C L O S E R

Protected: AD.nl – ’Ibrahim’ ontkent ronselen voor jihad

Posted on December 1st, 2005 by martijn.
Categories: Religious and Political Radicalization, Young Muslims.

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C L O S E R – Dick Pels: Hoofddoekje leggen, niemand zeggen

Posted on November 30th, 2005 by .
Categories: Islam in the Netherlands, My Research, Religious and Political Radicalization, Young Muslims.

Soms zeggen anderen duidelijker wat ik bedoel, dan ik zelf. Daarom integraal het artikel van Dick Pels: Hoofddoekje leggen, niemand zeggen uit Trouw

,,Hoofddoekje of heilige oorlog: je kunt met de islam alle kanten op. ‘Zuivere’ moslims bestaan niet. De Koran bevat geen heldere, ondubbelzinnige, universeel dwingende boodschap. Het zou goed zijn als zowel gelovigen als ongelovigen hun hang naar zuiverheid wat meer zouden relativeren, en bereid zouden zijn om de deuren van de ijtihad (de vrije interpretatie) verder open te zetten.”

Het wonderlijke is dat ook de vrijzinnige moslims zich beroepen op de onwrikbare waarheid van het Heilige Boek

Als er één ding duidelijk wordt uit deze soms hilarische theologische muggenzifterij, dan is het wel dat zoiets als de ‘zuivere’ islam niet bestaat, en dat je met de Koran (net als met de Bijbel) zo’n beetje alle kanten op kunt. Het is dan ook merkwaardig om te zien dat seculiere islamcritici zoals Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Hans Jansen of Paul Cliteur in spiegelbeeld dezelfde zuiverheidsobsessie koesteren, en degenen die het anders zien op hun beurt kapittelen omdat zij ‘naïef’ en ‘onwetend’ zijn omtrent de ware strekking van de Koran. Maar Hirsi Ali’s stelling dat er maar één islam bestaat, namelijk ‘die van de Koran en de hadith en de Profeet Mohammed’, stuit minstens op het bezwaar dat tal van rekkelijke moslims de overleveringen niet rekenen tot de zuivere islam, en de Profeet zelf als een historische en dus feilbare figuur beschouwen. Haar overtuiging dat alle moslims per definitie onderworpen zijn aan een absolute Allah en een absolute Mohammed blijft wringen met het vrijzinnige uitgangspunt dat het blindelings volgen van de traditie of van schriftgeleerden door de Koran juist wordt veroordeeld.
Terwijl vrijzinnige moslims stellen dat de Koran ‘overduidelijk’ de gelijkwaardigheid predikt tussen man en vrouw, bewijzen de radicale Verlichters met evenveel aplomb dat de islam een machistische en vrouwvijandige godsdienst is. Terwijl de eersten met de hand op de Koran beweren dat de islam in wezen vredelievend is, sluiten Hirsi Ali c.s. zich aan bij de radicaal-fundamentalistische overtuiging dat dezelfde Koran oproept om afvalligen en ongelovigen te doden. Als de ene partij ‘bewijst’ dat het begrip djihad staat voor ‘het zich inspannen op Gods weg’, ‘bewijzen’ zowel Mohammed B. als Ayaan Hirsi Ali dat dit begrip alleen maar kan slaan op de Heilige Oorlog. Als gematigde moslims de terreur- en zelfmoordaanslagen ‘onrein’ en ‘onislamitisch’ noemen, en zien als misbruik van het geloof door ‘fascistoïde fundamentalisten’, tonen de aanhangers van Bin Laden en de radicale Verlichters in commissie aan dat terreur en martelaarschap logisch voortvloeien uit de ‘zuivere’ islam.
Gezien deze fundamentele onenigheid zou het beter zijn om elk essentialisme (het idee dat je het wezenskenmerk, de zuivere kern, kunt bepalen) ten aanzien van de teksten, geschiedenis en tradities van de islam voortaan te vermijden. De islam is een veelkleurig tapijt dat men niet naar de ene of de andere kant moet oprollen. Het is net zo misleidend om de islam te beschouwen als ‘in de kern’ gewelddadig, totalitair en terroristisch, als om hem ‘in wezen’ zacht en vredelievend te noemen. Oorlog en vrede zijn veeleer de uiterste polen die een uitgebreid continuüm naar twee kanten afbakenen: ‘de’ islam is niets anders dan dit continuüm. In dit licht heeft het even weinig zin om islam en terreur aan elkaar gelijk te stellen, als om te blijven weigeren om tussen beide enigerlei verband te zien. Ook vredelievende moslims zullen moeten erkennen dat de oorlogstraditie is ingebakken in de geschiedenis van de islam, en dat terroristen zich niet voor niets op het geloof beroepen. Andersom moet men zich blijven verzetten tegen het vooroordeel van zowel islamisten als Verlichters dat softe liberale moslims geen ‘echte’ moslims zouden zijn. Hoofddoekje of heilige oorlog: je kunt met de islam alle kanten op. ‘Zuivere’ moslims bestaan niet. De Koran bevat geen heldere, ondubbelzinnige, universeel dwingende boodschap. Het zou goed zijn als zowel gelovigen als ongelovigen hun hang naar zuiverheid wat meer zouden relativeren en bereid zouden zijn om de deuren van de ijtihad (de vrije interpretatie) verder open te zetten.

Lees het hele artikel: (more…)

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Protected: de Volkskrant – Light-versie Hofstadgroep

Posted on November 29th, 2005 by martijn.
Categories: Murder on theo Van Gogh and related issues, Religious and Political Radicalization, Young Muslims.

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'Geloofsmaffia'

Posted on November 28th, 2005 by martijn.
Categories: Religious and Political Radicalization, Young Muslims.

In het AD het artikel:
’Moslimjongens in ban van geloofsmaffia’

Over drie jongens die, zoals de ouders vrezen, wellicht naar Tsjetsjenie getrokken zijn.

