C L O S E R August 2009 Archives

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Migrantenstudies – Identificatie van migrantenjongeren

Posted on August 28th, 2009 by martijn.
Categories: [Online] Publications, ISIM/RU Research, Multiculti Issues, My Research, Young Muslims, Youth culture (as a practice).

Migrantenstudies is het enige Nederlandstalige wetenschappelijke tijdschrift voor onderzoek naar migratie, etnische minderheden en de Nederlandse samenleving. Tal van onderwerpen komen aan bod zoals huisvesting, gezondheidszorg, onderwijs, arbeidsmarkt, politieke participatie, discriminatie en identiteit. Het eerste nummer van dit jaar (dat sinds kort online staat) is een thema-nummer over identificatie van migrantenjongeren.

Jongeren nemen een belangrijke plaats in het identiteitsdebat in, omdat juist van hen verwacht wordt dat zij zich met Nederland identificeren; het is het land waar ze zijn opgegroeid en vaak ook zijn geboren. Dit themanummer brengt een aantal recente studies samen over identificatie van in het bijzonder Marokkaanse en Turkse migrantenjongeren. Deze studies besteden in het bijzonder aandacht aan de wijze waarop de migrantenjongeren in de context van de huidige Nederlandse samenleving hun identiteit construeren en welke factoren daarop van invloed zijn.
Ersanili & Scholten, p. 3

In dit nummer vindt u artikelen van Han Entzinger, Inge van der Welle en Virginie Mamadouh, Evelyn Ersanili, Susan Ketner, Simone Boogaarts en ondergetekende:

Inleiding, Evelyn Ersanilli & Peter Scholten (red), pag. 2-8
Integratie, maar uit de gratie. Multi-etnisch samenleven onder Rotterdamse jongeren, Han Entzinger, pag. 8-23
Territoriale identiteiten en de identificatiestrategieën van Amsterdamse jongvolwassenen van buitenlandse afkomst. Over evenwichtskunstenaars en kleurbekenners, Inge van der Welle en Virginie Mamadouh, pag. 24-41
Identificatie van Turkse migrantenjongeren in Nederland, Frankrijk en Duitsland, Evelyn Ersanilli, pag. 42-58
Islam is islam. Punt uit? Marokkaans-Nederlandse moslimjongeren in Gouda en de culturele constructie van een ‘zuivere’ islam, Martijn de Koning, pag. 59-72
“Ik denk niet in culturen… ik denk eigenlijk meer in mijn geloof’. Waarom jongeren van Marokkaanse afkomst in Nederland de moslimidentiteit zo sterk benadrukken, Susan Ketner, pag. 73-87
Gedwongen of Vrije keuze? In- en uitsluitingsmechanisme in de etno-party scene, Simone Boogaarts, pag. 87-104

U kunt het hele nummer gratis downloaden: Themanummer ‘Identificatie van Migrantenjongeren’

0 comments.

Spitsnieuws Online – Veel geschreeuw, weinig wol

Posted on August 27th, 2009 by martijn.
Categories: Blind Horses.

Net als andere weblogs heb ik hier al eerder aandacht besteed aan de berichtgeving op Spitsnieuws Online. Het ging onder meer om dit bericht op Spitsnieuws: Drie mannen opgehangen in Iran. Zoals u ziet staat daar een foto bij die niet echt ter zake doende is, of sterker nog een fout die compleet fout is aangezien Mohammed Cheppih, initiatiefnemer van de Poldermoskee, erop staat. (EDIT: schijnbaar heeft onze snelle GS en Spitsnieuws Online redactie toch de juiste knop gevonden, daarom onder deze alinea maar even de screenshot geplaatst). Daar ben ik dan toch maar eens achteraan gegaan met de vraag, waarom deze foto? Daarover heeft u eerder HIER kunnen lezen.

Screenshot Spitsnieuws

De hoofdredacteur Roel den Outer verzekerde mij (net als een medewerker eerder) dat de foto verwijderd zou worden. Let wel, dit heb ik niet gevraagd, ik wilde gewoon uitleg. Na enkele weken was de foto nog niet verwijderd, dus nog maar eens opnieuw gebeld. Nee hij zou nu echt verwijderd worden. Maar na een maand was dat nog niet het geval dus donderdag maar even opnieuw gebeld.

Dhr. Den Outer kreeg duidelijk een aanval van acute vermoeidheid toen hij mij aan de telefoon had en zei dat het er echt af was. Zoals u zelf kunt zien is dat nu echter nog steeds niet het geval. Hij zuchtte eens diep en ging eens kijken onder de terloopse opmerking dat het hem geen zak kon schelen. Daar ging ik nog maar eens dieper op in en hij bevestigde dat het hem inderdaad niks uitmaakte dat er een verkeerde foto met een verkeerde persoon op stond. Iets dergelijks kwamen we hier al eerder tegen bij uitlatingen over Marokkanen, dus toch maar eens gevraagd of Spitsnieuws Online nu en journalistiek medium is of een info-tainment kanaal. ‘Dat laatste’ was zijn onmiddellijke antwoord.

Dat verklaart natuurlijk wel het een en ander. Zo heeft Spitsnieuws Online recent ook een bericht uit The Sun gekopieerd:
SpitsNieuws : Moslim: ‘Mijn bus uit! Ik moet bidden!’

Een islamitische buschauffeur heeft in Groot-Brittannië passagiers de bus uitgezet omdat hij wilde bidden. De blanke, tot moslim bekeerde man rolde zijn gebedsmatje uit en begon zijn ritueel terwijl passagiers buiten vol ongeloof toekeken.

Tjsa het is natuurlijk goedkoop scoren met horror-verhalen over moslims en als je er geen hebt dan verzin je ze gewoon. Geen wonder dat The Sun heeft moeten rectificeren en excuses aanbieden.
Apology: Arunas Raulynaitis | The Sun |News

AN article on March 29, “Everyone off my bus, I need to pray”, stated that Arunas Raulynaitis, a London bus driver and a Muslim, asked passengers to leave his bus so he could pray and that passengers later refused to re-board the bus because they saw a ruck-sack which made them think he might be a fanatic.

Van het hele verhaal bleek niet veel waar: de chauffeur is geen ‘fanatic’ (intussen zal de redactie van Spitsnieuws denken dat ik dat wel ben vrees ik), hij had niet gevraagd aan passagiers om de bus te verlaten zodat hij kon bidden en hij bad gedurende zijn voorgeschreven pauze. Daarvan zien we natuurlijk niets terug in Spitsnieuws; iets waar Den Outer niets van wist zo zei hij tenminste en hem ook weinig kon schelen.

Intussen had hij nog steeds moeite had met het vinden van de pagina en dat deze er niet was. Mijn antwoord dat als hij de lezers voor de gek wil houden hij dat zelf moeten, maar hij mij aan de telefoon niet voor de gek moet houden viel niet in goede aarde en hij hing op. Omdat ik dat niet zo netjes vind toch maar even terug gebeld en ik kreeg een collega aan de lijn. Toen ik over de foto begon barstte hij uit en schreeuwde dat ze die foto gewoon zouden laten staan. Nogmaals, ik heb niet om verwijdering gevraagd, daar is Den Outer meegekomen en ik heb alleen nagevraagd waarom hij dat niet nakwam. Dat is ook wat ik zei en de man schreeuwde volgens weer wat harder wat het mij kon schelen. Allereerst natuurlijk vanwege mijn werk en vervolgens als nieuwsconsument meen ik ook recht te hebben op juiste berichtgeving. Daarop wilde de man mijn beroep weten, maar ik vond dat verder niet zo relevant waarop hij nog harder schreeuwde wat mijn beroep was en dat nieuwsconsument geen beroep is en ik spitsnieuws niet hoef te lezen als ik niet wil en dat ik maar bij de Raad voor de journalistiek mijn beklag moest doen. Maar dat is vreemd natuurlijk, want Den Outer had eerder gezegd dat Spitsnieuws Online geen journalistiek medium is en zowel Geenstijl als Spitsnieuws hebben al eerder laten weten die Raad helemaal niet te erkennen. En ook hij hing daarna boos op.

Dus wat weten we nu? Dat de heren van Spitsnieuws Online en Geenstijl (zoals eerder gezegd, het is één pot nat) nogal lichtgeraakt zijn. Dat ze soms grappige stukjes schrijven waarbij ze een mooi verhaal niet laten verpesten door feiten en dat de consequenties daarvan hen niet bar veel kan schelen. Dat ze er weinig moeite mee hebben hun lezers in een persoonlijk gesprek voor te liegen. Dat beiden zich tegenwoordig bewegen op het niveau van Nieuwe Revu en Panorama en als zodanig weinig daaraan toe te voegen hebben met uitzondering van de reactiepanelen.

Nu zoekt Spitsnieuws Online nog freelancers, vooral op het gebied van voetbalroddels en soft-porno voor hetero-mannen. Als dat u ligt en u wijkt verder niet teveel af van het gemiddelde profiel van de GS en Spitsnieuws Online redacteur (blank, man, mislukte carrière als journalist, niet teveel belang hechten aan objectieve en gebalanceerde verslaglegging, hard en laf kunnen weglopen als men een keer ter verantwoording wordt geroepen in plaats van achter het eigen stukje te blijven staan, de lezers niet al te serieus neemt en het liefst rechtse white trash, homo’s, allochtonen, religieuze mensen, radicalen en fanatici, feministes, zwarte mensen en alles wat nog meer afwijkt van het gemiddelde profiel van de GS en Spitsnieuws Online redacteur op de hak neemt, moralistisch zijn op de eigen vierkante millimeter) dan maakt u zeker een kans bij deze (vrij naar The Sun) scum-site.

3 comments.

Radicalization Series Part II – What is it? A plea for critical radicalization studies

Posted on August 25th, 2009 by martijn.
Categories: Headline, ISIM/RU Research, Religious and Political Radicalization.

