C L O S E R

Nikolaos van Dam: The Global Political Trend and the Role of Islam: The Academic Responsibility of Muslim Scholars

Posted on May 5th, 2009 by martijn.
Categories: Misc. News.

The Dutch Ambassador in Indonesia, Nikolaos van Dam, has delivered a speech on the occasion of the graduation ceremony of The Institute for Qur’anic Studies Jakarta, at Jakarta Convention Center, 29 April 2009. The complete text of the ‘Orasi Ilmiah’ The Global Political Trend and the Role of Islam: The Academic Responsibility of Muslim Scholars:

Your Excellency Dr. Maftuh Basyuni, Minister of Religion of the Republic of Indonesia;
Dr. Fauzi Bowo, Governor of DKI Jakarta;
Prof. Dr. Nasaruddin Umar, Rector of The Institute for Qur’anic Studies Jakarta;
Excellencies, colleague Ambassadors of befriended states;
Respected invitees and graduates,

I have been asked to speak about “The Global Political Trend and the Role of Islam: The Academic Responsibility of Muslim Scholars”. This will lead me also to a discussion about the issue of the responsibility of Western scholars and their dialogue with Muslim scholars. Together these scholars could play an important role in helping achieve a better understanding
of Islam and the role it plays in global politics.

What is Islamic and what not?

It is not only important to explain what Islam really is, but it is also important to make a distinction between what, in fact, involves Islam, and what people have incorrectly associated with and attributed to it. What is the relation between Islam and the actions of people that practice the Muslim faith? In my opinion All this has contributed a lot to existing misunderstandings. A lot of these misunderstandings have to do with false perceptions, but not with academic reality. Although one might also argue that perceptions become academic
realities if people believe their perceptions to be true. The responsibility of scholars, both Muslim and non-Muslim, is therefore to subject these perceptions to a reality test, particularly if this can help in providing a global forum which would help create a better mutual understanding, as well as a stronger cross-cultural friendship.

But not only scholars can give a helping hand. Governments and countries, too, can play an important role, particularly if they can fulfill the role of building a bridge between conflicting parties or cultures. But we must place these so-called bridge functions in the right perspective.

Bridge functions

Time and again I have heard about the potential “bridge functions” of certain countries, indicating that these countries could play an important role in helping improve understanding between different parties or cultures, or helping establish peace between hostile countries.
By way of an example: Indonesia is said to have the potential to play a large bridge function between the Islamic and Western world, in particular because it can be considered as a peaceful and successful democracy with a Muslim majority.
Turkey is supposed by some observers to be able to fulfill a bridging function between Europe and the Islamic world, because it is geographically located between them and is itself considered as both Muslim and democratic. According to yet other – in my view unrealistic observers – Israel could fulfill a bridge function between the West and the Arab Middle East, whereas a democratic Iraq could be a bridge between the democratic West helping spread
democracy in the Middle East, and so on. It seems as if the view of some of these observers is blurred or blinded by a kind of fixation on Islam as a religion, or democracy as an ideology.
Some countries are embellished with the epithet of being located at cross roads between various cultures or continents, or having geographic strategic importance. Turkey is seen by some as the cross roads between Europe and Asia, between the Christian and Muslim world. Egypt is part of both Africa, the Middle East and Asia, and therefore can play an important role in this context, and so on.

Some of these bridge visions which I just mentioned have also been expressed by various prominent Western politicians. What is essential in this respect, is to pose the question of whether or not the parties directly involved do themselves appreciate such a bridge function of other mediating parties. If their perception of it is positive on both sides, then the chances of success are there. But in the Arab Middle East, Israel is certainly not viewed as a potential
candidate capable of fulfilling a bridge function with the West, because Israel is seen as an adversary, to put it mildly. The Arab states prefer their own direct contacts with the West and do not want third parties in between. The same applies to Turkey, being a non-Arab country. Being a Muslim democratic country does not make any difference.
Indonesia is from the Arab Middle Eastern perspective more often than not seen as a country in the periphery of the Islamic world, which thereby would not havea natural central role.
Nevertheless, if Indonesia is seen as an important bridge from the view of the West, it can be useful to further explore this view so as to help achieve a better relation between the West and what is viewed from there as “the Islamic world”. If that perception is not there, it may be helpful to convince them of its usefulness.

Regional, cultural or religious identity?
African, European, Asiatic, Arab, Islamic or Christian? Today I want to report about some of my experiences with the Islamic dimension in various countries where I have lived as a diplomat, as an academic or as a student: chronologically in Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Iraq, Egypt, Turkey, Germany and finally in Indonesia. With the exception of Germany all of these
countries are considered as Islamic countries, or better said: countries all having an Islamic majority, and being members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).

Let me first, however, introduce myself to those who do not know me, and tell something about the countries where I have worked. During the past twenty-one years I have worked as ambassador in Baghdad, Cairo, Ankara, Bonn-Berlin and Jakarta. Before that I was Charge d’Affaires a.i. in Tripoli (Libya) and in 1980 I started my first posting abroad for the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beirut, Lebanon. From Lebanon I also covered Jordan, the Palestinian Occupied Territories and Cyprus. From Ankara I was co-accredited in Azarbaijan, and from Jakarta I also cover Timor Leste. As a student I made various study journeys to, among others, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon.
Many have noted that I have been working almost exclusively in Islamic countries. But you can also formulate it quite diffferently: I served in two African posts (Egypt and Libya), three Asiatic countries (Lebanon, Iraq and Indonesia), and in two European countries (Germany and Turkey). It just depends on the glasses through which you are looking, or the way you want to
see it. Some will readily say that Egypt and Libya actually are not really African countries but Middle Eastern ones, irrespective of the fact that they are both located in the African continent and that their political leaders have over the years developed ideas clearly containing an African component. Yet others have the opinion that also Lebanon, Syria and Iraq are not real Asiatic countries, and that they should actually be considered as Arab ones,
irrespective of the fact that they are located in the Asian continent. Again others will say that Turkey, when it really comes to the point, actually is not at all a European country, but actually more Middle Eastern. Nobody can deny the fact that the largest part of Turkey is geographically located in Asia, as is allready indicated by the name of Asia Minor. The Turkification of the population of Asia Minor, which today has the Turkish language as mother tongue, started only as late as the eleventh century as a result of the immigrations of Turkish tribes who came from Central Asia, and had, also because of their Altaic language a clear Asiatic background. But today many Turks prefer to call themselves Europeans because they want to belong to Europe, irrespective of the fact that the original ethnic Turks had a clear Asiatic background. This wish to be European also emanates from the Kemalist ideology which indicates that Turkey should direct itself more towards modern Europe, because it belongs more to that part of the world, irrespective of the fact that the former capital Istanbul originally was the center of the Islamic Ottoman Empire, which had its centre of gravity in the Middle East and North Africa, and not at all in Europe. (This is not to ignore the fact that the Ottoman Empire has also left clear traces in the Balkan, like for instance in Bosnia-Herzegowina.
And in the past, the Ottoman Sultan was even called “The Sick Man of Europe”).