De drie moslimjongens die al anderhalve week worden vermist, volgden huiskamerbijeenkomsten waarbij koranlessen werden gegeven.

Volgens diverse ingewijden in de Haagse moslimgemeenschap werden die bijeenkomsten geleid door een man die al in 2003 werd opgepakt op verdenking van ronselen voor de jihad.

De man werd destijds vrijgesproken wegens gebrek aan bewijs, maar zou na zijn vrijlating zijn doorgegaan met zijn praktijken. Hij kreeg daarop een spreekverbod in de orthodoxe As Soennah-moskee, waar onlangs ook twee van de vermiste jongens kwamen.

Afgelopen donderdag werd de man de toegang tot de moskee definitief ontzegd, omdat het moskeebestuur hem ervan verdenkt jongeren op het verkeerde pad te brengen. De man geniet vooral onder jonge, labiele Marokkanen status als korandeskundige. De politie kon gisteren niet zeggen of de man is gehoord in verband met de vermissingen.

De ouders van de verdwenen jongens vrezen dat hun zonen zijn gehersenspoeld door de ’geloofsmaffia’. Ze vrezen dat hun zonen in het buitenland zitten. Een van de jongens zei drie maanden geleden naar Tsjetsjenië te willen gaan. De drie jongens vertrokken zonder een spoor achter te laten. Ze namen alleen geld en hun paspoorten mee.

Het gaat onder andere om ‘Ramazan’ en ‘Said’ twee Turkse jongens.

Ramazan werkte in een viswinkel. Type rustige jongen, harde werker, grappenmaker. Said ging braaf elke dag naar school.

De vader van Said hoopt maar een ding: ,,Ik wil alleen maar dat mijn zoon thuiskomt, dat hij zijn school afmaakt.” Foto Frank Jansen

1/2
VOLGENDE
Kwam netjes meteen na school weer thuis, bij de oudere broer waar hij woonde. En als hij een zes haalde sprongen de tranen hem al in de ogen, zo ijverig was hij. Eigenlijk nog een moederskindje.

Maar Ramazan en Said verlieten anderhalve week geleden plotseling en zonder bericht achter te laten hun ouderlijk huis. Hun familie vreest het ergste: de jongens moeten zijn gehersenspoeld en geronseld voor de jihad. Waarom lieten ze anders hun telefoons achter? Dat doen jongens van die leeftijd toch alleen als ze écht niet gevonden willen worden?

Dertig jaar geleden kwam de vader van Ramazan vanuit Turkije naar Nederland. Hij werkte hard, onder meer in een krokettenfabriek, en zorgde ervoor dat zijn zoon uit de criminaliteit bleef. En nu dit. Hij moet er keer op keer hard om zuchten, zijn ogen vochtig. Ook al omdat hij er na de verdwijning van Ramazan achter kwam dat de jongen al een maand niet meer naar school ging. Terwijl hij ’s morgens netjes op tijd vertrok en ’s middags netjes weer thuis kwam.

De vader van Said, Ramazan’s boezemvriend, kan al dagen bijna geen woord uitbrengen. Het enige wat hij telkens herhaalt zijn dezelfde staccato, door ongeloof doordrenkte zinnen: ,,Het is nog een kind. Hij is zo goedgelovig. Het is een heel angstige jongen. Hij heeft het nooit over de jihad.’’

Ramazan wél. Eén keer sprak hij erover tegen zijn moeder. Dat hij naar Tsjetsjenië wilde. De vader van Ramazan greep meteen in toen hij het hoorde. Hij verbood zijn zoon nog langer om te gaan met de man, die hij ervan verdenkt zijn zoon te hebben gehersenspoeld. Ook Said werd met de man gesignaleerd, hoorde zijn vader na de verdwijning van zijn zoon.

De man zou, volgens verschillende bronnen, behoren tot de twaalf terreurverdachten die in 2003 werden opgepakt op verdenking van het ronselen voor de jihad. Ze werden vrijgesproken.

De vader van Said hoopt maar een ding: ,,Ik wil alleen maar dat mijn zoon thuiskomt, dat hij zijn school afmaakt.’’

0 comments.

‘Geloofsmaffia’

Posted on November 28th, 2005 by .
Categories: Religious and Political Radicalization, Young Muslims.

In het AD het artikel:
’Moslimjongens in ban van geloofsmaffia’

Over drie jongens die, zoals de ouders vrezen, wellicht naar Tsjetsjenie getrokken zijn.

De drie moslimjongens die al anderhalve week worden vermist, volgden huiskamerbijeenkomsten waarbij koranlessen werden gegeven.

Volgens diverse ingewijden in de Haagse moslimgemeenschap werden die bijeenkomsten geleid door een man die al in 2003 werd opgepakt op verdenking van ronselen voor de jihad.

De man werd destijds vrijgesproken wegens gebrek aan bewijs, maar zou na zijn vrijlating zijn doorgegaan met zijn praktijken. Hij kreeg daarop een spreekverbod in de orthodoxe As Soennah-moskee, waar onlangs ook twee van de vermiste jongens kwamen.

Afgelopen donderdag werd de man de toegang tot de moskee definitief ontzegd, omdat het moskeebestuur hem ervan verdenkt jongeren op het verkeerde pad te brengen. De man geniet vooral onder jonge, labiele Marokkanen status als korandeskundige. De politie kon gisteren niet zeggen of de man is gehoord in verband met de vermissingen.

De ouders van de verdwenen jongens vrezen dat hun zonen zijn gehersenspoeld door de ’geloofsmaffia’. Ze vrezen dat hun zonen in het buitenland zitten. Een van de jongens zei drie maanden geleden naar Tsjetsjenië te willen gaan. De drie jongens vertrokken zonder een spoor achter te laten. Ze namen alleen geld en hun paspoorten mee.