Introduction
This is part two of the radicalization series. In the first I gave a brief overview of different practices regarding counterradicalization, triggering (I think) the main question for part two: what the hell is radicalization.
Please consider the following statements:

The authority of the goverment is not based upon the people. This would amount to sovereignty of the people but Muslims only recognize the absolute sovereignty of Allah, while the people’s sovereignty only recognizes that state and the will of the people as her God.

If we will ever rule, we abolish democracy. There is not god but Allah and Allah is one. There is no room for other religions.

The only distinction that really matters, is one between belief and unbelief, between the party upholding Allah’s rule and accepting his word, and the party rejecting it.

If we ever rule, unbelieving journalists are the first who can enjoy their pension.

Would you consider the above statements as radical statements or perhaps even part of a radical ideology and/or movement?

What is it?
What is radical / radicalism / radicalization? There is a long standing tradition of evaluation and analysis of radicalization. The meaning of the term (political) radical usually pertains to a political orientation and/or means (sometimes including violence) that favor or promote revolutionary, fundamental changes in society. One of the first groups ever labelled (by themselves and others) as radical were the Radical Whigs whose writings played a major role in the American revolution with their ideas about democratic representation and taxes. Although nowadays radicalism is often linked to intolerance, anti-democratic views and means, the ideas of the Whigs their ideas will probably not considered as very radical in these days but rather as fair, Western and modern.

This example also shows that groups can call themselves radical. Another example is the Political Party of Radicals in the Netherlands in the past, which has merged with the Communist Party, Evangelical People’s Party and the Pacifist Socialist Party into the GreenLeft Party. Another term of used as a synonym to radical is extreme or extremism; but this is never (as far as I know) used by the groups themselves. Other similar terms are fundamentalist (in case of religion), subversive, fanaticism and far left or far right. Extremism or radicalism is not a prerogative from the fringes of society but can also occur in more mainstream parts of society.

Radicalism in Context: Bringing Cognitive Anthropology to Political Psychology

Political psychology research has recently converged on the realisation that any evaluation of ‘political radicalism’ cannot be undertaken in isolation, but must be done so with reference to specific social and cultural contexts (e.g. Haste, 2004; Marugesan, 2007). Meanwhile, developments in the field of cognitive anthropology offer a theoretical framework for capturing the interaction between universal cognitive modules and specific cultural contexts, the latter loaded with sets of ideological beliefs that can be taken on to differing degrees (Sperber, 1996). This paper presents the results of an attempt to utilise the lens of one such anthropological theory of belief maintenance, to analyse the arguments of those adhering to contextually radical beliefs: members of the UK Socialist Party. A combined qualitative and quantitative analysis of results reveals the negotiation of differing implicit and explicit beliefs, in a manner which sheds light on previous debates in cognitive functioning and socio-political ideology (e.g. Tetlock, 1984; Sidanius, 1985). It is concluded that useful theoretical insights can be garnered from the linking of political psychology and cognitive anthropology, while contemporary understandings of ‘radicalism’ will be enlightened by a sensitivity to differing socio-cultural contexts.

On Post-Fascism

As one of the greatest and most level-headed masters of twentieth-century political sociology, Seymour Martin Lipset, has noted, fascism is the extremism of the center.Fascism had very little to do with passéiste feudal, aristocratic, monarchist ideas, was on the whole anti-clerical, opposed communism and socialist revolution, and–like the liberals whose electorate it had inherited–hated big business, trade unions, and the social welfare state. Lipset had classically shown that extremisms of the left and right were by no means exclusive: some petty bourgeois attitudes suspecting big business and big government could be, and were, prolonged into an extremism that proved lethal. Right-wing and center extremisms were combined in Hungarian, Austrian, Croatian, Slovak para-fascism (I have borrowed this term from Roger Griffin) of a pseudo-Christian, clericalist, royalist coloring, but extremism of the center does and did exist, proved by Lipset also through continuities in electoral geography.

Today there is nothing of any importance on the political horizon but the bourgeois center, therefore its extremism is the most likely to reappear. (Jörg Haider and his Freedom Party are the best example of this. Parts of his discourse are libertarian/neoliberal, his ideal is the propertied little man, he strongly favors a shareholding and home-owning petty bourgeois “democracy,” and he is quite free of romantic-reactionary nationalism as distinct from parochial selfishness and racism.) What is now considered “right-wing” in the United States would have been considered insurrectionary and suppressed by armed force in any traditional regime of the right as individualistic, decentralizing, and opposed to the monopoly of coercive power by the government, the foundation of each and every conservative creed. Conservatives are le parti de l’ordre,and loathe militias and plebian cults.

Now lets turn to the Dutch situation and have a look at a publication by the Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (General Intelligence and Security Service – AIVD) I have blogged about earlier. The AIVD makes a useful distinction between terrorism and radicalism; both are obviously not the same but can occur together and being a terrorist would probably also mean being radical (but not the other way around I would add). One of the most striking findings is this one:
C L O S E R » Blog Archive » Terrorism and radicalization according to the AIVD

# A Moroccan national has been identified as a threat to national security because of his sympathy for the international violent jihad, has contacts with like-minded people abroad and support those people. He has been declared ‘persona non grata’ and will be deported to Morocco. In another report the AIVD concluded that an another man from the same family rejects the democratic order. This may prevent him to obtain Dutch nationality.
# The AIVD released a report about a Turkish man who travelled, via Turkey, to the Pakistani-Afghani border region to participate in the international violent Jihad. In the report the AIVD stated that he is a threat to national security and he also has been declared ‘persona non grata’.

It seems that ‘rejecting democracy’ is sufficient to label someone radical and declare him persona non grata. Also having plans to engage in global jihad (outside the Netherlands) is enough to be deemed a radical. Also the AIVD sees shared grievances as a main cause for (radical) activism but given the fact that the AIVD sees democracy and shared Dutch values as a yardstick for integration and radicalism, the danger exists that anyone Muslim who criticizes Dutch values or Dutch democracy is considered a radical.

For now the important thing is that radicalism is seen as a particular idea or act that goes against (a particular idea of) shared values and the existing (in this case democratic status quo) and that what is to be considered radical varies over time and across cultures. In an upcoming chapter in a volume on Politicization and Radicalization Roel Meijer and I have based ourselves upon a definition by Beach that captures the abovementioned aspects. He defines radicalization of social movements as

a change in one or more of the components of a social movement’s ideology and/or a change in the strategies and tactics employed or advocated by the movement such that the total of the change or changes brings the movement into a condition of lesser congruence with the values and means which are presented as legitimate by the dominant sector of the society in which the movement is acting.
Beach 1977, Social Movement Radicalization: the Case of the People’s Democracy in Northern Ireland. The Sociological Quarterly 19, pp. 305-318

This is a very useful definition, because it does not only focus on intra-movement developments but also on opinions and interests of other parties in society. Unfortunately in his worthwhile elaboration on this definition Beach (1977) conceptualizes the societally approved values as (‘initially’) static. Given the development of the Dutch Islam debate and the rise and toning down of the Salafi movement in the Netherlands it is however clear that what is approved in society can change rather rapidly in particular in the aftermath of shocking incidents such as 9/11. (See for example Van Bruinessen) In fact, what Meijer and myself are arguing that such a change was instrumental to the process of radicalization among young Muslims. We propose therefore a slightly changed and more precise definition of radicalization as

a change in one or more of the components of a group’s identity and/or ideology and/or a change in the strategies and tactics employed or advocated by the group such that the total of the change or changes brings the group into a condition of lesser congruence with the prevailing social arrangements, values and means which are presented as legitimate by the institutions and elites concerned with maintaining these social arrangements and values.De Koning & Meijer, forthcoming.

Instead of recognizing wider society and its institutions, radicalization involves a turn away from wider society into an exclusive in-group membership of a group with an anti-systemic ideology and/or tactics (see also Beach 1977: 313). This also means however that we should not only take into account the intra-movement developments but also wider society and ask ourselves why do particular institutions and elites consider and label particular individuals, social categories or social movements as ‘radical’, how does the process of labelling occur and what are the consequences? Neglecting the latter will, I think, inevitably mean that counter-radicalization policies, or even radicalization research, is state-centric and problem-oriented (with its focus on short-term imminent threats that take the state’s framing as self-evident – not very remarkable for policies of course) and moreover reducing issues of poverty, islamophobia, religionization and religion-based activism, lack of political influence into a matter of (the threat of) violence and/or a dangerous lack of cultural integration and social cohesion (or short; deviance). The fact that global inequalities and ucertainties, imperialism and (Western) interventionism in for example Iraq and Afghanistan (or the lack thereof in for example Chechnya) also play a role and provide fertile ground for militant oppositional ideologies and politics, is obscured in this way. In that sense labelling an individual, social category or movement as ‘radical’ is a political strategy that serves to protect particular interests.
Towards critical radicalization studies
What I mean by this perhaps becomes clearer when we have another look at the statements mentioned above. There is a major chance such public statements by Muslims would have been subjected to the label radical given the apparent concern of the Dutch government and institutions such as AIVD with seeing radicalism as something that is going against and/or threatening democracy. Those statements however, although made in public, were never considered as such. Maybe (I know I know, it is a trick and perhaps a little too obvious and simplistic) because they were not made by Muslims:

The authority of the goverment is not based upon the people. This would amount to sovereignty of the people. The SGP (orthodox Christian party) only recognizes the absolute sovereignty of God, while the people’s sovereignty only recognizes that state and the will of the people as her God. SGP Program of Principles

If the SGP will ever rule, we abolish democracy. There is only one God, there is no other way to receive salvation. The Lord Jezus says: I am the way, and the truth, and the life. There is no room for other religions.Ton Crijnen in daily newspaper Trouw.

