C L O S E R ISIM/RU Research - 2/7

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Tandenstokers, visum en vrouwen – Een verhaal van twee sheikhs

Posted on December 24th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: Gender, Kinship & Marriage Issues, ISIM/RU Research, Notes from the Field, Public Islam.

In discussies over de relatie tussen secularisme en religie speelt het lichaam een belangrijke rol. Of het nu om de hoofddoek gaat, (huiselijk) geweld, baarden, het lichaam wordt gezien door velen als een veld van zonde, verleiding, geschenk, heiligheid, last en dreiging, reinheid en onreinheid. Dit maakt het lichaam voor vrijwel alle religieuze instituties een ‘bastion van zonde en ketterij’ (in de islamitische tradities overigens zeker ook een bastion van genot en kracht), maar tevens een ideaal veld om religiositeit te stimuleren volgens hun eigen agenda en opvattingen. Voor secularisten is het lichaam tevens een ideaal veld om hun opvattingen over vrijheid te etaleren en op te leggen. Dit zien we deels terug in de recente controverses over de komst van islamitische predikers naar Nederland.

Zoals gebruikelijk hebben salafistische centra in Nederland rond kerst en oud en nieuw een jaarlijkse conferentie. En zoals niet ongebruikelijk is er ook een controverse over de komst van bepaalde imams uit het buitenland naar Nederland. In het verleden was er gedoe over Khalid Yasi en Haitham al Haddad om maar eens wat te noemen. Dit jaar ging de discussie allereerst en vooral over de komst van de Marokkaanse sheikh Al Maghraoui volgens wie kinderhuwelijken toegestaan zouden zijn in de islam. Hij zou deze kerst een lezing houden in de vernieuwde Haagse As Soennah moskee:

Daarmee werd hij al snel in de volksmond bekend als de ‘pedo-imam‘. Hij beroept zich daarmee op het voorbeeld van de profeet Mohammed die immers ook met een zeer jonge Aisha zou zijn getrouwd. En ook daar zijn natuurlijk de beschuldigingen van pedofilie alom te vinden op internet. Natuurlijk zou dat volgens de huidige maatstaven niet kunnen, maar de normen en patronen waren in de tijd van de profeet nu eenmaal anders en niet alleen anders in het Midden-Oosten.

Hier vindt u de uitgebreide reactie van imam Fawaz Jneid van de As Soennah moskee:

Niettemin heel begrijpelijk dat een en ander toch tot discussie leidde en tot beschuldigingen van aanzetten tot pedofilie en verkrachting. PvdA kamerlid Khadija Arib, die volgens mij een vrij consequente lijn volgt als het gaat om de positie van vrouwen en kinderen in Nederland, protesteerde tegen de komst van deze sheikh en stelde kamervragen hierover:

De As Soennah moskee waar de imam zou komen reageerde als volgt:

Ook de IslamDemocraten uit Den Haag reageerden: Al-Maghraoui van harte welkom in Den Haag. Overigens waren er ook mensen die de vrijheid van meningsuiting van Al Maghraoui verdedigden en ook vonden dat hij gewoon kon preken in Nederland. Voor anderen geldt slechts dat zijn ideeen bestreden moeten worden en dat hij dus niet toegelaten kon worden. Of het zou een uitgelezen mogelijkheid zijn om dit soort toestanden aan het licht te brengen. Op dit moment is volgens mij nog niet helemaal duidelijk of hij nu wel of niet komt ~~(wordt vervolgd)~~. update: Uiteindelijk is Al Maghraoui niet in Den Haag geweest. Officieel omdat hij te moe was om te reizen. Op maandag 26 december heeft hij een lezing gegeven voor de Haagse conferentie, per videolink.

De tweede imam en tweede conferentie betreft sheikh Mohammed Al-‘Arifi die naar de conferentie van de Fourqaan moskee is gekomen.

Dit werd onder meer opgepikt door het AD. Opvallend wel dat dit bezoek vooraf veel minder problemen opleverde en dat Al-‘Arifi ook al eerder (2009) in Nederland was zonder enige ophef. Maar de LPF in Eindhoven en de Brabantse PVV pikten het toch op zoals we in het volgende filmpje van Omroep Brabant kunnen zien. Daarin zit ook het omstreden fragment met Al-‘Arifi waarin hij zou stellen dat het toegestaan is om vrouwen te slaan:

Dit is de meest uitgebreide versie van de video die ik kon vinden:

Ik was enigszins verbaasd over die opmerkingen aangezien ik die niet helemaal in lijn vindt met wat hij gebruikelijk zegt over vrouwen en islam. Een uitgebreid transcript is HIER te vinden (H/T Carel Brendel). De moskee en Al-‘Arifi reageerden gisteren zelf met het volgende interview van prediker Al AlKhattab met de sheikh:

De reactie van Al-Arifi zal niet iedereen geruststellen. Immers, zijn opmerking dat je in zeer ernstige kwesties vrouwen een tikje mag geven met (symbolisch) een tandenstoker, gaat nog steeds uit van de man als hoofd van het gezin die bepaalt wat zijn vrouw wel of niet mag. Die reactie past overigens wel in wat ik van hem weet én past ook bij het beeld dat de Fourkaan moskee naar buiten wil brengen. Al eerder is de positie van de vrouw in lezingen en conferenties aan de orde geweest en ook daar is het slaan van vrouwen stellig veroordeeld (naar aanleiding van vragen van mannen en vrouwen uit het publiek daarover). Daarnaast wordt Al-‘Arifi ook in verband gebracht met terrorisme en jodenhaat hetgeen in België de nodige ophef veroorzaakt (hij gaat een dezer dagen ook nog naar Antwerpen).
Zie ook deze reactie bij Studio040:

In de lezingen van salafisten gaan opvattingen over gender en het lichaam meestal over vrouwen. Slechts een klein deel van de aandacht wordt besteed aan de man als de hoeder van het gezin hoewel dat wel bijna altijd de achtergrond vormt van de lezingen en geschriften over vrouwen. Opvallend is daarbij dat de sprekers voortdurend focussen op het tegengaan van macho- en vrouwonvriendelijk gedrag. Zo is in één van de lezingen (thuis in het huwelijk) van een Nederlandse prediker te beluisteren dat de man tijdens de huwelijksnacht vriendelijk moet zijn voor zijn vrouw, haar bezorgdheid wegnemen en in plaats van meteen over te gaan op de daad, moet hij eerst flirten, zoenen enzovoorts. De man wordt dus gezien als de actieve partij en de vrouw als passieve, ontvangende partij, maar de man dient wel op correcte wijze te werk te gaan. In het huwelijk moet hij in haar behoeften voorzien, aardig zijn voor haar en haar onderhouden. De beste man is niet de sterkste of degene die veel geld uitgeeft, maar degene die het beste omgaat met zijn vrouw met de profeet Mohammed als beste voorbeeld. De vrouw moet gehoorzaam zijn, maar hij moet haar beschermen, haar fouten en misstappen over het hoofd zien, haar onderwijzen in het geloof en haar verzorgen als ze ziek is. Hoewel de salafisten enkele jaren geleden nog in het nieuws kwamen vanwege de opvatting van één van de imams dat mannen hun vrouwen mogen slaan (met de kracht van een veer) tijdens een vragensessie over huiselijk geweld werd gesteld dat een echte man zijn vrouw niet slaat.

De soms ook ambivalente uitspraken met betrekking tot de gezagsverhouding tussen mannen en vrouwen is goed te zien in het volgende filmpje (noot voor sommige lezers het filmpje bevat klassieke muziek en nogal wat schokkende foto’s):

Aangezien we in een tijd leven waarin de seculiere norm de onverdachte norm is en waarin religie, in het bijzonder de islam, als de anti-these ervan wordt gezien en waarbij seculier zou staan voor vrijheid, tolerante, gelijkheid van mannen en vrouwen, is het niet moeilijk voor te stellen dat de opvattingen van salafisten voor discussie zorgen.

Raadsleden in gesprek met imam Al-Arifi via @alicevanderplas

Het gedrag en het lichaam van meisjes vormen belangrijke symbolische grenzen tussen wat men ziet als de eigen groep en buitenstaanders. De waarden betreffende vrouwelijk gedrag, kleding en omgang tussen mannen en vrouwen worden door verschillende groepen gearticuleerd om de ‘integriteit’ van de groep in stand te houden. De strijd over de controle over het lichaam van de vrouw is één van de belangrijkste grensmarkeringen tussen ‘wij’ en ‘zij’ in het islamdebat. De moslimvrouw is hiermee de belichaming in alle opzichten van dat woord) van de islam en het debat erover.

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Manji, Dibi and S4H/S4B – Not the back of the bus

Posted on December 12th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: Activism, Internal Debates, ISIM/RU Research, Notes from the Field.

Introduction:

Source: Flickr / Irshad Manji

Irshad Manji is on tour to promote her new book Allah, Liberty and Love – The Courage to Reconcile Faith and Freedom. She was in the Netherlands this week and during a debate with Green Left MP Tofik Dibi in De Balie a group of about 20 Muslim activists entered the room and disturbed the debate. Here I will attempt to give a brief overview of what happened and what the reactions were whereby I will treat both Manji’s appearance and the action of Shariah4Belgium and Shariah4Holland in terms in activism. In particular with regard to the latter I will treat their mode of activism not just as a reaction to particular circumstances, but as a tactic of creating a spectacle that belongs to theatrical resistance that dramatizes their project of both refusing the Dutch state’s and Muslim’s endeavour to produce liberal Muslims and their aim to achieve justice (how they understand it). The drama is also designed to evoke a reaction of moral outrage that actually confirms their project.

What happened?

According to some they are ‘salafists‘, according to others ‘radicals‘ and according the national news they were Muslims. It appears that they are part of a Belgian, Flemish, organization called Shariah4Belgium. This organization affiliated with the British Islam4Uk and with a Dutch branch, Shariah4Holland, wants to imply Sharia law in their countries of residence. It is not entirely clear what they mean with this, but for now it seems to work mainly as a powerful slogan.

They came in and shouted at both Dibi and Manji but:
Muslim Reformers vs Extremists

The speakers refused to leave the stage. Their discussion on the modernisation of Islam resumed after the police arrested a number of the extremists. Stated Manji, “I never felt afraid. Not once. Neither did Tofik. In fact, all of us refused to leave, even when police asked. We wouldn’t play on Jihadi terms. Some things are simply more important than fear.”

Emphasized Dutch MP, Tofik Dibi, “the disruption shows that even in the Netherlands it is necessary to continue the debate on reforming Islam.”

In several reports it was mentioned that the activists shouted ‘Takfir!‘ which Manji interpreted as an execution order. She also claims that the protesters pledged to break her neck (we can hear the latter indeed in the videos). Based upon the available footage however I do not recognize the ‘takfir’ call. What they do shout is ‘takbir’. It is a phrase well known and usually when someone shouts ‘takbir’ the audience responds with ‘Allahu Akhbar’. Which is exactly what happened as you could have seen in the video above. But of course the videos may not cover all what has been said. Nevertheless it would be strange if they shouted ‘takfir’ because that word is never used as a slogan, public outcry or the like. The combination of using Arab and Dutch/English slogans is interesting. The Arab slogans, as my colleague CB (checking the slogans for me) also noted, were mainly standard general religious slogans often used in protests. The Dutch/English slogans and calls were more specific for this occasion.

The next video does clarify a few of the issues mentioned above. It is in Dutch and made by the activists themselves. It appears from the video that the action was initiated by Shariah4Holland and that they asked support from Shariah4Belgium. In the video you will see the leader of Shariah4Belgium and some of their footage of them disturbing the debate:

Both the leader and the activists explain that they reject people who they regard as ‘murtadeen’ (apostates) to talk about Islam. They (Manji and Dibi) have the right to speak but then S4H and S4B have the right to protest and to object (‘verbally not physical’). They see the practices of Manji and Dibi as perverse among other things. According to Abu Imraan the mood in the debate room changed when his people entered and the speakers started to challenge them (Maybe he refers to Manji’s phrase: ‘the voices of sensationalism’?), which they responded to in a fierce manner.

Motives, means and objectives

For my Dutch readers here is the radio interview by Fouad Sidali with Abu Imraan, the leader of S4H:

According to him the hypocrites and apostates (Dibi and Manji) mock Islam and they wanted to make a statement that the mockery should be over. He says Dibi and Manji didn’t take them serious in the debate so they resorted to plan B: ‘a little takbir and a little takfir’. The interviewer ‘criticized’ the protesters also for spitting at Dibi and Manji but according to Abu Imraan they do not deserve respect. Abu Imraan declared Dibi an infidel but also claimed that this was no problem for him as long as they did not hurt him with his infidelity. He also refers to a debate on Tuesday 13 December where S4H might appear and says the police to be ready for them. They will defend Islam and not be afraid.

The next scene

The reactions in the media about the S4H/S4B action were very negative and often portrayed as a clash between Muslim reformers and extremists and on anti-Islam sites it is regarded as a demonstration of ‘true’ Islam whilst so-called moderates are only lying or indulging in some kind of fantasy islam and therefore, at least in the case of Dibi, the action was regarded as an ironic twist of fate. The more mainstream reactions however were more in line with the reformist vs. extremist or moderate vs. radical Islam/Muslims dichotomy. Some referred to S4H/S4B as barbarians or religious hooligans and praised Manji for being brave.

It appears that the dichotomy moderate vs. radical is used to not only alienate other Muslims from mainstream society but also used as a mobilizing frame. While S4H and S4B here use mobilizing frames such as ‘true Islam’ and ‘insults against Islam and the prophet’ people like Manji and Dibi use ‘moderate’, ‘liberal’ or ‘reformist’ Islam / Muslims as a way to call Muslims to stand up against intolerance and bigotry. The next part of the Dutch TV program Halve Maan which features Irshad Manji is not only very clear about the dichotomy but also about the attempt to mobilize people (the introduction is in Dutch, the interview in English begins after 30 seconds):

The problem according to Manji, and many others with her I think, is that too many ‘self-declared moderates’ do not stand up against these radicals. And if they don’t, or because they don’t, they are not only complicit to ‘this problem’ but she even challenges their self-definition of the moderates by saying ‘what is moderate about you when you are allowing these gangsters to define what Islam is’. She is therefore asking the moderates where their insistence and humility is to call upon the radicals to show their humility to God: “I want to hear your voices”. Such frames are used to inspire, mobilize and legitimate social movement activities and campaigns but ultimately always reduce the multi-dimensional realities. The dichotomies used by Manji but also by S4H and S4B do not cover, for example, the wide range of reactions among Muslims with regard to the actions of S4H and S4B. The same happens with people like Manji and Dibi of course. By some seen as collaborators (or traitors) with the infidels, by others seen as still too Muslim even though she tries to resist such reductionist views.

The reactions among Muslims I have seen so far are mixed but with a clear dominance of rejecting and disapproval. For my Dutch readers, watch here the debate at De Halve Maan, the girl you see on the videos vehemently opposing S4B/S4H is also in this debate:

I also have checked some of my informants and websites. Many see the attack as intimidating and agressive. Others think that the tactic goes against Islam; the tactic of intimidating but also throwing food (eggs) at Tofik Dibi. Several people think that an action such as this will only result in an increasing stigmatization of Muslims. Others however, although not approving the action, are a little more supportive since they see S4B as an organizations that ‘at least tries’ (without specifying what) with trial and error. And again others although some even disapproving the action say it is nevertheless necessary to support ‘the brothers’ against the infidels reagardless of what they do. And several support both the ideas and actions of S4H but also call for a ‘MuslimsAgainstShariah4Belgium‘. Several condemn the action, not because they agree with Dibi and Manji (on the contrary) but because it is against Islam, against tolerance and taints the image of Islam and Muslims. One calling them hooligans and a disgrace. Others condemn the action but also emphasize the need for reflection on the question if we do not have something of Abu Imraan as part of our self. Supporters of Manji define her insistence to remain on the stage during the protest as a ‘Rosa Parks‘ moment: “she didn’t move to the back of the bus”. Interestingly that is actually the statement of S4H and S4B as well: they dont want to be moved to the back of the bus (albeit with different tactics, aesthetics, frames and political identities).

Theater and Spectacle

It is not the first time S4B disrupts a meeting and I’ve written about it earlier as well. Every time the reactions among many Muslims are very negative even among those who do not necessarily object to the messages of S4B. The amount of support remains rather low in my impression. What is the use of tactics like these then? I guess we can look at it in terms of theatre and spectacle. What is happening here is that protestors orchestrate an event that breaks the usual order of things in debates and debating rooms. They do this in such a way, with dramatic acts of rupture, that dramatizes injustice experienced by the protesters and engages with media conventions in which the sensational is prioritized and whereby continuously social problems, enemies, leaders and followers are constructed, prioritized and pacified. So when, almost in a parade, they enter the debating room )with its highly formalized and stylized conventions for both speakers and audience), creating rwina (chaos, when things are not going the way they are supposed to go) they produce a stark contrast with what people expect and accept in such an environment. Violence is such a tactic, standing up and shouting in a debate is another one, spitting, threatening and so on are other tactics as well as using Arab slogans. And it works, immediately after the event the hunt for eye-witness accounts and video footage began.

The idea, also apparent among opponents of S4H, that no one is standing up for Muslims and against injustice, is significant. What S4H tries to do with this theatre and spectacle is to pursue visibility; both for their cause (injustice) as well as for themselves (as the true representatives of the oppressed). At the same time they try to render invisible any disagreement and weakness on their part or among Muslims in general. As such they use the media and how the media covers such an event is just as much part of the spectacle as the actions themselves as can be seen from Abu Imraan speech who turns the use of the label ‘radicals’ or ‘extremists’ against his opponents.

The media’s reaction confirms the S4B/S4H worldview and this theatrical resistance is meant to create that interplay because they know their message and performance will be interpreted through prevailing frames, concerns and norms. I wouldn’t be surprised therefore if they actually would agree with the Dutch intelligence service that fears a growing radicalization. I don’t. This is what we have seen before; a whole series of oppositional, provocative and militant disruptive spectacles that, taken together, can be seen as theatrical resistance. Using a video camera and Youtube shows they perfectly understand the power of theatre, spectacle and sensationalism in the age of social media.

