Radicalization Series V: Freedom Fighters, Conflict and Culture Talk

Posted on July 27th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: Headline, International Terrorism, Multiculti Issues, Religious and Political Radicalization.

Introduction
Anders Breilvik presents himself as a modern crusader; a nativist freedom fighter who engages in a war against islamization and the political establishment that accommodates the rise of Islam. His ideology resembles a copy-paste ideology which we know from other violent activists such as the Dutch Mohammed Bouyeri who killed writer and film director Theo van Gogh. A copy-paste ideology is not ‘just’ a random ideology of a lunatic. It is, for the people involved, a highly sophisticated worldview that gives meaning to the world, provides a sense of direction and enables a person to express their position in the world. The Internet plays an important role here since it makes it very easy for people to assemble and express their own worldview; in the case of Anders Behring Breivik in particular online fantasy games and the anti-islamist blogosphere provided him with clues, thoughts and probably a sense of cohesion as Thomas Hylland Eriksen pointed out.

Now it is important to understand the mindset and motivations of a terrorist and to see, for example, how it relates to (his) everyday life and issues on the ground. This does not mean that we should repeat his misguided anti-islamic viewpoints as for example Bruce Bawer does who in effect repeats Wilders’ statement on Breivik (although Wilders issued his statement later). Wilders sees Breivik as someone who abuses the ‘freedom loving ideals’ of the anti-islamization struggle that is about ‘defending‘ freedom and security. As Adam Serwer argues people like Wilders, Bawer and others seem to be worried foremost that Breivik’s actions are detrimental to the anti-islamization cause implying that his concerns and discourse about islamization for example in the Balkan, Turkey and the problems of the Middle East and beyond, are defensible and accurate (can you imagine such a piece after 9/11 or after the murder of Van Gogh).

It is important I think to see how his ideas (but not his actions) not only are derived from bloggers and politicians but also who they resonate with and are grounded on a grassroots everyday level. I also think the Netherlands can give some clues to that and is relevant here since Breivik partly derived his inspiration from Wilders’ Freedom Party ideology. In this blog therefore I will present some material of the Dutch section of the Ethnobarometer research in which we held focus group discussions on issues of security and culture after 9/11, the murder of Van Gogh and the French riots and Muhammad Cartoons. The research was conducted in 2005 and 2006 and the focus groups consisted all of both Moroccan-Dutch and native Dutch citizens of Gouda (except one group that was a moderate right wing group of native Dutch citizens). We did not aim for a representative sample but for an even division with regard to age, gender and political preferences. I will focus mostly here on the statements of the native Dutch participants. It shows how people struggle with tolerance on the one hand (seen as an important part of Dutch identity) and fear of Islamization and Muslims on the other hand expressed by different modalities of culture talk. While in the case of Bawer, Breilvik and Wilders the presence of Islam and Muslims are seen as the cause of conflict and by definition leading to conflicts, the Ethnobarometer research also revealed mechanisms that can de-escalate conflicts.

Communities of Tolerance
In the Ethnobarometer we can distinguish between four trends or better said four communities of tolerance: Destructed tolerance, Threatened tolerance, Promoting tolerance and ‘Christian’ tolerance.
Destructed tolerance
The first group was no part of any of the researches. Nevertheless via email, internet forums and other types of personal communication we managed to gather some insight in this group. Most outspoken were members of Freespeechsite.net when we tried to recruit participants for the Ethno-barometer.

One member from Gouda responded:

‘This is useless; those Marocs can do everything in Gouda. When you disagree, you will end up with a knife in your back with the police only watching? (been there). During these conversations Muslims will act as poor human beings and the Dutch people are guilty. During these conversations it comes down to the fact that we people from Gouda have to leave everything, giving all our money to them, let them rape our women, let them rob and abuse our children. If not, they stab you; they will destroy your windows, and beat your car to ruin! I have had these talks in Gouda. I am fed up with these talks. It doesn’t help a fuck! They have a free ticket from the state and they can do whatever they want. And do you know how it ended? That they (the police, MdK) wanted to fine because I gave my opinion and you can’t do that (not even if you can prove that they cheat). So a lot of fun with your discussions and that you want to spend your time for useless things. There is only one solution, throw the whole bunch out of the country. Yours sincerely,’

Another member stated:

‘I’m also waiting for the time when we as a host country will be treated with proper respect by our allochtone fellow people, because in my view we Dutch people have to adjust to our ‘fellow countrymen’ and not the other way around (Look for example at the Ramadan wish of our allochtones-fucker JeePee (MP Balkenende, I’m awaiting Christmas with all my heart). As long as that continues, you don’t have to expect any respect for them (a few exceptions left, but you have to search them with a looking glass). Nevertheless I am very interested in the results of your research. Good luck!’

Another interesting group of people were those people we contacted on the streets and a schoolyard. One of them said, for example, ‘I don’t want to talk to Muslims’. This was stated by a mother whose child was the only Dutch child in his class on a primary school. This school also had decided not to celebrate ‘carnaval’ (a Catholic feast) anymore. Instead they choose to celebrate ‘Eid’. The non-Muslim woman was very angry about that. Some Muslims responded that they would come, but most of them (except three) never showed up. These reactions made clear that these people experience a huge gap between Dutch culture and allochtones and, perhaps even more important, that they felt being deserted by Dutch politicians who in their view choose for Muslims and against them (the originally Dutch people). The kind of language used by the different people makes clear that these sentiments are very strong and very vivid. Looking at issues concerning tolerance people in this category tend to feel that tolerance has gone so far that Muslims and the Dutch government have became intolerant towards ‘we Dutch people’ while Muslims and other migrants enjoy all possible fruits of tolerance, at the expense of native Dutch people. Some Dutch people (the authorities, the researcher) constitute a third group they aim at: they see these people as traitors.

Threatened tolerance
The second community of tolerance is a very influential one and probably the most diverse one when we look at for example political preferences. People in this category perceive the virtue of tolerance as very important but fear that it is threatened by Muslims in general and in particular ‘radical Muslims’. One can find atheists and liberals among them who argue that all the freedoms they have fought for in the 1960s (women’s emancipation, liberation from the constraints of religion) is threatened because of the existence of Islam and Muslims in the Netherlands who, according to them, do not agree with these freedoms.

‘An important part of culture is religion. We used to have on the edge of the Dutch Guilder: God be with us. The fact that Muslims in large numbers and it is a group that grows fast, come here with us, means that they undermine my culture. That doesn’t belong to my culture, that doesn’t belong to my norms and values, which make culture. So when other norms and values and another religion come, that pushes aside as it were those things of me, then I think, wait a minute, that is not good’.

‘That is the fear!’ ‘It is not directed against Islam: you are fighting with yourself. What do I feel is important, what people have taught me about what is important and is that affected now? And that insecurity…’ On the question what is affected, one of the non-Muslims answered: ‘My culture. My culture, a new culture enters into that, and their culture grows and grows and grows and mine is getting smaller and smaller and smaller. And my culture is my identity, so I am being forced to change my identity and I really don’t want that, but I have to’.

The image of fear and distrust is a very strong and important one. During the Ethno-barometer it seemed that issues concerning Muslims abroad and issues in Gouda come together.

‘When you see the pictures of people in other countries decapitating each other, when you then see a group of Moroccans in the Netherlands: they look similar, here in Gouda, I know that because of course I talk to other people as well. I am not really afraid for it, I wouldn’t run away from you (she says to one of the Muslims who just told he thought people sometimes see him as a terrorist because he wears a long beard), but it does give you a sense of fear immediately. There are many people with fear. That is because of the pictures on TV, but also because you don’t hear the Muslim community when something happens. They don’t say, well now they do a little bit, but they don’t say: We don’t want this, we do not support this, and we disapprove.

’

The presence of Muslims puts, according to this group, Dutch tolerance under severe pressure and makes them question where the loyalty of Muslims lies: with Dutch society and Dutch people or with fellow Muslims.

Promoting tolerance
The third category of people can be mainly found among political leftists (left wing liberals, socialists). Although they do feel that Islam and Dutch tolerance are not fully compatible they blame the present intolerance on other Dutch people. Especially politicians such as Hirsi Ali and Wilders and the media are held responsible for the current tensions in society.

Back in the old days everyone used to be tolerant, but now many of friends say, let them (migrants/Muslims) fuck off

!

The people in this group tend to highlight the similarities between them and Muslims. Many of them feel truly appalled by what Fortuyn and Van Gogh said about Muslims. During the ethno-barometer discussions it became clear that they were convinced that people who followed Fortuyn were lower class and not very smart people. When differences between them and Muslims are highlighted they tend to exoticise these differences and give them a positive meaning for example by saying that Muslims help each other more then Dutch people do (a statement that can be heard in the former two categories as well). When controversial issues such as homosexuality are concerned these people tend to refer to the time of the pillarization when homosexuality wasn’t accepted among Christians. Muslims, according to them, have to go through the same process of liberating themselves from such opinions but that is only a matter of time. In other words, they can become the same as us tolerant Dutch people. The emphasis they put on tolerance and their reluctance to talk in terms of ‘us’ and ‘them’ is for many people related to the atrocities of the second world war. Racism and anti-semitism are shunned by all people in the research. This rejection of racism doesn’t necessarily mean people like the ‘other’ so much, but because ‘we’ have seen what racism and anti-semitism can do.

