C L O S E R

Nieuw boek: ‘Salafisme. Utopische idealen in een weerbarstige praktijk’

Wat moeten we ermee?

Datum: woensdag 14 mei 2014

Tijd: van 19:30 tot 21:30

Locatie: Huize Heyendael, Geert Grooteplein-Noord 9, Nijmegen

Organisator: Soeterbeeck Programma
Voor meer informatie over het programma zie HIER. Aanmelden is noodzakelijk, dat kan HIER.

Te verkrijgen vanaf 14 mei
Bij de bekende boekhandels onder andere:
Atheneum Amsterdam
Boekhandel Roelants Nijmegen
Bol.com
Boek.be

Lees de inleiding

New Book: Whatever Happened to the Islamists?

Posted on November 8th, 2012 by martijn.
Categories: Important Publications, ISIM/RU Research, Murder on theo Van Gogh and related issues, Public Islam, Religious and Political Radicalization, Ritual and Religious Experience, Society & Politics in the Middle East, Young Muslims.

At France24 we find an interview with sociologist of Islam, Amel Boubekeur.
Amel Boubekeur, Sociologist and expert on political Islam – FRANCE 24

As the West struggles to wrap its head around the repercussions of the Arab Spring, one issue that stands out is the increasing role of Islamists in all aspects of life. So how should Western leaders reframe their approach when it comes to dealing with Islamist politicians? Annette Young talks to Amel Boubekeur, a sociologist and the co-author of “Whatever Happened to the Islamists?”

Watch the interesting interview here:

Olivier Roy and Amel Boubekeur have edited a volume on Islamism and political Islam:Whatever Happened to the Islamists?

Islamism and political Islam might seem like contemporary phenomena, but the roots of both movements can be traced back more than a century. Nevertheless, the utopian beliefs of Islamism have been irrevocably changed by the processes of modernization—especially globalization—which have taken the philosophy into unmistakable new directions.

Through meticulous theoretical and ethnographic research, this collection maps the movements of current and former Islamists to determine what has become of political Islam. Islam continues to be a fresh and vital ideology to a new generation of militants, even though the channels though which it is expressed have changed. Jihad is often conducted electronically, via Islamist e-mail list-serves, and Islamist activism has been personalized—even domesticated—through the production and consumption of political goods, such as Islamic soft drinks. Even the street protests that once characterized the Islamist struggle have been eclipsed by Islamic rap concerts. In addressing these changes, this anthology highlights Islam’s remarkable adaptation to modern influences and the ongoing revitalization of its utopian message.

About the Author

Amel Boubekeur is research fellow and head of the Islam and Europe program at the Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels.Olivier Roy is a professor at l’Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris and a research director at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. A world authority on Islam and politics, Roy’s books are Secularism Confronts Islam, The Failure of Political Islam, The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah, and, with Mariam Abou Zahab, Islamist Networks: The Afghan-Pakistan Connection.

I’m very honoured to have a chapter in this excellent volume. In this chapter “The ‘Other’ Polical Islam: Understanding Salafi Politics’ I discuss how modern Dutch Salafi networks engage in politics in new and unexpectedways. Although many have described the Salafi movement as lacking a politicial program and shying away from politics, I show how they have started to becomeincreasingly engaged and entangled in the Dutch political scene. By attempting to influence the Dutch political scene while being the main target of the counter-radicalization policies, they have adjusted their messages and styles in a way that accommodates Dutch secular society. As such they have engaged in a politics of lifestyles, distinction and resistance, trying to transform the oppressive structures of society and build up their position as the only legitimate representatives of Islam in Dutch society.

For more information see also Hurst Publishers.

'Laughing Killer': Bouyeri and the Murder of Theo van Gogh

Posted on November 2nd, 2012 by martijn.
Categories: International Terrorism, Murder on theo Van Gogh and related issues, Notes from the Field, Religious and Political Radicalization.

On 2 November 2004 Mohammed Bouyeri killed Dutch writer and film director Theo van Gogh. He shot him, slit his throat and planted a knife in his chest with a letter to Ayaan Hirsi Ali attached to it. In Bouyeri’s view, violence against the infidels was not only allowed by Islam, or necessary to free Muslims from oppression by the ‘infidels’, but a direct command from Allah. According to him this order is clear and prescribed in the text ‘The Obligation’ referring to the obligation to kill ‘those who insult the Prophet’. This text is based upon the writings of Ibn Taymiyyah, an Islamic scholar who lived at the height of the Mongol threat and whose work was translated by Mohammed Bouyeri. Bouyeri’s reading of that text convinced him that comments such as uttered by Hirsi Ali, Wilders and Van Gogh about Islam and the prophet Muhammad, were insults such as Ibn Taymiyyah had referred to, and that consequentially the only proper response was to kill them. Such a punishment is thus not inspired by the insult of Muslims as such. If that were the case, the Muslim doing the executions would be following his own impulses. Instead, what he should be doing is obeying Allah’s will. After all, it was Allah Himself who had ordained this punishment. Any ‘good’ Muslim would have to act upon this order, or end up being an infidel. His reading of this text was heavily disputed by Salafi Muslims but at that time he and his group were already outside the circles of the Salafi in the Netherlands to a large extent.

Bouyeri clearly saw himself as an instrument of Allah and in his open letter to Hirsi Ali pinned upon Van Gogh’s body he claimed following the footsteps of the Prophet Muhammad. One of the most remarkable references in his letter (and again strongly contested by other Muslims) was to the Prophet as the ‘laughing killer’: Peace and Blessings on the Amir of the Mujahidin, the Laughing Killer Mohammed the Prophet of God (God’s Peace be Upon him) [Vrede en zegeningen op de Emir van de Mujahideen, de lachende doder Mohammed Rasoeloe Allah (Sala Allaho alaihie wa Sallam)]. This is a very unusual epithet, so unusual that it is worthwhile to have a look where it might have come from since it apparently does not appear in any of the accepted hadith books.

A similar reference is found after Bouyeri’s act in the letter claiming responsibility for the London bombings: ‘In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate, may peace be upon the cheerful one and undaunted fighter, Prophet Muhammad, God’s peace be upon him.’ The phrase in Arabic (ad-Dahûk al-Qattâl), can be translated as ‘the cheerful one and undaunted fighter’, meaning constantly laughing and lethal and ‘murderous, deadly, lethal’. An interesting reference to this text comes from Iraqi suicide bombers since a similar text can be found among them: ‘May peace be upon the cheerful one and undaunted fighter, Prophet Muhammad, God’s peace be upon him.’ Furthermore, Bouyeri’s reference may also be based upon a statement by Omar Bakri, former leader of the radical Al Muhajiroun in the UK. In an interview with Jamestown Foundation he was asked about the 9/11 attacks and whether they were Islamic or not. Omar Bakri Mohammed responded:
The Jamestown Foundation: Al-Muhajiroun in the UK: An Interview with Sheikh Omar Bakri Mohammed

A: The Prophet Muhammad once said to the enemy: I have come to terrorize you; he said: “O, people of Qureish I have come to slaughter you’; in another quote he said: ‘I am the Prophet who kills while laughing’.

Q: Are you sure these traits are attributable to the Prophet Muhammad?

A: I can quote to you the authentic references. Anyway for me “terrorism” is not necessarily a bad word; it depends on the context and whether it is based on the commands of Allah.

and on Living Islam I found this:
Various Shorter Texts by Shaykh Gibril Haddad

he [referring to Omar Bakri, MdK) states:

“ana al-dhahUk al-qattAl”

which i have seen translated as “i am the cheerful one, the dauntless fighter and would this be the most accurate rendering into english?

Ana al-dahuk al-qattal: “I am the oft-smiling one and I am the fierce warrior.”

Yes, this is related with its chain from Ibn `Abbas by the Shafi`i and Maliki philologist and litterateur Ahmad ibn Faris (d. 395) in his brief _Asma’u Rasulillah (salla Allahu `alayhi wa-Sallam) wa- Ma`aniha_ (Kuwait: Markaz al-Makhtutat, 1989). Al-Suyuti adduces the latter’s chain in his _Riyad al-Aniqa_ and al-Dhahabi mentions the report in the volume on Sira of his massive _Tarikh al-Islam_.

Note: “Dahuk” is germane to “qattal” in the sense that “al-dahhak,” which also means “the oft-smiling one,” is synonymous with “he of scathing courage in battle” as mentioned by al-Qastallani according to al-Nabhani in _al-Asma fima li-Sayyidina Muhammadin min al-Asma_.

Blessings and peace on the Prophet, his Family, and his Companions.

gibril
[SP 2006-05-12]

As said this was heavily disputed by other Muslims (including Salafis) and I haven’t found a reference anywhere in the major sources. It also doesn’t really matter. What matters here is what Bouyeri meant to do, meant to perform with this statement. By the term ‘laughing killer’ Bouyeri probably meant to be a ‘cheerful and undaunted fighter’, a person who goes to battle cheerfully and undaunted because he ‘knows’ God supports him. He does not fight because of feelings of rage against his enemies but because God wants him to. With this Bouyeri at the same time demonstrates his attempt to emulate his personal idea of the prophet and to build on the tradition of (what he saw as) contemporary true Muslims: the freedom fighters in Iraq. For him it was of crucial importance not to fight out of anger or frustration but solely because God asked him; he re-defined himself as an instrument of God.

This explanation of the Van Gogh’s murder can be sustained by an analysis of the particular form of the deed, performed as a ritual killing, and by the expectations of the perpetrator to be killed afterwards by policemen. The ritual killing of Van Gogh can be seen as a sacrifice for Allah and the expectations to be killed can be seen as a way to look for the status of martyr by Bouyeri. The West often refers to Islamic ‘suicide bombers’. According to Bouyeari and others fighters and victims of the occupation by the United States and Israel, people who kill themselves are ‘martyrs’ and not suicide bombers. A sacrifice gives a life that can not be reinstated but it is given to request new or alternative forms of live, health, birth of a child etc. Muslims have gone astray according the Bouyeri and the likes and reciprocity in the sacrifice makes it possible to restore the relation with Allah. From the point of view that a sacrifice as a ritual reasserts the norms, the murder can be seen as a peace offering, a gift with which a return can be claimed. Moreover, the intention of Bouyeri was offering his life for the cause of defending Islam in such a way as to achieve the most favourable return. The martyr has the assurance of paradise, the act alone automatically gives entrance to heaven.

For Bouyeri and his fellow members of the Hofstad network, their ideology as displayed in their texts, shows a fusion between global and local contexts and a mixture of all kinds of influences and re-interpretations of text of Hizb ut Tahrir, Salafiyya and American Christian Fundamentalists. They are clearly inspired by identification with the global ummah and the concomitant transnational religious movements, but also with a global public platform, perceived to be hostile towards Islam. This combination echoes in their assessment of the significance of the expressions of specific Dutch protagonists of which Hirsi Ali was, in this analysis, the principal actor. The group’s interpretation of Islam can be seen as a reversal of the main message in the Dutch Islam debates we addressed above. In particular, it is a turnaround of the views of Hirsi Ali; the negative image of Muslims is transferred into a strong and assertive one, providing, for Bouyeri and his companions, for a positive identification. Bouyeri’s radicalized version of Islamic activism based upon transnational and local influences is therefore a way to give meaning to the social realities surrounding him and can be seen as a cross-fertilization between an idealized Islamic past and a dark present.

A large part of this text is based upon, and taken from:
New Book: Local Battles- Global Stakes

Edien Bartels and Martijn de Koning, abstract
Submission and a Ritual Murder; The transnational aspects of a local conflict and protest
On 2 November 2004, Theo van Gogh, a Dutch columnist, filmmaker and producer of the film Submission was murdered in Amsterdam by a Moroccan-Dutch Muslim. However in order to understand the significance of the film Submission and the murder of its producer, Theo van Gogh, we should look beyond these local and national frames, and beyond the local significance of this conflict. In this chapter we will show how a transnational take on both topics, the film Submission and the murder of Theo van Gogh, can contribute to a better understanding of how and why these local events occurred.

‘Laughing Killer’: Bouyeri and the Murder of Theo van Gogh

Posted on November 2nd, 2012 by martijn.
Categories: International Terrorism, Murder on theo Van Gogh and related issues, Notes from the Field, Religious and Political Radicalization.

A: The Prophet Muhammad once said to the enemy: I have come to terrorize you; he said: “O, people of Qureish I have come to slaughter you’; in another quote he said: ‘I am the Prophet who kills while laughing’.

Q: Are you sure these traits are attributable to the Prophet Muhammad?

A: I can quote to you the authentic references. Anyway for me “terrorism” is not necessarily a bad word; it depends on the context and whether it is based on the commands of Allah.

and on Living Islam I found this:
Various Shorter Texts by Shaykh Gibril Haddad

he [referring to Omar Bakri, MdK) states:

“ana al-dhahUk al-qattAl”

which i have seen translated as “i am the cheerful one, the dauntless fighter and would this be the most accurate rendering into english?

Ana al-dahuk al-qattal: “I am the oft-smiling one and I am the fierce warrior.”

Yes, this is related with its chain from Ibn `Abbas by the Shafi`i and Maliki philologist and litterateur Ahmad ibn Faris (d. 395) in his brief _Asma’u Rasulillah (salla Allahu `alayhi wa-Sallam) wa- Ma`aniha_ (Kuwait: Markaz al-Makhtutat, 1989). Al-Suyuti adduces the latter’s chain in his _Riyad al-Aniqa_ and al-Dhahabi mentions the report in the volume on Sira of his massive _Tarikh al-Islam_.

Note: “Dahuk” is germane to “qattal” in the sense that “al-dahhak,” which also means “the oft-smiling one,” is synonymous with “he of scathing courage in battle” as mentioned by al-Qastallani according to al-Nabhani in _al-Asma fima li-Sayyidina Muhammadin min al-Asma_.