And to make it even more complex: being a Turk in modern Turkey no longer necessarily implies having a Turkish ethnic background, but rather having an identity which is linked to the territory of the Turkish state. Today one can speak of, for instance, Turks of Turkish ethnic origin, Turks of Kurdish ethnic origin, Turks of Arab ethnic origin, Turks of Armenian ethnic origin, and so on. Although the number of Turks of Turkish ethnic origin may not be that big, the Turks of Turkey, or Turkey-Turks, nevertheless feel themselves linked with many of their Turkish-speaking “brothers and sisters” who live outside Turkey, like, for instance, the Turkish Cypriots, and the Turkic speaking populations of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and other Central Asiatic countries. And whereas the Turkey-Turks today are focused mainly on Europe, they at the same time wish to keep an eye on their Turkish speaking Asiatic brothers, preferably in the role of the bigger brother, whose attitude tends to be perceived by the
other Turkish speaking parties as a kind of tutelage.

By way of analogy, one can speak of Indonesians of Javanese ethnic origin, of Minangkabau origin, of Bugis origin, Papua origin and so on, who are all bound together by their united and unifying language of Bahasa Indonesia, combined with their common territory of the Republic of Indonesia. Additionally, Indonesia has a special link with other Malay speaking countries in the region.

The separation of the Arab countries from the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the twentieth century was at the time seen by the Young Turks as a kind of betrayal towards those Turks whose nationalism actually had very much in common with Arab nationalism. The Turkish nationalists actually reproached the Arab nationalists of wanting something similar as what they aimed for themselves: notably the establishment of their own national state, which was based on their respective ethnic or linguistic identity. It goes without saying that both parties – Turks and Arabs – were aiming at controling as large a territory as possible. It did not disturb them if these territories would include also other important ethnic groups with a different ethnic or linguistic identity, different from the main ethnic group controling the new nation-state.

But what about the geographical position of Indonesia? To which continent does it belong? When I received the good news about my transfer from Berlin, my previous posting, to Jakarta, the first thing I did was to go to a bookshop to look for travel guides about Indonesia. But in the sections dealing with Asia and South East Asia I could not find any book on Indonesia. Until I finally had a look in the section Oceania and the Pacific. I was surprised to find the Indonesia books in that section, until I realised that Indonesia actually covers two continents, of which the border line runs trough the deep waterway between Bali and Lombok, at the so-called “Wallace Line”. To the east of this line we can find Kangaroos and other marsupials, but not to the west of it. The reason for this is clear: these animals in the past, when the sealevel was much lower, could not cross this sea straight because it remained too deep for them. As a result, divergent developments took place on both sides, also in the field of flora. But these deep straights did not prevent human beings from migrating all over the area which is today called the Archipelago.

The Austronesian languages spread out all over the area from Madagascar to New Zealand, but did not succeed in the past to penetrate into the Melanesian heartland of Papua. But in modern times this has started to change. Generally it can be said that the boundaries of Indonesia with its huge territory and extraordinary rich diversity, are not determined by ethnicity, language, or the fact of belonging to one or more continents, but rather by its colonial history. The colonial boundaries in the end became the boundaries of the Republic of
Indonesia. Not one inch more and not one inch less.

Should one conclude that Indonesia is Asiatic? Or Oceanic? I am inclined to conclude that it is both, when taking the geographical, ethnic and linguistic backgrounds of its population into consideration. But in my personal perception and my way of thinking, the Asiatic dimension generally prevails. This probably has to do with the political map of Indonesia with which I was raised. But perhaps also because, being a Dutchman, I am used to looking from West to
East instead of the other way around (like an Australian would probably do). And I had never heard of that Wallace line before I went to Indonesia. When looking at it with hindsight, the Wallace Line is no more than a scientific discovery, be it a very important one. But this discovery has not had any consequences for the composition of the human population and the cultures of Indonesia.

The first political map which is imprinted in one’s mind or memory, whether it be at school or elsewhere, is to a great extent decisive for the picture one has of the world. Usually it is a political map which is derived from the political realities of the day.

You may ask yourself why it is that I have given such a long introducttion about the various postings I had. But that is only to demonstrate how different identities can be approached, or how they can even be manipulated. And how the importance which is ascribed to those identities can shift in the course of time.
Is it about regional, cultural or religious identities? Or is it about a combination of them, the composition of which is determined according to what suits the argument best? Or is it about periods of time in which certain ideas prevail? Such as nationalism, capitalism, socialism, secularism, religion or religious fundamentalism, or a combination of some of these factors? Is it about being African, European, Asiatic, Oceanic, Arab or Islamic, or even Christian? What
was seen in the past as being Arab, is nowadays quite often also, or even more prominently seen as Islamic. Moroccan and Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands were in the past identified by their countries of origin, but today their so-called religious identity is placed to the foreground much more prominently.

People in Europe may look somewhat astonished when I mention that after Turkey I also had a “Christian” posting, notably Germany. (I shall leave the playful remark, made on the occasion of my official departure from Ankara to Berlin, that I was actually leaving for the largest Turkish city outside Turkey, out of consideration here). I had never before considered the European countries as specifically “Christian”. The more so I was surprised when the then Prime Minister of Turkey, Mrs. Ciller announced somewhere in 1998 that the European Union should be branded as a “Christian club” in case it would not welcome Turkey into its ranks. I think that only few Europeans saw the European Union as a kind of Christian club. Nevertheless Mrs. Ciller had introduced a new religious element into the political game, which was difficult to undo later on. Even today, many Europeans will still not see the European Union as a Christian
organization, even though it is not uncommon to say that the EU is founded on Christian norms and values. Turkey, which at the time was considered to be a secular bulwark, also in the time of Prime Minister Ciller, is now being seen more and more as an Islamic country, irrespective of the fact that quite other factors have played a role here, next to the remarks of Mrs. Ciller. Nowadays the Islamic identity of Turkey is underlined by those within the European Union
who do not like to see Turkey being taken up within their ranks.

Although I am aware of the fact that countries like Iraq, Syria, Palestine, Jordan and Libya have clear Muslim majorities, I have never experienced these countries primarily as Muslim countries, but rather as countries with their own cultural identity, in which to me the Arab element was the most prominent. I experienced Turkey at the time in a similar way, particularly in modern Ankara. This is not to say that the Muslim identity was not there; because it was often present very clearly, but it was also very normal and obvious. But it was also determined by the attitude of its inhabitants towards the outside world, and of course by the position of the ruling regime concerning secularism or religion. Next to this, the way in which these countries were being treated by the outside world was also playing a role. There can be a clear interaction or interplay between action and reaction, as we have been able to see clearly in the period after the 11th of September 2001.