‘Christian’ tolerance
The first three groups do not seem to differ about the importance the enlightenment ideal of autonomy. The fourth group does however. While according to the first three groups for example a negative view about homosexuality is intolerant and violates the ideal of autonomy, for this group tolerance and autonomy means that these views about homosexuality must be tolerated as long as it does not harm others. The same can be seen in ideas about women’s clothing. The first three groups are convinced that the fact that women have to wear certain clothing (headscarf or long skirts) is a violation of the ideal of personal autonomy and therefore also intolerant. This group emphasizes the freedom of choice and stresses that if women wear these clothes because they want to themselves, this should be tolerated because it does not violate the ideal of autonomy. This fourth group is made up by orthodox Christians and in some cases also leftist liberals. This group emphasizes dialogue with Muslims in order to gain more understanding and a harmonious relation with the Other. This group tends to avoid conflicts and exotice the Other.

When I came to live in this area (Oosterwei, an area in Gouda with many Moroccans, in popular speech also called ‘Little Morocco’, MdK) and got to know, many people I thought it was so exciting! I thought, oh, I hope I don’t do something wrong and hurt no one. Yes, I was truly afraid of that, because I truly wanted to become closer, but not hurt them. It was so nice to find out every time, you are you and we only want to know what you think about and why you think like that. […] these are always nice discussions, they are hard as well sometimes. Because you meet each other (and open up to eachother, MdK), but you notice, the invasion of Iraq, terrorism, killing each other here on the streets, you have gone through a great deal, disasters and all that, and when you notice how both of you respond to that and why you approve or disapprove, you find out that it generates a lot of respect.

Just like the third group, this group also thinks that Muslims have go through the same staged of development as the Dutch already did. In particular terrorist attacks and problems with Moroccan youth in Gouda, makes them wonder however, how long that will take and if some of ‘them’ are truly willing to become part of Dutch society. Nevertheless this groups is emphasizing the dialogue with Muslims in order to gain understanding. The same we can see for example in the role of the Council of Churches in the Netherlands.

It is quite clear that the common perception is that Islam and radical Muslims in particular form a threat for people’s way of life and society as a whole. When ‘identity’ comes under siege, their own identity, the other and the differences between self and the other become essentialised. In terms of identity politics this means that there is less space for negotiations and making compromises.

Moral protest: Dutch identity, tolerance and respect
In case of Dutch people the defensive and sometimes apologetic stand of Muslims concerning the fear Dutch people experience and concerning their question towards Muslims about being loyal to Dutch standards, leads to a demand for recognition by the Dutch during the interaction of the debates. They wanted recognition that their fears and expectations are legitimate, and they also want to be taken seriously. Even if they know that fears and negative images are sometimes based upon prejudices, they wanted to be able to address that. Calling upon Muslims to condemn terrorist acts is in this sense also a means to let Muslims say that terrible things have happened and that it is not surprising that people are scared. The angry reactions of Muslims about these fears and images did not lead to awareness that some of it was based on prejudice. It only led to a feeling that their grievances were not taken seriously by Muslims. These grievances are real and also major and minor events are real, and they could not be taken away by individual Muslims by stating that ‘no one asked them to wipe away their own culture’ or by saying that ‘terrorism is no part of Islam’.

This paper shows that the same could be the case for the dominant group. In fact the Ethno-barometerproject makes clear that when the different discourses meet during a debate, a call for recognition is the result. Both Bawer and Wilders in their condemnation of Breivik acts still start from the misguided assumption that having different ethnic and religious groups, in particular when of the groups has an Islamic religion, conflicts are unavoidable. Many researches however show that the ethnic dimensions of conflicts most often come into being during the conflict and is only seldom the cause of conflicts. This of course is exactly what Wilders and Bawers do; they point to some problems in society and then add a an ethnic and religious dimension to it by pointing to the alledged agressive and violent nature of Islam.

De-escalation
Conflicts and violence are never unavoidable however. During the Ethno-barometer meetings however it became clear that the boundaries between groups shift and are re-defined according to the topic at hand. The focus in this research is on the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims. It is therefore not surprising that Muslim identity is an important aspect of this report. This does not mean however that Muslim identity should be taken for granted. Because the Moroccan participants were challenged as Muslims, they often presented themselves as Muslims. This did not happen all of the time. Some of the Muslims stated that they were Moroccan or Berber in the first place and then Muslims. Most of the younger Muslims however made very clear that in the first place they are Muslims and secondly Dutch or Moroccan. When people were talking about social economic deprivation for example, they used terms such as allochtones, migrants and Moroccans. Most participants mixed these terms very often: Muslims referring to themselves as Muslim or Moroccan and in a few occasions as allochtone. Non-Muslims were referring to Muslims as Muslims, migrants, Moroccans and allochtones. Only occasionally they referred to themselves as autochthon or Dutch or Christians.

The presence of orthodox Christians in the first group meant a rearranging of coalitions among the participants. When for example the topic of ‘oppression of women’ was addressed the orthodox Christian girls and Muslim girls joint forces against one of the participants who came up with this issue (a man). We could see a similar example when people talked about insulting people’s religious beliefs or when someone stated that to him every one was equal and he did not care about the religious backgrounds. The orthodox Christians and the Muslims joined each other in explaining the others why people are sensitive when their religion is insulted. Both groups also saw themselves as being a minority and the others as the (secular) majority. It is also the Orthodox Christians who often acted as intermediairies between Muslims and other Dutch people.

This shifting of boundaries brings us to an important point that is visible in all the mentioned discourses above about tolerance and also in the ethno-barometer debates. This is the presence of a so called third party. According to Gert Baumann this Third Party is invisible in the construction of identities that always involve the construction of a self and an other. This Third Party is neither ‘us’ nor ‘you’ and seems, at first sight, not involved in the interaction. Although at first sight the way young Muslims construct their religious identity seems to be diametrically opposed to Dutch identity, it seldom leads to conflicts because most of them have good personal relationships with native Dutch people at work or at school and tend to avoid people whom they deem racists. These native Dutch people can be seen as the third party. The same happens among many Dutch people. In some cases its not the Muslims who they aim at with their frustration but the Dutch government, but also some native Dutch people have good personal relationships with their Moroccan co-workers, neighbours or classmates. In fact during the ethno-barometer debates it sometimes looked like all participants were third parties because in case of generalizations about Muslims or Dutch people, in most cases people said: ‘No, not you, but X people in general’. This clearly relieved the tensions in face to face contacts and brings back into memory the importance of the relationship between self-restraint and tolerance.

Several other mechanisms of de-escalation also became visible during the debates. Stressing common experiences, seeking for solutions instead of blaming people could turn a very emotional and harsh discussion into something more constructive. One of the most striking aspects was the tone and the atmosphere in the discussions remained quite friendly even when there were strong differences in opinion. Restraining yourself from causing inconvenience for other people, which is an important condition of tolerance, seems to be an attitude that existed among all participants. Only in the first group there were strong tensions between some of the non-Muslim participants and some of the Muslim participants. During one session of this group we decided to have an early break because we feared the tensions between two people would escalate. During the break, without us intervening, these two and other participants approached each other and continued their discussion in a friendly and joyful manner. We found it striking that that group was the most outspoken and most polarised group. This can have some relation with their age. Mainly the young people (between 16 and 30) were outspoken and sometimes vicious in their way of discussing. The older people often tried to smooth things down. The other three groups had not that many young people; mostly only one or two.

The Power of Radical Words

It is not difficult to see how Wilders’ discourse resonates and is expressed on a grass roots level, not only in the Netherlands, and how Wilders’ rhetoric is a reduction of a multi-dimensional every day life into a single narrative of islamization. As I have explained elsewhere with my colleagues Edien Bartels, Oscar Salemink and Kim Knibbe, the way that people define their cultural identity is part and parcel of their subjective sense of human security – first and foremost in terms of cultural security, but eventually also in terms of their physical safety. It is when people feel their lifestyle is being threatened that some of them (but usually a minority) feels the need for action and search for political leaders who can be their voice. Since people’s sense of cultural security is linked with the definition of the boundaries between cultural categories, between ‘us’ and ‘them’, and between zones under control and zones outside one’s control, when once ‘secure’ cultural boundaries start to shift, this may create anxiety, fear and resentment. We show how minority identities may enhance the internal sense of security in that group, but may lead to anxieties and (subjectively experienced) insecurity in greater society. It is this sense of cultural security that is stimulated by politicians and their culture talk and, conversely, it makes the logic of culture talk seem to be ‘common sense’. It isn’t however; conflict is not the logical outcome of a pluralist society but every society does need mechanisms for de-escalation of conflicts. Politicians such as Wilders however work to monopolize the political agenda and given their black and white nature of their verbal ammunition they in effect close off the windows to conflict de-escalation. This doesn’t mean of course Wilders is directly responsible or that people in the Ethnobarometer research who hold similar views are responsible. It only shows that Breivik’s grievances are not merely voices in his head; they are out there and they have been for a long time. Breivik’s case may show how dangerous it can be when politicians exploit the culture talk but it also doesn’t mean that Breivik is a representative of those people or of the ethnobarometer participants. It is worthwhile considering that Breivik represents nothing and no one except himself .(I think his copy-paste ideology could be a clue for that). Very hopefull in the Norwegian case now, and contrary to the Netherlands in 2004 when politicians talked about war, is the message of the government. Not repression, but more freedom and democracy.

0 comments.

Cultural Identity and Human Security in Europe

Posted on July 26th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: International Terrorism, Murder on theo Van Gogh and related issues, Religious and Political Radicalization.

