Vermijden van kerstmis…

Posted on December 21st, 2009 by martijn.
Categories: Internal Debates, ISIM/RU Research, Multiculti Issues.

Stem op het beste en slechtste!.

..dat is nog niet zo’n slecht idee, maar goed dat zegt dan ook een kerstmishater zoals ik. Het altijd goed geïnformeerde Allochtonen Weblog (wanneer verandert die naam nou eens?) komt met het volgende bericht:
Allochtonenweblog: Orthodoxe groepen roepen moslims op zich verre te houden van christelijke feestdagen

er [zijn] orthodoxe groeperingen die zich verzetten tegen het vieren door moslims van christelijke feestdagen. Zo heb ik dit jaar van verschillende afzenders een mail ontvangen waarin moslims wordt opgeroepen zich verre te houden van christelijke feestdagen. De brief bevat de volgende passage:

Wat houdt het vermijden van niet-islamitische feesten in de praktijk in?
1. Wegblijven van hun vieringen, dus het vermijden van plaatsen waar ze hun feestelijkheden houden en het vermijden dat je in hun feestelijkheden terecht komt, zoals bijvoorbeeld kerstmis en nieuwjaarsborrels, verjaardagsfeesten, st. maarten, sinterklaas, 1 aprilgrappen, allerlei jubilea, etc.
2. Vermijden om zelf zaken te doen, die te maken hebben met deze vieringen van de niet-moslims, zoals het in huis halen van een kerstboom, je kinderen mee laten doen met st. maarten of sinterklaas, verjaardagen vieren in je familiekring, vuurwerk afsteken op nieuwjaarsdag etc.
3. Vermijden om de niet-moslims te feliciteren met hun vieringen. Hoe kunnen we ze feliciteren met het feit dat ze ongehoorzaam zijn aan Allaah (subhanahu wa ta’ala)? Uitingen zoals prettige verjaardag, gelukkige feestdagen, gelukkig nieuwjaar, zijn ongepast. Het enige geluk is immers te vinden in imaan, waar geloof! Een moslim mag dus iemand niet feliciteren met het begaan van zonden en ongehoorzaamheid aan Allaah (subhanahu wa ta’ala)!
4. We moeten ook niet van onze eigen feesten imitaties maken van de feesten van de niet-moslims, dus dezelfde dingen doen die zij doen met hun feesten. Sowieso zullen veel van deze zaken verboden zijn.
Om onze identiteit en waardigheid te bewaren en om Allaah´s liefde en acceptatie te verdienen (en dit betekent vrede en geluk in dit leven en het uiteindelijke slagen in het Hiernamaals), laten we ons houden aan wat Allaah (subhanahu wa ta’ala) genoegen doet. Hij heeft ons dit laten weten in Zijn Boek en middels Zijn Boodschapper. En bedenk dat feesten en vieringen hierop geen uitzondering vormen.

Het volledige stuk kan HIER gelezen worden. Daartegenover staat het bericht in Trouw (onder meer opgepikt door Nieuwwij):
Mohammed, Alia en Feruk vieren Kerst – Trouw

Islam en Kerst, gaat dat samen? Steeds meer mensen vinden van wel. Kerstmis is niet alleen een religieus feest, maar heeft ook aardse waarde, „vriendschap, liefde, warmte en gezelligheid. Daar kan een moslim niet tegen zijn”.

Dit is allemaal niet erg nieuw. Het stuk waar Allochtonen weblog naar verwijst circuleert (deels) al enkele jaren op internet, zie Marokko.nl en is inmiddels aangepast en gerecycled op Ansaar.nl en Afghan.nl Forum. Op Ansaar.nl staat te lezen dat het stuk afkomstig zou zijn van de projectgroep Islam en Dialoog; of dat ook klopt weet ik niet. Een en ander verwijst naar een breder debat onder moslims en een bredere vraag: hoe moslim te zijn in een niet-moslim samenleving én wie spreekt namens de islam? Het is dan ook geen debat dat alleen tot Nederland beperkt blijft zoals onder meer het volgende artikel uit de Britse Independent laat zien:
Can a Muslim say happy Christmas to his friends? – This Britain, UK – The Independent

As a 23-year-old professional who socialises widely, Mr Azam had never considered the possibility that someone in his community might frown upon him for going round to his neighbours at Christmas or partying during New Year. But his friend, who had become increasingly devout, was adamant that such behaviour was haram (forbidden).

“Personally I think he’s wrong,” explained Mr Azam. “But it’s difficult to argue against him because all the information he gets is taken from the internet and it makes him sound very knowledgeable.”

Such a debate between two young British Muslims would have been almost unthinkable two decades ago. But today it is frequently the internet that young Muslims turn to when looking for spiritual advice. And what they find in cyberspace is often shockingly intolerant. “Do not congratulate [the unbeliever] on their festivals in any way whatsoever,” warns one prominent site. “That implies approval of their festival and not denouncing them.”

The Independent verwijst ook naar die bredere debatten en haalt als casus daarvoor de strijd tussen Egyptische Al Azhar en Saudische geleerden aan:
Can a Muslim say happy Christmas to his friends? – This Britain, UK – The Independent

Armed with quotes from Saudi scholars living thousands of miles away, a small number of angry young British Muslims are forgoing the inclusive Islam their parents were once taught in favour of an interpretation that encourages them to cut themselves off from mainstream society and view all non-Muslims with contempt.

But now, as the Hajj gets under way in Mecca, one of the world’s oldest Islamic institutions has come to Britain to remind young Muslims who might be tempted by the Wahabi rhetoric that there is an alternative way to worship. Scholars from Al-Azhar in Cairo have been touring Britain’s mosques to launch a new online book of fatwas (Islamic judgements) which directly challenge the Saudi way of thinking.

Het stuk verwijst naar Al Azhar’s stuk The Response dat te vinden is op de website Fixyourdeen (repareer je religie):
Fix Your Deen

What can the present work add to the overcrowded and, it seems, increasingly stagnant debate on “how to live as a Muslim in the modern world”? This book’s importance lies in refocusing our attention on the flexibility and coherence of the works of Sunni Islam’s traditional legal authorities, a point that, while eloquently made in Professor Muhammad Ra’fat ‘Uthman’s introduction, informs the reasoning behind all the legal opinions (fatawa) contained here. Of course, the same kind of reasoning was exercised by the classical jurists, for whom “difference” (ikhtilaf) was perceived as a sign of God’s mercy (rahma). Sadly, the jurists’ initial courage – their respect for difference, even for ambiguity – is now often forgotten, as the search for a single, monolithic reading to solve all problems regularly results in discussions breaking down into mere polemic. In troubled times, the authors invite Muslims to exercise compassion and common sense in their dealings with each other. The advice given is not to judge harshly someone who fails to live up to your standards, or who prefers a different path, or who is ignorant of the law in a particular instance.