Het gaat onder andere om ‘Ramazan’ en ‘Said’ twee Turkse jongens.

Ramazan werkte in een viswinkel. Type rustige jongen, harde werker, grappenmaker. Said ging braaf elke dag naar school.

De vader van Said hoopt maar een ding: ,,Ik wil alleen maar dat mijn zoon thuiskomt, dat hij zijn school afmaakt.” Foto Frank Jansen

1/2
VOLGENDE
Kwam netjes meteen na school weer thuis, bij de oudere broer waar hij woonde. En als hij een zes haalde sprongen de tranen hem al in de ogen, zo ijverig was hij. Eigenlijk nog een moederskindje.

Maar Ramazan en Said verlieten anderhalve week geleden plotseling en zonder bericht achter te laten hun ouderlijk huis. Hun familie vreest het ergste: de jongens moeten zijn gehersenspoeld en geronseld voor de jihad. Waarom lieten ze anders hun telefoons achter? Dat doen jongens van die leeftijd toch alleen als ze écht niet gevonden willen worden?

Dertig jaar geleden kwam de vader van Ramazan vanuit Turkije naar Nederland. Hij werkte hard, onder meer in een krokettenfabriek, en zorgde ervoor dat zijn zoon uit de criminaliteit bleef. En nu dit. Hij moet er keer op keer hard om zuchten, zijn ogen vochtig. Ook al omdat hij er na de verdwijning van Ramazan achter kwam dat de jongen al een maand niet meer naar school ging. Terwijl hij ’s morgens netjes op tijd vertrok en ’s middags netjes weer thuis kwam.

De vader van Said, Ramazan’s boezemvriend, kan al dagen bijna geen woord uitbrengen. Het enige wat hij telkens herhaalt zijn dezelfde staccato, door ongeloof doordrenkte zinnen: ,,Het is nog een kind. Hij is zo goedgelovig. Het is een heel angstige jongen. Hij heeft het nooit over de jihad.’’

Ramazan wél. Eén keer sprak hij erover tegen zijn moeder. Dat hij naar Tsjetsjenië wilde. De vader van Ramazan greep meteen in toen hij het hoorde. Hij verbood zijn zoon nog langer om te gaan met de man, die hij ervan verdenkt zijn zoon te hebben gehersenspoeld. Ook Said werd met de man gesignaleerd, hoorde zijn vader na de verdwijning van zijn zoon.

De man zou, volgens verschillende bronnen, behoren tot de twaalf terreurverdachten die in 2003 werden opgepakt op verdenking van het ronselen voor de jihad. Ze werden vrijgesproken.

De vader van Said hoopt maar een ding: ,,Ik wil alleen maar dat mijn zoon thuiskomt, dat hij zijn school afmaakt.’’

0 comments.

Protected: Elsevier.nl – Spaanse terreurcel had banden met Nederland

Posted on November 26th, 2005 by martijn.
Categories: International Terrorism, Murder on theo Van Gogh and related issues, Religious and Political Radicalization, Young Muslims.

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C L O S E R – Droogzwemmen? Radicalisering moslimjongeren: Feit of Fictie?

Posted on November 25th, 2005 by martijn.
Categories: Religious and Political Radicalization, Young Muslims.

Er zijn veel misvattingen over de radicalisering van moslimjongeren in Nederland. In het publieke debat is vaak geen ruimte voor de mening van jongeren over dit verschijnsel. Veel jongeren ergeren zich juist aan de misvattingen die veelvuldig herhaald worden in het publiek debat.

Op dinsdag 29 november om 19.00 uur vindt het debat “Radicalisering moslimjongeren: Feit of Fictie?” plaats in het Felix Meritis in Amsterdam (Keizersgracht 324). Jongeren van 20 verschillende jongerenorganisaties zullen hun mening geven over de radicalisering in de Amsterdamse samenleving. Verder zullen zij ingaan op het verschil tussen de beeldvorming en de realiteit van de radicalisering van moslimjongeren. Door het debat willen de organisatoren misvattingen bestrijden en een denkbeeldige brug bouwen tussen verschillende culturele en religieuze groeperingen, waaronder autochtonen, allochtonen, moslims, christenen, joden, hindoeïsten, boeddhisten en overige religies.

Aansluitend zal er een paneldiscussie plaatsvinden met: mw. M. Slootman, onderzoeker Universiteit van Amsterdam, dhr. C. Cörüz, Tweede kamerlid CDA, dhr. Saoed Kadje, Islamgeleerde en uitgever Dar Al-ilm, mw. Floor Booys, journalist Algemeen Dagblad, mw. Naima Azough, Tweede kamerlid Groenlinks, dhr. Edwin Bakker, onderzoeker Instituut Clingendael.

Het debat wordt geleid door dhr. Mark de Bruijn (redacteur 2 Vandaag)

Islam and Christianity is een project dat ontwikkeld is door MEX-IT en AAED Management om misvattingen in de Nederlandse samenleving te bestrijden en om een bijdrage te leveren aan het wederzijdse vertrouwen van verschillende groepen in de Nederlandse samenleving. Islam and Christianity organiseert in totaal 4 debatten en één afsluitende internationale conferentie.

I&C wordt mede mogelijk gemaakt door Gemeente Amsterdam en NCDO.

Ik ben er niet bij, dus als iemand wel gaat, stuur mij ff een verslagje 😉
Het jongerenprogramma Wat Nou?! van de NMO noemen ze zoiets ‘droogzwemmen’

In Nederland heeft iedereen wel wat te zeggen over radicaliserende moslimjongeren. Politici, opiniemakers en woordvoerders kwebbelen er lustig op los en voeren allerhande oplossingen aan. Maar de jongeren over wie het nou eigenlijk gaat worden nauwelijks bij de discussie betrokken.