Since the early 1960s Iraq and Syria mainly had secular Arab nationalist regimes. Both attached importance to the role of Islam, but also saw Islam as an inseparable part of Arab national history, of which both Muslims and Christians could be fully fledged and equal heirs. (The Iraqi Ba’thist regime was deposed in 2003). The Iraqi President Saddam Husayn during his speeches at the time put Arab historical figures like the Shi’i ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib, the Sunni Mu’awiyah and the Kurdish Salah al-Din (al-Tikriti), and others on an equal footing as Arab
national heroes, thereby wanting to bridge the sectarian differences within Iraqi society.

At the same time, Islamic fundamentalist organizations and movements were suppressed everywhere, because they were considered as – or they really constituted – a threat to the existing regimes. And I am referring to a period of which has already lasted at least half a century, be it that after the 11 September 2001 a lot has been put into motion and polarization has taken place.

Does Islam adapt itself to society or does society adapt itself to Islam?

Islam can be considered as a universalistic and all-comprising religion that touches upon all aspect of life of Muslims. But can this view also be turned the other way around? Are all aspects of life explainable through Islam? Or to put it differently, can all acts of Muslims or all developments in societies with a majority of Muslims, also sometimes called Islamic societies, be explained through Islam? In principle, I think, they could, from a Muslim perspective. But
if they could be explained in one way or another through Islam, should they therefore also necessarily be explained through Islam? Particularly in a world in which not everyone is Muslim and where a great variety of religions live side by side together?

Some describe Indonesia as an Islamic state or country, although there are many people with other religions living here. They constitute some 10% of the population, making up some 24 million people. Of the 33 Provinces 10 have now a non-Muslim Governor. Instead of calling Indonesia an Islamic country, it is often preferred to describe it as “the country with the biggest Muslim population of the world”, having an official state ideology, the Pancasila, which
could be described as secular and where the principle of “unity in diversity” is to be respected. It is even the slogan in the national weapon: “Bhinneka Tunggal Ika”.

Islam is a hot topic in the West and in the Islamic world itself

Islam is a hot topic in the West, and not only there, but also in the Islamic world itself. Many people talk about it, but much fewer people are knowledgeable about it. If you want to organize a seminar on “democracy in South East Asia”, for instance, it may not be that easy to raise funds for it. But if you add the word “Islam”, and make it about the role of democracy and Islam in South East Asia, the chances become much better. Nevertheless it may be wrong to stress the idea of any connection between Islam and all kinds of developments in the world. The danger exists that Islam becomes a kind of fixation, thereby adding to a misunderstanding between Muslims and non-Muslims or between so-called Muslim countries and non-Muslim countries. It is as if a kind of polarization is being stimulated, exactly there where we do not want such a polarization.

After the 11th of September many people in the West thought they could have a much better understanding of what were the deeper backgrounds of what had happened in New York by reading the Qur’an. I was posted in Berlin at the time, and found out that for that reason the German translation of the meaning of the Qur’an became the book most widely sold in Germany in this period. But could it help its readers much further in understanding what had happened? I do not think so. It may be of course very instructive to read the Qur’an, particularly for
those who have not done yet, but to understand everything happening in the world is a different matter.

To fully understand the Qur’an one needs additional explanations andclarifications to the text. This applies also to those who are well versed in Qur’anic Arabic. Sometimes one needs to read a lot of books in order to discover that one would not have had to read them after all. Sometimes things are much easier and simpler to explain.

Some have noted that “the Islam” does not really exist, because there are so many forms of Islam. I would argue, rather, that although Islam does have so many varieties and while there is such a rich diversity in Islamic communities, this does not exclude “the Islam” from existing. It merely means there are many different interpretations of it. Certain basic principles of Islam are the same everywhere. What is different are the regional and cultural diversities amongst
Islamic communities. Islam emanated in a specific Arabian social and cultural environment, existing in the Arabian peninsula at the time of the Prophet Muhammad ( ). It is only natural, therefore, that the original Islam contains many Arab specifics. Although Islam can be said to be a universalistic religion, it can also be said that it started as an Arab religion, revealed in the Arabic language. This language is so much part of Islam, that it is considered inappropriate to do the ritual prayer (Salat) in any other language than Arabic. An Indonesian religious leader who led the ritual prayers in Indonesian was imprisoned for this.

The Arabic language enjoys great prestige in Indonesia. Nevertheless the number of people who have a clear command of the Arabic language in Indonesia is not very big. Perhaps this has even added to its prestige.

When Islam spread outside the Arabian Peninsula and came into contact with other cultures, Islam adapted itself to these regions in the sense that various local habits and traditions where not only being accepted as not contradicting those of Islam, but were later on also sometimes interpreted by the local populations as being in line with Islam, if not Islamic itself. Many people who as new Muslims continued part of their former traditions, gradually came to argue that these traditions were in fact part of Islam. In the traditional West Sumatra Minangkabau society, for instance, Minang culture is said to be based on Islam: “culture based on religion, which in turn is being based on the Qur’an”. One might, however, also say that Islam has merged here to a large extent with local culture, because Islamic religion and Adat are in this region perceived to be almost identical.

More generally, one might say that in large parts of Indonesia Islam has adapted itself to the local cultures and traditions, or has embedded itself into them, instead of fully adapting to the culture and traditions of the Arabian Peninsula the other way around. A similar phenomenon could be said to have taken place in other regions of what today is considered to be the Islamic world. In many places people interpret local habits or traditions as part of Islam, whereas in fact they are not really. Also cultural manifestations based on different religious-
cultural backgrounds generally coexist peacefully together in Indonesia.

Some personal observations about culture and religion in Indonesia

I hope you do not mind when, as a non-Indonesian, I propose to share with you some of my personal observations about culture and religion in Indonesia. They are made from the perspective of a foreigner who for a long time has lived in other parts of the Islamic world, which are rather different from Indonesia. Just take a few examples from Indonesia in which culture and religion exist side by side:

– The Ramayana is a very popular epic Indonesia, Java in particular. When I saw this dance performed in Yogyakarta for the first time, I asked what the religion of the dancers was. The reply was that they were all Muslims. I was amazed because I considered the Ramayana performance to be Hindu, and therefore was surprised that the dance of another religion could be performed by Muslims. A friend of mine, who had studied Indonesia for a long time, explained, however, that the Ramayana should in this case not be considered as a Hindu dance, but rather as a performance which was an expression of Indonesian or Javanese
culture. Therefore culture was the key concept here, not religion.

