C L O S E R

Bestuurskundigen blikken terug op debat na moord op Theo van Gogh – Nieuws en Agenda – Universiteit van Amsterdam (UvA)

Posted on October 30th, 2005 by .
Categories: Murder on theo Van Gogh and related issues.

Bestuurskundigen blikken terug op debat na moord op Theo van Gogh – Nieuws en Agenda – Universiteit van Amsterdam (UvA)
Bestuurskundigen blikken terug op debat na moord op Theo van Gogh

Op 2 november is het precies een jaar geleden dat Nederland werd opgeschrikt door de brute moord op Theo van Gogh. In de daaropvolgende dagen werden moskee�n in brand gestoken, verklaarde minister Zalm de oorlog aan het moslimextremisme en kwamen buitenlandse journalisten in groten getale naar Amsterdam om de trouble in paradise van dichtbij te bekijken. Nu de rook is opgetrokken, blijkt echter dat de discussie zich anders heeft ontwikkeld dan men op het eerste gezicht zou verwachten.

Dat blijkt uit de resultaten van het onderzoek naar het mediadebat volgend op de moord van Theo van Gogh, die de politicologen Maarten Hajer en Justus Uitermark zullen presenteren op woensdagmiddag 2 november. In hun presentatie komen bovendien de verschillende strategie�n aan bod die Amsterdamse politici hebben gebruikt om zich staande te houden in dat debat – en het zeer wisselende succes daarvan.

Na afloop van de presentatie is er een borrel, en kunnen ge�nteresseerden een informatiemarkt bezoeken over de de master Bestuur en beleid en de gelijknamige specialisatierichting binnen de bachelor Politicologie. Informatie over de master Bestuur en beleid is te vinden via de verwijzing onder aan deze pagina.

De bijeenkomst zal plaatsvinden in de Oudemanhuispoort 4-6 en om 13.00 uur beginnen. Voor meer informatie en aanmelding: Wytske Versteeg, w.b.versteeg@uva.nl.

Woensdag 2 november 2005, 13:00 – 15:00 uur

4 comments.

spiked-politics | Article | What's behind the battle of Lozells?

Posted on October 30th, 2005 by martijn.
Categories: Misc. News.

spiked-politics | Article | What’s behind the battle of Lozells?

According to the rumour, a 14-year-old Jamaican was caught stealing a wig from an Asian-run shop selling black beauty products in nearby Perry Barr. One of the shopkeepers threatened to call the police, but she pleaded with him not to (‘she was an illegal immigrant, and didn’t want the police to be led to her house’, one black man told me). The girl agreed to have sex with the shopkeeper if he wouldn’t tell the police. But then he called his friends, who came around and raped her – some say she was raped by three men, others say 13 or 19.

There is no evidence that such an attack took place. Police forensic experts have reportedly checked out the beauty parlour but found nothing. No girl has come forward, in spite of police pledges of leniency. Nobody knows her name or when the attack happened, though some claim to know her family.

The two communities are divided by the story – most local black people claim it’s true, most Asians say it’s a myth. But this is less about the girl, real or imagined, than about simmering economic grievances. One local black community activist told me: ‘Blacks get nothing, no funding, no support. Blacks made Asians rich, we support their shops. It’s a joke.’ According to a 17-year-old originally from Somalia, ‘The word on the street is that a war is on, and it’s Asians versus blacks’. On the other side, a young Asian man claimed that blacks are ‘stupid people. They go to school but don’t learn anything. I don’t know what they are moaning about. We did well because we worked hard’.

It’s no surprise that tensions exist in a run-down inner city area such as this. This is often presented as a case of two communities hating each other, with the police standing helpless in between. In fact, the script for the conflict in Perry Barr was written at the top of New Labour’s Britain. Today, different groups are encouraged to play up their victimhood and unique cultural identities, in a bid for public funds and social authority. The fireworks in Lozells demonstrate the fractious consequences.

Black campaigners were talking the language of identity politics, saying that they didn’t get any ‘respect’ and their ‘grievances haven’t been understood’. ‘[Asians] look at Jamaican people like we are nothing’, said one black woman quoted in the New Nation (1). Respectable community organisations have helped to broadcast the issue over the past week. Maxie Hayles, head of the Birmingham Racial Attacks Monitoring Group, has been one of the more vocal activists: he was quoted on BBC News as saying ‘There are a lot of [black] people who think that the Asian people look down on African-Caribbean people’; while the New Nation recorded his comment, ‘We are not going to tolerate our women being abused. We have a zero tolerance against it’ (2). Hayles has contributed to a number of official consultations, and in 2000 was awarded the government’s ‘Active Community Award’. Meanwhile, one of the websites that played a role in spreading the rumours, Blacknet UK, has connections with official bodies including the Commission for Racial Equality.

The battle for cultural recognition is another source of friction. An article in The Voice detailed all the local African-Caribbean community’s grievances: the carnival was moved from Handsworth to Perry Barr, and renamed the ‘Birmingham International Carnival Enterprise’, while ‘unadulterated’ Asian celebrations such as Vaisakhi have taken their place; Black History Month is now apparently run by an Asian man, as is the Drum (a Birmingham centre for black arts); and the BBC has banished African-Caribbean programming to Saturday nights, while establishing the Asian Network as a 24-hr station.

On the other side, Asians also claim that everybody is set against them, and appeal for protection.

Why did it take the rumour of a rape for recent tensions to explode? Perhaps it suggests the lack of a vocabulary for discussing social and political inequalities in their own terms. Instead, conflicts are conceived as an allegory, as a personal attack on a member of your community. The rape story seems to express the fact that black people feel they are being screwed over. Some seemed to identity with her: the campaign is called ‘Silent Victim’, and speculation abounds about what the girl could be feeling. ‘She could be hurt’, said one black man. ‘It’s obvious why she did a deal [to have sex]’, said another: ‘You got no power, no position. Who is going to listen to you?’ Asians have their share of victimisation stories, too. One young man said that he heard a story about two Asian girls being attacked – ‘I don’t know if it’s true, but that’s what I heard’. Another said that he heard worshippers had been attacked inside a mosque.