The only distinction that really matters, is one between belief and unbelief, between the party accepting God’s rule and his word, and the party rejecting it. Asking for Evangelist worshippers, then and now by G.J. Schutte, 2003, former leader of an orthodox Christian party, now part of the Christian Union with six seats in parliament and part of the government

If we ever rule, Clairy Polak (Dutch journalist, accused of being a Leftie) is the first who can enjoy her pension. PVV Leader Wilders in magazine HP/De Tijd

Original Dutch versions:

De overheid ontleent haar gezag niet aan het volk. Deze opvatting staat in verband met de volkssoevereiniteit. De SGP daarentegen erkent de absolute soevereiniteit van God, terwijl de volkssoevereiniteit slechts de staat en de algemene volkswil als haar god erkent. Beginselprogram SGP

“Mocht de SGP ooit regeren, dan schaffen we de democratie af”, Er is maar één God. Op een andere wijze kun je niet zalig worden. De Here Jezus zegt: “Ik ben de Weg, de Waarheid en het Leven”. Er is dus geen ruimte voor andere godsdiensten Ton Crijnen. In: Trouw, 5.1.2002.

het enige onderscheid dat echt ter zake doet, is dat tussen geloof en ongeloof, tussen de partij die het gezag van God en zijn woord aanvaardt en de partij die dit gezag verwerpt – Evangeliebelijders gevraagd, toen en nu”, G.J. Schutte, 2003.

’Als wij het voor zeggen krijgen, is Clairy Polak de eerste die van haar wachtgeld mag gaan genieten.’ Wilders in HP/De Tijd

Radicalization is not a stable and objective phenomenon out there to be studied in a self-evident and uncritical way. Radicalization research therefore not only needs to take into account the developments among radicalizing Muslims or radicalizing right wing youth (or left or center) but also needs take critically examine broader processes in society and the ideas and practices of elites and state-institutions involved in counter-radicalization policies. Both form different parts of the same medal and both (may) produce and reproduce each other.

Radicalization research also needs to consider the motivation of those apparently radicalizing individuals, groups or movement more seriously. The focus on deviance, lack of integration or even downright evil (as in the case of terrorists) lead to a situation in which the motivations and actions are only taken into account very superficially and/or one-sided. In the case of Muslim radicalization we now are faced with a situation in which the apparent radicalization of Muslim youth is unprecendented, more threatening than ever before and exceptional although the terrorism throughout the 1970s has been more serious in the Netherlands in terms of the people targeted and killed. Although the current motivations for radicalization differ from those in the past and the transnational connections also make Muslim radicalization much more complicated and unpredictable, an important difference is also that the motivations of for example the Moluccan radicals in the 1970s received recognition and understanding (although the means were disapproved of), but for radical Muslim youth there seems to be less understanding let alone sympathy. (See HERE for Fighting terrorism in the Netherlands; a historical perspective). The state’s policies, the politics of labelling and the ‘extremism of the center’ should therefore be as much part of radicalization research. Lacking in much of the analyses is a critical reflection on the role of the state and its institutions. Why do states and their institutions label particular individuals, groups and movements as radical and what are the consequences in terms of rights, policies and the position and daily lives of the targeted groups?

Researchers of radicalization can benefit from the critical terrorism studies as proposed by Gunning, Jackson and Breen Smyth. Consider for example the next statement by Jackson
e-IR » Why We Need Critical Terrorism Studies

an acute sensitivity to the politics of labelling and the acceptance of the fundamental ontological insecurity of the ‘terrorism’ label and thus extreme care in its use during research; a commitment to inter-disciplinarity and a willingness to engage with research from disciplines outside of international relations (there is some excellent terrorism research from anthropology, for example); a commitment to transparency regarding the values and political standpoints of researchers, particularly as they relate to the geo-political interests and values of the states they work in; a willingness by researchers to expand the focus of their research to include topics such as the use of terrorism by states, gender dimensions of terrorism, ethical-normative analysis of counter-terrorism, and the discursive foundations which make ‘terrorism studies’ possible in the first place; adherence to a set of responsible research ethics which take account of the various users of terrorism research, including the ‘suspect communities’ from which terrorists often emerge and the populations who bear the brunt of counter-terrorism policies; a commitment to taking the subjectivity of both the researcher and the researched seriously, particularly in terms of being willing to ‘talk to terrorists’; and a commitment to normative values and a broadly defined notion of emancipation. These commitments go beyond simply the call to engage in more rigorous and self-reflective research. In their normative dimensions in particular, these kinds of commitments amount to an orientation that shares many of the same attitudes and approaches as the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory and the Welsh School of Critical Security Studies.

The call for the establishment of a new, more reflexive ‘critical’ terrorism studies (CTS) is a self-conscious and deliberate attempt to try and overcome some of the problems that have been noted about the broader field of terrorism studies, and to attract scholars who study terrorism but are uncomfortable associating with a field that has historically been closely aligned with the state. The initial aim of CTS advocates has been to map out a new ‘critical’ set of approaches to the study of political terrorism, and to generate a new, broader research agenda.

Also work from social movement theory has, already, been very useful in treating different forms of radicalization as (for example) islamic activism. In particular an anthropological social movement approach can among others things take into account the differences in trajectories of radicalization and differences in commitment, levels of participation and motivations of radical actors and can offer a critique of state policies and actions (as does CTS). This should lead us to open up novel areas of investigation and interrogate wider processes, discourses, practices and experiences that produce, nurture and reproduce reframings of politics that appear to become anti-systemic and oppositional.

This was the second blog entry. In two months part three will be published here, which will focus more on my own research. After that part four will be published, focusing on the Dutch state institutions. If you want to stay updated, please register HERE.
C L O S E R » Blog Archive » Radicalization Series – Part I: The slippery slope of ethnic profiling

2 comments.

Ghuraba – De Vreemdelingen

Posted on August 20th, 2009 by martijn.
Categories: Arts & culture, ISIM/RU Research, Ritual and Religious Experience.

Een nasheed (mv anasheed) is een islamitisch lied, gewoonlijk a-cappella gezongen soms begeleid met percussie. Als er een anasheed-hitparade zou bestaan, zou de volgende ongetwijfeld erg hoog scoren:

In deze entry vind je alle versies die ik toegestuurd heb gekregen. Op verzoek vermeld ik erbij wanneer de nasheed muziek bevat.
De tekst van het lied verwijst naar hadith verzameling van Bukhari (Ar-Riqaq, boek 8, volume 76, hadith 425)
Hadith (Hadis) Books

Narrated Mujahid: ‘Abdullah bin ‘Umar said, “Allah’s Apostle took hold of my shoulder and said, ‘Be in this world as if you were a stranger or a traveler.” The sub-narrator added: Ibn ‘Umar used to say, “If you survive till the evening, do not expect to be alive in the morning, and if you survive till the morning, do not expect to be alive in the evening, and take from your health for your sickness, and (take) from your life for your death.”

En naar Muslim (Kitab Al-Iman, boek 1, hadith 270)
Hadith (Hadis) Books

It is narrated on the authority of Abu Huraira that the Messenger of Allah (may peace be upon him) said: Islam initiated as something strange, and it would revert to its (old position) of being strange. so good tidings for the stranger.

Hieronder volgt een lezing van Khalid Yasin met zijn interpretatie van ghuraba (en Nederlandse ondertiteling)

De tekst verwijst naar een situatie waarin een moslim zich onthecht (of zichzelf vervreemd) van het wereldlijke en alleen nog God aanbidt. Het is een opvatting die we in vergelijkbare vorm ook onder christenen kunnen terugvinden, en waarschijnlijk ook wel bij andere religies.
Ongelovige vrienden, hoever ga je? (printversie)

Gebed + luisteren naar God:

“Verlies uw hart niet aan de wereld of aan de dingen in de wereld! Als iemand de wereld liefheeft, woont de liefde van de Vader niet in hem. Want al wat in de wereld is, de hebzucht, de afgunst en het pronken met bezit, dat alles komt niet van de Vader maar van de wereld. En die wereld gaat voorbij met heel haar begeerlijkheid, maar wie de wil doet van God blijft in eeuwigheid.” (1Johannes 2:15-17)

“Trouwelozen, weet u niet dat vriendschap met de wereld vijandschap met God betekent? Wie met de wereld bevriend wil zijn, maakt zich tot vijand van God.” (Jakobus 4:4)

“Ik ben al niet meer in de wereld, maar zij, zij blijven in de wereld achter, terwijl Ik naar U toe kom. Heilige Vader, bewaar hen in uw naam, die U Mij hebt toevertrouwd, opdat ze één mogen zijn zoals Wij…. Ik vraag U niet hen uit de wereld weg te nemen, maar hen te behoeden voor de macht van het kwaad. Zij zijn niet van de wereld, zoals Ik niet van de wereld ben.” (Johannes 17:11, 15-16)

De vraag die ik kreeg voor deze workshop was: Hoe moet je omgaan met niet-christelijke vrienden? Waaraan kun je meedoen en tot hoe ver kun je mee gaan in wat zij doen? Volgens mij is dit een vraag die uit het spanningsveld komt wat we net in het laatste bijbelgedeelte hebben gelezen. Het spanningsveld tussen het in deze wereld zijn, maar niet van deze wereld zijn. Jezus noemt hier een enorm spanningsveld. Als mensen hebben we de neiging om uit dit spanningsveld weg te vluchten. Maar dit spanningsveld is zo bedoeld. Het moet er zijn en ook blijven. Door dit spanningsveld worden we namelijk geprikkeld om te luisteren naar God. Om samen met Jezus te worstelen over wat je moet doen en wat je moet laten. Ik heb geen kant en klaar pakketje met antwoorden voor jullie waardoor je weet wat je wel met je ongelovige vrienden kunt doen en wat niet. Ik denk dat dit ook per persoon verschillend is. Wat ik wel voor jullie heb is een eenvoudige boodschap: Blijf in het spanningsveld wat Jezus zo prachtig omschrijft. Blijf met Jezus worstelen over wat je moet doen en wat je moet laten. En stap niet in één van de valkuilen!

De valkuilen die hier staan zijn allemaal gevaarlijk:

1) Het ene uiterste: je helemaal uit de wereld terugtrekken, bang zijn om besmet te worden, waardoor je kunt geen zout en licht meer kunt zijn.
2) Het andere uiterste: gelijkvormigheid, er is geen verschil meer te zien tussen jou en je ongelovige vrienden, je bent zouteloos geworden en het licht in jou is verduisterd.
3) Gevaarlijke middenweg: de compromis (van twee walletjes eten), schijnheiligheid (dingen laten of juist doen om de schone schijn op te houden en door mensen bewonderd te worden), wetticisme (jezelf en anderen onmogelijke lasten opleggen en menen dat je daardoor een streepje voor hebt bij God).

