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Posted on June 27th, 2012 by martijn.
Categories: Misc. News.
There is an interesting story on Al Jazeera about St. John’s Cathedral in the city of Den Bosch, the Netherlands, after the church commissioned a strange sculpture – a young winged woman, talking on a mobile phone. High on a 13th century Dutch cathedral, the sculpture in has attracted worldwide attention, prompting the cathedral to set up an official “angel” hotline, with calls from as far as China and Latin America.
Posted on June 23rd, 2012 by martijn.
Categories: anthropology, ISIM/RU Research, Multiculti Issues, Notes from the Field, Young Muslims.
This has been a very rewarding two weeks in England. After participating in a seminar on Monday 11 June I stayed for two more weeks. I wanted to do a follow up on my last visit to London, Birmingham and Leicester when I spoke with Muslims from the Netherlands who migrated to these cities. Read about that visit HERE and HERE. Short impression of this last visit follows below.
Research
The seminar in London was meant to work on a proposal for a new research project on integration (yes another one). A few people already know what this will be about but it is in such a premature stadium that I cannot say too much about it, except that it will be innovative, topical and so on…of course.
‘Living easy’
I had several meetings with Salafi Muslims from the Netherlands (from different backgrounds). These meetings were in a friendly atmosphere; with a few people it was mostly catching up where we left last time and I also met a few new informants. The stories by these persons differ strongly from the other talks I had (see below). In this case it involved people who were already above 20 years old when they left the Netherlands, they left voluntarily between 2 and 10 years ago. Some travel back and forth to the Netherlands but all of them appear to have chosen for England although the idea of migrating to an Islamic country is cherished by them. Most important difference according to them with life in the Netherlands is that they all are relatively anonymous in England. Either they are not bothered by intra-salafi politics and quarrels or they do not feel bothered by what they perceive as an intolerant climate in the Netherlands in which all kinds of negative definitions of identity and Islam are imposed upon them. Or both. Since the Salafi movement is the main target of the Dutch counter-radicalization policy and so-called ‘orthodox’ (meaning radical) religion is regarded as a security issue here, their impression might not be that strange. As such they find life easier moreover because they encounter more Muslims and better established (Salafi) Muslim communities here and they feel that their life style and outward appearances does not raise eyebrows as much as it does in the Netherlands.
‘The Netherlands is paradise’
The Salafis I have spoken to did certainly not regard England as paradise; they see too many problems for that such as crime, alcohol abuse, dirty neighbourhoods and so on. The others I have spoken to did see the Netherlands as a utopia. People are nicer, social, know each other, and so on. This rather ideal image of the Netherlands has probably something to do with the fact that they migrated to England when they were around 8-12 years old; a few even thinking they would only go for a long holiday. Their parents decided to migrate to England because they believed England would give them much more opportunities than the Netherlands. And although this group has a lot of negative things to say about England and is mostly positive about the Netherlands, also among them the discourse of opportunities is very strong as I already indicated last time. This is very remarkable at times for example when they talk about education. They are very positive about education in the Netherlands which is much better: better teachers, higher level, schools also teaching norms and values and so on; England is seen as the opposite. But still they believe that also in English education (although it is framed by some as a system of dumbing down) they have more chances. This is partly seen as a feature of the British system that appears to be more open and because they did not feel appreciated and recognized in the Netherlands. England offers much more security when it comes to be guarded againt discrimination (a point also made by the Salafis).
The educational system is appears to be a real issue in England. I spoke to one person who is teaching about youth work and we talked a little bit about education in England and problems with youth work; the latter having been severely hit by the cutbacks. This will be one of the issues I will pursue further because it gives some perspective to the stories of those who complain so much about England and offers some insight into the institutional and social challenges they face.
Living the Muslim life
Where both groups ‘meet’ each other is when they talk about religious life in England. As said above they feel protected in the England while in particular the Salafis complain about the loss of the once so tolerant country the others also signal that things have changed in the Netherlands. Although both groups do recognise a strong exclusion based upon race in daily life in England they feel very confident about being protected against anti-Islam discrimination (notwithstanding the rise of organisations such as the English Defense League (EDL). According to most of my interlocutors because there are more Muslims and better established Muslim organisations there is more of a Muslim life here whereby they are not bothered by questions of loyalty or having to account for everything. It does appear that most of them live relatively isolated from non-Muslims certainly in areas such Small Heath in Birmingham.
Setting the research agenda
I have used my visit last year and this one to establish new contacts and re-affirm old relationships. Both were meant to explore the possibilities for research and most meetings were rather unstructured; there were issues that came up and I responded to that. Now having a sort of basic list of topics and themes the third visit (probably in October or November) will have more structured meetings with a clearer involvement by me meant to go a little deeper into a few themes; this has to lead up to an article for an academic journal for which I have a clear idea now. This will be preceeded maybe by an article in a Dutch magazine on Middle East and Islam (ZemZem).
So this will be continued. For now, I would like to say thanks to everyone who was willing to talk to me, take me into their city and show me something of their lives in England. Thanks for making my stay very pleasant, useful and inspiring. iA we meet again in October / November.
