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The Majority Strategy of the Muslim Brotherhood II: Responses

Posted on January 14th, 2013 by martijn.
Categories: Activism, Public Islam, Religious and Political Radicalization, Society & Politics in the Middle East.

Guest Author: Roel Meijer

Will the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt promote the goals of the 25 January revolution, expanding civil, political, economic and social rights; or will it tailor these issues for its own purposes? Especially its strategy to gain power, here called the majority strategy, by means of general and presidential elections, has attracted attention. In two blogposts I will explore how this strategy be explained when its slogan under Mubarak had been “participation not domination” (musharaka la mughaliba)? In the first blogpost I have explained the background and development of the majority strategy. In the current blogpost I present an analysis of the counterforces and the failures of this strategy. My overall argument is that rather than its ideology, it has been the political strategy that explains both the success as well as the failure of the Brotherhood after the fall of Mubarak.

Counterforces

Despite the spectacular success of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafi Nour party in winning three-quarters of the seats of parliament, marginalizing the traditional parties, such as the Wafd, the success would not be long-lived. Resistance against the Brotherhood’s majority strategy emerged from all directions of society.

The Tahrir activists were the first to voice criticism of the Brotherhood on account of its opportunistic use of Tahrir protests. While the Brotherhood was careful to maintain relations with SCAF, and chimed in with increasing popular critique of the demonstrators as “anarchists” who were sabotaging the economy and the unity of the country, the Brotherhood did support ‘Tahrir’ when it exerted pressure on the military. Khairat al-Shatir on several occasions threatened SCAF to march to Tahrir if it did not comply with the demands of the revolution. Muhammad al-Biltagi followed him in this respect. The activists, however, condemned this opportunistic use of the resistance against the military.

In the meantime the former Brotherhood youth who had been evicted organized themselves in different organizations such as al-Tayyar al-Masri and joined the elections with a left-wing slate. Although they hardly won parliamentary seats, their critique and inside knowledge, which was published widely, damaged the Brotherhood in the larger cities. The very fact that the debate on the Brotherhood was opened up to an unprecedented extent after the fall of Mubarak, forced the Brotherhood to respond and defend itself, making it vulnerable.

More liberal-minded older generation leaders, who had been members of the Guidance Council, such as Abd al-Mun‘aym Abu al-Futuh, Ibrahim Za‘farani and Muhammad Habib, were perhaps more successful in their critique. Their critique of the undemocratic manner in which FJP was founded and operated (no founding conference, limited influence of its members, appointment of its leadership by the mother organization instead of being elected among new members), damaged the Brotherhood, but mostly among existing liberal critics. More important was Abu al-Futuh’s challenge in the presidential elections. Attracting the new critical generation and even Salafis, he was able to pose as a liberal open-minded Islamist alternative to the Brotherhood, even if his campaign was far from flawless.

Increasingly also the critique of civil society was felt. The heavy-handed attempts of the Brotherhood to gain or retain control over professional organizations had alienated many of its members. This was especially the case with the doctors’ syndicate. The Doctors’ syndicate had been dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood after Mubarak had frozen the board elections in 1993 and no new elections had been held since. By the time Mubarak fell a whole new generation of doctors had emerged who found that the board members had done little to improve the profession, leading to a dramatic deterioration of the national health service. They founded new organizations such as the Doctors Without Rights, and Doctors of Tahrir. Typically they were much more activist than the conservative older generation of the Brotherhood. In May 2011 they organized two strikes. These were opposed by the board dominated by the Brotherhood, following the deal with SCAF to oppose activism and promote “stability”. The Brotherhood later lost dramatically in syndicate elections on 18 October 2011 against the Independent List that won a majority in the boards of 14 of the 27 governorates.

But the story did not end there. The Doctors Without Rights persisted in its demands of raising the percentage of national budget form 4% to 15% and higher wages for doctors and a major overhaul of the whole system that should be based on accountability. When these demands were not met, it organized a new strike on 1 October 2012 against the Brotherhood faction that now directly supported a Brotherhood government. As the strike dragged on for weeks, the strike became politicized and turned into an anti-Brotherhood campaign that attracted greater support from all kinds of opponents of Mursi. When the proposal of the constitution was made available the doctors joined the critique of the final draft proposal demanding a revision of the article on the right of health for citizens.

The independent trade union movement had a similar experience. The first independent had been founded under Mubarak, but it really expanded after his fall, expanding to two hundred independent trade unions, representing 2 million employees, by the end of 2011. Organized in the Independent Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions (EFITU) and the Egyptian Democratic Labor Congress (EDLC), it competed with the corporatist, state controlled ETUF that had been founded in 1957 under Nasser. Although the EFITU was supported by the progressive minister of manpower and Migration, Ahmad Borai, it never succeeded in obtaining legal recognition under the government of Ahmad Sharaf, whose proposals were blocked by SCAF that was unwilling to sanction social rights.

Strikes were stepped up under the Mursi government as it became clear that the new Brotherhood minister of Manpower would not take measures beneficial to workers, condemning strikes, sit-ins and other forms of protest, as part of the official policy of the Brotherhood. Like the doctors, independent labor has recently strengthened its position by forming with a host of left-wing political parties the National Front for the Defense of Labor Rights and Unions Liberties.

Not all professional organizations were opposed to the Brotherhood after they became unfrozen. The Engineers syndicate was supportive of the Brotherhood, as was the Teachers Syndicate and the Pharmacists Syndicate, Dentists Syndicate, where the Brotherhood won the first free elections since the early 1990s in accordance of its majority strategy.

In others the results were mixed. In the Journalists’ Syndicate, its leader was sympathetic to the movement while its board was not, leading to internal struggle when the Brotherhood came to power. Often new organizations were established next to existing ones and had neither relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, not with the former NDP, such as the Teachers Outside Trade Unions, the Coordinating Committee of Teachers, Judges for Reform, Engineers against Legal Restraint, Coordinating Committee of Revolutionary Lawyers. They would mobilize against Brotherhood organizations, such as Coalition of Engineers for Egypt and Doctors for Egypt.

But not only did the Brotherhood’s majority strategy not succeed across the board in the professional organizations, it also did not make inroads in organizations where the previous regime was strongly represented, such as the judiciary. The judiciary had always been divided in reformists who advocated the complete independence of the judiciary and judges who had been appointed by the government. Some organizations changed over the years. For instance, the Judges’ Club (Nadi al-Quda’) had been reformist under Ahmad Makki, but became pro-government under Ahmad Zind. High Court of Cassation had been pro-government but with the appointment of al-Gharyani it had a pro-Brotherhood leader. The same applied to the Supreme Constitutional Court, that had been independent but became more subservient to the government.

