C L O S E R

De Marokkaanse Uitzondering?

Posted on February 20th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: Featured, Headline, Society & Politics in the Middle East.

Guest Author: Nina ter Laan

Marokko staat in het westen bekend als één van de meest liberale landen van Noord Afrika. Wat wij in Nederland over Marokko te weten komen wordt vaak gezien door de lens van migratie en integratiedebatten. We moeten echter niet vergeten dat de economische drijfveren (armoede) van de Marokkaanse gastarbeiders (voornamelijk uit de Rif) in de jaren ‘60 en ‘70 van de vorige eeuw, destijds voortkwamen uit politieke onderdrukking. Dezelfde misstanden die nu door bevolkingen in het MO aan de kaak worden gesteld. Is er zoveel veranderd in de tussenliggende jaren in Marokko? Want tot nu toe krijgt de revolutionaire geest die momenteel over landen in het MO waart geen vat op het land. Er zijn wel reacties vanuit de bevolking gekomen. Kleine protesten werden al geïnitieerd in steden als Tanger en Fes en een viertal mensen stak zichzelf in brand, in de hoop een vergelijkbare protestactie als in Tunesië te ontketenen. Ook via sociale media roepen kleine groepen op tot protest. Maar dit alles heeft niet hetzelfde effect gehad als in Tunesië, Egypte of zelfs Algerije.

De overheid reageerde ook. De Marokkaanse minister van informatie Khalid Naciri zei tijdens een persconferentie dat de Marokkaanse regering de volken in de Arabische wereld steunt, maar benadrukte tegelijkertijd het belang van stabiliteit van Marokko voor de rest van de regio. Bovendien zei hij dat het koninkrijk al lang het pad van meer democratie en vrijheden is opgegaan. Het vertrouwen in het veronderstelde voltooide democratisering proces van Marokko staat echter haaks op de onmiddellijke verhoging van de subsidies op voedselprijzen en het verplaatsen van militaire troepen van de Westelijke Sahara naar de binnenlanden als reactie op de onrust in Tunesië.

Of Marokko daadwerkelijk al gedemocratiseerd is, zoals Naciri beweert, valt te betwijfelen. Wel is het het enige land in de regio dat reeds sinds eind jaren negentig van de vorige eeuw al een geleidelijk democratiseringsproces heeft ondergaan. Als antwoord op het einde van de koude oorlog en onder druk van internationale mensenrechtenorganisaties werden er aan het einde van het bewind van Hassan II, de toenmalige koning van Marokko, hervormingen doorgevoerd. De Marokkaanse bevolking ging onder zijn bewind namelijk gebukt onder repressie. Tijdens zijn bewind trad hij hardhandig op tegen binnenlandse tegenstanders van het regime. Deze periode wordt ook wel “De loden jaren” genoemd. In 1970 en 1972 werden er door het leger aanslagen gepleegd op de koning. Beide aanslagen mislukten en de daders werden geëxecuteerd en hun families gearresteerd en jarenlang vastgehouden in mensonterende omstandigheden. Ook de Berbertalige bevolking uit de Rif is meerdere malen in opstand gekomen tegen repressies van het regime zoals tijdens de opstand in de jaren vijftig en later de jaren 80. Beide opstanden werden hardhandig neergeslagen door het leger. Na de laatste Rif opstand zette Hassan geen voet meer in het gebied en liet de regio aan haar lot over. De hervormingen zetten een nieuwe koers in en kwamen in een stroomversnelling toen Mohammed 6 zijn vader na zijn dood opvolgde in 1999. Nu, na een decennium Mohamed 6 aan het bewind lijkt er meer speling te zijn, zeker in vergelijking met de buurlanden. De armoede in Marokko is niet onderdrukkend, de kosten van levensonderhoud zijn relatief laag, er heerst niet al decennia lang een noodtoestand (zoals bijvoorbeeld in Egypte of Algerije), waardoor protesten tot op zekere hoogte getolereerd worden.

Toch zijn ook veel Marokkanen ontevreden met de huidige situatie met name door armoede (15% leeft onder de armoede grens), werkeloosheid (10%), slecht onderwijs, analfabetisme (40%) en beperkte politieke vrijheid. Het is een harde klassenmaatschappij met een traditie van patroon-cliënt-relaties en de daarmee gepaarde corruptie. Er is een enorme kloof tussen rijk en arm en een relatief kleine hoogopgeleide middenklasse. Volgens het tijdschrift Forbes is de koninklijke familie in het bezit van ongeveer 2,5 miljard dollar en worden belangrijke posities steeds gedomineerd door dezelfde hooggeplaatste families. Het is niet vreemd dus dat er toch oproepen tot protest zijn. Een groep jonge Marokkanen genaamd “le mouvement du 20 fevrier” heeft afgelopen donderdag opgeroepen om op 20 februari massaal de straat op te gaan om economische hervormingen te eisen, maar ook om een politiek geluid te laten horen tegen de regering, tegen de clan die het koningshuis omringt, maar ook tegen de koning. De groep, die opereert via netwerksite Facebook, claimt nu al ongeveer 5000 aanhangers te hebben. Ze eisen: ontbinding van het parlement, een nieuwe grondwet, een overgangsregering, vrijlating van politieke gevangenen, en sociaal economische rechten.

Regeringsvorm: constitutionele monarchie
Eén van de verklaringen waarom Marokko anders reageert op de opstanden dan overige Arabische landen moet gezocht worden in de regeringsvorm van het land en de centrale positie van de koning daarin. Marokko is geen militaire dictatuur zoals Algerije of Egypte, maar een constitutionele monarchie waarvan de afstamming van het staatshoofd terugvoert tot de profeet Mohammed via de Alawieten dynastie die Marokko nu reeds sinds 400 jaar regeert. De koning is Amir al Muminin, leider der gelovigen. De politieke macht van de monarch in Marokko is groot en reikt ver. Naast koning is hij ook opperbevelhebber van het leger en voorzitter van de Hoge Raad. Via artikel 19 van de grondwet staat hij boven alle andere politieke partijen en hij heeft de bevoegdheden ministers persoonlijk te benoemen en fatwa’s uit te vaardigen. Ook in het bedrijfsleven heeft de koning een aardige vinger in de pap. De Koninklijke familiebedrijven, zoals o.a. ONA, zijn tezamen goed voor 6 procent van het Marokkaanse BBP. Parallel aan het koningshuis beschikt Marokko ook over een democratisch bestel, met een parlement, politieke partijen en een minister president en verkiezingen. Het democratisch gehalte van dit staatsbestuur is echter niet zo groot. Het parlement en de kliek rondom de koning zijn gebaseerd op patroon-cliëntrelaties waarbij giften en invloedrijke posities gegeven worden in ruil voor politieke loyaliteit. Ook al heb je in Marokko nog zo’n goede opleiding, wanneer je niet de juiste connecties hebt kom je niet ver.

Koning Mohammed VI, geliefd monarch, hervormer of despoot?
Onder de invloed van de revoluties in Tunesië en Egypte gaan er nu wel stemmen op om de macht van de koning in te perken tot een meer ceremoniële positie, zoals in Zweden of Nederland. Echter, tegelijkertijd wordt de koning als enig geloofwaardig en betrouwbaar lid van het parlement gezien. Ondanks de corruptie en de ongelijke verdeling van macht geniet de koning toch een enorme legitimiteit onder een groot deel van de Marokkaanse bevolking. Dit is bijvoorbeeld te merken in de reacties van Marokkaanse jongeren via de sociale media: op Facebook hebben jongeren allerlei foto’s van Egyptische demonstranten gepost met teksten en steunbetuigingen en liefdesverklaringen aan de koning. Er is zelfs een beweging tegen de “mouvement du 20 fevrier” opgekomen, genaamd “de mars van de liefde”, waarin facebookers werden opgeroepen om op Valentijnsdag hun profielfoto te veranderen in een foto van Mohammed VI. De nog jonge koning (nu 47 jaar) heeft zijn populariteit niet alleen te danken aan zijn religieuze legitimiteit en de breuk die hij heeft gemaakt ten opzichte van dictatoriale beleid van zijn vader, maar ook aan zijn ondernemersgeest. Koninklijke initiatieven en hervormingen, zoals ontwikkeling van infrastructurele projecten – de bouw van havens, en wegen – maar ook sociale hervormingen zijn op tijd klaar en worden efficiënt uitgevoerd. Met als gevolg dat de Marokkanen een betere infrastructuur hebben gekregen en er voor vrouwen meer rechten zijn dan voorheen dankzij de herziening van de moudawana. Ook is er meer persvrijheid dan voorheen, en sommige minderheden zagen hun eisen ingewilligd.