Blessings and peace on the Prophet, his Family, and his Companions.

gibril
[SP 2006-05-12]

A large part of this text is based upon, and taken from:
New Book: Local Battles- Global Stakes

Edien Bartels and Martijn de Koning, abstract
Submission and a Ritual Murder; The transnational aspects of a local conflict and protest
On 2 November 2004, Theo van Gogh, a Dutch columnist, filmmaker and producer of the film Submission was murdered in Amsterdam by a Moroccan-Dutch Muslim. However in order to understand the significance of the film Submission and the murder of its producer, Theo van Gogh, we should look beyond these local and national frames, and beyond the local significance of this conflict. In this chapter we will show how a transnational take on both topics, the film Submission and the murder of Theo van Gogh, can contribute to a better understanding of how and why these local events occurred.

Fear and Loathing in Europe

Posted on October 5th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: Activism, International Terrorism, Murder on theo Van Gogh and related issues, Religious and Political Radicalization, Some personal considerations.

The following text was used for a spoken column at the ICCT’s expert meeting on Freedom from Fear: Answering Terrorism with Public Resilience on 3 October 2011. In this expert meeting the dilemma between fighting terrorism effectively by high-profile policies and the consequence that such measures might instil fear in the public was central in the contributions and debates.

It was probably in September 1219, almost 800 years ago, when a Christian monk stood before the sultan of Egypt, Malik al-Kamil. It was the time of the Crusades and this monk had the audacity of telling the sultan in his own quarters that he was on the wrong path, misled by a false prophet and that in order to preserve his own soul he’d better convert to Christianity. The monk had renounced his riches and his heritage to pursue a life of poverty and preaching modelled on that of the Apostles in which martyrdom was the highest reward. This monk like many who followed him tried to convert Muslims not by engaging in a dialogue with restraint and eloquence but by insulting and hoping those aggressive Muslims would kill them and allowing them to go to heaven as a martyr. Those following this monk for example went to the Caliph in Spain and attempted to convert the Caliph by saying many bad things about Muhammad and his damnable law. They were imprisoned and tortured but persevered in their insults and sacrilege. Through their determination they succeeded in becoming martyrs and when the monk heard the news of his five brothers he stated that:‘Now I can truly say that I have five brothers’. Other sources however claim that he responded by saying ‘‘let everyone be glorified by his own martyrdom and not by that of others!’’. Apparently the martyrs caused ambivalent emotions whereby some look with doubt at this active embrace of suicide by preaching while others held great admiration for such an active quest of martyrdom.

Nowadays such people would be seen as fanatic, erratic people threatening the social fabric of society at least but also fearing that such a fanatic search for martyrdom may lead up to horrible events such as 9/11 and the killing of Theo van Gogh. It is people like them and the fear of what they do or might do that has led to what my colleague Beatrice de Graaf has called a securitization of society. Such a securitization occurs after tragic events that are perceived as exceptional, threatening an order that is good, just and beneficial. Such events produce fear and these fears in turn create the need of risk containment in which phenomena that are perceived as different or even incompatible with what is normal and acceptable, are framed as security risks. Of course bad things have happened and fear is a normal, natural human emotion, even very sensible when you are faced with danger. But this naturalization of fear renders invisible that political entrepreneurs connect fear with existing social fault lines such as inequality, ethnicity and religion. The risk of an economic meltdown becomes a fear for the callousness of the Greek, feelings of insecurity caused by young boys hanging about on streets and apparently engaging in useless chatter and boredom becomes fear for Moroccan streetterrorists and fear for terror attacks becomes fear for Muslims.

Although in the Netherlands there are more problems reported by schools and police with radical right wing youth and we have on average one mosque or Islamic school being vandalized or worse every 2 months, we have set up a policy that has to contain the threat coming from those Muslims. Take for example the recent proposal for banning the burqa in several European countries, including the Netherlands. One of the reasons is public safety; the apparent need to see each others faces in public. The ban however does not produce safety, it produces fear. Where only about 300 women wear the face veil in the Netherlands, the public now is convinced that we can see them everywhere and that tens of thousands of Muslim women wear it.

Other measures to increase public safety include more leeway for intelligence services to monitor and disturb people’s lives; even when there is no official charge, the US last week killed an American civilian Anwar al-Awlaki believed to be an Al Qaeda leader on foreign soil with no official charge or proof, the Dutch evicted several Muslim migrants being implicated in terrorist activities without any charge, the Dutch are active of supporters of the war on terror that caused the deaths of thousands and thousands innocent civilians in Iraq, Afghanistan and Africa. So if we talk about fear and safety, whose fear and whose safety do we actually mean? After 9/11 the whole risk management idea has turned into a political and commercial ritual that intends to magically reinforce safety but produces feelings of fear and aversion. In the preface of one of my favourite novels, Fear and loathing in Las Vegas, English writer Samuel Johnsson is quoted stating: “He who makes a beast of himself gets rid of the pain of being a man.” The quote refers to the book’s main character’s drug abuse in trying to escape the harsh vulnerabilities of American life and to the books main theme the failure of American counterculture to provide a lasting answer to the harsh realities. Fear is a drug, and policies and management tactics combined with politicians who use feelings of insecurity and plead loudly for ever harder measures to resolve fear, are nothing less than socially accepted models to achieve ritualistic highs and illusions of safety that in the end do nothing except than cultivate that fear.

The “Wave Speech” from Justin Grevich on Vimeo.

The cultivation of fear does not only affect people’s daily lives directly, but also our memories that keep the fear for the Other alive. This year on 9/11 the Moroccan-Dutch goalkeeper of a Dutch soccer team, Khalid Sinouh, tweeted he wanted ‘to concentrate on the present’ and that he ‘felt a little tired of all that 9/11 propaganda’ and closed it with ‘pffff’. The soccer team, Philips Sports Association (PSV) distanced itself from his statements and emphasized the goalkeeper made his statement as a private person (and therefore not as a representative of PSV). The case refers to the monopolization of meaning and memory whereby the purpose of such ceremonials, as French historian Renan has noted, is nothing but the reaffirming of group loyalty rather than the establishing of historical accuracy, let alone the presenting of an event in all its moral and political complexity. To remember is not just grieving it may also mean to harbor a vision of securing justice or vengeance long after it is time to put the guns away. Part of what happens in this production of memory and solidarity is the monopolization of the meaning of ’9/11?. I saw many people on twitter saying now is not the time of saying but let’s think of the thousands of children in Africa dying or let’s think about the victims of the War on Terror. If we say our thoughts go to the victims of 9/11, we of course mean to victims of the terrorist attack that hit the US that day, not other people in the US or elsewhere. The negative, and sometimes downright hostile, comments on the tweets of the Moroccan-Dutch goalie show that we ought to remember 9/11 in a particular way; with our thoughts focused on one particular event, one particular category of victims. The commemoration shows a world caught in arms, hate, and fear.

Now of course there is nothing wrong with risk management, counter-radicalization policies and public commemorations perse, but we should recognize that with the attempt to produce safety we also produce meaning. Given the intended and unintended negative consequences of public risk management and such commemorations, alternatives should be considered. This is possible. Remember the monk I was talking about in the beginning? This man desperately looking for salvation through martyrdom is now presented as an animal lover, pacifist and a Christian committed to dialogue. It maybe hard to believe that he once affirmed the false idea that it was a ‘a Muslim belief’ apparently widespread ‘at that time’ that to kill a Christian was a sure path to salvation. It may be hard to imagine that one day we actually celebrate a feast dedicated to the monk. But that is what we do. Tomorrow we on October 4 we celebrate the Feast of St Francis of Assisi. It is a also a day for animals, in Dutch dierendag, a popular day for pets to be “blessed”. I wish you a blessed day as well.

'Tired of 9/11': Remembering as a dogma and creed

Posted on September 14th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: International Terrorism, Murder on theo Van Gogh and related issues, Some personal considerations.

Is it possible to have a commemoration that includes alternative meanings of 9/11 and that produces alternative forms of solidarity and public memory? (more…)

‘Tired of 9/11’: Remembering as a dogma and creed

Posted on September 14th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: International Terrorism, Murder on theo Van Gogh and related issues, Some personal considerations.

Is it possible to have a commemoration that includes alternative meanings of 9/11 and that produces alternative forms of solidarity and public memory? (more…)

Memories of 9/11 tragedy preserved – Philly.com

Closing the week 36 – The Remains of That Day 9/11

Posted on September 11th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: Blogosphere, International Terrorism, Murder on theo Van Gogh and related issues, Religious and Political Radicalization.

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Featuring The Remains of that Day: 9/11

Memory and relics
Daniel Silliman: 9/11 relics

Religion, Peter Berger once said, is the audacious proposal that human activities are cosmically meaningful.

In this sense, some of the remembrances and relics of 9/11 are deeply religious. Curiously so.

“What you find at most archaeological sites, ancient and modern, are things that are mundane, a part of daily life, so that is our mission here,” said Kate Quinn, the Penn Museum’s director of exhibitions.

Quinn said the September 11 museum lent Penn things that fulfill that goal of everyday items transformed – eyeglasses, a computer keyboard, visitor badges – that were unearthed during the excavations at ground zero.

“Archaeology usually tells us something about ancient times, but this is history, too, even if it is only 10 years old,” Quinn said.

It took me ten years, but I finally wrote something about September 11th. And then I made a little movie. | The Gideonse Bible

I knew I had to do it eventually, and I had to do it by today. When I saw that the VAMP theme for August was “Alternate Endings,” I knew exactly what to do. I wrote it in two hours; it exploded out of me. I’m sure it could be honed here and there, but I like the raw weirdness of it. What follows are my remarks as prepared for delivery. In the video, the last word is “possibility,” and I swallowed it for some reason. Also, I apologize for the sound quality; I don’t really know what I’m doing. Anyway:

Through the fragments of 9/11 » Knoxville News Sentinel

After the collapse of the south tower of the World Trade Center in New York, the first of the wounded, including four members of the New York City Medical Examiners Office, with Amy Mundorff, second from left, are brought via boat across the Hudson River to a triage area in Jersey City, N.J., September 11, 2001. Mundorff now teaches forensic anthropology at the University of Tennessee. (Chip East / Special to the News Sentinel)

The September 11th Industry | homophilosophicus

In the face of such horror however, a great hope was born on the streets ofManhattanten years ago today. On the television and on the radio inAmericaand around the world, millions witnessed the beautiful transformation of apparently cold New Yorkers into heroes and martyrs. Women and men in workaday suits and uniforms walked, often to certain death, into grave danger to reach the hands of other human beings whom they had never before met. In the sudden depths of catastrophe ordinary people took it upon themselves to become extraordinary. For all of our perceptions of the Big Apple as a cruel and hard place, it was the everyday New Yorker who reminded us that we are human. For all of the loss and the fear and the despair, there was a flash of something truly brilliant from the rubble and dust that day.

Reflecting on 9/11: Humanizing war

When I chose to enlist, I didn’t feel any great patriotic call. Our integrity as a nation never depended on me killing people in other countries. I didn’t have any college prospects—my GPA was a 1.17—and I didn’t want to end up as another pothead or meth-head in the rust belt. I wanted to blow shit up and kill people. Nobody in specific, no ethnic prejudice or anything stupid like that, I just wanted to shoot endless bad guys wearing the same clothes as each other, like in Goldeneye. Maybe pick up their ammo when I ran low.

‘A deeper meaning’: How 9/11 changed one Vermonter – for good: Rutland Herald Online

Ten years later, Michael realizes the eyewitness details he remembers were only the start of a larger story.

Column: Forgetting 9/11 Would Be a Tragedy – Long Valley, NJ Patch

Every person in this nation has differing opinions on the course of action America took in years following the deadliest attack on U.S. soil, but Sept. 11, 2001, in my opinion, is a day that cannot be forgotten.

9/11: Are We All Moral Monsters?

9/11 reveals often-hidden facts in our own anthropology: that we are all 9/11-enabled human beings, and we are all scared of our own mortality.

Marking the Tenth Anniversary of 9/11 : The New Yorker

For those in the immediate vicinity, the horror was of course immediate and unmistakable; it occurred in what we have learned to call real time, and in real space. For those farther away—whether a few dozen blocks or halfway around the world—who were made witnesses by the long lens of television, the events were seen as through a glass, brightly. Their reality was visible but not palpable. It took hours to begin to comprehend their magnitude; it is taking days for the defensive numbness they induced to wear off; it will take months—or years—to measure their impact and meaning.

The meaning of 9/11’s most controversial photo | Jonathan Jones | Comment is free | guardian.co.uk

http://static.guim.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/pictures/2011/9/2/1314964814888/Young-people-chat-as-the–005.jpg In the photograph Thomas Hoepker took on 11 September 2001, a group of New Yorkers sit chatting in the sun in a park in Brooklyn. Behind them, across brilliant blue water, in an azure sky, a terrible cloud of smoke and dust rises above lower Manhattan from the place where two towers were struck by hijacked airliners this same morning and have collapsed, killing, by fire, smoke, falling or jumping or crushing and tearing and fragmentation in the buildings’ final fall, nearly 3,000 people.

Museum Anthropology: 9/11 Museum Human Remains Controversy

The brewing controversy over the unidentified human remains at the new 9/11 Museum has hit the news. Full disclosure, Dr. Chip has been involved with some of the grass-roots advocacy groups. We believe this is an important issue for all museum anthropologists, as it creates an important dialogue that asks about how the profession treats all human remains in the museum context, the intersection of memorials and museums, the nature and process of consultation, and how we might respond should another attack of such a magnitude come.

An Anthropological Preview of the Post-9/11 World « ZERO ANTHROPOLOGY

Imagine this scenario for 2002 – science fiction a short while ago, exceedingly likely now. The world had entered the paranoid phase of globalisation. Countries were neither at war nor not at war. Detailed surveillance of citizens and quixotic imprisonment of individuals became commonplace. Politicians eagerly elaborated on the imminent threat of terrorist attacks, thereby justifying ever more draconian measures. Radical humanist networks and human rights groups were ostracised for their lack of loyalty and structural similarities to terrorist groups. Yet everybody, including the politicians, knew in their heart of hearts that turning the citizenry into potential enemies would only aggravate the problem.

