The Dutch 'Moroccans' Debate

Posted on January 26th, 2013 by martijn.
Categories: Multiculti Issues, Young Muslims.

The Dutch debates on integration have reached a new landmark moment: within a few weeks Dutch parliament will discuss the so-called ‘Moroccans Problem’. This term came about after a recent tragedy in the city of Almere (near Amsterdam) whereby several teenaged soccer players beat and kicked a volunteer linesman after a dispute that is not entirely clear yet. The man died the next day. At first reluctantly but after a few opinion articles in newspapers that followed the huge outcry on the internet the assailants were quickly called: ‘Moroccans’. This refers to the ethnic background of at least two young boys. Calling something by its name (benoemen), is used here as a rationale for identifying the problems (needed to tackle them) and to criticize multiculturalists who want to deny the problems. Of course, in dealing with societal issues some form of labelling of people seems inevitable, but at the same time the concepts used to classify people are not neutral or factual but implicitly take a position that often reflects a dominant discourse and a political agenda.
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Nationalism & Neo-Liberalism

The Euro-crisis may appear to have taken the top of the political agenda during the last elections, at the expense of integration / Islam but that was only at a superficial level. In reality neoliberalism met nationalism during the last election campaigns: it is quite remarkable how quickly particular stereotypes on southern Europe, in particular Greece, emerged after the news broke of their financial problems: unreliable, lazy, corrupt, you name it. The EU was blamed by politicians for most of the problems (conveniently shying away from the fact that national politicians make the EU) and parties such as the Freedom Party linked the EU with the problem of the so-called mass-migration. It was supposedly the EU who caused huge waves of migrants coming to the Netherlands (in fact the idea of mass-migration has been debunked by several experts) in particular the East-Europeans and the Muslims. It is in particular Wilders who has weaved together a strong anti-EU stand with anti-immigration and anti-austerity measures. Interestingly, and disturbingly, he is severely criticized on all these points but not so much on the connections he makes between the three themes.

Other parties however see culture (used for referring to migrants) also as problematic in their election campaigns and programmes. If the migrants are presented as beneficial at all (two parties; very few sentences) it is always in relation with something like ‘but there are problems as well’. Concrete measures are proposed that always restrict migrants in order to become compatible with ‘Dutch society’ or the punish them more than other citizens (for instance in the cases of domestic and other forms of family violence). And everything that remotely resembles multiculturalism should not be subsidized anymore. There are some differences between the parties with regard to issues such as dual citizenship, the ban on face-veiling, and some other discriminatory measures of the last government.

All parties do give some attention to the struggle against racism, homophobia and discrimination but often only in general slogans. In short a homogenized picture of the Dutch society is created in which the problems are caused by outsiders (unauthorized migrants, ‘Moroccans’, Muslims) while the problems among particular categories of migrants are denied, reduced to individual responsibility or othered through the discourse of culture. As Jolle Demmers and Sameer S. Mehendale argues the ‘faces of immigrants have served as ideal, identifiable flash points for new repertoires of belonging and othering’ in a neoliberal, ‘atomized’ society endulging in ‘fantasies of purity and the moralization of culture and citizenship’.

The Discourse of Moroccan Street Terrorists

In particular second generation Moroccan-Dutch youth have a bad reputation for causing trouble in the streets, being rude and insulting to women and for scoring high in many statistics on crime, unemployment and problems in education. Using the label ‘Moroccan’ only makes sense because of the dominant culture talk: Moroccan-Dutch youth cause problems, or more, they are a problem because of their culture which is perceived as macho and mysoginist, anti-western and violent. Much of the debate after the death of the referee was therefore about the relation between culture and crime. A flawed question because firstly it is based upon a homogenized and essentialist concept of culture that has no analytical value, and secondly although culture (in a non-essentalist version) always plays a role in crime it is impossible to determine a causal relation between culture and crime. Thirdly (and related to the former) because culture in the essentialized version is a ‘group-concept’ that has little value in explaining the behaviour of an individual.