Cultural Identity as a key dimension of Human Security in western Europe: The dutch Case

by Edien Bartels, Kim Knibbe, Martijn de Koning and Oscar Salemink

In this chapter of A world of insecurity: Anthropological perspectives on human security edited by Thomas Hylland Eriksen and Ellen Bal, we (your blogger, Edien Bartels, Oscar Salemink and Kim Knibbe) take up the discussion of cultural identity as a dimension of security. We deal with issues such as feelings of insecurity and radicalization among native Dutch and minority citizens. We show how minority identities may enhance the internal sense of security in the group, but may lead to anxieties and (subjectively experienced) insecurity in greater society. Both majorities and minorities are inclined to feel insecure about their belonging and sense of identification in contemporary Western European societies.

1 comment.

Belief and Violence: Anders Breivik and Wilders' Freedom Party

Posted on July 24th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: International Terrorism, Religious and Political Radicalization.

So it was Anders Behring Breivik, a white conservative Christian Norwegian nationalist with anti-multiculturalism and anti-islamic beliefs who carried out the Oslo and Utoya attacks. I guess most people initially thought it was an Al Qaeda attack and/or hoped it wasn’t so. Now the attacks were clearly aimed at a political party and not the state; this suggested a domestic issue instead of a global struggle. Nevertheless there were some reasons as to why also terrorism experts thought it could be Al Qaeda:
Oslo and Utoya attacks: Why we all thought it was al Qaeda « Christine Scott Cheng

Why would al Qaeda attack Norway? Current commentary (Robert Zeliger in Foreign Policy, James Dorsey in al Arabiya, Thomas Hegghammer and Dominic Tierney in The Atlantic last year) suggests the most likely reasons are: 1) anger for re-publishing the Danish cartoons 2) participation in the conflict in Afghanistan and Libya 3) Iraqi Kurdish Islamist Mulla Krekar 4) Norway is a soft target relative to US, UK.

(Read also this CSM article)

I think one of the first experts to call an actual claim by a jihadi organization was Will McCants who stated that at the Shmukh forum Abu Sulayman al-Nasir stated that the Helpers were involved in the operation. He has been severely criticized for this at Electronic Intifadah and by Glen Greenwald at Salon.com. I think that in particular EI’s critique is unwarranted. McCants clearly stated that the Abu Sulayman claim should be taken with a grain of sal and he cannot be entirely blamed for journalists who take over the claim without any qualification. I do think however that he wasn’t careful enough by posting a claim made by a not very reliable figure in this regard and he should have realized that posting it on his blog could have been inflammatory.

As soon as it became clear that the perpetrator was a white Norwegian guy with some nativist and Wilders’ Freedom Party sympathies another game emerged. The link with Wilders’ ideology and rhetoric was immediately picked up by his opponents. Well first I should add that as soon as it appeared that the shooter was a blonde white guy the staunch anti-racists of the conservative and liberal right wing stated that this did not mean it wasn’t a Muslim and people discussed the alledged radical outlook of converts. After that proved to be nonsense in this case, the debate on the Internet turned to Wilders and his ideology. His supporters denying any responsibility by Wilders for the terrible attacks. A minority however, after the condemning the attack when they still thought it was Al Qaeda, were actually supporting the attacks for example by stating: ‘As things turn out now, the perpertrator is a right wing extremist. In that case the attack is the only correct answer to a totalitarian leftist state where right wing people are silenced‘. Another person stated on his photoshop blog (where he frequently attacks left wing and Muslim politicians in satirical photoshops) that the perpetrator should enlist in a new course: “Choosing sensible targets as an anti-islamist” thereby showing a picture of, what appears to be, an attack on the Kaaba in Mecca and the people who go there to the Hajj“. Satire of course. But these people constitute a minority as far as I can tell. Others condemn the attacks and as far as I can tell now most Freedom Party supporters I know abhor the attacks. The reactions on Twitter and Facebook however are starting to resemble the reactions towards (salafiyyah) Muslims after the murder on Van Gogh in 2004.

There are differences in those reactions as well of course. After the murder on Van Gogh many so called shock sites mentioned the supportive reactions onf webfora after the murder and made big headlines out of it (although see here). More important in this regard is that many debates started with contemplations about ‘Islamic terrorism’ but when it became clear that the attacker was probably not Muslim people started talking about psychopaths and lonely crazy guys. That may be true but even lonely psychopaths are influenced by political context and political ideology. Furthermore, as my colleague Linda Duits pointed out on Twitter, is it a coincidence that Breivik shot the pretty girls first? And is there a similarity between this terrorist attack, the misogyny of Mohammed Bouyeri (the killer of Theo van Gogh) and, for example, (school) shootings in the US and Finland? The gender issue does deserve more attention I think.

In this case an obvious link may seem Breivik’s interest in the Dutch Freedom party. There is of course no direct link between ideology and violent action, not even when the ideology condones, supports or even calls for violence which is not the case in Wilders’ Freedom Party ideology. It just doesn’t work like that. Nevertheless, as far as we can tell now, we should also not treat violence as something that is completely inseparable from ideology; ideology can legitimize violence and can give meaning to it and can give a particular direction. It is in that sense not that strange that a man who appears to be a anti-multiculturalism and anti-islam nativist directs his actions not to Muslims but to social-democratic politicians. It is these politicians that are blamed for ‘islamization’ and the multicultural drama in the nativist discourse. As Paul Woodward explains:
From Pamela Geller to Anders Behring Breivik — how Islamophobia turned deadly in Norway — War in Context

The World War Two iconography they employ — battleships, tanks and squadrons of bombers — makes it clear that they regard their campaign against “Islamization” as a kind of war. One of the battles in that war played out in Oslo yesterday.

Breivik, who probably sees himself as one of SIOE’s “freedom fighters,” describes himself as a cultural conservative and anti-Marxist liberal. In his comments at Document.no, he says little about his religious beliefs and seems to see his Christian identity primarily as a cultural identity.
[…]

Breivik is much more specific in identifying the sources from whom he takes his own ideological direction: Robert Spencer, Fjordman, Atlas [Pamela Geller], Analekta [Informatics], Gates of Vienna, The Brussels Journal, and The Religion of Peace.

These are the preeminent voices promoting fear and hatred of Islam across Europe and America. But they also form — at least in Breivik’s mind — the “epicenter” of “political analysis” on the threat posed to cultural conservatives by multiculturalism in Europe and America. He recommends Fjordman’s book, “Defeating Eurabia,” as “the perfect Christmas gift for family and friends.”

Do any of the leaders of Stop Islamization of America (SIOA) and Stop Islamization of Europe (SIOE) advocate that their “freedom fighters” should adopt violent tactics such as those employed by Breivik? Perhaps not. Indeed, I have little doubt that in the coming days we will hear many vociferous disavowals of their having any association with the Norwegian. But have no doubt, while they might have a sincere revulsion for Breivik’s actions, they cannot so easily disassociate themselves from the ideas that drove him to murder almost a hundred innocent people.

Two years ago, Breivik called on fellow Norwegians to form a youth action group “that represents our ideological platform (anti-racist but critical of multiculturalism / Islamization etc).” He saw the group developing as part of Stop Islamization of Europe or as a new group that would model itself on SIOE and the English Defense League.
[…]
Those in the anti-Islam movement who now want to distance themselves from Breivik will proclaim that they are opponents of hatred and maybe that’s true — but that’s how he sees himself too: as a man dedicating his life to combating the “hate ideologies.”

It may surprise you, but also Jihadists see themselves as the vanguard of people fighting hatred and injustice. One can even say that governments use violence in their fights against hatred and intolerance as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have learned us. Even when it is true in the case of many anti-islam nativists that they abhor violence and even in the case of many salafi Muslims as well, the ideology can be used (or should one say abused) by others who directly engage in violent acts or call upon others to do so. History has taught us that the black and white rhetoric identifying and framing a dangerous, common enemy constituting an existential threat that is everywhere, can be very dangerous. As in particular social movement research shows however the actual turn to violence is not so much determined by ideology but on changes in political opportunities that trigger escalation and that can produce particular narratives that appeal to violent groups and individuals and in turn the content of these narratives can inform, shape and direct conflict behavior in the direction of either escalation or de-escalation of violence (DellaPorta 2008: 227-228).

5 comments.

Belief and Violence: Anders Breivik and Wilders’ Freedom Party

Posted on July 24th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: International Terrorism, Religious and Political Radicalization.

So it was Anders Behring Breivik, a white conservative Christian Norwegian nationalist with anti-multiculturalism and anti-islamic beliefs who carried out the Oslo and Utoya attacks. I guess most people initially thought it was an Al Qaeda attack and/or hoped it wasn’t so. Now the attacks were clearly aimed at a political party and not the state; this suggested a domestic issue instead of a global struggle. Nevertheless there were some reasons as to why also terrorism experts thought it could be Al Qaeda:
Oslo and Utoya attacks: Why we all thought it was al Qaeda « Christine Scott Cheng

Why would al Qaeda attack Norway? Current commentary (Robert Zeliger in Foreign Policy, James Dorsey in al Arabiya, Thomas Hegghammer and Dominic Tierney in The Atlantic last year) suggests the most likely reasons are: 1) anger for re-publishing the Danish cartoons 2) participation in the conflict in Afghanistan and Libya 3) Iraqi Kurdish Islamist Mulla Krekar 4) Norway is a soft target relative to US, UK.

(Read also this CSM article)

I think one of the first experts to call an actual claim by a jihadi organization was Will McCants who stated that at the Shmukh forum Abu Sulayman al-Nasir stated that the Helpers were involved in the operation. He has been severely criticized for this at Electronic Intifadah and by Glen Greenwald at Salon.com. I think that in particular EI’s critique is unwarranted. McCants clearly stated that the Abu Sulayman claim should be taken with a grain of sal and he cannot be entirely blamed for journalists who take over the claim without any qualification. I do think however that he wasn’t careful enough by posting a claim made by a not very reliable figure in this regard and he should have realized that posting it on his blog could have been inflammatory.