The Response is written primarily for Muslims who, in searching for guidance, have been given simplistic, problematic and often dangerous readings of the faith. Its hope – for Muslims to value patience, caution and mercy – should not be misread as a call for undue lenience. The lines separating Muslim behavior from that of non-Muslims are clearly delineated. One example will suffice: while certain commentators prohibit Muslims from congratulating non-Muslims on the latter’s festival days, The Response permits this (fatwa no. 15); yet, it also links this permission to the condition that Muslims do not, while interacting with non-Muslims, begin to emulate their thinking or behavior. Any act that endangers a Muslim’s commitment to his or her faith is strongly discouraged; what is most important in establishing ethical and legal culpability is the underlying intention (niyya). The classical jurists would have agreed.

Originally composed in Arabic, this work was translated into English with a sense of urgency: it needed to be done, and it needed to be done now. The Response joins a growing body of scholarship through which the early legal scholars of Islam are permitted once again to speak for themselves. In contrast to the idiosyncratic interpretations of certain contemporary Hanbali scholars, the books’ authors realize the need for some rulings to be adapted to modern settings; they strive to do so without sacrificing the fundamental principles upon which the original rulings were based (e.g. fatwa no. 75). Needless to say, not all the opinions recommended here will convince all readers. But, these authors would contend, that is not the main issue at stake. For, as they repeatedly emphasize throughout their work, so long as an issue produces ikhtilaf among the scholars of Islam, it may not be legally prohibited by Muslims (e.g. fatwa 48). Ultimately, then, the authors’ response to extremism is to leave Muslims, as intelligent readers, to make their own choices, and to live with the consequences of these.

Het gehele boek kan HIER gedownload worden.

Cover 'The Response'

Ik heb het zelf nog niet gelezen en kan er dus weinig over zeggen behalve dan dat het duidelijk geschreven is met Saudische geleerden in het achterhoofd aangezien ze na iedere vraag een Saudische fatwa citeren en dan hun eigen (naar eigen zeggen centristische) alternatief geven. Bijvoorbeeld met betrekking tot het feliciteren van niet-moslims met hun religieuze festivals:

Question: A question was asked about whether or not Muslims should congratulate non- Muslims during the latter’s festivals (a‘ayad).
Fatwa in Brief: It is illegal to congratulate non-Muslims during their religious festivals. In so doing one shares in sin, and [their] corruption.
The Permanent Committee, 313/3
See Shaykh Sa‘id ‘Abd al-‘Azim, www.alsalafway.com

Response:
There is no harm in congratulating non-Muslims with whom you have a family relationship, or that are neighbours of yours. Regarding their festivals, however, do not participate in the rituals (tuqus) of Christians, or those in a similar religious category [i.e. non-Muslims].
Commentary:
In two verses from the Holy Qur’an the nature of relationships between Muslims and others are laid down (Q. 60:8-9). These verses apply directly to the polytheists and idol-worshippers (mushrikin wa’l-wathaniyyin)
“Allah forbids you not, with regard to those who fight you not for (your) Faith nor drive you out of your homes, from dealing kindly and justly with them: for Allah loveth those who are just”.

“Allah only forbids you with regard to those who fight you for (your) Faith, and drive you out of your homes, and support (others) in driving you out, from turning to them (for friendship and protection). It is such as turn to them (in these circumstances), that do wrong”.
These two verses distinguish between, on the one hand, the peaceful (musalamin) and, on the other hand, the warriors (muharibin). Regarding the peaceful [non-Muslims], the law recommends behaving justly with them, this, in turn leads to charitable and kind dealings. On the other hand, the second verse forbids loyalty to the warriors. This is because they have taken Muslims as enemies, have fought with them and have driven them out of their homes.
The two Shaykhs [i.e. Bukhari and Muslim] report a hadith in which Asma’ (r.a.) the daughter of Abu Bakr, came to the Prophet (upon him be peace) and said: “O Messenger of God, my mother has come to me, and she is a polytheist (mushrika), and she wants to remain in contact with me, should I stay in touch with her?” The Prophet (upon him be peace) replied, yes, stay in touch with your mother. This hadith is agreed upon.
[We note that] This is the Prophet’s attitude towards a polytheist (mushrika); however, Islam’s approach to the People of the Book [i.e. to Jews and Christians] is known to be more lenient. Indeed, the Qur’an permits Muslims to be the dinner companions of Jews and Christians, and [even] to marry them. Obviously, in the latter case, an affectionate relationship is required. Further [as mentioned already], motherhood privileges a woman in her role over her children. The children [of a non-Muslim mother] will congratulate her on her festival days, and behave well towards her. The generous Prophet (upon him be peace) advises us “to treat people kindly” [lit: “with strong ethics”). He said “treat people”, and not just Muslims with kindness.21
Hence, if someone congratulates a Muslim during one of their feast, we are to respond to his greeting with a better, or at least an equal greeting. For God Almighty says:
“When ye are greeted with a greeting, [you should] return [this] with a better, or at least an equal greeting”. (Q. 4:86.)
Another motive to respond to the non-Muslim’s greeting is that, if Muslims want to call them [the non-Muslims] to Islam – which is an obligation upon all Muslims – one’s relationship with them should obviously be cordial. While in Mecca, the Prophet (upon him be peace) was well-mannered, and polite to the polytheists of the Quraysh. He behaved like this despite the fact that they wished to hurt him, and were plotting against him and his Companions. Indeed, he was so polite and decent with them that they trusted him with their valuables (wada‘i’). So, there should be nothing to prevent a Muslim from congratulating them verbally, or through letters that do not involve religious words or symbols. [This should not be difficult as] The greetings used to congratulate on such occasions do not normally pertain to religion; instead, they involve well-known complimentary messages. Likewise, there is also nothing to prevent a Muslim from accepting a present from non-Muslims, and [even] rewarding them for it. The Prophet (upon him be peace) accepted presents from non-Muslims. Hence, he accepted a gift from (among others) al-Muqawqas, the greatest of the Copts in Egypt. Likewise, we may accept presents on the condition that they are not forbidden by God, such as alcohol and pork.22 Regarding days set aside for national and social festivals, such as Independence Day, Children’s Day, Mother’s Day, and so on, a Muslim is free to congratulate non-Muslims at these times. If he is a citizen in this country, he is even free to participate in them, as long as he avoids the illegal acts that may occur during these occasions.
Dr. Yassir ‘Abd al-‘Azim