Posted on June 22nd, 2012 by martijn.
Categories: Multiculti Issues.
Vandaag zag ik op Twitter een foto genomen in Rotterdam, voorbij komen met daarbij de boodschap dat dit Nederland niet meer is. Wat maakt voor mensen Nederland tot Nederland. Welk straatbeeld hoort daarbij? En als gevolg daarvan, wie horen er nog wel bij en wie niet? En waarom?
Ik vroeg de persoon in kwestie dus waarom hij vond dat dit geen Nederland was. Dus de vraag is aan u, is dit Nederland ja of nee en waarom?
Het gaat om deze foto:
En heeft u andere foto’s die aangeven wat Nederland wel of niet is? Dump uw foto’s en opmerkingen in de comments of mail me via het contactformulier.
En als u uw antwoord heeft, maakt het dan ook nog uit dat het gerelateerd is aan deze context: HIER.
Posted on June 22nd, 2012 by martijn.
Categories: Multiculti Issues.
Vandaag zag ik op Twitter een foto genomen in Rotterdam, voorbij komen met daarbij de boodschap dat dit Nederland niet meer is. Wat maakt voor mensen Nederland tot Nederland. Welk straatbeeld hoort daarbij? En als gevolg daarvan, wie horen er nog wel bij en wie niet? En waarom?
Ik vroeg de persoon in kwestie dus waarom hij vond dat dit geen Nederland was. Dus de vraag is aan u, is dit Nederland ja of nee en waarom?
Het gaat om deze foto:
En heeft u andere foto’s die aangeven wat Nederland wel of niet is? Dump uw foto’s en opmerkingen in de comments of mail me via het contactformulier.
En als u uw antwoord heeft, maakt het dan ook nog uit dat het gerelateerd is aan deze context: HIER.
Posted on June 20th, 2012 by martijn.
Categories: Activism, Notes from the Field.
An interesting initiatief launched today in the Netherlands that expresses and calls for solidarity with the Palestinian hungerstrikers: Sarsak90
Their press release:
Dutch politicians and other prominent citizens have participated in a video protesting against the ongoing Israeli practice of administrative detention of Palestinian civilians. In this short film by Dutch filmmaker Abdelkarim El-Fassi, former prime minister Dries van Agt and members of Dutch Parliament Harry van Bommel of the Socialist Party and Tofik Dibi of the Green Left, have expressed their dismay over this issue. They voiced serious concerns about the treatment of Mahmoud Al Sarsak, who recently became the longest hunger striker in history by refusing food for 93 days. He forced a deal on June 18th for his release from Israeli prison on July 10th, in exchange for ending his hunger strike.
Even though 25-year old Mahmoud Al Sarsak, university student and member of the Palestinian National Football team, has ended his hunger strike, his impressive protest through the refusal of food has played an important role in exposing the practice of detention of Palestinian civilians without proper trial or charges. Thousands of Palestinian political prisoners this year have waged hunger strikes against their ordeal of unwarranted imprisonment, some of them making headlines worldwide, most notably Khader Adnan and Hana el Shalabi.
Despite their actions having drawn the attention of media and governments all over the world, no effective action has been taken at a political level to address and end the wanton practice by the Israeli regime of detaining Palestinian civilians arbitrarily, often without official charges or due process.
The fact that Mahmoud Al Sarsak has been able to force a deal for his release, has not affected filmmaker El-Fassi’s decision to publish his video. ‘The story of Mahmoud Al Sarsak illustrates the situation of so many other Palestinians, who are sometimes being detained for years in a row without a proper trial. No human being should need to go on such a long hunger strike to force a deal for his or her release, especially if the incarceration itself is already unjustified. I am relieved that Sarsak achieved this release deal, but this does not exempt Israel from well-founded criticism over an ongoing inhumane practice.’
Some Palestinian prisoners are still on hunger strike, like Akram Rikhawi, who is entering his 68th day, and Samer Al Barq, who renewed his hunger strike on May 21st after already having participated in the mass hunger strike by prisoners from April 17th until May 14th.
In the video, people are seen wearing an orange t-shirt in the style of the Dutch national soccer team, with the number 90 – referring to the period of the hungerstrike – and Mahmoud Al Sarsak’s name written on the back of it. Sarsak was on his way to play in a football match in Balata refugee camp in the West Bank, when he was arrested at Erez checkpoint. His detention was extended every six months.
On the date of his release, Sarsak will have completed an almost full three years of imprisonment under Israel’s “Unlawful Combatants Law,” which allows for Palestinians from the Gaza Strip to be detained for an unlimited amount of time without charge or trial. This law can be seen as an even stricter version of the one that provides for the administrative detention of Palestinians from the West Bank, offering even less legal protection for the detainees.
According to International Law, the denial of a fair trial constitutes a ‘grave breach’ of the Fourth Geneva Convention, making it one of the most serious forms of war crimes. It also violates Articles 9 and 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In a September 2008 resolution, the European Union called upon Israel to end the use of ‘administrative detention orders’. It has become obvious that the state of Israel is systematically ignoring these calls, and that stronger words and actions are needed to force its compliance with International Law.