At the same time however this spectacle is a site of contestation where different actors use the spectacle for their own agenda and interests; therefore the understandable fear among opponents that S4B/S4H only serves to legitimate islamophobia and to denounce all Muslims as freaks, barbarians and terrorist-in-disguise. Which is indeed what happens, showing that it is difficult to escape the islamophobic and anti-religious attitude whether one engages in such militant actions, responds to such militant actions, or not respond at all; actions designed to challenge the existing order may end up confirming them. Within this perspective, the insistence of Dibi and Manji to remain on the stage was by the way highly effective. Not only in the sense that the debate could go on but also in the sense of performance: by remaining steadfast within the ethic and aesthetic terms of the usual debate (not shouting, being supported by others) and by foregrounding themselves as defenders of free speech.

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Mesa 2011 Making Islamic Authority

Posted on December 7th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: ISIM/RU Research, Notes from the Field.

Mesa 2011 ended last Sunday. It was a rewarding conference this year in Washington DC. I met several new people, saw some old colleagues back after quite a while and attended several interesting panels. On Sunday morning I participated in a round table discussion with Gudrun Kraemer, Free University Berlin – Mirjam Kuenkler, Princeton University – Thomas Pierret, University of Edinburgh – and Hilary Kalmbach, University of Oxford; the latter also being the convenor and chair of this session. The title of this panel was Mapping Change in Islamic Authority: Shifting Cultures of Knowledge, Learning, and Practice. I’m not going to summarize this panel for you (you had to be there…) but I will share with you my notes which I used for a brief talk.

Social Field
Based upon my research on the Salafi movement I wanted explore the usefulness of Bourdieu’s social field approach with regard to the matter of authority. Now Bourdieu is certainly not unproblematic in this regard. In his work he maintained a very rigid distinction between authority and lay people, or as I put it (certainly not appreciated by everyone in the discussion given its obvious neo-liberal market connotation) between consumers and producers. Nevertheless his explorations of other fields shows that there are possibilities to explore the religious field in a more dynamic way. Following Bourdieu these fields are characterized by opposing forces and power struggles. I will use this idea as to point some ideas and suggestions of what we can look at, in a rather tentative way. In 1999, almost 10 years after the establishment of the first Salafi networks in the Netherlands a blacklist was published that featured several Salafi preachers, denouncing them as people from the Muslim Brotherhood, innovators and lacking piety. The list was issued by a then new network connected: the Madkhali network. A network of scholars and students that claims to shy away from politics and is loyal to Saudi (and other) authorities. They did the same in other countries as well for example in the UK and in the US. It immediately gave them a place among the others, albeit a contested one.

Establishing and performing authority through genealogy
The competition in the transnational Salafi field results to a large extent from conflicting claims by Salafis over positions of authority over what is, and how to establish, the authentic truth of Islam and what constitutes a trustworthy, genuine and reliable authority.. It has been in particular the Madkhali network that has established itself by identifying a false authority. They also issued lists of trustworthy scholars in order to authenticate their own religious knowledge in the sense that it is they who adhere to the silsila (or chain) of ‘true’, ‘trustworthy’, and ‘genuine’. By looking at the student-scholar relationship on this list, we can, for example, trace the inherited knowledge of someone like Ibn Baz back to the days of the Salaf. Like in Islamic traditions the isnad or the Chain of Authenticity is crucial instrument for ascertaining the validity of a hadith, this Salafi chain is used to trace the lineage of knowledge of a Salafi Shaykh to the Prophet Muhammad and his companions, perhaps somewhat similar (I’m speculating here) as the chain of masters and students, ‘silsila’ among Sufism. What is authentic is not only decided upon people’s mastery of knowledge but also about scholars with a reputation of being pious. It is a way to ascertain that one is on the correct path and to delegitimize those who are not part of the chain. It appears that within the religious field there are differences with regard to values, hierarchies and systems of aesthetic judgement serving to legitimate and authenticate particular practices, styles, and subjects. This is contrary to how Bourdieu treats the religious field but less as to how he treats other fields (such as arts).

The religious field and the media field
The religious field is not always clearly demarcated and isolated from other fields such as the media. A few of the lay preachers for example have a made an appearance on TV which in different ways contributed to their authority. It appears that their authority in the ‘Islamic’ field also rendered them authoritative in the Dutch media field in which debates about Islam and the nature and interpretation of Islam dominate. In both the religious and the media field their image as uncompromising about ‘what Islam really says’ contributes to this authority, albeit with a different interpretation and evaluation. Often in defending their own position in the public sphere they do not so much use arguments based upon works of scholars, the Qur’an, hadith, and Sunna, as a means of authenticating their knowledge. Instead they point to the freedom of speech and freedom of religion thereby demonstrating their adjustment to the rules of the game in the media field. At the same time these different fields interact. These Salafi preachers often get verbally attacked in the media and in particular on the Internet after their TV appearances. For many Muslim youth, a prime example of both how Muslims are treated in public (with double standards) and how one nevertheless should remain steadfast. Furthermore what this case alludes to I think is the issue of professionalization. There is much talk on Salafi activists about the need to become more professional in their outreach and becoming media-savvy is part of that. Muslims more critical about the Salafi preachers actually accuse of them of not being professional and often mock there media appearances. Dutch salafis in turn look to the English networks as example of professional media outreach while some of the English look at the Dutch as to how to respond to a strong anti-Islam party.

Genres of authority?
In Bourdieu’s work different fields are to be distinguished but not always separated. With regard to the making of authority we should not limit ourselves to analyze what kind of or how much people master particular types of religious knowledge but we can look to what kind of values, hierarchies and systems of aesthetic judgement serve to legitimate and authenticate particular practices, styles, and subjects. It is very clear that in a mediatised context not only mastery of religious knowledge counts but also how media savvy people are. Focus should be on how fields are positioned in relation to other fields, on distributions of value and resources, habitus and comparing them by focusing on their discursive resources, the kinds of effects they have when put to use, the strategies producers (speakers) pursue and the ends they achieve. It is clear that only some institutional affiliation is not enough to provide someone with authority. Based upon that we can probably distinguish between different genres of authority as came up in the discussion that ensued from the presentation. Whereby for example Amr Khaled (not a salafi) represents a different genre than for example Bin Baz in the past and both are in turn different from that of Nasr Abou Zayd. These differences are not only the result of differences in content or institution but also in aesthetics. Taken together they might constitute (following Bakhtin and his notion of ‘speech genres’) a set of peformative features combining different repertoires (for example media and religious capital) based upon more or less (but also contested) patterns and expectations. The persuasive power represented or manifested within the words of the preacher then resides outside his text (for example his or hers eloquence, gender, relation to particular institutions, gestures, styles of clothing and so on). Maybe this idea merits further exploration?

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Islamoloog Joas Wagemakers krijgt Erasmus studieprijs

Posted on November 9th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: Important Publications, ISIM/RU Research, Joy Category, Religious and Political Radicalization.

Stichting Praemium Erasmianum kent een studieprijs toe aan het proefschrift van Joas Wagemakers, onderzoeker en docent Islam & Arabisch aan de Radboud Universiteit. Wagemakers promoveerde in november 2010 cum laude op zijn dissertatie over de Jordaanse radicaal-islamitische ideoloog Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi.

De Stichting Praemium Erasmianum kent jaarlijks maximaal vijf Studieprijzen toe voor bijzondere dissertaties op het gebied van geesteswetenschappen en maatschappij- en gedragswetenschappen. De Studieprijs bestaat uit een geldbedrag van € 3.000 en een oorkonde.

Gematigd-extreme ideoloog
Joas Wagemakers ontvangt de prijs voor zijn proefschrift A Quietist Jihadi-Salafi.The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. Het onderzoek gaat over de ideologie van de Jordaanse radicaal-islamitische Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi in de context van het salafisme, een stroming binnen de islam. Salafisme wordt doorgaans in drie categorieën verdeeld: het quiëtisme, dat zich op missionaire activiteiten en onderwijs richt en politiek veelal mijdt; het politiek salafisme, dat juist zeer politiek geëngageerd is; en het jihadi-salafisme, dat zich, soms met geweld, tegen de bestaande regimes in de moslimwereld keert omdat deze niet-islamitisch zouden zijn vanwege het feit dat ze de islamitische wetgeving (sharia) niet of niet volledig invoeren. Wagemakers laat zien dat al-Maqdisi zowel in de quiëtistische (gematigde) als de jihadistische (extremistische) categorie thuishoort. Dit verklaart waarom deze ‘gematigde extremist’ in sommige contexten wel en in andere juist niet invloedrijk is geweest.

Breder belang
Belangrijk criterium voor de bekroning van een proefschrift met de Praemium Erasmianum is ‘de casusoverstijgende behandeling van het onderwerp en het bredere belang van het boek voor andere disciplines’, aldus het persbericht. Daarmee wordt, denkt Wagemakers, bedoeld dat zijn proefschrift niet alleen relevant is voor het leven en denken van al-Maqdisi, maar ook voor andere processen van radicalisering. ‘Mijn studie beschrijft hoe radicalisering in z’n werk gaat, hoe tekst en context, Koran en omgeving, elkaar beïnvloeden. Op zich is het geen spectaculaire ontdekking dát dat zo gaat, maar ik heb het wel voor het eerst heel systematisch aangetoond. Mijn proefschrift geeft bovendien een tot dan toe niet verschenen inkijk in de ideologische achtergrond van het salafisme. En het laat zien hoe ideologie – en dat stuk is zeker casusoverstijgend – evolueert.’

Veni
Wagemakers ontving in september een Veni-subsidie van de Nederlandse organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (NWO) waarmee hij onderzoek gaat doen naar islamitische activisten (sociaal en/of politiek) in Jordanië. Wagemakers is als onderzoeker ook verbonden aan het instituut voor internationale betrekkingen Clingendael.

Uitreiking
De Studieprijzen Praemium Erasmianum worden op donderdag 15 december uitgereikt in Amsterdam.

(Tekst:Anja van Kessel, RU)

Mijn collega en (nog even) kamergenoot aan de Radboud Universiteit heeft eerder een stuk geschreven voor dit blog naar aanleiding van zijn proefschrift over Mohammed al Maqdisi:
The Ideology and Influence of Muhammad al Maqdisi
En hij heeft bijgedragen aan de volgende post over Al Maqdisi:
Het glazen huis – Al Maqdisi Jihadi Controverse en nieuwe publicatie

2 comments.

Postcard from Birmingham: Paradoxes of the North Sea Triangle

Posted on November 2nd, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: Activism, ISIM/RU Research, Notes from the Field.

This is my second and last postcard from Birmingham. I have been in the UK for nine days (including two days in London, one in Leicester and one morning in Manchester) mainly to explore possibilities for future research comparing the UK and the Netherlands in terms of Muslim activism and its relation to every day life. The idea is that this builds on my current research on Salafism in the Netherlands, but includes a broader range of Muslims in both countries and does not immediately take their Muslim identity as their primary identity or even single identity, excluding other modes of identity and belonging.

I have spend my time in the UK talking to some colleagues and individual spokespersons of various networks and organizations. But most of my time I have been trying to establish contacts with those Muslims who migrated from the Netherlands to the UK and of course meeting them. Although I have spoken to about 10 people, more than I expected because I did not have that many contacts when I came to the UK, I will certainly try to speak with more men and women the next time I’m here. What I give you now is an impression of the main themes coming up during my conversations with these people. Do not expect too much in terms of reflection and analysis, it is just meant to give you some idea of what came up and the themes that might be explored in further research.

Snapshots from the UK

Almost all of the Dutch migrants I have been talking to have been born in the Netherlands. A few of them elsewhere, but also they lived for most of their, young, lives in the Netherlands.
They have been living in the UK for 5-7 years, a few of them a little longer (8-10 years).
All of them refer to both the UK and the Netherlands as important for who they are now, but also point to a third or fourth identification (sometimes used interchangeably) as Muslim or a particular ethnic group: Somali, Iraqi, Moroccan or otherwise. (This together with the Dutch and English identification, makes up for what I tentatively call the North Sea Triangle).
Several of them came voluntarily to the UK but also many came to the UK with their parents. The former group came to the UK expecting that their life as a Muslim would be easier and in some cases that they could easily connect to other people from the same ethnic group (Somali, Egyptian, Moroccan, Iraqi, Dutch). In the case of the latter, these parents moved because most of their relatives were living in the UK and/or because they were unhappy with life in the Netherland, in particular the lack of opportunities the country had to offer and/or because in some cases there were problems in schools. Also among them one can find the motive of having a ‘better religious life’ in the UK.
“So tell me what you think about England, except that it is dirty” is probably the question that was asked to me the most. According to almost all the migrants I talked to England is much dirtier than the Netherlands. Certainly some areas in the cities I visited gave rise to a similar experience on my account. The ‘Dutch’ pre-occupation with orderliness and cleanliness is important for them too? This of course can have something to do with the type of neighbourhoods they live in; mostly old, somewhat degraded poor urban areas with bad housing. But there is more to it than that, I think:
Life in the Netherlands is better in many ways according to many migrants. It is much better organized, people are blunt but honest (while in the UK they seem to be polite but might be backstabbing you), public services are much better, people are more helpful and the housing is much much better. They seem to be idealizing Dutch society, at least as they remember it.
Many of them (regardless of their ethnic background) refer to themselves as Dutch or at least state that they are proud to ‘come from Holland’. Some state that when they refer to themselves as ‘Dutch’ they mean Dutch in ways of doing or acting, not necessarily as an identity, meaning that for them at least there is a difference between both. I would say that there is a difference between overcommunicating and undercommunicating different modes of identity in different situations.
Several of them, when together with others from the Netherlands, talk Dutch. Many of the conversations I had were mixed Dutch and English language.
Among Somalis people distinguish between those coming from, for example, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands.
Several of them told me they needed time to get used to English food. They in particular missed the peanut butter, Dutch cheese, liquorice and sliced (!) meat.
Some of them go the Netherlands on a regular bases, to meet friends and family and because they ‘like to come back’ every now and then. A few go at least once a year.
I have the impression that this (5-10) experience came about after they moved to the UK, but this is something I have to look into more closely.
What is better in the UK according to everyone of them is the religious life. Many of their friends here (UK) are Muslim and many live in predominantly Muslim neighbourhoods. According to them being a good Muslim is easier, it is more relaxed and ‘it is more fun here to do things that are not haram’, there are more mosques. In a number cases this also produced a more religious lifestyle once being settled in the UK. A few of them, in the Salafi circles, state that there is much more social control which is very helpful ‘to remain steadfast and consistent’.
And here we see a kind of paradox. While many people experience religious life in the UK as more easy going, more embedded in daily life and being treated with less suspicion than in the Netherlands, there are also reports of people returning to the Netherlands from the UK. These appear to be Salafi Muslims who feel they are much more targeted under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) and much more harassed by the authorities. This clearly needs a follow up.
Some of them state that in the UK Muslims and/or migrants are much better protected by anti-discrimination laws. On the one hand this means that people do not dare to discriminate and are very careful on that level (while being more blunt and outspoken in the Netherlands) but on the other hand it means that you are not sure what people actually think, creating the accusation that people are hypocrite (while being honest in the Netherlands).
In particular Salafi Muslims seem to perceive their stay in the UK as temporary; they want to move (doing hijra) to an ‘islamic country’ later on. There have been statements by a Salafi shaykhs that moving to in particular Birmingham amounts to doing hijra. This is also controversial however.
And another paradox: the former (15) is somewhat inconsistent with this one: there is much more racial discrimination (and people feel more being discriminated against because of their race) than people have experienced in the Netherlands. A few of them however state that also in the Netherlands there is a lot of racism only people hide it better. I think the difference with the UK have a strong ‘race talk’ while the Netherlands has a strong ‘culture talk’ tradition is related to this, somehow. Of course, this leads to another type of discrimination so maybe that is why some say they are more discriminated against because they are black, while not experiencing much discrimination for being Muslim.
Whereas the Netherlands is the land of cleanliness and orderliness, the UK is the land of opportunities. According to the people I talked with here everyone gets a chance to make something out of their lives and people are much quicker accepted as part of society than in the Netherlands. Many of them appear to think that they wouldn’t be where they are now (in university for example) when they would have stayed in the Netherlands.
In some circles, in particular Salafi, there seems to be a fear that things in the UK will move into the same direction as (what they perceive as) in the Netherlands where people look with fear and suspicion to Muslims and where policy is becoming more and more restrictive for Muslims (who are clearly visible as such).
According to some people I talked with (not the migrants from the Netherlands) one of the reasons Muslims feel rather protected still and (migrants) feel religious life is easier in the UK, is because of the strong position Muslims have build up themselves with regard to representation, politics and economy and also (in some cities such at as Leicester) the strong interfaith dialogue.
The Dutch migrants see clear fault lines within the native British. They distinguish between higher educated and lower educated and/or ignorant people, the latter sometimes referred to (by the younger men and women) as ‘chavs’. Certainly when referring to ‘chavs’ they very clearly picked up the English class talk among their peers.
An interesting note for my salafism research is that in Birmingham, in particular in and around Small Heath there are so many Salafi bookshops, it almost looks as if the label ‘Salafi’ has become a brand. It clearly distinguishes people and organisations from others, and sends very specific messages to the audience.

Note that these are just 22 tentative issues that have come up in mostly informal, exploratory talks. This is by no means exhaustive nor representative or approaching any final conclusion, but just gives an idea of the themes and issues I’m focusing on now and might do in the future. What the list makes clear is that this North Sea Triangle (consisting of a Dutch part, English part and another ethnic or Muslim identity) is highly interesting and complicates much of the discussions on identity, integration and the role and position of Muslims in society and towards wider society. People clearly use different modes of identity, all of them with both positive and negative and often contradictory evaluations. Their often very positive evaluation of Dutch identity or a sense of belonging to Holland appears to have come up once they arrived (or shortly before) in the UK. All of them appreciate the opportunities they have in the UK to develop themselves both in terms of education, career as well as being a person and a Muslim, but research also shows that there is a lot of distrust and people suffer from being targeted as a group. At the same time there are many de-escalation processes at work.