As soon as it became clear that the perpetrator was a white Norwegian guy with some nativist and Wilders’ Freedom Party sympathies another game emerged. The link with Wilders’ ideology and rhetoric was immediately picked up by his opponents. Well first I should add that as soon as it appeared that the shooter was a blonde white guy the staunch anti-racists of the conservative and liberal right wing stated that this did not mean it wasn’t a Muslim and people discussed the alledged radical outlook of converts. After that proved to be nonsense in this case, the debate on the Internet turned to Wilders and his ideology. His supporters denying any responsibility by Wilders for the terrible attacks. A minority however, after the condemning the attack when they still thought it was Al Qaeda, were actually supporting the attacks for example by stating: ‘As things turn out now, the perpertrator is a right wing extremist. In that case the attack is the only correct answer to a totalitarian leftist state where right wing people are silenced‘. Another person stated on his photoshop blog (where he frequently attacks left wing and Muslim politicians in satirical photoshops) that the perpetrator should enlist in a new course: “Choosing sensible targets as an anti-islamist” thereby showing a picture of, what appears to be, an attack on the Kaaba in Mecca and the people who go there to the Hajj“. Satire of course. But these people constitute a minority as far as I can tell. Others condemn the attacks and as far as I can tell now most Freedom Party supporters I know abhor the attacks. The reactions on Twitter and Facebook however are starting to resemble the reactions towards (salafiyyah) Muslims after the murder on Van Gogh in 2004.

There are differences in those reactions as well of course. After the murder on Van Gogh many so called shock sites mentioned the supportive reactions onf webfora after the murder and made big headlines out of it (although see here). More important in this regard is that many debates started with contemplations about ‘Islamic terrorism’ but when it became clear that the attacker was probably not Muslim people started talking about psychopaths and lonely crazy guys. That may be true but even lonely psychopaths are influenced by political context and political ideology. Furthermore, as my colleague Linda Duits pointed out on Twitter, is it a coincidence that Breivik shot the pretty girls first? And is there a similarity between this terrorist attack, the misogyny of Mohammed Bouyeri (the killer of Theo van Gogh) and, for example, (school) shootings in the US and Finland? The gender issue does deserve more attention I think.

In this case an obvious link may seem Breivik’s interest in the Dutch Freedom party. There is of course no direct link between ideology and violent action, not even when the ideology condones, supports or even calls for violence which is not the case in Wilders’ Freedom Party ideology. It just doesn’t work like that. Nevertheless, as far as we can tell now, we should also not treat violence as something that is completely inseparable from ideology; ideology can legitimize violence and can give meaning to it and can give a particular direction. It is in that sense not that strange that a man who appears to be a anti-multiculturalism and anti-islam nativist directs his actions not to Muslims but to social-democratic politicians. It is these politicians that are blamed for ‘islamization’ and the multicultural drama in the nativist discourse. As Paul Woodward explains:
From Pamela Geller to Anders Behring Breivik — how Islamophobia turned deadly in Norway — War in Context

The World War Two iconography they employ — battleships, tanks and squadrons of bombers — makes it clear that they regard their campaign against “Islamization” as a kind of war. One of the battles in that war played out in Oslo yesterday.

Breivik, who probably sees himself as one of SIOE’s “freedom fighters,” describes himself as a cultural conservative and anti-Marxist liberal. In his comments at Document.no, he says little about his religious beliefs and seems to see his Christian identity primarily as a cultural identity.
[…]

Breivik is much more specific in identifying the sources from whom he takes his own ideological direction: Robert Spencer, Fjordman, Atlas [Pamela Geller], Analekta [Informatics], Gates of Vienna, The Brussels Journal, and The Religion of Peace.

These are the preeminent voices promoting fear and hatred of Islam across Europe and America. But they also form — at least in Breivik’s mind — the “epicenter” of “political analysis” on the threat posed to cultural conservatives by multiculturalism in Europe and America. He recommends Fjordman’s book, “Defeating Eurabia,” as “the perfect Christmas gift for family and friends.”

Do any of the leaders of Stop Islamization of America (SIOA) and Stop Islamization of Europe (SIOE) advocate that their “freedom fighters” should adopt violent tactics such as those employed by Breivik? Perhaps not. Indeed, I have little doubt that in the coming days we will hear many vociferous disavowals of their having any association with the Norwegian. But have no doubt, while they might have a sincere revulsion for Breivik’s actions, they cannot so easily disassociate themselves from the ideas that drove him to murder almost a hundred innocent people.

Two years ago, Breivik called on fellow Norwegians to form a youth action group “that represents our ideological platform (anti-racist but critical of multiculturalism / Islamization etc).” He saw the group developing as part of Stop Islamization of Europe or as a new group that would model itself on SIOE and the English Defense League.
[…]
Those in the anti-Islam movement who now want to distance themselves from Breivik will proclaim that they are opponents of hatred and maybe that’s true — but that’s how he sees himself too: as a man dedicating his life to combating the “hate ideologies.”

It may surprise you, but also Jihadists see themselves as the vanguard of people fighting hatred and injustice. One can even say that governments use violence in their fights against hatred and intolerance as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have learned us. Even when it is true in the case of many anti-islam nativists that they abhor violence and even in the case of many salafi Muslims as well, the ideology can be used (or should one say abused) by others who directly engage in violent acts or call upon others to do so. History has taught us that the black and white rhetoric identifying and framing a dangerous, common enemy constituting an existential threat that is everywhere, can be very dangerous. As in particular social movement research shows however the actual turn to violence is not so much determined by ideology but on changes in political opportunities that trigger escalation and that can produce particular narratives that appeal to violent groups and individuals and in turn the content of these narratives can inform, shape and direct conflict behavior in the direction of either escalation or de-escalation of violence (DellaPorta 2008: 227-228).

5 comments.

Niqab en de morele ambities van de PVV

Posted on July 18th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: Multiculti Issues, Notes from the Field, Public Islam.

Fractie-medewerker van de PVV Sam van Rooij plaatste de volgende video onder de kop ‘Scheveningen anno 2011: kiemen van achterlijkheid‘ op YouTube. Hij zette het filmpje eveneens op zijn Facebookpagina.


In een uitleg op zijn (nu gesloten) Facebook schrijft Van Rooy: ‘Opeens kwam dat tuig langslopen. Dus besloot ik ze maar gelijk te filmen. Of moet ik het normaal vinden dat mijn rust in Scheveningen wordt verpest door dat soort geimporteerde achterlijkheid van de islamtische zandbak?’

Op de vraag op Facebook waarom hij de vrouwen als ‘tuig’ omschrijft, zonder hen te hebben aangesproken, stelt Van Rooy: ‘Wat een onzin dat je mensen niet tuig mag noemen. Mensen die de westerse waarden afwijzen ten faveure van een racistisch, fascistisch en inhumaan systeem als de sharia is gewoon tuig, net als nazi’s en andere fascisten.’

Er is al het nodige over gezegd. Van een apologie voor Van Rooy die stelt dat het (inderdaad niet zo vreemd in het huidige klimaat) best begrijpelijk is dat mensen geraakt worden door een vrouw die gesluierd is tot een regelrechte aanval op ‘extremist‘ Sam van Rooij, tot een steunbetuiging waarin wordt beweerd dat niqabdraagsters eigenlijk de kiemen en de uitingen zijn van een aanstaande sharia en dat dergelijke vrouwen er dus min of meer zelf om vragen tot verontwaardiging.

Over het filmpje en de vrouwen in dat filmpje valt nog wel het een en ander te zeggen. Weten we eigenlijk wel zeker dat deze vrouwen uit Nederland komen? Eén van de dames droeg een hijab in khaliji style zo wist U.N. mij te vertellen en die komt toch echt vooral in de Golfstaten en Saoedi Arabië voor en veel minder hier. De niqab zoals die in filmpje wordt gedragen is ééndelig in tegenstelling tot de niqab die over het algemeen door enkele vrouwen hier wordt gedragen die vaak bestaat uit een losse gezichtssluier. Verder lijken me de niqabdraagsters wat oudere dames, terwijl de meeste Nederlandse niqabdraagsters toch jongere vrouwen zijn. Of deze vrouwen in het filmpje eigenlijk wel uit Nederland kwamen kan dus betwijfeld worden; wellicht waren ze in Scheveningen de toerist aan het uithangen net als Sam de Rooy. Scheveningen is immers een zandbak aan zee met een publiek uit alle windstreken.

Een ander punt, aan de orde gesteld door Bas Paternotte, is de vraag waarom Van Rooy aan de ene kant (volgens de PVV ideologie) de dames wil bevrijden van hun sluier en ze tegelijkertijd gaat lastigvallen? Bevrijding en lastig vallen (wat een zekere drang inhoudt) gaat volgens velen niet goed samen. We raken hier denk aan een specifiek punt wat we ook kunnen zien bij religieuze en linkse groeperingen die een bepaalde missie hebben. De morele ambitie van mensen die hier deel vanuit maken gaat verder dan de eigen persoonlijkheid, maar heeft ook betrekking op de hoop en verwachting die men heeft ten aanzien van anderen uit de eigen kring en daarbuiten. Met andere woorden, een betere wereld mag misschien wel bij jezelf beginnen maar we bereiken niets als anderen ook niet overtuigd raken door ons gelijk. En als anderen niet overtuigd raken, gaan we er alsnog allemaal aan.