Anthropology News

In the aftermath of a disaster, calls for the replacement, replication and reproduction of that which has been lost represent a yearning for a return to normal. Yet a full return to any pre-disaster “normal” is impossible as the physical and emotional rupture of tragedy transforms everything and everybody. That which has been lost is irreplaceable, even if what may appear to be the original form is rebuilt. There is no unadulterated replacement, only re/placement. To break down this word:

Watch Videos Online | Other 9/11s Remembered – DN! | Veoh.com

Watch Other 9/11s Remembered – DN! in News | View More Free Videos Online at Veoh.com

Social scientists on 9/11 and its aftermath
10 Years Later: Islam in the U.S. – YouTube

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ELKoWgKeSQo
Robert Hefner, professor of anthropology and director of the Institute on Culture, Religion, and World Affairs (CURA) at Boston University, discusses the state of Islam and Muslim society in the U.S. since the September 11th terrorist attacks.

Shaped by 9/11: UMBC Researchers Reflect – YouTube

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4VsXOjXJ7Nk
The events of September 11, 2001 changed course of history. To some faculty at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County (UMBC), particularly those early in their careers, they also changed the course of their life’s work. The attacks and subsequent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan led them to study new issues and respond to new needs. This video includes reflections from Dr. Rebecca Adelman, who examines imagery of the War on Terror, and Dr. Seth Messinger, who works with veterans recovering from limb loss.

9/11 impact was less in Europe, says WUSTL anthropologist | Newsroom | Washington University in St. Louis

Because the Sept. 11 attacks happened on U.S. soil, it makes sense that they might have had a more profound impact in the United States than in Western Europe.
John Bowen

Bowen

But the location of the attacks isn’t the only reason for that, says John R. Bowen, PhD, an anthropology and religious studies professor, both in Arts & Sciences, at Washington University in St. Louis, who has spent the past 10 years studying Islam and civil law in France and England.

Key differences in how Muslims were perceived before 9/11 in the United States and Western Europe played a key role in how much — or how little — attitudes on Muslims changed after 9/11, Bowen says.

“After 9/11, many in the United States came to fear American Muslims for the first time; most knew nothing about Islam,” says Bowen, PhD, the Dunbar-Van Cleve Professor in Arts & Sciences. “But fear of Muslims already was present in parts of Europe.”

Al-Qaeda Is Winning – Daveed Gartenstein-Ross – International – The Atlantic

A decade after the attacks of September 11, 2001, national security opinion leaders are converging around the ideas that the threat of terrorism has been substantially reduced over the past 10 years, and that al-Qaeda is on its death bed. “Al-Qaeda is sort of on the ropes and taking a lot of shots to the body and the head,” White House counterterrorism chief John Brennan told the Associated Press on August 31. Defense secretary Leon Panetta said in July that the United States is “within reach” of “strategically defeating” the jihadi group, and the Washington Post has confirmed that his assessment is shared by many analysts. Commentators in the public sphere are increasingly adopting similar views. But my own research into the group has led me in a different direction: that this emerging consensus doesn’t just appear wrong, but obviously wrong. Al-Qaeda isn’t anywhere near defeated — for all our triumphalism, it appears to be winning.

10 Years Later: How We Won – William McCants & William Rosenau – International – The Atlantic

Ten years into our struggle against al-Qaeda, it’s time to acknowledge that the “war” is over and recognize that the United States and its international partners overreacted to the al-Qaeda threat. Terrorism, after all, is designed to elicit such overreactions. But the confluence of the recent death of bin Laden, harsh new economic realities, the democratic movements in the Middle East, and the ten-year anniversary of the September 11 attacks provide an ideal time to take stock of what it actually takes to deal with the al-Qaeda threat.

Well, Is Al Qaeda Winning Or Not? | INTELWIRE.com | Terrorism news and analysis, investigative reports and exclusive documents | By J.M. Berger, author of Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go To War In The Name Of Islam, Al Qaeda terrorism expert, documentary maker, author, special subjects include 9/11 Documents, Ali Mohamed, Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, Oklahoma City Bombing, and more

Some of my favorite thinkers have diametrically opposing pieces in The Atlantic today. Will McCants and William Rosenau write about How We Won the War on Terror, while Daveed Gartenstein-Ross writes that Al Qaeda is Winning.

Why Is The Middle East Still In Thrall To 9/11 Conspiracy Theories? | The New Republic

The 9/11 attacks catalyzed a tremendous shift in American foreign policy in the Middle East. Rather than prioritizing petrol, Washington targeted terrorist organizations, dethroned a dictator, and lobbied throughout the region for liberalization. Yet despite the billions of dollars spent policing Baghdad and protecting Benghazi, the unpopularity of the United States in the Arab world continues to be fueled by the belief that Islamist terrorists had nothing to do with 9/11, with many claiming the attacks were an American, Israeli, or joint American-Israeli conspiracy. In this sense, overcoming 9/11 revisionism is, perhaps, the greatest challenge facing American public diplomacy in the coming decade: So long as such conspiracy theories persist, Arabs will continue to view American policies aimed at preventing “another 9/11” as thoroughly illegitimate since, as they see it, 9/11 is just a big American lie.

Ten Years after 9/11, Do the Arabs value Democracy more than We do? | Informed Comment

The September 11 attacks have been revealed as a last gasp of a fading, cult-like twentieth-century vision, not as the wave of the future. They were the equivalent of the frenetic dashing to and fro of a chicken already beheaded. Al-Qaeda’s core assumptions have been refuted by subsequent events and above all in 2011 by the Arab Spring.

9/11: more security, less secure | openDemocracy

The world has been changed by the securitisation of everyday life and the Islamisation of security. The accompanying threat-complex has shifted American sensibilities, says Cas Mudde.

The roots of conflict | Education | The Guardian

Is western culture better than any other? Umberto Eco argues that what is important is not superiority but pluralism and toleration

Human Terrain Systems Dissenter Resigns, Tells Inside Story of Training’s Heart of Darkness » Counterpunch: Tells the Facts, Names the Names

My initial inclination was to wonder if this was a gag, or, having written several critiques of the Human Terrain Systems program describing why it is an ethical and practical anthropological disaster, whether someone was setting me up. While I’ve had several other Human Terrain social scientists write me with complaints about the program, it didn’t seem likely that Human Terrain Systems (HTS) would hire someone with John’s politically progressive views. But the email address was the same one John had used for years, and John’s story checked out and made sense, so I approached our correspondence along the lines of his initial request to help him organize his focus and to understand critiques of HTS. As he undertook his HTS training, we corresponded and I passed along articles, and offered friendship and critiques of what he was learning in this training; not that John needed help with this critique, the flaws in the program were pretty obvious to him.

David H. Price: Anthropology’s Military Shadow | The New Significance

Just as it was becoming passe to remark on anthropology’s status as colonialism’s wanton stepchild, George Bush’s Terror War rediscovered old militarized uses for culture, and invigorated new modernist dreams of harnessing anthropology and culture for the domination of others. Because I began in the early 1990s using the Freedom of Information Act, interviews, and archival research to document American anthropologists’ interactions with military and intelligence agencies, by the time the post-9/11 push by the Pentagon and CIA to again use anthropological knowledge as tools for intelligence, warfare and counterinsurgency, I had a decent head start on documenting and thinking about some of this history. By the time America got its terror war on, I had already documented the details of how this worked in the past, and had thought about the core of the ethical, political and theoretical fundamentals of a critical approach to questions relating to the weaponization of anthropology.

Wiley: Anthropology, History & Sociology

In the 10 years since the events of September 2001 a vast amount of scholarly research has been written on the impact of 9/11. We are pleased to share with you this collection of free book and journal content from the Anthropology, History & Sociology books and journals published by Wiley-Blackwell.

Wiley: Religion & Theology

In the 10 years since the events of September 2001 a vast amount of scholarly research has been written on the impact of 9/11. We are pleased to share with you this collection of free book and journal content from the Religion & Theology books and journals published by Wiley-Blackwell.

The paradoxes of the re-Islamization of Muslim societies « The Immanent Frame

The 9/11 debate was centered on a single issue: Islam. Osama Bin Laden was taken at his own words by the West: Al-Qaeda, even if its methods were supposedly not approved by most Muslims, was seen as the vanguard or at least a symptom of “Muslim wrath” against the West, fueled by the fate of the Palestinians and by Western encroachments in the Middle East; and if this wrath, which has pervaded the contemporary history of the Middle East, has been cast in Islamic terms, it is because Islam is allegedly the main, if not the only, reference that has shaped Muslim minds and societies since the Prophet. This vertical genealogy obscured all the transversal connections (the fact, for instance, that Al-Qaeda systematized a concept of terrorism that was first developed by the Western European ultra-left of the seventies or the fact that most Al-Qaeda terrorists do not come from traditional Muslim societies but are recruited from among global, uprooted youth, with a huge proportion of converts).

10 Years after September 11

10 Years After September 11, a digital collection recently launched by the Social Science Research Council. In the days immediately following 9/11/01, the Council invited a wide range of leading social scientists to write short essays for an online forum. Ten years later, these same contributors have been asked to reflect on what has changed and what remains the same. The result is an extraordinary collection of new essays, with contributions from Rajeev Bhargava, Mary Kaldor, David Held, Olivier Roy, Saskia Sassen, Veena Das, Richard Falk, and many others.—ed.

9/11 chronomania « The Immanent Frame

This post sketches out some of the ways the events of 9/11 altered time-consciousness and temporal rhetoric in the public sphere and follows how the attacks continue to frame the subjective experience of temporality. Beginning with the lexicon of the war on terror—with its temporally overdertemined rhetoric of “the homeland,” “preemption,” “fundamentalism,” and, of course, the name-date “9/11” itself—I consider a few cases of what I call 9/11 chronomania—the obsession with time and temporal disruption that characterizes representations of 9/11 across a variety of media forms. In the case of the 9/11 Commission Report, by refashioning disaster as chronology, the narrative aims to replace victims with knowers—first, by establishing an authorial subject in command of its perceptual, technological, and temporal fields, and second, by attempting to shape personal and collective understandings of 9/11 by securing events unfolding in multiple locations and witnessed in myriad ways on a single, immanent timeline. The goals of such a narrative are clear: the chronometric novella that begins the 9/11 Commission Report is in part a hook designed to catch a national audience primed by thrillers like the television series 24, but it is also an attempt to incrementalize and disaggregate horrific events into an easily understood linear plot as part of a self-professed attempt to salve the wounds of collective trauma.

Accounts of everyday life and politics
Aftershock and awe – Haaretz Daily Newspaper | Israel News

Usama Hasan, a devout Muslim of Pakistani origin , who grew up in Britain and was known to be active in radical circles, was at work in his Oxfordshire office on the day of the attacks on the World Trade Center.
muslims.
Hicham Yezza, an Algerian Muslim who came to England on a scholarship to study computing and management, was at home in Nottingham, getting ready to go to class.

British Muslims tell the terrorists they ‘failed’ on the tenth anniversary of 9/11

More than 50 Muslim community groups the length and breadth of Britain have united on the tenth anniversary of 9/11 to express their solidarity with victims of terrorism and to tell the terrorists that a decade on ‘they failed’ in seeking to divide society on religious grounds.

How the fear of being criminalised has forced Muslims into silence | Mehdi Hasan | Comment is free | The Guardian

We have more Muslim MPs than ever. But there is a growing belief that dissent risks falling foul of terror laws

After 9/11: ‘You no longer have rights’ – extract | World news | The Guardian

What was it like for immigrant Muslims and Arab-Americans in the wake of 9/11? Ten years on, three people tell their stories

9/11 is No Excuse for Bashing Muslims – OtherWords

Violent jihadists don’t represent Islam any more than the Anders Breiviks of the world represent Christianity.

Book explores ‘Arab Detroit’ in decade since 9/11 | Detroit Free Press | freep.com

A book has been published that examines life in the Detroit area’s Arab-American community in the decade since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.

“Arab Detroit 9/11: Life in the Terror Decade” was released this past week and is published by Wayne State University Press. The book incorporates academic, artistic and everyday voices and viewpoints from one of the most well-known and largest communities of Arabs outside the Middle East.

The 9/11 Decade – How Interfaith Groups Built Bridges – NYTimes.com

Jews, Christians, Muslims come together, hoping to fight fear with familiarity. How it’s playing out in Syracuse.

Conversations with New Yorkers – The 9/11 Decade – Al Jazeera English

Al Jazeera speaks to people in New York about the 9/11 attack on their city and the events that followed.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y155rP6iTYo

Living with 9/11: the Muslim American | World news | The Guardian

Linda Sarsour lives in Brooklyn and is from a Palestinian American family. She has become increasingly involved in community activism since the September 11 attacks

Three girls lead ‘normal’ lives after 9/11 attacks, but never forget | MyCentralJersey.com | MyCentralJersey.com

Sept. 11 was just the start of family always being around. Casey remembers getting off the bus that day and being so confused because there were so many cars in her driveway. She said her mom told her they were having a party because it was the first week of school and they wanted to celebrate because they have to get back into their daily routines.

Misc
The criminalization of speech since 9/11 – War Room – Salon.com

The expanded use of the material-support law is an important part of the legacy of 9/11 and the legal regime erected in response to the attacks. To learn more about the history and use of the material-support statute, I spoke with Hina Shamsi, the director of the National Security Project at the American Civil Liberties Union.

Mahmood Mamdani: Good Muslim, Bad Muslim (Part 1) – YouTube

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w20DhY1O2j8

The HISTORY NEWS NETWORK (http://hnn.us) recorded this appearance of Mahmood Mamdani, Professor of Government and Professor of Anthropology Columbia University, at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association on January 6, 2007. He spoke as the guest of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. The speech took place over lunch at Atlanta’s famous Pittypat’s Porch.

A US Soldier’s Experience in Iraq on 9/11 | Savage Minds

Here is a second interview with my friend serving his second term in Baghdad. We talk about his ‘cultural training’ exercises, Bradley Manning, and his engagement with the local Iraqis.