Beneath it all, though, it seems that some are trying to put their differences aside and move on. Certainly the last thing this community needs is council-supervised intercultural dialogues. Black people are still buying in Asian shops; most of the broken windows have been replaced, and shops reopened. A number of people I spoke to blamed the trouble on outsiders. One Asian man said that the rioters came from London; a white man blamed coachloads of visitors from London, Leeds and Bradford. At Khan’s carpet shop in Lozells Road, the young shopkeeper told me: ‘I got no tension with black people. Some local black people are driving past and saying “we’re neutral”.’

One thing that did seem to unite the communities was common hostility to the media. I was chatting to a group of young British Asians when a young African-Caribbean man cycled past. ‘News reporter?’ he asked. ‘I say fuck off. You’re not from around this area, so mind your own fucking business’. There was a pause, then the young Asians responded: ‘That’s what I say, too’, ‘and me too’.

0 comments.

spiked-politics | Article | What’s behind the battle of Lozells?

Posted on October 30th, 2005 by .
Categories: Misc. News.

spiked-politics | Article | What’s behind the battle of Lozells?

According to the rumour, a 14-year-old Jamaican was caught stealing a wig from an Asian-run shop selling black beauty products in nearby Perry Barr. One of the shopkeepers threatened to call the police, but she pleaded with him not to (‘she was an illegal immigrant, and didn’t want the police to be led to her house’, one black man told me). The girl agreed to have sex with the shopkeeper if he wouldn’t tell the police. But then he called his friends, who came around and raped her – some say she was raped by three men, others say 13 or 19.

There is no evidence that such an attack took place. Police forensic experts have reportedly checked out the beauty parlour but found nothing. No girl has come forward, in spite of police pledges of leniency. Nobody knows her name or when the attack happened, though some claim to know her family.

The two communities are divided by the story – most local black people claim it’s true, most Asians say it’s a myth. But this is less about the girl, real or imagined, than about simmering economic grievances. One local black community activist told me: ‘Blacks get nothing, no funding, no support. Blacks made Asians rich, we support their shops. It’s a joke.’ According to a 17-year-old originally from Somalia, ‘The word on the street is that a war is on, and it’s Asians versus blacks’. On the other side, a young Asian man claimed that blacks are ‘stupid people. They go to school but don’t learn anything. I don’t know what they are moaning about. We did well because we worked hard’.

It’s no surprise that tensions exist in a run-down inner city area such as this. This is often presented as a case of two communities hating each other, with the police standing helpless in between. In fact, the script for the conflict in Perry Barr was written at the top of New Labour’s Britain. Today, different groups are encouraged to play up their victimhood and unique cultural identities, in a bid for public funds and social authority. The fireworks in Lozells demonstrate the fractious consequences.

Black campaigners were talking the language of identity politics, saying that they didn’t get any ‘respect’ and their ‘grievances haven’t been understood’. ‘[Asians] look at Jamaican people like we are nothing’, said one black woman quoted in the New Nation (1). Respectable community organisations have helped to broadcast the issue over the past week. Maxie Hayles, head of the Birmingham Racial Attacks Monitoring Group, has been one of the more vocal activists: he was quoted on BBC News as saying ‘There are a lot of [black] people who think that the Asian people look down on African-Caribbean people’; while the New Nation recorded his comment, ‘We are not going to tolerate our women being abused. We have a zero tolerance against it’ (2). Hayles has contributed to a number of official consultations, and in 2000 was awarded the government’s ‘Active Community Award’. Meanwhile, one of the websites that played a role in spreading the rumours, Blacknet UK, has connections with official bodies including the Commission for Racial Equality.

The battle for cultural recognition is another source of friction. An article in The Voice detailed all the local African-Caribbean community’s grievances: the carnival was moved from Handsworth to Perry Barr, and renamed the ‘Birmingham International Carnival Enterprise’, while ‘unadulterated’ Asian celebrations such as Vaisakhi have taken their place; Black History Month is now apparently run by an Asian man, as is the Drum (a Birmingham centre for black arts); and the BBC has banished African-Caribbean programming to Saturday nights, while establishing the Asian Network as a 24-hr station.

On the other side, Asians also claim that everybody is set against them, and appeal for protection.

Why did it take the rumour of a rape for recent tensions to explode? Perhaps it suggests the lack of a vocabulary for discussing social and political inequalities in their own terms. Instead, conflicts are conceived as an allegory, as a personal attack on a member of your community. The rape story seems to express the fact that black people feel they are being screwed over. Some seemed to identity with her: the campaign is called ‘Silent Victim’, and speculation abounds about what the girl could be feeling. ‘She could be hurt’, said one black man. ‘It’s obvious why she did a deal [to have sex]’, said another: ‘You got no power, no position. Who is going to listen to you?’ Asians have their share of victimisation stories, too. One young man said that he heard a story about two Asian girls being attacked – ‘I don’t know if it’s true, but that’s what I heard’. Another said that he heard worshippers had been attacked inside a mosque.

Beneath it all, though, it seems that some are trying to put their differences aside and move on. Certainly the last thing this community needs is council-supervised intercultural dialogues. Black people are still buying in Asian shops; most of the broken windows have been replaced, and shops reopened. A number of people I spoke to blamed the trouble on outsiders. One Asian man said that the rioters came from London; a white man blamed coachloads of visitors from London, Leeds and Bradford. At Khan’s carpet shop in Lozells Road, the young shopkeeper told me: ‘I got no tension with black people. Some local black people are driving past and saying “we’re neutral”.’

One thing that did seem to unite the communities was common hostility to the media. I was chatting to a group of young British Asians when a young African-Caribbean man cycled past. ‘News reporter?’ he asked. ‘I say fuck off. You’re not from around this area, so mind your own fucking business’. There was a pause, then the young Asians responded: ‘That’s what I say, too’, ‘and me too’.

0 comments.

spiked-politics | Article | Landscapes of Jihad: Osama bin Laden: more media whore than guerrilla warrior

Posted on October 30th, 2005 by martijn.
Categories: International Terrorism, Religious and Political Radicalization.

spiked-politics | Article | Osama bin Laden: more media whore than guerrilla warrior

Ask yourself the question: what the hell does Osama bin Laden want? Why did he authorise (apparently) the worst terrorist attack of modern times on 9/11, and why do groups or individuals linked to him, or inspired by him, detonate crude bombs – and often themselves, too – everywhere from beachside cafeterias in Bali to bank forecourts in Istanbul to Tube trains packed with working men and women on a sunny Thursday morning in London?