Het typische van wat de PVV doet met haar populistische retoriek is dat vaak wat vage, zogenaamde gezond verstand issues (iets is er niet in orde met die niqabs) en morele issues die we instinctief aanvoelen (onvrede, ongemak) in simpele slogans en simpele goed-kwaad tegenstellingen gegoten worden. In dit geval gebeurt dat in een vertoog over islamisering en op een wijze die demoniserend is.

Op die manier kan het vaak wat diffuse en impliciete onbehagen dat mensen hebben op een sterke manier geuit worden en geeft het eigenlijk ook al onmiddellijk een kader aan voor actie en voor oplossing van ‘het probleem’. Dat is ook precies waar de kracht ligt van de PVV ideologie; een naam geven aan vage gevoelens en ideeën die mensen ook daadwerkelijk hebben. Het filmpje is daar een uiting van (in het geval van Sam van Rooy zelf), en tegelijkertijd dus ook een poging het bredere publiek te laten zien dat de dreiging reëel zou zijn.

Niettemin gaat ook de PVV dit type activisme te ver; zowel het lastigvallen van de dames als de uitlatingen (‘tuig’) worden veroordeeld ook al betreurt men dat de vrouwen een niqab dragen. Dat laatste overtuigt mij niet echt; termen als ‘stemvee’ en ‘kopvod’ zijn nou ook niet echt keurig.  Het filmen van de dames is echter wel een vorm van activisme die de PVV totnutoe helemaal niet heeft laten zien; individuele medewerkers van de PVV dienen niet direct te komen aan de persoonlijke levenssfeer van mensen. Klaarblijkelijk strookt dat niet met hun vorm van politiek die toch vooral vooral verbaal en media-gericht is.

Niettemin of het nu dergelijke filmpjes zijn met begeleidend commentaar of de politieke slogans voor de politieke en mediabühne, er zit wel een risico aan. Weliswaar kun je niet stellen dat Wilders met zijn uitlatingen verantwoordelijk is voor de aanvallen op moskeeën of aanvallen op niqabdraagsters, maar we hoeven nu ook weer niet te doen alsof dergelijke gebeurtenissen uit de lucht komen vallen. Stellen dat de ‘andere kant‘ dat ook doet is behalve een drogreden eigenlijk ook hetzelfde als Van Rooy hier doet en ook hetzelfde als iemand die zegt dat een vrouw die verkracht is er om vroeg omdat ze er zo uitdagend bij liep. Uit het rapport (pp. 48-51) van Annelies Moors blijkt tevens dat vrouwen die niqab dragen last hebben van een vijandige, agressieve en soms zelfs gewelddadige bejegening door de omgeving. Door moslims en niet-moslims. Aangezien vrijwel alle politici er voortdurend op hameren toch echt niks te zien in een burqa of niqab en ook veel vertegenwoordigers van islamitische organisaties dat voortdurend benadrukken, kunnen we ons inmiddels toch afvragen wie er eigenlijk let op de veiligheid van deze dames.

PS

U kunt stoppen met vragen hoe ik aan dat filmpje kom. Ik zie geen enkele reden om dat te vertellen.

3 comments.

Srebrenica – Neither Here Nor There

Posted on July 11th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: anthropology.

On 11 July 1995 one of the worst atrocities since World War II took place in Srebrenica, Bosnia. The Muslim enclave, to be protected by Dutch soldiers for the UN had abandoned the enclave. Muslim men were separated from women and children; it is estimated that about 8.0000 men have been killed.

The film ‘Neither Here Nor There‘ is a portrayal of the struggles of the Selimovic family from Srebrenica, Bosnia, who resettled in Missouri after the worst single act of genocide in Europe since the end of World War II. The film traces the difficulties refugees have starting over in America, and how ties to the past remain an important, unbreakable part of their lives, especially for war refugees.

More than 8,000 men and teenage boys were murdered in Srebrenica in 1995. Many from the small town made the painful decision to seek refugee status in other countries as “ethnic cleansing” continued unabated. Missouri has become home to the largest Bosnian population outside of their homeland. Having survived the mass execution of their family and friends, the Bosnian refugees find themselves struggling to make a new life in Americas heartland.

The past comes back to haunt the family when they learn that DNA testing identified their father in a mass grave. The film follows the Selimovics on their first trip back to their homeland to a mass funeral in Srebrenica and to reunite with other family.

Sometimes a refugee’s home is neither here nor there. It’s somewhere in-between.

(Note: The film includes harrowing footage from the war, including recently discovered video proving mass executions.)

You need to a flashplayer enabled browser to view this YouTube video

Available from: The Videoproject

Running Time: 58 minutes
Gr. 9 – Adult
Closed Captioned
A film by Kerri Yost, Beth Pike, Stephen Hudnell, Elizabeth Federici

“A moving portrait of a family that survived the massacre of Bosnian Muslim men at Srebrenica, the film subtly but effectively explores issues of immigration, war, and memory. Neither Here Nor There is a beautifully told story of a people, an event, and an entire way of life. Scholars, students, and the public should see it, if only to tell themselves ‘never again’ yet again. Suitable for high school classes and for college courses in cultural anthropology, anthropology of ethnicity and ethnic conflict, anthropology of refugees and displaced persons, political anthropology, and European studies, as well as general audiences.”
– Jack David Eller, Anthropology Review Database

“Neither Here Nor There is required viewing for anyone wishing to learn more about the Bosnian genocide. It is especially valuable as an introduction to the challenges that refugees face when acclimating to a new life in the U.S. The film tells its story with compassion, intelligence, directness, and occasional humor.”
-Dr. Benjamin Moore, PhD, Associate Professor of English, Fontbonne University

“In Neither Here Nor There, we come to know the Selimovic family from Srebrenica, and are deeply touched by everything that happens to them. This remarkable film tells their story and why it matters in the larger scheme of things.”
– Patrick McCarthy, author of After the Fall: Srebrenica Survivors in St. Louis

Winner, Best Heartland Feature, Kansas City Film Festival

Note:

The film is well suited for teaching purposes, although the scenes are graphic at times. It includes a good introductory reader although I think for university students some additional reading is required.

1 comment.

Campus Watch, but better – Freedom Party and politics of obstruction

Posted on July 7th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: Guest authors, Headline, State of Science.

Guest Author: Maurits Berger

The conference Applying Sharia in the West organized by me was reason for Geert Wilders’ Freedom Party (PVV) to make use of the parliamentarian right to ask questions to cabinet ministers, in this case the Ministers of Interior and Education. Some questions were based on faulty assumptions (that our conference was organized in conjunction with the European Council for Fatwa and Research, for instance), other questions required some exegesis (for instance, whether the Ministers agreed that the central questions of the conference would be ‘a sign of progressive Islamization in education’).

The way the whole issue was launched by the PVV was typical of this party’s pr-policies: they hurl as set of statements and assumptions into the public domain, which are then quickly reproduced by the media. Insofar as media is interested in facts and backgrounds, they usually do not inquire with the PVV (because they never respond), but to those who stand accused. The no-response policy by the PVV was very effective, because it brought about the wondrous situation of journalists asking what we thought that the PVV ‘may have meant’ by questions that were either lies or incomprehensible.

What took the PVV three seconds to say, took us three days to rectify by means of press releases and answering journalists and the Ministry’s civil servants who had to formulate the formal answer to the parliamentarian inquiries. Why would you respond at all, colleagues asked, why bother if it is all lies anyway? But that was exactly the reason why we had to react: the lies would stick if we did not deny them. And denying lies, it turned out, is not easy.

This method is as effective as it is perverse. It is as if I would call someone on the radio a whoremonger and would then refuse any comment. In normal life I would have been the person who would have to corroborate such a serious accusation. But not in this life, not here in Holland. Not reacting to insinuations is accepting guilt. And accusing, even insulting, has become part of the freedom of speech. So bring in the mud and the slings.

This method is also successful for other reasons. Imagine that your name is mentioned as part of a parliamentarian question. It happened to one of my colleagues at university. He is a specialist of Islam and I had urged him to write more newspaper articles because we, as academics, had a duty to take part in public debates, especially in issues as sensitive as Islam and Muslims. It was our obligation to make the public aware of what is fact and what is falsehood, so I told him. And then one morning he walked into my office, white as a sheet, stuttering that his name and article were subject of parliamentarian questions posed by the PVV. Their statements were – again – false, their arguments – as usual – nonsense, but that was not the issue. The game of blaming and shaming was played, and my colleague will never write again. One-zero for the PVV.

The ingenuity of the perversity gets better. Many colleagues will shrug their shoulders: as long as it does not affect your academic freedom, let them talk their rubbish. But it is not what they say, not even that they say it, but the prolific way of saying it. The incredible repetitiousness of these kinds of nonsense – the PVV is the party that asks by far the most parliamentarian questions – and the constitutional obligation of the Ministers to answer has made people cautious or even fearful. Better not to have such kind of conferences like ours, because it may cause questions being asked in parliament. Civil servants suffer from the same inhibition: we know there is nothing against such conferences, but perhaps it is better not to subsidize such an event because… you know. The self-censorship has kicked in, and the nonsense has become a measure stick in real life.

The most frustrating aspect is that the PVV is not interested in the content of what they criticize. They were of course immediately invited to attend the conference. But none of them appeared, and no one asked for the conference proceedings. It is Islam, Muslims, Sharia and therefore: bad. And who is interested in badness? I used the argument that our rejection of genocide, fascism or serial killers does not preclude our academic interest in these issues. So, even if a party like the PVV abhors Islam as a ‘totalitarian doctrine aiming at domination, violence and oppression’ (from the PVV’s latest election programme), one would expect that they would like to know their enemy. But no.