Dit alles maakt dat de koning door velen over het algemeen minder als een despoot wordt gezien en meer als een weldoener en een geliefd monarch. De loyaliteit van de bevolking naar de koning is dus groot, terwijl de regerende klasse vaak wordt gezien als een falende en corrupte kliek die elkaar al jaren lang in het zadel houdt, de bevolking armer maakt en eerlijke kansen op werk ontneemt. Deze regering wordt echter benoemd door de koning die zelf ook deel uitmaakt van deze eeuwen oude klasse (Makhzen). De keerzijde is dat de massa vaak nog niet van de hervormingen heeft kunnen profiteren en dat, hoewel slachtoffers van de loden jaren hun verhalen mogen doen voor het gerechtigheid en verzoeningscomité, er geen vervolging van de daders plaats vindt. Daarbij wordt oppositie of kritiek op de koning niet geduld.

Pers
Dit is onder andere te merken in de pers. Ondanks het feit dat de persvrijheid de afgelopen jaren is verbeterd, moeten journalisten toch nog regelmatig voor enkele dagen de cel in wanneer zij zich kritisch uitlaten over de onderwerpen waar je in Marokko absoluut niet kritisch over mag schrijven: de onafhankelijkheid van de Westelijke Sahara, de islam, en de positie van de koning. De toename van persvrijheid lijkt het afgelopen jaar echter weer tanende. In 2010 werden maar liefst twee liberaal kritische tijdschriften uit de lucht gehaald: “Le Journal Hebdo” en “Nichane. Nichane was in 2006 al in de problemen geraakt door een artikel over humor en de grappen die Marokkanen maken over islam, seks en de koning. De schrijvers van het artikel werden vervolgd en kregen een boete en voorwaardelijke straffen. Na een publicatie van een populariteitspoll van de koning werd in oktober vorig jaar het tijdschrift subtiel de nek omgedraaid door met name een advertentieboycot van ONA, het bedrijf dat in handen is van het koningshuis. Het enige liberaal kritische tijdschrift dat nu nog bestaat is het Franstalige Telquel.

Oppositie en co-optatie
Wat Marokko ook onderscheidt van andere landen in het MO is dat het land een breed scala aan georganiseerde protestbewegingen en culturele politieke bewegingen kent, waarvan sommige buiten het politieke systeem opereren. Zij bemiddelen tussen de politieke macht en het volk via cultureel politieke organisaties en oefenen een belangrijke invloed uit op het politieke beleid. In tegenstelling tot zijn vader onderdrukt de huidige koning deze bewegingen niet. Ze worden getolereerd en gecontroleerd en er wordt geprobeerd hen in de machtscirkel te trekken door middel van coöptatie-strategieën. Met andere woorden het regime organiseert haar eigen oppositie. Dit is onder andere bij de Berberse beweging gebeurd, door middel van de oprichting van het koninklijk berber instituut (IRCAM), waar sommige voormalige Berberse activisten een aanstelling hebben gekregen als ambtenaar of onderzoeker. Een goed voorbeeld vormen de hoogopgeleide werklozen. Deze groep organiseert sinds een aantal jaren driemaal daags demonstraties voor het parlement in Rabat om de regering om werk in de publieke sector te vragen. Het gaat hier om een doordacht systeem van georganiseerde afgestudeerde werkelozen die hun bestaan zichtbaar maken door middel van straatprotesten in de hoofdstad van Marokko met als doel een baan in de publieke sector te verkrijgen. De regering houdt de demonstranten afhankelijk door jaarlijks banen te verstrekken ( in volgorde van wie het langst en trouwst geprotesteerd hebben). Hierdoor wordt dit systeem in stand gehouden, er wordt de schijn van democratie gewekt zonder dat het structurele probleem wordt aangepakt.

Politiek en islam
Na 9/ 11 en de aanslagen door jihadisten in 2003 in Casablanca is Marokko een nieuwe koers gaan varen. Er werd hardhandig opgetreden tegen leden van islamitische bewegingen en tegelijkertijd werd er een nationale campagne tegen terrorisme georganiseerd, waarbij de nadruk lag op een tolerante en moderne Islam. Hiermee werd niet alleen aan de internationale gemeenschap getoond dat de Marokkaanse islam een moderne en liberale islam is, maar ook bood men op deze manier een tegenwicht tegen ´radicalisering´. De nadruk op het soefisme als de pacifistische variant van de islam, als een basispeiler in de herformulering van een Marokkaanse islam staat hierin centraal. Men hoopt op deze manier de islamistische oppositie die sterk groeit in populariteit, onder de duim te houden. Een deel daarvan is toegelaten in het parlement (PJD), gecoöpteerd in het regime, waardoor het redelijk controleerbaar blijft. Echter, de grootste politieke islamistische beweging de al ‘adl wa l Ihsane is uitgesloten van politieke participatie vanwege hun standpunt jegens de koning, wier religieuze legitimiteit zij in twijfel trekken.

Marokkaanse jongerencultuur, globalisering en liberalisering van de culturele sfeer
In 2003, vlak na de aanslagen in Casablanca, werd een aantal heavy metal artiesten gearresteerd op verdenking van satanisme. Na een juridisch proces werden de muzikanten op verzoek van de koning vrijgelaten. Dit was een doorbraak voor een jongerencultuur die daarvoor verborgen was gebleven. Rap, techno en heavy metal liefhebbers en muzikanten kwamen aan de oppervlakte en speelden hun muziek op festivals die plots gesponsord of zelfs georganiseerd werden door de overheid. Rappers die maatschappijkritische liederen opvoeren werden uitgenodigd op het koninklijk paleis. Na de aanslagen liet de koning de teugels verder vieren. Hij gaf daarmee ruimte aan een generatie jongeren die in een plek opeist in de geglobaliseerde wereld waarin ze leeft. Deze muziekscene, Nayda ( van het Marokkaans Arabische woord Nod, dat opstaan betekent) stond aan de wieg van een nieuw soort patriottisme, tegen terrorisme en voor vrijheid van meningsuiting, voor een eerlijk en vrij Marokko. Een patriottisme dat niet conservatief is, maar open naar de wereld. Wellicht heeft de koning getracht deze muziekscene (voornamelijk stedelijk) te beïnvloeden en te controleren door middel van financiële en morele steun. Tegelijkertijd echter, is er daarmee een belangrijke uitlaatklep gecreëerd waarin, net als bij de georganiseerde protesten, een gefrustreerde bevolking haar gevoelens tot uiting kan brengen. Hierdoor kunnen rappers als Don Bigg nummers uitbrengen als Baraka men al Khouf (Genoeg met de angst).