Finally, the intellectual elite turned against the Brotherhood, when it realized the Brotherhood was pursuing a majority strategy. It especially condemned the Brotherhood for breaking its promises, first to just participate with winning 30 %, then with 40% and later 51% percent of the seats in parliament, and eventually going all the way. Its broken promise not running a presidential candidate infuriated them and seemed to confirm all the suspicions many intellectuals had always felt for the Brotherhood. Even highly sophisticated intellectuals such as Hasan Nafa‘a or Fahmi Huwaydi, who believed that the Brotherhood should take part in the political process, grew increasingly worried and disenchanted with the heavy-handed policy of the Brotherhood to dominate and exclude its critics rather than to cooperate and include them in fulfilling the demands of the revolution. When Mursi was inaugurated on 30 June 2012, many lambasted the Brotherhood and mocked its solemnity and moralism as a meager replacement for real politics and reform. They were careful to point out its lack of policy and its pursuit of the same economic policy that the previous government had pursued.

Failure of the majority strategy

The growing opposition against the Brotherhood started when its majority strategy had seemed at its most successful. At that point it became clear that the deal the Brotherhood had made with SCAF would not work in its favor. This was apparent from parliament and the Majlis al-Shura. Although the Islamists had a majority in both, they were hamstrung by the Constitutional Declaration of 30 March 2011 that withheld power form parliament the end of the transitional period and the acceptance of the new constitution. After their victories, the Brotherhood became increasingly entangled in the very jungle of measures and procedures it itself had agreed upon.

The Brotherhood found itself increasingly isolated and beleaguered from all sides after it tried to implement its majority strategy in its attempt to dominate the Constituent Assembly together with the Salafis in March 2011. Its claim that it represented the majority and the “will of the people” and that its opponents only represented a small minority of the “elite” (nukhba) grew increasingly thin as more and more institutions were able to organize opposition to the Brotherhood and withhold the legitimacy it craved for.

For a long time the judiciary constituted the main opponent of the Brotherhood’s ambitions. Fearful of its own position and still protected by SCAF, in June the Supreme Constitutional Court disbanded the parliament under the pretext of procedural mistakes. In April the same the Electoral Committee headed by the head of the SCC ruled against participation of several presidential candidates, among them Umar Sulayman, the Salafi leader Hamad Abu Isma’il, but also Khayrat al-Shatir, who was replaced by Muhammad Mursi.

By the time of the presidential elections declining the popularity of the Brotherhood became apparent. Winning in the first round only 24,9 %, against 24,5% for the establishment figure Ahmad Shafiq, 21,1 % for left wing candidate Hamdin Sabbahi and 21,6% for the more liberal-minded Islamist Abu al-Futuh, Mursi and the Brotherhood had done quit poorly; they had lost half the votes compared to the parliamentary elections half a year earlier. Clearly the following of the Brotherhood was a lot more volatile than had been expected and the boast of representing the will of the people became a lot more precarious. Only with support of the left and Islamist liberals was Mursi able to win barely from Ahmad Shafiq in the run-offs. In return Mursi pledged to the opposition to include them in the decision-making process, virtually promising to abandon its high-handed majority strategy. The new government reflected this intention, as well the establishment of a Advisory Council, with members such as Hasan Naf‘a.

Polarization

Despite these good intentions the Muslim Brotherhood continued its earlier strategy. From the fact that the Brotherhood could get rid of SCAF by firing its head Husain al-Tantawi on 12 August, it drew the conclusion that it could go it alone with its Salafi partner the Nour party, after all. Finally the Brotherhood have its cake and eat it too.

The elimination of SCAF from the power equation, however, made the Brotherhood the focus of all the social, economic and political demands that had been formerly directed at SCAF. The anger at the closed manner at which the Brotherhood pursued its policies, its inability to present an alternative to the economic policies of the Mubarak regime, its incapacity to respond to critique and understand the deep-seated demands for reform only fed the anger of the more critical part of the population.

This anger would express itself in the gradual walk-out of 29 of the 1000 members of the second Constitutional Assembly after it was established in June, reaching a crescendo in November. Although many commentators have argued that its illiberal character is the reason for lack of support, this in itself is a reflection of the failure of the Brotherhood to include other social, ideological, economic and cultural currents into the deliberative process of the formulating the constitution and write their rights into the constitution.

The result has been an attack over the past months of journalists, trade unions, human rights organizations, Coptic church, women’s organization, of the several draft and eventually of the final version of the constitution on 2 December as they progressively left the Constitutional Assembly. Theirs was basically in a vote of no-confidence in the Brotherhood-Salafi coalition to realize the demands of what they think is the revolution. Though Mursi’s “power grab” of 22 November of arrogating far-reaching power to himself and firing the Public Prosecutor is explainable as a means to be one step before the no-less undemocratic Supreme Constitutional Council to disband the Constituent Assembly and possibly annul the presidential elections, for the opposition it confirmed the worst fears of the Brotherhood. As opposed to the majority of the Brotherhood, it tried to mobilize its own ‘majority’ on Tahrir square.

Conclusion

The Muslim Brotherhood stands before a sheer impossible task of governing Egypt and solving the deep and almost insolvable economic crisis, while dealing with growing resistance of the vested interests on the hand in the military and the former regime on the one hand, and emerging plethora of activists and reformist movements on the other hand, while it has under fire of a strongly politicized Salafi movement not to give concessions to “secularists” and “atheists”. Even if the so-called liberals at a certain point have done everything in their power to sabotage the rule of the Brotherhood, the movement itself has made it extremely difficult for itself by pursuing a majority strategy that excludes instead of includes its opponents in order to implement widespread reform of the state instead of imposing its views on society.

Roel Meijer teaches modern Middle Eastern history at Radboud University in Nijmegen and is senior researcher at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations. He has published widely on Islamist movements: Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement and most recently, The Muslim Brotherhood in Europe.

This is part two of The Majority Strategy of the Muslim Brotherhood. The first part was published last week: Background and Development. A referenced version of this article has appeared in Orient, 1, 2013.

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The Majority Strategy of the Muslim Brotherhood I: Background and Development

Posted on January 9th, 2013 by martijn.
Categories: Public Islam, Religious and Political Radicalization, Society & Politics in the Middle East.

Guest Author: Roel Meijer

Few subjects are as controversial as the Muslim Brotherhood. During the past few decades many commentators have speculated about the nature of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Is it totalitarian, authoritarian, are there chances for it becoming democratic? What is the role of the Tanzim (the main organization of the Brothers), the third generation, and the youth? What are its relations with the previous regime, the left, and social movements in the first decade of the 2000s? This question has gained urgency with the fall of Mubarak and the Arab spring. Will the Brotherhood promote the goals of the 25 January revolution, expanding civil, political, economic and social rights; or will it tailor these issues for its own purposes? The past two years have provided new insights into the workings of the Brotherhood. Especially its strategy to gain power, here called the majority strategy, by means of general and presidential elections, has attracted attention. How can this strategy be explained when its slogan under Mubarak had been “participation not domination” (musharaka la mughaliba)?