This puts scholars of Islam in a particular difficult position. At Leiden we have established the Leiden University Center for the Study of Islam and Society (LUCIS) that aims at catering to the societal and political need for background information on Islam and Muslims. We academics at LUCIS want to leave our ivory towers and step into society. But the only arms we have is knowledge, and the only skills we have is to disseminate that knowledge. We are not prepared at all for the kind of onslaught that we receive from organizations like the PVV.

How to respond? And – more important – how do we get the time to respond? How can we turn the tables so that we can give a quick answer in three seconds and oblige the PVV to spend three days substantiating their ludicrous remarks? At present we are not equipped to do so, and as a reaction we mostly retreat back into our ivory tower where we can continue working on our peer-reviewed articles that ultimately will get us more credits within the university.

This situation has been on my mind for years, and as of recent really started to worry me. Because it is not only academics that are being cornered. The self-censorship has become all-pervasive. That means that the PVV is gaining the upperhand with empty rhetoric that we all know to be nonsense. As academics we fail the means to fight it, but neither can we allow ourselves to rely on the smug assumption that truth will prevail. It won’t, because new truths are being created. We need to change logic and methods – the thing is that I do not yet quite know how and what.

Maurits Berger is Professor of Islam in the contemporary West at Leiden University. He was senior research fellow with the Clingendael Institute from 2003-2008. Before that he worked as a lawyer in Amsterdam, and was researcher and journalist in Egypt and Syria for seven years. His expertise is Islamic law (Sharia) and political Islam.

3 comments.

New Book: Local Battles- Global Stakes

Posted on July 5th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: anthropology, Important Publications, ISIM/RU Research, My Research, Religious and Political Radicalization, Young Muslims.

Together with my colleague Edien Bartels I have written a chapter called Submission and a Ritual Murder; The transnational aspects of a local conflict and protest in a volume edited by my colleagues of VU University Amsterdam: Ton Salman and Marjo de Theije.

In this volume Local Battles, Global Stakes. The Globalization of Local Conflicts and the Localization of Global Interests the authors challenge the often held assumption with regard to conflicts around the world that ‘the local’ and ‘the global’ are clearly distinct realms. This is most clearly brought out in phrases about ‘local responses’ to ‘global change’. This book addresses a wealth of cases from around the world that illustrate how local tensions, frictions and open conflicts are not only influenced by outside actors, but how local parties proactively seek to insert their interests in global discourses, if only to strengthen their legitimacy.

This compilation covers issues ranging from religious contentions, ethical controversies, ethnic clashes, and environmental issues in Asia, Latin America, Africa and Europe. Geo-political interference from outside players, material and immaterial support from diasporas, international media articulation of the conflict’s stakes, and international religious proselytising, all co-constitute local disputes. This book shows how local strife is often situated in and shaped by broader political and other contexts.

This book is meant for all scholars and students interested in the real and tangible effects of globalization processes, in particular for anthropologists, political scientists, sociologists and scholars interested in international dimensions of environmental issues, religion, ethnicity and gender.

  • Introduction by Marjo de Theije and Ton Salman

    • Part One: Global Religions, Local Battles
    2
    Edien Bartels and Martijn de Koning, abstract
    Submission and a Ritual Murder; The transnational aspects of a local conflict and protest
    On 2 November 2004, Theo van Gogh, a Dutch columnist, filmmaker and producer of the film Submission was murdered in Amsterdam by a Moroccan-Dutch Muslim. However in order to understand the significance of the film Submission and the murder of its producer, Theo van Gogh, we should look beyond these local and national frames, and beyond the local significance of this conflict. In this chapter we will show how a transnational take on both topics, the film Submission and the murder of Theo van Gogh, can contribute to a better understanding of how and why these local events occurred.

    Keywords: Islam, identity, Muslim youth, terrorism, liberalism.

    3
    Oscar Salemink, abstract
    Changing rights and wrongs: The transnational construction of indigenous and human rights among Vietnam’s Central Highlanders
    In the context of Vietnam’s Central Highlanders’ conflict-ridden relationship with the Vietnamese state and the growing transnational interference by their vociferous diaspora, this paper analyzes particular shifts in the framing of their rights. A notion of collective group rights that are by definition particularistic and exclusive has given way to individual rights (especially religious freedom) that are universal and inclusive. Simultaneously, a localized and communal emphasis has changed to a transnational one oriented toward international fora. Local interests and aspirations thus come to be framed as universal human rights that pertain to individuals, rather than local rights that pertain to collectives. In this light, recent attempts to theorize minority or indigenous rights appear to be ineffective and will probably be counter-productive.

    Keywords: Ethnicity, Human Rights, indigenous rights, Religion, transnationalism.

    4
    Marjo de Theije, abstract
    Local protest and transnational Catholicism in Brazil
    Based on research in Brazil, the author discusses three local situations of conflict and social protest, using a transnational perspective. She concentrates on the use of universal claims of Catholicism in local negotiations of religious change under the influence of different cultural campaigns. The clashes in question are divided into those involving local political problems and those concerning the religious domain itself. The analysis shows that in each of the cases–albeit with different intensity and outcome–the interconnection between translocal processes and the meaning and experience of locality has a significant role in the power plays and the formulations of religious or social protest in the local context.

    Keywords: Brazil, Catholicism, local, protest, transnational.

    Part Two: Family Values, Gendered Morals, Contested Ethics
    5
    Claudia Fonseca, abstract
    Protest Against Adoption in Brazil: A “Global” Presence in “Local” Matters
    As we trace the processes that have influenced the recent evolution of child placement policies in Brazil – from plenary adoption and foster care to family preservation – we observe how these technologies of government, designed to smooth over disputes involving issues of class and nationality, combine “external” with national inputs. Relevant actors range from international celebrities to local specialists (social workers, NGO volunteers, and judicial officials) and journalists who may themselves circulate through international decision-making sites.  Finally, the inclusion in our analysis of the role and understandings of birth families – politically, the bottom rung in adoption procedures — leads to the hypothesis that strategic alliances between local and international protest movements may exert an influence in the formation of national policies that may, at least momentarily, perturb traditional hierarchies of power.

    Keywords: Technologies of government, transnational adoption, protest movements, child rights, global assemblages.

    6
    Pinkaew Laungaramsri    , abstract
    Imagining nation: Women’s rights and the transnational movement of Shan women in Thailand and Burma
    This article explores the relationship between women, nation, nationalism, and transnational women’s practice through the Shan women’s movement in Thailand, particularly the international campaign to stop the systematic rape of Shan women by Burmese soldiers. Employing a feminist critique of nationalism, the article argues that transnational networks allow for the negotiation between national, local, and women’s identities. Whereas the authoritative power of nationalism continues to suppress and silence the transnational subjectivity of women, the Shan women’s movement represents a transnational attempt to contest the confinement of women’s subjectivities within the territorialized nation-state.

    Keywords: gender, nation, rape, refugees, transnationalism.

    7
    Halleh Ghorashi and Nayereh Tavakoli, abstract
    Paradoxes of transnational space and local activism: Iranians organizing across borders
    The Iranian revolution of 1979 promised to bring freedom and equality, but as soon as one group gained power, it turned out to be oppressive of both its political opposition and women. This resulted in the formation of a large Iranian diaspora bound together by its hatred for the Iranian regime. Years of suppression in the 1980s in Iran resulted in a deep gap between Iranians living inside and outside Iran. During the 1990s, however, cross-border relationships started to change as a result of two major factors: transnational activities and the influence of cyberspace. This paper focuses on the paradoxes of transnational connections in local protest with a focus on the women’s movement. We show both how transnational links have empowered women activists in Iran and how they have led to new dangers at the local level. We also reveal how support from the Iranian diaspora can be patronizing as well as supportive.

    Keywords: cyberspace, Iranian diaspora, Iranian revolution, Iranian women’s movement, Iranian Women’s Studies Foundation.

    8
    Martha Cecilia Ruiz and Lorraine Nencel, abstract
    Sex Work(er): The struggles of a global concept
    This chapter aims to trace the travels of the global concept sex work(er). This political concept is globally used by women working in the sex industry to organize and fight for rights and social respect. It is also a concept challenging past and present discourses on “sexual slavery”. We focus on the global and local struggles of the concept in regard to its acceptance and incorporation in global and local discourse. For this objective we frame this chapter in a theoretical approach built on the ideas of travelling theories; a framework offered as an alternative to the cultural imperialism critique of global feminism. Travelling theories recognizes the interconnectedness of the global and local but does not assume that the concepts are imposed and/or imitated when they reach their local destination. To illustrate how the concept sex work(er) has circualted not only from North to South but also within the South, we elaborate on a particular case, the Sex Workers Movement of Machala, Ecuador – one of the earliest founded organizations on the Latin American continent.

    Keywords: Sexwork(er), transnational migration, travelling theories.

    Part Three: Belonging Amidst Scattered Boundaries / Global Ammunition, Local Essentialisms
    9
    Karsten Paerregaard, abstract
    Transnational crossfire: Local, national and global conflicts in Peruvian migration
    This chapter argues that globalization processes are shaped by friction and exclusion as much as fluidity and inclusion and that conflict therefore is integral parts of population movements, especially when this evolves in a transnational context. By applying a transnational approach the chapter brings to the fore how tensions are negotiated, contested and reinterpreted not merely in a local but also in a regional, national and international context. More specifically, it examines the transnational network of Peruvian migrants who work as sheepherders in the United States and examines the conflicts that this migration practice generates in both Peru and the United States. The chapter concludes that the tensions that occur on the sheep ranches not only cause a divide within the migrant community itself but also trigger a political crisis on a national level in Peru and an international strife between Peru and the United States.