– Something similar is the case when you look at many of the Javanese mosques. As has been described by Prof. Pijper in his well-known study on the mosques of Java, the roof or roofs of the Javanese mosques consist of various layers, the forms of which go back to Hindu-Javanese times, and may symbolize various heavens. These have nothing to do with Islam, but rather with the heavens existing in Hinduism. Here, again, the present shape has nothing to do with Hindu religion, but is rather a residue of Hindu culture in Java.

– Whereas in many other countries with Islamic majorities the use of Arabic Islamic names is very popular, in Indonesia, Java in particular, it is more common to frequently use traditional Javanese names. For that reason it is often not possible to know someone’s religious identity. But the ethnic and cultural background is often easily recognized. It is another example of the fact that traditional culture is given a prominent place in Indonesian society.

– Quite particular is also the performing by women of reciting the Qur’an during opening ceremonies of important gatherings. In other Islamic or Arab countries I have never noticed such a phenomenon. It simply is an Indonesian tradition which reflects more the position of women in society than religion itself.

– Another special phenomenon in Indonesia is the greeting of different religious communities with their respective greeting formulas, even if one does not belong to one of these communities. When addressing a Muslim audience it is fully accepted in Indonesia to start with “assalamu ‘alaikum wa rahmatullahi wa barakatuh”, also by non-Muslims (although not all Muslims appreciate this); when addressing Christians in for instance Manado one might start with “shalom”, and in Bali the Buddhist greetings might be used. It is, however, appropriate to, after a religious formula, always add: “Salam sejahtera bagi kita semua”, so as not to exclude anyone from being addressed.

When President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono started his opening of the United Nations Conference on Climate Change in Bali, December 2007, with the Muslim formulas “Bismillahi al-Rahman al-Rahim” and “assalamu ‘alaikum wa rahmatullahi wa barakatuh”, the master of ceremonies followed in English by saying to all the guests: “welcome to the Island of the Gods”, which is the commonly used name for Bali (Pulau Dewata). The special element here is that the plural of Gods is used, which normally would be considered as not in line with the principle of monotheism in a religion like Islam. But in Indonesia this terminology is fully acceptable, because it is understood as a cultural concept rather than a religious one. In this respect Indonesia differs from various other countries with a Muslim majority. Compare the situation with a country like Malaysia where the usage of the word Allah is supposed to be prohibited to non-Muslims, whereas it is just the word for God in Arabic. The name ‘Abd Allah is not uncommon among Christians in the Arab world, and was already in use in pre-Islamic times. The name of the Father of the Prophet Muhammad ( ) was ‘Abd Allah as well, whereas he certainly was not a Muslim, because Islam did not yet exist in his time… It would be strange to have to say ‘Abd al-Tuhan.

– Take another example of Indonesia: The Borobodur Hotel in Jakarta is full of Hindu statues and Gods, but nobody minds, because it is an expression of culture, just like Egypt has the statues of its Pharaohs and Egyptian gods and goddesses, whereas at the same time Egypt can be considered as a traditional Islamic religious country, and so on.

Other Islamic countries have their own examples concerning the local cultural heritage and Islam existing side by side. It could be noted, for instance, that whereas in strongly traditional Islamic Saudi Arabia women are prohibited from driving a car, the same is allowed in the Islamic Republic of Iran. These differences have nothing to do with Islam itself, but rather with different cultures existing in these countries. Similarly, the harsh treatment of women by the Taliban in Afghanistan is much more a reflection of regional tribal customs and attitudes than that is part of Islam. The acid throwing into the faces of women happens in wider parts of
Asia, including in India and Cambodia, and can be seen as purely criminal. It goes so far as to fully mix up Islamic religion and other phenomena, which have nothing to do with Islam. Other examples are female circumcision, which is most widely spread in Africa, and the so-called honor killings.

But this does not prevent larger part of the non-Muslim world from perceiving these attitudes as being connected with Islam, which therefore generally has a non-favorable effect on the attitude towards Islam in the West.

Or take the example of whipping which is used as a type of shari’ah-punishment. Are people against such forms of corporal punishment as a matter of principle, or because they are part of Shari’ah? During a discussion on this issue with some Europeans, I once made the remark that similar punishments were also carried out in Singapore. The reaction of one of my non-Muslim
counterparts was: “Yes, but that is not Shari’ah”…

When exchanging views within the framework of an inter-cultural, or inter-faith dialogue, we do not necessarily have to discuss religious issues as such. After all, it is common for most believers to consider their own beliefs to be the best and most correct. What is more important is to discuss underlying values and beliefs, which the various parties may have in common.

Mutual respect for religious and cultural diversity can only enhance unity, both internationally as well as nationally. Those who have disrespect for religious and cultural diversity, because they think it might undermine unity, may just achieve the opposite and create disunity.

Thank you for your attention.

Not everyone is happy about the speech:
Gates of Vienna: Dutch Ambassador Defends Islam at an Indonesian Madrassa

Freedom Party chairman Geert Wilders: “While speaking to an audience at the Institute for Quranic Studies in Jakarta, Mr Van Dam acted as an advocate of Islam, rather than a representative of the Netherlands.

“In doing this, he has lost all credibility. Instead of trying to defend Islam Mr Van Dam should be defending the universal human rights and be committed to improve the situation of the Christian minority in Indonesia.”

Freedom Party MPs Geert Wilders and Barry Madlener demanded the resignation of Mr Van Dam in written questions to the Dutch Secretary of State.

1 comment.

Islamizing Europe – Muslim Demographics

Posted on May 5th, 2009 by martijn.
Categories: Featured, Public Islam.

Note: This entry has been updated. See below, the part about the Netherlands.

If you want to stay updated and did not subscribe yet, you can do so HERE.

The following video is a hit on the world wide web:

YouTube – Muslim Demographics

friendofmuslim

Islam will overwhelm Christendom unless Christians recognize the demographic realities, begin reproducing again, and share the gospel with Muslims.

Here is a transcript of the text of the video:

In 40 years, Europe will be a Muslim continent

FTV–The world is changing. The Global culture our children will inherit will be vastly different than it is today. You are about to witness a report on the worlds changing demographics.

ACCORDING TO RESEARCH, IN ORDER FOR A CULTURE TO MAINTAIN ITSELF FOR MORE THAN 25 YEARS there MUST be a fertility rate of 2.11 per family.With anything less the culture will decline. Historically no culture has ever reversed with a 1.9 fertility rate.

A rate of 1.3 is IMPOSSIBLE to reverse. Because it would take 80 to 100 years to correct itself. And there is no economic model that can sustain a culture during that time.

In other words, if 2 sets of parents each have a child, there are half as many children as parents. If those children have one child, then are 1/4 as many grandchildren as grandparents. If only a million babies were born in 2006, it’s hard to have 2 million adults enter the workforce in 2026.

As the population shrinks, so does the culture.