Om daar wat aan te doen hebben ze een essaywedstrijd uitgeschreven voor jongeren:

Moslimjongere, of je nu liberaal bent, radicaal of iets er tussen in, laat je stem horen! Hoe denk jij dat de radicalisering van jongeren in Nederland bestreden of zelfs voorkomen kan worden? Heb je een goed plan en weet je dat ook stevig te onderbouwen, zet het dan zo nauwkeurig mogelijk op papier en zorg dat het vóór 1 december 2005 binnen is bij de NMO.

En ja je kunt ook nog leuke prijzen winnen, kijk maar op hun site.

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Asia Times Online :: Myths and madrassas

Posted on November 24th, 2005 by .
Categories: International Terrorism, Young Muslims.

Asia Times Online :: Myths and madrassas

By William Dalrymple

Earlier published in the NY Review of books.

Since the revelations that three of the four future British Muslim suicide bombers visited Pakistan in the year preceding the July 7 attack, the British media have been quick to follow the US line on madrassas, with the Sunday Telegraph helpfully translating the Arabic word madrassa as terrorist “training school” (it actually means merely “place of education”), while the Daily Mirror confidently asserted over a double-page spread that the three bombers had all enrolled at Pakistani “terror schools”.

In actual fact, it is still uncertain whether the three bombers visited any madrassas while they were in Pakistan: madrassas only entered the debate because the bombers told their families they were going to Pakistan to pursue religious studies, just as they told them they were going to a religious conference when they set off to bomb London.

Just as there are some yeshivas in settlements on the West Bank that have a reputation for violence against Palestinians, and Serbian monasteries that sheltered war criminals following the truce in Bosnia, so it is estimated that as many as 15% of Pakistan’s madrassas preach violent jihad, while a few have been said to provide covert military training. Madrassa students took part in the Afghan and Kashmir jihads, and have been repeatedly implicated in acts of sectarian violence, especially against the Shi’ite minority in Karachi.

Indeed, a number of recent studies have emphasized that there is a fundamental distinction to be made between madrassa graduates – who tend to be pious villagers from impoverished economic backgrounds, possessing little technical sophistication – and the sort of middle-class, politically literate global Salafi jihadis who plan al-Qaeda operations around the world. Most of these turn out to have secular and technical backgrounds. Neither Osama bin Laden nor any of the men who carried out the Islamist assaults on America or Britain were trained in a madrassa or was a qualified alim, or cleric.

It is true that there are several examples of radical madrassa graduates who have become involved with al-Qaeda: Maulana Masood Azhar, for example, leader of the jihadi group called Jaish-e-Muhammad and an associate of bin Laden, originally studied in the ultra-militant Binori Town madrassa in Karachi. A madrassa dropout took part in last year’s bombing of Musharraf’s convoy. In Indonesia, the Bali bombings were the work of the Lashkar-i-Jihad group, which partially emerged from a group of Salafi madrassas in Indonesia.

By and large, however, madrassa students simply do not have the technical expertise necessary to carry out the kind of sophisticated attacks we have recently seen led by al-Qaeda. Instead the concerns of most madrassa graduates remain more traditional: the correct fulfillment of rituals, how to wash correctly before prayers, and the proper length to grow a beard. All these matters are part of the curriculum of Koranic studies in the madrassas. The graduates are also interested in opposing what they see as unIslamic practices such as worshiping at saints’ graves or attending the Shi’ite laments called marsiyas, for the death of the Prophet’s son-in-law Ali at the battle of Kerbala.

(more…)

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The Guardian's Muslim Youth Forum

Posted on November 23rd, 2005 by martijn.
Categories: Young Muslims.

The Guardian has a Muslim Youth Forum that is connected to their Special Report: Islam, race and British Identity. The last report appeared last Sunday: Guardian Unlimited | Special reports | Islamic voice of reason speaks out, but the anger remains

Last week the Guardian brought together a diverse group of young Muslims to debate life after the London bombs. Two moods emerged: a desire to address extremism in their midst, and disaffection with British foreign policy

Sunny, one of the participants, has some usefull comments about it.

All us Asians need to move away from a victim mentality because it is de-moralising. Blaming someone else for your problems, or allowing people like Bunting and Lee Jasper to blame others, means you don’t gather the courage to deal with the problem. It is not empowering.

When our parents came to this country they didn’t blame racism and sat around the house doing nothing. They worked twice or four times as hard to get somewhere. To defeat terrorism, racism, bigotry and xenophobia: we all need to work twice as hard too – rather than just blame others.

Also on Harry’s Place:

One of the issues considered by the group was the problem of social exclusion. The main culprit, apparently, is alcohol. As Bunting explains:

Alcohol is probably now one of the most effective and unquestioned forms of exclusion practised in the UK, affecting every kind of social network.

Well to understand that comment, you have to read their blogs…

But you can have your say at the Guardian Newsblog as well:

By Jane Perrone / UK news 10:58am

Last week the Guardian brought together a diverse group of young Muslims to debate life after the London bombs. Two moods emerged: a desire to address extremism in their midst, and disaffection with British foreign policy.

How should Muslims be engaging in the political debate about government policy on terrorism? Is there a tension between Islam and British culture? Does anything need to change in Muslim communities in the wake of the scrutiny, criticism and hostility brought on by the terrorist attacks of July 7? If you attended the forum, or you would like to join in the debate, post your comments below.

And also columnist of the Guardian, Madeleine Bunting, has written some stuff:

These particular Muslim predicaments are underscored by a problem endemic in British political culture – a weak tradition of citizenship. In place of a powerful concept of citizen’s rights and responsibilities, we are still subjects of a hereditary monarchy. We use nationalism not citizenship to generate a sense of belonging and entitlement; that disables an immigrant minority.