The response, p. 52-54, zie ook de uitspraken onder supervisie van Qaradawi
The Response is te zien als een poging van Al Azhar om hun positie als leidend islamitisch instituut te herstellen, zo stelt Gauvain in The Independent en de nuance en ambiguïteit terug te brengen in de islam die al zo lang het kenmerk zijn van de islamitische tradities. De vraag is echter of dit wel zal aanslaan. Al Azhar heeft veel van haar positie verloren en voor velen is het juist de nuance en ambiguïteit in de islamitische tradities die een probleem zijn omdat het daardoor zou lijken alsof de islamitische boodschap is aangepast en dus verwaterd. De Al Azhar sheikhs worden ook wel gezien als ‘paleisgeleerden’ of ‘paleissheikhs’ omdat ze aan de leiband zouden lopen van de Egyptische overheid (en bezwaar dat sommigen overigens ook tegen enkele Saoedische sheikhs inbrengen). Het gebrek aan controle en reikwijdte van Azhar, maar tegelijkertijd ook de grote invloed die men niettemin toch heeft, was goed te zien bij de recente case over Sheikh Tantawi van de Al Azhar die de niqab verbood op scholen. Er zijn vrouwen (met en zonder niqab) die Tantawi’s actie afkeuren en die vast blijven houden aan wat zij zien als het voorbeeld van de vrouwen van de profeet. In het Midden-Oosten gaat het daarbij ook om een strijd tussen de seculiere elite en de conservatieve en progressieve massa die voor spiritualiteit maar ook voor een politiek alternatief het antwoord in de islam vinden. Een soortgelijke strijd is ook in Europa te vinden waar de laatste jaren in toenemende mate de Europese overheden ook menen iets te moeten vinden over de islam en de geloofsbeleving van mensen, in naam van integratie en radicalisering (daar ga ik binnenkort nog op in) en in beide gevallen ook de controle over het lichaam van de vrouw willen hebben.

Het aanhalen van teksten zoals die gepubliceerd is op allochtonen-weblog bemoeilijkt zowel de pogingen van de Europese overheden als die van in het Midden-Oosten en van Al Azhar om greep te krijgen op jongeren. Internet maakt het mogelijk voor deze jongeren om zich op eigen houtje in een alternatieve islamitische traditie te voegen, juist buiten de controle van allerlei (seculiere en religieuze) gezaghebbende instanties om.

Stem op het beste en slechtste!.

2 comments.

Dutch local Jihadist networks

Posted on December 15th, 2009 by martijn.
Categories: International Terrorism, ISIM/RU Research, Religious and Political Radicalization.

The Dutch General Intelligence and Security Agency (AIVD) announced today that the threat of local jihadist networks against the Netherlands has decreased. Dutch Jihadists appear to focus on jihad outside the country it is stated in the recent Dutch language publication ‘Lokale jihadistische netwerken in Nederland. Veranderingen in het dreigingsbeeld‘ (‘Local Jihadist Networks in the Netherlands. Changes in the security assessment’). This report is a follow-up on ‘Violent Jihad in the Netherlands. Current Trends in the islamist terrorist threat), published in 2006.

According to the AIVD local autonomeous networks from international recruiters have been reduced and subsequently also the threat against symbolic targets of the state, politicians and opinionleaders. The cause of the weakness of the local networks appears to be internal disagreement and lack of leadership. At the same time however, the local threat has gained a stronger international outlook. Within fringes of the local autonomeous networks their still exist the intention to participate in jihad. People try to join a jihad training or armed battle in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia or other jihad fronts. These contacts from the local networks with foreign jihadi groups can pose a threat to Dutch interests and those who return to the Netherland potentially constitute a threat on a European level. Also the continuing interest of international networks for Dutch targets in the Netherlands and abroad remains a threat, according to the AIVD.

I will not go into this report at length but I would like to add and criticize a few aspects.

1. The AIVD sees the weakness of local networks and the contacts with international networks as a new development. It isn’t. The weakness of the local Dutch networks is a fact since the arrests of the Hofstad network, the Piranha network and the Tirana network (in particular the first two). Also the interest of Dutch Jihadi’s in fighting Jihad abroad is not new but exists for a long time already. In the 1990s a few Dutch jihadists went to Bosnia, later Chechnya, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq became a focus for them. The focus on the Netherlands in 2003 and 2004 was caused by practical issues and the turn in the Islam debates after 2002 which put people like Hirsi Ali and Van Gogh in the spotlights.
2. Several alledged recruiters have already been evicted (without trial) in the years before. The practices of those youth trying to fight Jihad (to my knowledge: about 10 people) abroad have already for several years (in fact after 2005) been characterized by a lack of involvement of recruiters (one of the reasons many feel to reach their destination).
3. The contacts with international networks also have existed for many years although they are very unstable and the networks in general are characterized by fission and fusion. They diminished (but never completely disappeared) only temporarily in 2004-2006.
4. Already in 2008 the AIVD noted an increase in activities from Jihadist networks ‘after a period of relative calm’ without represent a specific threat (although the threat level has been raised after that report from limited to substantial due the the release of jihadist networks elsewhere and the release of Fitna). Now the threat seems to have decreased compared to 2006. But when was the period of relative calm then according to the AIVD? And the threat level remains substantial.

So what’s really new? I don’t know. As usual I actually do not really understand what the AIVD is trying to tell us here. Of course the public needs to be informed but the report overall remains vague, hinting at several things but (of course) not substantiating their vague claims. I think the situation as actually back to where we were before 2003 with regard to the geographical focus of most jihadists. The only thing that really has changed is that the jihadist networks have become smaller (although I have to be careful with this because I do not know everyone) and even more fragmented than in the past. The old networks have fallen apart because of arrests and people who changed their minds and/or are otherwise engaged. New networks indeed exist consisting mostly of politically radicalized youth, some of them indeed interesting in fighting abroad but most of them can be considered as (and see themselves as) armchair jihadists.

UPDATE

Well there appears to be some new after all. The threat level has been lowered from significant to limited. This means:

The level of the terrorist threat against the Netherlands has been lowered

that the chance of a terrorist attack against (interests of) the Netherlands is relatively small, but that it certainly cannot be entirely ruled out.

Duhh, of course it is impossible to rule out a terrorist attack, but do not make the mistake thinking this is entirely meaningless because in the past people have been arrested because authorities could not ‘rule out that they were planning a terrorist attack in the near future’

0 comments.

New Publication: Global Salafism – Islam’s New Religious Movement

Posted on December 6th, 2009 by martijn.
Categories: Important Publications, ISIM/RU Research.

Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement

Edited by Roel Meijer

November, 2009
Cloth, 400 pages,
ISBN: 978-0-231-15420-8
$35.00

“Salafism” and “jihadi-Salafism” have become significant doctrinal trends in contemporary Islamic thought, yet the West largely fails to offer a sophisticated and discerning definition of these movements.

The contributors to Global Salafism carefully outline both the differences among Salafist schools and the broader currents of Islamic thought constituting this trend. Essays examine the regional manifestations of the phenomenon and its shared essential doctrines. Their analyses highlight Salafism’s inherent ambivalence and complexities, or the “out-antiquing the antique” that has brought Islamic thought into the modern age while simultaneously maintaining its relationship with an older, purer authenticity. Emphasizing the subtle, local and global aspirations within the “Salafist method,” Global Salafism investigates the movement like no other study currently available.