Certainly for Salafi Muslims it is much easier to live here with more mosques, more organizations, living in areas like Small Heath provides some social control as well as protection against agressive anti-Muslim behaviour, but they also find themselves in a situation where there are many more networks than in the Netherlands offering all kinds of Islamic knowledge like the Barelwi, Deobandi, Hizb ut Tahrir and so on. The research on ‘suspect communities‘ makes clear that Muslims as a group are affected in every day life by the counter-terrorism measures, but this may have more negative consequences for a particular group of Salafi Muslims than for other Muslims (speculating here).

All of this means that the puzzle of the relationship between the islam and integration debates on the one hand and daily life of Muslims on the other hand is very complicated and contradictory and as such also the relation with high and low profile modes of Muslim activism. Research on Muslim activism then requires attention to different levels: media, policy-making and every day life and should not start with Muslim identity as a given, but exploring how it relates to the different local and national contexts as well as how it is influenced by and influences other modes of identity and activism.

Thanks to all the people in the UK who were willing to meet (or otherwise communicate) with me, and in particular the people in Small Heath, Birmingham, for their hospitality. Also thanks to all the people who responded on twitter and facebook (in private or public): greatly appreciated and very helpful.

0 comments.

Postcard from Birmingham: islam and ethnicity in everyday life

Posted on October 30th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: Activism, anthropology, ISIM/RU Research, Notes from the Field, Public Islam.

Right now Im making a trip in the UK, visiting London, Birmingham, Leicester and Manchester. The aim of this trip is twofold. Firstly, tying up some loose ends for my Salafism research. I am mainly interested in the lives of Salafi men and women, regardless their ethnic background, who migrated from the Netherlands to the UK. Some of them see this as a mode of doing hijra (lit. migration); migrating to an Islamic country. Certainly Birmingham is seen, in some Salafi circles, as a city where Muslims can practice their faith without almost any restrictions and without much prejudice and racism against Muslims.

Secondly, I’m planning to do new comparative research focusing on activism among Muslims (not only Salafi) in the UK and the Netherlands. It focuses on the various and multiple positions Muslims have taken up with respect to contested public events and conflicts in terms of Muslim activism. So far little is known about how such conflicts involving Islam are discussed among Muslims, let alone how they affect the level of lived experience. While the public, and hence easily accessible, dimension of these conflicts is important, we need to understand and investigate both how Muslims conceptualize and understand freedom of speech and freedom of religion, as well as the practices and processes of turning grievances and claims into public issues. Focusing on different modalities of Muslim activism, we understand Muslim activism as producing forms of social and political mobilisation aimed at contesting the exclusion of Islam from the public domain and of claiming a Muslim voice. Activism is a way for people to express their moral visions for themselves and on behalf of what they view as the common good, mobilizing others to share these moral visions.

Whereas much work on a Muslim public presence oscillates between a focus on highly radical/orthodox or very liberal Muslims, this research project engages with a far broader range of positions. It recognizes that religion needs to be taken seriously, but cannot be assumed to structure Muslims‘ engagement with the public completely. Starting from the concept of multiple positionalities that may well be ambiguous, ambivalent and at times contradictory, it also takes other aspects of people‘s everyday life serious. This then raises the question under which conditions Muslims engage in higher profile forms of public participation.

My trip to England is therefore intented to learn about the practices and experience of Salafi Muslim men and women in the UK after they migrated there from the Netherlands and to explore the field and getting to know new people for possibly future research. I will be staying in Birmingham most of the time, more in particular in the Small Heath area, known for its large share of migrants: Somalians and Asians and also as the headquarters for one of the Salafi branches in Europe: Salafipublications.

In both researches the realm of the every day life is very important. This makes research among Dutch Muslim migrants in the UK so interesting. It is in particular Salafi islam, in which it is emphasized that Islam is significant for all spheres of life, have the risk of reifying ‘Islam’ as the principal identity for Muslims and making Muslims ‘all about Islam’. A focus on the everyday life identity politics of Salafi Muslims in the Netherlands, brings about a more ambiguous and ambivalent interplay between local and transnational politics and between overcommunication and undercommunication of religious identity and ethnic identity. Many studies on European Muslims taking up the idea of Islam as a primary identity marker, are influenced by some sort of ‘groupism’ in which, for example, Salafi Muslims by definition are seen as upholding Muslim as a primary identity and rejecting ethnic identities because that is what being Salafi Muslim is all about. ‘Groupist’ readings take the existence of groups in society for granted and neglect that ethnicity and other types of social identities are part and parcel of processes of categorization and identification (Brubakers, Jenkins). Groupism is, following Brubaker, ’ the tendency to treat ethnic groups, nations and races as substantial entities to which interests and agency can be attributed.’ It conflates social categories with groups and groups with organizations that appear to speak on their behalf. In research this would mean ignoring how ethnicity works (as in how people attach particular meanings to social relationships) in daily life.

An approach that starts from the everyday life experiences of people in the case of the Salafi movement, means that I start with, following Ammerman’s writing on everyday religion, the experiences of nonexperts, the people who do not make a living being religious or thinking and writing about religious ideas or as political entrepeneurs. The official discourses are important of course, but only when they are used by the people themselves. Everyday also means activities outside religious institutions or movements according to Ammerman but without exluding those institutions and movements all together. Everyday ethnicity and religion can be related to mundane activities but also with crisis and special events. It means that we look as to how religion and ethnicity are interwoven with the lives of people we observe. In the case of ethnic and religious identity it means what Brubakers and others called the politics of categorization: how categories are proposed, propagated, imposed and articulated top down and how at a grass roots level they are appropriated, internalized, subverted, evaded or how transformed. It means to look at how, why and when particular social categories emerge or not, how these categories are used to mobilize people, how the provide people with a sense of belonging and self-understanding, and how they are used to communicate differences and similarities and so on. Or in other words, how religion and ethnicity make sense in daily life.

A focus on how ethnicity and religion make sense, or not, in daily lives of people, shows a more ambiguous side of the identity politics in which both overcommunication and undercommunication of ethnic identity and religious identity appear at the same time, where categories that are dominant at the national level are trickling down in daily interactions, get appropriated, transformed and subverted. Instead of being a game of one identity replacing the other, or coexisting hybrid identities, strong over- and under-communication is also part of identity negotiations.

A new postcard is due on Tuesday or Wednesday.

1 comment.

Een 'Europese' Islam

Posted on October 26th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: Important Publications, ISIM/RU Research, Religious and Political Radicalization.

Het tijdschrift Internationale Spectator van Instituut Clingendael heeft een themanummer over ‘Europese’ Islam.

Inhoud:

Maurits Berger – Islamisering van het Westen, of verwesterlijking van de islam? (SUMMARY [EN]) Oktober 2011 – 65(10), p.503-507 – (129 Kb)

Niek Biegman, Soefisme als Politieke Factor (SUMMARY [EN])
Oktober 2011 – 65(10), p.508-511 -(abonnees)

Roel Meijer, De Moslim Broederschap in Europa (SUMMARY [EN])
Oktober 2011 – 65(10), p.512-515 – (99 Kb)

Inez Schippers, De Gülenbeweging: Turkse islam met twee gezichten (SUMMARY [EN]) Oktober 2011 – 65(10), p.521-524 -(abonnees)

Eelko Hooijmaajers, Tussen Tanzimat en Koran: Modernisering en islamisme in het Ottomaanse Rijk (SUMMARY [EN]) Oktober 2011 – 65(10), p.525-529 -(abonnees)

Martijn de Koning, De Transnationale Salafiyyahbeweging
(SUMMARY [EN]) Oktober 2011 – 65(10), p.516-520 -(abonnees)

Mijn artikel is hier te downloaden:

Engelse samenvatting
De transnationale salafiyyahbeweging
Martijn de Koning elaborates the Salafiyyah movement, an Islamic movement that aims to revitalize Islam based upon the utopian ideal of the prophet Muhammad and his companions. The author explores how the Salafiyyah movement consists of transnational social fields: net-works of networks where people, ideas, means and identities meet. First it is shown how international migration has made it possible to establish local Salafiyyah networks in the Netherlands and how in turn Dutch Salafiyyah Muslims use the transnational networks. Secondly the focus is on transnational debates about the nature of Islam in Europe and how these debates informed the fragmentation of the Dutch networks. The author subsequently shows how people create a sense of belonging to the transnational Salafiyyah movement. While the transnational dimension of the Salafiyyah runs counter to current integration policies, for the Salafiyyah movement the interplay between local and transnational networks is essential for the establishment of a global movement.

Download artikel HIER.

De PDF van dit artikel is met toestemming van de redactie overgenomen uit de Internationale Spectator, maandblad voor Internationale politiek, uitgegeven door de Koninklijke Van Gorcum te Assen namens het Nederlands Instituut voor Internationale Betrekkingen Clingendael te Den Haag.

0 comments.

Een ‘Europese’ Islam

Posted on October 26th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: Important Publications, ISIM/RU Research, Religious and Political Radicalization.

Het tijdschrift Internationale Spectator van Instituut Clingendael heeft een themanummer over ‘Europese’ Islam.

Inhoud:

Maurits Berger – Islamisering van het Westen, of verwesterlijking van de islam? (SUMMARY [EN]) Oktober 2011 – 65(10), p.503-507 – (129 Kb)

Niek Biegman, Soefisme als Politieke Factor (SUMMARY [EN])
Oktober 2011 – 65(10), p.508-511 -(abonnees)

Roel Meijer, De Moslim Broederschap in Europa (SUMMARY [EN])
Oktober 2011 – 65(10), p.512-515 – (99 Kb)

Inez Schippers, De Gülenbeweging: Turkse islam met twee gezichten (SUMMARY [EN]) Oktober 2011 – 65(10), p.521-524 -(abonnees)

Eelko Hooijmaajers, Tussen Tanzimat en Koran: Modernisering en islamisme in het Ottomaanse Rijk (SUMMARY [EN]) Oktober 2011 – 65(10), p.525-529 -(abonnees)

Martijn de Koning, De Transnationale Salafiyyahbeweging
(SUMMARY [EN]) Oktober 2011 – 65(10), p.516-520 -(abonnees)

Mijn artikel is hier te downloaden:

Download artikel HIER.

De PDF van dit artikel is met toestemming van de redactie overgenomen uit de Internationale Spectator, maandblad voor Internationale politiek, uitgegeven door de Koninklijke Van Gorcum te Assen namens het Nederlands Instituut voor Internationale Betrekkingen Clingendael te Den Haag.

0 comments.

Pot, ketel en neo-cliëntelisme

Posted on October 18th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: Activism, ISIM/RU Research, Notes from the Field, Public Islam.

In de Volkskrant stelde Wasif Shadid, naar aanleiding van Tofik Dibi’s Final Fatwa, dat allochtone politici het vertoog van de zogenaamde islamcritici overnemen. Hoewel allochtone politici weliswaar niet anti-islam zijn, lijken ze de grondgedachte dat er iets mis is met islam te delen. Daarmee zouden ze kiezers in de steek laten en misleiden.
‘Allochtone politici bevestigen populisten’ – opinie – VK

Het negatief afschilderen van de eigen cultuur en achterban in situaties van onderschikking, zoals hierboven is beschreven, wordt in het boek Black Skin, White Masks van de Franse psychiater Frantz Fanon getypeerd als ‘de internalisering van inferioriteit’. Daarvan is volgens hem sprake wanneer mensen niet alleen de opgedrongen gedachte van achterlijkheid van hun cultuur accepteren, maar die ook in eigen opvattingen gaan verwerken en verder verspreiden.

Naast hun bijdrage aan stigmatisering maken genoemde allochtone politici zich ook indirect schuldig aan een vorm van kiezersmisleiding. Wat belangenbehartiging betreft, blijven ze in gebreke en vertolken ze ook niet de allochtone stem, maar een echo van autochtone critici. Ze maken als het ware een knieval voor het heersende populisme doordat ze kernaspecten van de eigen identiteit zoveel mogelijk proberen te camoufleren.

Naar aanleiding van dit stuk evolueerde de discussie zich naar een debat over cliëntelisme bij politici van allochtone afkomst. Zie bijvoorbeeld de reactie van Afshin Ellian die spreekt van een ‘schandalige, primitieve, en in zekere zin tribale aanval op de integriteit van democratisch gekozen Kamerleden uit naam van de islam en het multiculturalisme’:
Elsevier.nl – Weblog – Een tribale aanval op Dibi en Marcouch

Shadid propageert juist cliëntelisme: terug naar de woestijnperiode, vorm een eigen clan! Shadid snapt niets van democratie en rechtsstaat.

Dit was precies het probleem met de oude garde van multiculturalisten, die de gebreken en problemen in een multiculturele samenleving desnoods met leugens verborgen. Wie de problemen niet verdoezelde, was een racist.

Onze samenleving heeft al lang afscheid genomen van het multiculturele paradijs. Shadid eist van politici met islamitische achtergrond dat zij elke anti-islamretoriek bestrijden. Waarom moeten ze dat doen? Shadid verwart de Nederlandse Kamerleden met imams en moefti’s die juist tot taak hebben om hun religie te verdedigen.

Zie bijvoorbeeld ook de reactie van Zeki Baran (PvdA): Beoordeel politici op hun daden, niet op hun afkomst

Mensen beoordelen op hun gedrag en hun daden en niet op hun afkomst of religie. Dat zou men ook wat vaker bij politici moeten doen. Het inhoudelijk weerspreken van anti-islamretoriek moet niet voorbehouden zijn aan allochtone politici of politici van islamitische afkomst, maar het weerspreken van anti-islamretoriek is een taak van alle politici, ongeacht hun afkomst of religie.

Het ideaal in een liberale democratie is dat deelbelangen niet het algemene belang overschaduwen: niet in de politiek en helemaal niet in het beleid. Dat vind ik, persoonlijk, wel een mooi ideaal. Maar zo werkt het natuurlijk niet. De islam speelt natuurlijk een rol, net zo goed als etniciteit. Daar wees Latif Hasnaoui op in een nieuwe reactie in de Volkskrant:‘Islamitische politici komen niet op voor hun achterban’ – opinie – VK

Ten eerste is een Kamerlid een volksvertegenwoordiger. Hij of zij vertegenwoordigt dat deel van het electoraat dat op hem of haar heeft gestemd. Politieke partijen zetten niet voor niets moslims, allochtonen, vrouwen of katholieken op de kieslijst.

Menig politicus van een bepaald geslacht, afkomst of religie is door voorkeurstemmen in een gemeenteraad of in de Tweede Kamer gekomen. Kiezers stemmen op een bepaald persoon omdat ze verwachten dat hij of zij opkomt voor hun sociaaleconomische belangen en groepsrechten. Dit geldt ook voor allochtonen met een islamitische achtergrond. Het feit dat ze moslim zijn, heeft er in veel gevallen voor gezorgd dat ze op de kandidatenlijst zijn gekomen. Want ook moslims kiezen voor een kandidaat omdat zij zich met hem of haar identificeren.

Dat leverde een debatje op bij Pauw en Witteman:

Wat is nu eigenlijk het probleem met cliëntelisme? Dienen politici niet dichter bij het volk te staan zo horen we de laatste jaren voortdurend? Op basis van een recent artikel in the Annual Review of Political Science, kunnen we stellen dat cliëntelisme gebaseerd is op de volgende kenmerken:

het gaat om een relatie tussen actoren met ongelijke status en macht
het is gebaseerd op wederkerigheid: het gaat om een voortdurende en zich herhalende uitwisseling van belangen, goederen, en diensten die gebaseerd is op de opbrengst die de ene persoon denkt te krijgen van de ander. De relatie houdt op te bestaan wanneer één partij er niet in slaagt de goederen en diensten te leveren. In de politiek gaat het daarbij maar om één ding: de stem in het stemhokje.
De relatie is vaak niet publiek en gebaseerd op deelbelangen en heeft vaak slechts een beperkte relatie met wet en de waarden en normen van de gemeenschap.

Bij dit alles dient de relatie niet eenmalig te zijn, maar over een langere tijd en een voortdurende herhaling van de uitwisseling.

Nu is wat Hasnaoui bepleitte strikt genomen geen cliëntelisme. Politieke partijen en politici maken altijd programmatische pakketjes die bedoeld zijn om specifieke groepen stemmers aan te trekken. Men kan daarbij refereren aan etnische, religieuze, regionale identiteiten. Politici kunnen bepaalde groepen bepaalde voordelen beloven zoals belastingverlaging voor werkgevers, economische vrijstellingen voor boeren en beperking van de bezuinigingen voor grote gezinnen. Populisten kunnen bepaalde voordeeltjes voor elkaar proberen te krijgen voor de gemarginaliseerde groepen in de samenleving zoals ‘Henk en Ingrid’. Hierbij reikt men de hand naar specifieke groepen en negeert men specifieke andere groepen en allemaal met electorale motieven. Bij cliëntelisme gaat het om politieke steun, om de stem in het stemhokje. Een politicus doet iets voor degene die op hem gestemd heeft. In het geval van Hasnaoui is dat niet noodzakelijkerwijze het geval. Hij wijst in zijn argument immers op zijn en Dibi’s identiteit als Nederlander, Marokkaan en moslim. Ongeacht of alle moslims op hem en Dibi gestemd hebben, wil hij opkomen voor moslims. Bij cliëntelisme zou Hasnaoui alleen opkomen voor degenen die op hem gestemd hebben of beloven dat te doen en moet er ook sprake zijn van een lange relatie tussen patroon en cliënt.

Clientelisme is een rationale afweging van welbegrepen economisch en/of politiek eigen belang; een instrumentele vriendschap tussen ongelijken waar beide partijen iets naar hun gading vinden (al dan niet met een dreiging van dwang zoals geweld). In het ideaalbeeld staat democratie hier natuurlijk heel ver van af. Een democratie is idealiter gebaseerd op transparante en wettelijk bepaalde procedures die voor iedereen gelijk zijn. Politieke macht is in handen van gekozen functionarissen en hun positie is betwist in open, vrije verkiezingen waar in iedereen het recht heeft om te stemmen. Iemands gezag is gebaseerd op zijn/haar officiële positie, niet op wie hij of zij is en welke achtergrond hij of zij is. Dat laatste geeft overigens wel aan waarom sommigen Hasnaoui’s pleidooi, per vergissing, aanzien voor een pleidooi voor cliëntelisme. Dus laten we dat voor de discussie maar even aanhouden en het voor de helderheid even neo-cliëntelisme noemen.