The oft trotted-out answer to these questions is that bin Laden wants a free Palestine. Or he wants America’s grubby mitts off Saudi Arabia and an end to the sell-out House of Saud’s domination of that state. Or he wants to liberate Iraq and Afghanistan from American and British occupation and that however bastardised and bloody his tactics may be, he is nonetheless part of an ‘arc of resistance’ to Western meddling in the Middle East (1).

In short, many argue: it’s about territory, stupid! This view is held by thinkers on both sides of the left/right divide. So some of a leftish persuasion have come dangerously close to gushing over al-Qaeda and its offshoot groups, or at least seeking to explain their actions with reference to historic movements for land and freedom.

Rather, al-Qaeda is a new and peculiarly globalised movement. Its people can hail from Riyadh, Paris or Huddersfield, and can claim to be acting on behalf of Muslims in Iraq, Chechnya or Palestine – or even across historic periods as well as borders, as in the case of bin Laden’s claim that he wanted vengeance for the Moors who were booted out of Spain over 500 years ago. They blow up civilians in London or Madrid as payback for the killing of civilians in Grozny or Ramallah, and profess to represent Muslims in nations they have never visited, and which they might have difficulty pointing to on a map (a bit like their arch enemy, George W Bush, perhaps), but which they once saw on an evening news bulletin. ‘Take Mohammed Siddique Khan’, says Devji, referring to the Leeds-born former supply teacher who blew up himself and six others at Edgware Road in London on 7 July. ‘He said he was motivated by Iraq. When did he ever go to Iraq? What does he truly know about Iraq?’

In Landscapes of the Jihad, Devji argues that al-Qaeda’s relations are ‘not the kind of relations that had characterised national struggles in the past, which brought together people who shared a history and a geography into a political arena defined by processes of intentionality and control’. The jihad, he writes, ‘unlike the politics of national movements�is grounded not in the propagation of ideas or similarity of interests and conditions, so much as in the contingent relations of a global marketplace’ (5). In short, the disparate individuals who are part of al-Qaeda, or who claim to be part of al-Qaeda, are not bonded by any common experience of oppression (many of them are well-to-do and Western-educated) or by shared political visions, but rather by fleeting and fluid relationships, often forged in the planning and execution of a one-off spectacular event rather in the pursuit of a future-oriented programme of ideas and tactics.

So al-Qaeda’s fanciful war is not for something tangible; it is not about making a state or an Islamic territory. Where the Islamic radicals of the past – from the Iranian revolutionaries of 1979 to that last gasp of Islamic fundamentalism in the shape of the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in 1996 – were motivated by the desire to create an ideological state, al-Qaeda’s actions are better understood as a pose, Devji tells me, as ‘ethical gestures’. ‘Their acts function as exclamation marks’, he says.

‘Prior to al-Qaeda and networks of that ilk, the form that radical Islam took was fundamentalism – a form that explicitly drew from the communist imagination’, says Devji. ‘These were movements dedicated to setting up, through revolution, an ideological state, and they made use of all those terms: revolution; ideology; ideological state; even workers’ committees and all that. They had critiques of capitalism built into them to various degrees. That is no longer evident and it is not invoked at all by al-Qaeda. They have taken leave of that.’

According to Devji, al-Qaeda is not that different from other movements that inhabit our changed world – in terms of its substitution of moral posturing for politics and its appeal to the media rather than to a grassroots constituency. Indeed, Devji says al-Qaeda associates ‘resemble the members of more familiar global networks, such as those for the environment or against war and globalisation’. He writes: ‘Like the gestures that mark the environmentalist or anti-war movements, those of the jihad arise from the luxury of moral choice. This is a world whose concerns are global in dimension and so resistant to old-fashioned political solutions, calling instead for spectacular gestures that are ethical in nature. The passion of the holy warrior emerges from the same source as that of the anti-war protester – not from a personal experience of oppression but from observing the oppression of others. These impersonal and even vicarious passions draw upon pity for their strength. And pity is perhaps the most violent passion of all because it is selfless enough to tolerate monstrous sacrifices.’ (8)

Devji is at pains to point out that he isn’t saying al-Qaeda and Greenpeace are the same thing. ‘One uses murderous violence, the other doesn’t!’, he tells me. But he does think we need to interrogate the new political and social forces that have created something like al-Qaeda if we are going to come up with better ways of dealing with terrorism than simply by saying ‘sort out Palestine and everything will be okay’. It is time to ditch the lazy explanations that really are political hangovers from a bygone era, and look afresh at the problem of terrorism today.

Landscapes of the Jihad by Faisal Devji is published by Hurst & Company.

0 comments.

spiked-politics | Article | Landscapes of Jihad: Osama bin Laden: more media whore than guerrilla warrior

Posted on October 30th, 2005 by .
Categories: International Terrorism, Religious and Political Radicalization.

spiked-politics | Article | Osama bin Laden: more media whore than guerrilla warrior

Ask yourself the question: what the hell does Osama bin Laden want? Why did he authorise (apparently) the worst terrorist attack of modern times on 9/11, and why do groups or individuals linked to him, or inspired by him, detonate crude bombs – and often themselves, too – everywhere from beachside cafeterias in Bali to bank forecourts in Istanbul to Tube trains packed with working men and women on a sunny Thursday morning in London?

The oft trotted-out answer to these questions is that bin Laden wants a free Palestine. Or he wants America’s grubby mitts off Saudi Arabia and an end to the sell-out House of Saud’s domination of that state. Or he wants to liberate Iraq and Afghanistan from American and British occupation and that however bastardised and bloody his tactics may be, he is nonetheless part of an ‘arc of resistance’ to Western meddling in the Middle East (1).

In short, many argue: it’s about territory, stupid! This view is held by thinkers on both sides of the left/right divide. So some of a leftish persuasion have come dangerously close to gushing over al-Qaeda and its offshoot groups, or at least seeking to explain their actions with reference to historic movements for land and freedom.