* Welke valkuil vormt voor jou het grootste gevaar? Hoe komt dat zo?

De enige manier om te voorkomen dat je in één van deze valkuilen stapt en jezelf verwond is… in het spanningsveld blijven! Dit betekent dat je naar Jezus gaat luisteren en Hem vraagt wat je moet doen en wat je moet laten. Een vraag die je daarbij kan helpen is: “Here Jezus, kan u hier in en bij zijn?” Deze heiligingsvraag zullen we steeds weer moeten stellen. En het antwoord dat Jezus geeft kan heel goed per persoon verschillend zijn.

Preek van de week

Tenslotte bidt Jezus voor zijn leerlingen “dat zij God toegewijd mogen zijn in de waarheid”. Het feit dat Jezus daarvoor bidt, betekent dat het niet evident is, zelfs niet voor vrome christenen, om in de waarheid aan God toegewijd te zijn. Waarheid is hier de eigenschap van God zelf. Het is geen leersysteem, geen zaak van 1 + 1 = 2. Het is een weg om te gaan, Gods waarheid is zijn betrouwbaarheid, zijn waarachtigheid. Jezus bidt dus, dat wij mogen zijn als God zelf, waarheid, dat al wat wij zijn en zeggen en doen zonder leugen is, niet gehuicheld maar echt en vrij. Dit ‘Gode toegewijd zijn in de waarheid’ betekent hoegenaamd geen verwijdering van de wereld. “Ik bid niet dat Gij hen wegneemt uit de wereld, maar dat Gij bewaart voor het kwaad. Zij zijn niet van de wereld, wel in de wereld”.
Jezus bidt dat wij, juist in die onrustige en verwarde en dikwijls leugenachtige wereld die de onze is, staande zouden blijven, God niet uit het oog zouden verliezen, maar dat wij in waarheid aan God toegewijd zouden zijn.

vervolgalpha voorjaar 2008 | Jeugdalpha Papendrecht

De liefde van God vind je in Jezus. Elke vrees richting het oordeel moet uitgebannen zijn. Hoewel we nog in deze wereld zijn (we hebben last van onze zondige natuur en tekorten), zijn wij zoals Jezus.

Ghuraba lijkt hier ook naar te verwijzen en te stellen dat deze wereld niet het thuisland is voor moslims, maar dat zij hun thuis en waarheid kunnen vinden in de aanbidding van de enige en unieke God. Ghuraba is ook een oproep tot actie. Een oproep om niet teveel gehecht te raken aan de (materiële) zaken van deze wereld, maar om ook het spirituele toe te laten. De bedevaart naar Mekka raakt daarmee deels aan hetzelfde thema. Deze vijfde zuil is een oproep aan moslims om huis en haard te verlaten en daar te gaan waar de Quran geopenbaard zou zijn en Mohammed zich gevestigd zou hebben. Niet alleen de rituelen in Mekka zijn onderdeel van deze verplichting, maar ook de reis er naar toe als één van loutering en toenemende gerichtheid op God. Hoewel dit tegenwoordig allemaal wat makkelijker is en mensen meerdere malen (kunnen) gaan, was het vroeger vaak een lange eenmalige reis naar het onbekende waarbij het het bekende, wereldlijke, werd achtergelaten. Ghuraba met z’n voortdurende herhalingen in telkens hetzelfde ritme creëert zo een auditieve ruimte waartoe de luisteraar zich dient te verhouden en waarin deze vervolgens zijn of haar eigen verbeelding kan openstellen en creëren. Wat dat vervolgens is, verschilt natuurlijk van persoon tot persoon. Op Youtube zien we wel enkele voorbeelden van ghuraba-producties die enigszins laten zien welke betekenissen men hier aan kan hechten. Onmiddellijk valt dan de politieke lading op zoals in de volgende, misschien wel meest beroemde, variant van een gevangene in een Egyptische rechtszaal die ghuraba zingt, waarbij zelfs een rechter ge-emotioneerd geraakt zou zijn:

De volgende ghuraba versie brengt de oproep tot actie krachtig in beeld en verbindt het idee van ghuraba met de ideologie van Al Qaeda cs.

Soms gaat het daarbij om algemene (gewelddadige) strijd tegen onderdrukking, soms is het ook concreter zoals in de volgende nasheed voor Gaza waar ghuraba een onderdeel van is.

De volgende versie zoomt in op een hele serie landen/gebieden:

Anderen kiezen een nickname als ghuraba media en produceren zelf jihad anasheeds zoals deze (we marcheren voort als leeuwen, met Nederlandse ondertiteling):

Vreemdeling verwijst hier niet alleen meer naar een idee van onthechting of exclusieve aanbidding, maar het is ook een term voor uitverkorenen (die niet buigen, behalve voor God), de ware strijders of zelfs ware moslims; een idee waar zeker niet iedereen het mee eens zal zijn overigens.
De volgende ghuraba nasheed met Duitse vertaling maakt het idee van uitverkoren nog eens duidelijker:

Ook hierin komt het idee van huis en haard verlaten en het idee van de gelovige op doorreis weer terug. Beide kunnen betrokken worden op de gewelddadige jihad, maar ook spiritueel en sociaal gezien worden. Dit laatste omdat standvastig blijven in de godsdienst (dien) dan een zekere, spirituele en/of sociale, isolatie zou vereisen.
Uiteindelijk behoort het paradijs dan aan de vreemdelingen:

Naast uitverkoren heeft de notie vreemdeling ook betrekking op diegenen die op de proef gesteld worden zoals moslimgevangenen:

De vreemdelingen zouden dan mensen zijn die zonder acht te slaan op wat de wereld over hen zegt, doorgaan met hun religieuze verplichtingen en de Quran volgen om zo God tevreden te stellen.

De volgende nasheed (Liever de vreemden zijn) heeft betrekking op vrouwen in niqab, het begin bevat de ghuraba nasheed. Ook hierin vinden we thema’s als onthechting, afstand nemen van en op de proef gesteld worden terug. Deze is afkomstig van een Duitse moslima.

Ook de volgende video laat dit zien, maar dan veel breder (en zal volgens sommige lezers ongetwijfeld getuigen van een slachtoffermentaliteit)

Een mengeling van politieke, sociale en spirituele betekenissen vinden we terug in de volgende ghuraba nasheed met Spaanse ondertiteling (let op de boerkini afbeelding op het einde):

In de volgende versie van Soutus Salaim Beyond the Norm is het politieke evenmin afwezig (let op deze bevat muziek – het is een ‘popversie’ met daarin ghurabaa) maar toch op een andere manier dan bij de vorigen. Het bevat onder meer een oproep tot hervorming aangezien volgens de zanger de islam juist een vreemde is geworden.

It’s written in the history
Islam once ruled the world
But I’m standing here in melancholy
How can I claim of such word?

Those days have left us so far
Unreachable beauty like the star
History left ajar
Could I ever heal the scar?

c/o

What is happening to Islam today?
Why the feeling of me going astray?
Oh Allah, I plead and pray
Steadfast my faith in the righteous way

Ghurabaa..
Bada’al Islamu Ghareeban
Saya3oudul Islamu Ghareeban
Fathouba lil ghurabaa

Come on brothers let us reform
Stand united through blizzard storm
Let not our path be lured into darkness
We shall go beyond the norm

Contemplating my own fear
With this heart craving for a guidance
All the things I hold so dear
Put my dean in a distance

Islam is now estranged
Estranged from its former existence
For indeed we are strangers
Cause Islam’s our conscience

Repeat c/o

Song & Lyrics:
Mohammad Ihab Ismail

Clip Directors:
Imran, Hafidz

In de volgende ghuraba zijn bovenstaande thema’s ogenschijnlijk afwezig. De bijbehorende presentatie gaat namelijk over overspel, de gevaren en gevolgen ervan. Aangezien de remedie hiertegen, en het enige wat overspel kan voorkomen de aanbidding van God is, komt het thema van aanbidding niettemin toch terug.

Daarnaast kunnen de thema’s van ghuraba natuurlijk voorkomen in het persoonlijke leven van individuen zoals we kunnen zien in de serie van drie films van Omair Mazhar:

Muziek is een belangrijk, maar vaak onderbelicht, bestanddeel van iedere beweging of dit nu een traditionele sociale beweging is of een religieuze beweging. Muziek speelt een grote rol in pinksterkerken en de evangelische beweging, maar voorheen ook al in de Amerikaanse burgerrechten beweging. Muziek kan dienen ter mobilisatie van participanten en kan ook gebruik worden ter bemiddeling van een bepaalde religieuze of politieke boodschap. Met de anasheed wordt een eeuwenoude traditie nieuw leven ingeblazen door deze op sites als youtube te plaatsen, met niet alleen een tekstuele boodschap, maar ook een visuele. De beelden geven voeding aan de verbeelding van een gedeelde geschiedenis en hedendaagse situatie waarmee mensen geïnspireerd en gemotiveerd kunnen worden. De muziek en de beelden produceren een fusie tussen het spirituele, het politieke, sociale en individuele. Het gaat er daarbij niet om dat alle moslims deze boodschappen onderschrijven en zich gedragen als zijnde ‘vreemdelingen’, maar het luisteren ernaar lijkt een soort reminder voor het hoe eigenlijk zou moeten en kan door sommigen gebruikt worden als een manier om zich in gedachten af te zonderen en bij God te zijn.

Dit komt misschien nog wel het sterkst tot uiting in de volgende versie van ghuraba, waarin een collage ‘islamic legends’ wordt getoond. In mijn proefschrift heb ik over deze afbeeldingen geschreven als zijnde voorwerpen waardoor de alomtegenwoordigheid, almacht en barmhartigheid van God wordt gerepresenteerd en bemiddeld waardoor iets wat voor mensen niet te bevatten is, wordt geconcretiseerd en open komt te staan voor betekenisgeving zonder dat het ongrijpbare en onzegbare helemaal verloren gaat.