And this is where Ramadan’s move to the UK could be so important. Steeped in a French republican tradition of strong citizenship, he is remarkably challenging of his Muslim audiences. Who else can talk about the passivity and victim mentality of the Muslim community, as he did in the forum last week, and still get spontaneous applause? Who else challenges the community to stop complaining about not being consulted by the government, but organise themselves so effectively that the government has no choice but to listen? Who else argues that if Muslims want British-trained imams, they’ll have to pay for them instead of donating to international solidarity campaigns? You can best help the oppressed around the world by being a good citizen here, he stoutly commented.

This is tough love, and it is to the considerable credit of his audience that they want it. The question is whether it prompts the kind of energetic, critically engaged citizenship Ramadan calls for, or whether – a danger he well knows – it makes no headway against the satisfactions of complaint.

Notwithstanding all the comments made, it is a very interesting special report. I wonder if the Dutch newspapers could do something like that.

0 comments.

The Guardian’s Muslim Youth Forum

Posted on November 23rd, 2005 by .
Categories: Young Muslims.

The Guardian has a Muslim Youth Forum that is connected to their Special Report: Islam, race and British Identity. The last report appeared last Sunday: Guardian Unlimited | Special reports | Islamic voice of reason speaks out, but the anger remains

Last week the Guardian brought together a diverse group of young Muslims to debate life after the London bombs. Two moods emerged: a desire to address extremism in their midst, and disaffection with British foreign policy

Sunny, one of the participants, has some usefull comments about it.

All us Asians need to move away from a victim mentality because it is de-moralising. Blaming someone else for your problems, or allowing people like Bunting and Lee Jasper to blame others, means you don’t gather the courage to deal with the problem. It is not empowering.

When our parents came to this country they didn’t blame racism and sat around the house doing nothing. They worked twice or four times as hard to get somewhere. To defeat terrorism, racism, bigotry and xenophobia: we all need to work twice as hard too – rather than just blame others.

Also on Harry’s Place:

One of the issues considered by the group was the problem of social exclusion. The main culprit, apparently, is alcohol. As Bunting explains:

Alcohol is probably now one of the most effective and unquestioned forms of exclusion practised in the UK, affecting every kind of social network.

Well to understand that comment, you have to read their blogs…

But you can have your say at the Guardian Newsblog as well:

By Jane Perrone / UK news 10:58am

Last week the Guardian brought together a diverse group of young Muslims to debate life after the London bombs. Two moods emerged: a desire to address extremism in their midst, and disaffection with British foreign policy.

How should Muslims be engaging in the political debate about government policy on terrorism? Is there a tension between Islam and British culture? Does anything need to change in Muslim communities in the wake of the scrutiny, criticism and hostility brought on by the terrorist attacks of July 7? If you attended the forum, or you would like to join in the debate, post your comments below.

And also columnist of the Guardian, Madeleine Bunting, has written some stuff:

These particular Muslim predicaments are underscored by a problem endemic in British political culture – a weak tradition of citizenship. In place of a powerful concept of citizen’s rights and responsibilities, we are still subjects of a hereditary monarchy. We use nationalism not citizenship to generate a sense of belonging and entitlement; that disables an immigrant minority.

And this is where Ramadan’s move to the UK could be so important. Steeped in a French republican tradition of strong citizenship, he is remarkably challenging of his Muslim audiences. Who else can talk about the passivity and victim mentality of the Muslim community, as he did in the forum last week, and still get spontaneous applause? Who else challenges the community to stop complaining about not being consulted by the government, but organise themselves so effectively that the government has no choice but to listen? Who else argues that if Muslims want British-trained imams, they’ll have to pay for them instead of donating to international solidarity campaigns? You can best help the oppressed around the world by being a good citizen here, he stoutly commented.

This is tough love, and it is to the considerable credit of his audience that they want it. The question is whether it prompts the kind of energetic, critically engaged citizenship Ramadan calls for, or whether – a danger he well knows – it makes no headway against the satisfactions of complaint.

Notwithstanding all the comments made, it is a very interesting special report. I wonder if the Dutch newspapers could do something like that.

0 comments.

Protected: Ayaan Hirsi Ali over moslima's met een naveltruitje en een rappende Ali B.

Posted on November 14th, 2005 by martijn.
Categories: My Research, Young Muslims.

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Protected: Ayaan Hirsi Ali over moslima’s met een naveltruitje en een rappende Ali B.

Posted on November 14th, 2005 by martijn.
Categories: My Research, Young Muslims.

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Protected: Trouw – Radicale imam hekelt rellen

Posted on November 12th, 2005 by martijn.
Categories: Internal Debates, Young Muslims, Youth culture (as a practice).

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Protected: 'Pijn orthodoxe moslims erkennen' – telegraaf.nl [Binnenland]

Posted on November 5th, 2005 by martijn.
Categories: Religious and Political Radicalization, Young Muslims.

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Protected: ‘Pijn orthodoxe moslims erkennen’ – telegraaf.nl [Binnenland]

Posted on November 5th, 2005 by martijn.
Categories: Religious and Political Radicalization, Young Muslims.

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Protected: Ik ben de man uit Barcelona, Spanje en Andalusi�

Posted on November 5th, 2005 by martijn.
Categories: Murder on theo Van Gogh and related issues, Religious and Political Radicalization, Young Muslims.

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Protected: de Volkskrant – Saleh B. verdacht van terreur

Posted on November 1st, 2005 by martijn.
Categories: Murder on theo Van Gogh and related issues, Religious and Political Radicalization, Young Muslims.

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Protected: NRC Handelsblad – Prangende pubervragen over ramadan

Posted on October 5th, 2005 by martijn.
Categories: Islam in the Netherlands, My Research, Young Muslims, Youth culture (as a practice).

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Protected: NRC Handelsblad – Oproep Verdonk voor columniste

Posted on October 5th, 2005 by martijn.
Categories: Young Muslims.