About the Author

Roel Meijer is an Arabist and senior lecturer in the history of the Middle East at Radboud University, Netherlands. He also heads a team at Amsterdam’s International Institute for Social History that is building an archive on social movements in the Middle East and Islamist publications on the Internet. His major works include Alienation or Integration of Arab Youth: Between Family, State, and the Street; Cosmopolitanism, Identity, and Authenticity in the Middle East; and The Quest for Modernity: Secular Liberal and Left-Wing Political Thought in Egypt, 1945-58.

Contents:
Introduction: Genealogies of Salafi sm Roel Meijer
Part 1
SALAFIST DOCTRINE
1. On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action by Bernard Haykel
2. Between Revolution and Apoliticism: Nasir al-Din al-Albani and His Impact on the Shaping of Contemporary Salafism by Stéphane Lacroix
3. Th e Transformation of a Radical Concept: al-wala’ wa-l-bara’in the Ideology of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi by Joas Wagemakers
4. Jihadi Salafi sm and the Shi‘is. Remarks about the intellectual roots of anti-Shi‘ism by Guido Steinberg
5. Salafi sm in Pakistan: The Ahl-e Hadith Movement by Mariam Abou Zahab
Part 2
SALAFISM AND POLITICS
6. The Salafi Critique of Islamism: Doctrine, Difference and the Problem of Islamic Political Activism in Contemporary Sudan by Noah Salomon
7. Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts in the Salafi Movement in Indonesia by Noorhaidi
8. Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong as a Principle of Social Action: The Case of the Egyptian al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya by Roel Meijer
9. Salafi formations in Palestine: The Limits of a De-Palestinised Milieu by Khaled Hroub
Part 3
JIHADI SALAFISM
10. Jihadi Salafi’s or Revolutionaries? On Religion and Politics in the Study of Militant Islamism by Thomas Hegghammer
11. Debates within the Family: Jihadi-Salafi Debates on Strategy, Takfir, Extremism, Suicide Bombings and the Sense of the Apocalypse by Reuven Paz
12. ‘Destructive Doctrinairians’: Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri’s Critique of the Salafi’s in the Jihadi Current by Brynjar Lia
Part 4
THE LOCAL AND THE GLOBAL IN SALAFISM
13. The Local and the Global in Saudi Salafi Discourse by Madawi Al-Rasheed
14. How Transnational is Salafism in Yemen? by Laurent Bonnefoy
15. Growth and Fragmentation: The Salafi Movement in Contemporary Bale, Ethiopia by Terje Østebø
Part 5
SALAFISM AND IDENTITY
16. Salafism in France: Ideology, Practises and Contradictions by Mohamed-Ali Adraoui
17. The Attraction of ‘Authentic Islam’. Salafism by and British Muslim Youth by Sadek Hamid
18. Changing Worldviews and Friendship: An Exploration of the Life Stories of Two Female Salafists in the Netherlands by Martijn de Koning

Look here for Global Salafism or order at Amazon.

5 comments.

Swiss Minaret Ban or How Democracy, Secularism and Islamophobia threaten Democracy, Secularism and Religious Freedom

Posted on November 30th, 2009 by martijn.
Categories: ISIM/RU Research, Multiculti Issues, Public Islam.

It is widely believed that secular democracy is the best way of managing diversity in a country; it guarantees freedom, peaceful relations and conflicts managed in a political arena. So we like to believe. In Switzerland the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) organized a referendum wanting to ban the construction of minarets because they symbolise a ‘political-religious claim to power‘ having no ‘religious significance‘. A clear secularist statement not completely at odds with European secularism that does not ban all religious symbols from public life but only ostentatious claims that apparently do not fit the existing status quo. The SVP’s proposal was accepted by a majority of the voters except in four cantons (Swiss is a confederation). A clearly not so secularist statement because other religious groups have no such restrictions, which makes it double strange because in this way the Swiss have given Islam officially an exceptional status which is quite remarkable since no European country has done that (in the case of Islam).

The minaret ban may be considered as something extreme that does not obey an enlightenment logic, we can see the same considerations in the case of (proposed) bans on the burqa/niqab that are discussed in several European countries. First of all, it concerns non-Islamic politicians discussing what particular ‘Islamic’ features actually are. For some women for example a burqa/niqab is not a symbol but a command or recommendation from God. It does not signify ones belief, it is part of practicing that belief. Also a political party discussing a minaret having no religious significance but a symbol of a political-religious claim means defining a particular feature. Second, although the rise of a secularist voice in Europe does effect Christian groups as well, the burden is on Islam and not on other groups. Thirdly, following from the previous one, secularism seems to have become a defining feature of European nationalism wherein political islamic symbols are to be rejected from the public domain in order to safeguard a particular culture. Fourth, at the same time protests of Muslims (and other religious groups) against for example Fitna and the Muhammad Cartoons or the posters of the referendum are labelled as an attack on the freedom of expression, seen as a typical difference between Muslims and Europeans. This produces a remarkable paradox. In order to uphold the secularized European society as a freedom loving tolerant society and a homogenous cultural other is created and dismissed as a violent, intrusive outsider. The minaret ban, for the proponents anyway, is an expression of the paradox but also produces the same paradox and as such sustains it. The credo of being intolerant against the intolerant is the logical explanation for that paradox that in the Netherlands is also used by Wilders’ PVV who also pleas for such a referendum in the Netherlands as does the Danish People’s Party leader Kia Kjaersgaard. In order to sustain the images of the irrational, angry Muslim particular key symbols of Islam are frequently targeted as signifiers of intolerance, any negative reaction from the side of Muslims ‘prove’ their standpoint (just watch how people will respond to the negative reactions from Muslim communities the coming days).

Therefore yes, the Swiss minaret ban is extreme for Europe but it is only an extreme outcome of a logic that has been apparent in Europe for several years now and that certainly not limited to Switzerland or extreme right parties. On the other hand we should lose sight of major opposition among non-Muslim Europeans as well who, no matter what their stance is towards Islam, are very negative about this development and who fear that democracy and secularism will eat itself when it becomes mixed with an explosive combination of nationalism and islamophobia.

UPDATE
Orthodox Christian party SGP submitted a motion, following the Swiss ban on minarets, urging restraint in building minarets in the Netherlands. According to the SGP building of minarets and mosques increases polarisation in Dutch society and, contrary to church towers, minarets to not fit the ‘cultural landscape’ of the Netherlands, produce ‘alienation’ and negatively affect Dutch identity. SGP also opposes ostentatious satellite dishes, building large mosques and publicly sending the call for prayer and asks for restraint in those cases as well. The motion was supported by Wilders’ Party for Freedom and Verdonk’s Proud of the Netherlands; conservative liberal VVD withdrew their support at the last moment because, according to them, this is a matter for local councils. The rest of parliament (a majority) opposed and the motion was rejected.
As such an interesting coalition between an orthodox Christian party (the other two Christian parties are in the government and opposed), a conservative liberal party VVD (secular), a populist-nationalist party (Verdonk) (secular) and an extremist party PVV (Wilders) also secular. To be clear, three secular parties but with different opinions and definitions on what secularism is or should be.