Dat een nasheed als deze sterke emoties kan oproepen blijkt wel uit het gegeven dat sommigen tot tranen geroerd zijn bij het luisteren ernaar.

Bovenstaand overzicht is allesbehalve compleet, youtube en andere videosites bevatten nog veel meer videos van ghuraba. De video’s die hier geplaatst zijn, zijn mij gestuurd door mensen uit mijn onderzoek; dank daarvoor. Het overzicht wil ik afsluiten met de meest opmerkelijke, a-typische toespeling op ghuraba die ik kon vinden op youtube. Let op deze video bevat popmuziek:

6 comments.

Punk Piety – "Challenging the orthodoxy of Punk and Islam"

Posted on August 10th, 2009 by martijn.
Categories: Arts & culture, Young Muslims, Youth culture (as a practice).

A Muslim meld of punk and piety – The Globe and Mail

It was early September and the annual convention of the Islamic Society of North America [ISNA] was about to wrap up in Chicago. About 400 young Muslims had gathered at a Hyatt hotel ballroom for open-mike night, hyped as a wholesome alternative to the vice-land that every big American city inevitably becomes once the sun sets.

The first few acts – Koran recitation, stern spoken-word stylings – matched the hype. But around 3 a.m., with fewer than a quarter of the original audience still around, an all-girl Vancouver punk band took to the stage. A 25-year-old singer with short black hair and a voice like a bar fight asked the crowd: “ISNA, are you ready to rock?”

And no, not everyone was ready to rock on the song Middle Eastern Zombies by Secret Trial Five.
[flashvideo filename=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-CpqgrDFeUU /]
(accoustic version not from the ISNA event)

Secret Trial Five is an all-female Canadian punk rock band founded by Sena Hussain after 9/11. The name of the band is derived from a group of Canadian Muslims who currently remain in prison. Together with bands such as Vote Hezbollah, The Kominas, Al-Thawra and Diacritical they belong to a music movement or subculture called taqwacore. Taqwa meaning pious or God-fearing signifying the love and awe for God. Core comes from hardcore or hardcore punk, referring to a punk rock genre that is heavier and faster than early punk rock. Hardcore songs usually are short and very fast (and not to mention loud!) and covering a variety of topics often with a political connotation. Bands such as The Damned, The Dead Kennedys, Bad Religion and Hüskür Dü (in their early times). A particular faction within the hardcore subculture involves the straight edge philosophy of no promiscuity, smoking, drinking or doing drugs.

The name Taqwacores comes from Michael Muhammad Knight’s novel The Taqwacores that tells the story of Yusuf Ali. His house, and that of several of his companions, is a safe haven for punk parties and for Muslims who want to remain outside the local mosques for Friday prayers and outside the Muslim Student Organization.
hardcore piety

Umar is “straightedge”, though covered in halal tattoos, including 2:219, referring to the proscription in the Quran against drinking alcohol. Rabeya, the sole female occupant of the house, wears a burqa, and has never been seen by most of her friends. She is also an ardent feminist and a fan of the punk group Propagandhi. Fasiq is a hashishiyyun, often to be found on the roof with a Quran in hand. His usual companion is Jehangir, who tells drunken tales of the taqwacores (hardcore pious) in “Khalifornia” and punk Islamic philosophy to anyone who’ll listen.

All four perform wudhu and use whatever is at hand as a prayer mat. A hole smashed into the wall marks qiblah, the direction of Mecca. Jehangir plays the call to prayer, adhan, on his electric guitar from the rooftop. Every Friday afternoon Islamic kids, punks and drop-outs gather at the house for jumaa.

Jehangir is a tragic romantic, believing in an open and inclusive Islam. At parties, Umar stands disapprovingly at the back of the room, and refuses to allow beer and drugs in his truck, if not the communal space.

The core issue in this novel is the conflict between orthodox, fundamentalist and Sufi varieties of Islam, inclusion and exclusion, an attempt to find a (radical) alternative combined with a public display of complete lack of respect for authorities (in a true punk spirit I may add) by trying to merge hardcore punk with Islam:
Muslim Punk Rock? – India Currents

Both began in tremendous bursts of truth and vitality but seem to have lost something along the way—the energy perhaps, that comes with knowing the world has never seen such positive force and fury and never would again. Both have suffered from sell-outs and hypocrites, but also from true believers whose devotion had crippled their creative drive. Both are viewed by outsiders as unified cohesive communities when nothing can be further from the truth.

Taqwacores has become a sort of manifesto (as for example Catcher in the Rye has been) for a range of bands that mix punkrock with (their vision on) Islam but without having a distinctive style of music, which to a certain extent challenges people’s understanding of hardcore traditions. For example Al-Thawra has clear rai influences, while Sagg Taqwacore Syndicate is about hiphop and techno and the Kominas use Bhangra influences. Regarding ‘orthodox Islam’ as a code of to do’s and to don’ts they emphasize personal responsibility and individual piety (with no social restraints) and it is clearly a post 9/11 genre taking up all kinds of political issues that pertain to Muslims in a very harsh, rude, provocative and satirical way. What they do also seem to share is that they appear to be ‘pissed off about everything’ (parents, society, politicians, religious authorities you name it) and trying to resist homogenizing labelling (such as progressive, punk, radical, gay, Arab) of Muslims.
Allah, Amps and Anarchy : Rolling Stone

Vote Hezbollah (the band’s name is intended as a joke) is one of five Muslim punk bands that recently wrapped up a ten-date tour that took them from Boston to Chicago during August and September. The bands, which hail from Chicago, San Antonio, Boston and Washington, D.C., share left-of-center politics and an antipathy toward the president. And all have used punk as a means to express the anger, confusion and pride in being young and Muslim in post-9/11 America.

Twenty-four hours after leaving the Toledo mosque, Boston’s Kominas — Punjabi for “the Bastards” — are playing in a packed basement in a rundown corner of Chicago’s Logan Square. Local punks mix with curious young Muslims — including a few girls wearing head scarves — as Kominas frontman Shahjehan Khan launches into the opening lines of “Sharia Law in the U.S.A.”: “I am an Islamist!/And I am an anti-Christ!” Nearby, mohawked bassist Basim Usmani — whose T-shirt reads frisk me i’m muslim — slaps out the song’s bass line while viciously slam-dancing with a dude in a woman’s burqa.

I’m not really sure if we can speak about a real movement here. My impression is that it is yet too small yet but with the taqwacore tour the bands gained more recognition and also the first taqwacore webmagazine has been established. Needless to say that taqwacore also evokes controversy (always important for a movement), accusations of blasphemy and fear of angry Muslims resulting in censorship, but it clearly has also found a way into the lives of (American) Muslim youth:

The Koran, punk rock and lots of questions – Los Angeles Times

Hiba slips out of the white T-shirt with black letters that read “HOMOPHOBIA IS GAY,” which she wore to Kempner High School, where she is a junior. It’s one of a collection of slogans the 17-year-old has silk-screened on T-shirts in her bedroom, unbeknownst to her parents, both Muslim immigrants from Pakistan.

There are other aspects of Hiba’s life lately she thinks they might not approve of either, like the Muslim punk music she has been listening to with lyrics such as “suicide bomb the GAP,” or “Rumi was a homo.” Or the novel she bought online, about rebellious Muslim teenagers in New York. It opens with: “Muhammad was a punk rocker, he tore everything down. Muhammad was a punk rocker and he rocked that town.”

This much Hiba knows: She is a Muslim teenager living in America.

But what does that mean?

It is a question that pesters her, like the other questions she is afraid to ask her parents: Can she still be a good Muslim even though she does not dress in hijab or pray five times a day? If Islam is right, does that make other religions wrong? Is going to prom haram, or sinful? Is punk?

Hiba loves Allah but wrestles with how to express her faith. She wonders whether it is OK to question customs. Behind her parents’ backs, she tests Islamic traditions, trying to decipher culture versus religion, refusing to blindly believe that they are one.

“Isn’t that what Prophet Muhammad did?” asks Hiba, raising her thick black eyebrows and straightening her wiry frame, which takes on the shape of a question mark when she stands hunched in insecurity. “Question the times? Question what other people were doing?”

Hiba’s hunt for answers has led her to other books too. They line her bedroom wall next to copies of Nylon magazine, one with “Gossip Girls” on its front cover. There’s “Radiant Prayers,” a collection from the Koran, and “Rumi: Hidden Music,” a Persian poet celebrated in parts of the Muslim world.[…]One day, Hiba typed the word “punk” into an online search engine and stumbled across a book by writer Michael Muhammad Knight. “The Taqwacores,” a 2003 novel — its title a combination of the Arabic word “taqwa,” or consciousness of God, and “hardcore” — is about a group of punk Muslim friends: a straight-edged Sunni, a rebel girl who wears band patches on her burka and a dope-smoking Sufi who sports a mohawk. The characters drink alcohol, do drugs, urinate on the Koran, have sex, pray, love and worship Allah.

Hiba related to the main character’s take on his identity, in which the author wrote: “I stopped trying to define Punk around the same time I stopped trying to define Islam. . . . Both are viewed by outsiders as unified, cohesive communities when nothing can be further from the truth.”

Hiba devoured the book, passing it around to her friends.

I expect that two films will further contribute to the spread of taqwacore:

EyesteelFilm-TAQWACORE

TAQWACORE! follows Basim and The Kominas on their first North American tour. Along the way, they’ll pick up other Muslim misfits and together they’ll all descend upon Chicago in time to crash the party at the ISNA convention – the largest Muslim event in North America run by top mullahs and imams among the conservative ilk.

Sparks are sure to fly when Basim and his crew show up promoting the ultimate Taqwacore show. In between finding kindred spirits and battling the prejudices of the old guard, TAQWACORE! will chart this explosive new scene attracting Muslims youth all over the globe. Please join us on this intense and insightful thrill ride.

This feature documentary (directed by Omar Majeed and produced by EyeSteelFilm) also features the incident at ISNA referred to above and you can watch a trailer at the website. A second film based upon Taqwacores made by Eyad Zahra is planned for this year.