Hierboven staat cliëntelisme haaks op democratie. Het is geenszins zo dat rijke, westerse landen geen cliëntelisme zouden kennen ook al lijkt dat soms wel verondersteld te worden. Met de komst van migranten zou cliëntelisme dan ook hier (weer) haar intrede doen zo wordt soms wel gesteld:
Rotterdam: zwart zit links, wit rechts – Politiek – VK

Cliëntelisme ligt op de loer; veel allochtone kiezers verwachten iets terug van degenen die zij met voorkeurstemmen in het zadel hebben geholpen. Zo gaat dat in het thuisland immers ook.

Maar zo kent de VS het systeem van ‘constituent service’ waarbij volkvertegenwoordigers interveniëren namens hun individuen in hun achterban die problemen hebben met betrekking tot belastingen, sociale zekerheid, verblijfsvergunningen, bouw van fabrieken enzovoorts. Het is een plus voor deze volksvertegenwoordigers als zij op deze manier kunnen laten zien dichtbij hun achterban te staan. En wat bijvoorbeeld te denken van de druk die vanuit Zeeland is uitgeoefend in verband met het onder water zetten van een polder? Of de ‘Beste Els‘ brief van Bolkestein en andere zaken die te maken hebben met de nevenfuncties van politici (wie is dan hun achterban?). En is de mogelijk benoeming van Donner nu echt alleen gebaseerd op zijn kwaliteiten of heeft het ook te maken met de juiste politieke kleur en connecties? Als dat laatste bij benoemingen geen enkele rol speelt, waarom leren we dan allemaal dat het zo belangrijk is om de juiste mensen te kennen? Dat noemen we weliswaar ‘netwerken’ in plaats van cliëntelisme, maar het onderscheid is hoogstens gradueel. Zouden de klachten over de negatieve aspecten van het bestuur in Nederland (gebrek aan openheid, elitisme, onduidelijkheid bij benoemingen, enzovoorts) veroorzaakt worden door iets anders dan een vorm van (neo-)cliëntelisme?

Er zijn goede redenen om tegen cliëntelisme te zijn. Het opent de deur voor machtsmisbruik, men laat weliswaar de oren teveel hangen naar één groep in de samenleving maar is doof en blind voor de noden van anderen, het leidt tot een verstoring in de investeringen en verdeling van publieke middelen en er is nauwelijks democratische verantwoording mogelijk. Maar het bestaat niet voor niets nog in Nederland en andere landen. Cliëntelisme levert de nodige voordelen op. Het zorgt ervoor dat de elite zichzelf in stand houdt en er niet één groep is die er buiten valt, de ‘gewone’ man en vrouw heeft de mogelijkheid om politieke besluitvorming te beïnvloeden en zich op z’n minst gehoord en erkend te voelen. De bureaucratie die is opgezet in democratieën leidt er namelijk toe dat mensen als nummers worden gezien. Het onpersoonlijke beleid leidt er vaak toe dat mensen worden ingedeeld in bureaucratische hokjes: allochtoon, illegaal, uitkeringsgerechtigde, scholier, waarbij we de mens erachter vergeten. Cliëntelisme heft dat deels op. Mensen kunnen er banen, geld en status door verkrijgen, het kan bijdragen aan stabiliteit doordat conflicten vaak niet hoog opgespeeld worden. In diverse Afrikaanse en Latijns-Amerikaanse landen zien we bijvoorbeeld dat beleid dat cliëntelisme moet bestrijden vaak wel voordelig is voor de midden klasse, maar niet voor de echte armen.

Cliëntelisme kan dus een belangrijke ‘safety valve’ zijn. Wanneer echter één groep echt de macht heeft en geen rekening houdt met de vaak ingewikkelde patronage relaties met minderbedeelden, kan de situatie wel heel scheef groeien. En dat laatste dreigt nu in Nederland. Het grote probleem is namelijk dat openlijk etnisch cliëntelisme al lang haar intrede heeft gedaan en wel onder bepaalde autochtone politici en onder politieke partijen. De oproep van zowel Shadid als Hasnaoui komt in een tijd waarin de premier Nederland wil teruggeven aan de Nederlanders (en iets zegt mij dat daar geen allochtonen of moslims mee bedoeld worden), waarin minister Verhagen zegt de angst voor buitenlanders ‘begrijpelijk en terecht‘ te vinden, waarin het integratie beleid bijna alleen de nadruk legt op integratie in de ‘Nederlandse’ cultuur (en waarbij het zich houden aan de wet onvoldoende is voor allochtonen) en waarin de overheid mensen classificeert als 100 % outsider zelfs als deze van deels autochtone afkomst zijn.

We vinden het begrijpelijk wanneer autochtone Nederlanders vragen om erkenning en herkenning van hun Nederlandse cultuur in de politiek en het is dan ook normaal om te ervoor te pleiten dat PVV-stemmers het recht hebben om gehoord te worden. Wanneer het beleid in hun richting aangepast wordt, horen we niemand over cliëntelisme terwijl het toch echt gaat om het bevoordelen van een specifieke etnische groep: autochtonen (en dan nog meer in het bijzonder de niet-moslims daarbinnen). De scherpste kanten aan de retoriek die daarbij komt kijken noemen we populisme of anti-islam gedachtegoed, maar het is duidelijk dat de tegenstelling moslim – autochtoon mainstream is geworden. Jarenlang heeft dat niet geleid tot specifiek anti-islam beleid (wel tot specifiek beleid pro autochtone Nederlandse cultuur zoals inburgeringsbeleid en afschaffing ‘allochtone talen’ onderwijs), maar nu met de PVV als gedoger van het kabinet, de maatregel tegen ritueel slachten en het mogelijke ‘boerka-verbod’ is er wel een situatie ontstaan waarin specifiek moslims object van beleid en uitsluiting zijn geworden. Wenselijk of niet, een dergelijke situatie roept wel de reactie op onder moslims of er eigenlijk nog iemand is in de politiek die voor hun belangen opkomt? En roept ook de situatie op waarin moslimpolitici zich hetzelfde afvragen en enigszins vervreemd rondkijken naar hun moslim en niet-moslim collega’s. Tegelijkertijd is het opmerkelijk, zoals Jean Tillie laat zien (toegegeven in 2006), dat de etnische factor in stemgedrag weliswaar zeker aanwezig is, maar ook afneemt. Allochtone kiezers kijken eerst naar de partij en vervolgens naar de aanwezigheid van etnische kandidaten. En de invloed van dat laatste neemt af.

Hasnaoui’s oproep lijkt dus aan dovemansoren gericht. Deels wellicht omdat, zoals Shadid dat stelde, men het vertoog van moslim en/of allochtoon als probleemcategorie heeft geïnternaliseerd, deels wellicht omdat de etnische factor in het stemmen wel aanwezig is maar kleiner wordt, deels omdat moslims in Nederland nauwelijks een traditie lijken te hebben van groepsspecifieke politiek. Dit in tegenstelling dus tot de Nederlandse politieke partijen en vele politici. Het is een beetje vreemd om dit nu Hasnaoui te verwijten (los of zijn pleidooi nu wel of niet wenselijk is). In de Nederlandse geschiedenis hebben moslims niet of slechts zeer zelden pleidooien gehouden voor specifieke voorzieningen voor moslims en terwijl er voortdurend wordt geweeklaagd over de islam en moslims tot op het beledigende aan toe. Nu is er één moslim die ervoor pleit dat zijn Nederlandse, Marokkaanse en moslimcollega’s het nu eindelijk eens opnemen voor moslims, en dan zou hij zich schuldig maken aan cliëntelisme? Zou dit type reacties er mede toe leiden dat moslims eigenlijk nagenoeg onzichtbaar zijn in het publieke debat over islam?

1 comment.

Protest tegen mogelijk verbod gezichtssluiers

Posted on September 27th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: Activism, Gender, Kinship & Marriage Issues, ISIM/RU Research, Notes from the Field, Public Islam.

Over de recente plannen voor een verbod op gezichtssluier in het openbaar:

Op Facebook is een pagina geopend naar aanleiding van de recente plannen voor een verbod op gezichtssluiers dat in zou moeten gaan op 1 januari 2013. Op deze pagina wordt opgeroepen tot een protest actie tegen de plannen:
PROTEST ACTIE TEGEN NIQAAB VERBOD BIJ 2de KAMER!

Time
07 October · 16:00 – 18:30
Location
Den Haag

Met de wil en toestemming van Allaah zullen wij op vrijdag 7 oktober van 16.00 – 18.30 een actie houden. Daarin zullen wij onze ongenoegen uiten en dit verwerpen. Wij attenderen onze geliefde achterban dan ook om een gaatje vrij te houden op deze mooie vrijdag.

De protestactie zal plaatsvinden bij het Binnenhof.

Daarnaast is er een petitie opgesteld tegen de plannen:
Nee tegen boerkaverbod | petities.nl

Nee tegen boerkaverbod
4udta

Minister Donner wil het boerkaverbod gaan invoeren. Hij is van mening dat de boerka niet past in onze open samenleving en dat vrouwen met de gezichtssluier niet volwaardig mee kunnen doen.

Voor een papieren versie mail naar tegenboerkaverbod@hotmail.nl en wij sturen u zo snel mogelijk een pdf.

VERGEET UW ONDERTEKENING NIET TE BEVESTIGEN VIA EMAIL

PETITIE
Wij

willen dat moslima’s die hiervoor kiezen de vrijheid hebben de gezichtssluier te dragen.
constateren

Wij constateren dat moslima’s met dit verbod fundamenteel in hun vrijheid worden beperkt. Wij willen erop wijzen dat een groot deel van deze vrouwen Nederlandse bekeerlingen zijn (en dus niet gedwongen zijn door familie).
Wij denken dat een verbod deze vrouwen zal stigmatiseren en hen buiten de maatschappij zal plaatsen.
Wij willen wijzen op Groot Brittannië waar vrouwen met de gezichtssluier gewoon meedraaien in de samenleving.
en verzoeken

Wij wensen dat het boerkaverbod niet door de kamer wordt aangenomen.
Wij willen de religieuze vrijheid om de gezichtssluier in Nederland te dragen zonder hiervoor boetes te ontvangen.

Zie ook het KRO-programma De Wandeling waarin Shaista Khan aan het woord komt die een niqab draagt.:

In tegenstelling tot minister Donner volgens wie de gezichtssluier geen religieus gebruik is, stelt Shaista Khan in die uitzending het tegendeel. Op Wijblijvenhier.nl benadrukt Malika Mouhdi het belang van keuzevrijheid voor vrouwen:
De keuze is aan mij alleen | Wijblijvenhier.nl

Hoewel ik ‘verleidelijke’ kleding absoluut niet iets vind dat je buitenshuis zou moeten dragen, is het niet aan mannen of andere vrouwen zoals ik om besluiten te maken over wat iemand moet dragen. Of het nou gaat om een kort rokje of een niqaab, het is en blijft eenieders eigen keuze. Het is immers mijn lichaam en er is niemand die er iets over te zeggen heeft behalve ikzelf. Zeker niet een of andere gouverneur, een minister Donner of een groep zogenaamde feministen die zo verbitterd zijn dat ze niet kunnen inzien waarom iemand zichzelf wel wil bedekken. It’s my body and my choice, deal with it!

Ik zal de verschillende vormen van activisme blijven volgen. Reacties en tips zijn welkom natuurlijk.

3 comments.

Veilige religie of religieuze vrijheid

Posted on September 20th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: Important Publications, ISIM/RU Research, Religion Other, Religious and Political Radicalization.

Het wetenschappelijke tijdschrift voorReligie, Recht en Beleid heeft een themanummer over de relatie tussen religie en (gevoelens van) veiligheid. In dit themanummer, onder redactie van Beatrice de Graaf en Sipco Vellenga.

Aflevering 2, juli 2011
Redactioneel
Veilige religie, of religieuze veiligheid?
Trefwoorden: Editorial, Religion, Safety
Auteurs Maurits Berger

Religie en Onveiligheid
Trefwoorden: Editorial, Religion, Safety
Auteurs Beatrice de Graaf en Sipco Vellenga

Religieuze orthodoxie als bedreiging – Verschuivingen in het publieke debat
Trefwoorden: public debate, religious orthodoxy, religion and violence
Auteurs Sipco Vellenga

Religie, criminaliteit en geweld: ambivalente bevindingen
Trefwoorden: religious commitment, fundamentalism, muslim-radicalism, crime, violence, prevention
Auteurs Bas van Stokkom

Wanneer religie niet aan onze kant staat – Een cultuurpsychologische analyse van angst voor religie
Trefwoorden: religion, fear, cultural psychology, agency
Auteurs Mark Dechesne

‘Moge Hij onze ogen openen’ – De radicale utopie van het ‘salafisme’
Trefwoorden: salafism, social movements, radicalisation, muslims
Auteurs Martijn de Koning

Religion bites: religieuze orthodoxie op de nationale veiligheidsagenda
Trefwoorden: securitization, terrorism, securitization-framework, salafism
Auteurs Beatrice de Graaf

Discussie: Drie visies op de relatie tussen religie en veiligheidsbeleid
Verslag van de expertmeeting ‘Angst voor religie?’ van de Commissie Religie in het Publieke Domein, 23 juni 2010, Den Haag
Trefwoorden government, safety policy, religious orthodoxy, counternarratives
Auteurs Ernst Hirsch Ballin, Peter Knoope en James Kennedy

Religie, veiligheid en de gedaanteverandering van religie
Trefwoorden: religious transformation, religion and safety, religion and lifestyle
Auteurs Erik Borgman

Jurisprudentie
Het afdwingen van een islamitische verstoting
Trefwoorden: case law, divorce, Pakistan
Auteurs Maurits Berger

Kruisbeelden op openbare scholen in Italië (II)
De uitspraak van de Grand Chamber van het Europese Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens
Trefwoorden: case law, religion, Italy
Auteurs Carla Zoethout

Dit themanummer is het resultaat van een expert-meeting over religie en (on-)veiligheid georganiseerd door Forum. In mijn bijdrage probeer ik een kader te bieden dat een alternatief is voor bestaande radicaliseringsperspectieven op islam en op ‘salafisme’ in het bijzonder. Ik richt me daarbij in het bijzonder op het proces van betekenisgeving en laat zien dat veel praktijken van de ‘salafi’ beweging niet per definitie problematisch hoeven te zijn, maar vooral gericht zijn op het bieden van een alternatieve visie op de wereld hen heen en op het reorganiseren van het dagelijks leven van de participanten. Dit gebeurt dan wel op zo’n manier dat ze op gespannen voet kunnen staan met de visie van de Nederlandse staat op goed burgerschap dat sinds 9/11 steeds meer in het teken is komen te staan van veiligheid, seculiere en sexuele vrijheden.

U vindt meer informatie hier: 2 2011 · Tijdschrift voor Religie, Recht en Beleid · BJu Tijdschriften

0 comments.

Niet het laatste woord: debat de laatste fatwa in Argan

Posted on September 17th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: Internal Debates, ISIM/RU Research, Multiculti Issues, Notes from the Field, Public Islam, Religious and Political Radicalization, Young Muslims.

Afgelopen vrijdag was er in jongerencentrum Argan in Amsterdam een debat over de ‘final fatwa’ van GroenLinks Tweede Kamerlid Tofik Dibi. Tijdens deze avond onder leiding van Nadia Bouras ging Tofik Dibi in debat met jongerenimam Yasin elForkani en met de zaal over de inhoud en vorm van Final Fatwa. Ik had de eer een inleiding te mogen geven. Hier de tekst van de inleiding en een korte impressie van de avond. (more…)

1 comment.

Wikileaks: de VS, Nederlandse moslims en (anti-)radicalisering

Posted on September 10th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: Activism, International Terrorism, ISIM/RU Research, Murder on theo Van Gogh and related issues, Notes from the Field, Public Islam, Religious and Political Radicalization, Young Muslims.

Na de aanslagen van 11 september stond terrorisme natuurlijk hoog op de politieke agenda. En dan met name terreuraanslagen (mogelijkerwijze) gepleegd door moslims. Na 9/11 werden moslims dan ook nauwgezet gemonitored door de Nederlandse staat zoals blijkt uit een recent vrijgegeven ‘secret cable‘ bij Wikileaks. Het beeld is ontluisterend. (more…)

2 comments.

Radicalization Series VI – Muslims and Radicalization – What do we know?

Posted on September 8th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: anthropology, Headline, International Terrorism, ISIM/RU Research, Murder on theo Van Gogh and related issues, Religious and Political Radicalization, Young Muslims.

Since 9/11 the issue of radicalization of Muslims is top priority on many policy and research agenda’s. A large industry of research, policy making and advising, counter-radicalization programs and so on has emerged. In this post I will focus on research and the very basic question of what we know by now about radicalization. (more…)

3 comments.

New Book: Local Battles- Global Stakes

Posted on July 5th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: anthropology, Important Publications, ISIM/RU Research, My Research, Religious and Political Radicalization, Young Muslims.

Together with my colleague Edien Bartels I have written a chapter called Submission and a Ritual Murder; The transnational aspects of a local conflict and protest in a volume edited by my colleagues of VU University Amsterdam: Ton Salman and Marjo de Theije.

In this volume Local Battles, Global Stakes. The Globalization of Local Conflicts and the Localization of Global Interests the authors challenge the often held assumption with regard to conflicts around the world that ‘the local’ and ‘the global’ are clearly distinct realms. This is most clearly brought out in phrases about ‘local responses’ to ‘global change’. This book addresses a wealth of cases from around the world that illustrate how local tensions, frictions and open conflicts are not only influenced by outside actors, but how local parties proactively seek to insert their interests in global discourses, if only to strengthen their legitimacy.

This compilation covers issues ranging from religious contentions, ethical controversies, ethnic clashes, and environmental issues in Asia, Latin America, Africa and Europe. Geo-political interference from outside players, material and immaterial support from diasporas, international media articulation of the conflict’s stakes, and international religious proselytising, all co-constitute local disputes. This book shows how local strife is often situated in and shaped by broader political and other contexts.

This book is meant for all scholars and students interested in the real and tangible effects of globalization processes, in particular for anthropologists, political scientists, sociologists and scholars interested in international dimensions of environmental issues, religion, ethnicity and gender.