The video will be released on YouTube and www.sarsak90.org, and is expected to draw attention due to the participation of high-profile politicians and its soccer-themed approach, with the ongoing European Championships in Poland and Ukraine.
And here’s the video:
Posted on June 15th, 2012 by martijn.
Categories: Misc. News.
Sometimes you come across an excellent piece of new, innovating research. One such example is the research project Analysing Social Media Collaboration of Professor Procter and his team of the University of Manchester Dr Alex Voss from St Andrews University. Together with Dr Alex Voss from St Andrews University, Dr Farida Vis from The University of Leicester and others they did research on twitter and the riots in England last year Reading the Riots:
Twitter and the riots: how the news spread | UK news | The Guardian
An in-depth analysis of a database of more than 2.6m riot-related tweets has revealed the ways in which the network was used during the disturbances. “Politicians and commentators were quick to claim that social media played an important role in inciting and organising riots, calling for sites such as Twitter to be closed should events of this nature happen again. But our study has found no evidence of significance in the available data that would justify such a course of action in respect to Twitter,” said Prof Rob Procter of the University of Manchester, who led a team of academics conducting the analysis. “In contrast, we do find strong evidence that Twitter was a valuable tool for mobilising support for the post-riot clean-up and for organising specific clean-up activities.” The study, conducted as part of Reading the Riots, the Guardian and London School of Economics investigation into the riots, was based on a database provided by Twitter.
Using Twitter data on a large scale is not done that often I think. At Researching Social Media Farida Vis explains some things with regard to methodology:
Reading the Riots on Twitter: who tweeted the riots? « researching social media
The full set of tweets came from around 700,000 individual users, producing an expected very long tail. In discussion with The Guardian we looked at those accounts that received the most mentions, initially focusing on the top accounts (more than 500 mentions initially, as well as the top 200 and top 1000 most mentioned accounts). I feel that we should also try to look at a range of other samples, to see what is going on in that very long tail or even with those accounts that are frequently mentioned, but do not make the top 1000 accounts (which have at least 182 mentions each). It would be good to be able to compare the top of the tail to the middle and the end as well, with a two more (stratified) randomly selected samples for 500 accounts each for example. My feeling is that doing this will reveal a number of things. As the top accounts mainly contain elite UK users (for obvious reasons), these other samples will add a potentially stronger international dimension (media outlets, journalists, bloggers and so on) as well as more non elite UK based users and offer a more complex picture of how the riots were tweeted.
At Lift12 Farida Vis gave a detailed and fascinating account of what happened:
The full visualization (yes my dear colleagues, with a note to myself, this is how visualization should be done) can be found on the site of the Guardian. It should not come as a suprise that these researchers won an award for this research:
Winners of the inaugural Data Journalism Awards announced | News | guardian.co.uk
Jury comments:
This jumps out as the most original and compelling piece of data journalism and visualisation.
Peter Barron, Google
Visually compelling and intuitive but, more importantly, the visualisation helps to reveal trends and meaning that would not have been possible using traditional narrative techniques. The use of bubble graphics and organic growth also elegantly reinforce the message that rumours can mimic organisms.
Justin Arenstein, African News Innovation Challenge
Congratulations to a job well done. I hope we will see more of this research and that it will inspire other colleagues to explore new avenues of research as well.
Posted on June 11th, 2012 by martijn.
Categories: Multiculti Issues, Notes from the Field, Religious and Political Radicalization.
A few weeks ago the organizations Sharia4Belgium and Sharia4Holland organized the Global Khilafah conference. Sharia4Belgium and Sharia4Holland are both linked to Islam4UK led by Anjem Choudhary (which is to be traced back to the British Al Muhajiroun organizations). Sharia4Belgium and Sharia4Holland can both be seen as militant organizations in a political sense meaning that they engage in the political debates with a confrontational style, often experienced by outsiders as extremely provocative. In their ideology they appear to aim at a total transformation of society in line with their politico-religious convictions in which tawhid (unity and uniqueness of God) is central and which is translated into a call to implement sharia (without being very clear as to what that actually means). In several incidents, for example by disturbing a debate between Irshad Manji and Dutch politician Tofik Dibi, they have shown to be prepared to use force in pursuit of their politico-religious agenda. This is in line with their ideology that states that Islam is not only something one has to believe in and to practice in all spheres of life but also to struggle and sacrifice for by proselytizing (daw’ah) and jihad.
The conference immediately made headlines because the presence of Abu Imraan, the leader of the Belgian Sharia4Holland, was announced. The Dutch Freedom Party of radical nativism and anti-Islam Geert Wilders asked questions in Parliament to which the Dutch minister Opstelten (Home Office) announced that he did not expect Abu Imraan to come. In 2008 Morocco requested Abu Imraan to be extradited to Morocco. Belgium does not comply to such requests but for the Netherlands there would be no problem, according to the Dutch minister. Dutch newspaper Telegraaf mentioned that the reply by Abu Imraan was that Opstelten ‘could go to hell’ and that he would come anyway.
On Friday 25 May Sharia4Holland held a press conference at Dam Square; a significant place because they did it in front of the National Liberation Monument.
