always among the first of that responsibility. So yes, next time I would seriously consider doing it again because I see it as an important part of public accountability and reciprocity.
3. What does this event tell us about the Islam debate. Most of it of course I have already explained in the video and in my previous Cartoonesque post. But also the debate about my appearance tell us something I think. The most obvious of course is the escalation of us vs. them. The representation of Islam is public seems to divide that same public in two: us (the freedom loving Dutch) vs. them (the angry easy to irritate Muslim who cares more for his God and prophet than freedom).GreenLeft know-it-all ‘Tofu’ Dibi limits freedom « indedelta.nl:
   

   Then (based upon my comments in the video, see transcript, MdK) you show that you do not get it, De Koning! Itis not about making an opposition between issues; it is about correcting the one-sided nonsens of radical Islam with reasonable arguments. It is about the fact that there are people in this country who feel that this irrational religious stuff and in particular the intolerant Islam, is ridiculous and want to share that! With the matching illustrations! In ALL freedom!

   If it is not freedom of speech vs freedom of religion than it certainly shows idea of a (radical) Islam (intolerant) or religion (irrational) vs. freedom of speech (reason, tolerance, not one-sided) whereby the latter is learning the former to become reasonable. The title of the piece (‘Tofik Dibi limits freedom) refers to a Moroccan-Dutch MP who cautioned the publishing of these cartoons and called for restrained; interpreted by the person who wrote the comment, as well as did others, as an attack on the freedom of speech or (based upon the title of the piece of the first comment of this post) ‘throwing away the DNA of the Netherlands‘ to imam Fawaz. The critique on Tofik Dibi is important because he presents himself, and is seen as such by many, as a liberal. Earlier he stated that he (re-)discovered the DNA of the Netherlands: freedom of speech, right of self-determination, non-discrimination, equality of men and women and the separation of church and state). According to his critics, he is exposed here as a tool of intolerant Islam and a supporter of radical Islam and radical Muslim community. The freedom of speech is sacred and every restriction is seen as an attack with the Muhammad Cartoons as ‘icons of freedom speech’: they symbolize as I have explained the freedom of speech. Removing them after complaints of religious Muslims is therefore an attack on the freedom of speech, making the freedom of speech even more sacred because it is under attack. Hence the headline at the shocklog about ‘solidarity’ with the newspaper and magazine who received complaints by Muslims. Freedom of speech is absolute, hence the claims of people having the right to insult. Having a closer look reveals however that the situation is more complex. Also people who hold the freedom of speech as very important for Dutch society, do sometimes agree with my viewpoints and I have received emails from Muslims who, although agreeing for a large part with my viewpoints, think it is necessary to publish these cartoons as much as possible until radical Muslims keep silent about it and also at Islaam.tv one can read several comments by non-Muslims who support their action. And again, and I cannot say it often enough, the depiction of the Netherlands as a country trapped in that us vs. them dichotomy does not do justice to the social realities out here.

4. And to close this post: what does this tell us about public anthropology? The debate about public anthropology could have been given a boost by a recent publication in American Anthropologist that featured three blogs: Savage Minds, Zero Anthropology and AAA Blogs. Unfortunately it wasn’t anything more than a crash course about blogs for the digitally challenged. Certainly the first two deserved the attention: the are the best anthropological blogs have to offer in my opinion. In fact the comments on Savage Minds‘ following the publication are more insightful about public anthropology than the article in the journal. (For a strong but fair critique read Finds and Features and Ancient World Bloggers Group.With two colleagues of mine (E.B. and D.K) I’m preparing an article for a special issue of Fieldwork in Religion about well…fieldwork and religion. The article we are writing is about the politicization of the field. What are the consequences for researchers when their research field politicizes while the research takes place. One of the themes in this article is the issue of neutrality. People want neutral researchers and for some critics simply appearing in such video is compromising my neutrality. Interestingly, for others (and not only Muslims) it increases my neutrality because I know all sides of the conflict from within: as a native citizen and as a person who frequently mingles among so-called radical Muslims. For those who see the freedom of speech as sacred and absolute, my appearance is enough to question my neutrality not only in this research but also in the sharia research of which they think I’m the researcher as well (which is not the case by the way). It appears that saying that neutrality does not exist is enough; as we conclude (as some other researchers did as well) neutrality itself appears to be subject of interpretation. This situation becomes more complicated because of how people understand anthropological research. One of the things I did for example was announce on my Twitter account that I was going to a mosque. Indeed I went to the mosque that day to attend a lecture. The notice itself was seen as a sign of islamization and me going to the mosque as a lack of distance. The very fact of trying to inmerse oneself, to observe and, as far as (ethically) possible to participate, invalidates my research according to those people. In his classic study Time and the Other: How anthropology makes its object (1983) Fabian writes:
   

   “[Anthropology] patrols, so to speak, the frontiers of western culture. In fact it has always been a Grenzwissenschaft, concerned with boundaries: those of one race against another, those between one culture and another, and finally those between culture and nature. Those liminal concerns have prevented anthropology from settling down in any one accepted domain of knowledge other than the residual field of ‘social science'”

   I think, or like to believe anyway, that this is exactly what I’m doing and this is also exactly what is unsettling about anthropological research. I try to move back and forth in a world that is for some people dominated by us vs. them and therefore as a native man I transgress the boundaries of ‘us’. The fact that in the video I did not defend ‘freedom of speech’ against acts of ‘radical’ imams (although the team of Islaam.tv knows my views about it) or at least was not clear about own position probably contributed to that feeling of uneasiness, the fear that I secretly belong to ‘the other side’ or even the conviction that I am (which according to some makes me a ‘traitor’). For example in another post I questioned a British research about the Muslim Arbitrage Tribunals in the UK. I stated that regulating Islamic arbitration might be a good idea in order to monitor such practices and prevent problems but that religious arbitration (even when regulated) also has several problems attached to it. This comment contributed to the idea that I was in favour of sharia courts in the Netherlands, full stop. Hence, the comment quoted in the beginning of this post. What is a position of distance to me, for them is an attack and for those who objected to the cartoons it was a sign of neutral comments or maybe even friendly towards Muslims. This does not make public anthropology any easier but it does make it more necessary and relevant as Jovan Maud also stated at Culture Matters. And indeed, it will not give anthropologists a high ranking in popularity contests.

3 comments.

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