    Keywords: transnational, sheepherders, conflict, Peru, United States.

    10
    Lenie Brouwer, abstract
    Jokes, raps and transnational orientations – Protests of Dutch-Moroccan youths in the Debate on Islam
    Islam is today one of the most discussed topics in Dutch national newspapers and internet discussion groups. In this public debate the Muslim-voice is underrepresented, more in particular, the views of Muslim youngsters. The polarised debate and the current policy measures deepens the division between non-Muslims and Muslims, between ‘us’ and ‘them’, and fosters the highlighting of one specific identity that seems best suited to counter the accusations: that of being a Muslim. This makes Islam more attractive as a vehicle to reject all these accusations. The reactions of young Muslims or Dutch Moroccans are analysed in a media-technology context, a computer clubhouse in Amsterdam and Moroccan websites.  It is argued that Dutch Moroccan youths perceive Islam more and more as an appealing religion, as a motive of pride, in response to the negative image of Islam and the social exclusion of Muslims in the West.

    Keywords: Islam, Muslim youth, the Netherlands, media-technology, religious identity.

    11
    Ellen Bal and Kathinka Sinha-Kerkhoff, abstract
    British Indians in colonial India and Surinam: transnational identification and estrangement
    The authors present a case study of Indian nationalists who drew from a discourse on ‘exploited overseas Indian migrants’ to serve their own political interests. At the same time, overseas British Indians, in this case in Surinam, advocated the continuation of transnational relations between (British) India and Surinam in order to strengthen the position of their community locally. Clearly, for some time, transnational identification served the (national) interests of both groups in the two different nations. Yet, the authors also show that when such transnational ‘solutions’ did not serve any longer to solve local problems, estrangement between the two communities followed. Theoretically, this article constitutes a synthesis of approaches that connect identities to specific places and theories that have abandoned the study of geographically-based national societies. It demonstrates how the politics of place is dominant even within the field of transnational alliances.

    Keywords: estrangement, identity politics, overseas Indians, place, transnational identification.

    12
    Ton Salman, abstract
    Narrow margins, stern sovereignty: Juxtaposing transnational and local features of Bolivia’s crisis
    This article argues that the current Bolivian political crisis is ‘made’ both internally and abroad. Yet it is much more than a simple adding up of the two constituent factors: external influences are always mediated by local actors. Local actors turn these influences into meaningful issues and demands in the Bolivian political context. These actors, in turn, are co-constituted by external forces, as is the case with the prominent indigenous movements in the country: their self-awareness and identity politics in part depend upon support and discourses of a transnational nature. The fact that these indigenous movements insist on sovereignty and self-determination with regard to the use of Bolivia’s natural resources is a case in point. This demand, at the same time, is articulated in a setting in which this sovereignty suffers from tightening margins due to the external obligation to restructure both the state and the economy.

    Keywords: crisis of democracy, neo-liberalism, political protest, transnationalism.

    13
    Folkje Lips, abstract
    Stretching the margins of tolerated criticism: Using non-Cuban music in local protest
    This article presents music in Cuba as being more than just a sound and Cuban musicians as being more than mere entertainers. By choosing foreign music-genres as identity-markers, Cuban musicians and their audience express a critical awareness about their socio-political reality. Depending on the extent to which they want to employ this awareness to influence local concepts of society and politics, they modify and adapt their music to fit Cubaneity. Although critical awareness is not something the Cuban government will normally allow to be displayed, these musicians seem to enjoy some leeway. By examining two transnational musical genres, hip-hop and rock music, this article shows two different ways to find and widen the boundaries of the admissible in Cuba.

    Keywords: Cuba, Cubaneity, Hip-hop, Rock, Protest, State-control.

    Part Four: The Contested Ground of Environmental Values
    14
    Marja Spierenburg, Conrad Steenkamp, and Harry Wels, abstract
    Resistance of local communities against marginalization in the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation Area
    The Great Limpopo is one of the largest Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCA) in the world, encompassing vast areas in South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique. The TFCA concept is embraced by practically all (international) conservation agencies. The rationale for the support is that the boundaries of ecosystems generally do not overlap with those of the nation-state. Their protection requires transnational cooperation. By arguing that local communities living in or close to TFCAs will participate and benefit economically, TFCA proponents claim social legitimacy for the project. However, analysis shows that communities first have to live up to rigid standards and requirements set by the international conservation authorities, before they are considered ‘fit’ to participate. Communities attempt to resist this type of marginalization by forming alliances with (inter)national development and human rights NGOs, with mixed results.

    Keywords: NGOs, resistance, sustainable development, transfrontier conservation, transnationalism.

    15
    Julia M. Wittmayer and Bram Büscher, abstract
    Conserving conflict? Transfrontier conservation, development discourses and local conflict between South Africa and Lesotho
    Since the early 1980s, South Africa and Lesotho have tried to find ways to jointly conserve the Maloti-Drakensberg mountain ecosystem that runs across their shared boundary. Recently, the countries completed the first phase of the ‘Maloti-Drakensberg transfrontier conservation and development project’ (MDTP) that besides conservation aims to reduce poverty through ecotourism and increase international cooperation. This chapter describes and analyses how discourses of conservation and development in the project both cement and complicate transnational relations and how these in turn articulate with, shape and are shaped by ‘the local’. The ‘local’ in Lesotho, in turn, can never be understood without drawing South Africa into the equation, for one because of the many Basotho that have always worked in South African mines, so providing their families with crucial livelihood support. Recently, however, massive retrenchments have forced numerous Basotho men to return to their families and try to again fit in locally. Focussing on the people living around the north-eastern boundary of Lesotho, we show how conflictual situations put the spotlight on the ways in which ‘the local’ in Lesotho deals with dual forces of localisation and transnationalisation. We argue that local people accommodate, even appropriate, these dual pressures by adopted an increasingly flexible stance in terms of identity, alliances and discourses. This in turn allows them to increase their livelihood options. In contrast, by being more focused on the level of discourse rather than these contradicting dynamics on the local level, the MDTP intervention planners, have decreased the likelihood of attaining their objectives.

    Keywords: Conflicts, Transfrontier Conservation, development, South Africa, Lesotho.

    The book can be ordered at VU University Publishers € 39,95 or at internet bookstores

    1 comment.

    Voorbij de vrijheid van meningsuiting van Wilders

    Posted on July 2nd, 2011 by martijn.
    Categories: Multiculti Issues, Public Islam.

    Foto via @ehsanjami1985 in Den Haag

    Zo’n rechtszaak als die tegen Wilders (of welke dan ook) is te zien als een soort van ritueel; verschillende spelers nemen deel aan een juridische dans die een bepaalde gestandaardiseerde vorm kent met voortdurende herhalingen en die een soort integratieve functie heeft. Complexe conflicten worden geritualiseerd: in een rechtszaak tot een oplossing gebracht waar alle partijen zich bij neer dienen te leggen. Alle deelnemers verbinden zich om op een bepaalde manier hun conflict naar voren te brengen (geformaliseerd gedrag; en als je je daar niet helemaal aanhoudt zoals de burgerlijke partijen met Enait e.a. dan wordt je op z’n minst geridiculiseerd of het leidt zelfs tot wraking van de rechters) in een aanklacht en een verdediging (de basistegenstellingen) zoals altijd wordt gedaan ook in andere rechtszaken (herhaling) die plaatsvinden in een specifieke plaats en een specifieke opeenvolging van fases kennen door middel van het voorlezen van de aanklacht, openingspleidooi, repliek, slotpleidooi enzovoorts (herordenen van tijd en plaats) en door bijvoorbeeld een duidelijke scheiding aan te brengen in de tafels van de officier en rechters en specifieke kledij voor de professionals (gebruik van symbolische praktijken). Op die manier wordt het grotere conflict ook gemaskeerd en van de scherpe kantjes ontdaan. Op een rituele manier wordt daarom de bestaande sociale orde genaturaliseerd: zo doen we de dingen hier, daar liggen de grenzen en bepaalde personen staan in hun recht en anderen niet en bepaalde rechten en plichten gaan boven andere. In die zin is een ritueel gericht op het bereiken en bevestigen van maatschappelijke consensus en hiërarchie.

    Niettemin alle rituelen hebben ook een disintegratieve functie; één die meer te maken heeft met tweespalt dan met consensus. De heftige discussies over de nut, noodzaak en wenselijkheid van het proces tegen Wilders laten dat ook zien; is het een politiek proces? Wordt de vrijheid van meningsuiting bedreigd? We zouden een vergelijking kunnen maken met de rechtszaak tegen OJ Simpson in de VS. Die bittere rechtszaak vestigde eerder de aandacht op een onderliggend probleem (de relaties tussen blank en zwart) dan dat het sociale vrede bracht. Dat is natuurlijk ook het geval bij Wilders. Het gaat daarbij deels om het conflict over de islam in de samenleving, de status van islam en meer in het algemeen ook de positie van religie in de samenleving. Niet voor niets dat het OM waarschijnlijk weinig zin had in de zaak en dat ook Wilders’ tegenstanders er juist voor vreesden dat het conflicten zou aanwakkeren.

