C L O S E R

Jihad debate: the Dutch fighter and the British aid worker

Posted on July 2nd, 2014 by martijn.
Categories: Activism, International Terrorism, Religious and Political Radicalization, Society & Politics in the Middle East.

This is really fascinating and important stuff. A debate between Dutch foreign fighter in Syria, Yilmaz, and British aid worker in Syria Tauqir Sharif at Channel 4.

Tauqir Sharif, a 27-year-old originally from Nottingham, is an aid worker and activist – but not a fighter. He drives an ambulance in Aleppo and has set up an orphanage with his wife.

He told Channel 4 News: “I’m a grown man at the end of the day. Many of the people who came here are grown men. We came here to help people who are oppressed. To try and say that people are coming here and instead of helping oppressed people are going to start killing them – it’s a lot of scaremongering to be honest.

“To be honest, I feel this rhetoric needs to be changed. Even when you guys introduced me, you said he’s in jihadi-controlled areas. There’s the Free Syrian Army here. There’s so many various different groups and if we’re going to turn around and say everyone’s being radicalised…”

Yilmaz stated:
“The goal at the moment for me and for many of the fighters and groups that are around me, is still always getting rid of this tyrant al Assad, first and foremost.

“As soon as he’s gone we can establish Islamic courts and bring those who’ve committed any kinds of war crimes to justice. So the most important thing for me and the fighters in this region is to overthrow Assad.”
‘Lone wolf’

When asked if he was considering joining up with Isis fighters who have declared an Islamic caliphate “from Aleppo to Diyala” he said: “Basically, for me as a trainer, as a lone wolf, I need to investigate this whole Isis situation.

Watch it here:

Read all about it at Channel4 (the text above is taken from their page).

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Martyrdom Operations As Meaningful Violence

Posted on June 29th, 2014 by martijn.
Categories: Activism, Headline, International Terrorism, Religious and Political Radicalization, Research International, Society & Politics in the Middle East.

Guest Author: Pieter Nanninga

From Bali to Bagdad and from Nairobi to New York: jihadis have carried out hundreds of suicide attacks over the last one and a half decade. Young people from dozens of countries, including the Netherlands according to the AIVD, have sought martyrdom by blowing themselves up, killing thousands of people on their way.

The common perception is that it must psychopaths or chanceless dropouts who commit these acts. Sane persons would not do such a thing, so they must be mentally disturbed, brainwashed by manipulative organisations or tired of earthly life and attracted by the pleasures of Paradise. However, scholars have convincingly refuted these ideas over the last one and a half decade. Most suicide bombers are not psychopaths. They are not poor, uneducated or unemployed as compared to their surrounding societies, and their motivations cannot be compared to ordinary suicides. The label “suicide attacks” is highly misleading: the actions are not merely a spectacular way to escape life. Instead, jihadi supporters of the practice label them as “martyrdom operations” (amaliyyat istishhadiyya) – the insiders’ term I will use for the purpose of this article. But why, then, do these rather ordinary people commit these acts? What do martyrdom operations mean to them?

In this post, I will explore the meanings of martyrdom operations for the perpetrators themselves. I will focus on the martyrdom operations carried out by al-Qaeda, by which I mean the al-Qaeda of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, often dubbed “al-Qaeda Central”. More precisely, I will focus on the meanings that are given to al-Qaeda’s attacks in the martyrdom videos of its media group al-Sahab (“The Clouds”). These videos, the first of which was released in 2001, have been among the most extensive and professional media releases of jihadis until today. They typically include a martyr’s farewell message, his biography, statements by al-Qaeda leaders, Qur’an recitations, anasheed and scenes in which voice-overs comment on the state of the umma and the importance of jihad and martyrdom. These elements are sophisticatedly edited together, resulting in lengthy, documentary-like productions about al-Qaeda’s martyrdom operations.

These sources shed light on the meanings of al-Qaeda’s violence for the perpetrators and their sympathisers. They show that martyrdom operations are not senseless acts of terror. Instead, I argue, they can be better understood as meaningful social practices, as actions that are meaningful and therefore reasonable for the actors involved. Let me be clear, I do not justify, let alone condone, these actions. Yet I believe that, in addition to studying the profiles of the perpetrators, insights into the meanings of martyrdom operations for the actors involved is crucial to understand the phenomenon.

The state of the umma

The picture that emerges from al-Sahab’s videos is that there is a global conflict going on between the worldwide community of Muslims (umma) and an alliance of enemies including “crusaders and Jews”, “apostate” regimes in the Muslim world and supposed heretics such as Shia Muslims. In the eyes of jihadis, these enemies have been able to gain the upper hand in the struggle because Muslims have neglected God’s commands. They have become too attached to their earthly lives to fulfil the duty of jihad and make sacrifices for their brothers and sisters. As a result, the umma has become weak. Islam is disgraced, Muslims are oppressed and humiliated and their lands are defiled by infidel forces.

Whereas most Muslims have turned their backs to their suffering brothers and sisters in Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine, Syria and elsewhere, jihadis see themselves as the ones standing up for the umma. They recurrently indicate in al-Sahab’s videos that, at one point in their lives, they became touched by the fate of their fellow believers and decided to take action. In contrast to others, they were prepared to abandon their luxurious lives, revive the obligation of jihad and devote themselves to the struggle for the sake of the umma. In their view, martyrdom is the ultimate expression of their struggles and sacrifices. As such, it provides the solution for today’s problems. Once, the umma embraces the message of jihad through martyrdom, victory will be achieved, they believe.

Introduction of al-Sahab’s film Jihad wa-istishhad (Jihad and martyrdom) from 2008 about Abu al-Hasan who carried out a martyrdom operation in Afghanistan.

Why is martyrdom considered so important in this respect? To answer this question, I will provide three clusters of meanings that are given to martyrdom operations in al-Sahab’s videos: raids in the way of God; honour and dignity; and sacrifice and purity.

Raids in the way of God

According to jihadis, the solution to today’s problems is returning to the “pure Islam” of the righteous predecessors (al-salaf al-salih): the first three generations of Muslims that should be followed as closely as possible in all spheres of life. Just as Muhammad and his companions had done when they left Mecca for Medina in 622, Muslims should not resign themselves to oppression, jihadis claim. They should migrate to places where they can prepare for battle, practice ribat (guarding the borders of the Muslim lands) and wage jihad after the example of the Prophet. Then, they too, will return victoriously in the end, just as Muhammad did by conquering Mecca some eight years after he had left.

Martyrdom operations are perceived along the same lines, as becomes apparent from al-Sahab’s releases. After the example of the salaf, martyrdom seekers do not “cling heavily to the earth” (Q. 9:38), but renounce earthly life while longing for the hereafter. They desire martyrdom just as Muhammad had done, as is described in a frequently quoted hadith in which he says that he wished to be martyred and then made alive again, so that he could be martyred once more. Hence, despite the controversial character of martyrdom operations in the Muslim world, the actions are perceived as a continuation of the practices of the Prophet. They are designated as “raids” (ghazawat, sg. ghazwa), just like the raids of the Muhammad and his companions, and can be understood as re-enactments of the battles of the salaf. When Muslims will awake from their slumber and follow the example of the Prophet like jihadis do, victory will be achieved, they believe. Jihad through martyrdom will bring about triumph, just as it has done in the first century after the hijra.

Honour and dignity

It is not just by appropriating and reinterpreting early-Islamic traditions that the meanings of martyrdom operations are shaped. Another theme central to the discourse of the martyrs and their supporters is honour and dignity. They are far from exceptional in this case. Research on violence has shown that feelings of humiliation and shame (i.e. the violation of honour) have often fuelled violence. These feelings can be caused by direct personal insult, but also by the (perceived) dishonouring of the group or community the individual identifies him- or herself with, such as the family or the religious community (i.e. “humiliation by proxy”). In these instances, violence can be experienced as redeeming the honour of the insulted individual or community.

As noted above, the protagonists of al-Sahab’s videos perceive the umma as weak and humiliated. They appear to be personally affected by the suffering of their brothers and sisters and indicate that they see themselves as the ones standing up for the umma. In his farewell message, one of the 9/11 bombers points at the suffering of the Palestinians and Iraqis, the “American rule in the Land of the Two Holy Places” (Saudi Arabia) and the atrocities committed against Muslims in Chechnya and Kashmir. He continues: “I take no pleasure in a life of humiliation, and my heart has demanded from me that I live honourably (‘aziza) in compliance with my Lord’s religion.” Therefore, he states, he left his family “to avenge my brothers blood” and “to die with honour.” Along these lines, martyrdom operations are regularly associated with terms such as ‘izza (“honour”, “power”) and karama (“dignity”, “honour”, “respect”). The attacks are seen as honourable as they express that jihadists do not acquiesce in the humiliating situation of the umma, but are willing to make sacrifices to revenge its disgrace. The martyrdom operations humiliate the enemy just as the enemy has humiliated the Muslim community, and therefore they redeem the honour of the umma. They “bring an end to the age of cowardice and weakness” and “restore the dignity of the umma”, the perpetrators believe.

Sacrifice and purity

A third cluster of terms frequently associated with martyrdom operations is sacrifice and purity. These terms too, are often connected to religiously motivated violence. As several scholars have noted, fundamentalist movements usually uphold strong boundaries between “good” and “evil”, between the own group and the “polluted” outside world. This typically implies the view that the purity of the own group should be safeguarded. The impure should be avoided and, once it has penetrated the group, removed. Such a desire for purification can result in violence to eradicate the source of pollution. More precisely, it often results in sacrificial violence. Ritualised bloodshed is experienced as removing pollution and cleansing the community from defilement, thus restoring the boundaries between “good” and “evil”.

These insights can also be applied to al-Qaeda’s martyrdom operations. The umma is perceived as defiled. The “crusader forces” roaming the Muslim world have desecrated the lands of Islam, which are in need of purification. The ritualised self-sacrifice of the bombers accomplishes this. According to early-Islamic traditions, those who are martyred in the way of God are inherently pure. Their blood symbolised this status, which is why the bodies of martyrs, in contrast to those of other deceased, should not be ritually cleansed. Along these lines, martyrdom seekers too, become emblems of purity through their actions, their supporters believe. Yet it is not just the men themselves who are considered pure from their moment of their death, they also purify their surroundings: the umma and the lands of Islam. For instance, about an attack in Saudi Arabia is said that the blood of the martyrs “purifies the Land of the Two Holy Sanctuaries from the defilement of the crusader and Zionist occupation.” Hence, the sacrificial blood of the martyrs cleanses the community and restores the umma’s purity by washing away the pollution caused by the “infidels” and “apostates”.

The meanings of martyrdom

The meanings given to martyrdom operations vary in each context. The videos of al-Sahab therefore not represent the meanings of martyrdom operations for jihadis. Yet the themes we have encountered in al-Sahab’s videos also frequently appear in other sources. Terms such as honour, dignity and sacrifice also often return in blogs, posts and videos in which fighters in Syria and Iraq celebrate the martyrdom of their comrades. The above discussed meanings given to martyrdom therefore also tell us something about other cases.

They learn us that, for the perpetrators, martyrdom operations are not in the first place a means towards victory on the battlefield. Rather, they are considered crucial as they embody victory in terms of honour, dignity and purity. In addition, they learn us that the message of jihad through martyrdom as expressed in al-Sahab’s videos can be attractive for young people who have become touched by the fate of their brothers and sisters. The message offers them a framework to make sense of the world around them and to cope with feelings of humiliation and shame. It provides them with a sense of agency, a way to assist their fellow believers and to contribute to the restoration the glory of the umma. And it offers them empowerment, a crucial role as the defenders of the umma who redeem its honour, restore its dignity and purify its lands in the footsteps of the Prophet.

Therefore, martyrdom operations should not be seen as “senseless violence” performed by dropouts who are brainwashed by a barbaric, medieval ideology. They can better be seen as meaningful social practices for the actors involved. Searching for martyrdom in Syria, Iraq and other arenas of jihad can be an attractive and thoroughly modern way for young people to give meaning to their lives and deaths.

Pieter Nanninga carried out his PhD research at the Faculty of Theology and Religious Studies at the University of Groningen, the Netherlands. Since 2011, he is attached to the Department of Middle Eastern Studies at the same university, where he will occupy a position as Assistant Professor from August 2014. He teaches on politics, culture and religion in de modern Middle East and conducts research on jihadism, violence and media. Pieter Nanninga defended his PhD: Jihadism and Suicide Attacks: al-Qaeda, al-Sahab and the Meanings of Martyrdom. This post is based upon his research.

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Islamophobia & Media – Linda Sarsour vs. Brigitte Gabriel

Posted on June 23rd, 2014 by martijn.
Categories: Activism, International Terrorism, Panoptic Surveillance, Religious and Political Radicalization, Society & Politics in the Middle East.

The US Heritage Foundation has organized a series of gatherings to draw attention to the Benghazi controversy. A week or so ago this however this turned into taunting of a Muslim woman with a headscarf. According to the Washington Post:

Heritage’s ugly Benghazi panel – The Washington Post

The session, as usual, quickly moved beyond the specifics of the assaults that left four Americans dead to accusations about the Muslim Brotherhood infiltrating the Obama administration, President Obama funding jihadists in their quest to destroy the United States, Obama and Hillary Rodham Clinton attempting to impose Sharia blasphemy laws on Americans and Al Jazeera America being an organ of “enemy propaganda.”

Then Saba Ahmed, an American University law student, stood in the back of the room and asked a question in a soft voice. “We portray Islam and all Muslims as bad, but there’s 1.8 billion followers of Islam,” she told them. “We have 8 million-plus Muslim Americans in this country and I don’t see them represented here.”

Panelist Brigitte Gabriel founder of a group called ACT! for America pounced. She said “180 million to 300 million” Muslims are “dedicated to the destruction of Western civilization.” She told Ahmed that the “peaceful majority were irrelevant” in the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and she drew a Hitler comparison: “Most Germans were peaceful, yet the Nazis drove the agenda and as a result, 60 million died.”

“Are you an American?” Gabriel demanded of Ahmed, after accusing her of taking “the limelight” and before informing her that her “political correctness” belongs “in the garbage.”

“Where are the others speaking out?” Ahmed was asked. This drew an extended standing ovation from the nearly 150 people in the room, complete with cheers.

The panel’s moderator, conservative radio host Chris Plante, grinned and joined in the assault. “Can you tell me who the head of the Muslim peace movement is?” he demanded of Ahmed.

“Yeah,” audience members taunted, “yeah.”

Ahmed answered quietly, as before. “I guess it’s me right now,” she said.

[…]
But it was Gabriel, a Lebanese Christian by birth, who was most vitriolic when Ahmed asked her question. Gabriel dismissed as “irrelevant” the “2.3 million Arab Muslims living in the United States [when] it took 19 hijackers — 19 radicals — to bring America down.” She mocked Ahmed’s “point about peaceful, moderate Muslims” by making quotation marks with her fingers when she said the word peaceful.The young woman responded calmly to the taunts of the panelists and the crowd. “As a peaceful American Muslim,” she told them, “I would like to think I’m not that irrelevant.”

The controversy continued on a talkshow of Sean Hannity. Hannity repeatedly pressed Ahmed to specifically condemn the laws that oppress women and gay people with punishment. Brigitte Gabriel was on Hannity too and accused Ahmed of distracting the panel with an irrelevant question. Ahmed talked about herself and how no one’s forcing her to wear her head scarf, but Hannity confronted her about women elsewhere being forced to do so.

The debate continued on CNN’s Reliable sources where Linda Sarsour (national advocacy director of national network of Arab-American communites) challenged Brigitte Gabriel’s bigotry in an item that also focussed on the role of the media in producing and reproducing Islamophobia. In this tv program we see, again, the distinction between moderate (or liberal) and radical Islam/Muslims and the question where are the moderate Muslims is asked again. We have seen this in the Netherlands as well as I have explained earlier.

This is always a dangerous thing as it enhances the us vs. them rhetoric and turns Muslims into terrorists by association or lack of visible disassociation. For the pro radical activists these calls are again a sign of the hypocrisy of democrats as they accuse them of never having condemned violence against Muslims by regimes that are supported by the West.

The calls for public disassociation are part of what I have called the regime of surveillance whereby Muslims are encouraged to enact the accepted and expected models of the Dutch secular liberal citizen. Taken together we can regard the public debates on Islam, the policies regarding Muslims, integration and security politics (often leading to more debate and policies) as a surveillance of the everyday lives of Muslims. The debates about (radical) Islam and the counter-radicalization policies have influenced Muslims’ lives severely. In the Netherlands, several studies have explored how particular debates on Islam trickle down into the daily lives of people in a variety of ways ranging from people’s experiences in schools, workplaces and, of course, their media-consumption at different levels in society. This begs the question if we need to take security measures in order to prevent terrorism whose security are we talking about?

As Sarsour also points out, there have been numerous people condemning the recent atrocities; the question therefore is not where are they but why are they not listened to? The example of Ahmed above shows why: because they are distrusted. As soon as people who condemn the violence speak out they are interrogated if they condemn this and that, and in the case of women with headscarves their headscarf is challenged as a sign of radicalism. Therefore calls for moderate Islam/Muslims are not to be seen as a desperate attempt to hear a moderate voice but to actually silence those voices.

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Islamophobia & Media – Linda Sarsour vs. Brigitte Gabriel

Posted on June 23rd, 2014 by martijn.
Categories: Activism, International Terrorism, Panoptic Surveillance, Religious and Political Radicalization, Society & Politics in the Middle East.

The US Heritage Foundation has organized a series of gatherings to draw attention to the Benghazi controversy. A week or so ago this however this turned into taunting of a Muslim woman with a headscarf. According to the Washington Post:

Heritage’s ugly Benghazi panel – The Washington Post

The session, as usual, quickly moved beyond the specifics of the assaults that left four Americans dead to accusations about the Muslim Brotherhood infiltrating the Obama administration, President Obama funding jihadists in their quest to destroy the United States, Obama and Hillary Rodham Clinton attempting to impose Sharia blasphemy laws on Americans and Al Jazeera America being an organ of “enemy propaganda.”

Then Saba Ahmed, an American University law student, stood in the back of the room and asked a question in a soft voice. “We portray Islam and all Muslims as bad, but there’s 1.8 billion followers of Islam,” she told them. “We have 8 million-plus Muslim Americans in this country and I don’t see them represented here.”

Panelist Brigitte Gabriel founder of a group called ACT! for America pounced. She said “180 million to 300 million” Muslims are “dedicated to the destruction of Western civilization.” She told Ahmed that the “peaceful majority were irrelevant” in the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and she drew a Hitler comparison: “Most Germans were peaceful, yet the Nazis drove the agenda and as a result, 60 million died.”

“Are you an American?” Gabriel demanded of Ahmed, after accusing her of taking “the limelight” and before informing her that her “political correctness” belongs “in the garbage.”

“Where are the others speaking out?” Ahmed was asked. This drew an extended standing ovation from the nearly 150 people in the room, complete with cheers.

The panel’s moderator, conservative radio host Chris Plante, grinned and joined in the assault. “Can you tell me who the head of the Muslim peace movement is?” he demanded of Ahmed.

“Yeah,” audience members taunted, “yeah.”

Ahmed answered quietly, as before. “I guess it’s me right now,” she said.