In two blogposts I will explore the majority strategy of the Muslim Brotherhood. Firstly, in this blogpost, I will delve into the background and development of the majority strategy. In the next blogpost I present an analysis of the counterforces and the failures of this strategy. My overall argument is that rather than its ideology, it has been the political strategy that explains both the success as well as the failure of the Brotherhood after the fall of Mubarak.

Changing views

As Nathan Brown (When Victory is not an Option: Islamist Movements in Arab Politics, New York: Cornell University Press) makes clear, the Muslim Brotherhood is not a exclusively a political organization, but one with multiple activities, diverse interests and different strategies. Having become extremely cautious under authoritarian regimes, political participation in the 1980s implied tremendous risks. The repression political participation could provoke could jeopardize the whole movement and therefore political participation remained one option among others. This does not mean that the movement did not change. Participation, the rise of the third generation and greater outreach to society, led to important ideological changes. Whereas under Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) multiparty system had been rejected, “partyism” (hizbiyya) in the 1980s became increasingly accepted as a means of expanding the influence of the Brotherhood, aside from its more traditional work of building up its infrastructure of hospitals, schools, social services.

For the first time, the Brotherhood was forced to think deeper about politics and the political process, producing in 2004 and 2007 increasingly more elaborate political programs that provided pragmatic solutions to problems society faced as a whole. In its struggle against the authoritarian regime, it saw the usefulness of citizenship rights, the independence of the judiciary, the limitations of the power of the president and the balance of powers between the legislative, the judiciary and the executive. Even if these rights were marred by religious oversight, and contained illiberal elements, especially in regard with equal rights for women, non-Muslims, and the freedom of expression, it did recognize the sovereignty of the people. In that sense, it built upon the political opening Hasan Hudaiby had set out in his Preachers not Judges in the 1960s, a trend that most recently reflected in embracing the concept of the “civil state” (al-dawla al-madaniyya) rather than the religious state (al-dawla al-diniyya).

The question, however, was not whether the Brotherhood had changed, but to what extent? As it was still mostly a semi-legal, partly underground organization, repressed by an authoritarian state, it was difficult to determine how far these reforms went. The fact that its most liberal current split-off formed the Wasat party in the 1990s did not augur well. The Wasat Party no longer promoted the implementing the shari‘a and the founding of an Islamic state. Instead it upheld the idea that Islam is a civilization and Muslims and Copts were equal because they both were participants in its history. More reassuring was that liberal figures, such as Abd al-Mun‘aym Abu al-Futuh, still remained inside the movement and were members of the Guidance Council. Hope for reform was also stimulated by the emergence of a more progressive youth. On the other hand, it seemed unlikely that the more liberal-minded forces were able to influence the Tanzim, the highly structured main organization of the movement, based on a cell structure of the “family” (‘usra), which was mostly recruited from the conservative countryside. Neither were there any signs that the hierarchical internal structure, still based on the principle of “hearing and obeying” (sam‘a wa-l-ta‘a), was seriously challenged. If anything, the multiple interests, sectors, and strategies of the movement deepened the profound ambiguity that had plagued the Brotherhood from its inception.

Which direction the Brotherhood would take depended on the struggle between the more outward looking political current and the more inward looking da‘wa oriented section that was focused on Islamization pof society from below. While the first current seemed to gain in influence after the Brotherhood did well in the general elections in 2005, gaining 88 of the 454 seats, the subsequent repression, during which one if its leader Khairat al-Shatir was imprisoned, worked in favor of the latter. When during the fraudulent elections of 2010 the Brotherhood failed to win a single seat, and Muhammad Badi‘ became the General Guide, its more cautious wing seemed to have gained the upper-hand. In anticipation of the succession of Gamal Mubarak of his father, even the assuring slogan of “participation without domination”, seemed too radical. The cautious attitude of the Brotherhood was also reflected in the way it took part in the many demonstrations and movements of the decade preceding the uprising: it did participate but always kept the larger interests of preserving its organization and manifold non-political interests at heart.

The majority strategy

The predominance of the inward looking group explains why the Muslim Brotherhood was not only taken by surprise by the uprising of 25 January 2011 but was also unable to respond adequately to the subsequent events. Not until 28 of January when the regime accused the Brotherhood of instigating the uprising, did it unleash the Tanzim on Tahrir and wholeheartedly supported the demands for the fall of the regime. But even then, the risks of participation in the revolution were so high, that it negotiated with the regime.

The majority strategy emerged after the fall of Mubarak. It was not a policy that was formulated from the beginning but grew over time, depending on the politics of its adversaries and their responses to the Brotherhood’s moves. Despite the lack of evidence of a stated policy, the subsequent measures the Brotherhood took make it into a coherent strategy. It consisted of two components. The first was to maintain good relations with Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and make a tacit agreement that recognized the military’s interests while playing down its own political ambitions. To assure the military of their good intentions, for instance, the old slogan “participation not domination” was dusted off, and the announcement was made that the Brotherhood would run only in limited number the electoral districts.

The second component contradicted the first and aimed at building up the Tanzim as rapidly as possible by expanding its countrywide network. Already on 14 February it announced that it would establish a new party, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). In the following year hardly a week passed without the Brotherhood announcing the opening of another office of the FJP. To its credit it must be said that secular opposition was weak and the Brotherhood had to fill the vacuum the defunct NDP had left behind.

More damaging in the long run were the series of deals with SCAF the majority strategy entailed. One of these deals was to prevent the most urgent demands of the revolution from being met, namely to elect a Constitutional Assembly to write a new constitution that would enshrine the civil, political and social rights the revolution demanded. Instead, a constitutional committee was appointed by SCAF in February 2011, headed by the pro-Brotherhood judge Tariq al-Bishri, with the assignment to adjust a limited number articles of the 1971 Constitution. Its assignment was to pave the way for free and fair elections, of which the Brotherhood, as the strongest movement, would benefit the most. The victory of 77,3% in favor of the amendments during the referendum on 19 March came as a shock to the activists of Tahrir square and the liberals, whose suspicions of the Brotherhood as a thoroughly counter-revolutionary movement—never far from the surface—were re-awakened.

The Constitutional Declaration (30 March) of SCAF would enshrine the previous compromises. It laid down that first general elections would be held under the adjusted constitution of 1971 after which the newly elected parliament would appoint 100 member Constituent Assembly. In addition, it stipulated that the transitional period would only end with a referendum accepting the constitution and that a transition of power from SCAF to independent government would be appointed by the president.

Although the recognition of political rights was a dramatic step forward (recognition of political parties became a formality), the flaws of the arrangement (the sequence of steps of the transitional phase, the retention of power of SCAF) would block the fundamental transformation of Egyptian society based on civil, political and social rights Egyptians in their new awareness as citizens were claiming after the fall of Mubarak. Because they were not supported by a sympathetic government during the transitional period that could translate the revolution in law, reformists had to fight out a prolonged battle with conservatives in each and every institution for reform, almost always leading to bitter disputes. The “long march through the institutions” from below would clash with the Brotherhood’s attempt to gain control of society from above by means of its majority strategy.