Rather, al-Qaeda is a new and peculiarly globalised movement. Its people can hail from Riyadh, Paris or Huddersfield, and can claim to be acting on behalf of Muslims in Iraq, Chechnya or Palestine – or even across historic periods as well as borders, as in the case of bin Laden’s claim that he wanted vengeance for the Moors who were booted out of Spain over 500 years ago. They blow up civilians in London or Madrid as payback for the killing of civilians in Grozny or Ramallah, and profess to represent Muslims in nations they have never visited, and which they might have difficulty pointing to on a map (a bit like their arch enemy, George W Bush, perhaps), but which they once saw on an evening news bulletin. ‘Take Mohammed Siddique Khan’, says Devji, referring to the Leeds-born former supply teacher who blew up himself and six others at Edgware Road in London on 7 July. ‘He said he was motivated by Iraq. When did he ever go to Iraq? What does he truly know about Iraq?’

In Landscapes of the Jihad, Devji argues that al-Qaeda’s relations are ‘not the kind of relations that had characterised national struggles in the past, which brought together people who shared a history and a geography into a political arena defined by processes of intentionality and control’. The jihad, he writes, ‘unlike the politics of national movements�is grounded not in the propagation of ideas or similarity of interests and conditions, so much as in the contingent relations of a global marketplace’ (5). In short, the disparate individuals who are part of al-Qaeda, or who claim to be part of al-Qaeda, are not bonded by any common experience of oppression (many of them are well-to-do and Western-educated) or by shared political visions, but rather by fleeting and fluid relationships, often forged in the planning and execution of a one-off spectacular event rather in the pursuit of a future-oriented programme of ideas and tactics.

So al-Qaeda’s fanciful war is not for something tangible; it is not about making a state or an Islamic territory. Where the Islamic radicals of the past – from the Iranian revolutionaries of 1979 to that last gasp of Islamic fundamentalism in the shape of the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in 1996 – were motivated by the desire to create an ideological state, al-Qaeda’s actions are better understood as a pose, Devji tells me, as ‘ethical gestures’. ‘Their acts function as exclamation marks’, he says.

‘Prior to al-Qaeda and networks of that ilk, the form that radical Islam took was fundamentalism – a form that explicitly drew from the communist imagination’, says Devji. ‘These were movements dedicated to setting up, through revolution, an ideological state, and they made use of all those terms: revolution; ideology; ideological state; even workers’ committees and all that. They had critiques of capitalism built into them to various degrees. That is no longer evident and it is not invoked at all by al-Qaeda. They have taken leave of that.’

According to Devji, al-Qaeda is not that different from other movements that inhabit our changed world – in terms of its substitution of moral posturing for politics and its appeal to the media rather than to a grassroots constituency. Indeed, Devji says al-Qaeda associates ‘resemble the members of more familiar global networks, such as those for the environment or against war and globalisation’. He writes: ‘Like the gestures that mark the environmentalist or anti-war movements, those of the jihad arise from the luxury of moral choice. This is a world whose concerns are global in dimension and so resistant to old-fashioned political solutions, calling instead for spectacular gestures that are ethical in nature. The passion of the holy warrior emerges from the same source as that of the anti-war protester – not from a personal experience of oppression but from observing the oppression of others. These impersonal and even vicarious passions draw upon pity for their strength. And pity is perhaps the most violent passion of all because it is selfless enough to tolerate monstrous sacrifices.’ (8)

Devji is at pains to point out that he isn’t saying al-Qaeda and Greenpeace are the same thing. ‘One uses murderous violence, the other doesn’t!’, he tells me. But he does think we need to interrogate the new political and social forces that have created something like al-Qaeda if we are going to come up with better ways of dealing with terrorism than simply by saying ‘sort out Palestine and everything will be okay’. It is time to ditch the lazy explanations that really are political hangovers from a bygone era, and look afresh at the problem of terrorism today.

Landscapes of the Jihad by Faisal Devji is published by Hurst & Company.

0 comments.

Protected: NRC Handelsblad – God voelde als een XTC-Pil

Posted on October 30th, 2005 by martijn.
Categories: My Research, Religion Other, Youth culture (as a practice).

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C L O S E R – de waarde van je blog

Posted on October 30th, 2005 by .
Categories: Joy Category.

Omdat het zondag is, ff een geintje.

0 comments.

Oh You Who Believe…

Posted on October 29th, 2005 by .
Categories: Internal Debates.

A very interesting weblog is Ummati – Oh You Who Believe…

On this blog, among other things, a discussion on netiquette: Intermingling of the sexes I, about:

The topic in discussion is one that will surely create some controversy amongst the minds of many. Some of you may read the first paragraph and decide you would like to read no further. Others may read the entire post and quietly dismiss what is said. However I place a small request before you: please do ponder upon what is said. Jazakallah.

By communication I mean conversations between a non mehram man and a woman in person, or via the phone, even by a mere look and yes, let me utter the deadly words, the most common form of communication amongst non-mehrams is taking place on the internet. It is the most easiest form and sadly it is succeeding beyond measure in corrupting our minds and leading us astray.

(Let me stress, this form of contact I am referring to is one that is kept unnecessarily, there are instances where non-mehrams can communicate, these shall me mentioned later on inshallah)

The debate continues in a next entry: Intermingling of the sexes II

I was specifically targetting the ‘chatting’ that is taking place in todays age that has become the norm. We no longer consider it to be an evil but instead it seems to be encouraged.

However, I ask you, what has become of us today? We use this very excuse of propagating Islam and instead misuse it to suit our desires. Yes, once in a while an Islamic issue may crop up but other times? Other times, readers we are involved in deep conversations be it MSN or any other way, we are involved in many hours of zina. What is the need in speaking to a non-mehram about personal issues, about petty issues which are simply not necessary.

The discussion is picked up on several blogs: virtuallyislamic and Niqaabi-4ever

0 comments.

Protected: NRC Handelsblad – Lid terreurgroep bleef ongemoeid

Posted on October 28th, 2005 by martijn.
Categories: Murder on theo Van Gogh and related issues, My Research, Religious and Political Radicalization.

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C L O S E R MOI-Dag 2005: Muziek kent geen grenzen

Posted on October 28th, 2005 by .
Categories: Misc. News.

Vereniging voor de studie van het Midden-Oosten en de Islam

Muziek kent geen grenzen
Continu�teit en verandering in muziek en identiteit

11 November 2005

Lokatie:Kerkzaal hoofdgebouw VU

De Boelelaan 1105, Amsterdam
(16e etage)

Meer info: C L O S E R MOI-Dag 2005: Muziek kent geen grenzen

0 comments.