In most of these accounts the underlying assumption is that Moroccan-Dutch youth should be educated into the ‘Dutch’ rules of conduct and the core values of Dutch society (in the idealized version being secular and upholding sexual freedoms) and in particular their parents should ‘shape up’ and ‘take responsibility’ for the actions of their children. That this type of analysis and its related ‘solution’ is part of the issue by (re-)producing Moroccan-Dutch as people out of place is entirely obscured. Dutch society has left the somewhat pacifying model of the 1990s with regard to the integration of migrants for a more confrontational model after 2000. This has however not resulted in closing the gap with regard to socio-economic inequality and neither with regard to convivial contacts. A recent report by the Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP) found that social contact between white native Dutch and the main immigrant groups (Moroccan-Dutch, Turkish-Dutch, Antillean-Dutch and Surinamese-Dutch) has actually decreased over the past 17 years. Half a century after the first Turkish and Moroccan guest workers arrived in the Netherlands, only 28% of Turkish-Dutch and 37% of Moroccan-Dutch identify themselves strongly as Dutch. And while their Dutch language skills have improved, immigrant groups felt less accepted in Dutch society in 2011 than in 2002. This however does not lead to the conclusion that something is wrong with the current model of integration (with its focus on cultural values) but re-affirms the image that something is wrong with (the culture of) migrants.

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Gender & Race

The debate is not only about culture, ethnicity and religion. It is also about gender and race. Gender in the sense that often the Moroccan-Dutch girls are seen as the symbols of upward social mobilitiy while being oppressed at the same time by Moroccan-Dutch / Muslim men. Furthermore the boys figure as the poster boy for what is wrong with multiculturalism, Islam and ‘Moroccan culture’ and in need of government intervention and being taught the appropriate model of masculinity in a secular liberal society. This is in particular clear after a Moroccan-Dutch woman stabbed and killed her daughter. This led immediately to the conclusion that we have a possible honour killing at hand here; again the focus on culture whilst calls for closer police monitoring.

Race is the other theme here. Although the Dutch discourse is not so much about race as it is about culture (a difference that has important consequences) there is certainly a racialization going on. First of all essentializing culture to such a degree that is seen as a causal factor in individual wrongdoings is a form of cultural determinism very close to the biological determinism that is part of some race discourse. Secondly, the body is an important marker of otherness. Recently a Turkish-Dutch young man requested a name change because with his ‘Turkish-sounding’ first name he was ‘mistaken’ to be a ‘foreigner’ and a ‘Muslim’ as he was ‘Dutch’ (the young man had an Turkish-Dutch father and ethnic Dutch mother). Moreover the newspaper described him as ‘looking Dutch‘. I don’t know how the young man actually looks like, but I think we can assume here the young man looks ‘white’. The reference here to ‘Turkish’ and ‘Muslim’ shows that skin, eyes and hair color are not (only) signifiers of the exotic other anymore but, through the intersection with ethnicity and Islam, have also come to embody the threatening other in the today’s political and every day imagination.

The Moroccans Debate as Flash Potential

The latter is of course also strongly related to Islam as a threat and apparently minor issues can still explode the Dutch debates for example a Dutch amusement park announcing to establish a Muslim prayer room and the controversy surrounding the ‘halal-homes’ in Amsterdam whereby a social-housing corporation reconstructed houses with partitions separating men and women. The fact that the term ‘halal-homes’ was an invention by a local newspaper, that the houses were fit for non-Muslims as well (actually enjoying it there and living there in larger numbers than before) was lost. The first example shows how the fear of Islamization partly comes about when arrangements for Muslims are made in particular areas that are connected to people’s daily lives, the second example shows how far this fear goes; it does not only come about in relation to public manifestations of Islam but even in relation to Muslims’ private living arrangements. It shows furthermore how superficial the perceived peace on integration issues actually is. Not only horrible events lead to outbursts but also relatively minor issues. This gives these issues a certain ‘flash potential of identity politics’ as explained by Hagendoorn and Sniderman: the speed with which large numbers can be mobilized in opposition to multiculturalism and that serves as an excellent repertoire for politicians to make use of and and to keep the image of the ideal moral community where things like these ‘just not happen’ intact.