Containing the revolution

SCAF represented the first major hindrance to the revolution. With the exit of Mubarak and the source of corruption of intermingling of politics and economic interests, it believed the revolution had ended. It literally advised the revolutionaries to go home after Mubarak had left. It blocked all reform measures that would dismantle the authoritarian state and its patronage system and prevented the Sharif government from taking any initiatives to meet civil and social demands of demonstrators, refusing to disband the Military Courts, accept the existence of independent trade unions, reform universities, let alone take on the Ministry of Interior.

Only gradually did SCAF realize that political and social unrest would not go away. The continuous Friday demonstrations and sit-ins on Tahrir square beginning a week after Mubarak’s fall and gaining in force in March and the during the summer, turning into more violent confrontations on 9 October (Maspero massacre) and November and December (Muhammad Mahmoud street clashes), would tarnish the image of SCAF as the “guardian of the revolution” and belie its pledge not to fire on civilians.

At the same time the Muslim Brotherhood organized the FJP as an instrument to pursue its majority strategy. It did this by keeping it on a tight leash and transferring the top members of the Guidance Council to lead the party although they had to relinquish their functions in the Brotherhood. It, moreover, stipulated that its members were only allowed to vote for the FJP.

As a result, liberals and groups within the movement who did not agree with the majority strategy pursued by Khairat al-Shatir either left or were purged from the movement, in turn leading to the deepening of its conservative character. For instance, Abd al-Mun‘aym Abu al-Futuh was expelled after he announced candidacy to run for presidency. The more independent minded Brotherhood youth started to leave in March, and were finally kicked out in May after they had taken part in unauthorized mass demonstrations on Tahrir. The few independent minds that the movement harbored, such as Muhammad al-Baltaji, who had sympathized with the Tahrir movement and constantly tried to mediate between the two, were exceptional and in the end ineffectual to broker a compromise between the two.

Aside from building up its infrastructure, purging the dissidents, blocking demands for internal reforms and adapting itself to the much more open environment after the 25 January Revolution, the majority strategy also dictated that the Brotherhood extend its power to social and civic institutions in society, further hampering the drive for change. Gaining power over these institutions was imperative as the members of the Constituent Assembly would be nominated from. Also here the vacuum left behind by the NDP, which through patronage, often had its candidate elected head of the syndicates, proved helpful.

From the fall of Mubarak to the electoral victory in the parliament and Majlis al-Shura in February 2012 the majority strategy of the Brotherhood seemed to work. In return for tenuous support for Tahrir demonstrations and major counterdemonstrations on 27 July, which showed the power of the Islamist movement, SCAF allowed the Brotherhood to build the necessary infrastructure to win the elections, which were exceptionally successful.

At the same time, the Brotherhood benefited from the gradual erosion of the prestige of SCAF that increasingly showed that it was incapable of handling the opposition in the fall-out of Maspero and Muhammad Mahmoud street clashes. Severely weakened, the Brotherhood increasingly could challenge SCAF when it overtly tried to preserve its privileges, as was the case with the Ali Silmi document. Typical of the Brotherhood, it unleashed its troops on Tahrir in protest against SCAF, but pulled them back at the right time not to alienate SCAF, letting the activists take the brunt of clash with security forces.

For the Brotherhood, winning the elections remained the main goal of its actions. Once they had the elections through the ballot box legitimacy would be transferred from Tahrir to parliament, with the Brotherhood representing the “will of the people” (iradat al-sha‘b). Representing the majority (ghalabiyya) was the basis of taking over power from SCAF.

The even larger victory for the Senate (Majlis al-Shura) in February seemed to confirm the viability of this strategy. Emboldened the Brotherhood took the next step and launched Khairat al-Shatir at the end of March 2012 as presidential candidate. When he was rejected as candidate by the Electoral Commission in April, he was succeeded by Muhammad Mursi, another previous member of the Guidance Council who had become leader of the FJP.

Roel Meijer teaches modern Middle Eastern history at Radboud University in Nijmegen and is senior researcher at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations. He has published widely on Islamist movements: Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement and most recently, The Muslim Brotherhood in Europe.

PS

This is part one of two blogposts on The Majority Strategy of the Muslim Brotherhood. Coming Monday the second part will be published on Monday.

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The Jihad Struggle: #MyJihad Campaign

Posted on December 17th, 2012 by martijn.
Categories: Activism, anthropology, Notes from the Field, Public Islam.

A recent anti-Muslim ad campaign by the American Freedom Defense Initiative (ADFI) in New York called Muslims “savages” and proclaimed “defeat Jihad.” The ads appeared in New York underground stations and where quickly defaced. For many Muslims however Jihad is an Islamic spiritual concept that is simply means “struggle”:

a struggle against odds, difficulty, and barriers — a struggle to a better place.

This video is the making of the first photo shoot for the newly minted MyJihad ad campaign, a national public educational campaign, starting in Chicago, in which American Muslims showcase how everyday Muslims define, practice, and live Jihad.

MyJihad is an American campaign sponsored by the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR). ‘MyJihad’ ads will appear on public buses featuring Muslims’ interpretations of the term ‘jihad’ often erroneously defined as ‘holy war’. This of course does not mean that no Muslim understand jihad as a violent struggle against oppression, imperialism and humiliation (as they probably see it). But what this campaign shows are the multitude of meanings connected to jihad. The campaign has its own website MyJihad and released two Youtube videos (above you already saw the first):

According to Ahmed Rehab of CAIR (on OnIslam):

The MyJihad campaign is about reclaiming Jihad from the Muslim and anti-Muslim extremists who, ironically but not surprisingly, see eye to eye on Jihad. Jihad is a term that has unfortunately been widely misrepresented by the actions of Muslim extremists first and foremost, and by attempts at public indoctrination coming from Islamophobes who claim that the minority extremists are right and the majority of Muslims are wrong.
It is also about pushing for an intelligent and informed understanding of Islam and its concepts and practices in the media, the educational circles, and the public,

According to campaign volunteer Angie Emara:

We have been overwhelmed with the participation of people of other faiths tweeting their struggles. People of different backgrounds are finding a common language, they’re learning to see themselves in one another as they share similar expressions of their daily Jihad.

The ads on the buses range from personal struggles to religious interpretations to wanting to share a positive image on Islam and the world and fighting Islamophobia in positive novel ways.
American Muslims launch campaign to reclaim ‘jihad’ | The Raw Story

“#MyJihad is to build friendships across the aisle,” says one ad showing an African American man leaning on the shoulder of a Jewish friend.

“#MyJihad is to march on despite losing my son,” says another ad, featuring a portrait of a mother with her three remaining children.

“#MyJihad is to not judge people by their cover,” says a third, framed by two women in headscarves.

Although there are some sceptical voices among Muslims as well and also a few denouncing the use of women’s portraits in the campaign, most seem positive. The strongest criticism on the part of Muslims comes from some Salafi networks and organizations like Hizb ut Tahrir who criticize the outlook of the campaign as well as the content. As they see it the people from MyJihad want to make jihad compatible to American national identity by stripping it from its warrior content and de-politicizing it. Pamela Geller who co-founded ADFI called the MyJihad campaign a ‘contemptuous propaganda campaign‘. The ADFI will launch a new campaign in January 2013.