UPDATE:

Note that the SGP already filed the motion before the Swiss referendum (thanks to A el M to point that out to me)

8 comments.

Public Anthropology – 10 Years from Researchpages to Closer (1999/2000 – 2009/2010)

Posted on November 9th, 2009 by martijn.
Categories: anthropology, Blogosphere, Headline, ISIM/RU Research.

Introduction: a fantastic, time-consuming, idea
In 1999, when I just had started my Ph.D project in Gouda, I had a fantastic idea. An idea so fantastic that in the next 10 years I would dedicate a huge amount of time to sustaining and developing it. Too much time perhaps because sometimes it destroyed my time to sleep. The idea was that I would launch a website about and for my research and that also dealt with all kinds of issues related to it. Certainly not the first anthropology site (that is as far as I know CSAC Ethnographics Gallery) but I do think it was one of the first of an individual anthropologist and the first Dutch anthropologist website. It started out as a ‘normal’ website called Researchpages. It does not exist anymore and I lost a copy because of a recent computercrash. It took me until April 2001 to have a real website and although not updated anymore it is still working.

In the course of 2002 and 2003 I developed a weblog that initially was only one of the parts of the whole website. Since March 2004 the weblog is hosted at Religionresearch.org, an initiative set up with several colleagues from the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (note to myself…this also means that Religionresearch.org has a five year anniversary): Peter, Marten and Johan. After 2006 the weblog became the most important part of the site and i decided not to update the other parts anymore but to include more and more in the weblog. Furthermore the site had changed from a linkdump to a mix between linkdump, research reports and personal accounts and early attempts to analyze particular developments, themes and issues.

C L O S E R
Why the name Closer? One of my colleagues at ISIM said at one point that the name suggest (physical) intimicacy. And she was spot on. Because when you ethnographic research (and in particular in the way of my PhD research) you become quite intimate with people and you have a look in their daily private lives, thoughts and acts. It also suggests a closer look at issues and developments we do not immediately understand.

In the beginning Closer was somewhat out of mainstream blogosphere and also out of the anthropology blogosphere. From 2008 onwards but (after a break for which I’m still not going to tell you the reasons behind it) in particular from March 2009 I have tried to link up with the growing anthropology blogging community. In particular Open Anthropology, Media Anthropology and Antropologi.info provide interesting and thought-provoking entries I often link to.

What do I want with Closer? Closer can be seen as my contribution (with all the strong and weak points that come with it) to a public anthropology. Public anthropology is not easily to define but let me refer to Robert Borofsky, quoted on Zero Anthropology:
What is Public Anthropology? « ZERO ANTHROPOLOGY

Public anthropology engages issues and audiences beyond today’s self-imposed disciplinary boundaries. The focus is on conversations with broad audiences about broad concerns. Although some anthropologists already engage today’s big questions regarding rights, health, violence, governance and justice, many refine narrow (and narrower) problems that concern few (and fewer) people outside the discipline. Public anthropology seeks to address broad critical concerns in ways that others beyond the discipline are able to understand what anthropologists can offer to the re-framing and easing–if not necessarily always resolving–of present-day dilemmas. The hope is that by invigorating public conversations with anthropological insights, public anthropology can re-frame and reinvigorate the discipline.

There are two main principles of public anthropology (that also distinguishes it from applied anthropology):

1. Public accountability
2. Attempting to understand the structures that frame and restrict solutions to problems

Craig Calhoun in a recent essay poses two important questions for public social science (H/T ZeroAnthropology and Sexuality and Society):
Public Sphere Forum » Blog Archive » Calhoun

First, what is the relationship between effective participation in public discourse and the maintenance of more or less autonomous academic fields with their own standards of judgment and intellectual agendas? Second, what is the relationship between “public intellectual” work, informing broad discussions among citizens, and “policy intellectual” work informing business or government decision makers?

As Calhoun explains it is not only about reaching a broader public. It is not only about spreading your knowledge which would amount to ‘showing off’ with little bearing on public issues. It is about producing ‘better social science’ that addresses public issues, tests particular social science hypothesis and informs both scientific and public debates. Social scientists should therefore engage with issues that are part of the public debate at that moment (what Calhoun calls ‘real time social science’) based upon reseach already done in the past (even before it came to be a public issue) or by collecting new research material in which the public debate taking place is incorporated. This is important and researchers should not shy away from it (as happens now sometimes, also by me) but there is a risk of course that the public debate and policy concerns determine the research agenda. It would compromise the neutral position of researchers (certainly when dealing with Muslims and Islam which is a highly politicized topic) but it would also compromise one of the great advantages of doing scientific research: the ability to work on particular topics for a long time. Combining both, Calhoun explains:
Public Sphere Forum » Blog Archive » Calhoun

They may be studied in more immediate ways related to current policy dilemmas or in terms of larger and longer lasting patterns. Social science produces public knowledge when it provides historical or comparative context to grasping particular configurations of such issues as well as when it evaluates the results of particular policies.

Calhoun continues by stating that public science and addressing public issues is not just giving answers to questions the public has. It is as much, or even more, about questioning why particular issues are addressed in the way they are addressed by particular people and what the consequences of that are. How are particular issues and the way they are debated related to (changing) historical and cultural contexts, what is taken-for-granted and what does it mean? In my opinion this is (or at least should) should be the focus of this blog and has informed the change from my website Researchpages to Closer. In this sense public anthropology is not the same as applied anthropology.

Who is the public?
One important question to ask, is this blog anthropology in public or public anthropology? Both I hope. And judging by the list of my frequent readers the public of this blog is very mixed: anthropologists, policy-makers, journalists, students, fellow bloggers and (for me very important – see principle 1) my research subjects. This blog, as are other means of publication, provides a channel for dialogue with the social science community but also with other publics for social science knowledge consisting of journalists, policy-makers, politicians, researchgroups, students, movements’ activists, and others (cf. Calhoun).

It is in particular the input provided by research subjects that has proven to be valuable and opening up your research to the people you study, is an important part of doing research. Rex asks at Savage Minds:
Is it unethical to say something about someone that they cannot understand? | Savage Minds

Do anthropologists have a moral obligation to make their work accessible to the people they are writing about? The answer, to me, is an obvious ‘yes’.
[…]
So: is it ethical in principle to say things about people that they cannot understand (technical work) or that is written in a genre they don’t care for or ‘get’ (disciplinarily-defined beauty)?