Dutch newspaper Telegraaf saw this as ‘insulting the Netherlands‘; a feeling shared by many commenters on that article and elsewhere for example at anti-Islam site Gates of Vienna. The next quote:
And for those who made it their job to insult Allah and Mohammed, like the dog of the Romans, Geert Wilders. As the Khalifa takes over the Netherlands, then we shall deal with you, as the Khalifas have dealt with those kinds of people in the past.So learn from it, also from the case of Theo van Gogh.
was taken as a death threat by Wilders (since Van Gogh was murdered in 2004 by a Moroccan-Dutch man claiming to act on behalf of Islam). There was critique on the police who took a man stepping up to spokesperson Aboel Qaasim and saying: ‘You are just an asshole’. They arrested him because he was harassing journalists at the demonstrations as well. Flos, the leader of the conservative liberals (VVD) in the municipal council saw a clear death threat in the comments about Wilders and Van Gogh and they should have arrested Abdoel Qaasim. Flos stated he was shocked that ‘At our monument of freedom, such a message of unfreedom (my translation, MdK) was preached‘. Also Wilders’ Freedom Party stated they would ask questions to the minister again. In these questions they make clear that they view Sharia4Holland as an ‘extremist’ group calling for violence that should be banned and the person who made the ‘death threat’ should be prosecuted, denaturalized and evicted. According to the Freedom Party all organizations that want the implementation of sharia ‘and therefore call for violence against women, Jews, people who hold different beliefs’ should always be banned.Aboel Qaasim was arrested the next day and released as well but he will have to appear before court on 11 July. According to Sharia4Holland / Belgium Abu Qaasim there is no death threat. According to them Wilders should not be surprised if there will be a Muslim who cannot control himself any longer if Wilders continue like this. You can watch the next video in Dutch where Abu Qaasim explains:
The Dutch minister stated however that Sharia4Holland cannot be banned because it does not exist as an organization. Individuals however can be prosecuted. This minister also stated that there is a risk that sympathizers or hardcore participants of Sharia4Holland will use violence. ‘There is a risk. I totally recognize that’. You can see his answer with regard to that in full in here (Dutch, no subtitles):
The conference took place on Saturday and you can watch it entirely here:
You see: Abu Qaasim (NL), Abu Abdullah Al-Britani (UK), Abu Imran (BE), Saiful Islam (UK) and Anjem Choudary (UK). And no, I’m not going to summarize it. I actually think Abu Qaasim’s press conference on Dam Square is a very good summary, as well as Abu Imraan’s phrase that I think nicely catches the strategy of Sharia4Belgium: ‘make some noise and do some dawa’. Of those people Anjem Choudary is the most renowned one given his status in the UK and his past with Al Muhajiroun. According to Choudary the ‘Holland Regime’ used ‘oppressive measures against Sharia4Holland’. He later released a statement on Twitter containing 13 points that more or less sum up his views:
Among Muslims Sharia4Holland is far from uncontested. Their disturbance last year of a debate between Green Left politician Tofik Dibi and Canadian activist Irshad Manji was shocking and severly criticized by many people. The main Dutch Muslim blog ‘Wij Blijven Hier’ (We are staying) published a piece (in Dutch) with the English title ‘We are all Abu Imran, aren’t we?‘ aimed against radicalism among Muslims. Among Dutch Salafis Sharia4Holland are labelled Khawarij; the name for an extreme sect within Islam often seen as extremists with a radical approach of ‘takfir’ (excommunication) that sets them apart from mainstream Muslims and from those often categorized under the label Salafism.
Now more recently it appears that Sharia4Belgium has moved to another level of activism. In Belgium Stéphanie Djato, who converted to Islam four years ago, was arrested in the Brussels area Molenbeek when she wore a face-veil (niqab). When, according to reports, ms. Djato (now dubbed ‘niqabgirl’ in Belgian media) was arrested for refusing to take it off (wearing the face-veil is not allowed in Belgium) she was arrested. She then resisted because, according to her, the police attacked her and assaulted her. The police claims the arrest was according to the book even after she put up a resistance. Whatever the story is, it lead to unrest in the Molenbeek area after Sharia4Belgium called for protest against this ‘police brutality’. These protests got out of hand and riots ensued. The unrest reached a critical point when last Friday a man from Paris was arrested at the Brussels public transport and subsequently attacked both police officers involved in the arrest ending up with one of them being severely wounded by his knife. The perpetrator claimed to wanted to protest against the Belgian politics on Muslims (whatever that means). Because it was suspected that the Sharia4Belgium leader Abu Imraan was behind the unrest and was inciting to hatred and violence he was arrested later. Sharia4Belgium on their part denied having incited to violence. They claim to be a peaceful organisation (in my memory, correct me if I’m wrong, the first time they say that) although they believe that there is a struggle going on between Muslims and ‘your democracy’. What they are trying to do is to ‘unmask’ democracy. Often they point do instances of double standards such as the recent call by radical right wing leader Winters to hand in those Muslim women who wear the face-veil. Something that made the S4B spokesman think of the times of “Hitler”. The violence has led to Belgium increasing the level of threat to national safety and strong and clear rejection of the actions by Muslim organizations, imams and other spokespersons.