Al Jazeera English has a very good episode on the Playlist Series on taqwacores featuring taqwacore band Al-Thawra, Eyad Zahra and writer Michael Muhammad Knight
[flashvideo filename=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6rbFyBedolM /]
And another fine example of taqwacore band is Sagg Taqwacore Syndicate:

[flashvideo filename=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W71_qVZTADw /]
I’m not sure if it is has reached (mainland) Europe yet and certainly not the Netherlands, but lets wait, see and listen.

There is also a digital ethnography of the taqwacore scene: Taqwatweet

4 comments.

Punk Piety – “Challenging the orthodoxy of Punk and Islam”

Posted on August 10th, 2009 by martijn.
Categories: Arts & culture, Young Muslims, Youth culture (as a practice).

A Muslim meld of punk and piety – The Globe and Mail

It was early September and the annual convention of the Islamic Society of North America [ISNA] was about to wrap up in Chicago. About 400 young Muslims had gathered at a Hyatt hotel ballroom for open-mike night, hyped as a wholesome alternative to the vice-land that every big American city inevitably becomes once the sun sets.

The first few acts – Koran recitation, stern spoken-word stylings – matched the hype. But around 3 a.m., with fewer than a quarter of the original audience still around, an all-girl Vancouver punk band took to the stage. A 25-year-old singer with short black hair and a voice like a bar fight asked the crowd: “ISNA, are you ready to rock?”

Umar is “straightedge”, though covered in halal tattoos, including 2:219, referring to the proscription in the Quran against drinking alcohol. Rabeya, the sole female occupant of the house, wears a burqa, and has never been seen by most of her friends. She is also an ardent feminist and a fan of the punk group Propagandhi. Fasiq is a hashishiyyun, often to be found on the roof with a Quran in hand. His usual companion is Jehangir, who tells drunken tales of the taqwacores (hardcore pious) in “Khalifornia” and punk Islamic philosophy to anyone who’ll listen.

All four perform wudhu and use whatever is at hand as a prayer mat. A hole smashed into the wall marks qiblah, the direction of Mecca. Jehangir plays the call to prayer, adhan, on his electric guitar from the rooftop. Every Friday afternoon Islamic kids, punks and drop-outs gather at the house for jumaa.

Jehangir is a tragic romantic, believing in an open and inclusive Islam. At parties, Umar stands disapprovingly at the back of the room, and refuses to allow beer and drugs in his truck, if not the communal space.

Both began in tremendous bursts of truth and vitality but seem to have lost something along the way—the energy perhaps, that comes with knowing the world has never seen such positive force and fury and never would again. Both have suffered from sell-outs and hypocrites, but also from true believers whose devotion had crippled their creative drive. Both are viewed by outsiders as unified cohesive communities when nothing can be further from the truth.

Vote Hezbollah (the band’s name is intended as a joke) is one of five Muslim punk bands that recently wrapped up a ten-date tour that took them from Boston to Chicago during August and September. The bands, which hail from Chicago, San Antonio, Boston and Washington, D.C., share left-of-center politics and an antipathy toward the president. And all have used punk as a means to express the anger, confusion and pride in being young and Muslim in post-9/11 America.

Twenty-four hours after leaving the Toledo mosque, Boston’s Kominas — Punjabi for “the Bastards” — are playing in a packed basement in a rundown corner of Chicago’s Logan Square. Local punks mix with curious young Muslims — including a few girls wearing head scarves — as Kominas frontman Shahjehan Khan launches into the opening lines of “Sharia Law in the U.S.A.”: “I am an Islamist!/And I am an anti-Christ!” Nearby, mohawked bassist Basim Usmani — whose T-shirt reads frisk me i’m muslim — slaps out the song’s bass line while viciously slam-dancing with a dude in a woman’s burqa.

The Koran, punk rock and lots of questions – Los Angeles Times

Hiba slips out of the white T-shirt with black letters that read “HOMOPHOBIA IS GAY,” which she wore to Kempner High School, where she is a junior. It’s one of a collection of slogans the 17-year-old has silk-screened on T-shirts in her bedroom, unbeknownst to her parents, both Muslim immigrants from Pakistan.

There are other aspects of Hiba’s life lately she thinks they might not approve of either, like the Muslim punk music she has been listening to with lyrics such as “suicide bomb the GAP,” or “Rumi was a homo.” Or the novel she bought online, about rebellious Muslim teenagers in New York. It opens with: “Muhammad was a punk rocker, he tore everything down. Muhammad was a punk rocker and he rocked that town.”

This much Hiba knows: She is a Muslim teenager living in America.

But what does that mean?

It is a question that pesters her, like the other questions she is afraid to ask her parents: Can she still be a good Muslim even though she does not dress in hijab or pray five times a day? If Islam is right, does that make other religions wrong? Is going to prom haram, or sinful? Is punk?

Hiba loves Allah but wrestles with how to express her faith. She wonders whether it is OK to question customs. Behind her parents’ backs, she tests Islamic traditions, trying to decipher culture versus religion, refusing to blindly believe that they are one.

“Isn’t that what Prophet Muhammad did?” asks Hiba, raising her thick black eyebrows and straightening her wiry frame, which takes on the shape of a question mark when she stands hunched in insecurity. “Question the times? Question what other people were doing?”

Hiba’s hunt for answers has led her to other books too. They line her bedroom wall next to copies of Nylon magazine, one with “Gossip Girls” on its front cover. There’s “Radiant Prayers,” a collection from the Koran, and “Rumi: Hidden Music,” a Persian poet celebrated in parts of the Muslim world.[…]One day, Hiba typed the word “punk” into an online search engine and stumbled across a book by writer Michael Muhammad Knight. “The Taqwacores,” a 2003 novel — its title a combination of the Arabic word “taqwa,” or consciousness of God, and “hardcore” — is about a group of punk Muslim friends: a straight-edged Sunni, a rebel girl who wears band patches on her burka and a dope-smoking Sufi who sports a mohawk. The characters drink alcohol, do drugs, urinate on the Koran, have sex, pray, love and worship Allah.

Hiba related to the main character’s take on his identity, in which the author wrote: “I stopped trying to define Punk around the same time I stopped trying to define Islam. . . . Both are viewed by outsiders as unified, cohesive communities when nothing can be further from the truth.”

Hiba devoured the book, passing it around to her friends.

I expect that two films will further contribute to the spread of taqwacore:

EyesteelFilm-TAQWACORE

TAQWACORE! follows Basim and The Kominas on their first North American tour. Along the way, they’ll pick up other Muslim misfits and together they’ll all descend upon Chicago in time to crash the party at the ISNA convention – the largest Muslim event in North America run by top mullahs and imams among the conservative ilk.

Sparks are sure to fly when Basim and his crew show up promoting the ultimate Taqwacore show. In between finding kindred spirits and battling the prejudices of the old guard, TAQWACORE! will chart this explosive new scene attracting Muslims youth all over the globe. Please join us on this intense and insightful thrill ride.

[flashvideo filename=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W71_qVZTADw /]
I’m not sure if it is has reached (mainland) Europe yet and certainly not the Netherlands, but lets wait, see and listen.

There is also a digital ethnography of the taqwacore scene: Taqwatweet

4 comments.

Closing the week 31 – Featuring the March of the Extremists

Posted on August 2nd, 2009 by martijn.
Categories: Blogosphere.

Closer
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Featuring the March to Extremism in Europe
The March to the Far Right – TIME

The March to the Far Right

Front-page feature by Catherine Mayer on the turn to the far-right in Europe, focusing on four parties: the BNP, France’s Front National (FN), Hungary’s Jobbik and Geert Wilders’ Partij voor de Vrijheid (Party for Freedom, PVV).
Sunny on Pickled Politics provide us with some useful comments:
Pickled Politics » The rise of the far-right across Europe

1. It’s good that Geert Wilders is being included in the list of the ‘far-right’. I’ve been saying this for ages. It’s also worth nothing that he has supporters in the UK, especially Douglas Murray of the Centre for Social Cohesion. That tells you a lot about their politics.

2. The writer does a good job of capturing the dilemmas for anti-facists:

…the urgent question is how best to contain the surge. Deny far-right leaders the oxygen of publicity? Tricky — they have a democratic mandate. Confront them? That risks casting them as martyrs, victims who tell unpalatable truths. Expose the racism that often underlies professions of patriotism? Well, yes, but that assumes voters choose far-right parties in ignorance of their views, rather than because they strike a chord. Steal their nationalist thunder by taking tough lines on issues such as immigration? This smacks of capitulation to the very ideas critics seek to defeat.

3. There are some hints towards, but not a deeper look at the solutions. These would be: (a) have politics more about grassroots campaigning and organising; (b) have Parliament more representative of class, gender and race; (c) raising rather than doing anything about people’s concerns (on immigration, globalisation, poverty, housing etc), as Sarkozy has done, while promoting diversity.

I do wonder however if these parties can simply be called far right. Much of their features and those of its constituences pertain to what Seymour Lipset has called ‘extremism of the center’ (combined with right wing extremism): On Post-Fascism

As one of the greatest and most level-headed masters of twentieth-century political sociology, Seymour Martin Lipset, has noted, fascism is the extremism of the center.Fascism had very little to do with passéiste feudal, aristocratic, monarchist ideas, was on the whole anti-clerical, opposed communism and socialist revolution, and–like the liberals whose electorate it had inherited–hated big business, trade unions, and the social welfare state. Lipset had classically shown that extremisms of the left and right were by no means exclusive: some petty bourgeois attitudes suspecting big business and big government could be, and were, prolonged into an extremism that proved lethal. Right-wing and center extremisms were combined in Hungarian, Austrian, Croatian, Slovak para-fascism (I have borrowed this term from Roger Griffin) of a pseudo-Christian, clericalist, royalist coloring, but extremism of the center does and did exist, proved by Lipset also through continuities in electoral geography.