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What’s next?
Wat ook de uitkomst zal zijn, het is onwaarschijnlijk dat de koning zal vertrekken. De koning in Marokko heeft een haast goddelijke rol, en slechts weinigen durven hem te bekritiseren. Met zijn aantreden is er zeker modernisering en democratisering gekomen, maar vele van de door de koning geïnitieerde hervormingen lijken vooral symbolisch van aard aangezien ze niet altijd ten goede zijn gekomen van de massa. Toch hebben de Marokkanen slechtere tijden gekend van onderdrukking, volksopstanden en militaire coups. De herinnering aan de Loden jaren boezemt (zeker bij de nog oudere generatie) nog steeds angst in. Tegelijkertijd bieden de geleidelijke hervormingen zichtbare verbeteringen en vooral hoop en vertrouwen. Dit biedt zekerheid en stabiliteit en legitimiteit van de status quo. Misschien hebben de Marokkanen teveel te verliezen om aan een revolutie te beginnen? Daarbij zijn er sinds het aantreden van Mohammed VI meer uitlaatkleppen ontstaan zoals de mogelijkheden van (gecontroleerde) straatprotesten en muziekfestivals. Deze vrijheden werken als katalysatoren tegen mogelijke onrust en conflict. Marokko is misschien niet reeds gedemocratiseerd, zoals Naciri beweert, maar wel zijn er reeds sinds enkele jaren onderhandelingen gestart over de vrijheid van meningsuiting tussen de staat en de bevolking via cultuur, protest en politieke bewegingen over de grenzen van expressie van collectieve onvrede.

Of deze geleidelijke verbeteringen werkelijk richting een democratisering van het land gaan, of gericht zijn op de consolidatie van het huidige bewind valt te bezien. De vraag is of de pas der geleidelijkheid snel genoeg gaat voordat de onvrede over armoede, ongelijke machtsverdeling, corruptie en werkeloosheid wellicht toch ook overslaat naar Marokko.

Nina ter Laan is promovendus in het onderzoeksprogramma ‘Islam and the performing arts in the Middle East and Europe: from cultural heritage to cultural citizenship’aan de afdeling Islam en Arabisch van de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen . Haar onderzoek richt zich op nieuwe ontwikkelingen op het terrein van islamitisch entertainment en kunst in het Midden-Oosten, in het bijzonder Marokko.

Tekst: Baraka men al Khouf/ Genoeg met de angst
Artiest: Don Bigg ( Al Khasser)

Baraka!
Laten we stoppen met bang zijn
Hef je hoofd oh ware Marokkanen
En laten we stoppen met bang zijn
Hef je handen en laat de angst niet in jullie harten huizen
Jullie zijn bang voor de politie, voor de gemeenschap en voor de rijken
Jullie zijn bang voor iedereen maar niet voor God

Er zijn er die bang zijn voor de politie
Er zijn er die bang zijn voor de ambtenaar
En dan zijn er ook die immuun tegen hen zijn
Dan zijn er hen die bang zijn voor mij
En ook zij die bezorgd zijn om mij
Er zijn er die onrechtvaardigheid hebben doorleefd
En er zijn er die zichzelf opblazen
Er zijn er die een politieke partij representeren
En er zijn er die zichzelf representeren
Er zijn er die mensen voorliegen
Er zijn er die stelen en dan liegen dat ze hebben gestolen
Er zijn er die zich verloren voelen en God de schuld geven
Er zijn er die naar me luisteren en anderen die bang zijn voor mijn woorden
Er zijn er die dood zijn.
Er zijn er die mensen vermoord hebben en nog steeds vrij rondlopen
Er zijn er die de Koran kennen maar niets te zeggen hebben in de pers
Er zijn er die miljarden verdienen maar nog geen dirham spenderen
Er zijn mensen die in Tel quel schrijven en daarvoor gearresteerd worden.

We zijn met jullie broeders!

Vertaling: Nina ter Laan

2 comments.

Two Faces of Revolution

Posted on February 1st, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: Featured, Guest authors, Headline, Society & Politics in the Middle East.

Guest Author: Linda Herrera

The events in Tunisia and Egypt have riveted the region and the world. The eruptions of people power have shaken and taken down the seeming unbreakable edifices of dictatorship. (At the time of writing Mubarak has not formally acknowledged that he has been toppled, but the force of the movement is too powerful and determined to fathom any other outcome). Events are moving at breakneck speed and a new narrative for the future is swiftly being written. In the throes of a changing future it merits returning to the stories of two young men, the two faces that stoked the flames of revolution thanks to the persistence of on-line citizen activists who spread their stories. For in the tragic circumstances surrounding their deaths are keys to understanding what has driven throngs of citizens to the streets.

Mohammed Bouazizi has been dubbed “the father of Arab revolution”; a father indeed despite his young years and state of singlehood. Some parts of his life are by now familiar. This 26 year old who left school just short of finishing high school (he was NOT a college graduate as many new stories have been erroneously reporting) and worked in the informal economy as a vendor selling fruits and vegetable to support his widowed mother and five younger siblings. Overwhelmed by the burden of fines, debts, the humiliation of being serially harassed and beaten by police officers, and the indifference of government authorities to redress his grievances, he set himself on fire. His mother insists that though his poverty was crushing, it was the recurrence of humiliation and injustice that drove him to take his life. The image associated with Mohammed Bouazizi is not that of a young man’s face, but of a body in flames on a public sidewalk. His self-immolation occurred in front of the local municipal building where he sought, but never received, justice.

The story of 28 year old Egyptian, Khaled Said, went viral immediately following his death by beating on June 6, 2010. Two photos of him circulated the blogosphere and social networking sites. One was a portrait of his gentle face and soft eyes coming out of a youthful grey hooded sweatshirt; the face of an everyday male youth. The accompanying photo was of the bashed and bloodied face on the corpse of a young man. Though badly disfigured, the image held enough resemblance to the pre-tortured Khaled to decipher that the two faces belonged to the same person. The events leading to Khaled’s killing originated when he posted a video of two police officers allegedly dividing the spoils of a drug bust. This manner of citizen journalism has become commonplace since 2006. Youths across the region have been emboldened by a famous police corruption case of 2006. An activist posted a video on YouTube of two police officers sodomizing and whipping a minibus driver, Emad El Kabeer. It not only incensed the public and disgraced the perpetrators, but led to their criminal prosecution. On June 6, 2010, as Khaled Said was sitting in his local internet café in Alexandria two policemen accosted him and asked him for his I.D. which he refused to produce. They proceeded to drag him away and allegedly beat him to his death as he pleaded for his life. The officers claimed that Khaled died of suffocation when he tried to swallow a package of marijuana to conceal drug possession. But the power of photographic evidence combined with eyewitness accounts and popular knowledge of scores of cases of police brutality left no doubt in anyone’s mind that he was senselessly and brutally murdered by the very members of the police that were supposed to protect them. The court case of the two officers is ongoing.

Mohammed Bouazizi was not the first person to resort to suicide by self immolation out of desperation, there has been an alarming rise in such incidents in different Arab countries. And Khaled Said is sadly one of scores of citizens who have been tortured, terrorized, and killed by police with impunity. But the stories of these two young men are the ones that have captured the popular imagination, they have been game changers.

For the youth of Egypt and Tunisia, the largest cohort of young people ever in their countries, the martyrdoms of Khaled Said and Mohamed Bouaziz represent an undeniable tipping point, the breaking of the fear barrier. The youth have banned together as a generation like never before and are crying out collectively, “enough is enough!” to use the words of a 21 year old friend, Sherif, from Alexandria. The political cartoon of Khaled Said in his signature hoodie shouting to the Intelligence Chief, also popularly known “Torturer in chief” and now Mubarak’s Vice President, to “wake up Egypt” perfectly exemplifies this mood (from the Facebook group, We are all Khaled Said). No longer will the youth cower to authority figures tainted by corruption and abuses. These illegitimate leaders will cower to them. The order of things will change.