I have no idea how this is going to work out. Whether or not Sharia4Belgium had called for violence or not, their rhetoric is dangerous up to a certain level and I think the riots in Molenbeek and the action of the Parisien man has proven that. Even if they did not call for violence, it was part of the protests they wanted anyway. If anything they might have underestimated the impact of their own words. Another problematic aspect of this whole event is that the reaction among so-called islam-critical sites and some popular sites in Flandres and the Netherlands has been almost equally uncareful and incautious in particular focusing on the area of Molenbeek (even though that both ms. Djato and the male attacker of the police come from elsewhere). It may not be the rhetoric on one side alone that is dangerous but it could be the mutually constitutive spiral of inciting speech that has the potential of being dangerous.
Posted on June 11th, 2012 by martijn.
Categories: Multiculti Issues, Notes from the Field, Religious and Political Radicalization.
A few weeks ago the organizations Sharia4Belgium and Sharia4Holland organized the Global Khilafah conference. Sharia4Belgium and Sharia4Holland are both linked to Islam4UK led by Anjem Choudhary (which is to be traced back to the British Al Muhajiroun organizations). Sharia4Belgium and Sharia4Holland can both be seen as militant organizations in a political sense meaning that they engage in the political debates with a confrontational style, often experienced by outsiders as extremely provocative. In their ideology they appear to aim at a total transformation of society in line with their politico-religious convictions in which tawhid (unity and uniqueness of God) is central and which is translated into a call to implement sharia (without being very clear as to what that actually means). In several incidents, for example by disturbing a debate between Irshad Manji and Dutch politician Tofik Dibi, they have shown to be prepared to use force in pursuit of their politico-religious agenda. This is in line with their ideology that states that Islam is not only something one has to believe in and to practice in all spheres of life but also to struggle and sacrifice for by proselytizing (daw’ah) and jihad.
The conference immediately made headlines because the presence of Abu Imraan, the leader of the Belgian Sharia4Holland, was announced. The Dutch Freedom Party of radical nativism and anti-Islam Geert Wilders asked questions in Parliament to which the Dutch minister Opstelten (Home Office) announced that he did not expect Abu Imraan to come. In 2008 Morocco requested Abu Imraan to be extradited to Morocco. Belgium does not comply to such requests but for the Netherlands there would be no problem, according to the Dutch minister. Dutch newspaper Telegraaf mentioned that the reply by Abu Imraan was that Opstelten ‘could go to hell’ and that he would come anyway.
On Friday 25 May Sharia4Holland held a press conference at Dam Square; a significant place because they did it in front of the National Liberation Monument.
Dutch newspaper Telegraaf saw this as ‘insulting the Netherlands‘; a feeling shared by many commenters on that article and elsewhere for example at anti-Islam site Gates of Vienna. The next quote:
And for those who made it their job to insult Allah and Mohammed, like the dog of the Romans, Geert Wilders. As the Khalifa takes over the Netherlands, then we shall deal with you, as the Khalifas have dealt with those kinds of people in the past.So learn from it, also from the case of Theo van Gogh.
was taken as a death threat by Wilders (since Van Gogh was murdered in 2004 by a Moroccan-Dutch man claiming to act on behalf of Islam). There was critique on the police who took a man stepping up to spokesperson Aboel Qaasim and saying: ‘You are just an asshole’. They arrested him because he was harassing journalists at the demonstrations as well. Flos, the leader of the conservative liberals (VVD) in the municipal council saw a clear death threat in the comments about Wilders and Van Gogh and they should have arrested Abdoel Qaasim. Flos stated he was shocked that ‘At our monument of freedom, such a message of unfreedom (my translation, MdK) was preached‘. Also Wilders’ Freedom Party stated they would ask questions to the minister again. In these questions they make clear that they view Sharia4Holland as an ‘extremist’ group calling for violence that should be banned and the person who made the ‘death threat’ should be prosecuted, denaturalized and evicted. According to the Freedom Party all organizations that want the implementation of sharia ‘and therefore call for violence against women, Jews, people who hold different beliefs’ should always be banned.Aboel Qaasim was arrested the next day and released as well but he will have to appear before court on 11 July. According to Sharia4Holland / Belgium Abu Qaasim there is no death threat. According to them Wilders should not be surprised if there will be a Muslim who cannot control himself any longer if Wilders continue like this. You can watch the next video in Dutch where Abu Qaasim explains:
The Dutch minister stated however that Sharia4Holland cannot be banned because it does not exist as an organization. Individuals however can be prosecuted. This minister also stated that there is a risk that sympathizers or hardcore participants of Sharia4Holland will use violence. ‘There is a risk. I totally recognize that’. You can see his answer with regard to that in full in here (Dutch, no subtitles):
The conference took place on Saturday and you can watch it entirely here:
You see: Abu Qaasim (NL), Abu Abdullah Al-Britani (UK), Abu Imran (BE), Saiful Islam (UK) and Anjem Choudary (UK). And no, I’m not going to summarize it. I actually think Abu Qaasim’s press conference on Dam Square is a very good summary, as well as Abu Imraan’s phrase that I think nicely catches the strategy of Sharia4Belgium: ‘make some noise and do some dawa’. Of those people Anjem Choudary is the most renowned one given his status in the UK and his past with Al Muhajiroun. According to Choudary the ‘Holland Regime’ used ‘oppressive measures against Sharia4Holland’. He later released a statement on Twitter containing 13 points that more or less sum up his views:
Among Muslims Sharia4Holland is far from uncontested. Their disturbance last year of a debate between Green Left politician Tofik Dibi and Canadian activist Irshad Manji was shocking and severly criticized by many people. The main Dutch Muslim blog ‘Wij Blijven Hier’ (We are staying) published a piece (in Dutch) with the English title ‘We are all Abu Imran, aren’t we?‘ aimed against radicalism among Muslims. Among Dutch Salafis Sharia4Holland are labelled Khawarij; the name for an extreme sect within Islam often seen as extremists with a radical approach of ‘takfir’ (excommunication) that sets them apart from mainstream Muslims and from those often categorized under the label Salafism.