Introduction by Marjo de Theije and Ton Salman

Part One: Global Religions, Local Battles
2
Edien Bartels and Martijn de Koning, abstract
Submission and a Ritual Murder; The transnational aspects of a local conflict and protest
On 2 November 2004, Theo van Gogh, a Dutch columnist, filmmaker and producer of the film Submission was murdered in Amsterdam by a Moroccan-Dutch Muslim. However in order to understand the significance of the film Submission and the murder of its producer, Theo van Gogh, we should look beyond these local and national frames, and beyond the local significance of this conflict. In this chapter we will show how a transnational take on both topics, the film Submission and the murder of Theo van Gogh, can contribute to a better understanding of how and why these local events occurred.

Keywords: Islam, identity, Muslim youth, terrorism, liberalism.

3
Oscar Salemink, abstract
Changing rights and wrongs: The transnational construction of indigenous and human rights among Vietnam’s Central Highlanders
In the context of Vietnam’s Central Highlanders’ conflict-ridden relationship with the Vietnamese state and the growing transnational interference by their vociferous diaspora, this paper analyzes particular shifts in the framing of their rights. A notion of collective group rights that are by definition particularistic and exclusive has given way to individual rights (especially religious freedom) that are universal and inclusive. Simultaneously, a localized and communal emphasis has changed to a transnational one oriented toward international fora. Local interests and aspirations thus come to be framed as universal human rights that pertain to individuals, rather than local rights that pertain to collectives. In this light, recent attempts to theorize minority or indigenous rights appear to be ineffective and will probably be counter-productive.

Keywords: Ethnicity, Human Rights, indigenous rights, Religion, transnationalism.

4
Marjo de Theije, abstract
Local protest and transnational Catholicism in Brazil
Based on research in Brazil, the author discusses three local situations of conflict and social protest, using a transnational perspective. She concentrates on the use of universal claims of Catholicism in local negotiations of religious change under the influence of different cultural campaigns. The clashes in question are divided into those involving local political problems and those concerning the religious domain itself. The analysis shows that in each of the cases–albeit with different intensity and outcome–the interconnection between translocal processes and the meaning and experience of locality has a significant role in the power plays and the formulations of religious or social protest in the local context.

Keywords: Brazil, Catholicism, local, protest, transnational.

Part Two: Family Values, Gendered Morals, Contested Ethics
5
Claudia Fonseca, abstract
Protest Against Adoption in Brazil: A “Global” Presence in “Local” Matters
As we trace the processes that have influenced the recent evolution of child placement policies in Brazil – from plenary adoption and foster care to family preservation – we observe how these technologies of government, designed to smooth over disputes involving issues of class and nationality, combine “external” with national inputs. Relevant actors range from international celebrities to local specialists (social workers, NGO volunteers, and judicial officials) and journalists who may themselves circulate through international decision-making sites. Finally, the inclusion in our analysis of the role and understandings of birth families – politically, the bottom rung in adoption procedures — leads to the hypothesis that strategic alliances between local and international protest movements may exert an influence in the formation of national policies that may, at least momentarily, perturb traditional hierarchies of power.

Keywords: Technologies of government, transnational adoption, protest movements, child rights, global assemblages.

6
Pinkaew Laungaramsri, abstract
Imagining nation: Women’s rights and the transnational movement of Shan women in Thailand and Burma
This article explores the relationship between women, nation, nationalism, and transnational women’s practice through the Shan women’s movement in Thailand, particularly the international campaign to stop the systematic rape of Shan women by Burmese soldiers. Employing a feminist critique of nationalism, the article argues that transnational networks allow for the negotiation between national, local, and women’s identities. Whereas the authoritative power of nationalism continues to suppress and silence the transnational subjectivity of women, the Shan women’s movement represents a transnational attempt to contest the confinement of women’s subjectivities within the territorialized nation-state.

Keywords: gender, nation, rape, refugees, transnationalism.

7
Halleh Ghorashi and Nayereh Tavakoli, abstract
Paradoxes of transnational space and local activism: Iranians organizing across borders
The Iranian revolution of 1979 promised to bring freedom and equality, but as soon as one group gained power, it turned out to be oppressive of both its political opposition and women. This resulted in the formation of a large Iranian diaspora bound together by its hatred for the Iranian regime. Years of suppression in the 1980s in Iran resulted in a deep gap between Iranians living inside and outside Iran. During the 1990s, however, cross-border relationships started to change as a result of two major factors: transnational activities and the influence of cyberspace. This paper focuses on the paradoxes of transnational connections in local protest with a focus on the women’s movement. We show both how transnational links have empowered women activists in Iran and how they have led to new dangers at the local level. We also reveal how support from the Iranian diaspora can be patronizing as well as supportive.

Keywords: cyberspace, Iranian diaspora, Iranian revolution, Iranian women’s movement, Iranian Women’s Studies Foundation.

8
Martha Cecilia Ruiz and Lorraine Nencel, abstract
Sex Work(er): The struggles of a global concept
This chapter aims to trace the travels of the global concept sex work(er). This political concept is globally used by women working in the sex industry to organize and fight for rights and social respect. It is also a concept challenging past and present discourses on “sexual slavery”. We focus on the global and local struggles of the concept in regard to its acceptance and incorporation in global and local discourse. For this objective we frame this chapter in a theoretical approach built on the ideas of travelling theories; a framework offered as an alternative to the cultural imperialism critique of global feminism. Travelling theories recognizes the interconnectedness of the global and local but does not assume that the concepts are imposed and/or imitated when they reach their local destination. To illustrate how the concept sex work(er) has circualted not only from North to South but also within the South, we elaborate on a particular case, the Sex Workers Movement of Machala, Ecuador – one of the earliest founded organizations on the Latin American continent.

Keywords: Sexwork(er), transnational migration, travelling theories.

Part Three: Belonging Amidst Scattered Boundaries / Global Ammunition, Local Essentialisms
9
Karsten Paerregaard, abstract
Transnational crossfire: Local, national and global conflicts in Peruvian migration
This chapter argues that globalization processes are shaped by friction and exclusion as much as fluidity and inclusion and that conflict therefore is integral parts of population movements, especially when this evolves in a transnational context. By applying a transnational approach the chapter brings to the fore how tensions are negotiated, contested and reinterpreted not merely in a local but also in a regional, national and international context. More specifically, it examines the transnational network of Peruvian migrants who work as sheepherders in the United States and examines the conflicts that this migration practice generates in both Peru and the United States. The chapter concludes that the tensions that occur on the sheep ranches not only cause a divide within the migrant community itself but also trigger a political crisis on a national level in Peru and an international strife between Peru and the United States.

Keywords: transnational, sheepherders, conflict, Peru, United States.

10
Lenie Brouwer, abstract
Jokes, raps and transnational orientations – Protests of Dutch-Moroccan youths in the Debate on Islam
Islam is today one of the most discussed topics in Dutch national newspapers and internet discussion groups. In this public debate the Muslim-voice is underrepresented, more in particular, the views of Muslim youngsters. The polarised debate and the current policy measures deepens the division between non-Muslims and Muslims, between ‘us’ and ‘them’, and fosters the highlighting of one specific identity that seems best suited to counter the accusations: that of being a Muslim. This makes Islam more attractive as a vehicle to reject all these accusations. The reactions of young Muslims or Dutch Moroccans are analysed in a media-technology context, a computer clubhouse in Amsterdam and Moroccan websites. It is argued that Dutch Moroccan youths perceive Islam more and more as an appealing religion, as a motive of pride, in response to the negative image of Islam and the social exclusion of Muslims in the West.

Keywords: Islam, Muslim youth, the Netherlands, media-technology, religious identity.

11
Ellen Bal and Kathinka Sinha-Kerkhoff, abstract
British Indians in colonial India and Surinam: transnational identification and estrangement
The authors present a case study of Indian nationalists who drew from a discourse on ‘exploited overseas Indian migrants’ to serve their own political interests. At the same time, overseas British Indians, in this case in Surinam, advocated the continuation of transnational relations between (British) India and Surinam in order to strengthen the position of their community locally. Clearly, for some time, transnational identification served the (national) interests of both groups in the two different nations. Yet, the authors also show that when such transnational ‘solutions’ did not serve any longer to solve local problems, estrangement between the two communities followed. Theoretically, this article constitutes a synthesis of approaches that connect identities to specific places and theories that have abandoned the study of geographically-based national societies. It demonstrates how the politics of place is dominant even within the field of transnational alliances.

Keywords: estrangement, identity politics, overseas Indians, place, transnational identification.

12
Ton Salman, abstract
Narrow margins, stern sovereignty: Juxtaposing transnational and local features of Bolivia’s crisis
This article argues that the current Bolivian political crisis is ‘made’ both internally and abroad. Yet it is much more than a simple adding up of the two constituent factors: external influences are always mediated by local actors. Local actors turn these influences into meaningful issues and demands in the Bolivian political context. These actors, in turn, are co-constituted by external forces, as is the case with the prominent indigenous movements in the country: their self-awareness and identity politics in part depend upon support and discourses of a transnational nature. The fact that these indigenous movements insist on sovereignty and self-determination with regard to the use of Bolivia’s natural resources is a case in point. This demand, at the same time, is articulated in a setting in which this sovereignty suffers from tightening margins due to the external obligation to restructure both the state and the economy.

Keywords: crisis of democracy, neo-liberalism, political protest, transnationalism.

13
Folkje Lips, abstract
Stretching the margins of tolerated criticism: Using non-Cuban music in local protest
This article presents music in Cuba as being more than just a sound and Cuban musicians as being more than mere entertainers. By choosing foreign music-genres as identity-markers, Cuban musicians and their audience express a critical awareness about their socio-political reality. Depending on the extent to which they want to employ this awareness to influence local concepts of society and politics, they modify and adapt their music to fit Cubaneity. Although critical awareness is not something the Cuban government will normally allow to be displayed, these musicians seem to enjoy some leeway. By examining two transnational musical genres, hip-hop and rock music, this article shows two different ways to find and widen the boundaries of the admissible in Cuba.

Keywords: Cuba, Cubaneity, Hip-hop, Rock, Protest, State-control.

Part Four: The Contested Ground of Environmental Values
14
Marja Spierenburg, Conrad Steenkamp, and Harry Wels, abstract
Resistance of local communities against marginalization in the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation Area
The Great Limpopo is one of the largest Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCA) in the world, encompassing vast areas in South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique. The TFCA concept is embraced by practically all (international) conservation agencies. The rationale for the support is that the boundaries of ecosystems generally do not overlap with those of the nation-state. Their protection requires transnational cooperation. By arguing that local communities living in or close to TFCAs will participate and benefit economically, TFCA proponents claim social legitimacy for the project. However, analysis shows that communities first have to live up to rigid standards and requirements set by the international conservation authorities, before they are considered ‘fit’ to participate. Communities attempt to resist this type of marginalization by forming alliances with (inter)national development and human rights NGOs, with mixed results.

Keywords: NGOs, resistance, sustainable development, transfrontier conservation, transnationalism.

15
Julia M. Wittmayer and Bram Büscher, abstract
Conserving conflict? Transfrontier conservation, development discourses and local conflict between South Africa and Lesotho
Since the early 1980s, South Africa and Lesotho have tried to find ways to jointly conserve the Maloti-Drakensberg mountain ecosystem that runs across their shared boundary. Recently, the countries completed the first phase of the ‘Maloti-Drakensberg transfrontier conservation and development project’ (MDTP) that besides conservation aims to reduce poverty through ecotourism and increase international cooperation. This chapter describes and analyses how discourses of conservation and development in the project both cement and complicate transnational relations and how these in turn articulate with, shape and are shaped by ‘the local’. The ‘local’ in Lesotho, in turn, can never be understood without drawing South Africa into the equation, for one because of the many Basotho that have always worked in South African mines, so providing their families with crucial livelihood support. Recently, however, massive retrenchments have forced numerous Basotho men to return to their families and try to again fit in locally. Focussing on the people living around the north-eastern boundary of Lesotho, we show how conflictual situations put the spotlight on the ways in which ‘the local’ in Lesotho deals with dual forces of localisation and transnationalisation. We argue that local people accommodate, even appropriate, these dual pressures by adopted an increasingly flexible stance in terms of identity, alliances and discourses. This in turn allows them to increase their livelihood options. In contrast, by being more focused on the level of discourse rather than these contradicting dynamics on the local level, the MDTP intervention planners, have decreased the likelihood of attaining their objectives.

Keywords: Conflicts, Transfrontier Conservation, development, South Africa, Lesotho.

The book can be ordered at VU University Publishers € 39,95 or at internet bookstores

1 comment.

Theologisch debat – Dialoog en geloof in actie

Posted on June 15th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: [Online] Publications, Important Publications, ISIM/RU Research, Multiculti Issues.

Het tijdschrift Theologisch Debat doet haar naam eer aan en heeft een debatsectie; ditmaal over interreligieuze dialoog. De opening wordt verzorgd door kersverse hoogleraar interreligieuze dialoog Marcel Poorthuis. Andere artikelen zijn van Gé Speelman (Een integere en respectvolle dialoog – Opmerkingen bij de Islamnota van de PKN), Bernhard Reitsma (Wat er achter de dialoog schuil gaat) en van uw blogger en antropoloog: Dialoog en Geloof in Actie.

Inleiding

In zijn artikel gaat Marcel Poorthuis in op het ‘eigene van de dialoog tussen godsdiensten’. Volgens Poorthuis zijn mensen weliswaar door de secularisatie ‘vervreemd van hun eigen religie en kerk’, maar dat betekent niet dat er geen belangstelling is voor religie. Die belangstelling kenmerkt zich echter door een hoog knip- en plakgehalte waarbij mensen hun eigen religieuze repertoire van voorstellingen en praktijken in elkaar zetten zonder oog voor de tradities en zonder enig gevoel voor de sociale verbanden van het jodendom, christendom en islam. Deze postmoderne houding zoals hij dit noemt bedreigt de interreligieuze dialoog. Gé Speelman heeft in dit nummer hier al uitstekend commentaar opgeleverd. Ik ga in mijn bijdrage in op de andere hindernis voor religieuze dialoog die Poorthuis ziet: fundamentalisme. Volgens hem is fundamentalisme het tegendeel van dialoog om dat ‘de ander daarin louter als ketter en vijand verschijnt, zonder enige verwantschap’.

Wat ik wil betogen is dat Poorthuis er een heel specifiek religiebegrip op na houdt dat heel gesloten is doordat het uitgaat van de vraag tot welke religie mensen zich rekenen en welke bijbehorende geloofsvoorstellingen mensen hebben. De vragen hoe mensen geloven en waarin mensen geloven komt niet aan de orde. Daardoor mist hij dat de waarde van interreligieuze dialoog (in het algemeen) niet ligt in uitwisselingen over religieuze doctrines, religieuze overtuigingen en geschiedenis, maar, zo betoog ik hier, in sociale relaties. En daar zouden zelfs fundamentalisten een rol in kunnen spelen. Allereerst zal ik verder ingaan op het specifieke religiebegrip van Poorthuis. Om dit verder te concretiseren geef ik vervolgens een korte schets geven van de activiteiten onder moslims met betrekking tot interreligieuze dialoog waarna ik aan de hand van voorbeelden in Gouda en Roermond me richt op de vraag wat interreligieuze dialoog te maken heeft met hoe mensen geloven en meer specifiek met hoe fundamentalisten ( salafisten’) geloven.

Theologisch Debat wordt uitgegeven door Uitgeverij Kok en zit tegenwoordig ook op twitter: Theologisch Debat.
De bijdrage van Poorthuis is gebaseerd op zijn oratie die u HIER kunt lezen. Op Republiek Allochtonië een verkorte weergave van die oratie: Dialoog tussen de religies: toekomst of verleden tijd?

1 comment.

Seminar Dynamiek van islamitische culturen

Posted on May 11th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: anthropology, ISIM/RU Research, My Research.

De afdeling Islam & Arabisch van de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen houdt haar jaarlijkse studiedag. Op deze dag zullen diverse onderzoekers van de afdeling vertellen over hun onderzoek. Aan het einde van de dag zal Dr. Samuli Schielke, Research Fellow Zentrum Moderner Orient (ZMO)Berlijn, een lezing geven met als titel “Second thoughts about the anthropology of Islam, or how to make sense of grand schemes in everyday life“. In zijn lezing ontvouwt Samuli Schielke een antropologische benadering voor het bestuderen van het dagelijks leven moslims op een manier die religie serieus neemt, maar mensen niet reduceert tot hun religiositeit. Samuli Schielke schreef eerder op dit blog over de opstand in Egypte “Now, it’s gonna be a long one” – some first conclusions from the Egyptian revolution en Egypt: After the Revolution. Hij houdt ook een eigen blog bij: HIER.

Datum: vrijdag 13 mei 2011
Locatie: Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen, Gymnasion GN7

Programma

10.00-10.15 Inloop

10.15-10.20 Introductie onderzoeksprogramma

10.20-11.00 Gender & Islam
Sahar Noor
Annemarie van Geel

11.00-11.15 Pauze

11.15-11.55 Islamitische Kunst
Karin van Nieuwkerk
Joseph Alagha

11.55-12.35 De pre-islamitische tijd
Gert Borg
Nicolet Boekhoff-van der Voort

12.35-13.30 Lunch

13.30-14.30 Salafisme & Wahhabisme
Joas Wagemakers
Martijn de Koning
Carmen Becker

14.30-14.45 Pauze

14.45-15.45 Keynote: Dr. Samuli Schielke, Zentrum Moderner Orient, Berlijn

15.45-16.30 Borrel

De toegang tot de sessies is gratis en vrij toegankelijk. Wilt u een lunch tijdens de middagpauze en koffie/thee in de overige pauzes dan s.v.p. aanmelden bij Sahar Noor (s.noor@rs.ru.nl). Aanmelden voor de lunch/koffie/thee kan tot en met woensdag 11 mei. Daarvoor geldt een eigen bijdrage van € 5.

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Publication – The Quest for Religious Purity in New Age, Evangelicalism and Islam

Posted on January 21st, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: Important Publications, ISIM/RU Research, Public Islam, Religion Other, Religious and Political Radicalization.

Together with my colleagues of Erasmus University Rotterdam, Johan Roeland, Stef Aupers, Dick Houtman and Ineke Noomen, I have written an article the first edition of the Annual Review of the Sociology of Religion, published by Brill on the quest for religious purity in the Netherlands.