What was Osama bin-Laden for Muslims? | Islam, Muslims, and an Anthropologist

Yet what was bin-Laden for Muslims? This question is more difficult to answer than the previous one. First, I think we have to look at how western commentators, politicians, and of course the general public imagined what bin-Laden was for Muslims. Indeed, this is even more important than the former question since such perceptions have shaped how many people living in western countries saw and see Muslims. You only need to ask around in any European or US city and you will find people whom are strongly convinced that Muslims adore bin-Laden.

The Missing Martyrs — By Charles Kurzman — Book Review – NYTimes.com

In “The Missing Martyrs,” Charles Kurzman suggests that even before Osama bin Laden was killed, his movement had failed utterly. Al Qaeda’s ideological trademark is to exhort ordinary Muslims to engage in individual acts of violence against those deemed enemies of Islam, specifically Americans, Jews and the infidel rulers of Muslim-majority states. And yet very few such attacks have occurred in the United States since Sept. 11, and certainly none comparable to the devastating events of that day. To emphasize just how surprising this is, Kurzman cites a 2006 online manual for aspiring jihadists that lists 14 “simple tools” that “are easy to use and available for anyone who wants to fight the occupying enemy” — they include “running over someone with a car” and “setting fire to homes or rooms at sleep time.” Kurzman, a sociologist who has written widely about Islamic reform movements, asks: “If terrorist methods are as widely available as automobiles, why are there so few Islamist terrorists? In light of the death and devastation that terrorists have wrought, the question may seem absurd. But if there are more than a billion Muslims in the world, many of whom supposedly hate the West and desire martyrdom, why don’t we see terrorist attacks everywhere, every day?”

Al-Qaeda’s Past and Present « jihadica

The newest issue of Foreign Affairs on the ten-year anniversary of 9/11 includes an essay by me (free registration required) on the history of al-Qaeda and its prospects after the Arab Spring. The essay covers the reasons for al-Qaeda’s founding, its targeting of the United States, its strategic thinking under Zawahiri’s leadership, its concept of an Islamic state, and its enduring problem with Islamist parliamentary politics.

After the Massacre, Norway Reexamines Its Values and Fears – The Daily Beast

In the wake of a devastating massacre, Norway reexamines its values—and its fears.

Slow attempts at making sense: Oslo 22/7

This research diary has until now exclusively treated the various facets of my PhD research project in Paris. When the numbness began to lose its grip, I started to realise why I feel so terribly concerned. Of course, I think most Norwegians, many Europeans and even many, many fellow world citizens feel deep concern when an atrocity like this strikes, even when they or their closest aren’t struck personally. This concerns us as fellow humans (of both the victims and the perpetrator…), and it concerns us as political beings. But I also realised that this concerns me profoundly in terms of the career I’ve chosen: What good is it to devote my professional life to understanding nationalism, belonging, community cohesion, conceptions of difference and the like when I have done nothing to prevent the worst thinkable acts of violence to take place in my own country? Especially since I think – or I’m sure – that I’ve felt there was a need for worry (but of course, not to this unconceivable degree…). For several days now I’ve been thinking about how I can contribute. How can I contribute in the best way with my knowledge (of living with difference in Europe), my concern (for the future of us all) and my devotion (to work for a better world)? I know need to think much more about this in the coming days and weeks, and I know that I need to act.

Jihadi Suicide Bombers: The New Wave by Ahmed Rashid | The New York Review of Books

After September 11, 2001, readers around the world quickly learned about the basic tenets of jihad and its distortion by al-Qaeda. Now the shelves of Western bookshops are again filled with books on the subject, which gives no sign of going away. Jihad, which means struggle, is “recommended” rather than obligatory for all Muslims, but its interpretation is literally an open book—the lesser jihad to purify one’s soul and perform good deeds for the community, the greater jihad to defend Islam when it is under attack. Each major collection of Hadith, or the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad that were compiled by several Muslim scholars well after the Prophet’s death, contains its own descriptions of jihad, with the result that the discussion of jihad has always been a matter of differing interpretations rather than literal observance.

Report – A Call to Courage: Reclaiming Our Liberties Ten Years After 9/11 | American Civil Liberties Union

An ACLU report release to coincide with the 10th anniversary of 9/11 warns that a decade after the attacks, the United States is at risk of enshrining a permanent state of emergency in which core values must be subordinated to ever-expanding claims of national security. (More on Civil Liberties After 9/11 »)

Empire, Subalternity, and Ijtih?d: Two Muslim Women’s Leadership Models in the Post-9/11 US – Ahmed – 2011 – The Muslim World – Wiley Online Library

Binary stereotypes silence Muslim women in post 9/11 America, but little has been written about how Muslim women’s leadership can enable voice. This article presents two leadership models based on the philosophy of ijtih?d (independent reasoning), which facilitate self-worth and solidarity, key elements of voice. The less visible spiritual colleague model, which has a followership of practising Muslim women, facilitates self-worth through ijtih?d, allowing women to seek self-definition through their own interpretation of the Qur’?n. As strategy, the leader converts her home into a space which is simultaneously sacred and political where such informal discussions take place around religious rituals. The public bridge-builder model creates solidarity between and among its following of practising and nonpractising Muslims and non-Muslim men and women. The strategy focuses on effective dialogue between different groups. Ijtih?d as discourse in pursuit of knowledge (‘ilm) creates equality and respect, the basis of sustainable alliances.

Anwar Al-Awlaki’s Links to the September 11 Hijackers – J.M. Berger – International – The Atlantic

In the timeline of the hijackers’ movements in the months before the attacks, New Mexico-born Awlaki and his followers seem to turn up nearly every step of the way

Zakaria: Why America Overreacted to 9/11 – The Daily Beast

Nine years after 9/11, can anyone doubt that Al Qaeda is simply not that deadly a threat? Since that gruesome day in 2001, once governments everywhere began serious countermeasures, Osama bin Laden’s terror network has been unable to launch a single major attack on high-value targets in the United States and Europe. While it has inspired a few much smaller attacks by local jihadis, it has been unable to execute a single one itself. Today, Al Qaeda’s best hope is to find a troubled young man who has been radicalized over the Internet, and teach him to stuff his underwear with explosives.

New books reflect what we’ve learned from September 11 and how we’ve learned to say it – The Boston Globe

Yet there is much to praise in these volumes. One captures the grief and loss of the period with uncommon intimacy. One captures the disillusion of the decade with unusual anger. And the third retells those events with unbridled drama. None of these three – or the scores of other commemoratives, perhaps the only growth industry in publishing right now – is in itself a one-volume work that captures this period of pathos and personal powerlessness.

Thoughts on 9-11: On the Importance of Intolerance | Reuters

She was a producer who lived in downtown Manhattan and upon hearing the first collision had run up the stairs of an apartment building across from the towers and banged on doors until someone fleeing the building let her in to watch from their windows.

Dutch
NOS Nieuws – Moslim-jongeren praten over gevolgen 9/11

Praten over de gevolgen van de aanslagen van 11 september in Amerika voor Nederland. Dat gebeurde gisteravond in Amsterdam door moslim-jongeren. Maar ze kwamen vooral voor de mening van een bijzondere gast, merkte verslaggever Rienk Kamer.

Fotozondag: Tien jaar geleden | DeJaap

Tien jaar geleden is het vandaag, dat twee vliegtuigen zich kort na elkaar in de Twin Towers van het World Trade Center in New York City boorden. Een derde vliegtuig raakte het Pentagon en een vierde stortte neer in Pennsylvania. Bij deze terroristische aanslagen kwamen 2974 mensen om het leven. Onder hen 328 brandweermannen en 62 politiemensen die direct na de eerste inslag op zoek gingen naar slachtoffers.

Wikileaks: de VS, Nederlandse moslims en (anti-)radicalisering

Posted on September 10th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: Activism, International Terrorism, ISIM/RU Research, Murder on theo Van Gogh and related issues, Notes from the Field, Public Islam, Religious and Political Radicalization, Young Muslims.

Na de aanslagen van 11 september stond terrorisme natuurlijk hoog op de politieke agenda. En dan met name terreuraanslagen (mogelijkerwijze) gepleegd door moslims. Na 9/11 werden moslims dan ook nauwgezet gemonitored door de Nederlandse staat zoals blijkt uit een recent vrijgegeven ‘secret cable‘ bij Wikileaks. Het beeld is ontluisterend. (more…)

Radicalization Series VI – Muslims and Radicalization – What do we know?

Posted on September 8th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: anthropology, Headline, International Terrorism, ISIM/RU Research, Murder on theo Van Gogh and related issues, Religious and Political Radicalization, Young Muslims.

Since 9/11 the issue of radicalization of Muslims is top priority on many policy and research agenda’s. A large industry of research, policy making and advising, counter-radicalization programs and so on has emerged. In this post I will focus on research and the very basic question of what we know by now about radicalization. (more…)

3 comments.

Cultural Identity and Human Security in Europe

Posted on July 26th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: International Terrorism, Murder on theo Van Gogh and related issues, Religious and Political Radicalization.

Cultural Identity as a key dimension of Human Security in western Europe: The dutch Case

by Edien Bartels, Kim Knibbe, Martijn de Koning and Oscar Salemink

In this chapter of A world of insecurity: Anthropological perspectives on human security edited by Thomas Hylland Eriksen and Ellen Bal, we (your blogger, Edien Bartels, Oscar Salemink and Kim Knibbe) take up the discussion of cultural identity as a dimension of security. We deal with issues such as feelings of insecurity and radicalization among native Dutch and minority citizens. We show how minority identities may enhance the internal sense of security in the group, but may lead to anxieties and (subjectively experienced) insecurity in greater society. Both majorities and minorities are inclined to feel insecure about their belonging and sense of identification in contemporary Western European societies.

Waar is de Hofstadgroep?

Posted on January 10th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: International Terrorism, ISIM/RU Research, Murder on theo Van Gogh and related issues, Religious and Political Radicalization, Young Muslims.

Het lijkt al weer een eeuwigheid geleden dat de kranten volstonden met de Hofstadgroep. Nederlands enige echte ‘terreurorganisatie’ van de laatste 10 jaar. De groep jongeren rondom Mohammed Bouyeri werd in de debatten exemplarisch voor alles wat er mis is met islam en moslims: agressief, onmogelijk (cultureel) te integreren, onbetrouwbaar en een stel idioten. De gretigheid waarmee men deze groep als terreurgroep wilde aanmerken kwam vooral tot uiting toen het gerechtshof tot het oordeel kwam dat ze geen terroristische organisatie waren. Nadat het OM in cassatie ging tegen die beslissing verwees de Hoge Raad de zaak terug naar het Gerechtshof. Dat gerechtshof heeft nu het oordeel geveld dat de groep wel een terroristische organisatie was:
Rechtspraak.nl – Veroordelingen in zaken Hofstadgroep

Het gerechtshof Amsterdam is van oordeel dat de verdachten wel degelijk hebben deelgenomen aan een samenwerkingsverband van voldoende structuur en duurzaamheid om te kunnen spreken van een organisatie. Voorts stelt het hof vast dat die organisatie gericht was op opruiing, aanzetten tot haat en geweld, en bedreiging, onder meer met een terroristisch misdrijf.

De Raad en nu ook het gerechtshof vond dat in de voorgaande behandelingen het begrip ‘organisatie’ niet goed was beoordeeld:
Rechtspraak.nl – Zoeken in uitspraken

Volgens bestendige jurisprudentie moet onder een organisatie als bedoeld in artikel 140 (en dus ook 140a) Sr worden
verstaan:

Een samenwerkingsverband met een zekere duurzaamheid en structuur tussen de verdachte en tenminste één andere persoon. Niet is vereist dat daarbij komt vast te staan dat een persoon om als deelnemer aan die organisatie te kunnen worden aangemerkt moet hebben samengewerkt met, althans bekend moet zijn geweest met alle andere personen die deel uitmaken van de organisatie of dat de samenstelling van het samenwerkingsverband steeds dezelfde is.

Aanwijzingen voor het bestaan van een dergelijk samenwerkingsverband kunnen bijvoorbeeld zijn gemeenschappelijke regels, het voeren van overleg, gezamenlijke besluitvorming, een taakverdeling, een bepaalde hiërarchie en/of geledingen. Dit zijn echter geen constitutieve vereisten om van een samenwerkingsverband te kunnen spreken. Evenmin is vereist dat het samenwerkingsverband steeds uit dezelfde personen bestaat of dat alle deelnemers elkaar kennen.

In concreto heeft de Hoge Raad in de onderhavige zaak geoordeeld dat het gerechtshof Den Haag een te beperkte reikwijdte heeft gegeven aan de maatstaf van gestructureerdheid en duurzaamheid van het samenwerkingsverband door te eisen dat “binnen die groep gemeenschappelijke regels en een gemeenschappelijke doelstelling hebben bestaan, waaraan de individuele leden gebonden waren en door welke gemeenschappelijkheid op die leden een zekere druk kon worden
uitgeoefend zich aan die regels te houden en aan die doelstelling gebonden te achten”.

In zijn conclusie in de onderhavige zaak merkt de advocaat-generaal (AG) bij de Hoge Raad (onder 27 en 28) het volgende op:

Naarmate samenwerking inniger en duurzamer is, zal eerder aan het vereiste van een samenwerkingsverband met een zekere structuur zijn voldaan. Het duidelijkst springt dat in het oog wanneer wordt bedacht dat ook twee personen duurzaam en gestructureerd, dat wil zeggen, gericht op een bepaald doel, kunnen samenwerken zonder dat hun samenwerking verder is gestructureerd in afspraken. Een dergelijk samenwerkingsverband kan toevallig en in de loop der tijd ontstaan omdat men “werkendeweg”ontdekt dat men een gezamenlijk doel heeft waarvan de realisering met duurzame samenwerking gediend is. Zo’n samenwerkingsverband is niet afhankelijk van regels, uitdrukkelijke afspraken of hiërarchische verhoudingen, maar kan heel wel duurzaam zijn en aan het werken aan een gemeenschappelijk doel een bepaalde structuur ontlenen.