[…]
But it was Gabriel, a Lebanese Christian by birth, who was most vitriolic when Ahmed asked her question. Gabriel dismissed as “irrelevant” the “2.3 million Arab Muslims living in the United States [when] it took 19 hijackers — 19 radicals — to bring America down.” She mocked Ahmed’s “point about peaceful, moderate Muslims” by making quotation marks with her fingers when she said the word peaceful.The young woman responded calmly to the taunts of the panelists and the crowd. “As a peaceful American Muslim,” she told them, “I would like to think I’m not that irrelevant.”

The controversy continued on a talkshow of Sean Hannity. Hannity repeatedly pressed Ahmed to specifically condemn the laws that oppress women and gay people with punishment. Brigitte Gabriel was on Hannity too and accused Ahmed of distracting the panel with an irrelevant question. Ahmed talked about herself and how no one’s forcing her to wear her head scarf, but Hannity confronted her about women elsewhere being forced to do so.

The debate continued on CNN’s Reliable sources where Linda Sarsour (national advocacy director of national network of Arab-American communites) challenged Brigitte Gabriel’s bigotry in an item that also focussed on the role of the media in producing and reproducing Islamophobia. In this tv program we see, again, the distinction between moderate (or liberal) and radical Islam/Muslims and the question where are the moderate Muslims is asked again. We have seen this in the Netherlands as well as I have explained earlier.

This is always a dangerous thing as it enhances the us vs. them rhetoric and turns Muslims into terrorists by association or lack of visible disassociation. For the pro radical activists these calls are again a sign of the hypocrisy of democrats as they accuse them of never having condemned violence against Muslims by regimes that are supported by the West.

The calls for public disassociation are part of what I have called the regime of surveillance whereby Muslims are encouraged to enact the accepted and expected models of the Dutch secular liberal citizen. Taken together we can regard the public debates on Islam, the policies regarding Muslims, integration and security politics (often leading to more debate and policies) as a surveillance of the everyday lives of Muslims. The debates about (radical) Islam and the counter-radicalization policies have influenced Muslims’ lives severely. In the Netherlands, several studies have explored how particular debates on Islam trickle down into the daily lives of people in a variety of ways ranging from people’s experiences in schools, workplaces and, of course, their media-consumption at different levels in society. This begs the question if we need to take security measures in order to prevent terrorism whose security are we talking about?

As Sarsour also points out, there have been numerous people condemning the recent atrocities; the question therefore is not where are they but why are they not listened to? The example of Ahmed above shows why: because they are distrusted. As soon as people who condemn the violence speak out they are interrogated if they condemn this and that, and in the case of women with headscarves their headscarf is challenged as a sign of radicalism. Therefore calls for moderate Islam/Muslims are not to be seen as a desperate attempt to hear a moderate voice but to actually silence those voices.

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The Pursuit of Happiness – Happy Muslims, Creativity and Political Agency

Posted on May 18th, 2014 by martijn.
Categories: Activism, islamophobia, Notes from the Field, Religious and Political Radicalization, Society & Politics in the Middle East.

A few weeks ago The Honest Policy launched a ‘Happy Muslims’ version of Pharrell Williams’ feel-good ‘Happy’.

By now it has been followed by several other initiatives such as a German video:

One from Egypt:

One from Chicago, US:

One from Abu Dhabi:

And one from the Netherlands:

And several others, just check Youtube. In that list you will see several critical responses to it as well. We can distinguish at least four types of criticism that I’ve seen in regard to the UK and Dutch versions (I haven’t checked the debates in other cases):

Defining Humanity

Much of the critique was about Muslims who are giving in to ‘Western’ ideas of the good Muslim: someone who shows his/hers allegiance to the country they live in. What gets included in the category of the good Muslim is central to the reproduction of dichotomies between humanity/creativity/happiness in relation to the West on the one hand, and fundamentalism/ terrorism/inhumanity/angriness in relation to Islam on the other. The next comment is exemplary for this type of critique:

Happy Muslims: Performing “Happiness” and “Normalcy” | Muslim Reverie

With regard to the “Happy Muslims” videos, the critiques are again about how Muslims perform “happiness” for the white gaze to be seen as “normal” (“normal” meaning “just like every other British/American/Canadian person” and being seen as nonthreatening to white supremacy). An article on OnIslam.net, which wrote in defense of the video, concluded with a sentence stating that 83% of Muslims are “proud to be a British citizen.” To counter stereotypes, the message seems to always be: “We deserve equal rights and dignity because we’re proud British/American/Canadian/Australian, etc. citizens,” instead of “We deserve equal rights and dignity because we’re human beings.” It’s as if the only way to be respected and accepted in society is to show white non-Muslims that we are not only “happy” in their white supremacist nations, but also how we are “the Good Muslims,” or “proud citizens just like them.” Subsequently, this works to distinguish us from the Muslims “over there,” i.e. the Muslims who aren’t citizens of the West and characterized as being “backwards,” “uncivilized,” “unintelligent,” etc. (and as if their lack of citizenship makes them less human or their deaths less outrageous).

Internalized racism

Related to the first and building upon it is that Muslims through these videos are internalizing the stereotypes that are imposed on them. A critique that is very much related to analysis of racism, orientalism and Islamophobia in the sense that is pretty much how racism works: it gets internalized by the ones who are targeted by it:
I ain’t happy | Escape The Cage

How can we claim to actively fight the stereotypes that plague Western perceptions of Muslims if we operate under the veneer of those very prejudices? What the video very evidently does is it seeks to humanise Muslims by implicitly submitting to orientalist accounts. Why do we continually insist on trying to prove our humanity and normality through such nonsensical antics? And just for the record, I don’t take issue with the dancing or the music, although I know some elements of the Muslim community will. To be clear, I am taking issue with a very specific point, the underlying message that is being bulldozed through this video: “Hey Britain, check us out, we’re not all suicide-bombers. Some of us are even in touch with chart music. And look, we can even crack a smile when we’re happy”. We never play by our rules, we only seem to be efficient when reacting to standards imposed upon us. That’s not smart. The worst “Other-ing” is that which one imposes upon oneself. Self-enslavement, unknowingly absorbed, is the most dangerous form of bondage. Failing to understand that by the very act of attempting to defy dehumanising stereotypes, we have (in)conveniently bought into the status quo’s sophisticated trickery, and have done an unprecedented disservice to ourselves and to our heritage. The result is, to put it bluntly, amateurish and we frankly do not have the right to complain about negative portrayals of Muslims by Western discourse-setters if we have chosen to submit ourselves to such narratives.

Misogyny

A third category of critique pertains to tapping into pop culture and the figure of Pharrell who has featured in rather misogynist pop videos before. In this sense the Muslims in the video trade in the stereotypes of the angry Muslim for the misogynist imagination of pop culture.
‘Happy British Muslims’ sparks unhappiness

Bopping to substandard R&B tracks is a thing many self-respecting folk (whether Muslim or not) might confess to with sheepish embarrassment. That stuff’s catchy, no one’s denying it. But to gloat about it under the banner of a marginalised religious community gives the impression of trying to compensate for something.

The issue I want to raise is, why buy into an aspect of pop culture that sends a message of brainless conformity, as opposed to positive contribution?

I use the term “brainless” deliberately because of what Pharrell has been associated with. I refer to his feature in Robin Thicke’s controversial single “You know you want it” which was banned in 20 student unions across the UK for its “rape-promoting content”.^[ii] The same Pharrell who also produced the song’s video featuring Robin, rapper TI and himself alongside a handful of near-nude models being generally demeaned.

Anti-islamic slavery

The conservative critique focuses on the issues of happiness and the role of women in the video. The latter are regarded as dancing provocatively in the video and some see the line ‘happiness is the truth’ as a secular message that opposes Islam as the truth.
My thoughts on #HappyMuslims video | Islam21c

The image which came to mind after a few moments was of slave masters watching their slave girls/boys amuse, dance and entertain them as they twirl their moustaches happily. Yes this is a metaphor and our brothers and sisters are not slave girls, but what is worse is when a Muslim makes that conscious decision that what they have from their Deen and their values just isn’t “good enough” and thus “let’s use the medium of popular culture instead regardless of whether it fits an Islamic ethos or not”. This is of course the real slavery. The slavery of the mind. The music etc wasn’t so depressing for me; it was watching a people fall even more into subservience.

– Any women who claim that females dancing is not provocative or sexual, is either naïve or just plain miskeen. And any man whom claims the same, is, well, lying. Ladies, you could dance like Peter Crouch and men would find that sexual! Men don’t think like you. You lift an elbow out and just wiggle your head forget about anything else and you just provocation-ed off the provocation-meter. You want to do that, keep it for your fella’s eyes only please.

– It’s amazing just how strong that feeling of inferiority amongst liberal and secular Muslims is. That is definitely the major concern here, not the music or dancing. Folks used to call it a inferiority complex. That’s outdated now. We need to call it an “inferiority crisis”.

These different categories are not exclusive and in fact are very much related to each other: they all pertain to how to resist particular oppositions, imaginaries and stereotypes that are imposed on Muslims? The producers and the people who participate in the video are criticized for tapping into and reproducing those imaginaries in different ways.

Happiness as political

My first reaction about the UK video and after the Dutch networks announced their video was in line with much of the critique I have highlighted here. And as one of my interlocutors stated on my Facebook page why should Muslims be happy when in the Netherlands they are submitted to all kinds of racist statements, when there is a terrible war in Syria and when in Burma Rohingya Muslims are persecuted? Why shouldn’t we be angry then? In fact we should be angry now and this video is depoliticizing the whole Muslim issue making our grievances invisible. After some thinking I still agree with these critiques but I have also a few doubts in particular because it ignores an important part of the message of all the different videos: escaping social pressures, happiness, fun, and the diversity among Muslims themselves. As the Honesty Policy stated they wanted to “rethink the rulebook of religious expression”, for a community which is “eclectic, creative and competent”.

As such the fun and happiness displayed in the Happy Muslim meme is of course highly political. It shows a group of Muslims performing a capacity to stop noticing the negative social imaginaries and miseries of the world while at the same time attempting to tame of violence of the racist impositions and the frustrations of feeling powerless against the injustice in the world.

It is I think a mode of double resistance. First of all it is a protest against the imposition of the social imaginary of the angry Muslim basically reducing all Muslims to violent, intolerant and uncreative robots. Second it indicates an area where Muslims, against all odds, are themselves in a way participants experience as ‘finally something fun and positive’ and in a way that challenges the idea that all Muslims are the same by showing their diversity. Also it indicates an attempt to make themselves visible. Although Muslims often disappear as unique individuals in the debates as they are often seen seen as representatives or examples of this and that, the videos state ‘here we are as Muslims and we are all different and unique’. Of course that is also tapping into a cultural development that highly privileges authenticity and individualism (with all its down sides) but it is still a type of resistance anyway.

Silencing the alternative?

Of course, this is a bit speculative since I would need to know more about the motives of the makers and participants and so far I have only seen their facebook postings. I’m engaging in it anyway because I’m wondering if the four categories of criticism I listed here do not fall into a similar trap as the people of the videos are accused of: reproducing the divide between us and them and between the West and Islam. Moreover the criticism appears to make a plea for a type of resistance that is completely separate and not informed by the stereotypes and imaginaries imposed upon Muslims and I wonder if that is possible at all.

It seems as if we think that if people are using happiness, fun and diversity as their main message, we are saying by definition now you are succumbing to Western standards instead of being yourself or being Islamic? But surely there are more repertoires of a good life than Western, Islamic or being yourself? We make highly detailed analysis of how Muslims are trying to create a feeling of belonging to other Muslims or ethnic groups, but we criticize them when they perform their search for belonging to the Netherlands and we see that as being submissive to the negative social imaginaries and Islamophobic policies? What does that say about our own analysis? Is it based upon only two distinct and non-related categories of oppression and opposition against oppression? Why not a different reading as well? Why not the reading, hey here we have a bunch of Muslims and against all odds, against you saying we are all the same and against you trying to exclude us from the important debates and policies, here we are, we are all the same and different at the same time and no matter how violent your policies are, you cannot touch us, we are still happy?

Furthermore I wonder if these critiques do not ignore the idea that governmentality and resistance are always highly related and mutually constitutive. It is precisely through those government policies which are devised to manage integration and radicalization, that Muslims are objectified as governable targets and where the subjectivation of Muslims – as Muslims – occurs but it is also that which creates, informs and shapes the potential for resistance. This means yes resistance is always highly informed by the same social imaginaries it tries to resist and in this case highly informed by the same orientalisms, sexisms and pop culture shallowness it actually tries to resist.

But at the same time happiness, fun, and creativity are all located within wider alternative national and religious geographical imaginaries and as such constitute a critique of social and political injustice, and demands for a more just, satisfying and equitable future. The enactment of happy Muslims within a context of people telling them how to behave, religious conservatism, racism and war can therefore be seen as a political demand for humanity itself and drawing a space where they are left alone by outside pressures. While the above mentioned critique may be warranted (and I think it is) it may also amount to silencing those Muslims who engage in a type of activism which may not have a determinate political effect or one that we have a hard time recognizing and acknowledging.

Of course these comments mainly pertain to Happy Muslims as a transnational phenomenon. Which political effect they exactly create or what type of political agency we are witnessing here is of course for  determined by the concrete local political context as well, making Happy Muslims from the Netherlands partly different from Happy Muslims from Gaza:

See also at Allegra Lab: To Be #HAPPY Muslim Or Not To Be – #ANTHROISLAM By Raana Bokhari

0 comments.

Nieuw boek: ‘Salafisme. Utopische idealen in een weerbarstige praktijk’

Posted on May 9th, 2014 by martijn.
Categories: [Online] Publications, Headline, Islam in the Netherlands, Murder on theo Van Gogh and related issues, My Research, Religious and Political Radicalization, Ritual and Religious Experience, Society & Politics in the Middle East, Young Muslims.

Woensdag 14 mei verschijnt bij Uitgeverij Parthenon het boek dat ik samen met mijn collega’s van de afdeling Islamstudies van de Radboud Universiteit, Joas Wagemakers en Carmen Becker, heb geschreven: Salafisme. Utopische idealen in een weerbarstige praktijk.

Hoe ben je een goede moslim?
Wat salafisten gemeen hebben, is dat zij proberen om de profeet Mohammed en de eerste generaties moslims na hem zo nauwkeurig mogelijk te volgen. Maar hoe ben je een goede, vrome moslim? Daar zijn uiteenlopende, soms tegenstrijdige ideeën over. Bijvoorbeeld: zijn strikte kledingvoorschriften enorm belangrijk of leidt die nadruk op uiterlijkheden af van de spiritualiteit? Is geloof een persoonlijk project, dat deelname aan de samenleving niet in de weg staat, of moet je je zo afzijdig mogelijk houden? ‘Er zijn tegenwoordig zelfs salafisten die oproepen om te stemmen. Daar krijgen ze zware kritiek op van anderen, want je zo actief bemoeien met wereldlijk gezag zou een stap op weg naar het ongeloof zijn.. Het is me door ons onderzoek veel duidelijker geworden dat salafist zijn vaak een worsteling is. Tegelijkertijd maakt dat harde werken ook een belangrijk deel uit van een goede moslim zijn.

Populair na ‘9/11’
In de jaren na ‘9/11’ nam de populariteit van het salafisme wereldwijd toe. Toch is de stroming overal, behalve in Saoedi-Arabië, nog altijd een minderheid binnen de islam. In Nederland zou volgens Amsterdams onderzoek zo’n 8 tot 10 procent van de moslimbevolking , dus ongeveer 80.000 mensen, geïnteresseerd kunnen zijn in een stroming als het salafisme – ‘met zo veel slagen om de arm is dat het meest exacte cijfer dat we hebben’.

Theo van Gogh
In Nederland leidde de moord op Theo van Gogh, in 2004, tot een piek in de belangstelling. ‘Deels was dat nieuwsgierigheid, maar er zit ook wat rebels in salafisme. De publieke reacties op orthodoxe moslims waren scherp, destijds. En dan krijg je een tegenreactie: als salafisten denken te worden aangevallen op hun geloof, kunnen ze fel uit de hoek komen. De laatste jaren, hebben mijn collega’s en ik de indruk, is het aantal bezoekers bij bijeenkomsten voor salafisten behoorlijk stabiel.

Arabische Lente
Het boek besteedt ook aandacht aan de gevolgen van de Arabische Lente, die de apolitieke ideeën van veel salafisten behoorlijk op z’n kop hebben gezet. Moesten salafisten langs de kant blijven staan terwijl allerlei regimes omver geworpen werden of moesten ze toch politiek actief worden? Hoewel salafisten vaak bekend staan als rigide, zijn ze in sommige gevallen uiterst flexibel met deze nieuwe uitdaging omgegaan.

Wat moeten we ermee?

Het boek Salafisme. Utopische idealen in een weerbarstige praktijk verschijnt bij Uitgeverij Parthenon en wordt op woensdag 14 mei in Nijmegen gepresenteerd in het Soeterbeeck Programma ‘Salafisme, wat moeten we ermee?’ (lezing en discussie met onder andere Ineke Roex en Roel Meijer, onder leiding van Jan Jaap de Ruiter van de Universiteit van Tilburg).

Datum: woensdag 14 mei 2014

Tijd: van 19:30 tot 21:30

Locatie: Huize Heyendael, Geert Grooteplein-Noord 9, Nijmegen

Organisator: Soeterbeeck Programma
Voor meer informatie over het programma zie HIER. Aanmelden is noodzakelijk, dat kan HIER.

Te verkrijgen vanaf 14 mei
Bij de bekende boekhandels onder andere:
Atheneum Amsterdam
Boekhandel Roelants Nijmegen
Bol.com
Boek.be

Lees de inleiding

1 comment.

Nieuw boek: 'Salafisme. Utopische idealen in een weerbarstige praktijk'

Posted on May 9th, 2014 by martijn.
Categories: [Online] Publications, Headline, Islam in the Netherlands, Murder on theo Van Gogh and related issues, My Research, Religious and Political Radicalization, Ritual and Religious Experience, Society & Politics in the Middle East, Young Muslims.

Woensdag 14 mei verschijnt bij Uitgeverij Parthenon het boek dat ik samen met mijn collega’s van de afdeling Islamstudies van de Radboud Universiteit, Joas Wagemakers en Carmen Becker, heb geschreven: Salafisme. Utopische idealen in een weerbarstige praktijk.

Hoe ben je een goede moslim?
Wat salafisten gemeen hebben, is dat zij proberen om de profeet Mohammed en de eerste generaties moslims na hem zo nauwkeurig mogelijk te volgen. Maar hoe ben je een goede, vrome moslim? Daar zijn uiteenlopende, soms tegenstrijdige ideeën over. Bijvoorbeeld: zijn strikte kledingvoorschriften enorm belangrijk of leidt die nadruk op uiterlijkheden af van de spiritualiteit? Is geloof een persoonlijk project, dat deelname aan de samenleving niet in de weg staat, of moet je je zo afzijdig mogelijk houden? ‘Er zijn tegenwoordig zelfs salafisten die oproepen om te stemmen. Daar krijgen ze zware kritiek op van anderen, want je zo actief bemoeien met wereldlijk gezag zou een stap op weg naar het ongeloof zijn.. Het is me door ons onderzoek veel duidelijker geworden dat salafist zijn vaak een worsteling is. Tegelijkertijd maakt dat harde werken ook een belangrijk deel uit van een goede moslim zijn.