I fully agree with him. If we do not make our work accessible to the people we write about, we might as well lock or ourselves in our ivory tower and throw away the key. This means that anthropoligists should write better: clear and accessibly. Furthermore, when you do research among a group in a society in which you live yourself and the topic most likely will lead to some headlines in the newspaper, it is foolish to think that you can avoid the group about who you write. If you do not engage with them, they will engage with you and your research in the comments sections of newspapers, blogs and online communities. Many people in my current research project have read my PhD thesis, there have been discussions about it in chatrooms in which I present for my current research and several people emailed me, contacted me in the chatrooms and on MSN wanting to discuss my book and the publicity about it. Opening up your research in fact already begins at the initial stage when you have to explain to your informants what you are doing and why you are there where they are. In my experience, the conversations that follow from this are not a good a way of improving your ‘translation’ skills but also provide relevant input for your research. The same can be said about the questions people asked after reading my book and articles.

As good public science indeed can produce better social science because the public is allowed to question and test the hypothesis of the researcher and even the significance of the whole research. For a very good example see Brigt Dale at the Occational Blog featuring the debates at other blogs based upon interviews with six anthropologists at antropologi.info. This is also the reason why I have chosen not to delete the sometimes very hostile, vile and rude comments on particular posts because I believe also those comments to represent an important take on the issues I address.

Most Commented

1. Politiek en Rap: Salah Edin en Appa
2. apas-stsbyhtbs & Geenstijl III – Gefeliciteerd u staat op Closer
3. Against pornofication and sexualization – scratching the surface because you have to start somewhere

Other noteworthy posts in this category include:

1. Islamizing Europe – Muslim Demographics (without a doubt the number one hit for this year, addressing one of the important anxieties many people share: the fear for an Islamic takeover)
2. Coming soon…Fitna V Analysing political propaganda

The last one is number five in a series about Fitna, the movie by Dutch politician Geert Wilders and serves as the basis for three articles I will write (two of them will be published in 2010 I hope). These two entries also score very well in the most viewed ranking:

Most Viewed

1. Against pornofication and sexualization – scratching the surface because you have to begin somewhere
2. Zoeken naar een ‘zuivere’ islam. Religieuze beleving en identiteitsvorming van Marokkaans-Nederlandse moslims
3. Islamizing Europe – Muslim Demographics
4. Coming soon…Fitna V Analysing political propaganda
5. Politiek en Rap: Salah Edin en Appa

As you can see in both lists Dutch and English language contributions are part of this blog. Public anthropology involves, as said, asking who is the public? For anthropologists outside the English speaking world, they also have to ask, is my public native (in my case Dutch) or international? I have chosen to combine both since some Dutch issues are relevant for a wider, international public and because writing in English would mean that my blog would be less accessible for Dutch speaking people. The current development in social sciences that only writing in Anglo-Saxon journals is valued above anything else (or better, the rest doesn’t matter) could lead I’m afraid to a situation in which social sciences are not relevant anymore for native, non-English publics and render the cause for a public anthropology futile or even ridiculous.

Closing statement
This blog is a (modest) attempt to make anthropology publicly relevant and to improve anthropological research. At the same time it is on ongoing experiment to find out what public anthropology actually is and to explore it. Why would I do this? As Maximilian Forte explains very well:
Not Radical Enough: Disengaged Anthropology (1.5) « ZERO ANTHROPOLOGY

Some might object that anthropology does not need to be publicly engaged, does not need mass audiences, and thus eschew the common goals of both Bunzl and Besteman-Gusterson. I disagree. Anthropology will not reside safely in peace, ensconced in the Ivory Tower, because there too it is suffering from increased marginalization, and that’s in the cases of universities that actually have an anthropology program of some sort. Moreover, any discipline whose purchase covers a wide range of publicly relevant, directly relevant, issues should say something in public. There is no point being a mute bystander as public debates rage about race, the family, violence, religion, and thus act like some dog in the manger

In that blog entry he refers to a discussion in American Anthropologist (2008, vol. 110, no. 1). In November 2009 these articles are open for the public:
The Quest for Anthropological Relevance: Borgesian Maps and Epistemological Pitfalls – Matti Bunzl

In this essay, I critique the currently dominant mode of American sociocultural anthropology. Through a historical reading of canonical texts from the 1970s to the 1990s, I trace some of contemporary anthropology’s limitations and probe their implications for the possibility of a publicly engaged discipline. I focus my critique on the demand for ever-increasing complexity, identifying it as an implicit form of positivism that renders the results of anthropological inquiries increasingly irrelevant to the big questions of the day. Epistemologically speaking, contemporary anthropology is thus not radical enough. In conclusion, I mobilize the Weberian–Boasian tradition as the most viable alternative to sociocultural anthropology’s status quo.

A Response to Matti Bunzl: Public Anthropology, Pragmatism, and Pundits

Discussing only two out of 11 chapters, Matti Bunzl argues that Why America’s Top Pundits Are Wrong (2005) embodies an excessively deconstructive approach that undermines public anthropology by opposing all generalization. In fact, the contributors to the Pundits volume come from a variety of intellectual positions, some unfriendly to deconstructionism. In a book that is deliberately jargon free, the contributors are unified not by postmodernism but by pragmatism. They oppose generalizations that are manifestly ideological and untrue, not all generalizations. The point of the book is not to nitpick generalizations but to unmask media apologetics for neoliberalism and neoconservatism that misuse core terms (e.g., culture, ethnicity, human nature, gender) from the anthropological lexicon. We advocate a revitalized public anthropology based on grounded research, translation of sophisticated anthropological knowledge into accessible English, and a passionate concern for the well-being of those at the sharp end of neoliberal globalization.

A Reply to Besteman and Gusterson: Swinging the Pendulum

In this rejoinder to Catherine Besteman and Hugh Gusterson, I clarify that my essay “The Quest for Anthropological Relevance: Borgesian Maps and Epistemological Pitfalls” is not primarily a critique of their volume Why America’s Top Pundits Are Wrong (2005). Instead, I maintain that it takes issue with the current state of sociocultural anthropology and its inability to communicate with a larger public sphere. In conclusion, I reflect on the historical location of my argument, likening my position to advocacy for a swing in the discipline’s epistemological pendulum and finding additional cause for such action in the realities of the current political moment.

The debate is relevant, as Forte shows, for addressing several features of anthropology (such as the critique on generalizations, the tendency to increase ‘complexity’ and sophistication, the problem of othering, the institutional structures, and so on) that influence public anthropology. An issue that I did see addressed anywhere yet, is what happens when you speak out as an anthropoligist on topics that are part of a fierce public and political debate. Two recent cases from the Netherlands are exemplary here. First of all the dismissal of Tariq Ramadan in Rotterdam and the subsequent statement of social scientists from the University of Amsterdam (later followed by the Free University of Amsterdam) stating that Tariq Ramadan should be offered a position in Amsterdam. The people who wrote a public letter about this, were accused in several ways of being a traiter, islamic co-conspirator, leftists and so on. Another, even more striking case, is the report of the Volkskrant newspaper about a report for the Ministry of Home Affairs, in which Geert Wilders appears as a far right extremist. Three researchers are named and after the publication of the newspaper a whole debate came about. Anti-Wilders groups and politicians applauding the conclusion, pro-Wilders groups launching a personal attack against the three researchers. Interesting thing is that the report is not published yet because it is not finished. Therefore, no report but debates about the researchers anyway (or because of it). That is striking in itself, but also tells us something about the climate in which researchers have to work and which I think pose a challenge to public anthropology and the attempt to make anthropology matter. The same happened to me when I blogged about someone in Amsterdam who scratched a commercial posters that depicted women in a abusive way (see the above list of most viewed posts, nummer 1). I don’t know how to deal with it, but I think it is an important issue to reflect about and I will try to publish a series of blog entries about it next year.