Is van een lossere vorm van samenwerking sprake – geen vaste deelnemers aan het samenwerkingsverband, de deelnemers kennen elkaar maar ten dele – dan zal met name het vereiste van het samenwerkingsverband kunnen meebrengen dat ook de onderlinge verhouding tussen de deelnemers of – zoals in het hierna te noemen geval – enkele daarvan aan het samenwerkingsverband enige structuur geeft.

Met verwijzing naar HR 22 januari 2008, LJN BB7134, merkt de AG op dat de Hoge Raad het feit dat twee personen van een groep gedurende ongeveer dezelfde tijd in gestructureerd verband hebben samengewerkt, kennelijk voldoende acht om ook de overige personen van die groep te beschouwen als behorend tot de organisatie, zonder dat van hen een dergelijke structuur in de samenwerking wordt vastgesteld.

De aangehaalde opmerkingen van de AG acht het hof juist en neemt het hof als uitgangspunt.

Het Hof heeft dus een wijder begrip van het concept organisatie. Er hoeft geen nauw gestructureerd samenwerkingsverband te zijn en wanneer het helder is dat persoon A en B van dezelfde groep losjes hebben samengewerkt is dat voldoende om ook personen C t/m Z tot die organisatie te rekenen. Dat lijkt mij gezien de losse definitie een cirkelredenering. Je pikt een groep personen uit de massa, stelt dat er twee gedurende een periode hebben samengewerkt en stelt vervolgens dat dat betekent dat ook de overige tot dat verband horen; maar je had ze er toch al uitgepikt als groep? Wanneer gaat het dan precies van ‘groep’ naar ‘organisatie’? En is gezien de losse definitie van organisatie een groep niet al meteen een organisatie? In een artikel over de Hofstad groep schrijft Lorenzo Vidino dat het netwerk gezien de structuur en het functioneren van de verschillende individuen meer doet denken aan een jeugdbende (pp. 586-587):

In itself, the lack of a recruiter made the Hofstad group typologically distinct from most Western terrorist organizations. But this absence also made the group atypical in another respect: without a clearly dominant, charismatic individual, Hofstad developed an egalitarian spirit. Even though the group had some central figures, such as Bouyeri and Azzouz, its key members did not display true leadership qualities. Those members who were most knowledgeable, most faithful in attending meetings, and most charismatic obviously stood out, but they never took on the role of a leader. In the absence of a formal structure, every member was free to act on his own, without awaiting the direction of some superior. For example, Dutch authorities believe that Bouyeri and Azzouz conceived their attacks by themselves. While their intentions were clear to other members of the group, who might have been aware of some details of their planning, their actions did not emerge from a group effort.
This unusual characteristic of Hofstad might lead some to questionwhether it is actually a proper terrorist group. In its loose structure it parallels another social phenomenon that worries Dutch authorities: Moroccan youth gangs. […]

Jeugdbendes are mostly composed of groups of friends from the same neighborhood—boys between 16 and 20—who regularly congregate in certain squares or public gardens. Unlike many American gangs, jeugdbendes do not engage in large-scale criminal activities; their members limit their unlawful behavior to petty crime and unarmed confrontations with other gang members or even innocent passersby, often pursued for no other reason than to show bravado and impress their peers. Exactly like the Hofstad group, jeugdbendes lack structure and leaders. According to studies conducted by social scientists, those in jeugdbendes with strong personalities do assume a steering role, but no member of the gang is a properly defined leader who can order the other boys what to do. The Hofstad group also resembles a jeugdbende more than a terrorist group in its lack of a specific goal. Terrorist groups generally have a more or less realistic set of goals and a corresponding plan of action to accomplish them. Jeugdbendes, in contrast, are simply groups of disenfranchised youths that spend their time wandering the streets of Dutch cities looking for excitement and a sense of belonging. Unlike American gangs, they do not seek to control territory or to enrich themselves through activities such as selling drugs. The Hofstad group is similarly devoid of goals, with its members seemingly driven more by a nihilistic attraction to violence than by a concrete political goal.

Met die laatste zin ben ik het niet helemaal eens en volgens mij trekt Vidino die conclusie door een gebrek aan begrip over wat dat nihilisme inhoudt. De leden van het Hofstad netwerk hadden wel degelijk politieke doelen en denkbeelden; Vidino doet die af als dromen maar juist in het utopische zit de kracht (en voor de buitenwereld de dreiging) van die doeleinden zoals Roel Meijer en ik proberen te laten zien in ons recente stuk over het Hofstad netwerk. Zijn vergelijking met jeugdbendes is wel interessant en de discussie over de wat voor type groep het netwerk was, is ook meer dan een theoretische discussie zoals Vidino terecht stelt. Of het netwerk wel of geen terreurorganisatie is en wat de rol van ideologie is, is de crux in de afgelopen rechtszaken tegen dat netwerk. In het geval van de Hofstadgroep trekt het Hof op basis van bovenstaande uitgangspunten en het gepresenteerde feitenmateriaal de volgende conclusie:

3.1.4 Conclusie

De conclusie moet dan ook zijn dat de leden van de groep zich met elkaar verbonden voelden door een gemeenschappelijke geloofsovertuiging, dat zij daarin systematisch werden geschoold en dat binnen de groep gestructureerde activiteiten plaatsvonden, die erop gericht waren elkaar in die overtuiging te versterken en de geesten rijp te maken voor deelneming aan de jihad. Dat er tussen de leden van de groep verschil was in de intensiteit van de onderlinge contacten en in de mate van betrokkenheid bij en aanvaarding van het radicaal fundamentalistische gedachtegoed, doet daaraan niet af, nu in ieder geval kan worden vastgesteld dat er sprake was van een gedeelde bijzondere belangstelling voor dat gedachtegoed.

Op grond van het voorgaande, in onderling verband en onderlinge samenhang bezien, komt het hof tot het oordeel dat de verweren van de verdediging met betrekking tot het bestaan van een organisatie of organisaties moeten worden verworpen en dat hier aanwezig is een samenwerkingsverband of samenwerkingsverbanden van voldoende structuur en duurzaamheid om te kunnen spreken van een organisatie of organisaties in de betekenis die daaraan in de rechtspraak over artikel 140 Sr is gegeven, welke betekenis ook voor de toepassing van artikel 140a Sr moet worden aangenomen.
Deze organisatie of organisaties zullen hierna ook wel de groep worden genoemd, of, in het enkelvoud, de organisatie, ook als het om meer dan één organisatie gaat. De groep bestond vanaf in ieder geval mei 2003. Alle verdachten alsmede de overige in de tenlastelegging genoemde personen – met uitzondering van [O.A.L.] en [B.L.] (hierna: [B.L.]), van wier betrokkenheid bij de groep onvoldoende is gebleken – zijn vanaf mei 2003 (en vóór 9 augustus 2004) tot de groep gaan behoren en daarvan in de in de tenlastelegging, onder 2, genoemde periode lid gebleven.

Je vraagt je af waarom het OM in het verleden toch zo’n probleem heeft gehad verschillende verzamelingen criminelen als organisatie aan te merken. Zoals het OM het hier doet, en het Hof gaat daar in mee, kun je zo ongeveer iedere jeugdbende als organisatie aanmerken. Er is eigenlijk maar één verschil: volgens het Hof diende de ideologie als bindmiddel; ook al was er verschil van mening onder de netwerk deelnemers. Dat klopt wel in zijn algemeenheid en inderdaad dient ideologie onder meer als middel om individuen met elkaar te verbinden. Het OM baseert dat op de inhoud van aangetroffen documenten en denkbeelden van prominente betrokkenen zoals Mohammed Bouyeri en Abu Khaled. Het Hof gaat daarin mee, mede op basis van het gegeven dat er een vaste plek van samenkomst was, er scholing plaatsvond door een ervaren leraar Abu Khaled (zeer voor discussie vatbaar!) aan de hand van scholingsteksten en met laptop als leermiddel. De groep wisselde teksten uit waarin jihad werd verheerlijkt en de democratische rechtsorde werd verworpen, aanwezigheid van lijstjes voor financiële bijdragen voor de vrouw van Abu Khaled waaruit een bijzondere loyaliteit zou blijken. Daarnaast zijn er ook uitspraken waarin deelnemers naar zichzelf en anderen zouden verwijzen en zou Mohammed Bouyeri de broeders opgeroepen hebben een vergadering te beleggen. Allemaal punten die stuk voor stuk (deels) kloppen, maar nogmaals wat is dan de grens tussen een vriendengroep, jeugdbende en organisatie? Het belang van de ideologie daarbij wordt nog duidelijker wanneer we kijken naar de afwegingen van het Hof over het oogmerk van de organisatie.
Hierover stelt het hof:
Rechtspraak.nl – Zoeken in uitspraken

3.2.3 Slotsom aangaande oogmerk van de organisatie

De slotsom ten aanzien van het oogmerk van de organisatie is dat zowel het oogmerk tot het plegen van misdrijven als
– vanaf 10 augustus 2004 – het plegen van terroristische misdrijven aanwezig was, waarbij wordt gezien op de volgende misdrijven:
– het in het openbaar, bij geschrift, opruien tot enig strafbaar feit of tot gewelddadig optreden tegen het openbaar gezag, als bedoeld in artikel 131 Sr;
– het verspreiden en om verspreid te worden in voorraad hebben van een geschrift waarin tot enig strafbaar feit of tot gewelddadig optreden tegen het openbaar gezag wordt opgeruid, als bedoeld in artikel 132, eerste lid, Sr;
– het in het openbaar, bij geschrift, aanzetten tot haat tegen of gewelddadig optreden tegen persoon of goed van mensen wegens hun godsdienst of levensovertuiging, als bedoeld in artikel 137d Sr;
– bedreigingen met enig misdrijf waardoor de algemene veiligheid van personen of goederen in gevaar wordt gebracht en met enig misdrijf tegen het leven gericht, schriftelijk en al dan niet tevens onder een bepaalde voorwaarde, als bedoeld in artikel 285, eerste en tweede lid, Sr; en
– bedreigingen met een terroristisch misdrijf, als bedoeld in artikel 285, derde lid, Sr, te weten bedreiging met ‘een aanslag ondernemen met het oogmerk om de grondwettige regeringsvorm te vernietigen of op onwettige wijze te veranderen, begaan met een terroristisch oogmerk’, alsmede bedreiging met ‘moord, begaan met een terroristisch oogmerk’ en/of met ‘doodslag, gepleegd met een terroristisch oogmerk’.

Niet bewezen kan worden geacht dat het oogmerk van de organisatie ook op het plegen van andere (terroristische)
misdrijven was gericht.

3.2.4 Standpunt namens de verdachte dat nog bespreking behoeft

Na het voorgaande kan worden volstaan met de navolgende overweging naar aanleiding van hetgeen door of namens de
verdachte met betrekking tot het oogmerk van de organisatie is betoogd.

Door de raadsman is aangevoerd dat per uiting dient te worden bezien of deze uiting beschermd wordt door de
vrijheden van godsdienst, meningsuiting en ‘informatievergaring’. Voor zover daarmee bedoeld is dat een uitvoeriger
motivering vereist is dan hierboven op dit punt gegeven, verwerpt het hof dit betoog.

Het Hof komt mede tot die conclusie omdat twaalf van 25 aangetroffen documenten (er waren er overigens veel meer) kunnen worden aangemerkt als opruiend, aanzettend tot haat of gewelddadig optreden en dat diverse ook zijn verspreid. Daarnaast gaat het (natuurlijk) ook om de bedreigingen en de pogingen tot deelname aan gewapende jihad in het buitenland door enkele individuen. Dat laatste is natuurlijk begrijpelijk, maar ik wil toch nog even bij de ideologie blijven. Jos bij Geencommentaar.nl heeft daar enkele verstandige dingen over te zeggen:
Soekarno, Hatta en de Hofstadgroep – GeenCommentaar

Een tweede kwestie die De Meij bespreekt is de veroordeling van Soekarno op 22 december 1930 in het toenmalige Nederlands-Indië wegens lidmaatschap van een vereniging met een criminele doelstelling en meer in het algemeen stemmingmakerij tegen de koloniale overheid. Soekarno, na de bevrijding de eerste president van het nieuw Indonesië, draaide voor vier jaar de bak in. Waarom was zijn Partai Nasional Indonesio (PNI) crimineel? Critici van het vonnis van de koloniale rechtbank, waaronder De Meij, wijzen er op dat de rechter hier een nogal vreemde argumentatie hanteert. Er is geen sprake van criminele handelingen, er waren geen aanwijzingen voor gebruik van geweld. De rechter meende simpelweg dat uit de revolutionaire taal van de PNI de gewelddadige doelstelling kon worden afgeleid. Je zegt iets dat mogelijk tot criminele handelingen kan leiden en dus ben je bij voorbaat crimineel. Dit is dus precies de omgekeerde redenering van de Nederlandse rechter die een paar jaar eerder Hatta vrijsprak omdat er een verschil is tussen geweld prediken en geweld gebruiken. Hiermee, aldus de critici, construeerde de koloniale rechtbank zijn eigen feiten.

Inderdaad kun je je afvragen zoals Jos stelt of het Hof inzake het Hofstad netwerk niet hetzelfde doet. Er is zeker sprake van opruiende teksten en teksten die haatzaaien (laat daar geen twijfel over zijn), maar is dat voldoende om het netwerk als terroristische organisatie aan te merken? In tegenstelling tot de zaak tegen Soekarno zijn er hier overigens wel degelijk criminele handelingen en hebben enkele leden ook geweld gebruikt (even terzijde, kan iemand mij nou eens vertellen waar Jason in vredesnaam die handgranaten vandaan heeft gehaald?), maar ook hier leidt de rechter het karakter van de groep vooral (of op z’n minst mede) af aan de revolutionair-islamitische taal van de groep. Propaganda voor geweld hoeft echter nog niet gelijk te zijn aan opruiing laat staan onmiddellijk gebruik van geweld.