Populair na ‘9/11’
In de jaren na ‘9/11’ nam de populariteit van het salafisme wereldwijd toe. Toch is de stroming overal, behalve in Saoedi-Arabië, nog altijd een minderheid binnen de islam. In Nederland zou volgens Amsterdams onderzoek zo’n 8 tot 10 procent van de moslimbevolking , dus ongeveer 80.000 mensen, geïnteresseerd kunnen zijn in een stroming als het salafisme – ‘met zo veel slagen om de arm is dat het meest exacte cijfer dat we hebben’.

Theo van Gogh
In Nederland leidde de moord op Theo van Gogh, in 2004, tot een piek in de belangstelling. ‘Deels was dat nieuwsgierigheid, maar er zit ook wat rebels in salafisme. De publieke reacties op orthodoxe moslims waren scherp, destijds. En dan krijg je een tegenreactie: als salafisten denken te worden aangevallen op hun geloof, kunnen ze fel uit de hoek komen. De laatste jaren, hebben mijn collega’s en ik de indruk, is het aantal bezoekers bij bijeenkomsten voor salafisten behoorlijk stabiel.

Arabische Lente
Het boek besteedt ook aandacht aan de gevolgen van de Arabische Lente, die de apolitieke ideeën van veel salafisten behoorlijk op z’n kop hebben gezet. Moesten salafisten langs de kant blijven staan terwijl allerlei regimes omver geworpen werden of moesten ze toch politiek actief worden? Hoewel salafisten vaak bekend staan als rigide, zijn ze in sommige gevallen uiterst flexibel met deze nieuwe uitdaging omgegaan.

Wat moeten we ermee?

Het boek Salafisme. Utopische idealen in een weerbarstige praktijk verschijnt bij Uitgeverij Parthenon en wordt op woensdag 14 mei in Nijmegen gepresenteerd in het Soeterbeeck Programma ‘Salafisme, wat moeten we ermee?’ (lezing en discussie met onder andere Ineke Roex en Roel Meijer, onder leiding van Jan Jaap de Ruiter van de Universiteit van Tilburg).

Datum: woensdag 14 mei 2014

Tijd: van 19:30 tot 21:30

Locatie: Huize Heyendael, Geert Grooteplein-Noord 9, Nijmegen

Organisator: Soeterbeeck Programma
Voor meer informatie over het programma zie HIER. Aanmelden is noodzakelijk, dat kan HIER.

Te verkrijgen vanaf 14 mei
Bij de bekende boekhandels onder andere:
Atheneum Amsterdam
Boekhandel Roelants Nijmegen
Bol.com
Boek.be

Lees de inleiding

1 comment.

Terrorists or Freedom Fighters

Posted on March 18th, 2014 by martijn.
Categories: International Terrorism, Religious and Political Radicalization.

On Al Jazeera’s ‘Head to Head’ Mehdi Hasan challenges Martin McGuinness, exploring the definition of terrorism and when to negotiate with the enemy.

During the conflict in Northern Ireland, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) was branded a terrorist organisation by the British government. The Republican fighters, however, saw themselves as a legitimate army fighting against the British occupation. It was a classic case of ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’.

In this episode of Head to Head , Mehdi Hasan challenges Martin McGuinness, the elected deputy first minister of Northern Ireland and a former commander of the IRA, on his violent past; on why he sees himself as a man of peace; and on whether the Northern Irish Peace Process has lessons for other conflicts around the world.

McGuinness also argues for the importance of negotiations and talking to the enemy as the most effective way of ending conflict.

So, is violence ever justified? And when is it time to speak to the enemy?

Joining our discussion are: Professor Louise Richardson, a global terrorism expert and vice chancellor of St. Andrews University; Dr. Azzam Tamimi, the author of Hamas: A History from Within , and Charlie Wolf, an American political commentator.

It’s an interesting debate I think (H/T: AD). More in-depth is the next Aslan Media interview with Remy Brulin a Research Fellow at the Journalism Institute at New York University and terrorism historian. They dive into the etymology and roots of “terrorism”, how our current War on Terrorism was born in Latin America, how Henry Kissinger covertly supported human rights abuses in Latin America and Reagan overtly supported them.

1 comment.

Women & Violence – The Case of Dutch Muslim Women in Syria Part 1

Posted on March 13th, 2014 by martijn.
Categories: Gender, Kinship & Marriage Issues, Notes from the Field, Religious and Political Radicalization, Society & Politics in the Middle East.

Women and political violence

For some reason the participation of women in political violence and war triggers our imagination. This is also the case with Muslim women going to Syria, some who go there to fight, some to become active in humanitarian aid and others who join their husbands and take care of their household. Often the depiction of these women is quite one-dimensional. They are often constructed as trapped by cultural or religious circumstances tied to gender or they are constructed as “romantic dupes” who have been manipulated into violent acts by a male lover or male relative or into lending sexual services to men. Of course, this is not just fantasy, it does exist and there are, for example, more than enough examples of women who are used for sexual favours and raping women is a weapon of war. Furthermore the promise of sex can be an important motivation for male soldiers and there are for example horrific accounts of American soldiers raping French women during the ‘liberation’ of France.

The National Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism and Security estimates the number of Dutch women in Syria to be approximately 20. Not a lot and Dutch women going abroad for participating in armed struggle is also not new given the account of Tanja Nijmeijer who joined the Colombian FARC. Nevertheless, still a significant phenomenon at least for the stir it causes in society in general and among Muslims in particular.

Sex-jihad, jihad brides and what have you…

Last week in the Netherlands we had several accounts on ‘jihad brides’ and Moroccan-Dutch women being groomed by men to go to Syria to engage in temporary marriages so men can have sex with them. The anti-Islam and anti-Muslim/migrant Freedom Party is going to ask questions in parliament about it. In many of the discussions practices that usually are associated with Shia Muslims, in particular the zawaj mut‘a (pleasure marriage) or zawaj mu’aqqat (temporary marriage) are uncritically connected with these (Sunni) women and also related to grooming and prostitution.

It is very difficult to confirm or deny such accounts, the women themselves often do not speak to the regular media. Furthermore it is also difficult to ascertain the extent to which these stories are influenced by war propaganda. The stories about the so-called ‘jihad al-nikah’ or ‘sex(ual) jihad’ during the Syrian war seem to have originated in Tunisia and the Tunisian Minister of the Interior has stated it is a significant issue. According to the Minister, Lotfi Ben Jeddou, Tunisian women were traveling to Syria to wage “sex jihad” and having sex with “20, 30, [or] 100” militants, before returning pregnant to Tunisia. The other source of the jihad al-nikah narrative is said to be Muhammad al-Arifi, a Saudi salafi cleric. Al-Arifi has denied making the statements and stated that ‘no sane person‘ would such a fatwa. This has not prevented stories from Tunisia about young women being ‘brainwashed‘ and lured into ‘sex-jihad’. Later a Tunisian official stated there were only a few women going to Syria for these reasons. The Al Arabiya network revealed several cases of Syrian women who were abducted and raped by jihadis. It appears however that in reality they were kidnapped by Assad’s security services. Christoph Reuter, a reporter of Der Spiegel, stated that the ‘sex jihad’ is part of Assad’s propaganda war and that two human rights organizations haven’t been able to confirm the stories.:

Assad Regime Wages PR Campaign to Discredit Rebels – SPIEGEL ONLINE

One prime example is the legend of orgies with terrorists: The 16-year-old presented on state TV comes from a prominent oppositional family in Daraa. When the regime failed to capture her father, she was abducted by security forces on her way home from school in November 2012. During the same TV program, a second woman confessed that she had submitted to group sex with the fanatical Al-Nusra Front. According to her family, though, she was arrested at the University of Damascus while protesting against Assad. Both young women are still missing. Their families say that they were forced to make the televised statements — and that the allegation of sex jihad is a lie.

An alleged Tunisian sex jihadist also dismissed the stories when she was contacted by Arab media: “All lies!”, she said. She admitted that she had been to Syria, but as a nurse. She says she is married and has since fled to Jordan.

Two human rights organizations have been trying to substantiate the sex jihad stories, but have so far come up empty-handed.

Several other stories about sex jihad have been debunked as well although the Tunisian security services appears to have several girls from the Chaambi Mountains who were allegedly involved in a the so-called sex jihad. Amna Guellali, working for Human Rights Watch in Tunisia, spoke to the mother of an 18-year-old woman. She told Guellali that a woman close to the Tunisian militant group Ansar al-Sharia got her daughter tangled up in a network of girls in the area. Guellali also states however: “Everything I’ve heard were very broad allegations that didn’t really have all the features of a serious reporting about the case, […]All I have is very sparse, very little information, and I think that’s true for a lot of people working in the human rights community, in addition to reporters.”

Nevertheless whether the stories are true or not, some parents and other Muslims do voice their concerns over these women through a narrative that weaves together elements such as brainwashing, grooming and sexual violence. Last night at a talkshow Houda el Hamdaoui (candidate for the local Party of Unity for the upcoming elections and working in a grassroots organisation Mother/Daughter that supports parents of foreign fighters) expressed her concerns while also voicing her objections against the term ‘jihad bride’. She stated that parents should monitor the behaviour of their daughters and if necessary go to the police if they suspect their sons and/or daughters want to go to Syria.

There have also been reports, in the last couple of days, trying to debunk the stories about sex-jihad en jihadbrides and criticizing the sensationalist and alarmist tone of many of the reports.

Women ‘moving’ to Syria

Above is a video of women who calls herself ‘Maryam’. She is a convert from the UK apparently and has committed herself to ‘jihad’:

How British women are joining the jihad in Syria – Channel 4 News

She’s a tall young woman, dressed in a hijab, complete with face veil, firing a gun. She speaks with a London accent, and calls herself “Maryam”.

It’s not her real name, but her commitment to the jihad is real enough: “These are our brothers and sisters and they need our help.”

Maryam shoots a Kalashnikov for the camera, and then fires off a revolver. She’d like to fight, to become what she calls a martyr. But she’s not a frontline fighter. She’s a fighter’s wife, with weapons for her own protection.

(via T-V, thanks!)

The Channel4 documentary is an interesting one but does appear to suffer from a particular bias. In stories about female fighters the question often is why do such (pretty, search for it and note how many times they are categorized as pretty) engage in violent acts or, in this case join the European male foreign fighters in Syria? It appears as if people think that women engaging in violence are transgressing the dominant definitions of feminity and appropriate behaviour. The narrative of women being lured into sex jihad fits into that; it’s the men’s brainwashing that is responsible for luring women into ‘deviant’ acts. In the case of women we tend to overlook the reasons men give for fighting: ‘doing something’, ‘fighting for justice and against oppression, ‘fighting in the cause of God’ and assume women have other reasons. And maybe they have other reasons too, but Maryam’s story is quite familiar when we compare it to the narratives of men:

I couldn’t find anyone in the UK who was willing to sacrifice their life in this world for the life in the hereafter… I prayed, and Allah ruled that I came here to marry Abu Bakr.[…] “You need to wake up and stop being scared of death… we know that there’s heaven and hell. At the end of the day, Allah’s going to question you. Instead of sitting down and focusing on your families or your study, you just need to wake up because the time is ticking.

There is also another narrative that I haven’t seen thus far in the case of Muslim women going to Syria but that certainly exists in other cases. This one constructs female militants and fighters as “liberated” feminists who engage in violent acts as autonomous actors. The advantage of this perspective as that women’s agency is being brought into the narrative but in fact it is equally reductionist as the former. Committing acts of violence here becomes the ultimate equalizer oyer and these women may even more dangerous than man (‘kill the women first’ trope is such an example). It is as if these women by becoming fighters are expressing their full feminity, their full commitment as a Muslim and demonstrating gender equality. Such a view however (although maybe important to the women themselves) still gains its currency from the stereotype that a woman does not commit violent acts.

The Channel4 documentary albeit not completely independent from the stereotypes, does provide us with a clear view of women not being passive victims of bad men and not being the feminist warriors others want them to be. Economics, household issues, children’s issues and the realities of life at home and in Syria shape and inform their participation in the war in Syria. Coercion and social pressures may play a role here but the women’s political and religious agency do as well.

0 comments.

Women & Violence – The Case of Dutch Muslim Women in Syria Part 1

Posted on March 13th, 2014 by martijn.
Categories: Gender, Kinship & Marriage Issues, Notes from the Field, Religious and Political Radicalization, Society & Politics in the Middle East.

Women and political violence

For some reason the participation of women in political violence and war triggers our imagination. This is also the case with Muslim women going to Syria, some who go there to fight, some to become active in humanitarian aid and others who join their husbands and take care of their household. Often the depiction of these women is quite one-dimensional. They are often constructed as trapped by cultural or religious circumstances tied to gender or they are constructed as “romantic dupes” who have been manipulated into violent acts by a male lover or male relative or into lending sexual services to men. Of course, this is not just fantasy, it does exist and there are, for example, more than enough examples of women who are used for sexual favours and raping women is a weapon of war. Furthermore the promise of sex can be an important motivation for male soldiers and there are for example horrific accounts of American soldiers raping French women during the ‘liberation’ of France.

The National Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism and Security estimates the number of Dutch women in Syria to be approximately 20. Not a lot and Dutch women going abroad for participating in armed struggle is also not new given the account of Tanja Nijmeijer who joined the Colombian FARC. Nevertheless, still a significant phenomenon at least for the stir it causes in society in general and among Muslims in particular.

Sex-jihad, jihad brides and what have you…

Last week in the Netherlands we had several accounts on ‘jihad brides’ and Moroccan-Dutch women being groomed by men to go to Syria to engage in temporary marriages so men can have sex with them. The anti-Islam and anti-Muslim/migrant Freedom Party is going to ask questions in parliament about it. In many of the discussions practices that usually are associated with Shia Muslims, in particular the zawaj mut‘a (pleasure marriage) or zawaj mu’aqqat (temporary marriage) are uncritically connected with these (Sunni) women and also related to grooming and prostitution.

It is very difficult to confirm or deny such accounts, the women themselves often do not speak to the regular media. Furthermore it is also difficult to ascertain the extent to which these stories are influenced by war propaganda. The stories about the so-called ‘jihad al-nikah’ or ‘sex(ual) jihad’ during the Syrian war seem to have originated in Tunisia and the Tunisian Minister of the Interior has stated it is a significant issue. According to the Minister, Lotfi Ben Jeddou, Tunisian women were traveling to Syria to wage “sex jihad” and having sex with “20, 30, [or] 100” militants, before returning pregnant to Tunisia. The other source of the jihad al-nikah narrative is said to be Muhammad al-Arifi, a Saudi salafi cleric. Al-Arifi has denied making the statements and stated that ‘no sane person‘ would such a fatwa. This has not prevented stories from Tunisia about young women being ‘brainwashed‘ and lured into ‘sex-jihad’. Later a Tunisian official stated there were only a few women going to Syria for these reasons. The Al Arabiya network revealed several cases of Syrian women who were abducted and raped by jihadis. It appears however that in reality they were kidnapped by Assad’s security services. Christoph Reuter, a reporter of Der Spiegel, stated that the ‘sex jihad’ is part of Assad’s propaganda war and that two human rights organizations haven’t been able to confirm the stories.:

Assad Regime Wages PR Campaign to Discredit Rebels – SPIEGEL ONLINE

One prime example is the legend of orgies with terrorists: The 16-year-old presented on state TV comes from a prominent oppositional family in Daraa. When the regime failed to capture her father, she was abducted by security forces on her way home from school in November 2012. During the same TV program, a second woman confessed that she had submitted to group sex with the fanatical Al-Nusra Front. According to her family, though, she was arrested at the University of Damascus while protesting against Assad. Both young women are still missing. Their families say that they were forced to make the televised statements — and that the allegation of sex jihad is a lie.

An alleged Tunisian sex jihadist also dismissed the stories when she was contacted by Arab media: “All lies!”, she said. She admitted that she had been to Syria, but as a nurse. She says she is married and has since fled to Jordan.

Two human rights organizations have been trying to substantiate the sex jihad stories, but have so far come up empty-handed.

Several other stories about sex jihad have been debunked as well although the Tunisian security services appears to have several girls from the Chaambi Mountains who were allegedly involved in a the so-called sex jihad. Amna Guellali, working for Human Rights Watch in Tunisia, spoke to the mother of an 18-year-old woman. She told Guellali that a woman close to the Tunisian militant group Ansar al-Sharia got her daughter tangled up in a network of girls in the area. Guellali also states however: “Everything I’ve heard were very broad allegations that didn’t really have all the features of a serious reporting about the case, […]All I have is very sparse, very little information, and I think that’s true for a lot of people working in the human rights community, in addition to reporters.”

Nevertheless whether the stories are true or not, some parents and other Muslims do voice their concerns over these women through a narrative that weaves together elements such as brainwashing, grooming and sexual violence. Last night at a talkshow Houda el Hamdaoui (candidate for the local Party of Unity for the upcoming elections and working in a grassroots organisation Mother/Daughter that supports parents of foreign fighters) expressed her concerns while also voicing her objections against the term ‘jihad bride’. She stated that parents should monitor the behaviour of their daughters and if necessary go to the police if they suspect their sons and/or daughters want to go to Syria.

There have also been reports, in the last couple of days, trying to debunk the stories about sex-jihad en jihadbrides and criticizing the sensationalist and alarmist tone of many of the reports.

Women ‘moving’ to Syria

Above is a video of women who calls herself ‘Maryam’. She is a convert from the UK apparently and has committed herself to ‘jihad’:

How British women are joining the jihad in Syria – Channel 4 News

She’s a tall young woman, dressed in a hijab, complete with face veil, firing a gun. She speaks with a London accent, and calls herself “Maryam”.

It’s not her real name, but her commitment to the jihad is real enough: “These are our brothers and sisters and they need our help.”

Maryam shoots a Kalashnikov for the camera, and then fires off a revolver. She’d like to fight, to become what she calls a martyr. But she’s not a frontline fighter. She’s a fighter’s wife, with weapons for her own protection.

(via T-V, thanks!)

The Channel4 documentary is an interesting one but does appear to suffer from a particular bias. In stories about female fighters the question often is why do such (pretty, search for it and note how many times they are categorized as pretty) engage in violent acts or, in this case join the European male foreign fighters in Syria? It appears as if people think that women engaging in violence are transgressing the dominant definitions of feminity and appropriate behaviour. The narrative of women being lured into sex jihad fits into that; it’s the men’s brainwashing that is responsible for luring women into ‘deviant’ acts. In the case of women we tend to overlook the reasons men give for fighting: ‘doing something’, ‘fighting for justice and against oppression, ‘fighting in the cause of God’ and assume women have other reasons. And maybe they have other reasons too, but Maryam’s story is quite familiar when we compare it to the narratives of men:

I couldn’t find anyone in the UK who was willing to sacrifice their life in this world for the life in the hereafter… I prayed, and Allah ruled that I came here to marry Abu Bakr.[…] “You need to wake up and stop being scared of death… we know that there’s heaven and hell. At the end of the day, Allah’s going to question you. Instead of sitting down and focusing on your families or your study, you just need to wake up because the time is ticking.