Taken as a prime model of secularization north European societies have religion more or less confined to the private sphere and religion appears to have less significance in social and public life. In particular Christianity appears to have lost much of its former appeal. Quite a number of authors have argued however that the secularization paradigm is challenged by obvious developments in Western societies, that do witness – albeit to varying degrees – to what José Casanova (1994) called the ‘de-privatization’ of religion. While, from a normative perspective that regards religion as a private matter, public religion is an anomaly, from an empirical perspective it is a reality. This de-privatization of religion appears to have broken the „secularist truce? that guaranteed religious freedom on the one hand, while banning religion from the public sphere on the other.

In our article we discusses contemporary religious discourses and practices among New Age, Evangelical and Salafi Muslim youth in the Netherlands. The three are nowadays not only embraced much more enthusiastically by the younger generations than any other type of religion, but moreover attain some striking features in their hands that serve to set them apart from the traditional types of church-based or mosque-based religion embraced by older generations of faithful. By discussing Luckmann’s (1967) classical account of modern religion as radically privatized we argue that among young Dutch New Agers, Evangelicals and Muslims religion is neither ephemeral and superficial, nor socially unorganized, nor publicly insignificant.
Annual Review of the Sociology of Religion – BRILL

The purpose of the Annual Review of the Sociology of Religion (ARSR) is to investigate the “new” role of religion in the contemporary world, which is characterized by cultural pluralism and religious individualism.

It is the aim of the ARSR to combine different methods within the social scientific study of religion. The ARSR employs an interdisciplinary and comparative approach at an international level, to describe and interpret the complexity of religious phenomena within different geopolitical situations, highlighting similarities and discontinuities. Dealing with a single theme in each volume, the ARSR intends to tackle the relationship between the practices and the dynamics of everyday life and the different religions and spiritualities, within the framework of the post-secular society. All contributions are welcome, both those studying organizational aspects and those exploring individual religiosity.

Contents

Preliminary Material (i-x
Differential Reconstruction Of Religions Among Second Generation Immigrant Youth In Canada (1-28) by Peter Beyer
Youth, Spirituality, And Religion In Canada And Quebec (29-64) by Solange Lefebvre and K. Gandhar Chakravarty
Brazilian University Students And Religion (65-88) by Ari Pedro Oro and Mauro Meirelles
Developments In Spirituality Among Youth In Australia And Other Western Societies (89-114) by Michael Mason, Andrew Singleton and Ruth Webber
The Religiosity Of Youth In Australia And Thailand (115-146) by Philip Hughes
Youth And Religion In Modern China: A Sketch Of Social And Political Developments (147-162) by Fenggang Yang
Young People And Religion In France (163-192) by Céline Béraud and Jean-Paul Willaime
Youth And Religion In Finland (193-218) by Kati Niemelä
Dis)engagements With Christianity Amongst Young People In England And Scotland (219-250) by Giselle Vincett and Sylvia Collins-Mayo
German Youth: Neither Participants Nor Partakers In Religion? (251-288) by Gert Pickel
The Quest For Religious Purity In New Age, Evangelicalism And Islam Religious Renditions Of Dutch Youth And The Luckmann Legacy (289-306) by Johan Roeland, Stef Aupers, Dick Houtman, Martijn de Koning and Ineke Noomen

Introduction
Religious Privatization Or Religious Purification?
Sociality Beyond Church And Mosque
Pure Religion’s Social And Public Significance
Conclusion: In Search Of Religious Purity
References

Religion and Youth in Croatia (307-328) by Dinka Marinovi? Jerolimov and Boris Joki?
Young Muslims Of Italy. Islam In The Everyday Life And The Public Visibility Of A New Generation Of Muslims (329-352) by Annalisa Frisina
Believers In Progress Youth And Religion In Italy (353-382) by Giuseppe Giordan
Lifestyles And Religion (383-402) by Luigi Berzano
Visual Sociology And Religion (403-420) by Roberto Cipriani and Emanuela C. Del Re
The United States: God Bless America (421-438) by William H. Swatos Jr.
Religion In The Netherlands (439-460) by Erik Sengers
Religion And Politics In Portugal: Religious Landscape And Prospective Developments (461-478) by Helena Vilaça
List Of Contributors (479-488)

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New Book – Muslim Diaspora in the West

Posted on January 13th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: Important Publications, ISIM/RU Research, Multiculti Issues, My Research, Public Islam, Young Muslims.

I had the honour of writing a chapter for a new volume Muslim Diaspora in the West edited by Haideh Moghissi and Halleh Ghorashi The book is the product of two workshops, one in Toronto and one in Amsterdam. In my chapter Understanding Dutch Islam – Exploring the Relationship of Muslims with the State and the Public Sphere in the Netherlands, I explore the culturalization of citizenship with the shifting modes of governance of minorities and the secular and the religious in the Netherlands during the last 30 years. This shift with a growing emphasis on cultural integration of migrants (focused on sexual and secular freedoms, tolerance and women’s rights), a defense of secular identity and a more compelling political populism with its focus on the Dutch moral community of citizens, a counter-radicalization policy emerges mainly directed against the Salafi movement.

The Netherlands has often been characterized as an open, tolerant country that changed into the opposite after 9/11 and the murder of van Gogh by a radical Moroccan-Dutch Muslim. It is stated that the secular freedoms of Dutch society are threatened by radical Islam. In this chapter I will explore the dominant model of managing religion in the Netherlands and problematize an unquestioned opposition between the secular and the religious by critically investigating the secularist assumptions of the Dutch state policy of domesticating Islam. A basic tenet of the Dutch model is treating Islam and Muslims as outsiders who do not belong to the Dutch moral community. Combined with recent changes in the public debates about Islam such as going from a consensual style to a confrontational style and the culturalization of citizenship the dominant political praxis of secularism leads to stimulating and integrating a so-called ‘liberal’ Islam while excluding a more assertive version of Islam that is labelled as ‘radical. As such, Dutch secularism does not advocate the complete removal of religion in the public sphere, particular strands of visible Islam are categorized as ‘radical’ and therefore to be excluded from the public domain. One of the main functions of the distinction between ‘liberal’ and ‘radical’ Islam is to create unity among the political elites who are divided over the management of religion but agree that ‘radical’ Islam does not belong to Dutch society.

During my stay in Toronto (and during the flights to Toronto and back) I enjoyed in particular the conversations with Frank Buijs, author of one of the first extensive books on radicalism among Muslim youth in the Netherlands. It seems that sometimes you have to travel to other side of the world in order to have a good conversation with a person who only lives 100km from you. Many thoughts in this chapter emerged during the discussions with him during our flight to Toronto and back. Unfortunately, Frank Buijs died suddenly in 2007. It is to him I dedicate my chapter.

In view of the growing influence of religion in public life on the national and international scenes, the volume Muslim Diaspora in the West constitutes a timely contribution to scholarly debates and a response to concerns raised in the West about Islam and Muslims within diaspora. It begins with the premise that diasporic communities of Islamic cultures, while originating in countries dominated by Islamic laws and religious practices, far from being uniform, are in fact shaped in their existence and experiences by a complex web of class, ethnic, gender, religious and regional factors, as well as the cultural and social influences of their adopted homes.

Within this context, this volume brings together work from experts within Europe and North America to explore the processes that shape the experiences and challenges faced by migrants and refugees who originate in countries of Islamic cultures. Presenting the latest research from a variety of locations on both sides of The Atlantic, Muslim Diaspora in the West addresses the realities of diasporic life for self-identified Muslims, addressing questions of integration, rights and equality before the law, and challenging stereotypical views of Muslims. As such, it will appeal to scholars with interests in race and ethnicity, cultural, media and gender studies, and migration.

Contents:

Introduction, Haideh Moghissi;

Part I Women’s Agency Within Intersection of Discourses:

Culturalist approach of women’s emancipation in the Netherlands, Halleh Ghorashi;
Globalization and women’s leadership in the Muslim diaspora: an intersectional analysis, Fauzia Erfan Ahmed;
Emergence of a transnational Muslim feminist consciousness among women in the WENAAZ (Western Europe, North America, Australia & New Zealand) context, Cassandra Balchin.

Part II Shifting Notions of Sexuality and Family in Diaspora:

Multiculturalism and religious legislation in Sweden, Anne Sofie Roald;
Iranians in Britain, Vida Nassehi-Behnam;
Changing spousal relations in diaspora: Muslims in Canada, Haideh Moghissi;
Sexing diaspora: negotiating sexuality in shifting cultural landscape, Fataneh Farahani.

Part III Reflections on Islamic Positionings of Youth in Diaspora:

Styles of religious practice: Muslim youth cultures in Europe, Thijl Sunier;
The struggle to stay on the middle ground: the radicalization of Muslims in Sweden, David Thurfjell;
Young French women of Muslim descent: discriminatory social context and politicization, Sepideh Farkhondeh.

Part IV Diasporic Space and Locating Space: Making homes in turbulent times:

Moroccan-Dutch Muslims contesting dominant discourses of belonging, Marjo Buitelaar and Femke Stock;
Understanding Dutch Islam: exploring the relationship of Muslims with the state and the public sphere in the Netherlands, Martijn de Koning;
Between Iraq and a hard place: Iraqis in diaspora, Jacqueline Ismael and Shereen Ismael;
Conclusion, Halleh Ghorashi;

Index.

About the Editor:
Haideh Moghissi is Professor of Sociology and Women’s Studies at York University, Toronto

Halleh Ghorashi is PaVEM-chair in Management of Diversity and Integration in the Department of Culture, Organization, and Management at VU University Amsterdam

Imprint: Ashgate
Published: December 2010
Format: 234 x 156 mm
Extent: 236 pages
Binding: Hardback
ISBN: 978-1-4094-0287-9
Price : £55.00 » Website price: £49.50
BL Reference: 305.6’97’091713-dc22
LoC Control No: 2010026830

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Waar is de Hofstadgroep?

Posted on January 10th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: International Terrorism, ISIM/RU Research, Murder on theo Van Gogh and related issues, Religious and Political Radicalization, Young Muslims.

Het lijkt al weer een eeuwigheid geleden dat de kranten volstonden met de Hofstadgroep. Nederlands enige echte ‘terreurorganisatie’ van de laatste 10 jaar. De groep jongeren rondom Mohammed Bouyeri werd in de debatten exemplarisch voor alles wat er mis is met islam en moslims: agressief, onmogelijk (cultureel) te integreren, onbetrouwbaar en een stel idioten. De gretigheid waarmee men deze groep als terreurgroep wilde aanmerken kwam vooral tot uiting toen het gerechtshof tot het oordeel kwam dat ze geen terroristische organisatie waren. Nadat het OM in cassatie ging tegen die beslissing verwees de Hoge Raad de zaak terug naar het Gerechtshof. Dat gerechtshof heeft nu het oordeel geveld dat de groep wel een terroristische organisatie was:
Rechtspraak.nl – Veroordelingen in zaken Hofstadgroep

Het gerechtshof Amsterdam is van oordeel dat de verdachten wel degelijk hebben deelgenomen aan een samenwerkingsverband van voldoende structuur en duurzaamheid om te kunnen spreken van een organisatie. Voorts stelt het hof vast dat die organisatie gericht was op opruiing, aanzetten tot haat en geweld, en bedreiging, onder meer met een terroristisch misdrijf.

De Raad en nu ook het gerechtshof vond dat in de voorgaande behandelingen het begrip ‘organisatie’ niet goed was beoordeeld:
Rechtspraak.nl – Zoeken in uitspraken

Volgens bestendige jurisprudentie moet onder een organisatie als bedoeld in artikel 140 (en dus ook 140a) Sr worden
verstaan:

Een samenwerkingsverband met een zekere duurzaamheid en structuur tussen de verdachte en tenminste één andere persoon. Niet is vereist dat daarbij komt vast te staan dat een persoon om als deelnemer aan die organisatie te kunnen worden aangemerkt moet hebben samengewerkt met, althans bekend moet zijn geweest met alle andere personen die deel uitmaken van de organisatie of dat de samenstelling van het samenwerkingsverband steeds dezelfde is.

Aanwijzingen voor het bestaan van een dergelijk samenwerkingsverband kunnen bijvoorbeeld zijn gemeenschappelijke regels, het voeren van overleg, gezamenlijke besluitvorming, een taakverdeling, een bepaalde hiërarchie en/of geledingen. Dit zijn echter geen constitutieve vereisten om van een samenwerkingsverband te kunnen spreken. Evenmin is vereist dat het samenwerkingsverband steeds uit dezelfde personen bestaat of dat alle deelnemers elkaar kennen.

In concreto heeft de Hoge Raad in de onderhavige zaak geoordeeld dat het gerechtshof Den Haag een te beperkte reikwijdte heeft gegeven aan de maatstaf van gestructureerdheid en duurzaamheid van het samenwerkingsverband door te eisen dat “binnen die groep gemeenschappelijke regels en een gemeenschappelijke doelstelling hebben bestaan, waaraan de individuele leden gebonden waren en door welke gemeenschappelijkheid op die leden een zekere druk kon worden
uitgeoefend zich aan die regels te houden en aan die doelstelling gebonden te achten”.

In zijn conclusie in de onderhavige zaak merkt de advocaat-generaal (AG) bij de Hoge Raad (onder 27 en 28) het volgende op:

Naarmate samenwerking inniger en duurzamer is, zal eerder aan het vereiste van een samenwerkingsverband met een zekere structuur zijn voldaan. Het duidelijkst springt dat in het oog wanneer wordt bedacht dat ook twee personen duurzaam en gestructureerd, dat wil zeggen, gericht op een bepaald doel, kunnen samenwerken zonder dat hun samenwerking verder is gestructureerd in afspraken. Een dergelijk samenwerkingsverband kan toevallig en in de loop der tijd ontstaan omdat men “werkendeweg”ontdekt dat men een gezamenlijk doel heeft waarvan de realisering met duurzame samenwerking gediend is. Zo’n samenwerkingsverband is niet afhankelijk van regels, uitdrukkelijke afspraken of hiërarchische verhoudingen, maar kan heel wel duurzaam zijn en aan het werken aan een gemeenschappelijk doel een bepaalde structuur ontlenen.

Is van een lossere vorm van samenwerking sprake – geen vaste deelnemers aan het samenwerkingsverband, de deelnemers kennen elkaar maar ten dele – dan zal met name het vereiste van het samenwerkingsverband kunnen meebrengen dat ook de onderlinge verhouding tussen de deelnemers of – zoals in het hierna te noemen geval – enkele daarvan aan het samenwerkingsverband enige structuur geeft.

Met verwijzing naar HR 22 januari 2008, LJN BB7134, merkt de AG op dat de Hoge Raad het feit dat twee personen van een groep gedurende ongeveer dezelfde tijd in gestructureerd verband hebben samengewerkt, kennelijk voldoende acht om ook de overige personen van die groep te beschouwen als behorend tot de organisatie, zonder dat van hen een dergelijke structuur in de samenwerking wordt vastgesteld.

De aangehaalde opmerkingen van de AG acht het hof juist en neemt het hof als uitgangspunt.

Het Hof heeft dus een wijder begrip van het concept organisatie. Er hoeft geen nauw gestructureerd samenwerkingsverband te zijn en wanneer het helder is dat persoon A en B van dezelfde groep losjes hebben samengewerkt is dat voldoende om ook personen C t/m Z tot die organisatie te rekenen. Dat lijkt mij gezien de losse definitie een cirkelredenering. Je pikt een groep personen uit de massa, stelt dat er twee gedurende een periode hebben samengewerkt en stelt vervolgens dat dat betekent dat ook de overige tot dat verband horen; maar je had ze er toch al uitgepikt als groep? Wanneer gaat het dan precies van ‘groep’ naar ‘organisatie’? En is gezien de losse definitie van organisatie een groep niet al meteen een organisatie? In een artikel over de Hofstad groep schrijft Lorenzo Vidino dat het netwerk gezien de structuur en het functioneren van de verschillende individuen meer doet denken aan een jeugdbende (pp. 586-587):

In itself, the lack of a recruiter made the Hofstad group typologically distinct from most Western terrorist organizations. But this absence also made the group atypical in another respect: without a clearly dominant, charismatic individual, Hofstad developed an egalitarian spirit. Even though the group had some central figures, such as Bouyeri and Azzouz, its key members did not display true leadership qualities. Those members who were most knowledgeable, most faithful in attending meetings, and most charismatic obviously stood out, but they never took on the role of a leader. In the absence of a formal structure, every member was free to act on his own, without awaiting the direction of some superior. For example, Dutch authorities believe that Bouyeri and Azzouz conceived their attacks by themselves. While their intentions were clear to other members of the group, who might have been aware of some details of their planning, their actions did not emerge from a group effort.
This unusual characteristic of Hofstad might lead some to questionwhether it is actually a proper terrorist group. In its loose structure it parallels another social phenomenon that worries Dutch authorities: Moroccan youth gangs. […]

Jeugdbendes are mostly composed of groups of friends from the same neighborhood—boys between 16 and 20—who regularly congregate in certain squares or public gardens. Unlike many American gangs, jeugdbendes do not engage in large-scale criminal activities; their members limit their unlawful behavior to petty crime and unarmed confrontations with other gang members or even innocent passersby, often pursued for no other reason than to show bravado and impress their peers. Exactly like the Hofstad group, jeugdbendes lack structure and leaders. According to studies conducted by social scientists, those in jeugdbendes with strong personalities do assume a steering role, but no member of the gang is a properly defined leader who can order the other boys what to do. The Hofstad group also resembles a jeugdbende more than a terrorist group in its lack of a specific goal. Terrorist groups generally have a more or less realistic set of goals and a corresponding plan of action to accomplish them. Jeugdbendes, in contrast, are simply groups of disenfranchised youths that spend their time wandering the streets of Dutch cities looking for excitement and a sense of belonging. Unlike American gangs, they do not seek to control territory or to enrich themselves through activities such as selling drugs. The Hofstad group is similarly devoid of goals, with its members seemingly driven more by a nihilistic attraction to violence than by a concrete political goal.