Al met al is de uitspraak van de rechter opmerkelijk en voor zover ik kan beoordelen een belangrijke doorbraak voor mogelijk toekomstige processen tegen vermeende terreurgroeperingen. Ik heb de nodige twijfels of deze uitspraak niet veel te ver gaat en of de groep eigenlijk niet gewoon is veroordeeld op basis van de ideologie (op degenen die geweld gebruikt hebben na natuurlijk). Op z’n minst was dit proces tegen de Hofstad groep de belangrijkste; je vraagt je wel af waarom er dan zo weinig aandacht in de media is geweest. Is de hype voorbij?

New Book – Identity and Participation in Culturally Diverse Societies: A Multidisciplinary Perspective

Posted on November 15th, 2010 by martijn.
Categories: International Terrorism, ISIM/RU Research, Murder on theo Van Gogh and related issues, Religious and Political Radicalization, Young Muslims.

Together with Roel Meijer I wrote a chapter Going All the Way: Politicization and Radicalization of the Hofstad Network in the Netherlands. In this chapter we analyze the shift from a politicized identity to a radicalized identity of (members of) the Hofstad network. Our findings are based on an analysis of texts written by the Hofstad network by Meijer who acted as an expert witness at one of the trials involving the network. We also include my observations and transcripts of chats and online debates that I gathered when I followed the activities of the Hofstad network on the Internet between 2002 and 2005 and conducted interviews with three informants within the network. After introducing the Hofstad network, we provide an analysis of the “assimilationist” discourse and the rise of the Salafi movement as a background for the politicization and radicalization of the members of the Hofstad network. This process is analyzed from a social movement perspective, following Gamson (1992), by focusing on their perception of injustice, the agency of the people, and their identity.

This chapter will be published in Identity and Participation in Culturally Diverse Societies: A Multidisciplinary Perspective edited by
Assaad E. Azzi, Xenia Chryssochoou, Bert Klandermans, Bernd Simon
ISBN: 978-1-4051-9947-6
Hardcover
400 pages
October 2010, Wiley-Blackwell
£75.00 / €90.00

You can order online at Wiley.

Identity and Participation in Culturally Diverse Societies presents an original discussion in an edited volume of how the links between identity, political participation, radicalization, and integration can provide a scientific understanding of the complex issue of coexistence between groups in culturally diverse societies.

Offers a scientific understanding of the complex issue of coexistence between groups in culturally diverse societies
Utilizes original theory which combines social psychology, sociology, and political science
Includes an original and extensive discussion of combining the concepts of identity and diversity
Innovatively and engagingly employs the latest research and state-of-the-art theory

Introduction (Xenia Chryssochoou, Assaad E. Azzi, Bert Klandermans, and Bernd Simon).

Part I Development, (Re)Construction, and Expression of Collective Identities (Xenia Chryssochoou).

1 The Role of Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Class in Shaping Greek American Identity, 1890–1927: A Historical Analysis (Yannis G. S. Papadopoulos).

2 Religious Identity and Socio-Political Participation: Muslim Minorities in Western Europe (Maykel Verkuyten).

3 The Bicultural Identity Performance of Immigrants (Shaun Wiley and Kay Deaux).

4 Perceptions of (In)compatibility between Identities and Participation in the National Polity of People belonging to Ethnic Minorities (Xenia Chryssochoou and Evanthia Lyons).

Part II Collective Identity and Political Participation (Bernd Simon).

5 Winners and Losers in the Europeanization of Public Policy Debates: Empowering the Already Powerful? (Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham).

6 New Ways of Understanding Migrant Integration in Europe (P. R. Ireland).

7 Collective Identity and Political Engagement (Bernd Simon).

8 Collective Identity, Political Participation, and the Making of the Social Self (Stephen Reicher and John Drury).

Part III Radicalization (Bert Klandermans).

9 Radicalization (Jacquelien van Stekelenburg and Bert Klandermans).

10 Citizenship Regimes and Identity Strategies Among Young Muslims in Europe (Catarina Kinnvall and Paul Nesbitt-Larking).

11 Going All the Way: Politicization and Radicalization of the Hofstad Network in the Netherlands (Martijn de Koning and Roel Meijer).

12 Trajectories of Ideologies and Action in US Organized Racism (Kathleen M. Blee).

13 No Radicalization without Identification: How Ethnic Dutch and Dutch Muslim Web Forums Radicalize Over Time (Jacquelien van Stekelenburg, Dirk Oegema, and Bert Klandermans).

Part IV Integration (Assaad E. Azzi).

14 Immigrant Acculturation: Psychological and Social Adaptations (John W. Berry).

15 Ethnic Social Networks, Social Capital, and Political Participation of Immigrants (Dirk Jacobs and Jean Tillie).

16 Naturalization as Boundary Crossing: Evidence from Labor Migrants in Germany (Claudia Diehl and Michael Blohm).

17 Confronting the Past to Create a Better Future: The Antecedents and Benefits of Intergroup Forgiveness (Nyla R. Branscombe and Tracey Cronin).

Conclusion: From Identity and Participation to Integration or Radicalization: A Critical Appraisal (Assaad E. Azzi).

Name Index.

Subject Index.

Authors
Assaad Azzi is Professor of Psychology and Director of the Social Psychology unit at the Université Libre de Bruxelles. His research focuses on identity, resource-distribution, and the perception of justice and injustice in majority-minority relations.

Xenia Chryssochoou is Associate Professor at Panteion University, Athens. She currently works on mobility, migration and justice and on perceptions of globalization and political participation.

Bert Klandermans is Professor in Applied Social Psychology at the VU-University, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. He is co-editor (with Suzanne Staggenborg, 2002) of Social Movements, Protest, and Contention and co-author, most recently, of the Handbook of Social Movements Across Disciplines (with Conny Roggeband, 2007).

Bernd Simon is Professor of Social and Political Psychology and one of the Directors of the Institute of Psychology at the Christian-Albrechts-University in Kiel, Germany. His research investigates inter- and intragroup processes.

Review/promo
This is a timely, incisive, and groundbreaking book on participation amidst societal change. Its fascinating chapters discuss a set of related topics – identity, intergroup relations, inequality, and migration – providing rich insight into dynamics of inclusion and exclusion. It is a great read that capably charts the course for future research on complex and global social issues.’
— Professor Susan Opotow, City University of New York, US

‘This is really a remarkable book on an important, complicated and challenging topic. It is a brilliant example of the fruitfulness of true interdisciplinarity, which is not interested in just being right, but in solving a problem with the serious and open use of contributions from different sources. And it shows that a strictly analytic perspective is not only possible in these soft fields of identity and political engagement, but also the only chance to find a way out of the various traps of more or less open discourses or casual descriptions that we are mostly used to seeing in these fields.’
— Professor Hartmut Esser, University of Mannheim, Germany

‘Multi-disciplinarity is extolled by many, but practiced by very few. This international team of contributors moves across levels of analysis, disciplines, and contexts with real intellectual verve. The volume impresses with its genuine and serious attempt to examine identity as a rich latticework of society and subjectivity. The esteemed team of editors – learned scholars all – provide what may prove to be the new social science of identity in society. I am excited by the possibilities.’
— Professor Colin Wayne Leach, Department of Psychology, University of Connecticut, US

‘Bridging psychology and sociology, this book demonstrates the importance of self and identity for analyzing and understanding social movements in diverse societies. With essays by some of the most eminent scholars, this volume is a must-read for scholars interested in how identity influences social movement recruitment, activism, and maintenance.’
—Professor Verta Taylor, University of California Santa Barbara, US

‘This volume represents a turning point in the study of cultural diversity. Migrations in a globalised world have rendered the question of identity within diversity such a complex matter that it requires the coordinated effort of several disciplines in the social and human sciences. Identity and Participation in Culturally Diverse Societies achieves this coordination through the scientific rigour of an outstanding group of international scholars with the insight derived from the added value of genuine interdisciplinarity.’
— Professor Fabrizio Butera, University of Lausanne, Switzerland

Brief van Jason W.: Herziening

Posted on October 16th, 2010 by martijn.
Categories: ISIM/RU Research, Murder on theo Van Gogh and related issues, My Research, Religious and Political Radicalization.

De Volkskrant maakt vandaag melding van een brief van Jason W. waarin hij terugkomt op zijn eerdere denkbeelden en acties. Dit herzienings- of herroepingsdocument is hieronder volledig geplaatst:

De idealen die ik eens huldigde zijn teloor gegaan en ik ben tot het besef gekomen dat ze moreel bankroet zijn. Met afgrijzen heb ik toegezien hoe een ooit hooggestemde ‘vrijheidsstrijd’ die het startsein zou moeten zijn voor een nieuwe, rechtvaardige wereld – met name in Irak – is verworden tot een bloedige escalatie van geweld, sektarisme en godsdienstwaanzin. Daarbij zijn ongehoorde wreedheden en misdaden begaan.

Mensen in landen die (mede) door Islamisten zijn bevrijd van dictaturen zoals Irak hebben massaal de ideologie verworpen in welke naam ze ‘bevrijd’ zouden zijn nadat ze er in de praktijk onder hebben moeten leven. Ze concludeerden dat deze geen enkel toekomstperspectief beidt. Dit heeft mij ertoe gedwongen mijn standpunten kritisch te herzien, wat heeft geleid tot het besef van de onhoudbaarheid ervan.

Ik schrijf dit om de samenleving te informeren dat ik mij niet langer identificeer met de vroeger door mij gehuldigde standpunten en hoop een constructieve bijdrage te leveren aan onze verdeelde samenleving. Ik hoop hiermee jongeren te waarschuwen om zich niet te laten misleiden door valse beloften en idealen.

Het streven om een Islamitische Staat te realiseren is op een totale mislukking uitgelopen. Dit heeft naar mijn inzicht verschillende redenen. Zo heeft de Islam een oorlogsrecht en legt het zijn volgelingen een hoge ethische standaard op. Deze is echter moeten voeten getreden in de vele, volslagen willekeurige moordpartijen op onschuldige (moslim)burgers.

Maar er is meer aan de hand. De hele achterliggende wereldbeschouwing, berust op een ondeugdelijke basis. Het beeld dat de wereld slechts bestaat uit gelovigen en ongelovigen, waarbij de laatsten er slechts op uit zijn om de eersten te vernietigen, is een kinderachtige en grove simplificatie van de werkelijkheid. Het gaat voorbij aan de complexiteit en vele nuances die de werkelijkheid rijk is. En aan het feit dat de meeste van de huidige problemen in de Islamitische wereld niet het resultaat zijn van complotten van interne en externe vijanden, maar historisch gegroeide problemen. Daar bestaan geen snelle of makkelijke oplossingen voor. De bewering dat deze problemen zullen verdwijnen wanneer moslimgemeenschappen terugkeren naar de ‘zuivere islam’, is veel te kort door de bocht.

Dit wereldbeeld wortelt voor een belangrijk deel in het verwerpen van ongeloof. Het is de radicale variant van dit concept dat munitie levert om iedereen die niet exact hetzelfde religieuze wereldbeeld deelt tot ongelovige te verklaren en daarmee zijn bloed en bezit buiten de wet te stellen. Het is een extreem exclusieve, uitsluitende opvatting, die slechts leidt tot een constante vergroting van het aantal te bestrijden vijanden.

Het kan geen probleem oplossen, doordat het elke mogelijkheid om compromissen te sluiten en te participeren in wereldse politiek bij voorbaat onmogelijk maakt. Het is een heilloze visie welke ten onder gaat aan zijn eigen rigoureus gesloten ideologische kaders.

De wereldvreemdheid van de Islamisten kenmerkt zich door het ontbreken van banden met de samenlevingen namens welke het beweert te vechten. Het roept conflicten uit tot jihad die in werkelijkheid vooral nationalistisch zijn en historische gronden hebben. Deze samenlevingen hebben hun eigen doelen en zitten er niet op te wachten dat hun strijd wordt gekaapt door salafisten met een heel andere agenda. Dit gebrek aan binding verklaart waarom in alle conflicten sinds de jaren ’80 geen enkele heeft geleid tot een Islamitische staat.

Islamisten dienen derhalve de wapens neer te leggen en andere, vruchtbaarder methoden aan te wenden. Ze moeten zich omvormen tot sociale en politieke partijen om zo de gewenste hervormingen tot stand te brengen. De problemen in Palestina, Afghanistan, Tsjetsjenië enzovoorts, vereisen oplossingen op politiek niveau. De tot nu toe gevolgde strategie is contraproductief geweest en heeft mogelijke oplossingen alleen maar verder weggebracht.

Maar er is een belangrijker, bredere issue en dat betreft het Islamisme zelf. Is het echt nodig om te streven naar een Islamitische staat? We dienen te beseffen dat zich in de laatste drie eeuwen zeer ingrijpende en radicale veranderingen hebben voorgedaan, globaal aangeduid met modernisering. De meeste problemen in de Islamitische wereld zijn een gevolg van het achterop raken in het moderniserings- en industrialiseringsproces. De stelling dat de Sharia de oplossing is voor alle partijen lijkt in dit licht bezien achterhaald. Het is veeleer zo dat we behoefte hebben aan een fundamentele herbezinning over de plaats van religie in de moderne wereld. De Sharia is geënt op traditionele, rurale gemeenschappen en lijkt een anachronisme in de moderne wereld, die in toenemende mate urbaniseert, liberaliseert en globaliseert, en waar het gevoel van gemeenschapszin is vervangen door ideologisch en economisch individualisme. Ook heeft religie door de opkomst van de moderne wetenschap en het rationele denken zijn waarheidsmonopolie verloren, en kan het geen aanspraak meer maken op het belang en de status die het eens had. Al deze problemen zijn uniek voor de moderne tijden kunnen niet opgelost worden met voormoderne oplossingen.

Ik roep daarom moslims, vooral salafisten, op om goed na te denken over deze zaken. Een terugkeer naar het verleden zit er niet meer in. We moeten de moderne tijd met al zijn verworvenheden, waaronder de democratische rechtstaat, accepteren, en ons van daaruit oriënteren op onze plek in de samenleving. We moeten voor onszelf erkennen dat het verleden voorbij is en niet meer terugkomt, en ons richten op de toekomst.