As of 2007 the fertility rate in France was 1.8

England 1.6

Greece 1.3

Germany 1.3

Italy 1.2

Spain 1.1

Across the entire European Union, in 31 countries, the fertility rate is mere 1.38

Historical research has told us these numbers are impossible to reverse.

In a matter of years Europe as we know it will cease to exist. Yet the population of Europe is not declining. Why? Immigration. ISLAMIC immigration.Of all population growth in Europe since 1990, has been Islamic immigration.

France 1.8 children per family

Muslims 8.1

In Southern France, traditionally one of the most populated Church regions in the world, there are now more Mosques than Churches. 30% of children ages 20 and younger, are now Islamic.

In larger cities such as Nice and Paris the number has grown to 45%.

By the year 2027, 1 in 5 Frenchmen will be Muslim. In just 39 years France will be an Islamic Republic. In the last 30 years the Muslim population of Great Britain rose from 82,000 to 2.5 MILLION. A 30 fold Increase. There are over 1,000 Mosques, many of them former Churches.

In the Netherlands 50% of all newborns are Muslim. And in only 15 years, half of the population of the Netherlands, will be Muslim.

In Russia, there are 23 MILLION Muslims. That’s 1 out of 5 Russians.. 45% of the entire Russian Army will be Islamic in just a few short years.

Currently in Belgium, 25% of the population, and 50% of the newborns, are Muslim. has stated ”

The government of Belgium has stated 1/3 of all European children will be born to Muslim families by the year 2025. Just 17 years away.

The German government, the first to talk about this openly, recently released a statement saying: “The fall in the population ( German ), can no longer be stopped. It’s downward spiral is irreversible…It will be a Muslim state by the year 2050! -( German Federal Statistics Office )

Muammar al-Ghadaffi of Libya has said: “There are signs that Allah will grant victory to Islam in Europe without swords, without guns, and without conquest.

We don’t need terrorists , we don’t need suicide bombers. The 50+ Muslims in Europe will turn it into a Muslim Continent in a few decades”

There are currently 52 MILLION plus Muslims in Europe. The German government has said that number is expected to double in the next 20 years to 104 MILLION Muslims.

Closer to home the numbers tell a similar story. Right now, Canada’s fertility rate is 1.6, nearly a full point below the 2.11 required to sustain a culture. And now Islam is now the fastest growing religion. Between 2001 and 2006, Canada’s population increased by 1.6 million.1.2 of those? Immigration.

In the US, the current fertility rate USA citizens is 1.6. With the influx of the Latino nations, the fertility rate increases is 2.11. The bare minimum required to sustain a culture.

In 1970 there were 100,000 Muslims in America. In 2008 there were over 9 MILLION-( 9,000,000) The world is changing, it’s time to WAKE UP!

Muslim Demographics

3 years ago, a meeting of 24 Islamic Organizations was held in Chicago. The transcripts of that meeting showed in detail, their plans to “evangelize” America. Through journalism, politics, education, and more. They said “We must prepare ourselves for the reality that in 30 years there will be 50 million Muslims living in America. ( Islamic Strategy Conference in Chicago )

The world that we live in is not the world in which our children and grandchildren will live.

The Catholic church recently reported that Islam has just surpassed their membership numbers.

Some studies show that at Islams current rate of growth, in 5-7 years it will be the dominant religion of the world.

Again, it is time to AWAKEN out of our malaise in this country. Unless YOU want to be the next offering of Islam on the altar of it’s “god” aka the father of lies.<– ( I said this )

As believers we call upon you to share the Gospel message with a changing world. This is a call to ACTION!

It is part of a discourse that is prevalent among many:

1. Islam is a threat to (Western) liberal values
2. The islamization of (Western) society is in progress
3. Western societies are therefore threatened and the threat needs to be stopped before it is too late

Another part of the discourse is the following:

1. Islam is a threat to (Western) liberal values
2. Muslims are governed by Islam
3. Migrants from countries where Islam is (almost) a majority religion are therefore Muslim
4. Muslim migration poses a threat do (Western) liberal values

And a third part of the discourse is:

1. Islam is a threat to (Western) liberal values
2. Islam governs Muslims
3. Islam says procreate
4. Therefore Muslims procreate faster than other people
5. The high fertility rates among Muslims threaten (Western) liberal values and societies

More or less the production of such discourses is meant to let people conclude something like this:

Broken Arrows | Pass the Salt

Our nation is under an invasion and there is no one standing at the gate with whom they must speak. We must encourage Christian couples to start having babies. The future of our nation depends on them. At some point, as the war intensifies, Christians will reach for arrows to shoot at the enemy. What will we do when we find our quiver is empty? Maybe, we can throw a plasma TV at them.

The video is not only meant to provide evidence for, in particular the latter, such a logic, it also calls upon Christians to have more children and share their faith with Muslims. How credible are the statistics that are used in the video? I meant to do a thorough search for all the statistics but I don’t have enough time for that. Fortunately several other bloggers have done the job for me and I will list the most important results and provide links to their websites.

One of the most extensive reviews is made by Tiny Frog. I will list the most important claims and Tiny Frog’s counterclaims. Below that I will add some more info about the Netherlands:

Muslim Demographics « Tiny Frog

1. Claim: “Historically, no culture has ever reversed a 1.9 fertility rate.”They provide no source for this claim. However, birth rates do vary over time, and have increased.
2. Claim: “A rate of 1.3: impossible to reverse… There is no economic model that can sustain itself during that time.”It’s true that declining birth rates cause a lot of problems for nations […];It’s also worth noting that the fertility rates of these nations have been rising slightly over the past five years.
3. Claim: “France: 1.8 Children per family, Muslims: 8.1.”They list of source for this claim, but it’s too small to read. This claim is almost certainly false. First, there isn’t a country in the whole world that has a fertility rate of 8 children, so I doubt that millions of Muslims in France’s are having that many children.
4. Claim: “In the Netherlands, 50% of all newborns are Muslim.”That same article I read a few years ago claimed that 50% of all newborns within a particular Dutch city were Muslim (which may or may not be accurate). I have to wonder if that claim was generalized to “In the Netherlands, 50% of all newborns are Muslim.” There are approximately 1 million Muslims in the Netherlands, a nation of 16.6 million people. So Muslims makeup about 6% of the total population. Yet, we’re supposed to believe 50% of the children born in the Netherlands are Muslim? The fertility rate in the Netherlands is 1.66 children per person. Mathematically, Muslims in the Netherlands would need to have 26 children to makeup 50% of the births in the country.Further, if we look at the countries of origin of these Muslims, we find that 2/3rds immigrated from Turkey (1.87 fertility rate) or Morocco (2.57 fertility rate).
5. Claim: “In only 15 years, half of the population of the Netherlands will be Muslim.” It makes my head hurt to figure out how 1 million Muslims will outnumber 15.6 million non-Muslims in 15 years.
6. Claim: “In Russia, there are over 23 million Muslims, that’s 1 out of 5 Russians.”According to Wikipedia:According to the most recent estimates by the R&F Agency, there are more than 20 million officially self-identified Muslims in Russia, a number that has risen by 40% in the last 15 years, though no more than 6 million are truly orthodox. Roman Silantyev, a Russian Islamologist has estimated that there are only between 7 and 9 million people who practise Islam in Russia, and that the rest are only Muslims by ethnicity.Also, Russia’s population is 140 million. Even if “23 million muslims” was accurate, that’s 16.4%, not 1 out of 5 (or 20%).
7. Claim: “Currently in Belgium, 25% of the population and 50% of all newborns are Muslim.”Wikipedia states: An 2008 estimation shows that 6% of the Belgian population, about 628,751, is Muslim (98% Sunni). Muslims cover 25.5% of the population of Brussels, 4.0% of Wallonia and 3.9% of Flanders.Maybe they mixed up “Brussels” and “Belgium”. Regardless, they inflated the percentage of Muslims in Belgium from 6% to 25%. Again, we see the same pattern of immigration as we saw in the Netherlands – 2/3rds are Moroccans and Turkish immigrants – whose home countries have relatively low birthrates (2.57 and 1.87, respectively).
8. Claim: “1/3rd of all European children will be born to Muslim families by 2025, just 17 years away.” That doesn’t seem very likely considering that Muslims currently makeup “4 percent of the European Union’s population” (Source). This particular claim about “1/3rd of all European children” appears to come from the Right-wing Brussel’s Journal.
9. Claim: “The German Government, the first to talk about this publicly, recently released a public saying, ‘the fall in the German population can no longer be stopped. Its downward spiral is no longer reversible… It will be a Muslim state by 2050.” Considering that Muslims makeup 4.0% of the German population, that statement seems over the top. They credit the “Germany Federal Statistics Office” with the statement that “[Germany] will be a Muslim state by 2050?, when it was actually a statement made by a vague group identified as “some demographic trend-watchers”. Immediately, in the next paragraph, they mention the right-wing Brussels Journal – leading me to suspect that they are the “demographic trend-watchers”.(2) The quote was twisted from “is well on the way to becoming a Muslim state by 2050? into “It will be a Muslim state by 2050?.
10. Claim: “There are currently 52 million Muslims in Europe. The German government said that number is expected to double in the next 20 years to 104 million.” The EU population is 491 million, 4% (19.6 million) of which are Muslim (Source).
11. Claim: “In the United States, the current fertility rate of American citizens is 1.6. With the influx of the latino nations, the rate increases to 2.11; the bare minimum needed to sustain a culture.” Considering that latinos makeup only 13% of the US population, it’s hard to believe they can single-handedly bring-up the fertility rate from 1.6 to 2.11.
12. Claim: “Today, there are over 9 million [muslims in the United States]“.Reality? No one really knows. Estimates vary between 1.1 million and 8 million.
13. This wasn’t specifically argued in the video, but I should also add that the fertility rates among Muslims (in their own countries) is also declining.
14. And let’s not forget that some Muslim countries have already fallen below the replacement number of 2.11 (and, supposedly, below the mythical 1.9 fertility rate that the video says is very, very bad). When you look at the three most populous countries of the Middle East (Egypt, 79 million; Turkey, 70 million; Iran, 69 million), you find that Turkey and Iran have already dropped below a fertility rate of 2.0. Egypt recently dropped below a fertility rate of 3.0, and the Egyptian government is aiming to get it down to 2.0 within 8 years. All three are experiencing a decline in their fertility rates.

Therefore, based upon this analysis we can say that most numbers given in the video are at least unclear, more likely distortions and at worst false. Let me add a few things:

1. As already noted in the analysis above, low fertility rates do cause serious problems:
   

   Population paradox: Europe’s time bomb – Europe, World – The IndependentThe implications of all this are enormous. Low-birth Europe is faced with an ageing population, a pensions crisis, later retirement, changes in work patterns, shrinking cities and a massive looming healthcare cost. Nations of children with no siblings, cousins, aunts or uncles – only parents, grandparents, and perhaps great-grandparents – will face the burden of paying for the care of a massive older generation. The same prospect of an older, more conservative, less vigorous or inventive culture looms in China, Japan and much of the Far East.Meanwhile high-birth Africa will remain stuck in a vicious circle unless it gets economic growth, agricultural reform, improved world trade terms, infrastructure investment, better health and education systems, more girls into school and a wider availability of family planning. A tall order, though the example of Bangladesh shows change can come.

2. About the Netherlands. The Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI) makes clear the Muslims are most likely to remain a minority. See HERE (pdf). The number 50% pertains to statistics about the city of Amsterdam but is incorrect (or I just can’t find it). In 2004 51% of the Amsterdam population was native with an increasing number of migrants moving from Amsterdam to Almere (one of the suburbs; 70% of the total number of people moving to Almere was migrant). UPDATE: I finally found the statistics on the four major cities in the Netherlands. You can find them HERE. (The first column gives the different migrantgroups and Dutch natives. The next columns are for Amsterdam (51% native), Rotterdam (53,8% native), The Hague (53,8% native), Utrecht (69% native) and the Netherlands (80,4% native) as a whole. Note that a few areas in Amsterdam and Rotterdam have more then 85% migrants. Among Dutch women over 30 there was a remarkable increase in fertility rate, while it decreased among migrant women. Second generation migrants in Amsterdam have fewer children than their parents did. This development corresponds with that of the rest of the Netherlands as you can read in the report of NIDI mentioned here. Furthermore, the estimated number of Muslims 940.000 is based upon a calculation. In this calculation it is assumed, for example, that when in Turkey a X% of the population is Muslim, the same percentage will apply to migrants. This is not always accurate. In the case of Turkey there are a lot of Christian migrants as well as secular Muslims and Christians. This also means that the label Muslim does not say much; one can be secular, pious, radical, traditional or perhaps even combinations of that. The number of Muslims differs considerably per region with some high numbers in cities in the west and some small provincial towns. In 2007 a new method of estimating the number of Muslims has been used based upon people’s self-identification in a survey. The revised number of Muslims is now 850.000. The links lead to the webiste of Statistics Netherlands (CBS), the official bureau for statistics, often used by the government but also by researchers. The report by NIDI is based upon data from Statistics Netherlands.
3. In talking about ‘Muslim’ demographics we not only ignore the fact that we do not know anything about the nature of Muslim identity behind the numbers (or the Sunni/Shi’a divide) but also the ethnic diversity among Muslims. In the Netherlands Muslims in general are well organized but mainly on ethnic grounds: there are Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese, Somalian organizations at the national and local level and two national organizations that unite the most important (ethnic) organizations. In order to understand intra-Muslim politics this ethnic division is very (if not most) important.
4. Not only non-Muslims are claiming that Islam is one of the (or the) fastest growing religion. We can hear the same among Muslims. Such a claim is not very surprising. For example among Pentecostals we also find the claim that they are the fastest growing religion on Earth. Wiki even has a page dedicated to the topic Claims to be the fastest growing religion, showing a number of religion (almost all actually) and its adherents claiming it to be the fastest. The page also shows why these claims are often unreliable because of a lack of hard data.
5. In the video it is mentioned that the fertility rate among French Muslims is about 8 children. According to Tiny Frog, however, there is no country in the world with such a fertility rate. That is not correct: Uganda (8.5), Niger (8.4), Madagascar (8.1) and Eritrea (8.0) have such high fertility rates in 2004.
6. The video mentions 2.1 as the ‘bare minimum to sustain a culture’. What is probably referred to here is the replacement fertility; the level at which the population remains stable. If a population indeed declines is also related to migration and population momentum. If the low fertility remains at a low level and combined with other developments the population will decline. But does a decreasing population mean that a culture cannot be sustained? Also does culture = population, that is is a culture homogeneous? It is assumed in the video but in most countries that just is not the case.