Protected: RTL Z Stelling: Allochtonen zijn in Nederland achtergesteld

Posted on October 28th, 2005 by martijn.
Categories: Multiculti Issues.

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Protected: 1 op de middag: Radicalisering moslimjongeren

Posted on October 28th, 2005 by martijn.
Categories: Murder on theo Van Gogh and related issues, My Research, Religious and Political Radicalization.

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Memories of Sayyid Qutb: An Interview With John Calvert – Worldpress.org

Posted on October 25th, 2005 by .
Categories: Internal Debates.

Memories of Sayyid Qutb: An Interview With John Calvert – Worldpress.org

Nearly 40 years after he was hanged for treason, Sayyid Qutb remains as dangerous today as he was in Nasser�s Egypt. Qutb had pushed the limits of Muslim Brotherhood thought, practically declaring war on any ruler that does not govern by Islamic law. Such talk got him executed, but a new generation of jihadists has taken up his call.

Qutb�s impact was not just felt in his native Egypt. His works and disciples have spread far and wide. In fact, it can be argued that much of Osama bin Laden�s Islamic radicalism can be traced back to the mentoring he received from Sayyid Qutb�s brother and Abdullah Azzam, a Qutb family friend.

Contributing to the study of this influential Egyptian ideologue, John Calvert and William Shepard have recently translated Qutb�s autobiography A Child from the Village. The book tells of a child�s life in rural Upper Egypt, of local superstitions and Sufi holy men, of government medical missions and looming poverty � of an extremist before he became an extremist.

(more…)

1 comment.

Protected: AD.nl – We praten nog steeds vooral over elkaar

Posted on October 25th, 2005 by martijn.
Categories: Gouda Issues.

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Sorry wereld, wij willen vermaakt worden

Posted on October 25th, 2005 by .
Categories: Some personal considerations.

Wij, Nederlanders, zijn toch een raar volkje. Neem nu onze oranje-voetbalsupporters. Nederland plaatste zich door de 2-0 zege uit in Tsjechi� en dus kon de thuiswedstrijd tegen Macedoni� een aardig feestje worden. Helaas het werd 0-0. De supporters waren blijkbaar vergeten dat supporteren toch eigenlijk een werkwoord is. Een werkwoord dat niet hetzelfde betekent als vanuit je luie stoel met bier, chips en afstandsbediening in je hand, rondzappen naar ander vermaak als het ene je niet bevalt. Nee supporteren is je team aanmoedigen als het niet goed gaat (en het ging niet goed), keihard juichen als het wel goed gaat (en het ging goed want ‘we’ gaan door) en de supporters van de tegenstanders met rust laten.

Ik heb zelden zo’n grote groep dooie supporters in de trein zien zitten daarna. Ik baalde al want ik kwam die avond laat uit Gouda vanwege mijn onderzoek aldaar en zag het vooruitzicht met lallende supporters niet zo zitten. Het was doodstil. Men had zich verveeld…

Hetzelfde doet zich nu weer voor, maar dan op een heel ander front: de aardbeving in Pakistan. De Volkskrant bracht het pijnlijk in beeld met haar kop: Sorry Pakistan, jullie ramp heeft het niet Hierin wordt verwezen naar de de trage stroom van donaties naar aanleiding van die ramp. Deze zou in schril contrast staan met eerdere rampen en met name met die Tsunami-ramp van vorig jaar.

Geen werklozen die met behoud van uitkering naar het rampgebied willen, geen �artiesten voor Kashmir�, geen optimistische analyses over de groeiende filantropische inslag van de Nederlander, geen landelijke televisieavond. De SHO heeft daar wel om gevraagd, zegt Brouwer, �maar de omroepen maken een eigen afweging�.

Het klinkt cru, zegt Jan Krol van het Vakblad Fondsenwerving, maar deze ramp h��ft het niet. De aardbeving is ernstig genoeg voor massale actie maar �tijd en plaats zijn fout�.

Uitleg: �De tsunami kwam op tweede kerstdag. Iedereen had vrij, zat voor de tv en gaf geld. Nu is iedereen volop bezig met zijn werk. De tsunami gebeurde bovendien om de hoek: in vakantiebestemmingen waar ook Nederlanders werden vermist. Pakistan is psychologisch gezien veel verder weg.�

En dan is het �een ander soort ramp�, zegt Suzanne Vermeulen van Tear Fund, dat inmiddels 50duizend euro naar Pakistan stuurde en schrijnende verhalen terughoort over het uitblijven van hulp. �Een tsunami kun je je niet voorstellen, een aardbeving komt vaker voor�. Bovendien spoelde de vloedgolf via home videos zo de huiskamer in.

VU-collega Theo Schuyt die zeer interessant onderzoek doet naar Filantropie in Nederland, wijst op het fenomeen van ‘kinship altruism’:

we geven meer als het gaat om mensen als onszelf. Jaarlijks dingen driehonderd rampen naar de gunst van de gever, zegt hij erbij, dus dat er keuzes worden gemaakt is logisch.

En dat speelt natuurlijk een rol. Nou ja een beetje in ieder geval. Bij die tsunami waren toeristen (dat zijn wij allemaal wel eens) betrokken en dan ook nog eens Nederlandse toeristen. Degenen die het overleefden konden o p Schiphol voor alle camera’s hun zegje doen.

Een vergelijkbare ramp in India in 2001 leverde na een week al bijna 9 miljoen op en de Pakistan-ramp staat nu op 4,5 miljoen. ‘Kinship altruism’ brengt mij nog op een ander idee. Zou het iets te maken kunnen hebben met het feit dat de slachtoffers vooral moslims zijn? Sommige mensen zijn zo boos over de moslims hier, dat ze moslims heel ergens anders nog niet het licht in hun ogen zouden gunnen:

Pakistani, mohammedanen, wapenleveranciers, moordenaars, doei.
Waarom zouden wij jullie in leven willen houden om ons nog verder uit te moorden?
Hoe durven organisaties of pakistani dit van ons te vragen? Hieruit blijkt wel weer dat wederom respect, medelevendheid, medemenselijkheid van ons geeist wordt, maar zodra wij dat terugvragen is daar het ‘geloof’, de uitspraken van ene pedofiele moordenaar die hun voorbeeld is.
Best wel zielig hoor, die beelden die nu de schermen weer overspoelen, maar het lijkt mij dat het westen ook maar eens een statement moet maken.
Jullie vermoorden ons, moeten wij geld gaan storten om jullie in leven te houden om ons straks te vermoorden?
Hoe zot denken ze dat wij zijn?