Besides the bus ads MyJihad makes extensive use of social media through a Facebook page and a Twitter stream:

All of this shows an interesting struggle (pun intended)of identity politics over the meaning of the word jihad with Muslims indeed trying to make it more compatible with secular notions of individual struggle and the common good and with both anti-islam activists and so-called radical Muslim groups trying to oppose such an attempt. But perhaps the secular-religious binary is a little to easy or even misleading here. It is not that the MyJihad campaign is fully detached from Muslim traditions; Jihad as a personal struggle has always existed but so does Jihad as an armed struggle (albeit with different definitions than for example the one of HuT). The whole issue here goes beyond Islam as a religion; it is also about trying to gain acceptance and recognition of Muslims as Americans and making a strong statement against anti-Islam campaigners and the definitions of Islam they try to impose on Muslims and wider society. Furthermore such a strong display of ‘Muslimness’ does that fit into American definitions of the secular? Maybe, I don’t know to be honest, but I expect it would be more problematic in some European countries such as France. There are also many non-Muslims supportive of this campaign equally dismayed by the anti-Islam rhetoric of Geller cs. The secular here is as much diversified as the religious when it comes to the question of Islam in American society.

I think we need to analyse the whole spectacle of the campaign, its supporters and opponents by going beyond the binary religious-secular; showing how they are blurred but perhaps also look for the a-secular/a-religious aspects of it. How do we that? Do we have meta-secular tools available for such an analysis? Or are we inevitably reproducing the binary and thereby perhaps privileging one perspective in the controversy over the other?

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Rethinking Secularism: The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere

Posted on December 12th, 2012 by martijn.
Categories: anthropology, Public Islam, Religion Other.

On 22 October 2012 Jürgen Habermas, Charles Taylor, Judith Butler and Cornel West met in the historic Great Hall at Cooper Union to discuss “Rethinking Secularism.” In this symposium convened by the Institute for Public Knowledge at NYU, the Social Science Research Council and the Humanities Institute at Stony Brook University, they presented their accounts of religion in the public sphere.

Jürgen Habermas: “‘The Political’ – The Rational Sense of a Questionable Inheritance of Political Theology“
Charles Taylor: “Why We Need a Radical Redefinition of Secularism”
Judith Butler: “Is Judaism Zionism? Religious Sources for the Critique of Violence”
Cornel West: “Prophetic Religion and the Future of Capitalist Civilization”

You can listen to their very inspiring and challenging contributions on The Immanent Frame HERE and join the online discussion HERE.

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Islamitische internaten in Nederland

Posted on December 6th, 2012 by martijn.
Categories: Activism, anthropology, Guest authors, Islam in the Netherlands, Public Islam.

Guest Author: Mehmet Sahin

Binnen de Turkse samenleving is het internaat een algemeen geaccepteerde instelling waar schoolgaande kinderen en studenten wonen. De eerste internaten werden door de Turkse overheid in de jaren vijftig opgericht om voor studerende jongeren van het platteland een geschikte slaapplaats in de stad te creëren. Bovendien wilde de Turkse overheid op deze manier indirect de modernisering van het platteland bevorderen. In diezelfde periode waren er ook al islamitische internaten waarbij de kinderen alleen maar Koranlessen kregen van de geestelijken, om later imam te worden. Deze islamitische internaten waren niet zo geïnteresseerd in het onderwijs dat door de Turkse overheid werd aangeboden, omdat dat immers gekarakteriseerd werd door een behoorlijke seculiere benadering.

Süleymanci- en de Nurcu bewegingen

Vanaf de jaren zestig hebben twee Islamitische stromingen in Turkije, namelijk de Süleymanci- en de Nurcu bewegingen (waarbij die laatste de toenmalige benaming was van de huidige Gülenbeweging), het curriculum in hun internaten veranderd, met een specifiek doel voor ogen. Aan de ene kant wilden deze twee bewegingen het islamitische onderwijs niet loslaten, maar aan de andere kant wilden ze het seculiere onderwijs promoten onder hun aanhang. In de jaren zeventig opende de Süleymanc?-beweging de eerste internaten met een gecombineerd programma van seculier en islamitisch onderwijs in Turkije. De leerlingen gingen overdag naar de seculiere school van de overheid. Na schooltijd echter kwamen deze leerlingen naar het internaat, om hun huiswerk te maken en zich te verdiepen in de islamitische leer. De leerlingen in deze internaten werden begeleid door de jonge sympathisanten van deze beweging die studeerden aan de universiteiten. Vanaf begin jaren tachtig begon de Gülenbeweging massaal zulke internaten te openen in Turkije waar kinderen, naast hun school, intensieve huiswerkbegeleiding en islamitische lessen kregen. Deze islamitische internaten bloeiden vooral omdat de islamitisch georiënteerde ouders wilden dat hun kinderen volwaardig zouden deelnemen aan de maatschappij, met behoud van hun geloof.

Vanaf de jaren negentig hebben de Turkse Süleymanci- en Gülen-bewegingen in Nederland verschillende internaten geopend voor de kinderen van de Turkse migranten. In de jaren tachtig stuurden veel Turkse ouders hun kinderen naar de internaten van deze bewegingen in Turkije, om hen te beschermen tegen de schadelijke effecten van de Westerse cultuur in Nederland. De opening van zulke internaten in Nederland vanaf de jaren negentig was een grote opluchting voor veel Turkse ouders. Ze hoefden hun kinderen nu niet meer naar Turkije te sturen. Daar, in Turkije, hadden veel van deze jonge kinderen het erg moeilijk omdat ze hun ouders erg misten. Daarnaast hadden deze kinderen grote aanpassingsproblemen wanneer ze terugkeerden naar Nederland. Hun diploma werd bovendien niet als gelijkwaardig aan het Nederlandse diploma erkend. Door hun lange verblijf in Turkije hadden daarnaast vele van deze jongeren de Nederlandse taal vergeten.

Soorten internaten

De Turkse studenten die nu verbonden zijn met deze bewegingen, wonen ook in de Nederlandse internaten. Daar helpen zij de jongeren met hun huiswerk. Er zijn ook studenten met een theologiestudie uit Turkije die intensief les geven over de islam aan deze jongeren en meisjes in deze internaten. Er zijn twee soorten internaten. De meisjes- en jongensinternaten hanteren een strikte scheiding van de seksen. Een belangrijk effect van het verblijf in deze internaten is dat de leerlingen meestal succesvol hun school afmaken door het strakke huiswerkbegeleidingprogramma. De student-begeleiders in deze internaten houden ook contact met de school van deze leerlingen en voeren dagelijkse gesprekken met de leerlingen over de school resultaten. Daarnaast vormt de geestelijke vorming een belangrijk aandachtspunt voor deze begeleiders. Met name in de weekenden hebben de leerlingen meer tijd om zich te verdiepen in de islamitische kennis en verder hebben ze meer tijd voor de sociale en sportactiviteiten. De ouders die hun kinderen missen mogen op bezoek komen wanneer ze willen. De kinderen mogen tijdens hun zomer- en andere schoolvakanties naar hun ouders gaan.