Today there is nothing of any importance on the political horizon but the bourgeois center, therefore its extremism is the most likely to reappear. (Jörg Haider and his Freedom Party are the best example of this. Parts of his discourse are libertarian/neoliberal, his ideal is the propertied little man, he strongly favors a shareholding and home-owning petty bourgeois “democracy,” and he is quite free of romantic-reactionary nationalism as distinct from parochial selfishness and racism.)

The same can be said I think for Geert Wilders and his Freedom Party. With fascism it shares a strong sense of (cultural) nationalism, a protectionist view of economy, suspicion of religion and a strong belief in the superiority of Western civilization. Simple slogans and truisms, anti-intellectualism and anti-establishment are very much part of the its political spirit. It is also very much concerned with freedom and liberty of the people although the current parties are more concerned with the freedom of the individual than with the freedom of the people as an organic whole. The political views of Wilders and others are not necessarily grounded in fascism (and this is where much of the comparisons are flawed I think) but they relate to particular aspects of social life in which many people are concerned about. The political center among a population does not have to be fascist or extremist in the sense of a consistent ideological approach but they may favor extreme approaches to fringe groups who are labelled as asocial, anti-societal, deviant, dangerous or radical. In this case the perception that Islam is a problem ‘we’ have to solve urgently is widely shared with political parties on the center and left who think Islam can and should be changed and parties on the right who think Islam cannot be changed and therefore has to be stopped. Therefore at least Wilders’ PVV (I’m not sure about the other parties) I think can be analyzed better as ‘extremism of the center’ its main claim being Europe is becoming Islamized. A thesis that has been severely contested and proves flawed:

IRR: Christopher Caldwell dissected

‘Can Europe be the same with different people in it?’ asks the question on the front cover. For Caldwell the question is purely rhetorical, particularly when these ‘different’ people are Muslims. At the end of his book he concludes that: ‘It is certain that Europe will emerge changed from its confrontation with Islam. It is far less certain that Islam will prove assimilable’ since ‘when an insecure, malleable, relativistic culture meets a culture that is anchored, confident, and strengthened by common doctrines, it is generally the former that changes to suit the latter’. If Muslims should not prove ‘assimilable’ then what should be done with them? The nuanced observer does not say, but he does not need to, when so many others are saying it for him. And the uncritical reception given to this artful anti-Muslim diatribe in liberal circles is a depressing reminder of the extent to which its essential assumptions have moved from the political margins to form a new mainstream consensus.

Anthropology
Links: Debates on Iran and Leftist Politics « OPEN ANTHROPOLOGY

As often happens in the heat of debate, the “really big” assumptions behind certain perceptions remain unquestioned. I believe that these are some that need to be addressed before the debate can continue fruitfully:

1. When writers use the term “left” what exactly do they mean?
2. Are all leftists anti-imperialist?
3. Are all anti-imperialists leftist?
4. What theory, or theories, of imperialism are at work here in order for us to know what writers mean by imperialism, and for judging the basis on which Iran’s current regime is anti-imperialist?

The cultural significance of Internet practices « media/anthropology

The ethnographic study of Internet in 2000 gives us useful baseline: Miller and Slater, Hine, Zurawski. Key debate was whether you could study online phenomena in their own right, without tracing them back to their everyday offline contexts. On one side of the debate, Miller and Slater argue starting point should be the myriad practices and specific contexts of daily life, including online practices as part of – not apart from – those contexts. They back this up with ethnography of Internet on the island of Trinidad and among Trini diaspora. On the other side, Hine argues you can indeed study online practices and communities in their own right, and seeks to demonstrates this with own ethnographic study of online groups formed in support of an English nanny accused of killing a baby in America.

In this article I review four works completed eight years later, in 2008. What are the debates now? What’s the state of the anthropological/ethnographic study of the Internet eight years on, the new baseline? I argue that the online/offline methodological debate has been revived with Boellstorff’s ethnography of Second Life and should not be dismissed or explained away as it remains important. But I also suggest we need to pay heed to the great labour of the new generation of anthros studying the internet of empirically documenting and seeking to understand Internet practices both ethnographically and historically (esp. Kelty). These include online/inworld practices studied in their own right (Second Life) as well as practices that traverse sites and domains (Free Software, internet filmmaking, digital integration projects).

The theoretical approaches adopted in order to assess the cultural significance of these new Internet practices merit attention as well: recursive publics (Kelty), techne (Boellstorff), actor-network theory (Hinkelbein), practice theory (Roig).

Personal noteI think this is a very important review that takes up the old online-offline debate again. In our researchgroup both Carmen Becker and myself are dealing with the issue.
Teaching Anthropology: Welcome to My World

Enough said?

Now does everyone understand why I rant so much. Any and all expressions of pity, outrage, disgust, and disbelief are most welcome.

Making Sense of Darfur » Blog Archive » Poverty and Maldistribution: Sudan’s Fundamental Security Challenge

In the recent US Congressional hearings on a review of US policy on Sudan, little was said about the crushing burden of poverty that confronts the average Sudanese– from the outskirts of Khartoum to the outer fringes of this vast and isolated country; the perennial displacement of people occasioned by conflict ,disease, and climate change; and the lack of opportunity and isolation imposed on a generation of Sudanese by both national and international actors. While Darfur represents its most wretched and heart wrenching visage, displacement and destitution visited upon a hapless people is no less apparent in the Nuba Mountains, the Red Sea hills, the rolling plains of Blue Nile State, the drowned cataracts of the Nile, the formless shantytowns of South Sudan, and the teeming suburbs of Khartoum etched on the desert sands. Such is the reality of Sudan.

ethnosnacker: Ethnography & the arts

I must admit to having no idea what we would uncover when I proposed a small study to try to understand how the arts (galleries, concerts, theatre, etc.) fitted into people’s lives.

Gender
Op-Ed Columnist – Not a Victim, but a Hero – NYTimes.com

After being kidnapped at the age of 16 by a group of thugs and enduring a year of rapes and beatings, Assiya Rafiq was delivered to the police and thought her problems were over.

Then, she said, four police officers took turns raping her.

The next step for Assiya was obvious: She should commit suicide. That’s the customary escape in rural Pakistan for a raped woman, as the only way to cleanse the disgrace to her entire family.

Instead, Assiya summoned the unimaginable courage to go public and fight back. She is seeking to prosecute both her kidnappers and the police, despite threats against her and her younger sisters. This is a kid who left me awed and biting my lip; this isn’t a tale of victimization but of valor, empowerment and uncommon heroism.

“I decided to prosecute because I don’t want the same thing to happen to anybody else,” she said firmly.

Rise in Canadian ‘honour killings’ should not be ignored: expert

As many as 5,000 women and girls lose their lives — most at the hands of family members — in “honour killings” around the world each year, according to the United Nations.

Up to a dozen have died for the same reason in Canada in the last decade, and it’s happening more often, says Amin Muhammad, a psychiatrist who studies honour killings at Memorial University in Newfoundland.

“There are a number of organizations which don’t accept the idea of honour killing; they say it’s a Western-propagated myth by the media, but it’s not true,” he says. “Honour killing is there, and we should acknowledge it, and Canada should take it seriously.”

Patriarchy and violence against women exist in all societies

Immigrant and Muslim women are often put in a paralyzing position when violence occurs against such women in Canada.

This position is a result of the media’s misunderstanding of how patriarchy manifests itself in societies around the world, including North America. This misunderstand forces us and our communities to fight the racism in media reports and readers’ commentaries when we should otherwise be facing the challenge of eliminating all forms of control and violence against women and children.

[…]Gender violence must be analyzed comprehensively, not viewed as a “cultural problem” among certain communities. If a white man kills his partner and/or children, he is seen as a murderer and a “bad apple.” But when non-whites and non-Christians kill, the crime is often called an “honour killing” and entire communities and cultures are labelled as “backward.”

[…]

Indeed, as Adeema Niazi of the Toronto-based Afghan Women’s Organization states: “Violence against women exists everywhere.”

Middle East Online

Muslim women use mosques to reclaim their rights

Patriarchy progressively challenged by female reformers in the name of original Islam.

By John Esposito – WASHINGTON, DC

Like the status of women in all the World’s religions, in Islam and Muslim societies patriarchy played and in many cases continues to influence the status and roles of women. The place of women in the formative period of Islam reflected Qur’anic concerns for the status and rights of women as well as the patriarchal structure of the societies in which Islamic law was developed and elaborated. The status of women and the family in Islamic law was the product of Arab culture, Qur’anic reforms, and foreign ideas and values assimilated from conquered peoples. While the Qur’an introduced substantial reforms, providing new regulations and modifying local custom and practice, at the same time, much of the traditional pre-Islamic social structure with its extended family, the paramount position of males, the roles and responsibilities of its members, and family values was incorporated.

A new source of women’s empowerment today has become active participation in the mosque and use of Islam’s tradition to reclaim their rights in Islam. Reformers today emphasize that just as women during the time of the Prophet prayed in the mosque, so too today they actively exercise that right. In the centuries after the death of Muhammad, women played a small but significant role as transmitters of hadith (prophetic traditions) and in the development of Sufism (Islamic mysticism). Gradually, however, women’s religious role and practice, particularly their access to education and the mosque, were severely restricted. Male religious scholars cited a variety of reasons, from moral degeneration in society to women’s bringing temptation and social discord, to restrict both their presence in public life and their access to education and the mosque.

Walid El Houri: Neda and Marwa: a Tale of Two Murdered Women

On June 20th 2009, Neda Agha Soltan was shot dead during the post-election protests in Iran. The protests occupied the largest news segments around the world, with analysts and commentators predicting the fall of the Iranian regime and the dawn of freedom breaking in “the axis of evil.”

Neda’s death became an icon of the Iranian opposition and a symbol for millions of people of the injustice of the Iranian regime and the defiance of the protesters. Neda’s death was put in context. It was taken from the personal realm of the death of an individual to the public realm of the just cause of a whole society.