And so on January 25, 2011, inspired by the remarkable and inspiring revolution in Tunisia that toppled the twenty-three year reign of the dictatorship of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Egyptian youth saw it was possible to topple their dictator, Hosni Mubarak, of 31 years. Activists used different on-line platforms, most notably the April 6 Youth Movement and the “We are all Khaled Said” Facebook group to organize a national uprising against “Torture, Corruption, Poverty, and Unemployment.”

It is not arbitrary that civil rights, as exemplified in torture and corruption (recall Khaled Said), topped the list of grievances, followed by economic problems. For youth unemployment and underemployment will, under any regime, be among the greatest challenges of the times.

No one could have anticipated that this initial call would heed such mass and inclusive participation. Youths initially came to the streets braving tanks, rubber bullets, tear gas (much of which is made in the US and part of US military aid, incidentally), detention, and even death. And they were joined by citizens of all persuasions and life stages; children, youth, elderly, middle aged, female, male, middle class, poor, Muslim, Christians, Atheists.
Contrary to a number of commentators in news outlets in North America and parts of Europe the two revolutions overtaking North Africa are not motivated by Islamism and there are no compelling signs that they will be co-opted in this direction. Such analyses are likely to be either ideologically driven or misinformed. In fact, Islam has not figured whatsoever into the stories of Bouazizi and Said. These are inclusive freedom movements for civic, political, and economic rights. To understand what is driving the movement and what will invariably shape the course of reforms in the coming period we need to return to these young men. Their evocative if tragic deaths speak reams about the erosion of rights and accountability under decades of corrupt dictatorship, about the rabid assault on people’s dignity. They remind us of the desperate need to restore a political order that is just and an economic order that is fair. Mohamed Bouazizi and Khaled Said have unwittingly helped to pave a way forward, and to point the way to the right side of history.

*Correction: The figure who appears cowering in the cartoon is former Minister of Interior, Habib al-Adly, NOT Omar Suleiman, Mubarak’s VP

Linda Herrera is a social anthropologist with expertise in comparative and international education. She has lived in Egypt and conducted research on youth cultures and educational change in Egypt and the wider Middle East for over two decades. She is currently Associate Professor, Department of Education Policy, Organization and Leadership, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. She is co-editor with A. Bayat of the volume Being Young and Muslim: New Cultural Politics in the Global North and South, published by Oxford University Press (2010).

This post also appeared at Thetyee.ca

8 comments.

Introducing Anthropology and Publicity

Posted on October 17th, 2010 by martijn.
Categories: anthropology, Featured, Headline, ISIM/RU Research.

Although anthropology is by definition ‘public’, the relationship between its practitioners and society, its social relevance and its connections with the wider audience, have always been controversial and complex. This will be the general theme of the meeting on 5 November 2010 at Ravenstein. To be sure, it is a vast and multifaceted topic.

The focus is on the dissemination of anthropological knowledge to relevant groups in the societies to which anthropologists belong and those where they conduct their research. We will address the reasons for the underexposure of anthropological knowledge (albeit there is considerable variation in this regard according to national anthropological traditions) and explore ways to improve its dissemination and application in society.

Since the emergence of academic anthropology, the discipline has had the double mission of, on the one hand, describing and interpreting cultural differences and, on the other, generating cross-cultural knowledge about humankind. The inherent tension between the particular and the general requires a balancing act on the part of anthropologists and complicates the translation of anthropological knowledge for ‘consumption’ by the wider public, media and policy makers. Given the increased complexity of societies in a globalizing world, anthropological knowledge has become potentially more relevant, yet remains underexposed to wider audiences.

The meeting in Soeterbeeck will be structured by four intimately related questions. First, in which ways can anthropological knowledge be improved in order to become more relevant and accessible for non-collegial groups in their own society and in the societies where they do their fieldwork? Second, what are the pros and cons of popularizing anthropological publications and moving them to the ‘front lines’? Third, to what extent can cultural relativism play a role in the public debate on social issues? And, finally, what role can the new digital media play in enhancing the public value of anthropology?

These questions will be addressed by the following speakers: Ulf Hannerz (Stockholm University), Thomas Hylland Eriksen (University of Oslo), Jeremy MacClancy (Oxford Brookes University), Annelies Moors(University of Amsterdam), Mathijs Pelkmans (London School of Economics) and discussed in a small gathering of colleagues at the conference centre Soeterbeeck of Radboud University Nijmegen.

Henk Driessen, Martijn de Koning, 27/08/2010

You can find more information about the seminar and contributions of guest writers on the weblog Anthropology & Publicity.

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Radicalization Series IV – Salafism as a Utopian Movement

Posted on August 6th, 2010 by martijn.
Categories: Featured, Headline, ISIM/RU Research, My Research, Religious and Political Radicalization, Young Muslims.

Introduction
There are many different approaches for research on Salafism and they all make clear that, although Salafism has some distinguishing features, the movement is quite diverse with many doctrinary contradictions and clashes and different politico-theological tendencies. Almost all definitions emphasize that the term Salafism is derived from ‘al-salaf al-salih, (the pious predecessors); the first three generations of Muslims who are, according to tradition, the best generations of Muslims ever lived. They also emphasize that Salafists treat Quran and Sunna (the life of the prophet Muhammad) as the only legitimate sources for reason and behaviour of Muslims. It is therefore difficult to define Salafism in a clear, consistent way. One of the main frames for research on Salafism is Quintan Wiktorowicz’ work on Islamic activism; based upon social movement theory. He makes a distinction between Purists, Politicos and Jihadis. The purists, according to Wiktorowicz are not interested in politics, while Politicos (often influenced by Muslim Brotherhood networks) do engage in politics while the Jihadis see the world in such a deplorable state that only a violent Jihad can bring peace and (Islamic) justice to Muslims. Several authors in the book Global Salafism (in particular Thomas Hegghammer) have criticized his model among other things for being internal inconsistent (because jihadis should be a subsubdivision of politicos based upon him seeing political strategy as the defining issue), the definition is still too much based upon theology that does not tell us very much about people’s actual behaviour and claiming to be a-political (as purists do) is a political claim because it indirectly supports the status quo. Hegghammer propes a different typology based upon the structural presence of resources, strategies and rationales for action. Although helpful this model does not solve the problem that it cannot take into account identity, gender or the idea that security and radicalization (two angles in which both approaches fit) are themselves cultural constructions with specific local, national and transnational dimensions. Both models are also top down: they take up the official doctrines, methods and identities of spokespersons and religious authorities but ignore the perspectives, ideas and practices of participants in the movements.

In my research I choose for a more anthropological account of Salafism as a religious movement, taking seriously the political and religious subjectivities of participants. Based upon an article on Grounded Utopian Movements by Price, Nonini and Fox Tree in Anthropological Quarterly, I regard Salafism as a movement trying to revitalize Islam based upon a homogenuous ideal of Islam of the days of the first generation Muslims. The Salafi movement aims to cleanse Islam from so-called non-Islamic accretions, such as Sufism, Shi‘a Islam, or local practices and doctrines, which have sullied a “pure” Islam (Meijer, in Global Salafism). The only way to lead a pure and authentic life and to inherit paradise is to return to the period of the prophet Muhammad and his companions and to emulate their lives. The sources of the Islam, the Qur??n and the ?ad?th are seen as the written version of the authentic and pure Islam. All human action has to be covered by the sources of Islam to be legitimate, otherwise they are condemned as bid’a or worse: in some cases such illegitimate acts may lead to takfir. Moreover since the prophet Muhammad is considered to be an exemplary, perfect Muslim, the Sunna, a close reading of the Qurann and hadth are essential sources with guidelines for leading the correct life and staying on the righteous path. This applies to thought, behaviour as well as appearance. Based upon this ideal the movement tries to develop a lifestyle participants find more just and satisfying than at present. The transnational Salafi movement consists of local and global branches and is characterized by a loosely coupled network structure that is non-hierarchical and characterized by a segmentary-like mobilization and fission and fusion of several sub-networks. The different Salafi networks share the same doctrine of tawhid (the unity and uniqueness of God) as Wiktorowicz explains, but (contray to Wiktorowicz’ claim) do not agree on all aspects of this principle such as what constitutes belief and unbelief and how to interpret particular attributes of Allah. Furthermore, Salafi networks share the method of reading and interpreting the sources of Islam but they differ on the methods of worship and the manner of achieving their goals.