There is also another narrative that I haven’t seen thus far in the case of Muslim women going to Syria but that certainly exists in other cases. This one constructs female militants and fighters as “liberated” feminists who engage in violent acts as autonomous actors. The advantage of this perspective as that women’s agency is being brought into the narrative but in fact it is equally reductionist as the former. Committing acts of violence here becomes the ultimate equalizer oyer and these women may even more dangerous than man (‘kill the women first’ trope is such an example). It is as if these women by becoming fighters are expressing their full feminity, their full commitment as a Muslim and demonstrating gender equality. Such a view however (although maybe important to the women themselves) still gains its currency from the stereotype that a woman does not commit violent acts.

The Channel4 documentary albeit not completely independent from the stereotypes, does provide us with a clear view of women not being passive victims of bad men and not being the feminist warriors others want them to be. Economics, household issues, children’s issues and the realities of life at home and in Syria shape and inform their participation in the war in Syria. Coercion and social pressures may play a role here but the women’s political and religious agency do as well.

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Dutch Foreign Fighters and Regimes of Surveillance

Posted on February 26th, 2014 by martijn.
Categories: Activism, International Terrorism, Notes from the Field, Religious and Political Radicalization.

Since it has become known that European Muslims are fighting in Syria against Assad (and probably against each other as well) it appears that the focus of counter-radicalization has narrowed. In the past this policy mainly targeted Salafi Muslims. This counter-radicalization policy is embedded within a wider public debate about Muslims, Islam, integration and radicalization. Moreover, the public debates on Islam and the counter-radicalization policies are carriers and producers of symbolic references as to why Muslims are a problem (for example, problems with street youth, violence, intolerance, ‘fanatical’ religion). These references are often regarded as the cause of current and anticipated risks to society which, in turn, constitute the legitimatizations and rationalizations for intervention and transformation. Taken together we can regard the public debates on Islam, the policies regarding Muslims, integration and security politics (often leading to more debate and policies) as a surveillance of the everyday lives of Muslims.

Through websites and social media, a number of particular specialists take part in this. But lay people join in too and are encouraged to enact the accepted and expected models of the Dutch secular liberal citizen. The debates about (radical) Islam and the counter-radicalization policies have influenced Muslims’ lives severely. In the Netherlands, several studies have explored how particular debates on Islam trickle down into the daily lives of people in a variety of ways ranging from people’s experiences in schools, workplaces and, of course, their media-consumption at different levels in society.

From the start of 2013 onwards, the counter-radicalization efforts appear to concentrate on a smaller group: those Muslims who may have plans to travel to Syria, the families of those who are already there and those who have returned. In the Netherlands several cities stand out as many of the fighters were born and raised in a few cities: Den Haag, Delft, Utrecht and Arnhem. In the beginning of this week the National Coordinator for Counter-terrorism and security (NCTV) announced that the threat level assessing the possibilities of a terrorist attack remains ‘substantial’ (the continuum ranges from minimal, to limitied to substantial to critical). Last year the NCTV stated:

Current threat level | National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism

The present threat assessment is still mainly determined by the involvement of foreign combatants in the Syrian conflict. There are also worrying indications of growing radicalisation among small groups of young Muslims in the Netherlands. Developments in some countries in the Middle East and jihadist conflict zones have also had a negative impact on the present threat assessment. Since the risks have not diminished, not only is this heightened approach justified, but further action would seem to be warranted.

Dutch nationals are still travelling to Syria with jihadist intentions. In August, the number of people leaving the Netherlands for Syria was again higher than in preceding months. At this point, just under 100 such individuals have made the journey, a growing number of whom are thought to be fighting under the flag of Jabhat al-Nusra (JaN), an al Qa’ida (AQ) ally that seeks to wage violent global jihad. Their possible return could affect the threat to Europe and the Netherlands in particular. It is also important to bear in mind that returnees from other EU countries could carry out terrorist activities in the Netherlands, either on their own initiative or on the instructions of other parties.

During the period under review, Dutch jihadists with combat experience began returning to the Netherlands from Syria for the first time. They are now being monitored closely.

In its recent press release the NCTV gives a broad overview of their assessment of the current situation, potential threats and measures that are taken:

concrete situation & measures:

• There are about 100 Dutch ‘travellers’: 70 are still in Syria and more than 20 have returned.
• Some have fighting experiences, others not.
• The state has revoked the passports of at least 11 persons who are seen as potential foreign fighters. A passport can be revoked when there are serious suspicions that a person will be engaging in activities abroad that might pose a threat tot he Netherlands, such as joining an Al Qaeda affiliated group.
• There are several investigations against recruiters.
• Several minors have been stopped when they wanted to travel to Syria. They are now under supervision of youth care and/or send to a closed residential youth care; a measure usually taken in cases of youth with severe behavioural problems.
• In October 2013 two people suspected of travelling to Syria appeared in court. One is sentenced for attempted murder (but send to a psychiatric institution because of mental instability) and the second is convicted for preparing an arson attack and disseminating inflammatory texts.
• The government has proposed a law that revokes Dutch citizenship in case of terrorist activities. The draft law is now under consultation.
• The government has invoked ‘sanctieregeling terrorisme 2007-II’ in four cases and frozen the financial assets of these persons.
• There is a local municipal approach aimed at intervening in specific cases and in which public servants, local police officers and community workers are trained to detect signs of radicalization and to intervene when necessary. This approach is still work in progress.
• All welfare benefits for known Syria travellers have been stopped.

Cooperation

• On 19 and 20 February a meeting was held in The Hague of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) about foreign fighters.
• Turkey and the Netherlands have agreed to cooperate in countering the threat resulting from travelling back and forth to Syria. A Memorandum of Understanding will be signed in 2014.

Radicalization in the Netherlands

The NCTV expresses it concern that the events in Syria and the activities of (returned) foreign fighters stimulates radicalization of Muslims in the Netherlands:

• The NCTV expresses its concern over online and offline public manifestations of ‘jihadism’ in the Netherlands. In particular the expressions of public support and loyalty to ISIL and Jabhat al Nusra are cause for concern according to the NCTV. They see the ‘fanatic’ expressions of a anti-Western and violent ideology as inflammatory and fear it might lead to justifying violence against Western targets. This public manifestation also is evident, according to the NCTV, in the intimidation of Muslim clerics and opinion leaders who express their opposition to ‘jihad travels’ and the violent message of Al Qaeda. The NCTV fears this development might hinder the potential resistance among Muslim communities against extremism and violence.
• Because of the animosity between Syrian rebels the NCTV fears that there will be more returnees in the coming months.
• The NCTV signals an empowerment of radical forces in several Muslim countries due to the conflict in Syria as well as an increase in ‘jihadist inspired’ violence.
• The NCTV and General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) are working on a joint paper on tendencies of radicalization in the Netherlands.
• The government will send a letter about fundamentalism to the Dutch parliament. This letter is an answer to debates about the research of Koopmans. Read my review HERE.
• The NCTV alerts internet access providers and webhosts to extremist messages and urges them to ‘take responsibility’ and to take down these messages according to their own terms of use. The web radio station Radio Ghurabaa was one of the first to experience this measure from the NCTV. Their webhost has denied the request and Radio Ghurabaa and NCTV are now discussing the possibilities to have a meeting on the issue.
• The NCTV sees the current radicalization as a potential threat to the integration in the sense that has a segregating and polarizing effect on society and undermines people’s attachment to democratic core values. Minister Asscher of Social Affairs has therefore prioritized stimulating the potential resistance among individuals and groups who are prone to ‘jihadist messages’.

Some of my observations (but by no means all…)

• The NCTV alerts internet access providers and webhosts to extremist messages and urges them to ‘take responsibility’ and to take down these messages according to their own terms of use. The web radio station Radio Ghurabaa was one of the first to experience this measure from the NCTV. Their webhost has denied the request and Radio Ghurabaa and NCTV are now discussing the possibilities to have a meeting on the issue. Furthermore, several mosques have refused speakers who are regarded as ‘jihadist’ the possibility to deliver a lecture claiming to be warned by Dutch authorities.
• There appears to be an increased surveillance of people who are seen as potential foreign fighters. This has not prevented people from actually going to Syria.
• However, those who are actually under surveillance, who are associated with sympathizing (or engaging in) armed struggle are very aware of the fact that they are under counter-terrorism surveillance, an experience which they find much more intrusive than anything in the Netherlands.
• It is in particular the involvement of youth care in the case of minors that troubles many of those under surveillance as they fear their children will be taken away from them.
• By others the involvement of youth care is met with great scepticism since youth care will become a priority of the municipalities and they think the municipality will not be equipped to deal with youth care and youth care will not be able to deal with radicalization at all (this should also be seen against the background of a general distrust towards youth care).
• The involvement of Islamic organizations in either counter-radicalization or in stimulating Muslims to go to Syria appears to be limited. A few mosques have organized meetings on the issue for parents but in general they appear to be largely irrelevant at the moment. There are attempts by mosque organizations to become more involved in national and local policies but it remains to be seen if this really matters since the targeted groups of Muslims usually do not visit the mainstream mosques (except for prayer occasionally).

The issue of foreign fighters is framed within a nexus of security, (pathological) radicalization and integration. It remains to be seen if the narrow focus nowadays will prevent stigmatization of Muslim communities in general. I’m not so sure if there is indeed a threat to resistance against radicalization; in fact more Muslim spokespersons have appeared on TV expressing their disapproval of Muslims going to Syria than before. The public manifestations of foreign fighters on social media for example and their supporters, all labelled as ‘radical’ Muslims, also seems to create a platform for those Muslims who want to speak out against jihad in Syria and who are, therefore, labelled as ‘moderate’, ‘liberal’ or ‘free-thinking’ Muslims and/or who label themselves as such).

You can find the NCTV documents here:

1. Threat level remains at ‘substantial’; government action still necessary | National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism
2. Policy implications

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Welkom in Eurabia IV – Het ‘islamitisch terrorisme’ verhaal

Posted on February 22nd, 2014 by martijn.
Categories: International Terrorism, Religious and Political Radicalization.

In 2004, een paar dagen na de moord op Theo van Gogh, stelde een beleidsmedewerker mij bij een borrel na afloop van een vergadering de vraag of ik dacht dat er na ‘Van Gogh’ nog meer terreuraanslagen zouden volgen. Mijn antwoord daarop was tweeledig: Ik ben antropoloog en doe onderzoek naar identiteit en geloofsbeleving onder moslims. Ik ben dus a) geen helderziende en b) geen terreurexpert. Daar moest deze, overigens heel aardige, beleidsmedewerker het mee doen want dat soort gesprekken is precies één van de redenen waarom ik een hekel heb aan borrels en ik vertrok.

Eén van de gevolgen van 9/11 is een grote verandering in het denken over veiligheid; terrorisme en in het bijzonder ‘islamitisch terrorisme’ stond snel bovenaan de prioriteitenlijst. Het gevolg was dat islam en moslims niet alleen een discussie onderwerp waren wanneer het ging over integratie en over de verhouding seculier – religieus, maar ook in discussies over veiligheid. Islam werd meer en meer een veiligheidsissue en veiligheid werd steeds meer een islamissue.

Islamitisch terrorisme

Het begrippenapparaat van die kwesties is mee veranderd. Terrorisme, ‘islamitisch terrorisme’, haat, vrijheid, democratie en rechtvaardigheid hebben gaandeweg andere betekenissen mee gekregen. De term ‘islamitisch terrorisme’ komt uit het veld van terrorisme studies en is in het bijzonder terug te herleiden op het onderzoeksveld van ‘religieus terrorisme’ waarvan de basis min of meer is gelegd in een artikel van David Rapoport: ‘Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions’ (American Political Science Review, 78: 3 (1984), pp. 658–77). In het geval van ‘islamitisch terrorisme’ is het veld daarboven tevens beïnvloed door tal van meer of minder oriëntalistische teksten over islam en het Midden-Oosten zoals het werk van Bernard Lewis en Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations. De politieke discussie over ‘islamitisch terrorisme’ is daarnaast sterk beïnvloed door moralistische verhalen over beschaving vs. barbarisme, de onschuld van het Westen, vijfde colonne, massavernietigingswapens, enzovoorts.

Het hele terrorismeverhaal staat dan ook bol van dramatische opposities zoals het Westen vs. islam, extreem of radicaal vs. gematigd, seculier vs. religieus, achterlijk vs. modern, barbaars vs. beschaafd en allerlei sociale etiketjes die daar weer uit voortkomen zoals het vrije Westen, gematigde moslims, enzovoorts. Net zoals bij het spreken over fundamentalistische christelijke groepen de notie van geweld impliciet verondersteld wordt, lijkt bij specifieke islamitische trends (islamisme, fundamentalisme, salafisme) ook de veronderstelling aanwezig dat geweld in de aard van het beestje zit en onvermijdelijk is. Ongeacht sociale en politieke factoren zou de aanwezigheid van die trends dus altijd leiden tot geweld simpelweg omdat het in de aard van het gedachtegoed zit.

Daarbij zit een zekere urgentie: na 9/11, na de aanslagen van Madrid, na Van Gogh, na Londen en nu met de Syrië-gangers: een nieuwe aanslag op de Westerse democratie, vrijheid en manier van leven ligt voortdurend om de hoek. Het is altijd vijf voor twaalf. Opvallend is dat de aanslagen in Casablanca, op Bali en in Amman daarbij nauwelijks lijken mee te tellen. Het verhaal over ‘islamitisch terrorisme’ is een verhaal van aanslagen in het Westen door moslims uit het Midden-Oosten en ‘home-grown’ moslims. En omdat ‘islamitisch terrorisme’ fanatiek, religieus gemotiveerd, moordlustig, irrationeel en gebaseerd is op haat tegen het vrije Westen is een rationele dialoog onmogelijk; er valt niet mee te praten en kan alleen met repressie bestreden worden. Verder zou ‘islamitisch terrorisme’ echt iets nieuws zijn in vergelijking met andere oudere vormen van terrorisme. Als je echter beter kijkt dan zie je vooral dat men voortborduurt op al lang beproefde tactieken en strategieën van anderen en gebruikt maakt van de moderne mogelijheden.

Kritiek

Er is nogal wat kritiek mogelijk op de term ‘islamitisch terrorisme’ en het verhaal erachter. Ten eerste is het onduidelijk wat nu precies onder terrorisme verstaan wordt, of beter gesteld het is nogal eenzijdig gedefinieerd: namelijk vanuit het perspectief van de Westerse staten. Het aanvallen door Al Qaeda van het militaire schip de USS Cole wordt gezien als een terreurdaad, maar de Amerikaanse drone aanvallen op burgers in Afghanistan, Pakistan en Jemen niet. Ten tweede is islam als religieuze en culturele traditie zo divers en omvat het label moslims meer dan 1 miljard mensen dat het bijvoeglijk naamwoord eigenlijk veel te generaliserend en stigmatiserend is. Ten derde, iedere religieuze traditie heeft een geschiedenis waar geweld onder bepaalde regels en omstandigheden gelegitimeerd wordt, maar er zijn zulke grote verschillen in opvatting tussen bijvoorbeeld ‘salafisten’, Hamas, Al Qaeda, en Hezbollah (the usual suspects) en ook binnen volgelingen van die bewegingen en trends, dat de term ‘islamitisch’ ook nog eens misleidend is en analytisch gezien volstrekt nutteloos.

Ten vierde, al zou het zo zijn (dat is niet zo) dat weliswaar niet alle moslims terroristen zijn, maar alle terroristen wel moslims (zoals de slogan van sommige opinieleiders luidt) dan nog is er geen reden om het islamitisch terrorisme te noemen. Het grootste deel van de terroristen is namelijk ook man; maar we gebruiken gelukkig ook niet de term mannelijk terrorisme en we gaan er (toch?) niet vanuit dat als iemand man is, de kans ook wel groot zal zijn dat hij een terrorist is. Ten vijfde, en dat geldt ook voor de bredere term ‘religieus terrorisme’ er is geen directe, causale link tussen religie en een specifiek type geweld. Ten zesde de term ‘religieus terrorisme’ of ‘islamitisch terrorisme’ legt de nadruk op religie en maakt ons blind voor politieke en nationalistische motieven van mensen en negeert het gegeven dat de meesten ‘terroristen’ pas religieus en/of ideologisch gemotiveerd en onderlegd raken nádat zij in contact komen met terreurnetwerken. De religieuze motieven krijgen daarbij vaak betekenis tegen de achtergrond van nationalistische motieven: verzet tegen een vreemde bezetter van het eigen grondgebied of tegen een brute dictator.

De gevolgen van het ‘islamitisch terrorisme’ verhaal

Het hele vertoog over ‘islamitisch terrorisme’ krijgt een specifieke betekenis binnen de huidige politiek-maatschappelijke context waarin islamofobische stemmen aan kracht, legitimiteit en vanzelfsprekendheid hebben gewonnen en waarop de identiteit van het Westen, Europa, Nederland mede bepaald en geconsolideerd wordt door de constructie van een geweldadige islamitische ander tegenover een liberale, beschaafd Europa/Nederland/Het Westen. Het zorgt ervoor dat ‘islamitisch radicalen’ worden gereduceerd tot een categorie die moet worden bestreden als veiligheidsprobleem en integratieprobleem; de politieke kritiek die inherent is aan de politieke ideologie van radicalen en in hun optredens kan volkomen buiten beschouwing blijven.

De vermeende nieuwigheid en urgentie van ‘islamitisch terrorisme’ stelt overheden ook in staat diverse binnen- en buitenlandse beleidsinitiatieven te realiseren die uiteindelijk alle burgers in binnen- en buitenland raken. Denk aan de druk op privacy, het afluisteren van mensen, het steunen van dictators in het Midden-Oosten, het sturen van troepen naar Mali om, ja wat te doen eigenlijk? Omdat het iets ‘nieuws’ was, was dat ook de legitimering om bovenop de al bestaande veiligheidsmaatregelen nieuwe maatregelen toe te voegen. Alle landen hebben er dan ook een schepje bovenop gedaan en de verschillen in maatregelen en de ingrijpendheid ervan, worden vooral bepaald door eerdere ervaringen. Landen zoals Frankrijk en Engeland die al ervaring hadden met terrorisme en al stringente maatregelen gedaan hebben daar op voortgeborduurd. Nederland had minder ervaring, minder maatregelen en is daarop verder gegaan.

Daarnaast zou je je kunnen afvragen of de tegenstand die moslims en anderen ondervinden om islamofobie als erkend te krijgen als maatschappelijk fenomeen, ook niet te maken heeft met het verhaal van ‘islamitisch terrorisme’. Immers, ‘islamitisch terrorisme’ legitimeert en institutionaliseert de angst voor moslims en islam, maakt het vanzelfsprekend. Dat is ongetwijfeld niet het doel van de meeste politici en overheden, maar zou wel eens een ongewenst neveneffect kunnen zijn.