On July 1st Marwa El Sherbini, an Egyptian researcher living in Germany, was stabbed to death 18 times inside a courtroom in the city of Dresden, in front of her 3-year-old son. She had won a verdict against a German man of Russian descent who had verbally assaulted her because of her veil. Her husband, who rushed in to save her when she was attacked in the courtroom, was shot by the police. Marwa’s death was not reported by any Western news media until protests in Egypt erupted after her burial. The reporting that followed focused on the protests; the murder was presented as the act of a “lone wolf,” thus depriving it of its context and its social meaning.

The fact that media are biased and choose what to report according to their own agenda is not the issue in this case. What the comparison of the two murders shows, is that European and Western societies have failed to grasp the significance and the importance of the second murder in its social, political, and historical context.

Burqas, Bans and Feeble Women « Nuseiba

In Mythologies Roland Barthes’s suggested that signs could be used as signifiers for other concepts; those concepts he identified as mythologies formed to perpetuate an idea of society. The myths are artificial constructions, adding a new layer of meaning over text and speech. He highlights that what we accept as being a natural, inductive relationship between the text and the myth is in fact an illusory reality constructed in order to mask the real structure of power.

In her approach Haussegger uses the burka as a loaded symbolic text for an idea – the oppression and subjugation of women. And like Barthes notes, to symbolize is to be. So, even if a garment does not literally restrict, if it signifies restriction then the garment restricts all those who wear it, freely chosen or not. But the myth of oppression constructed around the burqa deprives the burqa of substance; the burqa is distorted to suit the needs of the myth. Though it remains within the concept, it is “half-amputated … deprived of memory … [it is] speech wholly at the service of the concept. The concept, literally, deforms, but does not abolish the meaning … it alienates it.”

[…]

I’m not denying the use of the burqa to oppress and subjugate women. But to then deny that the burqa inhabits a number of uses and roles along with oppression is to deny the inherent dynamism of the burqa. Linking it to one myth and generalising that experience to the whole of Muslim women is patronising and smacks of neo-colonialism. As Nazish Brohi argues in her article “At the Altar of Subalternity: The Quest for Muslim Women in the War on Terror Pakistan after 9/11?, “this selective invocation is reducing spaces for women’s personal identity formation and its political articulation, and by coopting the very language of women’s rights and empowerment and investing in it political strategies, has rendered it ineffective.” And the lingering question remains: banning a garment, a single piece of clothing, doesn’t necessarily combat the ideology that is used when the burqa is forced onto women. A ban would be an empty, symbolic gesture perpetuating another myth and another power structure: Australia’s control over the Others in our midst, dictating that “we” know about democracy, Australian-ness and compassion while “they” do not.

What’s it like being a gay Muslim? | UK news | The Guardian

What’s it like being a gay Muslim?

EastEnders’ current romantic storyline featuring a gay Muslim character has caused a stir. But what is it really like to be gay within Britain’s Muslim communities?

Only 367 Muslim women in France wear full veil – report | World | Reuters

Only 367 women in France wear Islamic veils that cover their faces and bodies, a newspaper reported on Wednesday, undermining the position of politicians who are pushing for a ban on the garments.

A panel of legislators is studying the issue of whether the number of women wearing such veils is on the rise and why. The panel is expected to say in coming months whether it backs a ban on the veils in public places, as advocated by some politicians.

Ramadan
tabsir.net » Hilarious Introduction to Ramadan

Ramadan this year starts in just three weeks. Last Ramadan I was in Indonesia and bootleg copies of a Malaysian produced animated Ramadan TV special were circulating. Upin and Ipin are a pair of Malay twins about 5 or 6 years old whose gang of friends include an Indian boy, a Chinese girl, and two other Muslim boys. I recently showed this to my children as an effort to start teaching them about world religions. They loved it, they laughed so hard. And they learned something about Islam as it is lived, or at least nostalgialized in Malaysia.

Because the series was created to educate Malaysian kids about Ramadan, it is perfect for teaching about Ramadan to American kids.

Virtual Sphere

Saudi Gazette – Google’s abuse of power to take over popular YoutubeIslam.com

“Will we just hand over a million dollar website for free?” questions Yusuf.
“First they said our logo and images were identical to theirs, which was a big lie. Then they changed their direction and called us up on the phone saying we should give them the domain because they are Google, the biggest and most powerful company on the Internet and they can make it difficult for anyone who gets in their way.
“Then they came up with the idea that our domain name sounded too much like theirs and it was confusing people who use the Internet. For that reason, went to the controllers of the Internet itself with their claim and requested what is called arbitration.”
But Sheikh Yusuf Estes says his website’s name cannot be mistaken for Google’s. “Does anyone really have trouble making a distinction between the word ‘youtube’ and ‘youtubeislam’?”
“The fact is, Google got sued for exactly what they claim we are doing, but in their case there really was no difference in the sound. When they bought YouTube for $1.3 billion, the company UTUBE.com sued them as they owned that name on the Internet for 10 years before Google did,” he added.
What Sheikh Yusuf is worried about is the possibility that Google may misuse the website by advertising Haraam things and using it for un-Islamic purposes.
He calls on every Internet user to support his campaign by spreading the message and speaking up against the takeover, as time is running out.
“Without notification in advance, our server, Godaddy.com, sent an email stating due to a decision made by arbitration on the Internet, they are going to give our domain name to Google,” he said.

Dutch

Bekeerd in Elspeet – Trouw

Het christelijk geloof gaf haar niet langer wat ze nodig had. Dus begon Helma Frens (17) een zoektocht langs de wereldreligies. Uiteindelijk belandde zij bij de islam en vond wat ze zocht. Bekeren was toen een kwestie van tijd en durf.

Droomland Marokko stelt vrome moslim teleur – Binnenland – de Volkskrant

Ahrazem is in Nederland opgegroeid, hij woont in Limburg. Aan de Hogeschool Zuyd in Maastricht studeert hij sinds 2006 Arabisch, en hij heeft in Marokko net een cursus Arabisch achter de rug bij het Nederlands Instituut in Rabat. In het begin voelde hij zich gefrustreerd dat uitgerekend hij, die een goed moslim wil zijn, op zijn tellen moet passen in Marokko, het land dat hij altijd meer als zijn vaderland beschouwde dan Nederland.

Nederlands Juridisch Dagblad NJD § Juridisch nieuws – Moslima-verpleegkundige Jeroen Bosch Ziekenhuis krijgt standaard correctiefactor (c=1)

Het Jeroen Bosch Ziekenhuis heeft het helemaal gehad met de wensen van een moslima en verzoekt tot ontbinding van de arbeidsovereenkomst. Met succes, 2 augustus a.s. is haar eerste ‘vakantiedag’.

Centrale vraag aldus: in hoeverre mag een ziekenhuis door middel van een kledingvoorschrift (te weten het dragen van korte mouwen) inbreuk mag maken op het grondrecht van een moslima-verpleegkundige om zich te kleden overeenkomstig haar geloofsovertuiging (dwz het dragen van lange of driekwart mouwen)?

Iets waar werkgever en werknemer toch in goed overleg een werkbare oplossing voor hadden kunnen vinden? Normaal wel, maar niet op de dialyse-afdeling. De arbeidsovereenkomst wordt ontbonden en wel onder toekenning van een vergoeding, bepaald met neutrale factor c=1, want de moslima-verpleegkundige kan zich niet schikken in geboden tegemoetkomingen van werkgeefster.

Wettelijk kader in deze casus onder meer de ‘WIP-richtlijn’, die volgens advocaat van werkneemster veelvuldig wordt geschonden in het ziekenhuis.

De inbreuk die het Jeroen Bosch Ziekenhuis met het kledingvoorschrift maakt op het grondrecht van de verpleegkundige om zich volgens haar geloofsovertuiging te kleden oordeelt kantonrechter mr. G.J. Roeterdink op 13 juli 2009 ‘noodzakelijk, proportioneel en gerechtvaardigd’.

Onderarm moet tot maximaal 15 cm boven pols onbedekt; was ze bij 25 cm wel in dienst gebleven?

Nederlands Juridisch Dagblad NJD § Juridisch nieuws – Moslima-verpleegkundige Jeroen Bosch Ziekenhuis krijgt standaard correctiefactor (c=1)

Vanwege haar islamitische geloofsovertuiging is [verweerster] verplicht haar armen, inclusief de onderarmen, zoveel mogelijk te bedekken. Om die reden heeft zij gevraagd om onder de bedrijfskleding lange mouwen te mogen dragen en, indien dat niet mogelijk is, om drie-kwart-mouwen te mogen dragen waarbij de onderarm tot maximaal 15 cm. boven de pols onbedekt is.

Het Ziekenhuis heeft het verzoek van [verweerster] in overweging genomen en heeft daartoe gedurende het jaar 2008 meerdere in- en externe adviezen (o.m. van een lid van genoemde Werkgroep) ingewonnen, doch is tot de conclusie gekomen dat moet worden vastgehouden aan bedrijfskleding met korte mouw.

Joods en Wilders stemmen – DePers.nl

Prominente joden als Job Cohen, Harry de Winter en rabbijn Soetendorp zijn felle tegenstanders van Geert Wilders. De joodse PVV-stemmers zijn minder bekend. Maar ze zijn er wel. ‘De joodse elite wil niet dat er gepraat wordt over de woede onder de joden.’

2 comments.

C L O S E R

August, 2009

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Migrantenstudies – Identificatie van migrantenjongeren

Spitsnieuws Online – Veel geschreeuw, weinig wol

Radicalization Series Part II – What is it? A plea for critical radicalization studies

Ghuraba – De Vreemdelingen

Punk Piety – "Challenging the orthodoxy of Punk and Islam"

Punk Piety – “Challenging the orthodoxy of Punk and Islam”

Closing the week 31 – Featuring the March of the Extremists

August, 2009

Pages

Categories

General

Dutch [Muslims] Blogs

Non-Dutch Muslims Blogs

General Islam Sites

Islamic Scholars

Social Sciences Scholars

Women's Blogs / Sites

Ritueel en religieuze beleving Nederland

Muslim News

Moslims & Maatschappij

Arts & Culture

Misc.

'Fundamentalism'

Islam & commerce

2

Morocco

[Online] Publications

Religious Movements

Site Meta

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