Utopian Movement
Just like in the case of Salafism, Price et al make clear that movements such as Global Justice, Rastafari, Maya Movement and Pentecostalism can be seen as Grounded Utopion Movements whereby grounded refers to the idea that identities, values and imaginaries are grounded in local histories and are embodied and experienced by concrete persons with their own histories. They use the term grounded to refute that we are not talking about irrational, obsolete and romantic ideas; instead they rooted, constructed and nurtured by interactions and practices binding people to the idea of being and becoming part of a community. They admit that all movements have utopian dimensions; this dimensions directs actions in terms of goals and the correct trajectory towards achieving those goals. Grounded Utopian Movements however are distinct from other movements because their utopian imaginaries pertain to the protection of the moral integrity of one’s own community and of one’s own identity against different modalities of oppression and injustice. It is in particular their capacity to create new, alternative realities that make state institutions and elites wary of them and perceive these movements as a threat for social cohesion, security and existing arrangements in society.

Establishing Utopia: politics of lifestyles, distinction and resistance
The Salafi movement is a modern social movement aimed at guarding the identity and integrity of Muslims in a world perceived to be full of seduction, oppression and injustice. Convincing and teaching Muslims to be part of common life, a common heritage and common practices determining a good and correct life is crucial for establishing a ‘true’ moral community emulating the model of the prophet Muhammad. Many activities of the Salafi movement therefore are aimed at constructing the moral community and teaching people the proper ways of being part of that community. The most important strategy of the Salafi movement for de-corrupting Islam and the Muslim community is da’wa: inviting people to Islam (mission). With their da’wa activities the movement spreads its ideas of a virtuous life based upon the idea of commanding good and forbidding evil (al-amr bi-l-ma’ruf wa nahy ‘an almunkar). We can distinguish between three different types of activities sustaining that principle: politics of lifestyles, politics of distinction and politics of resistance (de Koning, 2009b).

All Salafi networks in the Netherlands and other European countries are engaged in one way or another in these type activities. Politics of lifestyles are activities aimed at shaping and nurturing the correct Islamic identity and lifestyle of participants. Preachers of the Salafi movement give lessons, lectures, organize conferences about the correct islamic lifestyle (dress, marriage, ways to interact, being Muslim in a Western society, and so on). The different networks publish books and leaflets about these topics and every networks has its own (sometimes overlapping) circles of lectures and courses by which they aim at a moral rehabilitation of Muslim youth. This does not mean that people are passive consumers of Salafi ideas; in daily life they have to make compromises which most of them do with regard to for example dress and interaction between men and women. Also the courses and conferences are not only about transferring knowledge; they are also meant to establish a sense of belong, brotherhood/sisterhood. It is the combination of knowledge and being together that accounts for many people using the knowledge circles to boost their imaan (faith).

The politics of distinction are aimed at protecting a minority position of Muslims in a society where the majority tries assimilate them. Particular lifestyle practices such as wearing the niqab can become part of the politics of distinction when they are part of public debate or even forbidden. As a result the Salafi movement tries to engage with the public debate and at the same time such plans offer them a platform to disseminate their ideas to a larger (Muslim and non-Muslim) audience. Also self-identification is part of the politics of distinction for example pertaining to the internal quarrels over using the label Salafi method, Salafi (in Dutch also selefie) and criticizing other groups. The boundaries between different branches of the Salafi movement may appear very strong and impermeable when looking at the daily life of participants a more nuances picture emergers because for example economic motivations can lead to people of one network working in the institutes of another (antagonistic) network. And indeed, building their own institutions such as Islamic schools and home care are also part of this type of politics as well as criticizing other Muslim organisations for their allegedly complacent attitude in the Islam debate.

The third type, resistance politics, involves activities aimed against what the Salafi movement perceives as oppressive structures in Europe and Muslim countries. This can pertain to preaches about ‘zionist’ aggression against Palestinians, the necessity of fighting against injustice and severe attacks at Muslim representatives outside the Salafi movement. Travels of some youths to Chechnya, Afghanistan, Pakistan (Kashmir), Iraq and Somalia to participate in the fighting against the US, is also part of this, as well as publishing jihad texts and videos on the internet. Most networks of the Salafi movement do not differ with regard to life style politics but are in fierce disagreement over the other two types.

Welcoming utopia
The call for unity, purity and religionization coming from the Salafi movement can be seen as an attempt to establish itself as the only true representatives of ‘true’ Islam in the Netherlands protecting the Muslim communities from attacks from inside and outside. Moreover, given the practice of Salafi preachers to base their statements upon ‘evidence’ from Islamic sources and explaining them at the same time, the Salafi movement does not only provide Muslim youth a way to engage with a vision of ‘true’ Islam and create a sharp distinction between them and their parents and them and Dutch society, but also a method and path to immerse oneself into a ‘new’ tradition. As I have shown in my contribution to Global Salafism by analyzing the life-stories of two female Salafists, the process by Moroccan-Dutch youth turn to Islam after a period of ‘being not so religious’ or ‘sleeping Muslims’ and affiliate themselves with the Salafi movement can be described as a type of conversion; a re-affiliation within the same religious tradition. These women seek a strong identity, self-realisation and a symbolic transformation of a personal crisis. The Salafi doctrines enable them to rewrite their own life stories and to construct their sense of self as strong people who find their purpose of life in Islam. They have rebuild their own life-stories in the process of seeking wholeness and connected their own individual trajectories, predicaments, ideals and ideas to the Salafi interpretation of Islam.

The rigorous and sometimes rigid Salafi creed and piety creates a stark contrast with the often conflicting and troublesome experiences of daily life. This, as is the same as with the other Muslim youth searching for a ‘true’ Islam, does not mean people actually follow every aspect of the Salafi way. Many of them see it as an attempt to follow a life as a ‘true’ Muslim, as a personal project that has to be fulfilled and as a means to revive ones personal faith (imaan) without fully living up to it. The utopian Islam and the dark, messy, chaotic daily life coexist and, this contradiction is exactly what both is the strength and weakness of the Salafi movement. The utopia with its high moral standards can become an obstacle for functioning in daily life with family, work and education where other rules and loyalties exist. At the same time it gives the Salafi movement its power for it means that people can hold on to the ideal without diluting it and it makes people striving for more all the time: the utopia lies somewhere at the horizon (it is concrete) although impossible to reach. By framing the ideas about the correct lifestyle, building up a position as a minority in Europe and its fight against oppression and justice, in terms of commanding good and forbidding evil the actions of the Salafi movement become moral issues by which the Salafi movement tries to construct a moral community and emphasizes its integrity and tries to safeguard it.

8 comments.

Islamizing Europe – Muslim Demographics

Posted on May 5th, 2009 by martijn.
Categories: Featured, Public Islam.

Note: This entry has been updated. See below, the part about the Netherlands.

If you want to stay updated and did not subscribe yet, you can do so HERE.

The following video is a hit on the world wide web:

YouTube – Muslim Demographics

friendofmuslim

Islam will overwhelm Christendom unless Christians recognize the demographic realities, begin reproducing again, and share the gospel with Muslims.

Here is a transcript of the text of the video:

In 40 years, Europe will be a Muslim continent

FTV–The world is changing. The Global culture our children will inherit will be vastly different than it is today. You are about to witness a report on the worlds changing demographics.