The culture talk in integration masks the ways different modes of exclusion and makes it actually harder to pin down: ‘we are not excluding people, we work very hard to integrate them’. The problems with Moroccan-Dutch are then not problems of a society lacking social cohesion, or of a social category at the bottom of the socio-economic hierarchies or problems of families that to some extend are disintegrated, but problems of ‘Moroccan culture’ that appears to be just impossible (or reifying it: unwilling) to assimilate.

Paradox of resistance
All of this leads to a problematic paradox for migrants. The understandable emotions over the death of a referee are channelled through defining a particular social category, Moroccan-Dutch, as a problem: ‘Moroccan’. Being defined as a problem is problematic for people and resistance among Moroccan-Dutch people against such labelling (for example by saying, no not all Moroccans are like this, or yes there are problems but look at how well some of us do) is bringing about the accusation of having a victim mentality. Something that does not belong to a liberal society where people take responsibility for their actions.

At the same time individual Moroccan-Dutch are turned into representatives of ‘their own group’  through the label ‘Moroccan’ and they are held accountable for the actions of others. Protest against the exclusion that occurs by being labelled as a problem therefore leads to the accusation of (still) not being integrated enough and ‘not willing or able to face the facts’. Events such as the death of the referee than brings about the question ‘What more do we need to do for/with them’? Here the public statements (or myths) of the Netherlands as a freedom loving, tolerant country turn into racist and intolerant forms of politics while the individual experiences among Moroccan-Dutch of being excluded are re-affirmed, discarded and to a certain extent made invisible through the discourse of integration.

6 comments.

The Dutch ‘Moroccans’ Debate

Posted on January 26th, 2013 by martijn.
Categories: Multiculti Issues, Young Muslims.

The Dutch debates on integration have reached a new landmark moment: within a few weeks Dutch parliament will discuss the so-called ‘Moroccans Problem’. This term came about after a recent tragedy in the city of Almere (near Amsterdam) whereby several teenaged soccer players beat and kicked a volunteer linesman after a dispute that is not entirely clear yet. The man died the next day. At first reluctantly but after a few opinion articles in newspapers that followed the huge outcry on the internet the assailants were quickly called: ‘Moroccans’. This refers to the ethnic background of at least two young boys. Calling something by its name (benoemen), is used here as a rationale for identifying the problems (needed to tackle them) and to criticize multiculturalists who want to deny the problems. Of course, in dealing with societal issues some form of labelling of people seems inevitable, but at the same time the concepts used to classify people are not neutral or factual but implicitly take a position that often reflects a dominant discourse and a political agenda.
You need to a flashplayer enabled browser to view this YouTube video

Nationalism & Neo-Liberalism

The Euro-crisis may appear to have taken the top of the political agenda during the last elections, at the expense of integration / Islam but that was only at a superficial level. In reality neoliberalism met nationalism during the last election campaigns: it is quite remarkable how quickly particular stereotypes on southern Europe, in particular Greece, emerged after the news broke of their financial problems: unreliable, lazy, corrupt, you name it. The EU was blamed by politicians for most of the problems (conveniently shying away from the fact that national politicians make the EU) and parties such as the Freedom Party linked the EU with the problem of the so-called mass-migration. It was supposedly the EU who caused huge waves of migrants coming to the Netherlands (in fact the idea of mass-migration has been debunked by several experts) in particular the East-Europeans and the Muslims. It is in particular Wilders who has weaved together a strong anti-EU stand with anti-immigration and anti-austerity measures. Interestingly, and disturbingly, he is severely criticized on all these points but not so much on the connections he makes between the three themes.

