AlterNet: ForeignPolicy: The Hard Truth About Suicide Bombers

AlterNet: ForeignPolicy: The Hard Truth About Suicide Bombers
The Hard Truth About Suicide Bombers

By Nichole Argo, AlterNet. Posted May 8, 2006.

Though many Americans assume otherwise, most suicide bombers are not poor, violent Muslims, as explained in this special report from MIT’s Center for International Studies.
Suicide terror has become a daily news staple. Who are these human bombs, and why are they willing to die in order to kill? Many observers turn to Islam for an explanation. They cite the preponderance of Muslim bombers today, indoctrination by extremist institutions, and the language used in jihadi statements.But these arguments fall short. At present, bombers are primarily Muslim, but this was not always so. Nor does indoctrination play a strong role in growing today’s selfselected global jihad networks. Rather, militants and bombers are propelled by social ties. And even when jihadis use the Qur’an and Sunna to frame their struggle, their justifications for violence are primarily secular and grievance-based.

So what is religion’s role? Almost 100 years ago, Emile Durkheim contended that religious ideation is born of sentiment. This is worth considering in the current context. Against the repression, alienation and political helplessness of the Muslim world, jihad speaks of individual dignity and communal power. ‘Against the Goliaths,’ martrydom says, ‘even one bursting body can make a difference.’ The Muslim street is buying it, though sometimes ambivalently. To stop the bombers of today and tomorrow, we need to figure out why.

Why Religion, and Why Not

Since 9/11, the notion that terror is bound to religious extremism has almost become an implicit assumption. This is easy to understand. If bombers were once “normal” people, then religious indoctrination could explain their fanatical behavior. Moreover, the numbers are powerful: 81 percent of suicide attacks since 1968 have occurred after 2001, with 31 out of the 35 organizations responsible being jihadi. Even the London and Bali (II) bombers who acted independently of terror organizations were Muslim. It would be difficult to deny that Islamic inspiration is at work in the motivation and mobilization of rising terror. But how? Inspiration is not causation, and a growing body of data suggests that Islamic indoctrination and belief are not the answer. Below, I audit several arguments commonly offered in support of the religious terror thesis.

1. Muslims perpetrate most of today’s terror, so most terror must be motivated by Islam.

2. Indoctrination: madrassas, mosques and terror cells manufacture suicide bombers.

3. Terrorists justify their violence with the language of Islam.

Religious beliefs do not simply mold individuals. They exist as “sets of ideas that ‘are there,’ as if on the shelves of a supermarket waiting for someone to make them their own.” Individuals pull them off the shelf when their old frames no longer make sense of the world around them.

If beliefs are not born of sacred texts alone, neither are behaviors like marytrdom. Rather, would-be bombers place jihadi values — fighting for life, dignity, equality — above all else. It is not the commandment that is sacred, but the emotional reward it bestows. We need to be asking new questions: For what are normal individuals able to kill? A plausible answer is: their community, under threat. When does a person make costly sacrifices to do so?

Within a social structure — a terror cell, a military unit, a family, or group of friends — that continually regenerates conviction to a cause, a feeling of obligation to do something about it, and a sense of shame at the idea of letting each other down. Whether one lands in a social group with jihadi tendencies may be random. But the prerequisite for this path is perceived injustice.

The social networks theory has several implications for policy. First, because commitment to jihad is rarely a cost-benefit decision, or an explicit decision at all, military deterrence will likely fail. Terrorists and insurgents forge loyalties that are difficult to betray, and like our own military units, many would prefer to fight to the death rather than leave their brothers. Second, under urban conditions of asymmetrical engagement, military missions almost inevitably entail civilian casualties. Military leaders must re-conceptualize the effect civilian casualties have on the populations surrounding the terrorist or insurgent. They are frequently interpreted by the population as offensive, and thereby engender an impulse to fight back. As one Palestinian told a reporter: “If we don’t fight, we will suffer. If we do fight, we will suffer, but so will they.”

Lastly, findings about the way in which people acquire beliefs suggest that a war of ideas will mean nothing unless it resonates emotionally with our targets. Emotional resonance only comes when the values we promote reflect our role in the local realities on foreign ground.

Read the whole article on AlterNet