Dit betekent niet dat wij onze religie moeten verloochenen; wel betekent het dat we de realiteit moeten accepteren en ons eraan aan moeten passen. Slechts dan zullen wij werkelijk in staat zijn om onze problemen op te lossen.

Jason.

Beluister HIER een kort gesprek met de advocaat van Jason W.

Nu Online: Zoeken naar een ‘zuivere’ Islam

Posted on August 22nd, 2010 by martijn.
Categories: [Online] Publications, Gouda Issues, ISIM/RU Research, Murder on theo Van Gogh and related issues, My Research, Religious and Political Radicalization, Ritual and Religious Experience, Young Muslims, Youth culture (as a practice).

Sinds enige tijd kun je via de VU repository mijn proefschrift Zoeken naar een ‘zuivere’ islam downloaden. Dat kan ook via deze site.

Het proefschrift is online te lezen: HIER
Samenvatting in het Nederlands lezen én downloaden: HIER
Artikel Migrantenstudies lezen én downloaden: HIER
Samenvatting in het Engels lezen én downloaden: HIER
Artikel ISIM Review in het Engels lezen én downloaden: HIER

Veel leesplezier, en commentaar wordt op prijs gesteld.

3 comments.

Nu Online: Zoeken naar een 'zuivere' Islam

Sinds enige tijd kun je via de VU repository mijn proefschrift Zoeken naar een ‘zuivere’ islam downloaden. Dat kan ook via deze site.

Het proefschrift is online te lezen: HIER
Samenvatting in het Nederlands lezen én downloaden: HIER
Artikel Migrantenstudies lezen én downloaden: HIER
Samenvatting in het Engels lezen én downloaden: HIER
Artikel ISIM Review in het Engels lezen én downloaden: HIER

Veel leesplezier, en commentaar wordt op prijs gesteld.

3 comments.

BBC Heart and Soul – Muslims in Amsterdam

Posted on April 27th, 2010 by martijn.
Categories: Multiculti Issues, Murder on theo Van Gogh and related issues, Public Islam, Religious and Political Radicalization, Ritual and Religious Experience, Young Muslims.

Roger Hardy is one of the best journalists when it comes to religion and how religion affects people’s daily lives. Right after the murder of Theo van Gogh he made a program about Dutch Muslims. He also documented his findings in a book the Muslim Revolt. A few weeks ago he returned to the Netherlands:
BBC – BBC World Service Programmes – Heart And Soul, Muslims in Amsterdam 28/04/2010

to see how the Moroccan Muslim community has fared since – and to meet a group that seldom makes the headlines: Moroccan Muslim women.

Among them, he finds young, highly successful power women.

Among them Fatima Elatik, mayor of the multi-cultural district of Zeeburg, who combines her headscarf with a determination not to let young Muslims to be restricted by the Islam label;

and Samira Bouchibti, an MP who speaks on gay rights for the Dutch Labour party – a highly unusual brief for a Muslim woman.

But Roger also wins the trust of women from very traditional backgrounds – like Rahma, a grandmother who’s learning how to read and write in her 70s.

Join him and find out why in 21st century Amsterdam, it’s easier to be called Fatima than Mohammed.

Illustration above of Fatima Elatik, the young and outspoken district mayor of Zeeburg in Amsterdam.

On Wednesday 28 March 2010 his report will be broadcast on BBC’s Heart and Soul at 12.32 (GMT+1), after the show you listen to the podcast available at the website.

UPDATE
The podcast is available now. You can download it HERE.

De curieuze verdwijning van Mohammed Chentouf

Posted on March 10th, 2010 by martijn.
Categories: International Terrorism, ISIM/RU Research, Murder on theo Van Gogh and related issues, Religious and Political Radicalization.

Enige tijd geleden zonder netwerk een item uit over Mohammed Chentouf. die is uitgezet nadat hij zijn straf heeft uitgezeten wegens terrorisme gerelateerde activiteiten:

Mohammed Chentouf is veroordeeld in de zogenaamde Piranha-zaak
Openbaar Ministerie – Piranha

Wapengebruik, jihadistisch-salafi stische bedreigingen, voorbereidingen van aanslagen en een apothekersgesprek. Onderdelen van “Piranha”, de hogerberoepzaak, waarin het met name ging om de vraag of er sprake was van een terroristische organisatie.

Mohammed Chentouf werd destijds (2006) tot vier jaar cel veroordeeld in het proces waarin Samir A. de spil was. Hij was eveneens betrokken bij het hofstad netwerk en getrouwd met een dochter van Abu Khaled die hij had leren kennen in het IPC in Schiedam; de leraar van het netwerk die op de dag van de moord op Theo van Gogh vluchtte naar Syrie. Chentouf heeft nog enige tijd contact met hem onderhouden. Chentouf kon uitgezet worden omdat, hoewel in Nederland geboren, hij nooit een Nederlands paspoort heeft aangevraagd en dus alleen de Marokkaanse nationaliteit heeft.

Nu is Marokko alles behalve een bananenrepubliek, maar personen verdacht van of (zeker) veroordeeld wegens terrorisme gerelateerde activiteiten worden daar niet bepaald zachtzinnig behandeld. Mohammed C. is niet de enige die een dergelijk onzeker lot wacht of te verdragen heeft gekregen: Ahmed Said is een ander voorbeeld. Illegaal in Nederland en door de VS verdacht van banden met Al Qaeda. Er volgt een uitleveringsverzoek van de VS maar het bewijs is volgens de rechter onrechtmatig verkregen. Direct daarna is hij opgepakt en uitgezet naar een geheime gevangenis in Egypte alwaar hij gemarteld zou zijn. Nog een voorbeeld is Abu Hanan (kunya) die gezien werd als een spil van de Tirana groep. Hij is echter niet opgepakt maar snel uitgezet naar Mauritanië en zijn financiën zijn bevroren zonder enige strafrechtelijke verdenking. Behalve dus dat de Nederlandse staat voor terrorisme veroordeelde verdachten kan uitzetten naar landen met een twijfelachtig rechtsysteem, kan ze dat zelfs doen zonder veroordeling, sterker nog zonder enige strafrechtelijke grond. Nog een voorbeeld is Otman C. (broer van de in Engeland veroordeeld Houria C.) die is aangemerkt als ‘sympathisanten van de internationale gewelddadige jihad’ en een ‘gevaar voor de nationale veiligheid’. Ook voor hem zijn er plannen om uitgezet te worden naar Marokko samen met zijn jongere broer wiens naturalisatieverzoek was geweigerd. Wellicht zijn er nog enkelen meer onder wie Abu S.

Het standpunt van de VVD in de video lijkt hier exemplarisch. Nederland lijkt beducht voor alle invloed vanuit Marokko in Nederland, zelfs als het gaat om activiteiten tegen radicalisering, maar men is niet te beroerd om ongewenste personen daar te dumpen en de eigen handen in onschuld te wassen. De VVD, net als de Nederlandse staat, werpt zich op als de kampioen van de rechtsstaat en mensenrechten en schroomt niet andere landen te bekritiseren, maar als men van de eigen problemen af moet komen lijkt de gebrekkige rechtsstaat van anderen ‘ineens’ niet zo’n groot probleem. Het gaat volgens mij niet eens zozeer tegen de Nederlandse wetgeving in, maar dat komt omdat de anti-terreur maatregelen de rechtsstaat voor de dergelijke verdachten op afstand heeft gezet. Dat doet vrezen dat de steun voor de rechtsstaat helemaal niet zo principieel is. De rechtsstaat is dan niet bedoeld om de vrijheid van de individuele burger ten opzichte van de staat te waarborgen, maar om de burger onder controle te houden. Nog even en we zijn allemaal terrorist:

Wordt vervolgd.

Mohammed el Fizazi en de open brief aan moslims: Duitsland is geen slagveld

Posted on November 1st, 2009 by martijn.
Categories: Internal Debates, ISIM/RU Research, Murder on theo Van Gogh and related issues, Religious and Political Radicalization.

Enkele jaren gelden werd Muhammad el Fizazi, de spirituele leider van de Salafia Jihadia in Marokko, veroordeeld tot 30 jaar cel. Hij ontving zijn religieuze training in Saoedi Arabië en na zijn terugkeer naar Marokko begon hij eind jaren negentig openlijk Osama Bin Laden te steunen met (vermeende?) uitspraken waarin hij naar Bin Laden verwezen zou hebben als ‘metgezel van de profeet’ en dat ‘de kelen van christenen en joden doorgesneden zouden moeten worden’. In 1999 werd Fizazi de imam van de Al Quds moskee in Hamburg, waar de Hamburg cel die de aanslagen van 9/11 uitvoerde regelmatig gekomen zou zijn, en keerde kort voor 9/11 terug naar Marokko. Fizazi had ook banden met de aanslagen in Madrid (Hasan el Haski, Jamal Zougham en Abdelaziz Benyaich) en de Salafia Jihadia was (samen met Assirat al Moustakin) betrokken bij de aanslagen in Casablanca in 2003. Die aanslagen vormden de aanleiding voor zijn veroordeling in 2003 voor het verspreiden van radicaal gedachtegoed en banden met de plegers van de aanslagen in 2003. In 2007 nam hij nog deel aan een hongerstaking van meer dan 20 dagen. Ook Nederlandse jihadisten zouden door hem beïnvloed zijn.

In juli 2009 zou El Fizazi een brief naar zijn dochter in Hamburg hebben gestuurd waarin hij zich distantieert van terreuraanslagen op doelen in het Westen. Dat mag opmerkelijk genoemd worden want daarmee distantieert hij zich volgens mij ook van Al Qaeda. Voor de goede orde, hij wijst gewapende strijd niet af, maar het gaat om een heroriëntering op de doelen van dat geweld. Moslims in Duitsland zouden zich volgens hem moeten richten op vreedzame demonstraties, stakingen en protesten in plaats van niets en niemand ontziende aanslagen en het doden van onschuldige burgers alleen omdat ze ongelovig zouden zijn. Eén van de argumenten die hij geeft, is dat wanneer moslims naar Duitsland immigreren contracten ondertekenen ze geen geweld kunnen gebruiken tegen hun gastheren omdat dit contractbreuk zou zijn en verraad. El Fizazi is niet de eerste die zijn ideeen herziet; in Egypte is bijvoorbeeld de leiding van de Gamaat Islamiyya hem voorgegaan en in Saoedi Arabië Salman al Awda. Niettemin geloof niet iedereen in de authenticiteit van de brief en/of weigert men van koers te veranderen. Zie voor de achtergronden het artikel in Der Spiegel en de discussies op Jihadica HIER en HIER.

Der Spiegel heeft ook de brief geplaatst en ik zal hem hieronder integraal (in Engelse vertaling) weergeven:
Mohammed El Fazazi’s Letter: ‘Germany Is No Battle Zone’ – SPIEGEL ONLINE – News – International

My daughter has put to me a few questions with the aim of finding answers about the situation of Muslim immigrants in Germany and their relationship with the German state. I consider myself truly happy that she has raised these topics with me because it provides me with the opportunity to express my thoughts and opinions about these issues and provide answers to those who seek them.

I would like to declare firstly that I, Muhammad bin Muhammad El Fazazi, the writer of these lines, has not been forced to put these down. I am under no pressure to write this, because I am in prison or have been put under pressure to do so or because I want to pretend about something — and, as a proof of this, shall serve the logical arguments and the arguments of the sharia that I will put forward here.

In addition, my situation in a Moroccan prison is very unusual, given the rights that I enjoy here and the respect that I am met with. I am not lacking anything apart from my freedom, and I have appealed to the almighty Allah that it is given back to me as soon as possible. This is because everybody knows, including the Moroccan government, that the accusations against me, because of the attacks in Casablanca, are not true. They represent a big mistake on the part of the Moroccan secret service. This error must be corrected.

‘I Am a Muslim and Nothing More’

In terms of the questions about what my thoughts and religious points of reference where before I moved to the German city of Hamburg, here’s what I think:

I am a person whose personality is put together from different sources and maybe it is possible to say as a summary that I do not trust so much the way that certain people think as much as I rely on the arguments that these men bring forward. (…) I have no particular sheik whom I follow apart from the Koran and the sunna of the prophet. Apart from this I am a modern person. For 32 years I was a teacher of French and mathematics, and I have also for more than 30 years served Da’wa (editors’s note: mission) and I have devoted myself to preaching under the auspices of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs in Morocco. In other words: I am a Muslim and nothing more. I am not a Salafist jihadist and I am not a traditional Salafi. I am not a Muslim Brother or anything else. I am a Muslim and nothing more. (…)

As for my books and my speeches or talks — which partly contained thoughts that were terrible towards my opponents — one must put them into context in terms of the time and location and one must not more interpret more into them than they actually contained. I say here publicly that I was the object of vicious attacks by leftist circles in Morocco. I was insulted, coerced, I was wrongly quoted in newspapers and forums. And a lot of what I said in books was a reply to these attacks and an act of self-defense. And I admit that I went too far and overshot the target in my attempt to counter what I had to hear about myself by my leftist opponents and other forces. (…) So that’s the context in which my books and my articles must be understood. (…)

‘I Have Moved Away from Some of My Beliefs’

Without a doubt, the long years that I had to spend behind bars in prison have given me an opportunity to contemplate and soberly reflect. I am not ashamed that I have once again reflected on my world of thoughts and have moved away from some of my beliefs. This is a laudable thing and not to be lamented. (…)

As for the questions regarding Muslim immigrants and the German state or Western states in general: The first ones who should answer those questions are the learned people who have emigrated themselves, because they know more about the details and more about those particular relations, they are living the everyday life and they experience the behavior of state institutions and they have contact with the population.