Medialogica: The Usual Suspects

Dat het vertoog van ‘islamitisch terrorisme’ een heel sterke is, is ook terug te zien in een recente uitzending van Medialogica. Inmiddels werkt dit vertoog niet alleen zo dat we terroristische acties van moslims aanduiden als ‘islamitisch’, maar ook dat specifieke terreurdaden als snel een ‘islamitische signatuur’ hebben zonder dat duidelijk is wie het gedaan heeft of zelfs als duidelijk is wie het gedaan heeft. Denk aan zelfmoordaanslagen. De kans is groot dat u dan eerst aan islamitische groeperingen denkt ook al waren in de moderne geschiedenis de Tamil Tijgers de trendsetters. Als we binnen de categorie ‘religieus terrorisme’ blijven dan zouden we stellen dat islamitische groeperingen ‘seculier-boeddhistische’ terreurtactieken toepassen. Waarbij de labels dus helemaal nietszeggend zijn geworden. Maar denk ook aan de aanslagen in Noorwegen door Anders Breivik, daarvan wisten we ook zeker dat er moslims achter zaten. Waarom? Vanwege de tactiek die werd toegepast, die zou een Al Qaeda signatuur kennen. Alsof specifieke strategische en tactische overwegingen alleen maar door religieuze overtuigingen zouden zijn ingegeven. De uitzending van Medialogica laat dit mooi zien en tal van wat ik hier besproken heb komt daar expliciet en impliciet aan bod. Daarnaast heeft Medialogica nog een extra argument tegen de term ‘islamitisch terrorisme’; die levert een kokervisie op waardoor we er dus flink naast kunnen zitten. Let ook op hoe ‘de blonde man’ ineens verschijnt én dat twijfels zaait over het idee dat het moslims zijn.

Kijk de uitzending van Argos TV – Medialogica: The Usual Suspects.

Mede gebaseerd op en ontleend aan: Jackson, R. (2007), Constructing Enemies: ‘Islamic Terrorism’ in Political and Academic Discourse. Government and Opposition, 42: 394–426. doi: 10.1111/j.1477-7053.2007.00229.x

Eerder in de serie Welkom in Eurabia:

1. Deel 1: Voor een islamisering van de samenleving
2. Deel 2: De Protocollen van de Wijzen van Mekka
3. Deel 3: Islamofobie

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Welkom in Eurabia IV – Het 'islamitisch terrorisme' verhaal

Posted on February 22nd, 2014 by martijn.
Categories: International Terrorism, Religious and Political Radicalization.

In 2004, een paar dagen na de moord op Theo van Gogh, stelde een beleidsmedewerker mij bij een borrel na afloop van een vergadering de vraag of ik dacht dat er na ‘Van Gogh’ nog meer terreuraanslagen zouden volgen. Mijn antwoord daarop was tweeledig: Ik ben antropoloog en doe onderzoek naar identiteit en geloofsbeleving onder moslims. Ik ben dus a) geen helderziende en b) geen terreurexpert. Daar moest deze, overigens heel aardige, beleidsmedewerker het mee doen want dat soort gesprekken is precies één van de redenen waarom ik een hekel heb aan borrels en ik vertrok.

Eén van de gevolgen van 9/11 is een grote verandering in het denken over veiligheid; terrorisme en in het bijzonder ‘islamitisch terrorisme’ stond snel bovenaan de prioriteitenlijst. Het gevolg was dat islam en moslims niet alleen een discussie onderwerp waren wanneer het ging over integratie en over de verhouding seculier – religieus, maar ook in discussies over veiligheid. Islam werd meer en meer een veiligheidsissue en veiligheid werd steeds meer een islamissue.

Islamitisch terrorisme

Het begrippenapparaat van die kwesties is mee veranderd. Terrorisme, ‘islamitisch terrorisme’, haat, vrijheid, democratie en rechtvaardigheid hebben gaandeweg andere betekenissen mee gekregen. De term ‘islamitisch terrorisme’ komt uit het veld van terrorisme studies en is in het bijzonder terug te herleiden op het onderzoeksveld van ‘religieus terrorisme’ waarvan de basis min of meer is gelegd in een artikel van David Rapoport: ‘Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions’ (American Political Science Review, 78: 3 (1984), pp. 658–77). In het geval van ‘islamitisch terrorisme’ is het veld daarboven tevens beïnvloed door tal van meer of minder oriëntalistische teksten over islam en het Midden-Oosten zoals het werk van Bernard Lewis en Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations. De politieke discussie over ‘islamitisch terrorisme’ is daarnaast sterk beïnvloed door moralistische verhalen over beschaving vs. barbarisme, de onschuld van het Westen, vijfde colonne, massavernietigingswapens, enzovoorts.

Het hele terrorismeverhaal staat dan ook bol van dramatische opposities zoals het Westen vs. islam, extreem of radicaal vs. gematigd, seculier vs. religieus, achterlijk vs. modern, barbaars vs. beschaafd en allerlei sociale etiketjes die daar weer uit voortkomen zoals het vrije Westen, gematigde moslims, enzovoorts. Net zoals bij het spreken over fundamentalistische christelijke groepen de notie van geweld impliciet verondersteld wordt, lijkt bij specifieke islamitische trends (islamisme, fundamentalisme, salafisme) ook de veronderstelling aanwezig dat geweld in de aard van het beestje zit en onvermijdelijk is. Ongeacht sociale en politieke factoren zou de aanwezigheid van die trends dus altijd leiden tot geweld simpelweg omdat het in de aard van het gedachtegoed zit.

Daarbij zit een zekere urgentie: na 9/11, na de aanslagen van Madrid, na Van Gogh, na Londen en nu met de Syrië-gangers: een nieuwe aanslag op de Westerse democratie, vrijheid en manier van leven ligt voortdurend om de hoek. Het is altijd vijf voor twaalf. Opvallend is dat de aanslagen in Casablanca, op Bali en in Amman daarbij nauwelijks lijken mee te tellen. Het verhaal over ‘islamitisch terrorisme’ is een verhaal van aanslagen in het Westen door moslims uit het Midden-Oosten en ‘home-grown’ moslims. En omdat ‘islamitisch terrorisme’ fanatiek, religieus gemotiveerd, moordlustig, irrationeel en gebaseerd is op haat tegen het vrije Westen is een rationele dialoog onmogelijk; er valt niet mee te praten en kan alleen met repressie bestreden worden. Verder zou ‘islamitisch terrorisme’ echt iets nieuws zijn in vergelijking met andere oudere vormen van terrorisme. Als je echter beter kijkt dan zie je vooral dat men voortborduurt op al lang beproefde tactieken en strategieën van anderen en gebruikt maakt van de moderne mogelijheden.

Kritiek

Er is nogal wat kritiek mogelijk op de term ‘islamitisch terrorisme’ en het verhaal erachter. Ten eerste is het onduidelijk wat nu precies onder terrorisme verstaan wordt, of beter gesteld het is nogal eenzijdig gedefinieerd: namelijk vanuit het perspectief van de Westerse staten. Het aanvallen door Al Qaeda van het militaire schip de USS Cole wordt gezien als een terreurdaad, maar de Amerikaanse drone aanvallen op burgers in Afghanistan, Pakistan en Jemen niet. Ten tweede is islam als religieuze en culturele traditie zo divers en omvat het label moslims meer dan 1 miljard mensen dat het bijvoeglijk naamwoord eigenlijk veel te generaliserend en stigmatiserend is. Ten derde, iedere religieuze traditie heeft een geschiedenis waar geweld onder bepaalde regels en omstandigheden gelegitimeerd wordt, maar er zijn zulke grote verschillen in opvatting tussen bijvoorbeeld ‘salafisten’, Hamas, Al Qaeda, en Hezbollah (the usual suspects) en ook binnen volgelingen van die bewegingen en trends, dat de term ‘islamitisch’ ook nog eens misleidend is en analytisch gezien volstrekt nutteloos.

Ten vierde, al zou het zo zijn (dat is niet zo) dat weliswaar niet alle moslims terroristen zijn, maar alle terroristen wel moslims (zoals de slogan van sommige opinieleiders luidt) dan nog is er geen reden om het islamitisch terrorisme te noemen. Het grootste deel van de terroristen is namelijk ook man; maar we gebruiken gelukkig ook niet de term mannelijk terrorisme en we gaan er (toch?) niet vanuit dat als iemand man is, de kans ook wel groot zal zijn dat hij een terrorist is. Ten vijfde, en dat geldt ook voor de bredere term ‘religieus terrorisme’ er is geen directe, causale link tussen religie en een specifiek type geweld. Ten zesde de term ‘religieus terrorisme’ of ‘islamitisch terrorisme’ legt de nadruk op religie en maakt ons blind voor politieke en nationalistische motieven van mensen en negeert het gegeven dat de meesten ‘terroristen’ pas religieus en/of ideologisch gemotiveerd en onderlegd raken nádat zij in contact komen met terreurnetwerken. De religieuze motieven krijgen daarbij vaak betekenis tegen de achtergrond van nationalistische motieven: verzet tegen een vreemde bezetter van het eigen grondgebied of tegen een brute dictator.

De gevolgen van het ‘islamitisch terrorisme’ verhaal

Het hele vertoog over ‘islamitisch terrorisme’ krijgt een specifieke betekenis binnen de huidige politiek-maatschappelijke context waarin islamofobische stemmen aan kracht, legitimiteit en vanzelfsprekendheid hebben gewonnen en waarop de identiteit van het Westen, Europa, Nederland mede bepaald en geconsolideerd wordt door de constructie van een geweldadige islamitische ander tegenover een liberale, beschaafd Europa/Nederland/Het Westen. Het zorgt ervoor dat ‘islamitisch radicalen’ worden gereduceerd tot een categorie die moet worden bestreden als veiligheidsprobleem en integratieprobleem; de politieke kritiek die inherent is aan de politieke ideologie van radicalen en in hun optredens kan volkomen buiten beschouwing blijven.

De vermeende nieuwigheid en urgentie van ‘islamitisch terrorisme’ stelt overheden ook in staat diverse binnen- en buitenlandse beleidsinitiatieven te realiseren die uiteindelijk alle burgers in binnen- en buitenland raken. Denk aan de druk op privacy, het afluisteren van mensen, het steunen van dictators in het Midden-Oosten, het sturen van troepen naar Mali om, ja wat te doen eigenlijk? Omdat het iets ‘nieuws’ was, was dat ook de legitimering om bovenop de al bestaande veiligheidsmaatregelen nieuwe maatregelen toe te voegen. Alle landen hebben er dan ook een schepje bovenop gedaan en de verschillen in maatregelen en de ingrijpendheid ervan, worden vooral bepaald door eerdere ervaringen. Landen zoals Frankrijk en Engeland die al ervaring hadden met terrorisme en al stringente maatregelen gedaan hebben daar op voortgeborduurd. Nederland had minder ervaring, minder maatregelen en is daarop verder gegaan.

Daarnaast zou je je kunnen afvragen of de tegenstand die moslims en anderen ondervinden om islamofobie als erkend te krijgen als maatschappelijk fenomeen, ook niet te maken heeft met het verhaal van ‘islamitisch terrorisme’. Immers, ‘islamitisch terrorisme’ legitimeert en institutionaliseert de angst voor moslims en islam, maakt het vanzelfsprekend. Dat is ongetwijfeld niet het doel van de meeste politici en overheden, maar zou wel eens een ongewenst neveneffect kunnen zijn.

Medialogica: The Usual Suspects

Dat het vertoog van ‘islamitisch terrorisme’ een heel sterke is, is ook terug te zien in een recente uitzending van Medialogica. Inmiddels werkt dit vertoog niet alleen zo dat we terroristische acties van moslims aanduiden als ‘islamitisch’, maar ook dat specifieke terreurdaden als snel een ‘islamitische signatuur’ hebben zonder dat duidelijk is wie het gedaan heeft of zelfs als duidelijk is wie het gedaan heeft. Denk aan zelfmoordaanslagen. De kans is groot dat u dan eerst aan islamitische groeperingen denkt ook al waren in de moderne geschiedenis de Tamil Tijgers de trendsetters. Als we binnen de categorie ‘religieus terrorisme’ blijven dan zouden we stellen dat islamitische groeperingen ‘seculier-boeddhistische’ terreurtactieken toepassen. Waarbij de labels dus helemaal nietszeggend zijn geworden. Maar denk ook aan de aanslagen in Noorwegen door Anders Breivik, daarvan wisten we ook zeker dat er moslims achter zaten. Waarom? Vanwege de tactiek die werd toegepast, die zou een Al Qaeda signatuur kennen. Alsof specifieke strategische en tactische overwegingen alleen maar door religieuze overtuigingen zouden zijn ingegeven. De uitzending van Medialogica laat dit mooi zien en tal van wat ik hier besproken heb komt daar expliciet en impliciet aan bod. Daarnaast heeft Medialogica nog een extra argument tegen de term ‘islamitisch terrorisme’; die levert een kokervisie op waardoor we er dus flink naast kunnen zitten. Let ook op hoe ‘de blonde man’ ineens verschijnt én dat twijfels zaait over het idee dat het moslims zijn.

Kijk de uitzending van Argos TV – Medialogica: The Usual Suspects.

Mede gebaseerd op en ontleend aan: Jackson, R. (2007), Constructing Enemies: ‘Islamic Terrorism’ in Political and Academic Discourse. Government and Opposition, 42: 394–426. doi: 10.1111/j.1477-7053.2007.00229.x

Eerder in de serie Welkom in Eurabia:

1. Deel 1: Voor een islamisering van de samenleving
2. Deel 2: De Protocollen van de Wijzen van Mekka
3. Deel 3: Islamofobie

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Symposium: Hemelbestormers – Radicaliteit, religie en samenleving

Posted on February 17th, 2014 by martijn.
Categories: (Upcoming) Events, ISIM/RU Research, Religious and Political Radicalization.

In een seculiere wereld zullen levensbeschouwing en religie onderworpen zijn aan het primaat van de politiek. Dat zou betekenen dat binnen de grenzen van de democratische rechtsorde aanhangers en organisaties van levensbeschouwing en religie kunnen opereren en hun plek vinden. Dat is de gangbare opvatting. In de huidige maatschappij zijn het echter juist de religies en levensbeschouwingen die de meest uitgesproken critici van het gangbare liberale, kapitalistische en democratische model zijn. Met hun visies op het functioneren van samenleving en politiek, met hun aanhangers en politieke actie vormen ze een serieus te nemen alternatief voor de bestaande structuren. Op dit symposium willen we radicale vormen van levensbeschouwelijke actie en hun invloed op de samenleving presenteren en analyseren.

Programma
10.00 uur: Registratie en ontvangst

Voorzitter: dr. Sipco Vellenga
10.30 uur: Opening door prof. dr. Marcel Sarot (Tilburg School of Catholic Theology)
10.35 uur: Inleiding door dr. Sipco Vellenga (Werkgezelschap Godsdienstsociologie en -antropologie)
10.45 uur: De strijd tegen de geest van de moderniteit. Conservatieve revolutie – dr. Marin Terpstra (Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen)
11.30 uur: Als dat radicaal is, dan ben ik radicaal. Salafi moslims – dr. Martijn de Koning (Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen/Universiteit van Amsterdam)

12.15 uur: Pauze, lunch op eigen gelegenheid

Voorzitter: dr. Erik Sengers
14.00 uur: Orthodoxie verboden? Conservatieve katholieken – dr. Marjet Derks (Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen)
14.45 uur: De stille refolutie. Bevindelijk Gereformeerden – prof. dr. Fred van Lieburg (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)
15.30 uur: Wat heeft religie met radicaliteit? – prof. dr. Staf Hellemans (Tilburg University)
15.45 uur: Einde/borrel

Praktische informatie:
Datum: 6 juni 2014
Tijd: 10.00-15.45 uur
Lokatie: Auditorium Museum Catharijneconvent Utrecht, Lange Nieuwstraat 38
Routebeschrijving: zie www.catharijneconvent.nl
Entree: € 15 zonder boek/ € 25 euro met boek Aanmelding via dr.sengers@hotmail.com (ook voor meer informatie) en door overmaking van de deelnemersbijdrage op NL92SNSB0871023970 t.n.v. D.H. Hak o.v.v. symposium 2014 (abonnees Religie & Samenleving krijgen boek thuisgestuurd > abonneren via www.religiesamenleving.nl).

Een symposium van Religie & Samenleving (www.religiesamenleving.nl) i.s.m. Tilburg School of Catholic Theology en Werkgezelschap godsdienstsociologie en –antropologie.

Marin Terpstra – De strijd tegen de geest van de moderniteit
Onderwerp van mijn bijdrage is het (neo)conservatieve denken met als spil Leo Strauss (1899-1973). Deze stroming is verbonden met wat in Duitsland ooit heette: de conservatieve revolutie. Radicaal is deze beweging omdat ze zich fundamenteel keert tegen een belangrijk aspect van de moderne geest: het liberalisme dat uitloopt op nihilisme. Strauss verdedigt die radicaliteit met het argument dat de moderniteit feitelijk wel gewonnen mag hebben, maar dat haar legitimiteit daarmee nog niet is vastgesteld. Zolang de geest van de moderniteit nog niet overtuigend is, loopt deze het risico ten onder te gaan.

Martijn de Koning – Als dat radicaal ism dan ben ik radicaal. ‘Salafi’ moslims en het anti-radicaliseringsbeleid in Nederland
Na de moord op Theo van Gogh in 2004 werden moslims onderwerp van discussie en beleid met betrekking tot veiligheid en het bewaken van sociale cohesie. Er werd een antiradicaliseringsbeleid opgezet dat zich vooral richtte op zogenaamde ‘salafi’ moslims. In deze bijdrage zet ik uiteen hoe de Nederlandse ‘salafi’-gemeenschappen zich ontwikkeld hebben en wat hen zo ‘radicaal’ maakt. Daarbij richt ik me op de doctrine en de praktijk van het afwijzen van wat God haat en het trouw zijn aan datgene wat God lief heeft. De vraag naar de aard van de radicaliteit van deze moslims kan niet beantwoord worden zonder in te gaan in op de vraag waarom de Nederlandse overheid, politici en opinieleiders deze netwerken als radicaal bestempelen en wat consequenties zijn. Ook het label ‘salafi’ zal daarbij kritisch tegen het licht worden gehouden. Mijn bijdrage is gebaseerd op veldwerk onder Nederlandse salafi netwerken en onder het netwerk van supporters van Haagse moslims die zijn afgereisd
naar Syrië.

Marjet Derks – Orthodoxie verboden? Conservatieve katholieken en de veranderingen in de Nederlandse kerkprovincie in de lange jaren zestig
In de marge van de vernieuwingen in de katholieke kerk ontstond een beweging die qua omvang moeilijk te duiden is, maar die zich regelmatig en krachtig publiekelijk uitte. Hoewel bestaande uit sociaal zeer diverse groeperingen, hadden de aanhangers ervan gemeen dat zij zichzelf als de echte katholieken zagen die vasthielden aan wat zij zagen als de officiële leer van de kerk en loyaal wilden zijn aan de paus. Velen hadden hun leven lang de katholieke zaak gediend, in organisaties, wetenschap of missie. Sommigen waren getekend door oorlog en verzet. Anderen voelden zich bedreigd door de tijdgeest. Allen zagen de vernieuwing in de kerk als verraad aan de kerk en voelden zich door de vernieuwingsgezinde media de mond gesnoerd. Orthodoxie was verboden in de jaren zestig, zo stelden ze. In de geschiedschrijving is deze beweging veronachtzaamd of gestereotypeerd. In deze lezing ga ik in op drie groepen conservatieven, hun achtergronden en beweegredenen, en op het culturele klimaat waarin zij zich verloren voelden.