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Isim – Workshop Muslim Religious Authority

Posted on September 29th, 2005 by .
Categories: Internal Debates, Islam in the Netherlands, My Research, Young Muslims.

Isim organizes: Workshop Muslim Religious Authority in Europe

30 September 2005 – 1 October 2005

Venue: Leiden University, Spectrum room,

Plexus building, Kaiserstraat 25, Leiden

Convenors: Frank Peter & Elena Arigita

Organized in cooperation with Zentrum Moderner Orient (ZMO)

Current processes of institutionalization of Islam in Western Europe display some paradoxical features. Muslims and non-Muslims alike often emphasize the egalitarianism inherent in Islam. In recent years, however, discussions on who is entitled to claim religious authority have become an increasingly prominent feature of Europe�s Muslim communities. This phenomenon, which may be seen in part as a response to the political need for representative Muslim spokespersons, is at the same time challenged by processes of religious individualization and the diversification of the Muslim associational network. This workshop explores approaches able to capture the complex development of Muslim religious authority in the new Western European context.

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TIME.com: Generation Jihad

Posted on September 27th, 2005 by .
Categories: Religious and Political Radicalization, Young Muslims.

In Time: TIME.com: Generation Jihad — Oct. 03, 2005 — Page 1

Well ‘generation jihad’ is a nice soundbite of course, but the article is not bad.

Posted Monday, Sep. 26, 2005
The last time Myriam Cherif saw her son Peter, 23, was in May 2004, when the two of them stood at the elevator on the fifth floor of the gritty public-housing project where they lived, just north of Paris. Myriam, 48, was born in Tunisia, moved to France when she was 8 and became a French citizen. Peter’s father, who died when the boy was 14, was a Catholic from the French Antilles in the Caribbean. But Peter took a different path. In 2003 he converted to Islam and became a devout Muslim. He took to wearing loose trousers and a long tunic instead of blue jeans and repeatedly told Myriam that she should wear the traditional Muslim head scarf. And then one day last spring, Peter told his mother he was heading off to Syria to study Arabic and the Koran.

Today Peter, one of five French citizens captured by U.S. forces in Iraq, is being held at Abu Ghraib prison outside Baghdad, family members say. More than a year since she last heard from her son, Myriam Cherif is still trying to understand how, in the streets and caf�s of Paris, Peter and other young Muslims like him were lured into giving up their lives in the West and pursuing jihad. “They saw aggressive, violent images on the Internet and asked questions about why Muslims were suffering abroad while European countries were doing nothing,” she says. “It’s like they set off a bomb in their heads.”

Generation Jihad suggests there are an awfull lot of them

Call it Generation Jihad–restive, rootless young Muslims who have spent their lives in Europe but now find themselves alienated from their societies and the policies of their governments. While the precise number of European jihadists is impossible to pinpoint, counterterrorism officials believe the pool of radicals is growing. Since 1990, the Muslim population in Europe has expanded from an estimated 10 million to 14 million. (Estimates of the number of Muslims in the U.S. range from 2 million to 7 million.) A 2004 estimate by the intelligence unit of French police found that about 150 of the country’s indexed 1,600 mosques and prayer halls were under the control of extremist elements. A study of 1,160 recent French converts to Islam found that 23% identified themselves as Salafists, members of a sect sometimes associated with violent extremism. In the Netherlands, home to 1 million Muslims, a spokesman for the Dutch intelligence service says it believes as many as 20 different hard-line Islamic groups may be operating in the country–some simply prayer groups adhering to radical interpretations of the Koran, others perhaps organizing and recruiting for violence. In London, authorities say, as many as 3,000 veterans of al-Qaeda training camps over the years were born or based in Britain.

Jihadi’s or non-jihadi’s many of these young muslims have the same frustrations:

Interviews with dozens of Muslims across Western Europe reveal a wide range of explanations for why so many are responding to the call of radical Islam. A common sentiment among members of Generation Jihad is frustration with a perceived scarcity of opportunity and disappointment at public policies that they believe target Muslims unfairly. Some lack a sense of belonging in European societies, which have long struggled to assimilate immigrants from the Islamic world. Many, in particular younger Muslims, suffer disproportionately from Europe’s high-unemployment, slow-growth economies. Some are outraged over the bloodshed in Iraq and the persistent notion–stoked by Osama bin Laden but increasingly accepted among moderates–that the West is waging an assault on Islam.

The rage expressed by members of Generation Jihad has raised concerns among European counterterrorism officials that policies pursued by the U.S. and its allies in response to the Islamic terrorist threat may be further galvanizing radicals. Says a French investigator with a decade of antiterrorism experience: “There’s a spreading atmosphere of indignation among normal Muslims that’s echoing among the younger generation.”

Besides economic deprivation the war in Iraq is also stimulating extremism:

What’s more, TIME’s reporting across Europe shows, the war in Iraq has further radicalized some Muslims, convincing them that the U.S. and Britain are bent on war with Islam and that the only proper response is to fight back. Listen to Uzair, the Savior Sect leader in London: “Muslims are being killed all over the world through the foreign policy of the U.K. and U.S. Many feel they cannot sit around and do nothing about it. What is the difference between a suicide bomber and a B-52? I really feel that war has been declared on Islam.” Iraq, says a senior French security official, “has acted as a formidable booster” for extremist groups

And some quotes of Dutch and Belgian Muslims might be disturbing for some:

In Belgium, a radical Muslim named Karim Hassoun who is head of the Arab-European League, says flatly, “The more body bags of Americans we see coming back from Iraq, the happier we are.” What’s worrisome is how openly such rhetoric is received among ordinary Muslims, many of whom consider themselves moderates. In the Netherlands, where 1 of every 16 Dutch citizens is a Muslim, it’s trendy for kids to hang on their bedroom walls half-burned American flags with Stars of David placed on them, says Mohammed Ridouan Jabri, founder of the eight-month-old Muslim Democratic Party.