ACCORDING TO RESEARCH, IN ORDER FOR A CULTURE TO MAINTAIN ITSELF FOR MORE THAN 25 YEARS there MUST be a fertility rate of 2.11 per family.With anything less the culture will decline. Historically no culture has ever reversed with a 1.9 fertility rate.

A rate of 1.3 is IMPOSSIBLE to reverse. Because it would take 80 to 100 years to correct itself. And there is no economic model that can sustain a culture during that time.

In other words, if 2 sets of parents each have a child, there are half as many children as parents. If those children have one child, then are 1/4 as many grandchildren as grandparents. If only a million babies were born in 2006, it’s hard to have 2 million adults enter the workforce in 2026.

As the population shrinks, so does the culture.

As of 2007 the fertility rate in France was 1.8

England 1.6

Greece 1.3

Germany 1.3

Italy 1.2

Spain 1.1

Across the entire European Union, in 31 countries, the fertility rate is mere 1.38

Historical research has told us these numbers are impossible to reverse.

In a matter of years Europe as we know it will cease to exist. Yet the population of Europe is not declining. Why? Immigration. ISLAMIC immigration.Of all population growth in Europe since 1990, has been Islamic immigration.

France 1.8 children per family

Muslims 8.1

In Southern France, traditionally one of the most populated Church regions in the world, there are now more Mosques than Churches. 30% of children ages 20 and younger, are now Islamic.

In larger cities such as Nice and Paris the number has grown to 45%.

By the year 2027, 1 in 5 Frenchmen will be Muslim. In just 39 years France will be an Islamic Republic. In the last 30 years the Muslim population of Great Britain rose from 82,000 to 2.5 MILLION. A 30 fold Increase. There are over 1,000 Mosques, many of them former Churches.

In the Netherlands 50% of all newborns are Muslim. And in only 15 years, half of the population of the Netherlands, will be Muslim.

In Russia, there are 23 MILLION Muslims. That’s 1 out of 5 Russians.. 45% of the entire Russian Army will be Islamic in just a few short years.

Currently in Belgium, 25% of the population, and 50% of the newborns, are Muslim. has stated ”

The government of Belgium has stated 1/3 of all European children will be born to Muslim families by the year 2025. Just 17 years away.

The German government, the first to talk about this openly, recently released a statement saying: “The fall in the population ( German ), can no longer be stopped. It’s downward spiral is irreversible…It will be a Muslim state by the year 2050! -( German Federal Statistics Office )

Muammar al-Ghadaffi of Libya has said: “There are signs that Allah will grant victory to Islam in Europe without swords, without guns, and without conquest.

We don’t need terrorists , we don’t need suicide bombers. The 50+ Muslims in Europe will turn it into a Muslim Continent in a few decades”

There are currently 52 MILLION plus Muslims in Europe. The German government has said that number is expected to double in the next 20 years to 104 MILLION Muslims.

Closer to home the numbers tell a similar story. Right now, Canada’s fertility rate is 1.6, nearly a full point below the 2.11 required to sustain a culture. And now Islam is now the fastest growing religion. Between 2001 and 2006, Canada’s population increased by 1.6 million.1.2 of those? Immigration.

In the US, the current fertility rate USA citizens is 1.6. With the influx of the Latino nations, the fertility rate increases is 2.11. The bare minimum required to sustain a culture.

In 1970 there were 100,000 Muslims in America. In 2008 there were over 9 MILLION-( 9,000,000) The world is changing, it’s time to WAKE UP!

Muslim Demographics

3 years ago, a meeting of 24 Islamic Organizations was held in Chicago. The transcripts of that meeting showed in detail, their plans to “evangelize” America. Through journalism, politics, education, and more. They said “We must prepare ourselves for the reality that in 30 years there will be 50 million Muslims living in America. ( Islamic Strategy Conference in Chicago )

The world that we live in is not the world in which our children and grandchildren will live.

The Catholic church recently reported that Islam has just surpassed their membership numbers.

Some studies show that at Islams current rate of growth, in 5-7 years it will be the dominant religion of the world.

Again, it is time to AWAKEN out of our malaise in this country. Unless YOU want to be the next offering of Islam on the altar of it’s “god” aka the father of lies.<– ( I said this )

As believers we call upon you to share the Gospel message with a changing world. This is a call to ACTION!

It is part of a discourse that is prevalent among many:

1. Islam is a threat to (Western) liberal values
2. The islamization of (Western) society is in progress
3. Western societies are therefore threatened and the threat needs to be stopped before it is too late

Another part of the discourse is the following:

1. Islam is a threat to (Western) liberal values
2. Muslims are governed by Islam
3. Migrants from countries where Islam is (almost) a majority religion are therefore Muslim
4. Muslim migration poses a threat do (Western) liberal values

And a third part of the discourse is:

1. Islam is a threat to (Western) liberal values
2. Islam governs Muslims
3. Islam says procreate
4. Therefore Muslims procreate faster than other people
5. The high fertility rates among Muslims threaten (Western) liberal values and societies

More or less the production of such discourses is meant to let people conclude something like this:

Broken Arrows | Pass the Salt

Our nation is under an invasion and there is no one standing at the gate with whom they must speak. We must encourage Christian couples to start having babies. The future of our nation depends on them. At some point, as the war intensifies, Christians will reach for arrows to shoot at the enemy. What will we do when we find our quiver is empty? Maybe, we can throw a plasma TV at them.

The video is not only meant to provide evidence for, in particular the latter, such a logic, it also calls upon Christians to have more children and share their faith with Muslims. How credible are the statistics that are used in the video? I meant to do a thorough search for all the statistics but I don’t have enough time for that. Fortunately several other bloggers have done the job for me and I will list the most important results and provide links to their websites.

One of the most extensive reviews is made by Tiny Frog. I will list the most important claims and Tiny Frog’s counterclaims. Below that I will add some more info about the Netherlands:

Muslim Demographics « Tiny Frog

1. Claim: “Historically, no culture has ever reversed a 1.9 fertility rate.”They provide no source for this claim. However, birth rates do vary over time, and have increased.
2. Claim: “A rate of 1.3: impossible to reverse… There is no economic model that can sustain itself during that time.”It’s true that declining birth rates cause a lot of problems for nations […];It’s also worth noting that the fertility rates of these nations have been rising slightly over the past five years.
3. Claim: “France: 1.8 Children per family, Muslims: 8.1.”They list of source for this claim, but it’s too small to read. This claim is almost certainly false. First, there isn’t a country in the whole world that has a fertility rate of 8 children, so I doubt that millions of Muslims in France’s are having that many children.
4. Claim: “In the Netherlands, 50% of all newborns are Muslim.”That same article I read a few years ago claimed that 50% of all newborns within a particular Dutch city were Muslim (which may or may not be accurate). I have to wonder if that claim was generalized to “In the Netherlands, 50% of all newborns are Muslim.” There are approximately 1 million Muslims in the Netherlands, a nation of 16.6 million people. So Muslims makeup about 6% of the total population. Yet, we’re supposed to believe 50% of the children born in the Netherlands are Muslim? The fertility rate in the Netherlands is 1.66 children per person. Mathematically, Muslims in the Netherlands would need to have 26 children to makeup 50% of the births in the country.Further, if we look at the countries of origin of these Muslims, we find that 2/3rds immigrated from Turkey (1.87 fertility rate) or Morocco (2.57 fertility rate).
5. Claim: “In only 15 years, half of the population of the Netherlands will be Muslim.” It makes my head hurt to figure out how 1 million Muslims will outnumber 15.6 million non-Muslims in 15 years.
6. Claim: “In Russia, there are over 23 million Muslims, that’s 1 out of 5 Russians.”According to Wikipedia:According to the most recent estimates by the R&F Agency, there are more than 20 million officially self-identified Muslims in Russia, a number that has risen by 40% in the last 15 years, though no more than 6 million are truly orthodox. Roman Silantyev, a Russian Islamologist has estimated that there are only between 7 and 9 million people who practise Islam in Russia, and that the rest are only Muslims by ethnicity.Also, Russia’s population is 140 million. Even if “23 million muslims” was accurate, that’s 16.4%, not 1 out of 5 (or 20%).
7. Claim: “Currently in Belgium, 25% of the population and 50% of all newborns are Muslim.”Wikipedia states: An 2008 estimation shows that 6% of the Belgian population, about 628,751, is Muslim (98% Sunni). Muslims cover 25.5% of the population of Brussels, 4.0% of Wallonia and 3.9% of Flanders.Maybe they mixed up “Brussels” and “Belgium”. Regardless, they inflated the percentage of Muslims in Belgium from 6% to 25%. Again, we see the same pattern of immigration as we saw in the Netherlands – 2/3rds are Moroccans and Turkish immigrants – whose home countries have relatively low birthrates (2.57 and 1.87, respectively).
8. Claim: “1/3rd of all European children will be born to Muslim families by 2025, just 17 years away.” That doesn’t seem very likely considering that Muslims currently makeup “4 percent of the European Union’s population” (Source). This particular claim about “1/3rd of all European children” appears to come from the Right-wing Brussel’s Journal.
9. Claim: “The German Government, the first to talk about this publicly, recently released a public saying, ‘the fall in the German population can no longer be stopped. Its downward spiral is no longer reversible… It will be a Muslim state by 2050.” Considering that Muslims makeup 4.0% of the German population, that statement seems over the top. They credit the “Germany Federal Statistics Office” with the statement that “[Germany] will be a Muslim state by 2050?, when it was actually a statement made by a vague group identified as “some demographic trend-watchers”. Immediately, in the next paragraph, they mention the right-wing Brussels Journal – leading me to suspect that they are the “demographic trend-watchers”.(2) The quote was twisted from “is well on the way to becoming a Muslim state by 2050? into “It will be a Muslim state by 2050?.
10. Claim: “There are currently 52 million Muslims in Europe. The German government said that number is expected to double in the next 20 years to 104 million.” The EU population is 491 million, 4% (19.6 million) of which are Muslim (Source).
11. Claim: “In the United States, the current fertility rate of American citizens is 1.6. With the influx of the latino nations, the rate increases to 2.11; the bare minimum needed to sustain a culture.” Considering that latinos makeup only 13% of the US population, it’s hard to believe they can single-handedly bring-up the fertility rate from 1.6 to 2.11.
12. Claim: “Today, there are over 9 million [muslims in the United States]“.Reality? No one really knows. Estimates vary between 1.1 million and 8 million.
13. This wasn’t specifically argued in the video, but I should also add that the fertility rates among Muslims (in their own countries) is also declining.
14. And let’s not forget that some Muslim countries have already fallen below the replacement number of 2.11 (and, supposedly, below the mythical 1.9 fertility rate that the video says is very, very bad). When you look at the three most populous countries of the Middle East (Egypt, 79 million; Turkey, 70 million; Iran, 69 million), you find that Turkey and Iran have already dropped below a fertility rate of 2.0. Egypt recently dropped below a fertility rate of 3.0, and the Egyptian government is aiming to get it down to 2.0 within 8 years. All three are experiencing a decline in their fertility rates.

Therefore, based upon this analysis we can say that most numbers given in the video are at least unclear, more likely distortions and at worst false. Let me add a few things:

1. As already noted in the analysis above, low fertility rates do cause serious problems:
   

   Population paradox: Europe’s time bomb – Europe, World – The IndependentThe implications of all this are enormous. Low-birth Europe is faced with an ageing population, a pensions crisis, later retirement, changes in work patterns, shrinking cities and a massive looming healthcare cost. Nations of children with no siblings, cousins, aunts or uncles – only parents, grandparents, and perhaps great-grandparents – will face the burden of paying for the care of a massive older generation. The same prospect of an older, more conservative, less vigorous or inventive culture looms in China, Japan and much of the Far East.Meanwhile high-birth Africa will remain stuck in a vicious circle unless it gets economic growth, agricultural reform, improved world trade terms, infrastructure investment, better health and education systems, more girls into school and a wider availability of family planning. A tall order, though the example of Bangladesh shows change can come.

2. About the Netherlands. The Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI) makes clear the Muslims are most likely to remain a minority. See HERE (pdf). The number 50% pertains to statistics about the city of Amsterdam but is incorrect (or I just can’t find it). In 2004 51% of the Amsterdam population was native with an increasing number of migrants moving from Amsterdam to Almere (one of the suburbs; 70% of the total number of people moving to Almere was migrant). UPDATE: I finally found the statistics on the four major cities in the Netherlands. You can find them HERE. (The first column gives the different migrantgroups and Dutch natives. The next columns are for Amsterdam (51% native), Rotterdam (53,8% native), The Hague (53,8% native), Utrecht (69% native) and the Netherlands (80,4% native) as a whole. Note that a few areas in Amsterdam and Rotterdam have more then 85% migrants. Among Dutch women over 30 there was a remarkable increase in fertility rate, while it decreased among migrant women. Second generation migrants in Amsterdam have fewer children than their parents did. This development corresponds with that of the rest of the Netherlands as you can read in the report of NIDI mentioned here. Furthermore, the estimated number of Muslims 940.000 is based upon a calculation. In this calculation it is assumed, for example, that when in Turkey a X% of the population is Muslim, the same percentage will apply to migrants. This is not always accurate. In the case of Turkey there are a lot of Christian migrants as well as secular Muslims and Christians. This also means that the label Muslim does not say much; one can be secular, pious, radical, traditional or perhaps even combinations of that. The number of Muslims differs considerably per region with some high numbers in cities in the west and some small provincial towns. In 2007 a new method of estimating the number of Muslims has been used based upon people’s self-identification in a survey. The revised number of Muslims is now 850.000. The links lead to the webiste of Statistics Netherlands (CBS), the official bureau for statistics, often used by the government but also by researchers. The report by NIDI is based upon data from Statistics Netherlands.
3. In talking about ‘Muslim’ demographics we not only ignore the fact that we do not know anything about the nature of Muslim identity behind the numbers (or the Sunni/Shi’a divide) but also the ethnic diversity among Muslims. In the Netherlands Muslims in general are well organized but mainly on ethnic grounds: there are Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese, Somalian organizations at the national and local level and two national organizations that unite the most important (ethnic) organizations. In order to understand intra-Muslim politics this ethnic division is very (if not most) important.
4. Not only non-Muslims are claiming that Islam is one of the (or the) fastest growing religion. We can hear the same among Muslims. Such a claim is not very surprising. For example among Pentecostals we also find the claim that they are the fastest growing religion on Earth. Wiki even has a page dedicated to the topic Claims to be the fastest growing religion, showing a number of religion (almost all actually) and its adherents claiming it to be the fastest. The page also shows why these claims are often unreliable because of a lack of hard data.
5. In the video it is mentioned that the fertility rate among French Muslims is about 8 children. According to Tiny Frog, however, there is no country in the world with such a fertility rate. That is not correct: Uganda (8.5), Niger (8.4), Madagascar (8.1) and Eritrea (8.0) have such high fertility rates in 2004.
6. The video mentions 2.1 as the ‘bare minimum to sustain a culture’. What is probably referred to here is the replacement fertility; the level at which the population remains stable. If a population indeed declines is also related to migration and population momentum. If the low fertility remains at a low level and combined with other developments the population will decline. But does a decreasing population mean that a culture cannot be sustained? Also does culture = population, that is is a culture homogeneous? It is assumed in the video but in most countries that just is not the case.