Fred van Lieburg – De stille refolutie
Refo’s of bevindelijk gereformeerden – de bevolkingsgroep achter de SGP – lijken ietwat dubbelzinnig in hun trouw aan de overheid. Enerzijds zijn ze zeer orangistisch, voeren ze ‘gouvernementele’ oppositie, gedogen ze liberale kabinetten met PVV of PvdA, leveren ze goede bestuurders en ambtenaren en voegen zij zich met hun theocratische idealen moeiteloos in het democratisch bestel. Anderzijds zijn zij trots op hun Nacht van Kersten, voelen zij wel wat voor Wilders, verlangen zij uitzonderingsmaatregelen wegens gewetensbezwaren tegen allerlei wetten en gewoonten, lappen ze visquota aan hun laars, kunnen zij hevig in verzet komen en zijn hun dorpen op nieuwjaarsdag een ravage. Valt er historische orde te scheppen in dit verwarrende plaatje? Zijn er verschuivingen gaande? (zie ook www.dutchbiblebelt.org)

Staf Hellemans – Wat heeft religie met radicaliteit?
Religies hebben iets met radicaliteit. Daarvan zijn voorbeelden te geven: christelijke martelaren, religieuzen en missionarissen, godsdienstoorlogen, strenge meditatie- en ascesepraktijken, radicale dienstbaarheid. Hoe komt dat? En komt daaraan in het Westen een einde?

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Nieuwsuur: Yilmaz – The Story of a Dutch Soldier in Syria

Posted on February 6th, 2014 by martijn.
Categories: International Terrorism, Religious and Political Radicalization, Society & Politics in the Middle East.

Currently about 120 Dutch Muslims have joined the armed struggle in Syria as foreign fighters. One of them is a former soldier in the Dutch army, the Turkish-Dutch Yilmaz. Roozbeh Kaboly, foreign editor of the Dutch National TV program Nieuwsuur (NewsHour) found Yilmaz on his social media page (Instagram) 8 months ago. It took Yilmaz a long time to trust Kaboly and accept to give an interview. In the beginning he even denied that he was from the Netherlands. As it’s not safe for reporters in Syria and extremist fighters target them, Nieuwsuur asked an intermediary to do the interview.

Yilmaz was active on Instagram (and I think Dutch journalist Harald Doornbos was one of the first to notice him) but since that account is closed you can find him on Tumblr where he posts pictures of fighting, Syrian children, weapons and several modalities of propaganda. On Ask.fm one can ask him questions to which he responds.[EDIT: It is not correct that Doornbos was the first. Doornbos discovered one of Yilmaz’ last instagram accounts. Roozbeh Kaboly was already in contact with him at that time.]

Syria 2014. Jihad in style. Alhamdulillah.

Shared from chechclear using Embeddlr
The report is interesting for several reasons. First of all it is the first interview with a Dutch fighter who is actually present in Syria. There have been a few interviews with returnees and there was a full page interview in a national newspaper with a spokesperson of a few fighters, but this is the first one on national TV. Also Yilmaz appears not to belong to the networks of Muslims that are usually associated with fighting in Syria. Interestingly, Yilmaz wears his Dutch army uniform while training other foreign fighters. Also Yilmaz states that the fact that he fights in Syria not by definition means he belongs to the Al Qaeda affiliated networks (ISIS and Nusra) although in his posts he does have words of praise for ISIS rebels.

Yilmaz makes clear that he fights ‘fissabillaah’ for the sake of God as his ultimate motive. He does not plan to return to the Netherlands to die as a martyr; as a response to the often expressed fear that returnees will turn into local violent militants in Europe.

“No, no, I came to Syria for Syria only. I didn’t come to Syria to learn how to make bombs, or this or that and to go back. That’s not the mentality many of these fighters here have. We came here — basically, and I know it sounds harsh, but many of the brothers here, including myself, we came here to die…. So, us going back is not part of our perspective here. I mean it’s a big sacrifice and there’s a lot of work to do, so why should I even think about Holland or Europe? It’s a closed chapter for me.”

He even states that if the Dutch army had sent a unit to help the ‘Syrian people’ he would have been the first to enlist. Also interestingly while in many of the debates radicalization and the fighting in Syria is seen as a lack of integration and as some kind of pathology, Yilmaz stresses political goals: the suffering of the Syrian people under the hands of Assad (‘you can not sit at home…’) and the creation of an Islamic state. He also displays some sense of humor and ‘Dutchness’ when he refers to sushi, Dr. Pepper and ‘kapsalon’ (a Dutch fast food invented by a Turkish Dutch snackbar owner).

The interview also yielded a lot of criticism from different sides (among them the Dutch Coordinator for Counter-terrorism and security) who stated that Nieuwsuur made propaganda for Syrian fighters and/or Al Qaeda. I think therefore it was good the program also showed how they came into contact with Yilmaz and had Erwin Bakker providing the critical note at the end. Of course Yilmaz’ story is partly a media operation. As he states himself on social media: ‘Half of Jihad is media’. What I did miss however was the hardship of foreign fighters themselves. It is not an easy thing to do, to fight there. The sometimes difficult conditions under which they operate, their position as foreign fighters amidst Syrian fighters, the atrocities of war are all left out. Nevertheless I do think the interview provides us with some idea about foreign fighters (of course this is only one of them) that has been completely absent in the discussion (as outlined above).

You can watch the interview here:

See also NYT The Lede Blog

1 comment.

Rowan Williams & Faith in the Public Square

Posted on January 31st, 2014 by martijn.
Categories: Public Islam, Religion Other, Religious and Political Radicalization.

On Friday 13 December 2013, former Archbishop of Canterbury and now Master of Magdalene College, Cambridge, Rowan Williams, gave the Edward Schillebeeckx lecture at the Radboud University Nijmegen, organised by the Soeterbeeck Programme and the journal Tijdschrift voor Theologie. During this event also the Dutch translation of Faith in the Public Square (Geloof in de publieke ruimte) will be presented. It has been translated by Huub Stegeman and Stephan van Erp.

Prior to the lecture a seminar on religion and politics was held in which Herman Westerink, Chantal Bax and yours truly were invited to discuss the book with Rowan Williams and the audience of the seminar. The three of us presented a short review of the book and these reviews have now been published at the Telos blog:

Rebellious and Responsible: On Rowan Williams’s Faith in the Public Sphere – Herman Westerink« Telos Press

A rebellious archbishop—what more can the reader wish? An archbishop willing to take the risk of “blundering into unforeseen complexities” when trying to find the connecting points between various public questions with religious faith. No blundering as far as I can tell, but a risk, yes, there is always a risk when talking about Faith in the Public Sphere, or having faith, being faithful, in the public sphere. This is not only a risky undertaking for an archbishop, but probably for every modern believer since the days of Ignatius and Calvin, who realizes that there is a tension between good civil behavior and raising one’s voice of conscience. Hence, that there is a fundamental tension between faith and the public sphere in modernity—a tension that cannot be resolved, but should actually be regarded to be constitutive and constructive for both faith and the public sphere itself.

Religion beyond Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft: On Rowan Williams’s Faith in the Public Square – Chantal Bax « Telos Press

Faith in the Public Square is far from an orthodox book. It is unafraid to challenge received opinions, both religious and other kinds. This for instance shows itself in Williams’s consistent challenging of a dichotomy that has long shaped Western social and political thought, namely that of Gemeinschaft versus Gesellschaft, or of community versus society. What I am referring to is the idea that there is a sharp distinction between, on the one hand, traditional social bonds based on a robust shared identity resulting in organic solidarity—that would be Gemeinschaft—and on the other hand typically modern organizations of collective life in the form of negotiated interests and impersonal contracts—which would be Gesellschaft (and I’ll stick to the German terms because these bring out the contrast most clearly).

While Williams does not mention this distinction explicitly, his arguing against a secularism that bans religious voices from the public square—a main topic in almost all of the chapters of the book—can be explained as an undermining of the notion of Gesellschaft.

The Limits of Faith in the Public Square – Martijnde Koning« Telos Press

Rowan Williams’ book Faith in the Public Square, which is based upon several lectures, should not be read as a compendium of political theology, but instead as a “series of worked examples of trying to find the connecting points between various public questions and the fundamental beliefs about creation and salvation” (p. 2). I read the book as an attempt by Williams to provide the reader with themes, thoughts, and questions which are relevant to current debates about what kind of society we want to construct, how we should deal with pluralism, and how we might engage with any conflict between the religious and the secularist in contemporary society. And that is exactly what it does.

I want to address three issues that arose while I was reading, namely: the distinction between procedural and programmatic secularism, the limits of Williams’ approach and, related to both, the issue of gender segregation at UK universities.

0 comments.

Rowan Williams & Faith in the Public Square

Posted on January 31st, 2014 by martijn.
Categories: Public Islam, Religion Other, Religious and Political Radicalization.

On Friday 13 December 2013, former Archbishop of Canterbury and now Master of Magdalene College, Cambridge, Rowan Williams, gave the Edward Schillebeeckx lecture at the Radboud University Nijmegen, organised by the Soeterbeeck Programme and the journal Tijdschrift voor Theologie. During this event also the Dutch translation of Faith in the Public Square (Geloof in de publieke ruimte) will be presented. It has been translated by Huub Stegeman and Stephan van Erp.

Prior to the lecture a seminar on religion and politics was held in which Herman Westerink, Chantal Bax and yours truly were invited to discuss the book with Rowan Williams and the audience of the seminar. The three of us presented a short review of the book and these reviews have now been published at the Telos blog:

Rebellious and Responsible: On Rowan Williams’s Faith in the Public Sphere – Herman Westerink« Telos Press

A rebellious archbishop—what more can the reader wish? An archbishop willing to take the risk of “blundering into unforeseen complexities” when trying to find the connecting points between various public questions with religious faith. No blundering as far as I can tell, but a risk, yes, there is always a risk when talking about Faith in the Public Sphere, or having faith, being faithful, in the public sphere. This is not only a risky undertaking for an archbishop, but probably for every modern believer since the days of Ignatius and Calvin, who realizes that there is a tension between good civil behavior and raising one’s voice of conscience. Hence, that there is a fundamental tension between faith and the public sphere in modernity—a tension that cannot be resolved, but should actually be regarded to be constitutive and constructive for both faith and the public sphere itself.

Religion beyond Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft: On Rowan Williams’s Faith in the Public Square – Chantal Bax « Telos Press

Faith in the Public Square is far from an orthodox book. It is unafraid to challenge received opinions, both religious and other kinds. This for instance shows itself in Williams’s consistent challenging of a dichotomy that has long shaped Western social and political thought, namely that of Gemeinschaft versus Gesellschaft, or of community versus society. What I am referring to is the idea that there is a sharp distinction between, on the one hand, traditional social bonds based on a robust shared identity resulting in organic solidarity—that would be Gemeinschaft—and on the other hand typically modern organizations of collective life in the form of negotiated interests and impersonal contracts—which would be Gesellschaft (and I’ll stick to the German terms because these bring out the contrast most clearly).

While Williams does not mention this distinction explicitly, his arguing against a secularism that bans religious voices from the public square—a main topic in almost all of the chapters of the book—can be explained as an undermining of the notion of Gesellschaft.

The Limits of Faith in the Public Square – Martijnde Koning« Telos Press

Rowan Williams’ book Faith in the Public Square, which is based upon several lectures, should not be read as a compendium of political theology, but instead as a “series of worked examples of trying to find the connecting points between various public questions and the fundamental beliefs about creation and salvation” (p. 2). I read the book as an attempt by Williams to provide the reader with themes, thoughts, and questions which are relevant to current debates about what kind of society we want to construct, how we should deal with pluralism, and how we might engage with any conflict between the religious and the secularist in contemporary society. And that is exactly what it does.

I want to address three issues that arose while I was reading, namely: the distinction between procedural and programmatic secularism, the limits of Williams’ approach and, related to both, the issue of gender segregation at UK universities.

0 comments.

Muslims of France: Colonials, Immigrants and Citizens

Posted on January 6th, 2014 by martijn.
Categories: Islam in European History, islamophobia, Multiculti Issues, Public Islam, Religious and Political Radicalization, Young Muslims.

Al Jazeera has a very interesting series on Muslims in France by filmmaker Karim Miské. They ask:

Today, there are an estimated five million Muslims living in France. A century ago, they were referred to as “colonials”. During the 1960s, they were known as “immigrants”. Today, they are “citizens”. But how have the challenges facing each generation of immigrants changed?

The first part of the series tells the story of the 5,000 Muslims who by 1904 were working on the shop floors of Paris, in the soap factories of Marseilles and in the coalfields of the north; of the Muslim soldiers who fought and died for France during the First World War; and the Muslim members of the resistance who helped liberate Paris in 1944. Born as North Africans, many would die for France. But how much did post-war France care about their sacrifices?

The second part of the series explores post-Second World War immigration and reveals a generation of Muslims who, far from expecting to one day return home, began building their lives and communities in France.

The third and final part of the series tells the stories of the young Muslims who grew up in France and entered adulthood at a time of economic crisis, massive unemployment and rampant social problems.

The series is very useful I think for teaching purposes. I will consider using it next year.
All info on the episodes taken from the Al Jazeera site

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Closing the year 2013: Conflict, Racism and Inspiration

Posted on December 31st, 2013 by martijn.
Categories: Activism, anthropology, Headline, Notes from the Field, Religious and Political Radicalization, Society & Politics in the Middle East.

In this post a short overview of 2013 in three themes: Islamophobia & Racism, Egypt and Syria which dominated my blog this year and also the themes that attracted the most visitors. After that I will reveal my plans for the upcoming year including my new research project! And there is something with this blog in 2014…

Islamophobia and Racism in the Netherlands
A huge topic this year was the Dutch blackface tradition of Black Pete. Although there is a debate since 1960s (flaring up in the 1980s and 1990s) the last couple of years the debate is getting broader, getting more attention on primetime tv and according to some a slightly shifting consensus among opinionleaders in favour of those opposing the tradition. People who support the tradition were also more vocal this year however resulting in, among others, a facebook petition called Pietitie (Piet+petition). I wrote about this in my most popular post this year: Pietitie, Blackface Pete and Nativism: Commodifying Popular Dissent Through Facebook. The petition was organized by a social media campaign agency (without disclosing so) and they used to show how powerful a social media campaign can be.

Debating the negative and islamophobic debate about Islam in Europe is also major topic among Muslims in Europe. Not surprisingly so of course and I blogged about one such attempt: a debate organized by the Oxford Student Union where, among others, in particular Mehdi Hassan left quite an impression: Debating Islam as a Peaceful Religion. That these attempts to counter islamophobia are important was shown in the UK this year where after the Woolwich murder an islamophobic backlash cost the life of one Muslim and where several attacks at mosques occurred and were prevented. At a different level the necessity of combating islamophobia and racism was shown in the Netherlands where Dutch parliament scheduled the ‘Moroccans-debate’ on its agenda. I’m not going to refer to the last time the Dutch parliament had an official debate about a specific minority. but you can read about the Moroccans-debate here: The Dutch ‘Moroccans’ Debate.

Also very popular this year were the posts in Dutch on white privilege: Niet mijn schuld, wel mijn zorg: structureel racisme en wit privilege in Nederland.(Not my fault, still my concern: structural racism and white privilege in the Netherlands) where I used my own position as a white male to explain the benefits of being white in this country. More controversial was my Dutch post: Muselmann – Joden als Moslims in de Concentratiekampen – (Musulmann – Jews as Muslims in the concentration camps). In this post I explored the meaning of the German term Muselmann, meaning Muslim, that was used in the nazi concentration camps for those prisoners who were almost dead. If I have time I will translate the post in English in 2014. Fortunately not all was negative this year. The aforementioned Dutch posts were number two and three in the popularity contest; the number one among the Dutch posts was one about a Dutch contestant of X Factor: a Muslim woman with a headscarf with the name Sevval Kayhan: Hallo dan! – X Factor, Sevval en Inspiratie.

Syria and Egypt
Syria and Egypt were the two other major themes at my blog. The second and fourth most popular posts dealt with Egypt and Syria. Number two was a post in which I explored the rise of and contestations over a new symbol that has emerged in the Middle East, online and offline, to remember the crackdown of the Rabaa al-Adawiya protest camp whereby many pro-Mursi citizens were killed. The ‘four-fingered’ salute is a black hand on a bright yellow background and posted on several social networking sites by people who want to express their solidarity with, remembrance of and anger about the death of the Rabaa protesters: R4bia – The Symbolic Construction of Protest. The symbol has recently been forbidden in Egypt so be careful if you use it on the internet.

Syria obviously is a major theme and I started a post called: European foreign fighters in Syria. I updated this post regularly until the summer and then decided to leave it up to the experts such as Aaron Zelin who are much better at this than me. I did updated it recently with a link to a new report of ICSR estimating the number of foreign fighters. Also the Dutch constituency of the fighters in Syria got quite some attention at my blog since my last research endeavours involves them. In particular my Dutch post Anatomie van een relletje op een Haagse trapveldje – (Anatomy of a small riot on a playing field in The Hague) describing a run in with the police during a football get-together where I was present as well, received a lot of attention.

The classics
Of course in the 14 years this site exists (of which 7 years as a blog) there are a number of classics here as well: posts that score high every year. The absolute all time favorite is my debunking of Islamizing Europe – Muslim Demographics. This post is not the most popular of all time (that is my pornofication post and as a second the one on sex, Arab women and orientalism) and I expect its position as the all time classic will be severely threatened by the R4bia post of this year. The 2012 interview of Veena Malik by Nazima Shaikh also scored high this year (she was in the news, wasn’t she?): Veena Malik: My Pakistan is infamous for many reasons other than me.

Another classic is the interview with John Bowen on France24, I know for a fact that some colleagues use it in the courses they give (I do too): Anthropologist John Bowen – Islam of France. The classic posts in Dutch are Stierf Michael Jackson als moslim? (Did Michael Jackson die as Muslim?). The answer is most likely ‘no’ by the way. And for some reason: Rwina – Stijl in debat. I can’t translate rwina into English but is a Moroccan term referring to absolute chaos and noise people make, in this case during a debate on tv in 2009.