But if I were to say something personally about it, as someone who has on only two occasions spent two weeks in Germany — not even enough time to allow me to really get to know the people and the country or even the Muslim community there — then I would say that a Muslim immigrant, no matter where he comes from, has generally come to Germany because he wants to learn something there or he wants to work, seek medical treatment or any number of things. Germany accepted him under certain conditions.

‘Germany Is Not a Battle Zone’

In order for these conditions to be formulated, certain forms have been filled out and certain contracts have been concluded. In these cases we are talking about real contracts that have to be adhered to. In reality this is what you would call an Ahd Amam, a security contract for both sides and Allah says in his beloved book: “You who have given security, keep the contracts.”

So it follows that anything that breaks these contracts — e.g. by declaring theft to be halal (editor’s note: something which is permitted under Islam) (…) or by allowing the killing of the population in the name of jihad (…) or by trying to build cells who put people into a state of fear and horror and so on (…) — in my eyes constitutes a breach of contract and betrayal in regard to what one has signed in the embassy, in the consulate or in the immigration office.

Germany is not a battle zone. Germany is a field for work, a school for learning, workshops for investments, hospitals for treatment and a market for the sale of goods. Put in another way, Germany is a place for peaceful coexistence and a good life — not least of which because German judges and police (…) protect foreigners and take care of them. (…)

Muslims Seen as ‘Group of Backward-Looking Idiots’

Of course there are people, and these are not learned people, who say that Germany is a NATO member state and that Germany is part of those states that fight against Muslims in Afghanistan and support the state of Israel (…) I say that this is right. An injustice is always an injustice and every one must stand up against injustice, including the German people. I know that (the German people) are against war and occupation and that they have more than once publicly expressed their rejection of the war in general.

It is the job of immigrants to debate and engage with such people. (This should be done) by means of peaceful demonstrations, strikes and protests that are far removed from indiscriminate attacks, the killing of innocent people with the argument of killing kuffar, or non-believers.

The rejection of German or other foreign policy must be organized through civilian, peaceful methods of resistance.

The strength of the argument lies not in a rifle bullet, in violence or in explosive belts. Those won’t bring about change. They will only reinforce the backwardness of Muslims and their image as a group of backward-looking idiots whose place is in the caves and not in the streets of Hamburg, Frankfurt, Berlin or wherever. That’s what this is about. (…)

‘I Advise all to Live Together Peacefully’

I also want to add, in clear Arabic, that Hamburg (because the question addressed to me was about Hamburg) is a city in which there is a plurality of religious sects, ideologies and political directions. Apart from that, Islamic religious communities — for the reasons that I already mentioned and other generally accepted reasons — have been established there. The mosques are open, there are many of them and they are protected. There is real freedom of religion which does not exist in many Muslim states. The things that educated people and preachers can say there cannot be said in some Muslim countries.

There are many ways and possibilities of expressing oneself, and they are open to everyone. That, again, is hardly the case in the Muslim world. There is no prohibition on the peaceful promotion of Islam. Within the scope of legal possibilities and general relations between host and guest, one can express his opinion and represent his faith. (…)

I do not believe even that the rulers there (Germany) would close there office doors or their ears to the requests of the Muslim community. This is why I advise all to live togther peacefully. The wide world of Allah is open to anyone who cannot. And those who don’t want anything but killing, blood, robbery and theft have nothing to do with the religion of Allah the Exalted — neither in Germany nor anywhere else.

‘The Bite of Food that He Earned Himself Is Tasteful and Sweet’

When it comes to earning a living, work and unemployment, I do not think that it is permitted to rely on the German state and to avoid working to make a living, and instead claim unemployment benefits or similar. It is true that there are some lines of employment that are inappropriate for Muslims (…) but it is also true that there are many, many other possibilities for working that, from an Islamic perspective, are halal and thus permitted. (…) It is better the he (the Muslim) live from the work of his hands and the sweat of his brow because the mouthful is flavorsome and sweet. (…)

As for those in the streets of Hamburg who think about jihad in the path of God, they should think about life, because this is the true jihad in the path of God. The mere fact that there are 46 prayer rooms in Hamburg is in and of itself evidence of the tolerance showed by the German state towards Muslims. There is no comparably large number of churches in a city in any Islamic country. I know quite a bit about the fragmentations between the founders of those mosques and even within particular mosque communities. It has gone so far that this fragmentation has become one of the outstanding characteristics of the Muslims. This sorrowful state weakens the Muslim’s power. (…) Even when they want to engage in dialogue with the German state over certain issues, they confuse the state with all these conflicts.

‘The German Chancellor Is Great’

It is only just that I say that the other side — and with that I mean the German government — without any doubt does not guaranty all rights to immigrants. And I hope that they will stand up and see to it that their demands are met and that their suffering is eased and that they are better protected from attacks by xenophobes. Money must be invested in order to improve living conditions for immigrants as well as their level of education, their health care and their housing.

It is rude to demonize and insult the German government or Chancellor Merkel (…) is an immorality. The principle of biting the hand that feeds you doesn’t fit with Allah’s saying: “Don’t insult those who call upon another God than Allah.” (…)

What is the use of insulting the chancellor and describing her as a Taghut (or despot)? That’s nonsense. It doesn’t lead anywhere. The German chancellor is great. Germany has its religion and you have yours. The chancellor has her work and you have yours. (…) Germany has opened its doors to you and you have received something from its treasury, while you at the same time have not received anything from your own people. (…)

‘I Want to Guide My Brothers’

Finally, I say these are some of my answers that I have given. (…) I have not said any of this in order to achieve something. I want to guide my brothers in Islam and to point their attention to what is useful for them, especially since I am suffering in prison and have been misunderstood.

It has already been six years now since I was unjustly jailed.

I also say this, because many of you hold me in high esteem and trust my opinion. This is my opinion and that is my view.

I promise my daughter that I will answer all her questions in order to serve justice in the first and the last instance. May Allah grant success.

This has been written by Muhammad bin Muhammad El Fazazi who is been kept as a prisoner in the Tangier city prison unjustly, July 21, 2009.”

Editor’s note: This text is based on a German translation of Fazazi’s original Arabic letter that was commissioned by German security authorities. SPIEGEL ONLINE does not possess a copy of the Arabic original. About one-third of the original document has been removed in this abridged version because the passages were either difficult to understand or redundant.

Het is mij nog niet geheel duidelijk wat ik ervan moet denken. De herziening die El Fizazi doet past dus wel in een breder patroon van mensen die (oprecht zo lijkt het toch) deels afstand hebben gedaan van hun oude ideeen. In El Fizazi’s geval dan vooral voor wat betreft het gebruik van geweld in Westerse landen. Strijden tegen wat hij ziet als onrecht blijft wel belangrijk en hij wijst (in de brief althans) geweld niet in alle gevallen af. Aan de andere kant het gegeven dat deze brief (zoals die in Der Spiegel) via de veiligheidsdienst naar buiten is gekomen, zal het vertrouwen in de authenticiteit niet bepaald vergroten. De weigering van sommigen om het te geloven of, wanneer ze het wel geloven, kan er ook op wijzen dat de radicalisering wat dieper zit dan menigeen denkt en dat men niet blind zomaar wat geleerden navolgt zoals ook al eerder duidelijk werd in de zaak van Al Maqdisi. In ieder geval wijst El Fizazi’s brief op belangrijke vragen die leven en die betrekking hebben op één centrale vraag: wat zijn de grenzen van gewelddadige Jihad?

Suspected Female Terrorist Malika El-Aroud Arrested With 13 Others | wowOwow

Suspected Female Terrorist Malika El-Aroud Arrested With 13 Others

Posted on December 20th, 2008 by martijn.
Categories: Blogosphere, ISIM/RU Research, Murder on theo Van Gogh and related issues, Religious and Political Radicalization, Religious Movements.

Suspected Female Terrorist Malika El-Aroud Arrested With 13 Others
By The Staff at wowOwow.com

Malika El-Aroud

A suspected female terrorist known as the “Internet jihadist” was arrested last night on the eve of the European Union Summit in Brussels, a Belgian police source told CNN.

Malika El-Aroud — who once described the “love” she and her late terrorist husband felt for Osama bin Laden — was one of 14 suspected terrorists arrested for her alleged involvement in the plan to execute an attack during the EU summit. It’s been said that El-Aroud calls herself a female holy warrior for al-Qaeda and has become one of the most prominent “Internet jihadists” in Europe, spreading hate messages through chat rooms and discussion boards.

“It’s not my role to set off bombs — that’s ridiculous,” she said to The New York Times. “I have a weapon. It’s to write. It’s to speak out. That’s my jihad. You can do many things with words. Writing is also a bomb.”

Her late husband, Dahmane Abd al-Sattar, killed anti-Taliban resistance leader Ahmad Shah Massoud — two days before the September 11, 2001, attacks.

In a 2006 interview with CNN, El-Aroud proclaimed her “love” for deadly terrorist leader, Bin-Laden. “Most Muslims love Osama. It was he who helped the oppressed. It was he who stood up against the biggest enemy in the world, the United States. We love him for that.”

Police say that they had no time to waste. According to CNN’s source, the 14 detained had contacts at the “highest levels of al-Qaeda.”

AIVD: broer opgepakte moslima is staatsgevaar – Binnenland – de Volkskrant

Broers aangemerkt als 'sympathisanten van de internationale gewelddadige jihad'

Posted on November 12th, 2008 by martijn.
Categories: International Terrorism, ISIM/RU Research, Murder on theo Van Gogh and related issues, Religious and Political Radicalization.

Wat betekent dat nu eigenlijk ‘sympathisanten van de internationale gewelddadige jihad’? Alleen willen meedoen en geld overmaken?

AIVD: broer opgepakte moslima is staatsgevaar

Van onze verslaggeefsters Janny Groen, Annieke Kranenberg

DEN HAAG – De AIVD heeft twee broers in het vizier van de Nederlandse moslima die half oktober in Engeland is opgepakt wegens mogelijke betrokkenheid bij terrorisme. Beiden zijn volgens de dienst ‘sympathisant van de internationale gewelddadige jihad’.

Otman C. (35) is volgens de dienst een ‘gevaar voor de nationale veiligheid’. Hij zou willen meedoen aan de jihad en daartoe contacten in Libanon financieel hebben ondersteund. Nederland wil hem uitzetten naar zijn geboorteland Marokko. Het naturalisatieverzoek van zijn 20-jarige broer is afgewezen. De broers ontkennen alle aantijgingen van de dienst.

Hoewel de AIVD niet rept van de arrestatie van zus Houria (40) in Engeland, vermoedt C. dat zijn dreigende uitzetting daar wel mee te maken heeft.

(more…)

AIVD: broer opgepakte moslima is staatsgevaar – Binnenland – de Volkskrant

Broers aangemerkt als ‘sympathisanten van de internationale gewelddadige jihad’

Posted on November 12th, 2008 by martijn.
Categories: International Terrorism, ISIM/RU Research, Murder on theo Van Gogh and related issues, Religious and Political Radicalization.

Wat betekent dat nu eigenlijk ‘sympathisanten van de internationale gewelddadige jihad’? Alleen willen meedoen en geld overmaken?

AIVD: broer opgepakte moslima is staatsgevaar

Van onze verslaggeefsters Janny Groen, Annieke Kranenberg

DEN HAAG – De AIVD heeft twee broers in het vizier van de Nederlandse moslima die half oktober in Engeland is opgepakt wegens mogelijke betrokkenheid bij terrorisme. Beiden zijn volgens de dienst ‘sympathisant van de internationale gewelddadige jihad’.

Otman C. (35) is volgens de dienst een ‘gevaar voor de nationale veiligheid’. Hij zou willen meedoen aan de jihad en daartoe contacten in Libanon financieel hebben ondersteund. Nederland wil hem uitzetten naar zijn geboorteland Marokko. Het naturalisatieverzoek van zijn 20-jarige broer is afgewezen. De broers ontkennen alle aantijgingen van de dienst.

Hoewel de AIVD niet rept van de arrestatie van zus Houria (40) in Engeland, vermoedt C. dat zijn dreigende uitzetting daar wel mee te maken heeft.

(more…)

ISET Working Paper Series: Identity in transition. Connecting online and offline internet practices of Moroccan-Dutch Muslim youth

Posted on November 3rd, 2008 by martijn.
Categories: Blogosphere, ISIM/RU Research, Murder on theo Van Gogh and related issues, My Research, Religious and Political Radicalization, Some personal considerations, Young Muslims.

ISET aims to bring an interdisciplinary approach to research questions
arising from transformations taking place across Europe and in Europe’s
relations with the wider world. The ISET Working Paper Series presents works in progress, and key ideas and findings, relating to ISET’s main research interests in the transformations taking place across Europe and in Europe’s relations with the wider world.

My paper Identity in transition. Connecting online and offline internet practices of Moroccan-Dutch Muslim youth, has been published on their website:

In the last 5 years the Internet has become the principal platform for the dissemination and mediation of the ideology of Islamic movements, ranging from purist (non-violent) to politically engaged movements to Jihadi networks. Certainly in intelligence and security circles the Internet is considered the single most important venue for the radicalization of Muslim youth. On the other hand the Internet is seen as a means for people to transcend ethnic and religious divisions that are pervasive in other spheres of life.

In this paper I will argue that both premises seem to result from a lack of understanding of the relationship between online and offline realities and still more from the difficulty of ascertaining the extent to which websites influence wider audiences and users. In order to understand the reception of Internet messages the local context and the way global narratives are appropriated in the local context, should be taken into account.

My argument will be based on my empirical study of the practices of Muslim youth with regard to the Internet; I will explore how they act simultaneously as performers and observers in these virtual spaces.

Regios – Brabant – ‘De één was nog stoerder dan de ander’ | Brabants Dagblad

De drie van Bedir

Posted on October 30th, 2008 by martijn.
Categories: Murder on theo Van Gogh and related issues.

‘De één was nog stoerder dan de ander’

door Tom Vos.

UDEN – Er bestaan in Uden wijdverbreid misverstanden over de drie jongens die in 2004 de islamitische basisschool Bedir in brand staken, vaak door geruchten die een eigen leven gingen leiden.