Met die laatste zin ben ik het niet helemaal eens en volgens mij trekt Vidino die conclusie door een gebrek aan begrip over wat dat nihilisme inhoudt. De leden van het Hofstad netwerk hadden wel degelijk politieke doelen en denkbeelden; Vidino doet die af als dromen maar juist in het utopische zit de kracht (en voor de buitenwereld de dreiging) van die doeleinden zoals Roel Meijer en ik proberen te laten zien in ons recente stuk over het Hofstad netwerk. Zijn vergelijking met jeugdbendes is wel interessant en de discussie over de wat voor type groep het netwerk was, is ook meer dan een theoretische discussie zoals Vidino terecht stelt. Of het netwerk wel of geen terreurorganisatie is en wat de rol van ideologie is, is de crux in de afgelopen rechtszaken tegen dat netwerk. In het geval van de Hofstadgroep trekt het Hof op basis van bovenstaande uitgangspunten en het gepresenteerde feitenmateriaal de volgende conclusie:

3.1.4 Conclusie

De conclusie moet dan ook zijn dat de leden van de groep zich met elkaar verbonden voelden door een gemeenschappelijke geloofsovertuiging, dat zij daarin systematisch werden geschoold en dat binnen de groep gestructureerde activiteiten plaatsvonden, die erop gericht waren elkaar in die overtuiging te versterken en de geesten rijp te maken voor deelneming aan de jihad. Dat er tussen de leden van de groep verschil was in de intensiteit van de onderlinge contacten en in de mate van betrokkenheid bij en aanvaarding van het radicaal fundamentalistische gedachtegoed, doet daaraan niet af, nu in ieder geval kan worden vastgesteld dat er sprake was van een gedeelde bijzondere belangstelling voor dat gedachtegoed.

Op grond van het voorgaande, in onderling verband en onderlinge samenhang bezien, komt het hof tot het oordeel dat de verweren van de verdediging met betrekking tot het bestaan van een organisatie of organisaties moeten worden verworpen en dat hier aanwezig is een samenwerkingsverband of samenwerkingsverbanden van voldoende structuur en duurzaamheid om te kunnen spreken van een organisatie of organisaties in de betekenis die daaraan in de rechtspraak over artikel 140 Sr is gegeven, welke betekenis ook voor de toepassing van artikel 140a Sr moet worden aangenomen.
Deze organisatie of organisaties zullen hierna ook wel de groep worden genoemd, of, in het enkelvoud, de organisatie, ook als het om meer dan één organisatie gaat. De groep bestond vanaf in ieder geval mei 2003. Alle verdachten alsmede de overige in de tenlastelegging genoemde personen – met uitzondering van [O.A.L.] en [B.L.] (hierna: [B.L.]), van wier betrokkenheid bij de groep onvoldoende is gebleken – zijn vanaf mei 2003 (en vóór 9 augustus 2004) tot de groep gaan behoren en daarvan in de in de tenlastelegging, onder 2, genoemde periode lid gebleven.

Je vraagt je af waarom het OM in het verleden toch zo’n probleem heeft gehad verschillende verzamelingen criminelen als organisatie aan te merken. Zoals het OM het hier doet, en het Hof gaat daar in mee, kun je zo ongeveer iedere jeugdbende als organisatie aanmerken. Er is eigenlijk maar één verschil: volgens het Hof diende de ideologie als bindmiddel; ook al was er verschil van mening onder de netwerk deelnemers. Dat klopt wel in zijn algemeenheid en inderdaad dient ideologie onder meer als middel om individuen met elkaar te verbinden. Het OM baseert dat op de inhoud van aangetroffen documenten en denkbeelden van prominente betrokkenen zoals Mohammed Bouyeri en Abu Khaled. Het Hof gaat daarin mee, mede op basis van het gegeven dat er een vaste plek van samenkomst was, er scholing plaatsvond door een ervaren leraar Abu Khaled (zeer voor discussie vatbaar!) aan de hand van scholingsteksten en met laptop als leermiddel. De groep wisselde teksten uit waarin jihad werd verheerlijkt en de democratische rechtsorde werd verworpen, aanwezigheid van lijstjes voor financiële bijdragen voor de vrouw van Abu Khaled waaruit een bijzondere loyaliteit zou blijken. Daarnaast zijn er ook uitspraken waarin deelnemers naar zichzelf en anderen zouden verwijzen en zou Mohammed Bouyeri de broeders opgeroepen hebben een vergadering te beleggen. Allemaal punten die stuk voor stuk (deels) kloppen, maar nogmaals wat is dan de grens tussen een vriendengroep, jeugdbende en organisatie? Het belang van de ideologie daarbij wordt nog duidelijker wanneer we kijken naar de afwegingen van het Hof over het oogmerk van de organisatie.
Hierover stelt het hof:
Rechtspraak.nl – Zoeken in uitspraken

3.2.3 Slotsom aangaande oogmerk van de organisatie

De slotsom ten aanzien van het oogmerk van de organisatie is dat zowel het oogmerk tot het plegen van misdrijven als
– vanaf 10 augustus 2004 – het plegen van terroristische misdrijven aanwezig was, waarbij wordt gezien op de volgende misdrijven:
– het in het openbaar, bij geschrift, opruien tot enig strafbaar feit of tot gewelddadig optreden tegen het openbaar gezag, als bedoeld in artikel 131 Sr;
– het verspreiden en om verspreid te worden in voorraad hebben van een geschrift waarin tot enig strafbaar feit of tot gewelddadig optreden tegen het openbaar gezag wordt opgeruid, als bedoeld in artikel 132, eerste lid, Sr;
– het in het openbaar, bij geschrift, aanzetten tot haat tegen of gewelddadig optreden tegen persoon of goed van mensen wegens hun godsdienst of levensovertuiging, als bedoeld in artikel 137d Sr;
– bedreigingen met enig misdrijf waardoor de algemene veiligheid van personen of goederen in gevaar wordt gebracht en met enig misdrijf tegen het leven gericht, schriftelijk en al dan niet tevens onder een bepaalde voorwaarde, als bedoeld in artikel 285, eerste en tweede lid, Sr; en
– bedreigingen met een terroristisch misdrijf, als bedoeld in artikel 285, derde lid, Sr, te weten bedreiging met ‘een aanslag ondernemen met het oogmerk om de grondwettige regeringsvorm te vernietigen of op onwettige wijze te veranderen, begaan met een terroristisch oogmerk’, alsmede bedreiging met ‘moord, begaan met een terroristisch oogmerk’ en/of met ‘doodslag, gepleegd met een terroristisch oogmerk’.

Niet bewezen kan worden geacht dat het oogmerk van de organisatie ook op het plegen van andere (terroristische)
misdrijven was gericht.

3.2.4 Standpunt namens de verdachte dat nog bespreking behoeft

Na het voorgaande kan worden volstaan met de navolgende overweging naar aanleiding van hetgeen door of namens de
verdachte met betrekking tot het oogmerk van de organisatie is betoogd.

Door de raadsman is aangevoerd dat per uiting dient te worden bezien of deze uiting beschermd wordt door de
vrijheden van godsdienst, meningsuiting en ‘informatievergaring’. Voor zover daarmee bedoeld is dat een uitvoeriger
motivering vereist is dan hierboven op dit punt gegeven, verwerpt het hof dit betoog.

Het Hof komt mede tot die conclusie omdat twaalf van 25 aangetroffen documenten (er waren er overigens veel meer) kunnen worden aangemerkt als opruiend, aanzettend tot haat of gewelddadig optreden en dat diverse ook zijn verspreid. Daarnaast gaat het (natuurlijk) ook om de bedreigingen en de pogingen tot deelname aan gewapende jihad in het buitenland door enkele individuen. Dat laatste is natuurlijk begrijpelijk, maar ik wil toch nog even bij de ideologie blijven. Jos bij Geencommentaar.nl heeft daar enkele verstandige dingen over te zeggen:
Soekarno, Hatta en de Hofstadgroep – GeenCommentaar

Een tweede kwestie die De Meij bespreekt is de veroordeling van Soekarno op 22 december 1930 in het toenmalige Nederlands-Indië wegens lidmaatschap van een vereniging met een criminele doelstelling en meer in het algemeen stemmingmakerij tegen de koloniale overheid. Soekarno, na de bevrijding de eerste president van het nieuw Indonesië, draaide voor vier jaar de bak in. Waarom was zijn Partai Nasional Indonesio (PNI) crimineel? Critici van het vonnis van de koloniale rechtbank, waaronder De Meij, wijzen er op dat de rechter hier een nogal vreemde argumentatie hanteert. Er is geen sprake van criminele handelingen, er waren geen aanwijzingen voor gebruik van geweld. De rechter meende simpelweg dat uit de revolutionaire taal van de PNI de gewelddadige doelstelling kon worden afgeleid. Je zegt iets dat mogelijk tot criminele handelingen kan leiden en dus ben je bij voorbaat crimineel. Dit is dus precies de omgekeerde redenering van de Nederlandse rechter die een paar jaar eerder Hatta vrijsprak omdat er een verschil is tussen geweld prediken en geweld gebruiken. Hiermee, aldus de critici, construeerde de koloniale rechtbank zijn eigen feiten.

Inderdaad kun je je afvragen zoals Jos stelt of het Hof inzake het Hofstad netwerk niet hetzelfde doet. Er is zeker sprake van opruiende teksten en teksten die haatzaaien (laat daar geen twijfel over zijn), maar is dat voldoende om het netwerk als terroristische organisatie aan te merken? In tegenstelling tot de zaak tegen Soekarno zijn er hier overigens wel degelijk criminele handelingen en hebben enkele leden ook geweld gebruikt (even terzijde, kan iemand mij nou eens vertellen waar Jason in vredesnaam die handgranaten vandaan heeft gehaald?), maar ook hier leidt de rechter het karakter van de groep vooral (of op z’n minst mede) af aan de revolutionair-islamitische taal van de groep. Propaganda voor geweld hoeft echter nog niet gelijk te zijn aan opruiing laat staan onmiddellijk gebruik van geweld.

Al met al is de uitspraak van de rechter opmerkelijk en voor zover ik kan beoordelen een belangrijke doorbraak voor mogelijk toekomstige processen tegen vermeende terreurgroeperingen. Ik heb de nodige twijfels of deze uitspraak niet veel te ver gaat en of de groep eigenlijk niet gewoon is veroordeeld op basis van de ideologie (op degenen die geweld gebruikt hebben na natuurlijk). Op z’n minst was dit proces tegen de Hofstad groep de belangrijkste; je vraagt je wel af waarom er dan zo weinig aandacht in de media is geweest. Is de hype voorbij?

Closing the years 2009-2010

Posted on December 31st, 2010 by martijn.
Categories: anthropology, Headline, ISIM/RU Research, My Research.

Because I don’t exactly know anymore when I started my own website, both the years 2009 and 2010 have been labelled as celebrating 10 years of blogging. In the last two years I tried to re-direct this site into more like a public anthropology website. A process that started in 2009 with the post Public Anthropology – 10 years from Researchpages to Closer (1999/2000-2009/2010). Based upon a text of Craig Calhoun I stated:
C L O S E R » Blog Archive » Public Anthropology – 10 Years from Researchpages to Closer (1999/2000 – 2009/2010)

Calhoun continues by stating that public science and addressing public issues is not just giving answers to questions the public has. It is as much, or even more, about questioning why particular issues are addressed in the way they are addressed by particular people and what the consequences of that are. How are particular issues and the way they are debated related to (changing) historical and cultural contexts, what is taken-for-granted and what does it mean? In my opinion this is (or at least should) should be the focus of this blog and has informed the change from my website Researchpages to Closer.

Maybe the most important contribution to this is a post on Islamizing Europe in which I try to deconstruct the argument of a demographic takeover of Europe by Muslims but also trying to understand how the whole argument works. It is a post from May 2009, and was last year and this year the most popular post of my blog. A second post involves the digital re-publication of all of the issues of the ISIM Review; the magazine of the former Institute for the Study of Islam in the World (ISIM) where I worked until it was closed in 2009. The most popular issue was Newsletter 7 on confronting modernity and my own article on Moroccan-Dutch youth and Islam, based upon my PhD research. Also Welmoet Boender’s article on Imams in the Netherlands, based upon her PhD research was very popular.

When I started my current research – Understanding Islam – Salafism as a Utopian Movement – I still worked at ISIM but after it closed the whole project moved over to Radboud University Nijmegen that was already a partner in the project. The Radicalization Series on my blog is a part of this project and a preparation for articles and chapter to write. Salafism as Utopian Movement post is an attempt to bring anthropology into the social movement approach that is now sort of leading in the research on Islamic activism. Besides this Salafism research, or better more and more as a part of that project, I try to follow the current debates on Islam in Europe but sometimes also in the US given the transnational connections of both Islam and the debate about Islam. The post on the Dutch Ground Zero Mosque is the most important example of such transnational connections. An ongoing task in this is of course monitoring the debate about and with Dutch anti-Islam politician Geert Wilders for which my post on his movie Fitna is still leading. But other topics covered here have found some public as well. The post on Rebelle – Art, Feminism and Muslim Women is still very popular as well as the Orange Fever post on the Worldcup football and nationalism in the Netherlands. The post was covered in the anthropology carnival of Four Stone Hearth #97 while asking the question: Does orange truly transcend ethnic minority identities? I think it does, for a while, in a superficial but nevertheless important way. I think.

Another issue that has been covered somewhat in Dutch debate is the question whether or not society is suffering from pornofication and sexualization by commerce. When a Muslim man wanted to scratch out posters that were sexist in his view, the debate suddenly changed. Interesting enough to cover it on my blog with some …uhm… fascinating comments as well. When trying to build up some sort of public anthropology one risks to become part of the public debate on the topic one wants to study. This happened to me as well albeit that I have to admit that I did not always acted very smart. One thing I did, and I still stand by it, was to comment upon a debate about a Dutch newspaper that re-published one of the Muhammad Cartoons. One of the Salafi organizations of course was against it and protested it which led to the removal of the cartoon. This was followed by other newspapers and sites that as a protest against the removal in turn re-published that particular cartoon under the label of defending free speech. In my comment for the tv channel of the Salafi group I commented on the political use of this free speech argument. I wrote about this in the posts Cartoonesque 15 and Cartoonesque 16. When one becomes part of the public debates, the whole public anthropology idea gets a different turn of course. Together with my colleague Henk Driessen of Radboud University I organized the workshop Anthropology and/in Publicity in order to explore the idea of public anthropology further with lectures by Ulf Hannerz, Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Annelies Moors and Mathijs Pelkmans. Part of this workshop was a weblog to which several people contributed. One of the contributors, Daniel Lende, has written an excellent summary of the blogposts in Anthropology and Publicity(Thanks!). We will probably try to publish the lectures in a special issue of a journal and include material of the blog as well then (we are not yet sure how to do this). The blog will remain online for a while but in the future the blog could move entirely to this blog as a special section. Also on behalf of Henk Driessen I would like to say thanks to all the speakers of the workshop, the contributors to the blog and the discussants and participants of the workshop who made the whole endeavour succesfull.

To close this entry I would like to add that I would be a very bad public anthropologist when I did not write in Dutch anymore. Too bad for my English readers, but also in the future many posts will be in Dutch (I usually write one in Dutch and one in English every week). In Dutch I have tried to explain some of the motives of people who vote for the anti-Islam Freedom Party of Geert Wilders and try to go beyond the unsubstantiated claims that it is all about anti-islam sentiments and to take the voters seriously instead of mocking them for example in a post called Hungry Wolves – Wilders, PVV and Far Right. A similar analysis was written in English after the recent elections: Europe and Islam: Dutch Elections – Have the Dutch become intolerant? Another issue that has already been mentioned here is the instrumentalization of free speech to include and/or exclude minorities. In a Dutch post I try to extend this argument by pointing to something I coined as ‘freedomnarcissism‘: a form of behaviour that is characterized by an obsession with freedom of the self combined with egoïsm, a lack of empathy and an attempt to be the alpha male (it is often about male bloggers who fiercely attack others who take objection to their self-proclaimed freedom of speech heroism). It is about people who try to immunize themselves against critique from the outside by pointing to the freedom of speech and use the same freedom of speech to harm others. The idea is loosely based upon Christoffer Lash’s Culture of Narcissism who states that people are afraid to be meaningless and as a result develop all kinds of counter-strategies to feel real. Other popular Dutch posts are about the movie Avatar and the publication of a letter of a young Muslim, Jason Walters, convicted for terrorism. In this letter he revises his view on jihad, politics, violence and the position of Muslims in the West. Also both posts featuring my PhD (English summary HERE) are still quite popular.

A new feature on my blog in 2010 were the contributions of guest authors. Martin van Bruinessen on the Gülenmovement (in Dutch), Joas Wagemakers on the Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and Michel Hoebink of Radio Netherlands on Wilders’ outdated colonial rhetoric were the first with excellent contributions. I will certainly invite more guest authors in 2011 and people can send in their own contributions as well (those will be reviewed by another colleague and myself). I hope I can continue my line of blogging in the coming years. For now let me say thank you to all my readers, colleagues and most of all the people I work with in my research for their valuable input, comments, criticisms and jokes.

Publications

Books

2008

Zoeken naar een ‘zuivere’ islam. Geloofsbeleving en identiteitsvorming onder jonge Marokkaans-Nederlandse moslims, Amsterdam: Bert Bakker

Searching for a ‘pure’ Islam. Religious Beliefs and Identity Construction among Moroccan-Dutch Youth, Amsterdam: Bert Bakker (In Press). The Ph.D thesis will be in Dutch. The English summary is here. Read my article in the ISIM Review HERE.

Articles
2010
With Roeland, Johan, Stef Aupers, Dick Houtman, and Ineke Noomen. 2010. “Zoeken naar zuiverheid. Religieuze purificatie onder jonge new-agers, evangelicalen en moslims.” Sociologie 11-30.

‘The Quest for Religious Purity in New Age, Evangelicalism and Islam: Religious Renditions of Dutch Youth and the Luckmann Legacy’, in: Annual Review of the Sociology of Religion – 2009: Youth and Religion (with Stef Aupers, Dick Houtman, Ineke Noomen and Johan Roeland

2009

Islam is Islam. Punt uit? Marokkaans-Nederlandse moslimjongeren in Gouda en de culturele constructie van een ‘zuivere’ islam. Migrantenstudies 25, no. 1: 59-72.
Moslimjongeren. De salafi-beweging en de vorming van een morele gemeenschap. Tijdschrift voor Criminologie, no. 4: 375-385.