2014
The new year will be an important year.

1. My new project (working together with Annelies Moors and Sarah Bracke) ‘Forces that bind or divide?’ on interventions of Muslims in Dutch society and the islamdebate has already started. Together with our new PhD (more on her soon!) we will start with our research and also with several events that are interesting for a broader public for example an event about 25 years after Rushdie. The Rushdie Affair is only of the conflicts related to the public presence and representation of Islam that have had an enormous impact on European societies over the past decades. These conflicts have triggered debates about the binding or dividing function of religion in secular societies. Whereas most research considers Muslims as the object of integration policies, this project focuses on Muslims as active participants and investigates how their interventions produce ties that bind or divide both between Muslims and non-Muslims and amongst Muslims. Have such interventions contributed to development of a Muslim public sphere? To what extent and along which lines is this public sphere fractured? How does such a Muslim public intersect with other religious and non-religious publics? What transformations have taken place in the binding or dividing force of Islam in the Netherlands?
2. Related to my new research (and that of the PhD in the same project) a new blog will be launched very soon. This will be focused on activism in the Netherlands, monitoring events and debates. Part of it will be in Dutch but the most important issues will be available in English as well.
3. A new book, in Dutch, on Salafism will be published. This book is written by Carmen Becker, Joas Wagemakers and yours truly and is the final product of years of research.
4. In 2014 a report will be published based upon joint research with two other colleagues. And that is all I can say right now. Keep you posted.
5. Most likely in 2014 (God willing) something else will be published as well.
6. An event will be organized dedicated to 25 years after Rushie and 10 years after Van Gogh.
7. For my blog I plan to do a series of reports about doing online research: the usefulness of it as well as its predicaments. This most likely will also involve a Frequently Asked Questions post based upon questions of my interlocutors on Facebook.
8. The Guest Posts section was qualitatively very good this year, in terms of number of authors and visitors however it was less succesful. I will try to change this in 2014.
9. My new research means that more posts will be focused on: efforts by Muslims to put Islamophobia on the anti-racism agenda, debates among Muslims about (proper) activism and the role of women therein. Perhaps I will also include some post with historical topics.
10. In 2014 my website exists 15 years. On 1 March to be exact. I think this calls for a little celebration, don’t you?

Next week I will publish an overview of my academic and professional publications of 2013. For now, I wish all of you and your loved ones the best for 2014. In particular thanks to all my readers and commentators here. But most in particular thanks to all the people I work with in my research online and offline!

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Muslim fundamentalism – Some considerations about research

Posted on December 22nd, 2013 by martijn.
Categories: Islam in the Netherlands, islamophobia, Multiculti Issues, Religion Other, Religious and Political Radicalization.

Introduction

Last week professor Ruud Koopmans and dr. Evelyn Ersanili published a working paper on their six country survey investigating the effect of three different types of contextual factors on immigrant integration: regions of origin (including religion), localities in which they have settled within the country of immigration and related to the national context. In so doing they compare the different of levels of structural and socio-cultural integration of Turkish European migrants in Germany, France, the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium and Sweden and Moroccan-European immigrants in Germany, the Netherlands, France and Austria with a comparison group of natives in all these countries. You can find a short exposé written by Ruud Koopmans HERE and the full working paper HERE.

I will present a short summary (but please read their synopsis and report yourself as their conclusions are much more nuanced that I can report here!) and then present some considerations.

The findings
Koopmans and his collaborators interviewed nearly 9,000 people in six West European countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden), including 3,373 ‘natives’ and 5,548 ‘immigrants,’ respectively of Moroccan (2,204) and Turkish (3,344) origin.

In short the researcher find much higher numbers for fundamentalism among Muslims than among Christian natives and in both cases fundamentalism is strongly correlated with out-group hostility. Furthermore, they find that young Muslims are as fundamentalist as older Muslims.

My considerations

I will divide my considerations in three categories: the assumptions of the research, methodology, conclusions.

The assumptions
The research appears to have some assumptions that guide the methodology and findings.

1. The research seems to regard Muslims as migrants and natives as Christians. However, many Muslims in these European countries are not migrants as they are born and raised here. Also many natives who are not Muslim are not Christian either. They do find a very high number of Christians among their native respondents (70%) which is much higher than any research in those countries gives.
2. Muslims in Western Europe is restricted to Moroccan and Turkish Europeans. I do not understand why that is the case and why for example Somali Europeans, Algerian Europeans, Iraqi Europeans and Iranian Europeans are left out as well as native Europeans who are Muslim. Perhaps the numbers are not high enough to make the research reliable (as is the case in the Netherlands with native Muslims who are often excluded from the surveys for that reason) but nevertheless Europe’s Muslim community is much broader based than only European Turks and Moroccans.
3. Is asking a Muslim the question ‘are you a Muslim’ really the same question in these countries as asking a Christian ‘are you a Christian?’. I mean that, contrary to Christians, Muslims are in the center of debate in these countries for years now. Many Muslims (regardless of how they are practising their faith, if at all) feel scrutinized because of the amount of attention in the media but also in work places, leisure and schools. Everytime a research is published, regardless of the outcomes, many Muslims ask the question, ‘now what’ or ‘what do they want from us this time’?. Reactions I seldom hear from Christians when there is a research published concerning them. This could have consequences for how people see themselves as citizens, religious people, targets of research and so on.
4. Related to the former, the researchers ask people if they feel ‘Muslims aim to destroy Western culture’ or if ‘Western countries are out to destroy Islam’. Given the War on Terror, the invasion of Iraq (and the related political games and lies), the US drone attacks in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Yemen one might ask if these two questions really measure the same kind of outgroup hostility.

Methodology

1. I have a question with regard to the fundamentalism scale they use. They state:
   

   Following the widely accepted definition of fundamentalism of Bob Altermeyer and Bruce Hunsberger, the fundamentalism belief system is defined by three key elements:
   –
   a) that believers should return to the eternal and unchangeable rules laid down in the past;
   –
   b) that these rules allow only one interpretation and are binding for all believers;
   –
   c) that religious rules have priority over secular laws.

   a) Christians [Muslims] should return to the roots of Christianity [Islam].”
   b)“There is only one interpretation of the Bible [the Koran] and every Christian [Muslim] must stick to that.”
   c)“The rules of the Bible [the Koran] are more import ant to me than the laws of [survey country].”

   I cannot find a three item scale by Altemeyer and Hunsberger however. What I do find is a 20 item scale and a revised scale with 12 items. Would it be safe to assume that a 12 point scale by definition leads to lower numbers of fundamentalists among Muslims and Christians? Below is a picture of Altemeyer and Hunsberger’s 12 item scale:

2. Koopmans probably does not refer to Altemeyer and Hunsberger’s 2004 article but to a 1992 article where they define fundamentalism as:
   

   “The belief that there is one set of religious teachings that clearly contains the fundamental, basic, intrinsic, essential, inerrant truth about humanity and deity; that this essential truth is fundamentally opposed by the forces of evil which must be vigorously fought; that this truth must be followed today according to the fundamental, unchangeable practices of the past; and that those who believe and follow these fundamental teachings have a special relationship with the deity.” (Altermeyer and Hunsberger 1992: 118).

   With regard to the three key elements of Koopmans (note that Altemeyer and Hunsberger note four elements in their definition), I’m not very surprised about the high numbers. Many of the Muslims I work with, regardless of how religious they are and in what way, would concur with these statements as they would see them as ideals: the Qur’an is God’s word and therefore eternal and universal, there is only one Islam and God’s will comes before man made laws and the first three generations of Islam are the exemplary Muslims. In my own PhD research Zoeken naar een ‘zuivere’ islam (Searching for a ‘pure’ Islam) the quest of young people to find the authentic, universal Islam is central. Without having a clear idea how all of these statements would work out in daily life, their ‘true’ Islam is the one that is different from the one of their parents (which they perceive as a culturalized diluted Islam). Does this make all of them fundamentalists? No, as I have shown in that research some were at that time but others weren’t when you look at how they lived their lives and how they related to others.

3. An important element I’m missing in Koopmans’ scale is the idea of a struggle. In my work on Salafism (which could be analyzed as a mode of fundamentalism) is an important if not the most important characteristic of their religiosity. A struggle against daily temptations, injustice, one’s own distractions and emotions and so on. A struggle that is almost always seen as part of an eternal battle between good and evil. I think one can find this among under fundamentalists of other religions as well and it was in my PhD research the main difference between those could be regarded as fundamentalist and others.It is also part of Altemeyer and Hunsberger’s definition but not part of Koopmans’. I wonder why that is?
4. Let’s return to the 12 item scale. Although it is considered one of the most reliable scales and is indeed often used and tested there is some criticism as well. Moaddel for example states that, since the scale is mainly based upon research among Christians, its generalization to the Islamic world is limited (although I must note that Altemeyer’s and Hunsberger’s scale is much broader and less specific than most other scales I know of). Based upon Altemeyer’s work he uses a more general approach that I think is more fitting in this regard: ”
   

   the belief in one’s religion as a comprehensive system of ultimate truth and unfailing principles that must be followed for eternal salvation, in a strict division of humanity between the righteous who will be rewarded by God and the evil doers, in the necessity of belonging to one fundamentally true religion in order to lead the best and most meaningful life, in the superiority of one’s religious teachings over the findings of science and over the religion of others, and in the final redemption of only the followers of one’s religion

   This approach opens up the possibility of different fundamentalisms related to different religions. See the next point.

5. In Koopmans’ work the scripture plays in important role in assessing if a person is a fundamentalist or not. The problem here is that many, but surely not all, Muslims believe that the Qur’an is God’s word and therefore the truth and infallible. This makes questions about that aspect not specific enough to differentiate between fundamentalist beliefs and other beliefs. Furthermore if they do believe in this principle they may still vary in how strongly they adhere to the belief in the inerrancy of the Qur’an, the completeness of Islam and its superiority over all other religions. Furthermore if believing that the scripture is absolute and true makes one a fundamentalist, then how are we going to research fundamentalism among, let’s say, Buddhists and Hindus? I’m not saying that it does not matter, but I’m saying that the particularities of one’s religion and one’s religious practices matter in determining the items of the scale. Koopmans’ use of the term applies mainly to scriptural faiths with their preoccupation with doctrine and creed often shapes the debates and interpretations. In Islam this often pertains to interpretation of the Qur’an and hadith, in the Protestant Christianity on how to read the scripture whereas in Catholic Christianity the role of the Church is much more important. These differences I think do matter if one wants to measure fundamentalism.
6. Of course these considerations do not challenge the strong correlation that is found with outgroup hostility. It only questions if it is fundamentalism among Muslims that so strongly correlates with outgroup hostility.
7. With regard to both fundamentalism and outgroup hostility there I wonder if the issue of acquiescence bias plays a role here since all questions lean to approving fundamentalism and out-group hositility. For that, and its related qualification, I refer to Eric Tillman‘s comments.
8. The findings with regard to Islamophabia are lower than in many other studies. This could be related to the stronger wording that is used for Islamophobia (stronger than in the case of anti-semitism). See Cas Mudde‘s comments for that (you can find them in Dutch at Stuk Rood Vlees).
9. All of the statements in the survey had three categories: „I agree“, „I disagree“, and „I neither agree nor disagree.“ But doesn’t this paint a rather black and white image of the attitudes of people? If one regards God’s will as more important that human laws, what does that actually mean? That one completely rejects human laws or that one thinks God’s will is better but that one also fully agrees with human laws?

Fundamentalism and hostility

Koopmans’ conclusion are much more nuanced than many of the statements in the media albeit that there are large differences in media reporting as well (see Cas Mudde’s article for examples). He emphasizes that religious fundamentalism is not the same as support for, or the cause of or engagement in violence and that in the end Muslims constitute only a small minority of Western Europe: “the large majority of homophobes and anti-semites are still natives.” Nevertheless, I do have some questions about the conclusion as well:

1. He warns that: “religious fundamentalism is very likely to provide a nourishing environment for radicalization.” Yes maybe, maybe not. The problem is that he does not substantiate this claim from his own research nor with that of others.
2. Koopmans rejects the idea that fundamentalism is “a reaction to exclusion by the host society’ since they found the lowest levels in Germany “where Muslims enjoy fewer religious rights than in any of the other five countries’. Conceptualizing exclusion by focusing on religious rights is important as it does give some indication of institutionalized exclusion. It is only one however but he does not seem to use any other indicator. Exclusion can, and should, be measured also by looking at the debates in media and politics and as important the perception of these debates among Muslims. These debates do not only pertain to Muslims as Muslims but, in the Netherlands anyway, also to Moroccan-Dutch people for example during the so-called Moroccans-debate earlier this year in media and parliament. Furthermore it may be the case that religious rights of Muslims in the five countries are safe-guarded but they can, and are, limited by national and local authorities. But perhaps more importantly, and I’m speculating here, is the fact that there is a debate about these rights. For example, yes Muslims are allowed to construct their own mosques but when a new one is built it often leads to heated debates. Something we do not see so much in the case of Christians (with in the Netherlands the notable exception of orthodox Christians and their right not to vaccinate their children against polio). The content of these debates may not be so important as the fact that everytime there are debates which may lead people to the conclusion that their basic religious rights are threatened.
3. Furthermore what researchers and others who state that fundamentalism has nothing to do with exclusion often forget, is that fundamentalist preachers often portray the world as if it is engaged in an eternal struggle of good against evil in which the bearers of the ‘true’ religion are the victims. Every realistic or less realistic token of exclusion is blown up to huge proportions as being part of and the result of the forces of evil who are against them. Real or imagined exclusion (whatever the difference is) is therefore always part of fundamentalism.
4. See Jan Jaap de Ruiter‘s comparison with the findings of other surveys. (Also in Dutch).

So what does that all boils down to? I’m not sure. That fundamentalism correlates strongly with outgroup hostility is not surprising and let’s face it most European countries have a policy that aims to counter fundamentalism so if fundamentalists think others are out to get them, they do have a point. Moreover since European secularism makes a distinction between ‘good’ religion and ‘bad’ religion (and fundamentalism of course being the latter) they are at least often the topic of political debates and policies. The high levels of outgroup hostility (related to fundamentalism or something else) among Muslims are troublesome of course. As they appear to be in line with other research among European Muslims and other Europeans it shows that these six countries still have a long way to go to combat racism, anti-semitism, homophobia and islamophobia and that it is a complicated fight. But is it really fundamentalism what the researchers have found, or something else?

Of course part of my comments come about because I’m an anthropologist. Koopmans appears to regard fundamentalism as a matter of theology, an attachment to absolute beliefs resulting in particular attitudes, my thinking starts where he ends: not only about general patterns of what people are believing, but also how they believe, what and how they are practising their faith and how it is related to different sources, social relations and socio-political contexts that reveal something about the nature of people’s religiosity.

1 comment.

Jihadstrijders zijn ook mensen

Posted on December 1st, 2013 by martijn.
Categories: Guest authors, Headline, Public Islam, Religious and Political Radicalization, Society & Politics in the Middle East.

Gastauteur: Joas Wagemakers

De recente oproep op Facebook van een Arnhemse moeder om informatie over haar zoon, van wie ze inmiddels weet dat hij naar Syrië is vertrokken om daar wellicht te gaan strijden tegen het regime van President Bashar al-Asad, was schrijnend. De zorg van een moeder om haar zoon snapt iedereen, maar haar verhaal staat in schril contrast met het beeld dat we doorgaans via de media krijgen over jihadstrijders: ideologisch geïnspireerde fanatiekelingen, terroristen, jonge (wellicht misleide) mannen op zoek naar “martelaarschap” en verlangend naar de inmiddels welbekende 72 maagden in het paradijs. Toch lijkt deze moeder uit Arnhem met het alleszins menselijke beeld dat zij schetst van haar zoon dichter bij de realiteit van jihadstrijders te staan dan de beelden die we meestal over hen te zien krijgen.

Op tawhed.ws, een Arabischtalige website die de grootste online bibliotheek van radicaal-islamitische literatuur herbergt, bestaat een forum waar moslims van over de hele wereld om fatwa’s (islamitisch-juridische adviezen) kunnen vragen aan radicale geleerden. Omdat men onder een pseudoniem vragen kan stellen is de anonimiteit gewaarborgd en daarom geeft dit forum een goed beeld van wat er echt leeft onder in ieder geval een deel van de potentiële jihadstrijders. De vragen die gesteld worden op dit forum schetsen, interessant genoeg, een heel menselijk beeld van de jongemannen die maar al te snel als “terroristen” worden neergezet.

Familie

Een van de kwesties die telkens weer naar voren komen in de vragen die moslims met de bereidheid tot jihad stellen is toestemming van de ouders. Veel potentiële Syriëgangers weten dat zij voor bepaalde soorten jihad goedkeuring van hun ouders nodig hebben, maar stellen dat die hen dat absoluut niet geven. Sommigen ervaren dit duidelijk als een probleem en vragen dan ook of ze mogen liegen tegen hun ouders; anderen lijken eerder te hopen op een antwoord dat hen vrijstelt van de jihadplicht en willen weten of ze misschien ook met geld de strijd kunnen steunen. Een persoon gaat zelfs zo ver om te vragen wat de mogelijke excuses zijn om je aan de strijd te onttrekken, kennelijk in de hoop dat er tenminste eentje ook op hem van toepassing is.

Een ander belangrijk onderwerp dat vaak terugkomt in vragen van mogelijke Syriëgangers is de zorg voor hun familie. Velen stellen een arme familie, een zieke vader, een alleenstaande moeder of een vrouw en kinderen te hebben die ze geen van allen zomaar achter kunnen laten. Een persoon vreest dat als hij naar Syrië vertrekt zijn moeder van verdriet zal sterven en een ander zegt dat elke keer als hij over jihad begint zijn vrouw gaat huilen. Weer anderen willen graag trouwen, een baan behouden of hun studie afmaken en zien een reis naar Syrië als een mogelijk obstakel hiervoor. Kennelijk niet bereid om hun thuissituatie en carrière zomaar in de steek te laten, willen ze weten hoe ze in deze situatie moeten handelen.

Iets Doen

Dit alles duidt er niet op dat potentiële Syriëgangers er eigenlijk de kantjes vanaf willen lopen; dat zou geen recht doen aan hun wil om verzet te bieden tegen de oorlog die al-Asad tegen zijn eigen volk voert. Ook wordt hiermee niet ontkend dat er in Syrië door jihadstrijders wel degelijk gruwelijke misdaden worden gepleegd tegen alawieten, christenen en anderen. Het laat echter wel zien dat veel jihadstrijders in wording zich als moslims verplicht voelen “iets” te gaan doen aan de situatie in Syrië, maar tegelijkertijd ook gewoon mensen zijn met hun alledaagse beslommeringen. Hun vragen over jihad tonen dat ze lang niet altijd ideologisch geïnspireerde moordenaars zijn die reikhalzend uitkijken naar het “martelaarschap”, maar ook hun zorgen, twijfels en angsten hebben. Voordat we oordelen over deze “terroristen” is het daarom goed om een vraag in het achterhoofd te houden die op voornoemd forum gesteld werd door een van hen: “Als je gedood wordt tijdens de strijd, ben je dan ook een martelaar als je bang bent om te sterven?”

Joas Wagemakers is onderzoeker en docent aan de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen, afdeling Islamstudies. Hij deed onderzoek naar de ideologie en invloed van Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi; één van de meest invloedrijke jihadi-salafi denkers. In 2010 promoveerde hij cum laude op dit onderzoek en ontving hij eveneens de Erasmus Studieprijs. In 2012 verscheen zijn boek The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi bij Cambridge University Press. Hij publiceert veel over islamisme in het moderne Midden-Oosten en blogt ook voor Jihadica.com. Dit stuk verscheen eerder in Trouw en is met toestemming van de auteur geplaatst.

9 comments.

Dutch Foreign Fighters – Some Testimonials from the Syrian Front (part II: Abu Walae)

Posted on November 13th, 2013 by martijn.
Categories: Activism, Guest authors, Headline, Religious and Political Radicalization, Society & Politics in the Middle East.

Guest Author: Pieter van Ostaeyen

The Story of 28 year old Chokri Massali – Abu Walae
Died on Sunday July 28

In an earlier post I presented you the story of Abu Baseer, who died in the Battle of Khan Touman. Here is the story of one of his older brothers, who died only a few months later.