Now more recently it appears that Sharia4Belgium has moved to another level of activism. In Belgium Stéphanie Djato, who converted to Islam four years ago, was arrested in the Brussels area Molenbeek when she wore a face-veil (niqab). When, according to reports, ms. Djato (now dubbed ‘niqabgirl’ in Belgian media) was arrested for refusing to take it off (wearing the face-veil is not allowed in Belgium) she was arrested. She then resisted because, according to her, the police attacked her and assaulted her. The police claims the arrest was according to the book even after she put up a resistance. Whatever the story is, it lead to unrest in the Molenbeek area after Sharia4Belgium called for protest against this ‘police brutality’. These protests got out of hand and riots ensued. The unrest reached a critical point when last Friday a man from Paris was arrested at the Brussels public transport and subsequently attacked both police officers involved in the arrest ending up with one of them being severely wounded by his knife. The perpetrator claimed to wanted to protest against the Belgian politics on Muslims (whatever that means). Because it was suspected that the Sharia4Belgium leader Abu Imraan was behind the unrest and was inciting to hatred and violence he was arrested later. Sharia4Belgium on their part denied having incited to violence. They claim to be a peaceful organisation (in my memory, correct me if I’m wrong, the first time they say that) although they believe that there is a struggle going on between Muslims and ‘your democracy’. What they are trying to do is to ‘unmask’ democracy. Often they point do instances of double standards such as the recent call by radical right wing leader Winters to hand in those Muslim women who wear the face-veil. Something that made the S4B spokesman think of the times of “Hitler”. The violence has led to Belgium increasing the level of threat to national safety and strong and clear rejection of the actions by Muslim organizations, imams and other spokespersons.
I have no idea how this is going to work out. Whether or not Sharia4Belgium had called for violence or not, their rhetoric is dangerous up to a certain level and I think the riots in Molenbeek and the action of the Parisien man has proven that. Even if they did not call for violence, it was part of the protests they wanted anyway. If anything they might have underestimated the impact of their own words. Another problematic aspect of this whole event is that the reaction among so-called islam-critical sites and some popular sites in Flandres and the Netherlands has been almost equally uncareful and incautious in particular focusing on the area of Molenbeek (even though that both ms. Djato and the male attacker of the police come from elsewhere). It may not be the rhetoric on one side alone that is dangerous but it could be the mutually constitutive spiral of inciting speech that has the potential of being dangerous.
Posted on June 6th, 2012 by martijn.
Categories: Islam in European History.
Filmmaker: Ahmet Seven
On May 18, 1944, Joseph Stalin deported 218,000 Crimean Tatars to Central Asia.
Using personal testimonies, this film tells the story of the Tatars’ expulsion from their homeland and their long struggle to return.
It was only in 1989, with the opening up of the Soviet Union, that they were able to come back in large numbers. Most, finding Russians living in their former homes, built shacks in which to live.
Today, 300,000 Tatars live in Crimea – 5,000 of them still in shacks.
Even those with houses suffer because they only have minority status.
Despite this, 150,000 more are still hoping to return home.
It was just after New Year’s Day, 2011, and I was on my way to Ankara to visit my elder sister. I had decided to take the eight-hour train journey from Istanbul rather than the 45-minute flight. But as I sat on the train, feeling trapped, I was reminded of a story I had read about the exile, by train, of the Crimean Tatars.
As the journey progressed, I grew increasingly excited by the idea of making a film out of the anecdotes of the Crimean Tatars.
After researching the topic, I hit the roads once again – this time to Crimea for a research trip.
In my mind, there were many questions to be answered: Who are the Crimean Tatars? Why were they exiled? Why didn’t the thousands of Crimean Tatars who died during the exile have graves? And what happened during their years in exile?
The old family photographs I saw in the archives – many of them torn and damaged – all bore traces of those difficult years and hinted at answers to my questions. On some there were notes, like one that read ‘Year 1944, the Russo-German War continues’.
During my research I came across some stunning new information. The Crimean Tatars I met with claimed that Soviet soldiers had forgotten to exile the Tatars living in Arabat and had instead prepared a dreadful ending for them. It was a case that no one knew about.