Chapters in edited volumes
2010

With Bartels, Edien, Kim Knibbe, and Oscar Salemink. 2010. “Cultural Identity as a Key Dimension of Human Security in Western Europe: The Dutch Case.” Pp. 116-133 in A World of Insecurity. Anthropological Perspectives On Human Security, Eds. Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Ellen Bal, and Oscar Salemink. London: Pluto Press.

“Understanding Dutch Islam: Exploring the Relationship of Muslims with the State and the Public Sphere in the Netherlands.” Pp. 181-197 in Muslim Diaspora in the West Negotiating Gender, Home and Belonging, Eds. Haideh Moghissi en Halleh Ghorashi. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing.

With Roel Meijer. “Going All the Way: Politicization and Radicalization of the Hofstad Network in the Netherlands.” Pp. 220-239 in Identity and Participation in Culturally Diverse Societies: A Multidisciplinary Perspective, Eds. Assaad E. Azzi, Xenia Chryssochoou, Bernd Klandermans, and Bernd Simon. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

With Van Dijk-Groeneboer, Monique, and Joris Kregting, en Johan Roeland. 2010. “Ze Geloven Het Wel.” Pp. 25-88 in Handboek Jongeren en Religie. Katholieke, protestantse en islamitische jongeren in Nederland, Ed. Van Dijk-Groeneboer. Amsterdam: Parthenon.

De Koning, Martijn. 2010. “Zoeken naar Zuiverheid en Authenticeit..” Pp. 159-175 in Handboek Jongeren en Religie. Katholieke, protestantse en islamitische jongeren in Nederland,Ed. Monique Van Dijk-Groeneboer. Amsterdam: Parthenon.

2009

Changing Worldviews and Friendship. An Exploration of the Life Stories of Two Female Salafists in the Netherlands. In Global Salafism. Islam’s New Religious Movement, Ed. Roel Meijer, 372-392. London: Hurst.

Netherlands. In Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, Ed. Jorgen Nielsen, Samim Akgönül, Brigitte Maréchal, en Christian Moe, 1:243-257. Leiden: Brill.

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3 comments.

Debate: Sharia's in the West – A Place for religious Laws in Western Democracies?

Posted on December 13th, 2010 by martijn.
Categories: ISIM/RU Research, Multiculti Issues, Public Islam.

Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands, hosted a debate last week on the topic of Sharia(‘s) in the West. In the introduction of the debate, it was said that:

For many citizens of Western countries the concept of Shari’a is tantamount to violation of human rights. For them, religious and secular laws simply don’t go together. Period. No wonder that Rowan Williams, Archbishop of Canterbury, met with criticism and condemnation when, in 2008, he remarked that it would be ‘inevitable’ to adopt elements of Islamic family law into the British legal system.

And yet, only a few decades ago Western countries also upheld religiously inspired laws which provided for matters of marriage, child rearing and divorce. Since then, most of these laws have been abolished or adapted to achieve more individual freedom and a higher degree of equality between men and women. As a result, the whole domain of family law has been secularized en individualized.

Many Muslims living in Western countries find it hard to accept this state of affairs. They take it for granted that family matters must be settled according to religious rules and regulations. They therefore try to achieve some legal autonomy in these matters by appealing to the freedom of religion and anti-discrimination laws. Is this appeal justified? How should a modern secular State respond to the wishes and principles of religious minorities?

I have some doubts about the last paragraph. In the Netherlands there have been no claims to implement Sharia based rules and I this is the case in most European countries and there is a lot of resistance among Muslims about it as well.

In his lecture, John Witte, specialist in family law and religious freedom, gave his views on these matters. Piet Hein van Kempen and Jan Jaap de Ruiter responded.

Sharia’s in the West. A Place for religious Laws in Western Democracies? The Frontiers of Marital Pluralism by John Witte

This compromise on religion and education, forged painfully over a half century of wrangling, has some bearing on questions of religion and marriage. Marriage, like education, is not a state monopoly. Religious parties have always had the right to marry in a religious sanctuary or before a state official. Religious officials have long had the right to participate in the weddings, annulments, divorces and custody battles of their voluntary members. But the state has also long set the threshold requirements of what marriage is and who may participate. Religious officials may add to these state law requirements but not subtract from them. A minister may insist on premarital counseling before a wedding, even if the state will marry a couple without it. But if a minister bullies a minor to marry out of religious duty, the state could throw him in jail. A rabbi may encourage a bickering couple to repent and reconcile, but she cannot prevent them from filing for divorce. An imam may preach of the beauties of polygamy, but if he knowingly presides over a polygamous union, he is an accessory to crime.

Sharia’s in the West. A Place for religious Laws in Western Democracies? A Reply to John Witte by Jan Jaap de Ruiter

However sympathetic I find the essay of professor Witte, I am not convinced of the idea of acommodating Sharia or part of Sharia law in the Dutch legal system. In practice it concerns nearly always family law and exactly in this legal domain there are some very sensitive issues to consider, the most important of which the status of women. Islamic law is not compatible with Dutch law when it concerns women. In numerous instances Sharia holds to her half the authority or power that she accords to Muslim men. In court her witness counts as half a man’s witness. In cases like marriage, children, divorce and inheritance she is in a permanent inferiority position. The way to apply for divorce is so much easier for Muslim men than for women, and inheritance laws foresee half the share of men for women.

Speakers
Prof John Witte is Professor of Law at Emory University, Atlanta, US, and a specialist in religious freedom , history of law and marital law. He is Director of the Center for the Study of Law and Religion, one the world’s largest research programs on religion and human rights. His publications have been translated into several languages. A much sought-after speaker, John Witte was elected Teacher of the Year by students of Emory Law ten times.
Dr Jan Jaap de Ruiter is Arabist at the University of Tilburg. His main interest is in the status and role of the Arabic language and of Islam in Western Europe and Morocco.
Prof dr Piet Hein van Kempen is Professor of Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure and Professor of Human Rights Law at the Radboud University Nijmegen.

0 comments.

Debate: Sharia’s in the West – A Place for religious Laws in Western Democracies?

Posted on December 13th, 2010 by martijn.
Categories: ISIM/RU Research, Multiculti Issues, Public Islam.

Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands, hosted a debate last week on the topic of Sharia(‘s) in the West. In the introduction of the debate, it was said that:

For many citizens of Western countries the concept of Shari’a is tantamount to violation of human rights. For them, religious and secular laws simply don’t go together. Period. No wonder that Rowan Williams, Archbishop of Canterbury, met with criticism and condemnation when, in 2008, he remarked that it would be ‘inevitable’ to adopt elements of Islamic family law into the British legal system.

And yet, only a few decades ago Western countries also upheld religiously inspired laws which provided for matters of marriage, child rearing and divorce. Since then, most of these laws have been abolished or adapted to achieve more individual freedom and a higher degree of equality between men and women. As a result, the whole domain of family law has been secularized en individualized.

Many Muslims living in Western countries find it hard to accept this state of affairs. They take it for granted that family matters must be settled according to religious rules and regulations. They therefore try to achieve some legal autonomy in these matters by appealing to the freedom of religion and anti-discrimination laws. Is this appeal justified? How should a modern secular State respond to the wishes and principles of religious minorities?

In his lecture, John Witte, specialist in family law and religious freedom, gave his views on these matters. Piet Hein van Kempen and Jan Jaap de Ruiter responded.

Sharia’s in the West. A Place for religious Laws in Western Democracies? The Frontiers of Marital Pluralism by John Witte

This compromise on religion and education, forged painfully over a half century of wrangling, has some bearing on questions of religion and marriage. Marriage, like education, is not a state monopoly. Religious parties have always had the right to marry in a religious sanctuary or before a state official. Religious officials have long had the right to participate in the weddings, annulments, divorces and custody battles of their voluntary members. But the state has also long set the threshold requirements of what marriage is and who may participate. Religious officials may add to these state law requirements but not subtract from them. A minister may insist on premarital counseling before a wedding, even if the state will marry a couple without it. But if a minister bullies a minor to marry out of religious duty, the state could throw him in jail. A rabbi may encourage a bickering couple to repent and reconcile, but she cannot prevent them from filing for divorce. An imam may preach of the beauties of polygamy, but if he knowingly presides over a polygamous union, he is an accessory to crime.

Sharia’s in the West. A Place for religious Laws in Western Democracies? A Reply to John Witte by Jan Jaap de Ruiter

However sympathetic I find the essay of professor Witte, I am not convinced of the idea of acommodating Sharia or part of Sharia law in the Dutch legal system. In practice it concerns nearly always family law and exactly in this legal domain there are some very sensitive issues to consider, the most important of which the status of women. Islamic law is not compatible with Dutch law when it concerns women. In numerous instances Sharia holds to her half the authority or power that she accords to Muslim men. In court her witness counts as half a man’s witness. In cases like marriage, children, divorce and inheritance she is in a permanent inferiority position. The way to apply for divorce is so much easier for Muslim men than for women, and inheritance laws foresee half the share of men for women.

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MESA – Transnationalism and Religious Authority: Exploring the Salafi Movement

Posted on November 18th, 2010 by martijn.
Categories: ISIM/RU Research, My Research, Notes from the Field.

The Nijmegen research group on Salafism as a Transnational Movement will present itself in a panel at the annual MESA conference in San Diego. We are very pleased that Jocelyne Cesari agreed to be our discussant at this panel.

Our focus in this panel will be on the issue of religious authority. In general we can distinguish three perspectives in the study of transnationalism: one that focuses on the movement of people, goods, information and money between different countries and one that focuses on forms of consciousness, belonging, identity and cultural creation. A third approach takes into account the development of debates and discussions among Muslims about the nature and role of Islam in Europe and North America. Bowen argues that “Islam creates and implies the existence and legitimacy of a global public space of normative reference and debate […].”The transnational character of Islam surfaces in Islam’s history and its universality as well as in its reference to the ummah, the worldwide community of Muslims. This transnational character of Islam is related to the global flows of ideas, references and debates about the role and nature of Islam in Europe and North Africa (Bowen 2004:882-883). Among religious movements of Muslims it has been in particular the Salafi movement that has been able to emerge as a transnational movement in every regard by establishing transnational networks of authority, learning and communication. At the same time in many ways (Salafi) Islam is lived, experienced, and debated at local levels. Moreover it is often in concrete daily life, at a local level, that individuals connect their own local experiences to the larger narratives of a global Islam. Realizing the connection between individual daily experiences and global Islam is usually done by a reference to the global ummah and, especially in the case the second generation Muslim youth in Europe, by the discourse of a ‘return to ‘true’ Islam’ and a search for undisputed authorities on a global and local level. This panel aims to explore how religious knowledge of the Salafi movements is produced and transformed on a local and global level by focusing on the role of religious authorities within the Salafi networks. Papers about localized forms of Salafism in the Middle East and Europe will be presented as well as papers that take transnational authorities as a starting point. The panel will combine anthropology, social movement theory, religious studies and media studies in order to contribute to the ongoing debates about Salafism as a transnational movement.

Bowen, John. 2004. “Beyond Migration: Islam as a Transnational Public Space.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 30:879-894.
Sponsor: Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands

Presentations:

The Transnational vs. the Local: Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi’s Transnational Religious Authority and the Locally-Inspired Midad al-Suyuf Forum by Joas Wagemakers
Transformation of Religious Authority in Kuwait by Zoltan Pall
Fields of Authorization – Transnational connections of authority in Salafi networks by Martijn de Koning
Authority as Authenticity: Reconstructing Salafi Authority in Dutch and German Chat Rooms and Online Forums by Carmen Becker

Members:

Jocelyne Cesari (Harvard University) – Discussant
Joas Wagemakers (Radboud University Nijmegen) – Presenter
Martijn Koning, De (Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands) – Organizer & Presenter
Carmen Becker (Radboud University Nijmegen) – Presenter
Zoltan Pall (University of Utrecht) – Presenter

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The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi

Posted on November 16th, 2010 by martijn.
Categories: Guest authors, ISIM/RU Research, Religious and Political Radicalization.

The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi

Guest Author: Joas Wagemakers

The subject of my dissertation, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, is hardly known among Muslims outside Salafi circles and almost a complete unknown among non-Muslims outside specialists of radical Islam. Still, within those two groups, everybody knows who he is, and rightly so: he is the owner of the biggest online library of radical Islamic literature (www.tawhed.ws), the author of dozens of books and scores of articles, fatwas and poems, has inspired militant Islamists around the world (including the former leader of Al-Qa‘ida in Iraq, Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi) and is even said to have influenced Mohammed B., the murderer of Theo van Gogh. Who is this man and what is so special about him?

Al-Maqdisi’s life

Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi was born in a village called Barqa in the West Bank in 1959, from which he moved to Kuwait when he was only a small child. In Kuwait, he grew up in a secular family and through some friends who took him to mosques controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood, he became increasingly radical. He began to see the rulers of the Muslim world as apostates, “infidels” who should be fought in order to apply the shari‘a. He was never completely satisfied with the Muslim Brotherhood’s message, however, and wanted to combine the supposedly purist message of Salafism with the radical ideas he had learned from the Brotherhood. He eventually found those in certain 19^th-century Saudi writings that he discovered when he studied in the kingdom for a year in the 1980s.

Armed with the Salafi tools to label Muslim rulers (including Saudi ones) “infidels”, he moved to Pakistan to teach in the camps of the various “Afghan Arabs”, Arab volunteers who had come from all over the Arab world to fight the Soviet Union, which had occupied Afghanistan in 1979. After leaving Pakistan/Afghanistan, he moved back to Kuwait and eventually to Jordan, where he still lives and is imprisoned now.

Ideology

Al-Maqdisi’s ideas are – at first sight – nothing new. Haven’t we heard all this criticism and excommunication (takfir) of the rulers of the Muslim world before from the likes of Sayyid Qutb and Muhammad ‘Abd al-Salam Faraj? Partly, yes. What makes al-Maqdisi different, however, is that he makes extensive use of (often Saudi) Salafi concepts, arguments and scholars and was one of the first to do so extensively. In other words, whereas Salafism had mostly been a quietist version of Islam whose adherents were subservient to their rulers, al-Maqdisi used the tools that Salafism offered him against those very same rulers. This way, he turned the seemingly obedient Salafi ideology upside-down and revolutionised it. To be sure, al-Maqdisi was certainly not the only ideologue responsible for this process but there are certain areas where he was clearly ahead of his time.

Al-Wala’ wa-l-Bara’

One example of al-Maqdisi’s thinking that makes him somewhat special is his treatment of al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ (loyalty to God, Muslims and Islam and disavowal of everything else). While the overwhelming majority of scholars treated this concept (particularly but not exclusively in Saudi Arabia) as something pertaining only to interpersonal and religious affairs, al-Maqdisi changed this. Adopting the reasoning of the 19^th-century Saudi scholars who had influenced him so much, he stated that al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ should also be used in the political, legislative sphere. Not applying Islamic law, he contended, was a violation of the loyalty (wala’) that every Muslim had to show to God. If any ruler of the Muslim world was guilty of such a sin, this should be countered by disavowal (bara’) of them. According to al-Maqdisi, the highest form of bara’ is to fight such rulers through jihad.

Although al-Maqdisi’s reasoning is far more complicated and elaborate than the above shows, his use of concepts such as al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ as well as other terms and arguments usually only employed by state-supported quietist Salafi scholars ensured that he came up with radical solutions akin to what Qutb and Faraj had said but argued for them in a very Salafi way. As such, al-Maqdisi can certainly be viewed as a Jihadi-Salafi (i.e. a Salafi who believes jihad may be used against the supposedly apostate rulers of the Muslim world) but one who has been strongly influenced by the quietist and subservient branch of Salafism as well when it comes to their use of terminology, arguments and sources.

Influence

It is clear that al-Maqdisi’s “quietist Jihadi-Salafi” ideological background reflects his search for Salafi but radical answers to the questions he had. Considering this, it is not surprising that his influence is strongest among those radicals who have roots in or great respect for the quietist Salafi background that al-Maqdisi values so much. This was the case, for example, in Saudi Arabia, where Al-Qa‘ida on the Arabian Peninsula (QAP) was greatly influenced by him. Many members of QAP had strong roots in the Saudi quietist Salafi tradition since they had grown up in a country that prides itself on being a truly Islamic state and uses large parts of the school curriculum to teach its subjects the details of religion. As al-Maqdisi offered Saudi militants Saudi Salafi (and not Egyptian, secular or Marxist) tools to fight the rulers of the kingdom, his message of a radical Islam rooted in a quietist tradition was quite popular among members of QAP.

A process similar to the one in Saudi Arabia took place among radical Salafis in Jordan. Unlike Saudi Arabia, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan does not claim to be an Islamic state but there are nevertheless many Salafis there who generally adhere to the same teachings as Saudi Salafis do. Among al-Maqdisi’s supporters, a rather clear distinction can be made between those radicals who had roots in quietist Salafism and those who previously led a life of crime or drug abuse. During my research, I found that the former group has been quite loyal to al-Maqdisi and his teachings, while the latter have often drifted away from his ideas or have even turned against him, considering him too focussed on doctrine or blaming him for allegedly revising his views.

Although al-Maqdisi is not a household name in any country of the world, it is clear that he is an important and influential radical ideologue among like-minded Muslims. His widespread influence, his many writings, his sometimes original thinking and his status as a credible scholar among his admirers ensure that he is going to remain just that for some time to come. Moreover, his current incarceration in Jordan, rather than stop him from being influential, is much more likely to increase his stature as an ideologue unwilling to bend to the will of the “apostate” rulers.

Joas Wagemakers MA is a researcher at the Clingendael Diplomatic Studies Programme and a lecturer and PhD student at Radboud University Nijmegen. Today, 16 November 2010 he defends his PhD thesis on the ideology and influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (b. 1959), a Jordanian Jihadi-Salafi ideologue who is widely considered one of the most important radical Islamic scholars alive. Joas Wagemakers has published widely on Islamism and Islamist ideology and co-edits ZemZem, a Dutch-language journal on the Middle East, North-Africa and Islam. Joas Wagemakers blogs at Jihadica.com, a weblog on developments in jihad. His research interests are Islamist movements and Islamist ideology in the context of the modern Middle East and in relation to early-Islamic history.

update: Joas Wagemakers defended his PhD cum laude on 16 November 2010

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