    Niettemin de deelname aan het ritueel zelf heeft al zo’n normbevestigende en integratieve rol; conflicten worden opgelost via het recht en niet via geweld, dreigementen, enzovoorts. In die zin was de rechtszaak dus helemaal niet zo slecht; links Nederland, moslim Nederland en rechts Nederland nam gezamenlijk deel aan een ritueel waarbij men zich van te voren verbond aan de uitspraak en de procedure. Er zijn in dit land wel eens problemen op een andere beslecht. In plaats van een lijk ligt er nu dus een uitspraak van een rechter die helder is, maar niettemin ook toch wel wat vraagtekens oproept. De rechter plaatst terecht de uitspraken van Wilders in de context; van de specifieke artikelen en lezingen en in die van het maatschappelijk en politiek debat in het geheel. Dat laatste brengt echter wel een specifiek probleem met zich mee: Wilders is immers één van de aanjagers van dat debat en zet met zijn harde toon en hele en halve leugens de agenda van het debat. Zo vergelijkt Wilders islam met fascisme en communisme en stelt dat we er ook op dezelfde manier mee om moeten gaan. Helaas hebben ‘we’ het fascisme en communisme niet (alleen) verslagen door thee te drinken met fascisten en communisten, maar (ook) door geweld. Een dergelijke uitspraak is wel degelijk te zien als een oproep tot geweld, weliswaar op indirecte wijze en andere uitspraken liggen op z’n minst gevaarlijk dicht tegen racisme aan.

    Eén van de resultaten van dit ritueel is nu ook dat politici getransformeerd zijn tot een soort van heilige functionarissen die de voorhoede vormen van het maatschappelijk debat, die de kern vormen van dat maatschappelijk debat en er ook nog eens door beschermd worden. Op deze manier kunnen zij het hele proces van betekenisgeving op nationaal niveau domineren en beschermen zij en vestigen zij hun positie als gezaghebbende figuren. Zij praten niet namens zichzelf en wellicht niet eens namens hun partij; nee namens het hele volk en de vrijheid van meningsuiting. Het hele idee is dat dit altijd al een normale gang van zaken is (zij zijn ‘immers’ de stem van het volk en die is cruciaal in een democratie). De betekenis die Wilders gaf aan het proces, een aanval op de vrijheid van meningsuiting, is een voorbeeld van het creëren van een mythe. Niet in de zin van iets dat niet bestaat, maar een mythe in de zin van zo zijn de dingen, zo zijn we hier gekomen en dit is de betekenis. In het geval van Wilders gaat om een mythe die ertoe bijdraagt dat zijn positie als vertegenwoordiger van het volk voorop staat (en niet als ordinaire damschreeuwer)  en ons verblindt voor het feit dat voor hem dat volk bestaat uit de blanke niet-islamitische Henk en Ingrid. Of ons zicht wegneemt op het gegeven  dat hij de belangen van Israël verdedigd (in zijn optiek althans). Of alleen zijn eigen positie. Voor de politici aan de andere kant in het proces, zoals Mohammed Rabbae, kan een soortgelijke analyse gemaakt worden natuurlijk; ook zij creeeren mythes als strijders tegen racisme en haat. In een mythe worden betekenissen naar voren geschoven en krijgen personen een eigen rol toegewezen. Dat er andere interpretaties mogelijk zijn blijft buiten beschouwing. Een heel ander perspectief op politici is namelijk dat zij vanwege hun positie juist terughoudend moeten zijn in hun taalgebruik want zij spreken niet namens het volk, maar het volk volgt hen. Of door de toenemende personalisering van de politiek (waarbij de persoon van politici belangrijker wordt en sommige een echte celebrity status krijgen) spreken zij niet namens het volk maar vooral namens zichzelf en hun eigen status.

    Hoewel een ritueel dus bepaalde integratieve elementen heeft, creëert en legitimeert het dus ook een hiërarchische orde in de samenleving zoals nu met de politici die een speciale status hebben gekregen. Waar aan de ene kant de politici een bijna heilige positie hebben gekregen, is de positie van linkse en islamitische organisaties die het proces wilden enorm gelegitimeerd. Deels door hun opmerkelijke optredens tijdens de rechtszaak, maar zeker ook omdat men de rechtszaak überhaupt wilde. Nu denk ik niet dat een juridisering van politiek een oplossing is voor de samenleving en voor de politieke conflicten daarin, maar die kritiek op hun rechtsgang wringt ook een beetje. Het is immers hun goed recht om deel te nemen aan dergelijke processen en ze te initiëren als men vindt dat het politieke debat buiten alle proporties is. Of is het conflict tussen links en rechts en moslims en niet-moslims inmiddels zo scherp geworden dat we een partij vragen af te zien van hun recht?

    Met name voor moslims komt daar nog iets anders bij (ook al waren velen tegen dit proces zo heb ik gemerkt). Na de kalme reactie van moslims op Fitna stelde Hirsi Ali dat provoceren had gewerkt; zonder te provoceren hadden moslims nooit hun lesje geleerd. Ook politici prezen de moslims voor hun kalme reactie. Inderdaad men had zo goed als niets gedaan om Fitna tegen te houden en zich vooral toegelegd op het rustig houden van de achterban. Maar als moslims nu wel eens hun politieke stem willen laten horen omdat men genoeg heeft van de beledigingen? Is dat dan een teken van integratie of juist niet? En als men dat via de democratische weg doet? Het lijkt er momenteel vooral op dat het anti-radicaliseringsbeleid en het integratiebeleid er vooral op gericht zijn dat moslims zich koest houden. Dat verklaart misschien ook de opvallende afwezigheid van enige bespiegelingen over politieke participatie van moslims in de recente integratienotitie van Donner, zoals hoogleraar Jean Tillie recent al opmerkte. Bijzonder in dit verband is ook het optreden van het OM; eigenlijk de grote dissonant in het hele ritueel. Eerst maakt de politie het makkelijk voor mensen om aangifte te doen naar aanleiding van Fitna. Dat is al vreemd; men wist immers niet eens wat er in die film zat. Ook dat wekt de suggestie dat men vooral wil dat moslims zich koest houden (en daarmee het onterechte beeld versterkend dat moslims in Nederland voortdurend boos over straat gaan); ditmaal via de juridische weg. Vervolgens snijdt men echter de gang naar de rechter af door de aangiften te seponeren. En wanneer men dan toch moet, vraagt men om vrijspraak. Van de kritische houding die de rechter aannam was bij het OM nauwelijks nog iets te bespeuren. Kritiek op het OM was daarbij tijdens de rechtszaak niet toegestaan. Het OM versterkt daarmee de aantijging dat men vooral politiek bezig was; eerst door aangifte makkelijk te maken (tegen Wilders) en vervolgens door geen serieuze rol te spelen in het proces (en daarmee eigenlijk de rol van benadeelde partijen onmogelijk te maken).

    Dat wil niet natuurlijk zeggen dat met een andere rol van het OM de uitspraak anders geweest zou zijn. Het is gewoon heel moeilijk om iemand te veroordelen op basis van zijn/haar eigen mening. En niet alleen in Nederland. In Spanje werden recent twee boekhandelaren vrijgesproken die racistische en anti-semitische literatuur verkochten. In Australië werd een christelijk kerkgenootschap vrijgesproken van ‘religious vilification’ van moslims (waarbij er volgens mij later nog wel een bemiddeling plaatsvond). En juist de beschuldigingen dat het een politiek proces is (pro of anti Wilders) maakt het punt sterk dat je geen politieke debatten moet verplaatsen naar de rechtszaak; dat is alsof je twee rituelen die niet bij elkaar horen gaat vermengen. Dat kan, maar dat vraagt om onvoorziene en wellicht zelfs averechtse effecten. Strafrecht lijkt met andere woorden gewoon niet de meest handige methode om haatuitingen aan banden te leggen; ook al is het door de uitspraak wel degelijk helder dat er grenzen zijn en dat er niet zoiets bestaat als een absoluut recht op vrijheid van meningsuiting. Ik vind het afschaffen van de wetgeving daaromtrent overigens ook niet zo’n goed idee; de geschiedenis heeft geleerd wat de kracht van woorden kan zijn en dat is ook precies de reden dat Europa dergelijke wetgeving heeft (en wellicht daarom ook gevoeliger is voor anti-semitische haat?). Daarbij maakt de huidige wetgeving politiek debat helemaal niet onmogelijk; de laatste jaren is er immers gewoon een keihard debat geweest en de uitspraak heeft nog eens bevestigd dat dit mogelijk is. Niettemin is de wetgeving gebaseerd op het beschermen van minderheden tegen haatspraak door de meerderheid (ook al werkt het in de praktijk breder). Dat werkt dus amper en misschien is het tijd voor minister Donner om toch maar eens een paragraaf over politieke participatie van minderheden op te nemen in integratienotitie met daarin serieuze plannen voor het verbeteren van en vergroten van politieke participatie van moslims.

    Daarbij bedoel ik niet het volgende:
    Sheikh Fawaz over oordeel rechtbank

    “Maar ja, aan de andere kant zet de rechtbank met dit oordeel de deuren wijd open voor provocaties. Een uitgelezen kans voor ons om daar ‘dankbaar’ gebruik van te maken. Oog om oog, tand om tand, provocatie om provocatie en haatzaaierij om haatzaaierij.”

    Maar met dit is niks mis mee:

    Verder heeft Sheikh Fawaz in zijn preek een oproep gedaan aan de moslimjongeren om zich klaar te maken voor het bieden van een weerwoord. Hij heeft ze geadviseerd om in navolging van de jongeren in de Arabische wereld de websites, Facebook en Twitter op te zoeken om hun ongenoegen hierover te uiten. Om maatschappelijke druk uit te oefenen op de overheid en onze rechten vreedzaam af te dwingen. De Sheikh voegde daaraan toe dat wij moeten laten zien dat onze gemeenschap het schofferen van ons geloof niet langer zal tolereren.

    Met andere woorden zoals een Britse collega van mij recent stelde: ‘in plaats van een beperking van de meningsuiting voor de dominante groep een stimulans voor de meningsuiting van de minderheden.’

    1 comment.