Also Islam in Europe, Street Prophets, Daily Kos and Europenews have relevant comments to this whole issue.  Martin Walker has written an interesting article for The Wilson Quarterly that is very important in understanding all of this:

The World’s New Numbers

The World’s New Numbers

by Martin Walker

“Here lies Europe, overwhelmed by Muslim immigrants and emptied of native-born Europeans.” That is the obituary some pundits have been writing in recent years. But neither the immigrants nor the Europeans are playing their assigned roles.

Something dramatic has happened to the world’s birthrates. Defying predictions of demographic decline, northern Europeans have started having more babies. Britain and France are now projecting steady population growth through the middle of the century. In North America, the trends are similar. In 2050, according to United Nations projections, it is possible that nearly as many babies will be born in the United States as in China. Indeed, the population of the world’s current demographic colossus will be shrinking. And China is but one particularly sharp example of a widespread fall in birthrates that is occurring across most of the developing world, including much of Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. The one glaring exception to this trend is sub-Saharan Africa, which by the end of this century may be home to ­one-­third of the human ­race.

The human habit is simply to project current trends into the future. Demographic realities are seldom kind to the predictions that result. The decision to have a child depends on innumerable personal considerations and larger, unaccountable societal factors that are in constant flux. Yet even knowing this, demographers themselves are often flummoxed. Projections of birthrates and population totals are often embarrassingly at odds with eventual reality.

[…]

Because of this bastardization of knowledge, three deeply misleading assumptions about demographic trends have become lodged in the public mind. The first is that mass migration into Europe, legal and illegal, combined with an eroding native population base, is transforming the ethnic, cultural, and religious identity of the continent. The second assumption, which is related to the first, is that Europe’s native population is in steady and serious decline from a falling birthrate, and that the aging population will place intolerable demands on governments to maintain public pension and health systems. The third is that population growth in the developing world will continue at a high rate. Allowing for the uncertainty of all population projections, the most recent data indicate that all of these assumptions are highly questionable and that they are not a reliable basis for serious policy ­decisions.

[…]

Upon closer inspection, it turns out that while Muhammad topped Thomas in 2006, it was something of a Pyrrhic victory: Fewer than two percent of Britain’s male babies bore the prophet’s name. One fact that gets lost among distractions such as the Times story is that the birthrates of Muslim women in Europe—and around the world—have been falling significantly for some time. Data on birthrates among different religious groups in Europe are scarce, but they point in a clear direction. Between 1990 and 2005, for example, the fertility rate in the Netherlands for Moroccan-born women fell from 4.9 to 2.9, and for ­Turkish-­born women from 3.2 to 1.9. In 1970, ­Turkish-­born women in Germany had on average two children more than ­German-­born women. By 1996, the difference had fallen to one child, and it has now dropped to half that number.

These sharp reductions in fertility among Muslim immigrants reflect important cultural shifts, which include universal female education, rising living standards, the inculcation of local mores, and widespread availability of contraception. Broadly speaking, birthrates among immigrants tend to rise or fall to the local statistical norm within two ­generations.

The decline of Muslim birthrates is a global phenomenon. Most analysts have focused on the remarkably high proportion of people under age 25 in the Arab countries, which has inspired some crude forecasts about what this implies for the future. Yet recent UN data suggest that Arab birthrates are falling fast, and that the number of births among women under the age of 20 is dropping even more sharply. Only two Arab countries still have high fertility rates: Yemen and the Palestinian ­territories.

[…]

The falling fertility rates in large segments of the Islamic world have been matched by another significant shift: Across northern and western Europe, women have suddenly started having more babies. Germany’s minister for the family, Ursula von der Leyen, announced in February that the country had recorded its second straight year of increased births. Sweden’s fertility rate jumped eight percent in 2004 and stayed put. Both Britain and France now project that their populations will rise from the current 60 million each to more than 75 million by ­mid­century. Germany, despite its recent uptick in births, still seems likely to drop to 70 million or less by 2050 and lose its status as Europe’s most populous country.

In Britain, the number of births rose in 2007 for the sixth year in a row. Britain’s fertility rate has increased from 1.6 to 1.9 in just six years, with a striking contribution from women in their thirties and ­forties—­just the kind of hard-to-predict behavioral change that drives demographers wild. The fertility rate is at its highest level since 1980. The National Health Service has started an emergency recruitment drive to hire more midwives, tempting early retirees from the profession back to work with a bonus of up to $6,000. In Scotland, where births have been increasing by five percent a year, Glasgow’s Herald has reported “a mini baby boom.”

Immigrant mothers account for part of the fertility increase throughout Europe, but only part. And, significantly, many of the immigrants are arrivals from elsewhere in Europe, especially the eastern European countries admitted to the European Union in recent years. Children born to eastern European immigrants accounted for a third of Scotland’s ­“mini ­baby boom,” for ­example.

[…]

Population growth on a scale comparable to that which frightened pundits and demographers a generation ago still exists in 30 of the world’s least developed countries. Each has a fertility rate of more than five. With a few ­exceptions—notably, ­Afghanistan and the Palestinian territories—­those countries are located in ­sub-­Saharan Africa. Depending on the future course of birthrates, ­sub-­Saharan Africa’s current 800 million people are likely to become 1.7 billion by 2050 and three billion by the end of the ­century.

One striking implication of this growth is that there will be a great religious revolution, as Africa becomes the home of monotheism. By ­midcen­tury, sub-Saharan Africa is likely to be the demographic center of Islam, home to as many Muslims as Asia and to far more than inhabit the Middle East. The ­non-­Arab Muslim countries of ­Africa—­Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Senegal—constitute the one region of the Islamic world where birthrates remain high. In several of these countries, the average woman will have upward of five children in her lifetime.