Other parties however see culture (used for referring to migrants) also as problematic in their election campaigns and programmes. If the migrants are presented as beneficial at all (two parties; very few sentences) it is always in relation with something like ‘but there are problems as well’. Concrete measures are proposed that always restrict migrants in order to become compatible with ‘Dutch society’ or the punish them more than other citizens (for instance in the cases of domestic and other forms of family violence). And everything that remotely resembles multiculturalism should not be subsidized anymore. There are some differences between the parties with regard to issues such as dual citizenship, the ban on face-veiling, and some other discriminatory measures of the last government.

All parties do give some attention to the struggle against racism, homophobia and discrimination but often only in general slogans. In short a homogenized picture of the Dutch society is created in which the problems are caused by outsiders (unauthorized migrants, ‘Moroccans’, Muslims) while the problems among particular categories of migrants are denied, reduced to individual responsibility or othered through the discourse of culture. As Jolle Demmers and Sameer S. Mehendale argues the ‘faces of immigrants have served as ideal, identifiable flash points for new repertoires of belonging and othering’ in a neoliberal, ‘atomized’ society endulging in ‘fantasies of purity and the moralization of culture and citizenship’.

The Discourse of Moroccan Street Terrorists

In particular second generation Moroccan-Dutch youth have a bad reputation for causing trouble in the streets, being rude and insulting to women and for scoring high in many statistics on crime, unemployment and problems in education. Using the label ‘Moroccan’ only makes sense because of the dominant culture talk: Moroccan-Dutch youth cause problems, or more, they are a problem because of their culture which is perceived as macho and mysoginist, anti-western and violent. Much of the debate after the death of the referee was therefore about the relation between culture and crime. A flawed question because firstly it is based upon a homogenized and essentialist concept of culture that has no analytical value, and secondly although culture (in a non-essentalist version) always plays a role in crime it is impossible to determine a causal relation between culture and crime. Thirdly (and related to the former) because culture in the essentialized version is a ‘group-concept’ that has little value in explaining the behaviour of an individual.

In most of these accounts the underlying assumption is that Moroccan-Dutch youth should be educated into the ‘Dutch’ rules of conduct and the core values of Dutch society (in the idealized version being secular and upholding sexual freedoms) and in particular their parents should ‘shape up’ and ‘take responsibility’ for the actions of their children. That this type of analysis and its related ‘solution’ is part of the issue by (re-)producing Moroccan-Dutch as people out of place is entirely obscured. Dutch society has left the somewhat pacifying model of the 1990s with regard to the integration of migrants for a more confrontational model after 2000. This has however not resulted in closing the gap with regard to socio-economic inequality and neither with regard to convivial contacts. A recent report by the Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP) found that social contact between white native Dutch and the main immigrant groups (Moroccan-Dutch, Turkish-Dutch, Antillean-Dutch and Surinamese-Dutch) has actually decreased over the past 17 years. Half a century after the first Turkish and Moroccan guest workers arrived in the Netherlands, only 28% of Turkish-Dutch and 37% of Moroccan-Dutch identify themselves strongly as Dutch. And while their Dutch language skills have improved, immigrant groups felt less accepted in Dutch society in 2011 than in 2002. This however does not lead to the conclusion that something is wrong with the current model of integration (with its focus on cultural values) but re-affirms the image that something is wrong with (the culture of) migrants.

You need to a flashplayer enabled browser to view this YouTube video

Gender & Race

The debate is not only about culture, ethnicity and religion. It is also about gender and race. Gender in the sense that often the Moroccan-Dutch girls are seen as the symbols of upward social mobilitiy while being oppressed at the same time by Moroccan-Dutch / Muslim men. Furthermore the boys figure as the poster boy for what is wrong with multiculturalism, Islam and ‘Moroccan culture’ and in need of government intervention and being taught the appropriate model of masculinity in a secular liberal society. This is in particular clear after a Moroccan-Dutch woman stabbed and killed her daughter. This led immediately to the conclusion that we have a possible honour killing at hand here; again the focus on culture whilst calls for closer police monitoring.