Also Islam in Europe, Street Prophets, Daily Kos and Europenews have relevant comments to this whole issue.  Martin Walker has written an interesting article for The Wilson Quarterly that is very important in understanding all of this:

The World’s New Numbers

The World’s New Numbers

by Martin Walker

“Here lies Europe, overwhelmed by Muslim immigrants and emptied of native-born Europeans.” That is the obituary some pundits have been writing in recent years. But neither the immigrants nor the Europeans are playing their assigned roles.

Something dramatic has happened to the world’s birthrates. Defying predictions of demographic decline, northern Europeans have started having more babies. Britain and France are now projecting steady population growth through the middle of the century. In North America, the trends are similar. In 2050, according to United Nations projections, it is possible that nearly as many babies will be born in the United States as in China. Indeed, the population of the world’s current demographic colossus will be shrinking. And China is but one particularly sharp example of a widespread fall in birthrates that is occurring across most of the developing world, including much of Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. The one glaring exception to this trend is sub-Saharan Africa, which by the end of this century may be home to ­one-­third of the human ­race.

The human habit is simply to project current trends into the future. Demographic realities are seldom kind to the predictions that result. The decision to have a child depends on innumerable personal considerations and larger, unaccountable societal factors that are in constant flux. Yet even knowing this, demographers themselves are often flummoxed. Projections of birthrates and population totals are often embarrassingly at odds with eventual reality.

[…]

Because of this bastardization of knowledge, three deeply misleading assumptions about demographic trends have become lodged in the public mind. The first is that mass migration into Europe, legal and illegal, combined with an eroding native population base, is transforming the ethnic, cultural, and religious identity of the continent. The second assumption, which is related to the first, is that Europe’s native population is in steady and serious decline from a falling birthrate, and that the aging population will place intolerable demands on governments to maintain public pension and health systems. The third is that population growth in the developing world will continue at a high rate. Allowing for the uncertainty of all population projections, the most recent data indicate that all of these assumptions are highly questionable and that they are not a reliable basis for serious policy ­decisions.

[…]

Upon closer inspection, it turns out that while Muhammad topped Thomas in 2006, it was something of a Pyrrhic victory: Fewer than two percent of Britain’s male babies bore the prophet’s name. One fact that gets lost among distractions such as the Times story is that the birthrates of Muslim women in Europe—and around the world—have been falling significantly for some time. Data on birthrates among different religious groups in Europe are scarce, but they point in a clear direction. Between 1990 and 2005, for example, the fertility rate in the Netherlands for Moroccan-born women fell from 4.9 to 2.9, and for ­Turkish-­born women from 3.2 to 1.9. In 1970, ­Turkish-­born women in Germany had on average two children more than ­German-­born women. By 1996, the difference had fallen to one child, and it has now dropped to half that number.

These sharp reductions in fertility among Muslim immigrants reflect important cultural shifts, which include universal female education, rising living standards, the inculcation of local mores, and widespread availability of contraception. Broadly speaking, birthrates among immigrants tend to rise or fall to the local statistical norm within two ­generations.

The decline of Muslim birthrates is a global phenomenon. Most analysts have focused on the remarkably high proportion of people under age 25 in the Arab countries, which has inspired some crude forecasts about what this implies for the future. Yet recent UN data suggest that Arab birthrates are falling fast, and that the number of births among women under the age of 20 is dropping even more sharply. Only two Arab countries still have high fertility rates: Yemen and the Palestinian ­territories.

[…]

The falling fertility rates in large segments of the Islamic world have been matched by another significant shift: Across northern and western Europe, women have suddenly started having more babies. Germany’s minister for the family, Ursula von der Leyen, announced in February that the country had recorded its second straight year of increased births. Sweden’s fertility rate jumped eight percent in 2004 and stayed put. Both Britain and France now project that their populations will rise from the current 60 million each to more than 75 million by ­mid­century. Germany, despite its recent uptick in births, still seems likely to drop to 70 million or less by 2050 and lose its status as Europe’s most populous country.

In Britain, the number of births rose in 2007 for the sixth year in a row. Britain’s fertility rate has increased from 1.6 to 1.9 in just six years, with a striking contribution from women in their thirties and ­forties—­just the kind of hard-to-predict behavioral change that drives demographers wild. The fertility rate is at its highest level since 1980. The National Health Service has started an emergency recruitment drive to hire more midwives, tempting early retirees from the profession back to work with a bonus of up to $6,000. In Scotland, where births have been increasing by five percent a year, Glasgow’s Herald has reported “a mini baby boom.”

Immigrant mothers account for part of the fertility increase throughout Europe, but only part. And, significantly, many of the immigrants are arrivals from elsewhere in Europe, especially the eastern European countries admitted to the European Union in recent years. Children born to eastern European immigrants accounted for a third of Scotland’s ­“mini ­baby boom,” for ­example.

[…]

Population growth on a scale comparable to that which frightened pundits and demographers a generation ago still exists in 30 of the world’s least developed countries. Each has a fertility rate of more than five. With a few ­exceptions—notably, ­Afghanistan and the Palestinian territories—­those countries are located in ­sub-­Saharan Africa. Depending on the future course of birthrates, ­sub-­Saharan Africa’s current 800 million people are likely to become 1.7 billion by 2050 and three billion by the end of the ­century.

One striking implication of this growth is that there will be a great religious revolution, as Africa becomes the home of monotheism. By ­midcen­tury, sub-Saharan Africa is likely to be the demographic center of Islam, home to as many Muslims as Asia and to far more than inhabit the Middle East. The ­non-­Arab Muslim countries of ­Africa—­Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Senegal—constitute the one region of the Islamic world where birthrates remain high. In several of these countries, the average woman will have upward of five children in her lifetime.

Christianity will also feel the effects of Africa’s growth. By 2025, there will be as many Christians in ­sub-­Saharan ­Africa—­some 640 ­million—­as in South America. By 2050, it is almost certain that most of the world’s Christians will live in Africa. As Kenyan scholar John Mbiti writes, “The centers of the church’s universality [are] no longer in Geneva, Rome, Athens, Paris, London, New York, but Kinshasa, Buenos Aires, Addis Ababa, and Manila.”

But awareness of Africa’s religious revolution is usually overshadowed by the fearful possibilities raised by the continent’s rapid population growth.

[…]

Perhaps the most striking fact about the demographic transformation now unfolding is that it is going to make the world look a lot more like Europe. The world is aging in an unprecedented way. A milepost in this process came in 1998, when for the first time the number of people in the developed world over the age of 60 outnumbered those below the age of 15. By 2047, the world as a whole will reach the same ­point.

The world’s median age is 28 today, and it is expected to reach 38 by the middle of the century. In the United States, the median age at that point will be a ­young­ish 41, while it will be over 50 in Japan and 47 in Europe. The United States will be the only Western country to have been in the top 10 largest countries in terms of population size in both 1950 and 2050. Russia, Japan, Germany, Britain, and Italy were all demographic titans in the middle of the 20th century. Today, only Russia and Japan still (barely) make the top 10. They will not stay there long. The world has changed. There is more and faster change to ­come.

Notwithstanding all of the qualifications one can make about the video, I think most reactions here and on other websites, seriously underestimate the power of opening the window to imagination that might be the result of this video. Hard data is only one of the ways to evaluate the video. Certainly for some people the ‘facts’ as they have been presented in the video are authentic and true because they make the threat of Islam ‘real’, ‘imaginable’. The images in the video provide people with access to the abstract notion of the Islamic threat and in some cases (as with Fitna the movie) it creates and organizes the relationship between Wilders and parts of his constituency. In that case, the real facts do not matter, what matters is making the fact of the Islamic threat real and concrete.

UPDATE

The BBC has made its own countervideo, I did not check the numbers in that one yet.

[flashvideo filename=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mINChFxRXQs /]

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