All these problems should not lead us to conclusion that it is better to refrain from making anthropology public and retreat in our academic ivory tower. I think I have made clear why. There are several ways in which anthropologists can make their knowledge easily available for a wider audience and receive feedbak about it. A blog is a very good, works for me. Another way is working with journalists as Nancy Scheper-Hughes (certainly an example for me) shows in an issue of Anthropology Today, quoted at Lorenzo’s Antropologi.info. In her view this can help not only responding to public issues, but also making issues public issues as she tried to do with the Organs Watch Project. All of this is a lot of work because it means to work double time; not only responding to teaching obligations and the academic ‘publish or perish’ structure but also for example as I did giving a lecture at one o’clock at night on some obscure chat room that people only care about if they call for jihad or to respond to all of the vile and sometimes threatening comments here in a personal manner trying to find out what the person wants to say.
Nancy Scheper-Hughes: Public anthropology through collaboration with journalists

Paraphrasing Hortense Powdermaker: you want to be a public anthropologist – then do it! I always did. But don’t expect to be rewarded for it. Instead, consider it a precious right and a privilege. Be grateful that, despite the tendency of bureaucratic intuitions toward social con servatism, we can still ‘do what we want and get away with it too!’

Together with my colleague Henk Driessen from Radboud University I’m planning to organizing an international workshop on anthropology and publicity in 2010, I will keep you updated on that. Let me finish by saying thank you to my readers, commenters, colleagues, my informants and all others who have helped me with my weblog and research. And beware: I’m planning to ‘get away with it’  for another 10 years.

If you want to stay updated and did not subscribe yet, you can do so HERE

7 comments.

Two Dutch persons in terrorism cases

Posted on November 5th, 2009 by martijn.
Categories: International Terrorism, ISIM/RU Research, Religious and Political Radicalization.

In March 2009 Dutch police arrested Aqaal Abbasi in the southern Dutch town of Breda. He is a Pakistani national and arrested on suspicion of belonging to an “international jihadist network” operating from Barcelona preparing attacks in western Europe. There was no evidence he planned an attack in the Netherlands and the inquiry was the largest terrorism research so far in the Netherlands and the first time the Netherlands was confronted with an international terror cell according to Dutch authorities in NRC Handelsblad. Abbasi was a free man after a while because there was not enough evidence against. However he was re-arrested in August and extradited to Spain where a trial against him will start in December. He is one of the eleven people charged with offences relating to planning suicide bombings in Germany and Barcelona. It is claimed that Abbasi travelled from Spain to Germany to carry out a suicide attack, but left for the Netherlands without actually doing it.

Another Muslim from the Netherlands involved in a terrorism case is Houria Chentouf. She was arrested at Liverpool John Lennon Airport 16 October 2008 during an interview with Special Branch officers. Apparently after a USB device fell out of her burqa she was arrested and the search of the device uncovered a huge library of material including a manual describing how to make car bombs and how to detonate them. Another document fund was an explosives manual for the brothers of the Mujahidin Chentouf lived in the Netherlands but left the country, as she stated, because of the discrimination against Muslims. During the court case it became quite clear that Houria Chentouf had mental health problems and had self-harmed in the past after the death of a relative. In a letter she wrote:

Forgive me. Shall I give in to the rule of tyrants? Do you think that is something I would do? No, I would not, because I fear Allah. Myself and my children would seek revenge and we would be bombs for the sake of this religion.

According to the prosecutor this that she was prepared to sacrifice her life and those of her children for her religion.

It is not clear whether or not she is related to Mohammed Chentouf who serves prison time for being part of a terror plot (together with Samir Azzouz) but she did have contact with him by sending letters. She also had the phone numbers of exiled Muslim preacher Omar Bakri from the Al Muhajiroun and Abu Izzadeen (Trevor Brooks) a British convert jailed for raising money for terrorists and inciting terrorism overseas. She had also posted on the Internet about the role of women in jihad and wrote in support of Muslims seeking martyrdom.

She pleaded guilty to the possession of the documents connected with the commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism and was sentenced to two years in prison for the possession of documents likely to be useful for a terrorist. According to the judge the fact that she had thousands of documents showing her interest in Jihad, it meant that the possession of such documents is not a coincidence. The judge told she had ‘developed an obsessive interest in Jihad and the more extreme forms of Islam’, but there was ‘no evidence’ to suggest she intended to pass the material on and no intention of putting it into practical use.

If Houria Chentouf indeed suffers from mental illness such a line of reasoning can be questioned. Is she indeed a potential terrorist or a woman coping with some severe issues? On the other hand others have said this is only used to discredit her and her cause. I also do wonder if a non-Muslim has the same amount of documents and even the same documents, would he be convicted as well? The documents don’t have to be useful, likely to be useful is enough. In the Netherlands she would not have been convicted because the possesion of such documents does not constitute a violation of the law (although it can be used as arguments in court cases as happened in the past). It has not become clear why she was questioned at the airport by officers of Special Branch in the first place. Moreover she was already stopped four months earlier under the Terrorism Act at Liverpool Airport before she was eventually arrested in October.

Because she had spent more than a year in remand, she was freed but being kept in custody while arrangements are made for her deportation to Holland.

0 comments.

Drie nieuwe sites: Hagar-Sarah, Yakini Time en At-Tibyan Nederland

Posted on November 2nd, 2009 by martijn.
Categories: Blogosphere, ISIM/RU Research.

Ik heb maar weer eens drie nieuwe sites toegevoegd aan mijn toch al ellenlange en onoverzichtelijke linklijst:
Hagar Sarah

Met deze website willen wij een bijdrage leveren aan de dialoog tussen joden, christenen en moslims. Deze dialoog moet ons inziens gevoerd en voortgezet worden opdat wij van elkaars traditie leren hoe wij samen kunnen leven. Dat is niet altijd eenvoudig, soms roept dat spanningen op, maar het doorbreken en oplossen daarvan geeft meer diepgang in de relatie. Met onze voorbeelden uit de praktijk hopen wij een handreiking te bieden aan beginnende dialooggroepen.

De naam is een verwijzing naar aartsvader en profeet Abraham (Ibrahim) die getrouwd was met Sarah.