Race is the other theme here. Although the Dutch discourse is not so much about race as it is about culture (a difference that has important consequences) there is certainly a racialization going on. First of all essentializing culture to such a degree that is seen as a causal factor in individual wrongdoings is a form of cultural determinism very close to the biological determinism that is part of some race discourse. Secondly, the body is an important marker of otherness. Recently a Turkish-Dutch young man requested a name change because with his ‘Turkish-sounding’ first name he was ‘mistaken’ to be a ‘foreigner’ and a ‘Muslim’ as he was ‘Dutch’ (the young man had an Turkish-Dutch father and ethnic Dutch mother). Moreover the newspaper described him as ‘looking Dutch‘. I don’t know how the young man actually looks like, but I think we can assume here the young man looks ‘white’. The reference here to ‘Turkish’ and ‘Muslim’ shows that skin, eyes and hair color are not (only) signifiers of the exotic other anymore but, through the intersection with ethnicity and Islam, have also come to embody the threatening other in the today’s political and every day imagination.

The Moroccans Debate as Flash Potential

The latter is of course also strongly related to Islam as a threat and apparently minor issues can still explode the Dutch debates for example a Dutch amusement park announcing to establish a Muslim prayer room and the controversy surrounding the ‘halal-homes’ in Amsterdam whereby a social-housing corporation reconstructed houses with partitions separating men and women. The fact that the term ‘halal-homes’ was an invention by a local newspaper, that the houses were fit for non-Muslims as well (actually enjoying it there and living there in larger numbers than before) was lost. The first example shows how the fear of Islamization partly comes about when arrangements for Muslims are made in particular areas that are connected to people’s daily lives, the second example shows how far this fear goes; it does not only come about in relation to public manifestations of Islam but even in relation to Muslims’ private living arrangements. It shows furthermore how superficial the perceived peace on integration issues actually is. Not only horrible events lead to outbursts but also relatively minor issues. This gives these issues a certain ‘flash potential of identity politics’ as explained by Hagendoorn and Sniderman: the speed with which large numbers can be mobilized in opposition to multiculturalism and that serves as an excellent repertoire for politicians to make use of and and to keep the image of the ideal moral community where things like these ‘just not happen’ intact.

The culture talk in integration masks the ways different modes of exclusion and makes it actually harder to pin down: ‘we are not excluding people, we work very hard to integrate them’. The problems with Moroccan-Dutch are then not problems of a society lacking social cohesion, or of a social category at the bottom of the socio-economic hierarchies or problems of families that to some extend are disintegrated, but problems of ‘Moroccan culture’ that appears to be just impossible (or reifying it: unwilling) to assimilate.

Paradox of resistance
All of this leads to a problematic paradox for migrants. The understandable emotions over the death of a referee are channelled through defining a particular social category, Moroccan-Dutch, as a problem: ‘Moroccan’. Being defined as a problem is problematic for people and resistance among Moroccan-Dutch people against such labelling (for example by saying, no not all Moroccans are like this, or yes there are problems but look at how well some of us do) is bringing about the accusation of having a victim mentality. Something that does not belong to a liberal society where people take responsibility for their actions.

At the same time individual Moroccan-Dutch are turned into representatives of ‘their own group’  through the label ‘Moroccan’ and they are held accountable for the actions of others. Protest against the exclusion that occurs by being labelled as a problem therefore leads to the accusation of (still) not being integrated enough and ‘not willing or able to face the facts’. Events such as the death of the referee than brings about the question ‘What more do we need to do for/with them’? Here the public statements (or myths) of the Netherlands as a freedom loving, tolerant country turn into racist and intolerant forms of politics while the individual experiences among Moroccan-Dutch of being excluded are re-affirmed, discarded and to a certain extent made invisible through the discourse of integration.

6 comments.