Excited by this apparent discovery, I went to Arabat in northern Crimea without delay. The Crimean Tatars living there were looking for some form of proof to strengthen their claim.
Most of the exiled Tatars have now returned to Crimea. But they have become a minority in their own homeland.
They told me about the oppression they endured in the gulags, the Russian work camps, they were exiled to, and about their long fight to return home. Their struggle for their soil in Crimea, their homeland for 700 years, was quite impressive.
One by one, the questions that had formed in my mind were being answered and the film was taking shape – the exile, events in Arabat, the return.
In the beginning, the lack of a video-archive about the exile seemed to be a deficiency. But this allowed me to place the human stories at the centre of the film. Every Crimean Tatar I met had an intense story to tell – and what I discovered in Crimea went far beyond what I had anticipated during that train journey to Ankara.
Taken from: Al Jazeera
Posted on June 2nd, 2012 by martijn.
Categories: Multiculti Issues.
Islamofobie in beleid en debat
Gisteren hield ik een lezing voor het publiekssymposium ‘Godsdienst onder druk’. In deze lezing ging ik in op de angst voor islam en in het bijzonder de positie die ‘salafisme’ daarbij inneemt. Het gaat me niet om concrete agressieve acties tegen islamitische organisaties of personen, maar om een analyse van verschuivingen in paradigma’s die we kunnen aantref-fen in politiek, beleid en media en die betrekking hebben op migratie en het management van religie en in het bijzonder van moslims in Nederland. Deze paradigmaverschuivingen kunnen we analyseren met behulp van het begrip islamofobie.*
Vanaf het begin hebben alle natiestaten in Europa programma’s om de be-volking op hun grondgebied te homogeniseren op het gebied van taal en cultuur. Iedere staat dient daarvoor insiders en outsiders aan te wijzen en deze vervolgens te reguleren. Deze categorisering en regularisering heeft met betrekking tot moslims een sterke islamofobische logica. Islamofobie is een structureel verschijnsel dat leidt tot het categoriseren en hiërarchiseren van groepen mensen die vervolgens de toegang tot de morele gemeenschap wordt gegund of juist ontzegd.
Drie paradigmaverschuivingen
De islamofobische logica in beleid en debat is het gevolg van drie paradigmawisselingen: van het classificeren van migranten op basis van sociaal-economische kenmerken naar cultureel differentialisme; van het idee van Nederland als een morele gemeenschap gebaseerd op het behoren bij een religieuze of socialistische zuil naar een gemeenschapsidee op basis van een ideaalbeeld van seculiere en seksuele vrijheden; en de opkomst van securitisering van islam. De eerste paradigmawisseling die betrekking heeft op etnische diversiteit, religie en migratie, betreft de verschuiving van het categoriseren van migranten op basis van sociaal-economische kenmerken, naar het centraal stellen van hun cultuur: cultureel differentialisme. Cultuur wordt hierbij essentialistisch opgevat, als een duidelijk herkenbare, statische eigenschap van een groep van wie het doen en laten wordt verklaard door die cultuur.
De tweede paradigmawisseling is die van de morele gemeenschap. Zoals Haddad en Balz (2008) laten zien is de algemene tendens in Europa met betrekking tot integratie, veiligheid en secularisme een toenadering tot het Franse model met een meer rigide scheiding kerk-staat en een striktere benadering van islamitische gezagsdragers. Wie zien hier een tweede paradigmawissel die van belang is voor islamofobie: de opkomst van secularisme. Vanaf de jaren tachtig is het idee dat Nederland als morele gemeenschap gebaseerd is op religieuze identiteiten (de verzuiling), vervangen door een beeld van de morele gemeenschap waarin het idee van de natie en deugdzame burger is verbonden met het ideaal van seculiere en seksuele vrijheden en tolerantie. De tendens tot een seculiere uniformering in Europa onder linkse intellectuelen vaak fel verdedigd wordt tegenover islamitische praktijken zoals de sluier, ritueel slachten en besnijdenis. Dergelijke praktijken worden verworpen, niet persé omdat zij komen van mensen die niet christelijk zijn of een andere huidskleur hebben, maar omdat zij staan voor een cultuur die zich zou kenmerken door een onderwerping aan religieuze plichten en idealen en dus zou verhinderen dat individuen zich bekennen tot seculiere waarden. Het idee daarbij is dat juist secularisme veiligheid en vrijheid zou geven aan religieuze minderheden in natiestaten.
De derde paradigmaverschuiving heeft betrekking op islam als veiligheids-issue en culturalisering van veiligheid.Het debat over islam als maatschappelijk verschijnsel na 9/11 steeds meer een debat geworden over islam, dreiging en geweld. Het gaat hierbij echter niet alleen om dreiging van geweld. Diverse overheidsdiensten gingen zich steeds meer richten op verschijnselen van religieuze orthodoxie die de democratische rechtsorde en sociale cohesie zou ondermijnen.