Ophef

Recent is er enige ophef over deze internaten ontstaan. Daarover is in het kort het volgende te zeggen: De verschillende journalisten in Nederland van de landelijke kranten zoals de Volkskrant, NRC en de Trouw hebben zeer kritische vraagtekens gezet bij het sociaalpedagogische klimaat in deze internaten. Aan de ene kant is het goede dat deze internaten aandacht krijgen van de pers, maar helaas deze internaten worden structureel in een negatieve context behandeld door de Nederlandse journalisten. Het zou erg functioneel en waardevol zijn dat de positieve effecten van deze internaten ook aandacht zouden krijgen. Het positieve effect van deze internaten aan de educatie van de kinderen krijgt geen enkele aandacht in de pers waardoor een foutief beeld ontstaat over deze internaten.

Mehmet Sahin is verbonden aan de afdeling Culturele Antropologie van de Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam als NISIS PhD kanidaat. Zijn onderzoeksproject richt zich op de Gülen-beweging: The Golden Generation: Islam, Inspiration, Ethical techniques of binding within the Gülen Movement.

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Secularistische Sentimenten: Huis, Haard & Haram

Posted on November 27th, 2012 by martijn.
Categories: Gender, Kinship & Marriage Issues, Islam in the Netherlands, islamophobia, Multiculti Issues, Public Islam.

Woningcorporatie Eigen Haard ging in op woonwensen van moslims. Het Parool noemde dit halalwoningen en haalde zo secularistische gevoeligheden omhoog. Hier een overzicht van multicultureel bouwen in Nederland en van de discussie naar aanleiding van de publicatie in Het Parool.

Als antropoloog kom ik graag bij de mensen thuis. Dan zie je nog eens wat. Want hoe eenvormig de huizen tegenwoordig ook mogen lijken, de meeste mensen geven er toch een persoonlijk tintje aan gebaseerd op wat men ‘mooi’, ‘praktisch’ en ‘gepast’ vindt. Daar zit dan vervolgens ook weer een bepaald patroon in aangezien dat soort zaken altijd met de sociaal-culturele context van mensen te maken heeft. Dat is voor autochtonen zo en ook voor allochtonen. De tijd is voorbij dat we 35 mannelijke gastarbeiders in pensions stopten die eigenlijk amper geschikt waren voor één groot gezin.

‘Multicultureel’ bouwen in Nederland
Inmiddels zijn er dan ook tal van woningbouwprojecten die rekening houden met de behoeften van allochtone inwoners, in het bijzonder voor wat betreft de functionaliteit van een huis; zeg maar de praktische inrichting en plattegrond. Den Haag heeft Schilderswijk (Punt Komma in 1988), Verzorgingshuis Schildershoek (ruimte voor christelijke, joodse en islamitische gelovigen), de Bazar (ondernemers), Rotterdam Biz Botuluyuz en Oude Noorden, Dordrecht Noorderkwartier, Amsterdam Hudsonhof, Indische buurt, en het Centraal Park Noord. Niet alles is gerealiseerd overigens en sommige projecten waren niet meer dan studieprojecten. Ook plaatsen als Wageningen, Nijmegen, Boxtel en Utrecht kennen projecten; voornamelijk gericht op ouderen.

Eén van de oudste projecten in Nederland waar gebruik is gemaakt ‘uitheemse’ invloeden is denk ik Kasbah in Hengelo uit 1973, maar in feite staat architectuur door de eeuwen heen bloot aan invloeden van buitenaf die ook de woonwensen van mensen hier beïnvloeden. Woningen kunnen daarbij op verschillende manieren aangepast aan de wensen van bewoners: geschikt voor ouderen, samenwonen van meerdere generaties, gescheiden leefcircuits, licht en donker verdeling, enzovoorts. Weliswaar hielden de projecten rekening met de wensen van allochtonen, maar ze werden vaak ook zeer gewaardeerd door autochtone bewoners. In sommige steden (Arnhem en Rotterdam) is geprobeerd de specifieke eisen op te nemen in de standaardeisen. Opvallend is het Rotterdamse Oleanderproject (1993), bedoeld als de mooiste ‘Turkse wijk in Europa’. Eén van de reden dat dit losgelaten is, was omdat Turkse Nederlanders geen wijk wilden die teveel door Turkse Nederlanders gedomineerd zou worden. Ook in andere projecten, zoals het Rotterdamse Le Medi (discussie 2002/2003), kwam de vrees naar voren dat er ‘getto-vorming’ (zoals dat werd genoemd) zou ontstaan en ‘dat de islam door islamitische bouwstijlen sterker zou worden’. Met name die projecten die zich richten op een ‘duidelijke’ identiteit en multiculturele expressie werden vaak gaandeweg bijgesteld. En wel op zo’n manier dat die specifieke identiteit minder opviel.

Halalwoningen
Afgelopen zaterdag wist Het Parool te melden dat woningcorporatie Eigen Haard in Bos en Lommer (Amsterdam) een complex van 188 appartementen speciaal heeft aangepast aan de wensen van moslims: ‘halal-woningen’. In het uitgebreidere stuk in het PS katern van Parool kunnen we lezen in het stuk ‘Zo woont Mustapha het liefst‘ dat het onder meer gaat om een extra grote keuken, een ruim voorportaal met een schoenenkast (maar die staat dan weer niet bij de voordeur, slimmeriken), satellietschotels, extra waterleidingaansluitingen voor ritueel reinigen (de familie in het stuk gebruikt die echter niet) en schuifdeuren zodat woonkamer en keuken gescheiden kunnen worden (wat de vrouw in het artikel bijvoorbeeld doet als er visite is die ‘niet zo intiem’ is).

Het complex is onder renovatie vanaf 2010; daarvoor was het een aardig verloederd en uitgewoond pand. Voor de renovatie is gekozen voor uitgebreide inspraak met onder meer een vrouwenraad en een kinderraad. Het bleek met name de vrouwenraad te zijn die hamerde op een vrouwendomein en een scheiding met het mannendomein. In het Parool stuk wordt daarbij verwezen naar Koerdische gebruiken uit Oost-Turkije: “Daar eten mannen en vrouwen apart”. Een hemelsblauwe keuken werd afgewezen omdat ‘Hollanders dat niet willen’ en ‘je moet flexibel blijven’. De woningen zijn ook groter geworden tegen een redelijk vriendelijke prijs. Er blijken ook meer ‘Nederlanders’ te wonen dan voorheen.