Daarbij wordt dan ook nog verwezen naar het feit dat Arabische landen zouden achterblijven. Het is natuurlijk maar wat je als norm hanteert. Overigens denk ik dat het wanneer het in Marokko of Turkije zou zijn, ook autochtone Nederlanders toch wat guller zijn; daar hebben we dan toch net ff wat meer mee dan met Pakistan. En natuurlijk speelt ook mee dat Pakistan verder weg is dan let’s say Limburg. Toen de mensen daar in ’95 natte voeten kregen (want meer was het niet) spraken we over watersnoodramp (als dat een ramp was, wat was 1953 dan?) en haalden we meer dan 30 gulden op.

Maar deze kinship altruism is niet de hele verklaring en daar wijst de Volkskrant kop al hop. Jullie ramp heeft het niet…wat niet? Nou heel simpel: de X factor of nog beter: Je ne sais quoi:

‘I do not know what’; indescribable attractive attribute or quality; ‘a certain something’.

De ‘je ne sais quoi’ factor van de Tsunami zat ‘m in die toeristen die met hun cameraatje opnames hadden gemaakt van ronduit spectaculair geweld. Dat dan ook nog eens zo recht in onze huiskamer kwam. Zien we in Pakistan alleen de gevolgen van de oerkracht van Moeder Natuur, bij de tsunami zagen we de oerkracht zelf. En we hoefden er niks voor te doen…alleen tussen de kersttollen, konijnen en bavaroispudding door even de tv aan te zetten en te zappen. Net als bij de 9-11 aanslagen; als je niet zou weten dat het echt was, zou je denken dat je naar een Hollywood film zat te kijken. Veel sexier en gelikter kan een film niet zijn.

En ja laten we eerlijk zijn, we willen wel vermaakt worden. Zo’n ramp ok, maar ik wil wel kunnen vertellen dat ik het zelf met eigen ogen gezien heb, anders is het zo saai…

De term disneyficatie komt hier om de hoek kijken.

dat het etiket �Disneyficatie� van toepassing is op alle omgevingen die, net als Disneyparken, veilig zijn, waar de bezoeker vermaakt wordt, er geen onplezierige gebeurtenissen plaatsvinden en alles gesaneerd is.

Dat mag vreemd lijken met zo’n ramp maar dat is niet, want:

Zowel Disneys als alle daarop ge�nte projecten, hebben als gemeenschappelijk doel om de bezoeker het gevoel te geven even weg te zijn van het dagelijks leven en aan te zetten tot consumptie. Een ontwikkeling die zich in snel tempo verspreidt waardoor er steeds minder ruimte is voor andere waarden, normen en lokale culturele tradities. De nadruk wordt binnen de scriptie gelegd op Disneyficatie van architectuur in Noord-Amerika en Europa. De thematisch opgezette fantasie-architectuur en het controle- en organisatieconcept heeft uiteindelijk geleid tot een �Global Experience Design�.

Met andere woorden het filmscript van de ram moet zo zijn, dat mensen worden aangezet tot consumptie: kijken naar de beelden. Mensen nemen het tot zich, voelen er zich toe aangetrokken en trekken daarom de beurs op basis van deze ‘Disney Experience’. Ellende is er wel, maar in deze Disney Experience kan alles tot een goed einde gebracht worden als je maar geld geeft. Met andere woorden, de tsunami was een enorme Disney Experience en Pakistan eerder een ‘bad trip’.

Drie �toverwoorden� zorgen voor de succesformule: spektakel, consumptie en permanente controle.

Nou de tsunami was een spektakel en van Pakistan hebben we dat niet kunnen zien. Consumptie is het massale kijken naar beelden van de ramp en controle is het geld geven; het bezweren van het kwaad.

Een juiste combinatie van die factoren zorgt denk ik voor de je ne sais quoi factor. Daarom is die tv-uitzending die er dan toch gaat komen zo’n goed idee. Dat kan voor de nodige spektakel zorgen; op die manier kan wellicht van een ramp met een nix-factor een ramp met een x-factor gemaakt worden. Doet Talpa ook mee?

Die tv-actie geeft ons de gelegenheid vermaakt e worden �n te geven. En wat zullen we ons lekker voelen als we dat gedaan hebben. Nu maar hopen dat we ook inderdaad vermaakt worden, want als het een droge 0-0 wordt, is het wel saai.

DONEER HIER

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Protected: AD.nl – Jeugddetentie ge-eist tegen bommaker

Posted on October 25th, 2005 by martijn.
Categories: Religious and Political Radicalization.

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C L O S E R – If you are going to Fallujah Send my regards to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi

Posted on October 23rd, 2005 by .
Categories: International Terrorism.

C L O S E R

Is it fake or is it real? Thats the question. The letter from Ayman Zawahiri to Abu Musab Zarqawi has led to many reactions. Some people are questioning if the letter is real. According to Bruce Lawrence on Tabsir (and in National Review Online):

On the face of it, the content reflects much of what Zawahiri and his comrade, Osama bin Laden, have long been saying is the crux of the jihadi cause: Muslim lands have been invaded by infidels; apostate Muslim rulers welcome the invaders.

ALSO FAMILIAR is the incremental theory of how the reclamation of Muslim territory will take place: Expel the Americans from Iraq; establish an Islamic authority there; then extend the jihad wave to the secular countries nearby.

But Lawrence also has some doubts:

In fact, so important is winning goodwill that it entails overlooking doctrinal error, even heresy just short of blasphemy, among the Sunni ulama (the elite religious community). It also requires non-provocation of Shiite leaders, even though the falsehood of Shiite doctrines (and the Shiites� collusion with the invaders) is said to be “well known.”

If the letter is authentic, this would be a rare and extraordinary instance of strategic gamesmanship within Al Qaeda. For Al Qaeda to suggest compromising with tainted followers in order to ensure group cohesion to gain a larger prize � freedom from foreign occupation � would certainly be unprecedented.