Christianity will also feel the effects of Africa’s growth. By 2025, there will be as many Christians in ­sub-­Saharan ­Africa—­some 640 ­million—­as in South America. By 2050, it is almost certain that most of the world’s Christians will live in Africa. As Kenyan scholar John Mbiti writes, “The centers of the church’s universality [are] no longer in Geneva, Rome, Athens, Paris, London, New York, but Kinshasa, Buenos Aires, Addis Ababa, and Manila.”

But awareness of Africa’s religious revolution is usually overshadowed by the fearful possibilities raised by the continent’s rapid population growth.

[…]

Perhaps the most striking fact about the demographic transformation now unfolding is that it is going to make the world look a lot more like Europe. The world is aging in an unprecedented way. A milepost in this process came in 1998, when for the first time the number of people in the developed world over the age of 60 outnumbered those below the age of 15. By 2047, the world as a whole will reach the same ­point.

The world’s median age is 28 today, and it is expected to reach 38 by the middle of the century. In the United States, the median age at that point will be a ­young­ish 41, while it will be over 50 in Japan and 47 in Europe. The United States will be the only Western country to have been in the top 10 largest countries in terms of population size in both 1950 and 2050. Russia, Japan, Germany, Britain, and Italy were all demographic titans in the middle of the 20th century. Today, only Russia and Japan still (barely) make the top 10. They will not stay there long. The world has changed. There is more and faster change to ­come.

Notwithstanding all of the qualifications one can make about the video, I think most reactions here and on other websites, seriously underestimate the power of opening the window to imagination that might be the result of this video. Hard data is only one of the ways to evaluate the video. Certainly for some people the ‘facts’ as they have been presented in the video are authentic and true because they make the threat of Islam ‘real’, ‘imaginable’. The images in the video provide people with access to the abstract notion of the Islamic threat and in some cases (as with Fitna the movie) it creates and organizes the relationship between Wilders and parts of his constituency. In that case, the real facts do not matter, what matters is making the fact of the Islamic threat real and concrete.

UPDATE

The BBC has made its own countervideo, I did not check the numbers in that one yet.

[flashvideo filename=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mINChFxRXQs /]

If you want to stay updated and did not subscribe yet, you can do so HERE.

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Yme Kuiper on charisma, leadership, personality and the X-factor

Posted on May 5th, 2009 by martijn.
Categories: Religion Other.

Yme Kuiper is professor by special appointment in Religious and Historical Anthropology at the Faculty of Theology and Religious Studies at the University of Groningen. He researches the historical and cultural background to changes in the relationship between religion, society and culture. He is currently busy with elites and religion in the Netherlands and Europe in the twentieth century and the research project Religion and Biography. His most recent publication is about debates among anthropologists and sociologists about religion in a recent book he has edited called Religie in Nederland [Religion in the Netherlands].

According to Kuiper the concept charisma can provide an insight into political culture. The insight that someone like Obama in the Netherlands would have had less chance of becoming great than in the United States, for example.  However the concept is losing its meaning because it is being used all over the place:

Prof. Yme Kuiper: ‘Only use the word charisma in very exceptional circumstances.’

Prof. Yme Kuiper: ‘Only use the word charisma in very exceptional circumstances.’
Date: April 28, 2009

Barack Obama apparently has it, and even Silvio Berlusconi is said to have it. A whole load of pop stars, sport heroes and businessmen are also credited with it. But what is charisma actually? Too little time is spent pondering that, thinks Prof. Yme Kuiper of the University of Groningen. ‘The concept is used too often and too readily, in my view. It won’t be long before every well-known Dutch person is called charismatic. As a result the word is losing its edge, and that’s a shame.’ When it is used properly, thinks Kuiper, the concept can provide an insight into modern-day political culture. The insight, for example, that there is much less room for charismatic leadership in the Netherlands, and that Obama would never have thrived in the polder.

Hollow words

Personality, X-factor, leadership and charisma – in everyday situations these terms are too often used as synonyms, states Yme Kuiper. ‘Charisma is running the risk of becoming an inflationary concept. It’s being said that Pim Fortuyn was charismatic. I doubt that. He may have had serious rhetorical talent, but I think he was acting the part of a charismatic person.’ If you want to use the concept of charisma properly, you must not only study the style of leadership but also the context within which the leader in question is active, and the interplay between the leader and his followers. Only by drawing historical parallels is insight created into the complexity of the phenomenon of charisma. Kuiper: ‘There’s no way of avoiding it, Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin, the villains of the political religions of the twentieth century, did have great deal of charisma. They fascinated large groups of people and made them enthusiastic about their delusions.’

Between religion and politics

Charisma is originally a theological concept. It is used extensively in the Old Testament in the sense of a ‘Gift of Grace’, explains Kuiper. In his view if you want to use the concept optimally, you end up with the sacral aspects of leadership – the transition zone between religion and politics. The sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920) had a good eye for that, thinks Kuiper. ‘Weber himself used the concept to understand the world around him. In a demystified, secularized world, where authority would become completely based on rationality, there was a need for charismatic leadership, thought Weber. A charismatic person would offer an escape from the iron cage of bureaucracy and offer people the opportunity to participate again in a community.’

Religious symbolism

Founders of religions, prophets, apostles and sect leaders break through traditions using their charisma, based on supernatural qualities, thought Weber. At least, their followers were convinced that they were supernatural qualities. However, according to Weber neither the German Kaisers or Chancellor Von Bismarck had charisma. Kuiper: ‘But Weber greatly admired a president like Theodore Roosevelt and was very impressed by American political culture, that right from the start of the American nation-formation had had religious connotations, and where religious symbolism and references to the founding fathers were very important for the legitimacy and credibility of the political institutions.’

Charisma in the Netherlands

One of the few Dutch statesmen with charisma was Ferdinand Domela Nieuwenhuis, the founding father of the socialist movement in the Netherlands, in Kuiper’s view. ‘His way of conducting politics was partly supported by religious dimensions of charismatic leadership. He could identify himself with the suffering Christ. In their turn, Nieuwenhuis’s supporters believed in a loving way in his leadership – they regarded him as a martyr and saviour.’ In the meantime, there appears to be little room in the Netherlands any more for charismatic leadership, says Kuiper. ‘Our ministers and prime ministers have to join in a culture of “gezelligheid”, cosiness. Many people, particularly those in the populist corner, feel that they should not strike poses but nevertheless exude leadership qualities. But keeping a certain distance is also needed for charismatic leadership. A charismatic person is someone who comes from outside and wants things to be different. That is the paradox – charismatic leadership is difficult to democratize into a general will of the people, despite the charismatic person having to rely on his supporters.’

The Dutch article can be found HERE.

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