Might be true all these frustrations, but as I said, not only the jihadists have these frustrations also the non-jihadists. Radicalization is a (violent) form of activism that requires some form of organization. So the question must also be who is organizing whom and for what cause?

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Protected: Laveren tussen de wet en Allah

Posted on September 21st, 2005 by martijn.
Categories: Islam in the Netherlands, Murder on theo Van Gogh and related issues, Religious and Political Radicalization, Young Muslims.

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Taking Back Islam

Posted on September 19th, 2005 by .
Categories: Internal Debates, Religious and Political Radicalization, Young Muslims.

In the Washington Post an interesting article: Taking Back Islam

Rarely has a big idea gotten more lip service and less real substance than the argument that there is a war of ideas underway for the soul of the Muslim world. Do a Google search on war of ideas and Muslim, and you get more than 11 million hits. Yet, four years after Sept. 11, 2001, the real battle is only now beginning.

In this article David Ignatius tries to understand several developments among Muslims in relation to this ‘epic’ battle.

Traditional Islam is under assault from a puritanical fringe group known as the Salafists. The name is drawn from an Arabic word that refers to the seventh-century ancestors who walked with the Prophet Muhammad. For a Christian analogy to the Salafist extremists, think of the fanatical monk Savonarola, who in the 15th century burned the books of Florence in his rage at the corruption of the Medicis. The difference is that the Salafists have access to the Internet and car bombs — and perhaps far more dangerous weapons.

He refers to Quintan Wiktorowicz, who has done research among the Al-Muhajiroun in England and is the author of Radical Islam Rising

the Salafists operate like a cult. They draw in vulnerable young people, fill them with ideas that give their lives a fiery new meaning, and send them into battle against the unbelievers. Combating this seductive Salafist preaching requires the same kind of intense “deprogramming” used to wean away converts from other modern cults.

I have some problems with the notion of ‘deprogramming’ but nevertheless many of his insights are usefull (although not new) to get a better grasp of what is going on:

He found that the group preyed on disoriented young Muslims — not poor or oppressed themselves but confused and looking for meaning. Recruitment often involved a personal crisis that provided the Muslim cultists with a “cognitive opening.”

“To many young Muslims, their parents’ version of Islam seems archaic, backward and ill-informed,” Wiktorowicz explains. Into this spiritual void march the Salafists. They provide a structured life, through a mandatory study session every week in the halaqah , or prayer circle, and a new set of life rules. Among the prohibited activities Wiktorowicz discovered in his research were “playing games,” “watching TV,” “sleeping a lot and chilling out,” and “hanging out with friends.”

Despite the salafist dominance (or thanks to?) there is something of a counter attack emerging.

Traditional Islam is finally starting to fight back against the Salafists and their self-taught, literalist interpretations of the Koran. One of the leaders in this effort is Jordan’s King Abdullah, heir to a Hashemite throne that traces its lineage back to Muhammad. He convened an Islamic conference in Amman in July that concluded with a communique on “True Islam and Its Role in Modern Society.” It reemphasized the traditional faith — the four schools of Sunni jurisprudence, the orthodox school of Shiite jurisprudence, the canon set forth over centuries of fatwas and other orthodox interpretations of what Islam means.

Rather than running scared, as mainstream clerics sometimes do when facing the Salafist onslaught, the Amman declaration was proud and emphatic. It drew together fatwas from the leading clerics in Islam, including the sheik of Al-Azhar in Cairo and Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani in Najaf. Another backer was Sheik Yusuf Qaradawi, who has a weekly show on al-Jazeera and is probably the best-known television preacher in the Arab world.

The declaration forbids the practice of takfir and calls for unity among Muslims and also limits the issueing of fatwas to qualified Muslim clerics.

According to Ignatius:

These Islamic leaders sense that their religion is being kidnapped by Salafist radicals with a grab-bag theology, and they are finally beginning to push back. It’s a war of ideas they should win, if they can make traditional Islam a vibrant, living faith. Young Muslims don’t want to go back to the seventh century; they want to live with dignity in the 21st.

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Violence and Jihad

Posted on September 17th, 2005 by .
Categories: Internal Debates, International Terrorism, Young Muslims.

Violence in Iraq is dividing the jihad-warriors. It raising several interesting questions concerning religious authority and also about the religious legitimization of the attacks (not only in Iraq but also in Madrid and London).

n the past two weeks, two major controversial positions appeared on Jihadi web sites and in the Arab media. These statements were made by two of the most important and influential clerics of the Jihadi-Salafi current of global Jihad. The first was an interview of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdesi, the Jordanian-Palestinian Islamist scholar and spiritual guide of Al-Tawhid wal-Jihad in Jordan and Iraq , and was aired on the Al-Jazirah TV channel on July 3 rd 2005 . 1 Jordanian authorities have recently released Al-Maqdesi after a long arrest of about six months, only to detain him again following his controversial interview. In the interview, he criticized the Islamist insurgents in Iraq , led by his prot�g� Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, for the mass killing of Muslims in Iraq . On 5 July 2005 , he repeated his criticism in another interview with the Jordanian paper �Al-Ghad.’ 2 His most important statement was that �the indiscriminate attacks might distort the true Jihad.� This was not his first criticism of Zarqawi and his group. In September 2004, Al-Maqdesi sent a long message from Al-Qafqafa prison through Jihadi forums on the Internet. 3 In both cases this criticism generated a wave of responses by Jihadi scholars, clerics, and youngsters, who were surprised and confused. If in September 2004 Al-Maqdesi used a �soft� tone, much like a father talking to his son, then this time his tone was direct and decisive, especially as it was aired through the media. The interview also enjoyed high degree of publicity in Jordan and Iraq .