Eén van de vragen die opgeworpen worden in het stuk is of het wel de taak is van de woningcorporatie om rekening te houden met de religieus-culturele wensen van de huurders. UvA-socioloog Veldboer betwijfelt dit gezien de grote en snelle veranderingen in de wereld onder meer door secularisering (ontkerkelijking). Hij ziet wel een overeenkomst met een andere aanpak van corporaties: plaatsingsbeleid op grond van leefstijl. Hij erkent dat dat in het geval van ‘moslimleefstijl’ gevoelig is, maar als dat met andere leefstijlgroepen wél kan dan waarom hier niet.

Aanpassen aan moslims
In het grotere stuk staat nergens dat Eigen Haard stelt dat het gebouw is aangepast voor ‘moslims’; wel word er verwezen naar religieus-culturele wensen. Op de voorpagina echter stelt men wel dat EH het heeft aangepast aan de woonwensen van moslims. De politiek reageert daarop:

Volgens de gemeenteraadsleden Daniel van der Ree (VVD) en Marijke Shahsavari (CDA) zouden woningcorporaties zich niet moeten bezighouden met het aanbieden van woningen die specifiek inspelen op de woonwensen van moslims. “Dat komt de integratie niet ten goede.”
[…]
Integratiedeskundige Han Entzinger noemt het een sympathiek initiatief, maar waarschuwt voor concentraties van moslims. “De corporatie zegt wel dat ze braaf zal toewijzen via de regels, maar je loopt wel een risico dat er vooral moslims komen wonen.”

Van der Ree zegt dat het zo aanpassen van woningen geen corporatietaak is. “Je geeft zo het signaal af dat je specifiek bouwt voor moslims. Mensen mogen wonen waar ze willen, maar het is niet de bedoeling dat wij moslims naar een plek leiden om er met z’n allen onder elkaar te wonen.”

Volgens Shahsavari bestaat het gevaar dat het gebouw een moslimenclave wordt, doordat het in de praktijk vooral voor hen geschikt is. “En dan is dat allesbehalve bevorderend voor de integratie. Ik vind dit een heel vreemde ontwikkeling.”

Volgens Wim de Waard van Eigen Haard is er geen gevaar dat de woningen exclusief door moslims zullen worden bewoond. “We hebben geluisterd naar de wensen van onze bewoners, maar de woningen zijn net zo goed geschikt voor niet-moslims. Er is geen sprake van dat we zullen selecteren op religieuze achtergrond.”

En op pagina vier wordt gesproken over ‘moslimenclaves’

“En wat dan als er katholieken komen die bij hun huis graag een kapelletje willen?” zegt Shahsavari. “Dat wordt natuurlijk nooit toegestaan.”

Van der Ree en Shahsavari vinden dat de extra aanpassingen niet voor rekening van de belastingbetalers mogen komen. Wim de Waard van Eigen Haard stelt dat de kosten niet hoog zijn en verwerpt dat het complex een enclave wordt. “Inmiddels is het percentage niet-moslims toegenomen. De aanpassingen maken het onze moslimbewoners gewoon gemakkelijk, maar het kraantje dat de moslim gebruikt voor het ritueel reinigen, kan de niet-moslim gebruiken om zijn gieter te vullen.”

Entzinger noemt het een ‘beetje een ouderwets initiatief.’ “Aan de Molukkers vroegen we destijds ook: wat voor huizen willen jullie? Dat heeft niet veel zoden aan de dijk gezet.”

Hoewel de aanpassingen inderdaad gelegitimeerd kunnen worden op basis van de verwijzingen van mensen naar de islam, wordt dat in de bijlage niet gedaan. Hoogstens is er een verwijzing naar etnische patronen die de scheiding tussen mannen en vrouwen legitimeren. Het is echter nog maar de vraag wat dit nu allemaal met islam te maken, behalve wellicht dan dat veel bewoners moslim zijn. Er zijn genoeg redenen om het zo doen die te maken hebben met alledaagse praktische overwegingen die deels te maken hebben specifieke culturele gevoeligheden en patronen zoals Ferdows Kazemi laat zien.

Overigens in de voorbereiding op de renovatie is de woningcorporatie wel degelijk uitgegaan van een idee over wat moslims belangrijk zouden kunnen vinden:

“Daarnaast hebben we ook speciale bijeenkomsten voor vrouwen, omdat vrouwen uit een moslim-cultuur vaak niet met mannen in één ruimte samen willen zijn. Dat is het maandelijkse koffie-overleg. De deelneemsters hebben duidelijke eigen wensen, bijvoorbeeld de al bekende dichte keuken, waar vrouwen apart kunnen zitten, maar ook een betere wasgelegenheid in het toilet in plaats van het kleine handenwasbakje. Het lijkt niet spectaculair, maar het is belangrijk dat ze weten dat ze worden gehoord.”

Ook hieruit blijkt dat het de vrouwen waren die de nadruk legden op specifieke voorzieningen voor vrouwen. Je kunt je natuurlijk afvragen of men hier dan niet een heel specifieke selectie van vrouwen te pakken heeft. Zoals vaak het geval is bij inspraak is er een specifieke groep die de inspraak namens anderen verzorgd. Moslims die gruwen van een mogelijke scheiding tussen mannen en vrouwen zijn misschien niet aanwezig geweest. Overigens geldt daarbij nog wel de opmerking dat velen die een scheiding verwerpen, dat verwerpen voor publieke domeinen en niet voor privé-domeinen. Overigens, het rekening houden met specifieke etnisch-religieuze woonwensen (als dat het geval zou zijn) is natuurlijk nog niet hetzelfde als exclusief voor moslims bouwen.

De islamisering van minderheden
In de discussies die volgen op het Parool artikel gaat het met name om het vermeende islamitische aspect hiervan. Er wordt dan ook verwezen naar ‘halal-woningen’ (halal als in toegestaan in islamitische tradities). Het artikel zelf, de geschreven tekst, was nog niet eens zo heel slecht zoals ook Carel Brendel betoogt. Wat Brendel echter ook, terecht, betoogt is dat aan de veelbesproken plattegrond van de woningen niet te zien is of het islamitisch is en wat er islamitisch aan is. Hij geeft het voorbeeld van huizen in de Oekraïne, je zou ook aan grote woonboerderijen kunnen denken. De term halalwoning is daarom belangrijker dan menigeen suggereert. Die term op zich betekent weinig; het gaat niet om halal geslacht vlees, er is geen gezaghebbende instantie die het huis halal of haram kan verklaren. De term halalwoning krijgt betekenis en gezag doordat die voortdurend herhaald wordt: in andere krantenberichten, op blogs, twitter (RT’s) en Facebook (like & share). Het is de herhaling die van een onbestemde realiteit De Waarheid maakt.