They do have some very plausible arguments:

First is the suspiciously long delay between when the letter was written and when it was made public.
And then there is the improbable request for the payment of 100,000 (presumably dollars) from Zarqawi to Zawahiri, when one might have expected the opposite channel of funding.
And the bizarre suggestion that if the reader is going to Fallouja, “send greetings to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.” Did the writer of this letter forget that it was already addressed to Zarqawi?

The last part is important, because it is the reason why Katz states in a reaction on Lawrence on National Review Online the letter is for real.

In spite of these and similar doubts, Reuters quoted a spokesman for John Negroponte, U.S. director of national intelligence, who acknowledged that the greetings passage did appear confusing, but that the intelligence community was confident the letter was authentic. Other terrorism experts suggested that perhaps the letter was not addressed to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, but rather to abu Musab al-Suri, also known as Mustafa Setmarian Nasser, al Qaeda ideologist and expert on urban warfare.

Media representatives, U.S. government officials, and experts who doubt the credibility of the letter may have jumped to the wrong conclusion. The greetings in the passage in question, if anything, strongly confirm the letter�s authenticity. What all these pundits are sometimes missing is a familiarity with the vernacular of the jihadi community.

She points to a poem and a song that circulates widely on the internet

Since November 2004, following battles with the Coalition Forces in Fallujah, jihadis on the Internet have been widely using a slogan that was borrowed from a poem. The poem included the following lines:
It will be destroyed on the arrogant son of an arrogant

You who rule countries by his infidels

You can kill flies with chemicals

You who are riding the fast thing

By Allah, where are you going to?

If you are going to Fallujah

Send my regards to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi

And all the jihadis in his group . . .1

The poem has caught on in jihadi circles. Members of hundreds of online jihadi forums, not just ones directly connected to the insurgents in Iraq, had posted and discussed it. Some of these discussions are down now, but others are still active. Examples are the Jihadi Palestinian Forum where the poem has been posted since November 15, 2004, and the Yemen Youth Forum, which still features an active link.

On November 14, 2004 ,the Buradh jihadi message board posted a new thread titled �By Allah, if by chance you are going to Fallujah, send greetings to Abu Musab al-zarqawi.� The entire al-Ghamidi poem was posted, but the focus of discussion was the slogan. Likewise, on January 23, 2005, a member of a Palestinian forum signing as �Muhammad the engineer� posted a new thread, with the same title. Shortly thereafter, the slogan turned into a synonym for Zarqawi�s �great war� against the �crusaders.�Some message-board members even use it as a signature and in response to al Qaeda communiqu�s. The slogan is also frequently used in greetings, blessings, or, as in Zawahiri�s letter, as concluding statements.

This would mean, according to Katz, that this sentence (By Allah, if by chance you are going to Fallujah, send greetings to Abu Musab al-zarqawi.) is an important symbolic message to incite people for the war against the ‘crusaders’.

Katz makes a strong (but is it convincing?) argument concerning the specific sentence but she doesn’t adress the other concerns. So the question is still open for debate…

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Protected: Trouw – Hoofddoek / In de Koran staat het dus niet

Posted on October 21st, 2005 by martijn.
Categories: Internal Debates, Islam in the Netherlands.

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Ynetnews – News – British Muslim group declares new jihad

Posted on October 21st, 2005 by .
Categories: International Terrorism.

Ynetnews – News – British Muslim group declares new jihad

British Muslim group declares new jihad

A Ynetnews investigation has uncovered online recruitment of British Muslims for participation in terror attacks; ‘We should give them another magnificent day in history’ threatens one man

There is also a threat against Denmark, more information about that you will find at infovlad.net

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Protected: Trouw, hetNieuws| nederland – Misbruik via internet / Digitale kinderlokker heeft al gauw beet

Posted on October 21st, 2005 by martijn.
Categories: Misc. News.

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Protected: Trouw, hetNieuws| nederland – Misbruik via internet / Digitale kinderlokker heeft al gauw beet

Posted on October 21st, 2005 by martijn.
Categories: Misc. News.

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Protected: AD.nl – Afellay: Vasten en San Siro

Posted on October 19th, 2005 by martijn.
Categories: Islam in the Netherlands.

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C L O S E R – Van Hasna naar Gothic – Nou en?

Posted on October 19th, 2005 by .
Categories: Misc. News.

Enige tijd geleden heb ik nogal wat aandacht besteed aan Hasna de inmiddels ex-columniste van NRC en Spunk.nl. Zij gooide, jammer genoeg, het bijltje erbij neer na bedreigd te zijn. Vervolgens vonden enkele mensen dat de Marokkaanse gemeenschap hier stelling tegen moest nemen.

Alle commotie is echter niet alleen terug te redeneren naar berbers vs. arabieren en de marokkaanse gemeenschap. Het heeft ook wel iets te maken met hoe op internet discussies gevoerd worden.

Dat laat ook de volgende affaire zien. De groep Nou En heeft een nummer uitgebracht: Gothic Meisje. En dat roept nogal wat reacties op diverse gothicfora.

“H� gothic-meisje, wat doe je chagrijnig, je ogen staan zo dof en je zegt zo weinig. Ik ben een beetje bang voor jou”,

luiden drie regels van het refrein. En uit een couplet:

“Maar om daarom nou het hele jaar erbij te lopen als een zombie in een vleermuispak, zeg nou zelf, dat is een beetje raar of hang je ‘s nachts ook aan de balken van het zolderdak.”

Reacties zijn onder andere lezen de Nouen.weblog.nl. Bijvoorbeeld:

childrenofbodom :: 14 oktober 2005 14:04

vieze vuile kanker leiers weten jullie dat als ik wiost wie jullie waren en ik wist waar jullei woonden en ik zou jullie 1 op 1 tegen komen maak ik jullie helemaal kanker kapot :@:@:@ serieus ik zou maar focking bodyguards inhuren want ik scheur jullie kanker leiers helemaal aan kanker stukken :@:@:@
let op mijn woorden mannetjes ik laat niks van jullie over jullie gaan ervaren wat er gebeurt als 8 jaar opgekropte haat en woede naar buiten komt :@:@:@ KANKER HOEREN!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
al jullie fucking kanker losers bring it on!!!!!!!!!!!!!

childrenofbodom :: 14 oktober 2005 14:36

nee ik ga molotov cocktails op dat kk poduim van ze gooien als ze bezig zijn branden zullen de kanker motherfuckers

witch009 :: 14 oktober 2005 15:13

BLIJF VECHTEN TOT HET BITTERE EIND…

DE OVERWINNING IS AAN ONS!!!!!!!

tot snel mensen…
zoen
Birgit :: 14 oktober 2005 15:22

beste mensen
we dwalen een beetje van het onderwerp af, het gaat erom dat nouen realiseerd dat die k*ttekst niet kan!