De matrix
Deze drie paradigmawisselingen zorgen ervoor dat cultuur (ic islam) tot een veiligheidsprobleem is gemaakt en het veiligheids-beleid richt zich inmiddels op een bescherming van de morele gemeenschap met haar ideaalbeeld van seculiere, egalitaire en tolerante waarden. De dilemma’s in beleid en debat zijn daarbij redelijk overzichtelijk. Kiezen we voor de sociale cohesie van de samenleving als geheel of kiezen we voor de autochtone niet-moslims? Kiezen we voor een paciferende stijl of juist voor een confrontatie-stijl in het benoemen en aanpakken van problemen? Dit alles leidt tot de volgende islamofobie-matrix:
1) Nativisten: ‘Verdedigen’ een ideaalbeeld van de Nederlandse cultuur en identiteit tegen een verwatering, verloedering en teloorgang ervan veroorzaakt door een vermeende oprukkende islam en elite. Het idee van autochtonie eerst staat hier hoog in het vaandel.
2) Seculiere fundamentalisten: ‘Verdedigen’ specifieke verlichtingsidealen (zoals vrijheid van meningsuiting) als absolute en onaantastbare idealen en waarden vanuit het idee dat dit de sociale vrede en cohesie beschermt tegenover onverdraagzame ideologie en religie.
3) Culturisten: ‘Verdedigen’ het idee van de ‘joods-christelijke’ traditie als het cement dat de samenleving bijeenhoudt en leggen de nadruk op integratie/assimilatie in de Nederlandse cultuur met haar christelijke wortels.
4) Communitaristen: ‘Verdedigen’ de sociale vrede in de samenleving die gebaat is en gebaseerd is op seculiere en seksuele vrijheden en leggen sterk de nadruk op een cooptatie van minderheden, integratie en gelijkheid voor de wet.
In plaats van absolute categorieen moet je de vierdeling zien als posities die men kan innemen in debat en beleid en die per issue kan verschillen. Die dynamiek wordt niet alleen bepaald door bovengenoemde dilemma’s maar ook door de onderlinge posities en kritiek die men op elkaar heeft. Ook niet iedere vorm van islamkritiek valt hieronder. Alleen die maatregelen en kritiek valt eronder die uitgaan van de bovenstaande drie elementen van de islamofobische logica omdat die leiden tot een hierarchie tussen ogenschijnlijk homogene culturele blokken. Dus waar een beeld van de Nederlandse cultuur staat tegenover de islam en waarbij de laatste in haar geheel als anders wordt gezien of inferieur.
Salafisme als kwelgeest
In de angst voor islam en salafisme spelen verschillende angstbeelden een rol die we ook al bij racisme kunnen terugvinden, maar in het geval van islam en salafisme komt een ander angstbeeld naar voren. Er is angst voor het ongebreidelde geweld dat salafisten zouden kunnen gebruiken, hun pogingen om te participeren in de samenleving worden gewantrouwd (en ook wel uitgelegd als façadepolitiek) en er bestaat de angst dat salafisten met hun geloofsovertuiging grote druk uitoefenen op anderen, in het bijzonder vrouwen. Het gaat daarbij niet (meer) zozeer om het feit dat er een dreiging van geweld uitgaat van de salafisten, maar om de salafisten als bedreiging voor de morele gemeenschap, in het bijzonder de vrijheid die bedreigd zou worden door de vermeende afkeer (haat) van salafisten tegen het Westen.
De logica van islamofobie heeft een voorspelbaar verloop omdat daarin ten eerste wordt verwezen naar incidenten waarin moslims een rol hebben gespeeld (zoals 9/11) en ten tweede omdat daarin wordt uitgegaan van een essentialistisch beeld van islam dat wijdverbreid is onder intellectuelen, politici en in beleid. Het is natuurlijk niet verwonderlijk dat er geschokt wordt gereageerd op de verschrikkelijke daden van mensen als Mohammed Merah en Mohammed Bouyeri. Juist dat ‘natuurlijk’ zorgt ervoor dat deze beelden uitstekend geschikt zijn voor politieke manipulatie: ze geven gezag en een vanzelfsprekendheid aan een islamofobisch vertoog en een legitimering voor vergaande maatregelen tegen moslims in het algemeen en salafisten in het bijzonder. Als radicale moslims zouden salafisten bij uitstek de tolerantie en seculiere en seksuele vrijheden bedreigen. In beleid, media en politieke discussies zijn zij als het ware de verpersoonlijking van vrees, dreiging en wantrouwen doordat zij appelleren aan abstracte gevoelens van angst die te maken hebben met migratie, etnische diversiteit en religie. Naar moslims toe zendt dit de boodschap uit dat hun juridische en politieke insluiting afhangt van hun religieuze of culturele anderszijn. Hoe meer men als anders (radicaler) gezien wordt, hoe duidelijker de boodschap van uitsluiting is.
Een uitgebreidere versie kunt u vinden in: ‘Salafisme is overal’ Een radicale utopie en de constructie van angst in Tijdschrift Religie en Samenleving.
* Over het algemeen wordt islamofobie gezien als ‘irrationele’ of ‘ongegronde’ angst voor islam. Dat is ongelukkig en ook niet zo terzake doende. Het gaat erom dat de angst en afkeer reeël is en ook reële consequenties heeft.