Geenstijl duikt erop en vergroot het moslimaspect nog eens. Het aanpassen van woningen op basis van sekse (want onderdrukt!) en geloof kan niet. En columnist Jan Bennink schreef een stuk in de Volkskrant waarin hij zich beklaagt dat moslims voorgetrokken worden. Hij is er niet zozeer op tegen dat er rekening wordt gehouden met de woonwensen van mensen, maar wel wanneer dit zou gebeuren op basis van geloof in plaats van bijvoorbeeld inkomen. Het project zou een uiting zijn van een sluipende islamisering via commerciële kanalen. In haar programma gaat Eva Jinek in gesprek met minister Plasterk ook in tegen het idee van het aanpassen van woningen op basis van religieuze voorkeuren en zeker wanneer dat onder andere gaat om het scheiden van mannen en vrouwen en zeker zeker wanneer dat de overheid dat financiert. Plasterk relativeert dat, maar stelt ook dat we niet zo moeten gaan bouwen dat niet-moslims er niet meer willen wonen. De VVD in Amsterdam vindt het prima dat moslims onder elkaar willen wonen, maar met deze halalwoningen worden moslims toch een ‘verkeerde kant’ op gestuurd wat integratie niet ten goede zou komen. Daarbij gaat het hier om belastinggeld want sociale huurwoningen worden dubbel gesubsidieerd en dus moeten we er voorzichtig en efficiënt mee om gaan volgens hen. Dat betekent dat als mensen een eigen huis kopen of voor eigen rekening huren, ze zelf verantwoordelijk zijn voor indeling en inrichting. ‘Bij sociale huurwoningen ligt dit tot echt anders.’, aldus de VVD.

Seculiere neo-liberale gevoeligheden
In deze discussie zitten diverse interessante patronen;

Religieus / etnisch – Een groot deel van de aanpassingen heeft te maken met alledaagse woonomgeving. Het is nutteloos om daar een onderscheid te maken tussen wat religieus of etnisch is; de scheiding tussen mannen en vrouwen is niet alleen een religieus patroon, maar ook een cultureel en, zo blijkt uit het Parool artikel, deels aangegeven door de vrouwen zelf die onder elkaar willen zijn. Toch overheerst in de discussie de term halalwoningen, bedoeld als verwijzingen naar islam.
Man/vrouw – De scheiding tussen de seksen blijkt een gevoelige in de Nederlandse samenleving, zelfs wanneer dat achter de voordeur gebeurt. Behalve natuurlijk op verjaardagen en dergelijke van autochtone niet-moslims wanneer daar mannen en vrouwen apart zitten of wanneer in die families en vriendengroepen de vrouwen weer eens een dagje op pad gaan in het kader van zussen-, vrouwen- of vriendinnendag. Of mannen en hun mannendag natuurlijk. Maar in het geval van moslims wel, want die zijn islamitisch en in islam zouden vrouwen onderdrukt worden, en dus weten we hoe moslims denken en dus is die scheiding daar een uiting en een gevolg van. Of zoiets. Of degenen die niet in de val van het cultuurdenken trappen, wijzen erop dat de overheid (of semi-overheid) geen sekse-scheiding op religieuze gronden moet faciliteren.
Religie / seculier – Kennelijk is het problematisch dat woningen worden aangepast op basis van vermeende religieuze en etnische wensen. Religie zou geen punt moeten zijn en zeker niet wanneer het door de staat gesubsideerd wordt. Wat kennelijk wel kan is inkomen en seculiere leefstijlen. Dit verwijst deels verwijst naar een neo-liberale invulling van het secularisme en een seculiere invulling van het neo-liberalisme. Dat geldt ook voor de scheiding tussen mannen en vrouwen, die sowieso door velen wordt afgewezen, maar een belangrijk argument daarbij is dat er belastinggeld heen gaat. Het seculiere wordt hier behoorlijk overheerst door liberale economische motieven. Maar het werkt ook andersom. We zouden ook het beleid van Eigen Haard kunnen aanmerken als liberaal marktdenken. Om te zorgen dat mensen een appartement huren, pas je het aan aan hun wensen. Vervolgens kun je ook een hogere huur vragen. Wanneer dat om etnische of religieuze wensen gaat, wordt dat dus anders. Hier wordt het neo-liberalisme als het ware doorsneden door een idee over de scheiding seculier / religieus.
Publiek / Privé – De discussie gaat nogal ver, want het gaat over de privé-inrichting van huizen. Klaarblijkelijk heeft iedereen daar zeggenschap over behalve moslims en behalve mensen die sociale huurwoningen hebben; dan mogen anderen dat bepalen. Doet me een beetje denken aan de Volkskrant die een paar jaar geleden verzuchtte dat de integratie van moslims ophoudt bij de voordeur. We zien een dergelijke bemoeienis met het privé-leven van mensen ook terug in zaken als huwelijk, huiskamerbijeenkomsten (radicaal!), besnijdenis, enzovoorts.
Integratie / segregatie – Moslim is per definitie een probleem. Immers, ik heb deze discussie nog niet gezien voor christelijke studentenhuizen en studentenkamers, of voor Joodse studentenhuizen, of christenen die zouden blijven samenklitten in hun enclave, of voor de Duitstalige katholieken, of voor Nederlandse verzorgingstehuizen in den vreemde. Er zijn dus problemen met het idee dat moslims bij elkaar wonen. Men gaat er ook vanuit dat moslims graag bij elkaar willen wonen. Ook al blijkt uit het artikel in het Parool iets heel anders: a) er wonen meer autochtone Nederlandse niet-moslims dan voorheen en b) de andere bewoners zijn daar tevreden mee en c) het is niet alleen voor moslims. Gezien de koppeling met integratie hier is dat een herhaling van het voortdurend terugkerende standpunt dat moslims niet willen integreren en dat een concentratie van moslims niet goed is. Een standpunt dat niet alleen terug te vinden is bij radicalen als de PVV, maar ook bij sociaal-democraten als Plasterk. En niet te vergeten er zijn ook tegengeluiden.

Dikke seculier neo-liberale haram?
De obsessie met moslims zorgt ervoor dat we dit soort aanpassingen en huizen meteen zien als des moslims en islamisering ook al gaat het grotere artikel in het Parool daar nauwelijks over (in tegenstelling tot de kleinere teasers in het Parool). Dat is genoeg om vanuit secularistische overwegingen ‘Haram!‘ / ‘Mag Niet!’ te roepen. Op zo’n manier wordt het duidelijk dat het onderscheid tussen religieus – seculier, publiek – privé, integratie – segregatie, man-vrouw niet zozeer vastomlijnde heldere scheidingen zijn, maar het resultaat van politieke overwegingen en neo-liberale belangen. Het gaat daarbij niet eens zozeer om moslims vs. seculiere samenleving, maar eerder om verschillende invullingen van de liberale, seculiere multiculturele samenleving door verschillende instanties en politieke partijen. Er zijn ook tegengeluiden dus er is zeker geen eensgezindheid over waar de grenzen liggen. In plaats van scheidingen tussen bijvoorbeeld seculier / religieus als absolute scheidingen te nemen, kunnen we ze beter opvatten als verschillende posities in publieke debatten over de grenzen tussen verschillende domeinen en over het type samenleving dat we willen zijn.

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