Abu Walae and two other brothers from the Netherlands were waiting for Iftaar in their base camp, when via the radio they heard that a group of Mujahideen was surrounded by al-Assad’s troops in a village nearby. The brothers quickly prepared for battle and left camp. When they arrived on the scene they were immediately fired upon by snipers. Nonetheless the war party breached the enemy ranks; after heavy fighting Abu Walae and ten other brothers were ordered to control the left flank of the occupied village.

It was a pitch dark night; they only had limited sight on the frontline. After a little while they stumbled upon Bashar’s troops and opened fire. Abu Walae turned his weapon on automatic and stormed forward; he almost immediately took a bullet through the head. This action, led by Abu Walae, resulted in the death of all 22 enemy soldiers. On our side only Abu Walae got killed, another brother got shot in his leg. Abu Walae never feard the Kufar, he was a brave man …

A man asked: “Who is the superior Martyr?” The Prophet answered: “Those who stand in the line of battle and do not turn their heads until they die. They will dwell in highest region of Paradise, their Lord will smile at them. And when Allah smiles at one, there will be no reckoning on Judgement Day.” [at-Targheeb wa’t-Tarheeb]

Earlier this week, in the wonderful battle of Khan Asal in which the life of our Belgian brother Abu Mujahid was taken, several brothers witnessed Abu Walae killing six or seven soldiers all by himself. In the end we took over the town, killing about 250 Kufar.

When the Mujahideen captured soldiers of Bashar’s army on the battle field of Khan Asal, Abu Walae offered one of the captives some of his soft drink; laughing “They don’t even realize they’ll get a one way ticket to hell.” He told another soldier “hey, I know you ! Aren’t you one of the Mujahideen from our group ?” The soldier thought he found a way to escape death and replied “yes, that’s right ! I was in your group but they captured me at the checkpoint and made me fight you guys.” Abu Walae turned to one of the brothers: “Put your weapon on automatic and shoot this guy …”

Abu Walae prayed to God frequently, asking Him to kill lots of enemies before dying as a martyr himself. He dreamt of being united in Paradise with his younger brother Abu Baseer. And Insha’allah his prayers have been answered in this Holy month of Ramadan. May these two martyred brothers be offered the favors of the Shuhadaa. What an honor for this family to have two of their sons martyred.

For a Mujahid it is very important to be tolerant towards others, for in this Jihad you will be meeting people from different nations, with different habits and cultures. Furthermore you are in a completely different country, far away from life as you knew it. You have to adapt to the situation and the variety of people you will deal with. If you do not have an open heart and are impatient then you will probably not persevere this Jihad. It is during Jihad that you will truly get to know your comrades; it is here your true friends will be revealed.

One may believe the only thing you will deal with in Jihad are bullets and shelling. A Mujahid however must also stand hunger, pain, insomnia. He must be patient with the people he meets and has to adapt to a whole new situation. Sometimes you will have to stay put for weeks, enduring hunger, cold, rain … This asks for endurance and patience.

I knew Abu Walae for years, he was my best friend. I knew him for years at home and I got to know him better, thousands of kilometers away from home, fighting on the Syrian battle field. It was an honor to get to know him better whilst fighting together. He was a great man, he became even more exalted in Jihad. The same goes for all the other brothers I knew back home and here, both in good as in harder times. Me and Abu Walae were friends, for five years we shared everything. We left for Syria together, we followed each other from basecamp to basecamp, we fought side by side on the battle field. We shared everything, every day with him was a pleasure. We spent many hours at nights sitting together drinking tea or coffee, talking with other brothers. Daily we talked about Martyrdom and how it would be like to die like a Shaheed. He always stated firmly “if that bullet comes, so be it.”

Abu Walae was a well-informed brother, his Arabic was excellent and both at home as in Syria he was very involved with Dawah. He offered help to other brothers translating Arabic for them. If the brothers had any questions, he patiently took his time to explain everything in length. He did this in a humble way, never humiliating them with his knowledge. Other wise people could learn from Abu Walae. He was straightforward in his words yet easily forgiving.

Jihad without patience is impossible and our brother Abu Walae was a very patient man. Here you have to cope by yourself; there is no loving mother here cooking and washing for you. Here you learn to be independent. Jihad is a school of life; it’s not only fighting, you learn to be obedient and disciplined. If you fail to be patient, if you do not have these virtues, you will fail in Jihad. In a way your Jihad starts before you leave for the battle field. You will have to fight your own will, your doubts and fears. You will be in two minds, thinking about your family, you will worry. You have to be strong to overcome these feelings and to take the next step.

Abu Walae enjoyed Jihad even despite the hardship and sacrifices. Those who didn’t wage Jihad will hardly understand but for Muslims here’s a comparison. The Holy Month of Ramadan means fasting during the day and praying at night time. Both the fasting and praying are hard to endure, yet we see Ramadan as a time of joy, time flies by because of this. The same stands for Jihad; as in Ramadan, we are surrounded with brothers and close friends, you feel close to Allah.

It is quite evident why Abu Walae enjoyed Jihad. Jihad bestows the Ummah with life and nobleness, it is a source of victories for the Muslims. As we witnessed, leaving Jihad means indignation and dismay. Although at times you will have no food, no shelter, sleeping under trees or on a concrete floor, the Mujahid feels joy and satisfaction. Compare this with living in the West, where, despite having all they need, people live in sorrow and depression.

About a month ago, a brother had a dream about Abu Walae. He saw him drinking and asked what it was. Abu Walae said he was drinking the wine of Paradise. This brother saw this dream as a prediction of his Martyrdom. He later talked Abu Walae about this dream and Abu Walae answered that there was no worth in this life, that he wanted to be with Allah. Indeed a few weeks later Abu Walae was martyred.

Abu Walae’s mother had a similar dream. She saw her son entering the living room wearing his qamis, his gun over his left shoulder. He approached his mother and embraced her firmly. “My son, did you return?” “No,” he said, “I came to see you and will go back.” This dream was like a confirmation for his family that Abu Walae would die as a Martyr.

My family told me about the faith and perseverance the family of Abu Walae shows. This mother sacrificed two of her sons and when Allah will ask her what she did in her life she can tell Him she raised two sons whom she sacrificed for Allah’s cause. How many are there who can claim that these days ? Is there a greater sacrifice any mother can make ? May Allah protect her and unite her with her two martyred sons in Paradise.

If parents in the Netherlands love their children, they shouldn’t stand between them and Paradise. Indeed, they should give their children the example by first sending in the fathers to fight Jihad. Abu Walae cared deeply for his mother, he understood why for Islam it is so important to take good care of your mother. If he heard about one of the brothers not calling home for a long time, he would reprimand them. He would talk to the brother and convince him to call home. He was one of the brothers who took good care for the younger brothers from The Netherlands.

We ask Allah to accept our brother as a Martyr and to reunite us all in Paradise. Oh Allah, favor us with martyrdom and take our blood, our possessions, our effort and our sacrifices until it favors you.

Your Brothers from Bilad as-Sham

Pieter van Ostaeyen is a Belgian historian, Arabist and islamicist on current affairs in the Middle East. He is also active on Twitter: @p_vanostaeyen. This post was previously pbulished on Jihadology.net and is also to be found on his own blog. This is the second of a series of articles on Dutch foreign fighters in Syria. You can read the first here.

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Dutch Foreign Fighters – Some Testimonials from the Syrian Front

Posted on November 1st, 2013 by martijn.
Categories: Activism, Guest authors, Headline, Religious and Political Radicalization, Society & Politics in the Middle East.

Guest Author: Pieter van Ostaeyen

Introduction:

A while ago I documented Belgian Jihadi’s in Syria quite meticulously, even though source material is rather limited. Especially on social media the Belgian fighters seem to be keeping a rather low profile. Exactly the opposite stands for their “colleagues” from The Netherlands. It didn’t take too much trouble to stumble upon quite lengthy posts on all kinds of social media platforms. As opposed to my earlier work on the Belgians, I will not give an overview of who left, got killed or returned home; in these posts I will present some personal stories of the Dutch foreign fighters. This will be the first part in a series of posts on the topic.

Their Armor:

The armor of the Dutch Mujahideen:

• A Kalashnikov AK46 and 6 extra magazines
• A Makarov pistol
• Two handgrenades: one defensive, one offensive
• A sharp knife
• A Casio watch

This photo was taken an hour before a battle in the larger Homs area. The operation counted 150 fighters against about 400 regime forces.

Perhaps the most important belonging of a Dutch fighter is a translation of the Qur’an.

(This one is the translation by Fred Leemhuis (ISBN 90 269 4078 5), without any doubt the best translation of the Qur’an in Dutch)

[Edit 1-11-2013. Correction: This is not the translation by Leemhuis. This is ‘De Edele Koran’ (The Noble Qur’an), a translation by Sofian S. Srinegar. MdK – With permission of the author. Thanks to PC and AY.]

The story of Mujahid Mourad Massali – Abu Baseer

It was at the end of 2012 when we in Holland said goodbye to Abu Baseer. We were going training that evening but Abu Baseer came with the intention of saying farewell to the brothers. At first Abu Baseer didn’t want to participate in the training but after some brothers insisted he joined in. After the training we said farewell, Abu Baseer embraced us and asked for forgiveness. We later found out that this was to be the last night Abu Baseer was amongst us.

Abu Baseer is a brother who inspired many in The Netherlands to take the path of Jihad. He always called for truth, whether at work, in the streets, in the Mosque and even from Syria. He called us from Syria and told us about the beauty of Jihad; we would be foolish not to come over. This brother had everything he could wish for living in The Netherlands; he had a college degree, was married at the age of 20 and was soon to become father, he had a good job and lived with his wife in his own house. He was a lucky young man and yet he choose to sacrifice his life fighting for the cause of Allah.

It was not only the love for Allah that made Abu Baseer leave for Syria, but more importantly his love for the Ummah. For when a Muslim sees the suffering of the Syrian people, he sees them as if they were his own parents, his own children. It cannot be that the tears from our mothers in The Netherlands are more important than the tears of the hundreds of thousands Syrian mothers. These Syrian women lose husbands, children and family daily. These women get killed, raped or tortured. These women we see as our own mothers, we feel their grief as if it was our own. The same applies for the Syrian men and children who we see as our own kin.

If I would have to describe Abu Baseer in one word, I would use ‘Izz (honor). He was a man of honor and strength loyal to his Brothers. When he heard some Muslims were in hardship he always was the first to start collecting money to help them out. Whenever you were in trouble, Abu Baseer was there to help you out.

We arrived in Syria a month after him, we had to wait before meeting him because he was on a mission protecting the borders. Me and the Brothers were in the [military] training camp at that point. He was on his mission on the front for over 40 days. On missions like this you are at guard, facing the enemy constantly. Sometimes sleeping in your battle gear.

It was later that evening I saw Abu Baseer again. It had been about two months ago. We embraced; a moment not to forget. We spent hours with the brothers around a fire, talking about The Netherlands. And there we were in the blessed land of as-Sham al-Mujahideen. It was a dream to be participating in Jihad and Allah’s blessing to be in the company of an old group of friends.

Abu Baseer always had a prominent role on the battlefield. His courage and caring for wounded brothers are remembered. He was always the first on the frontline; even though he was younger, he engaged us all in Jihad.

The Battle of Khan Touman

We heard about a major battle coming up. It was directed against a major army base. That morning we left in several groups towards Khan Touman. Our orders were strict; no prisoners were to be taken and there was no such thing as retreat. We said goodbye to each other, we made some photos …

We divided into seven platoons. In total we were about 500 taking on about 2000 or more in open field. We were to attack after dusk. The platoon of Abu Baseer, led by Abu Baraa al-Homsi, was one of the first in battle. After initial silence, suddenly fire broke loose on Abu Baseer’s front. The group had overrun al-Assad’s troops and penetrated deep into enemy frontlines. Those who returned, told me bullets and bombs were all around but didn’t hit the brothers. One of the wonders they told about was that a mortar grenade landed in their middle and didn’t explode.

The next day me, Abu Baseer’s brother and other brothers we knew from The Netherlands, were sent to reinforce another frontline. Abu Baseer was there, he welcomed us and we decided to fight side by side. A dream came true. Every Muslim caring for Jihad dreams about fighting side by side with his brothers. Fighting the enemies of the Ummah. Who would have known this when we were in The Netherlands ?

After the evening prayer the enemy had fallen back to its original positions. I would protect this outpost together with Abu Baseer and four other Ansar during nighttime. It was a cold night and we were hungry. We had almost no blankets and slept on a concrete floor. Some of us hadn’t slept in over 48 hours. And yet in turn we had to take guard and stay on the look-out for the enemy. It is in times like this you experience Jihad an-Nafs fully; the internal strife you’re going through is but a reflection of the external battle you experience. But if you lose your internal strife it will reflect on battle and vice versa.

After we prayed Fajr we were going to the front line and awaited the enemy. This time they returned with more heavy weapons, covered by tank fire and heavy artillery. At a certain point I lost track of Abu Baseer and went out looking for him at the front. After I didn’t find him there, I returned to the other Dutch brothers. It is at this time we ran into Abu Baseer; he was carrying a box of food and fruit. We never knew where he got it, but he by himself thus provided over twenty men with breakfast. This is how Abu Baseer always thought about his brothers first and why we loved him so deeply.

After we ate Abu Baseer told me it would be better if we would reinforce the right flank because fighting was heavier there. We asked the Amir for permission to go there. Once arrived we ran into some brothers with food and drinks. One of them offered us some energy drinks; Abu Baseer took one and put it in my vest saying “here, take this, you’ll need it.” When the brother offered Abu Baseer one, he decisively said: “no, no, not for me, today I will drink in Paradise.”

The fighting was heavy, it was the last outpost of the enemy. We were under heavy fire from tanks. Luckily the Mujahideen as well had tanks and anti-tank rockets. Our Amir Abu al-Baraa had a rocket launcher he wanted to use on one of the tanks that shelled us constantly. He asked for volunteers to approach the tank. Abu Baseer was the first one to volunteer, I went with him.

The three of us now had to cross an open field, with only some high grass as cover. One of the brothers helped us cutting the barbed wire and we ran into the open land. They fired upon us with all they had; machine guns and snipers. The tank didn’t spot us yet but we were under heavy fire. Abu al-Baraa and Abu Baseer were three feet in front of me, they were going to fire the rocket at the tank which was only fifty feet away. When the tank spotted us it fired at us with its heavy machine gun and soon the shelling started.

The rocket, although it was brand new, blocked. Abu al-Baraa ordered me to go back to the others and return with the brother specialized in using these rockets. So once again I had to run across the field while the enemy had us in sight. The last thing I heard was Abu Baseer advising me to keep to the right. This was to be the last time he spoke to me…

When I arrived back I explained the situation to the others, the brother was to prepare to return back with me. Suddenly we heard via the radio one of us was martyred at the right flank. Some rushed in to get the body of the martyr. When I saw Abu al-Baraa and the others returning with a body, I knew Abu Baseer got what he wanted; to die as a Shaheed. Abu Baseer had been shot in the neck. We buried our friend the same day, a smile on his face.

A few hours after Abu Baseer died we took over the enemy base, after only two days of battle. We later destroyed the tank that caused Abu Baseer’s death. We captured 27 hidden bunkers stuffed with weapons and ammunition and two million liters of diesel. This was a marvelous victory, a glorious day to die as a Martyr. We later realized it was only because Allah wanted it we were victorious in this battle.

A month later I ran into Abu al-Baraa again; he told us he asked Abu Baseer moments before his death whether he was afraid. He answered: “Why should I be afraid when I will be in Paradise soon?”

We ask Allah to take care of Abu Baseer’s relatives and to accept him as true Martyr. We ask Allah to reunite us in Paradise, Oh Allah favor us with martyrdom, take our blood, our belongings and our endeavors untilled You are satisfied with us.

Your brother Abu Jandal

Pieter van Ostaeyen is a Belgian historian, Arabist and islamicist on current affairs in the Middle East. He is also active on Twitter: @p_vanostaeyen. This piece was originally posted on Jihadology.net and is also to be found on his own blog.

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Dr. Nelly Lahoud: "Is Jihadism An Enduring Threat?"

Posted on October 29th, 2013 by martijn.
Categories: Activism, International Terrorism, Religious and Political Radicalization.

On January 22, 2013, Dr. Nelly Lahoud gave a lecture at the World Trade Center in Baltimore, MD (US) on the topic “Is Jihadism An Enduring Threat?” In this lecture she does not present a yes or no answer this question, but instead discusses two issues:
1) What do we really mean by Jihadism?
2) How has the jihadi threat been conceptualized, in particular by the counter-terrorism community she thinks is ‘obsessively Al Qaeda centered’.

She proposes a different approach to jihadism that is aware of the performative power of branding groups as Al Qaeda. As she states, not every store that sells fried chicken, is a Kentucky Fried Chicken. When we brand jihadists as Al Qaeda it becomes part of their mission to attack the US. Referring to the situation in Mali she explains that branding Jihadists who are not affiliated with Al Qaeda, as Al Qaeda is empowering them and providing with authority and a global platform they would not be able to craft on their own.

Nelly Lahoud is Associate Professor at the Department of Social Sciences at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and Senior Associate at the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point. She completed her Ph.D. in 2002 at the Research School of Social Sciences — Australian National University. In 2003, she was a postdoctoral scholar at St John’s College, University of Cambridge — UK. In 2005, she was a Rockefeller Fellow in Islamic studies at the Library of Congress and in 2008-09 she was a Research Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University. Prior to her current position, Lahoud was an Assistant Professor of political theory, including Islamic political thought, at Goucher College.

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Dr. Nelly Lahoud: “Is Jihadism An Enduring Threat?”

Posted on October 29th, 2013 by martijn.
Categories: Activism, International Terrorism, Religious and Political Radicalization.

On January 22, 2013, Dr. Nelly Lahoud gave a lecture at the World Trade Center in Baltimore, MD (US) on the topic “Is Jihadism An Enduring Threat?” In this lecture she does not present a yes or no answer this question, but instead discusses two issues:
1) What do we really mean by Jihadism?
2) How has the jihadi threat been conceptualized, in particular by the counter-terrorism community she thinks is ‘obsessively Al Qaeda centered’.

She proposes a different approach to jihadism that is aware of the performative power of branding groups as Al Qaeda. As she states, not every store that sells fried chicken, is a Kentucky Fried Chicken. When we brand jihadists as Al Qaeda it becomes part of their mission to attack the US. Referring to the situation in Mali she explains that branding Jihadists who are not affiliated with Al Qaeda, as Al Qaeda is empowering them and providing with authority and a global platform they would not be able to craft on their own.

Nelly Lahoud is Associate Professor at the Department of Social Sciences at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and Senior Associate at the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point. She completed her Ph.D. in 2002 at the Research School of Social Sciences — Australian National University. In 2003, she was a postdoctoral scholar at St John’s College, University of Cambridge — UK. In 2005, she was a Rockefeller Fellow in Islamic studies at the Library of Congress and in 2008-09 she was a Research Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University. Prior to her current position, Lahoud was an Assistant Professor of political theory, including Islamic political thought, at Goucher College.

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