The second statement was given by the Syrian Mustafa Abd al-Mun`im Abu Halimah, better known as Abu Basir al-Tartusi, a Syrian Jihadi scholar residing in London. Like Al-Maqdesi, Abu Basir is one of the leading guides of the Jihadi-Salafi current. Unlike Al-Maqdesi, however, he enjoys complete freedom of activity and speech in London , and hence, can manage close contact with other supporters of global Jihad. In the past, Abu Basir used to be in close contact with the Algerian Jihadi-Salafi group and its supporters in London . Abu Basir is known for his very strict and sharp language, and for his, at times, harsh and brave criticism of Islamist groups. In the past year, for instance, he severely attacked the Palestinian movement Hamas for what he called its �deviation from true Jihad.�

On 9 July 2005 , Abu Basir published a Fatwa on his web site that protested the London bombings and the killing of innocent British civilians. 4 Abu Basir described the bombings as a �disgraceful and shameful act, with no manhood, bravery, or morality. We cannot approve it nor accept it, and it is denied islamically and politically.� He refused labeling the British citizens as �attackers� ( Harbiyyun ), emphasizing instead the social alliance ( `Ahd ) of Muslims in the United Kingdom with the British government and society, among which they live. He added, �if this act was done by British Muslims it does not mean that Islam or the Muslim community in the UK approve of this act.� He ended his statement by raising doubts about the responsibility taken for the London bombings by �The secret group of Al-Qaeda in Europe �

Abu Basir’s statement/Fatwa elicited many responses in Jihadi forums, most among them creating anger and resentment against him. Once again, the supporters of global Jihad were left confused and surprised. The harsh responses Abu Basir generated led him to publish yet another statement on 11 July 2005 , titled �The Love of Revenge or the Legal ruling.� 5 In this second statement, which did not sound apologetic at all, he explained that his position towards the attacks in London was not at all a retreat from his former well-documented positions on Jihad. His main argument was that there was no place for the symmetry of revenge between the Muslims and their oppressors�a symmetry that is a vital component of the strategy of global Jihad. According to Abu Basir, there is no place for revenge in Islamic doctrine, but only integrity based upon the interpretations of Islamic law. He also hinted at an attempt by Islamists to place a wedge between ordinary Muslims and clerics.

This last claim by Abu Basir, we should note, concerns a crucial issue in the research and analysis of religious groups in general, and radical ones in particular: the question of�who is leading who�are the clerics leading the operatives or vice versa? The examples of the martyrdom operations, beheadings, killing of Muslim civilians (Shi`is or Sunnis), and other such issues provide us with a clear answer�the operatives are leading the clerics. Jihadi clerics usually provide the ideological �umbrella’ for the radicalization of the modus operandi .

Concerning Iraq the issue of Takfir is also an important debate.

The enthusiasm that emerges from Iraq is also influencing another field�the Islamic debate over Takfir (excommunication), suicide bombings, and massive killing of Muslims. Zarqawi and his �military strategy� in Iraq attract harsh criticism by clerics who were regarded by the older generation of Al-Qaeda, including Zarqawi himself, as leading mentors�Abu Basir al-Tartusi, who recently published a fatwa against suicide bombings; Abu Muhammad al-Maqdesi, who criticized Zarqawi in public; Muhammad al-Mas`ari, one of the fathers of the oppositionist Saudi reform movement in London; and others who advised Zarqawi and his Sunni supporters in Iraq to reconsider their strict opposition to the new Iraqi constitution, and the planned elections.

It seems that there is a developing crisis in the relations between the older generation of Jihadi-Salafi clerics and scholars and their operative prot�g�s. Zarqawi and his colleagues in Chechnya , Afghanistan , Saudi Arabia , or Kashmir , will always find new and younger clerics to back their strategy from an Islamic point of view. Finding the �proper’ authority among the hundreds of graduates of Saudi Wahhabi Islamic universities should not prove too difficult. Such a split occurred for example between the two Saudi scholars, Safar al-Hawali and Salman al-Awdah, and their younger followers in the past three years in Saudi Arabia . In this case Hawali and al-Awdah lost their appeal and influence over the Saudi supporters of Al-Qaeda, were pushed aside, and became part of Ulamaa al-Salatin �the clerics of the government. They could not be divorced from the negative image Arab governments have in the eyes of the Jihadis.

The recent reactions in Jihadi forums against these debates and criticism over Zarqawi and his strategy by his supporters are in many cases insulting and disrespectful. The main motive is: �let the Mujahidin decide their policy, since they are in the front of Jihad and not the clerics.� This is a new style of discourse, if we look back to the criticizing but most respectful letters of Bin Laden to Sheikh Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz, or of Sheikh Yousef al-Uyeri to Dr. Safar al-Hawali. The �new generation of Iraqi Arabs� is rude and much more self-confident than their fathers of the �Arab Afghans,� especially that they have a new kind of a king�Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi.

In all cases however it is the new generation that seems to support the violent jihad (against Muslims and non-Muslims) and reject the older religious authorities stating that they are Ulamaa al-Salatin �the clerics of the government.

In Trouw of today there is more about the criticism of Maqdesi (in Dutch):
Trouw, deVerdieping| overigeartikelen – Geweld verdeelt djihadstrijders

�De heilige oorlog, zijn doelen en zijn middelen zijn te rein, te zuiver en te verheven dan dat ze mag lijken op de daden van maffiabendes.�

Na deze donderpreek trekt Zarkawi een lange neus naar zijn leermeester Maqdesi en gaat hij vuiler dan ooit tekeer. De combinatie van maffia en heilige oorlog bevalt wel.

Dat hij nog meer ge�soleerd raakt, zal hem weinig deren. In zijn geboorteplaats Zarka stond hij toch al nooit bekend als een gezellige mensenvriend.

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Protected: 'Marokkanen zijn de echte allochtonen'

Posted on September 16th, 2005 by martijn.
Categories: My Research, Young Muslims, Youth culture (as a practice).

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