Met andere woorden; men wil het liedje van Nouen weg hebben. Gelukkig zijn er ook nog mensen die minder hard van stapel lopen en nuchter wil blijven en tegelijkertijd erg bekende vragen stellen:

Er vermeldt dat niet �lle goths aan de bedreigingen meedoen, wat een vreemde verslaggever, zo hoort dat toch niet?

Op zich helemaal geen rare reactie vanuit de zogenaamde ‘gothic’ scene…
October 19 2005, 3:44 PM

… aangezien uit de tekst duidelijk blijkt dat ze zich richten op de gothic metal scene, en niks van doen (en waarschijnlijk geen eens enig flauw benul) hebben met (van) de gothic scene.

En tja, de metal scene staat nu niet echt bekend om zijn non-agressiviteit, , en zelfspot is zulke types (dus niet de gothic metal scene algemeen… “ik heb niks tegen de gothic metal scene, ik heb wat tegen de uitwassen van de gothic metal scene”) meestal ook al onbekend, dus tja…Daar zitten altijd wel een aantal mensjes tussen die graag een reden zoeken om zich weer eens lekker “uit te leven”.

Zoals dit forum laat zien, heeft de gothic scene wel de zelfspot om te lachen om dit liedje. Maar ja, wij krijgen het alsnog weer op ons bord…

Eigenlijk was dit de druppel die de emmer deed overlopen. Al jaren hebben mensen vooroordelen tegen
Gothics. Wij pikken dit niet langer en gaan deze vooroordelen de wereld uithelpen. Ja dus wij dragen donkere kleding. Ja dus wij luisteren metal en Hard rock muziek. Ja dus wij zijn iets spontaner dan de rest. DUS? Wij hebben toch ook geen commentaar over b.v R&B fans of Hardcore fans? Iedereen heeft zijn eigen stijl van muziek en kleding! Wij zijn niet allemaal depressief! Wij slaan niet mensen zonder reden neer omdat we daar zin in hebben! Wij zijn gewoon mensen net zoals jullie met een iets andere levens stijl!”

Sounds familiar huh?

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Protected: NRC – Koran eist hoofddoek, bijbel een lange rok

Posted on October 19th, 2005 by martijn.
Categories: Multiculti Issues.

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MarokkoNederland2005 – Lihoed Maroc

Posted on October 19th, 2005 by .
Categories: Misc. News.

MarokkoNederland2005 – Lihoed Maroc

Dit najaar opent het Bijbels Museum de tentoonstelling Lihoed Maroc, die de bijzondere geschiedenis belicht van de joodse gemeenschap in Marokko. In de titel komen de twee werelden samen: Lihoed betekent �joden� in het Marokkaans Arabisch. Op 23 oktober geeft Dr Herman Obdeijn met zijn lezing over de rol van de Joden in de Marokkaanse geschiedenis meer inzicht in de achtergronden van de tentoonstelling.

Geschiedenis: Al ver voor de komst van de islam in de achtste eeuw woonden er joden in Noord-Afrika. De joodse gemeenschap vormt eeuwenlang de belangrijkste en grootste minderheidsgroep in Marokko. Op grond van hun geschiedenis, cultuur en tradities is deze gemeenschap in twee groepen te onderscheiden. De eerste groep zijn de autochtonen, de toshavim, die sinds eeuwen op het platteland wonen. De tweede groep zijn de �verdrevenen�, de megorashim, uit Spanje en Portugal, die vooral in de steden wonen. Deze tweedeling is in de tentoonstelling terug te vinden.

Platteland – Stad: De cultuur van de plattelandsjoden is nauw verweven met die van de berbers. Beiden leefden immers lang in Marokko voor de islam er zijn intrede deed. Tal van objecten laten die gemeenschappelijke geschiedenis zien. Voor de nu in Nederland woonachtige Marokkanen, van oorsprong grotendeels afkomstig van de Berberbevolking in het Rifgebergte, is deze cultuur zeer herkenbaar. Dat dit een gedeeld joods-islamitisch erfgoed betreft, zal voor velen een eye-opener zijn.
De voorwerpen in het stadsgedeelte van de tentoonstelling zijn afkomstig uit steden en grote centra en tonen vaak een rijker karakter qua materiaal en bewerking. Ook wordt hier aandacht besteed aan architectuur en interieur. Een aparte ruimte vormt de muziekkamer; de Marokkaans joodse muziek is bij uitstek een bindmiddel en gemeenschappelijke factor. Dit wordt duidelijk gemaakt aan de hand van instrumenten, foto�s en hoorbare muziek.

Recente ontwikkelingen: De naoorlogse ontwikkelingen en de emigratie van de joden vanaf de jaren �50 worden in beeld gebracht door grote zwart-wit foto�s. Deze vormen de overgang naar het slot van de tentoonstelling. Prachtige verstilde kleurenfoto�s geven een indruk van het nu nog in Marokko aanwezige joodse culturele erfgoed. Ook wordt een gefilmd familieportret getoond, waarin de band van eeuwen tussen de joden en Marokko nadrukkelijk aanwezig is.

De tentoonstelling: De geschiedenis wordt getoond aan de hand van een grote verscheidenheid aan objecten, waaronder gebruiksvoorwerpen, kledij, sieraden, documenten, film en foto�s. De tentoonstelling is voor het merendeel samengesteld uit de priv�-collectie van Paul Dahan uit Brussel, een van de grootste in zijn soort in Europa. Gedurende de looptijd van de expositie vinden verschillende publieksevenementen plaats, waaronder lezingen, concerten en kinderactiviteiten. Lihoed Maroc, Marokko en de joden – een gedeelde geschiedenis, is in het Bijbels Museum te zien van 22 september 2005 t/m 15 januari 2006.

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