De moslima van Vermeer door Johannes Hogebrink

Omdat Sarah geen kinderen kon krijgen bood zij haar slavin Hagar aan als draagmoeder. Hager baart Ismael (Ismail) de aartsvader van de Arabieren. Later krijgt Sarah toch een kind; Izaak (Ishaq) die de aartsvader van de joden wordt. Het verhaal in de Koran wijkt hier iets van af. Hagar wordt achtergelaten door Ibrahim in de woestijn en op zoek naar water loopt zij op en neer tussen de heuvels Safa en Marwa waar ze de bron Zamzam vindt. De bedevaartgangers naar Mekka herhalen dit verhaal door zeven keer op en neer te lopen en vaak nemen zij ook Zemzem water mee terug (heb zelf nog een flesje staan dat ik gekregen heb). De joodse, christelijke en islamitische vrouwen van de adviesgroep Hagar-Sarah hebben er (toepasselijk denk ik) voor gekozen om de moeders van beide aartsvaders Ismail en Ishaq te nemen voor de naam van hun dialooggroep.

Yakini betekent waarheid. Yakini Time is een radioprogramma over islam en heeft een eigen weblog
Yakini Time!

Yakini Time! De web-log van het leukste radioprogramma over islam voor Antillianen, Surinamers, Caapverdianen en natuurlijk de rest van Nederland!

Ik kende het niet, maar het is een interessant initiatief vanuit een groep moslims waar we nauwelijks (in het bijzonder Antilliaanse en Kaapverdiaanse Nederlanders) iets van horen. Stichting Yakini die achter de website en het radioprogramma zit wil op een laagdrempelige manier informatie geven over de islam.Yakini Time radio kun je HIER vinden (klik links op Live radio en klik op Live Rotterdam Fm 106.5), iedere woensdag om 21:00 uur. Er wordt informatie gegeven over islam, nieuws over moslims en allochtone Nederlanders en er is Koran te beluisteren evenals anasheed en moslim hiphop.

De Tibyan (uiteenzetting) wordt wel gezien als een van de meest belangrijke bronnen over de gebeurtenissen in Al-Andalus (Andalusië) gedurende de elfde eeuw. Het is een autobiografie van ‘Abd Allah bin Buluggin, emir van de Taifa van Granada van 1073 tot 1090. Zijn verhaal bevat vele verslagen van strijd tegen christelijke en andere staten.
« At-Tibyan Nederland

Deze website is gemaakt voor informatie over de islam, met namen informatie over zaken in de islam waar mensen hun monden over houden of onder de tafel schuifen. zaken die weinig of helemaal niet worden besproken in de islam. Of waar men weinig kennis van heeft, zaken die je niet zo makkenlijk kunt vinden in de nederlandse taal!

Onze Belangrijkste Punten:

-Tawheed (Al Kufr Bi Taghout Wa Imanu Billah)
-Jihad (De Hedendaagse Oorlog In Onze Landen)
-Kufr Akbar met name Kufrul-Istibdaal: Ongeloof door Allah’s Wetten proberen te vervangen
-Zaken Waar Onze Ummah Door Heen Gaat Op Dit Moment

Er zijn al eerder Engelstalige en Nederlandstalige Tibyan sites geweest en ook diverse Nederlandse sites waar vertalingen van Tibyan Publications te vinden zijn (waren). Eén van de populairste vertalingen was aanvankelijk de Nederlandse vertaling van een lezing van Abdullah Azzam ‘In the hearts of Green Birds’ (In de harten van groene vogels) waarin bijzondere verhalen van martelaren uit Bosnië naar voren kwamen. Centraal in die verhalen staat de bescherming die God zou geven aan hen die strijden tegen onrecht en onderdrukking. Ik weet niet of er een relatie is met de huidige Tibyan site, maar het thema van de strijd tegen onrecht en onderdrukking is in ieder geval wel de rode draad van Tibyan Nederland.

Yakini Time en At-Tibyan Nederland maken deel uit van de Blogview.

1 comment.

Mohammed el Fizazi en de open brief aan moslims: Duitsland is geen slagveld

Posted on November 1st, 2009 by martijn.
Categories: Internal Debates, ISIM/RU Research, Murder on theo Van Gogh and related issues, Religious and Political Radicalization.

Enkele jaren gelden werd Muhammad el Fizazi, de spirituele leider van de Salafia Jihadia in Marokko, veroordeeld tot 30 jaar cel. Hij ontving zijn religieuze training in Saoedi Arabië en na zijn terugkeer naar Marokko begon hij eind jaren negentig openlijk Osama Bin Laden te steunen met (vermeende?) uitspraken waarin hij naar Bin Laden verwezen zou hebben als ‘metgezel van de profeet’ en dat ‘de kelen van christenen en joden doorgesneden zouden moeten worden’. In 1999 werd Fizazi de imam van de Al Quds moskee in Hamburg, waar de Hamburg cel die de aanslagen van 9/11 uitvoerde regelmatig gekomen zou zijn, en keerde kort voor 9/11 terug naar Marokko. Fizazi had ook banden met de aanslagen in Madrid (Hasan el Haski, Jamal Zougham en Abdelaziz Benyaich) en de Salafia Jihadia was (samen met Assirat al Moustakin) betrokken bij de aanslagen in Casablanca in 2003. Die aanslagen vormden de aanleiding voor zijn veroordeling in 2003 voor het verspreiden van radicaal gedachtegoed en banden met de plegers van de aanslagen in 2003. In 2007 nam hij nog deel aan een hongerstaking van meer dan 20 dagen. Ook Nederlandse jihadisten zouden door hem beïnvloed zijn.

In juli 2009 zou El Fizazi een brief naar zijn dochter in Hamburg hebben gestuurd waarin hij zich distantieert van terreuraanslagen op doelen in het Westen. Dat mag opmerkelijk genoemd worden want daarmee distantieert hij zich volgens mij ook van Al Qaeda. Voor de goede orde, hij wijst gewapende strijd niet af, maar het gaat om een heroriëntering op de doelen van dat geweld. Moslims in Duitsland zouden zich volgens hem moeten richten op vreedzame demonstraties, stakingen en protesten in plaats van niets en niemand ontziende aanslagen en het doden van onschuldige burgers alleen omdat ze ongelovig zouden zijn. Eén van de argumenten die hij geeft, is dat wanneer moslims naar Duitsland immigreren contracten ondertekenen ze geen geweld kunnen gebruiken tegen hun gastheren omdat dit contractbreuk zou zijn en verraad. El Fizazi is niet de eerste die zijn ideeen herziet; in Egypte is bijvoorbeeld de leiding van de Gamaat Islamiyya hem voorgegaan en in Saoedi Arabië Salman al Awda. Niettemin geloof niet iedereen in de authenticiteit van de brief en/of weigert men van koers te veranderen. Zie voor de achtergronden het artikel in Der Spiegel en de discussies op Jihadica HIER en HIER.

Der Spiegel heeft ook de brief geplaatst en ik zal hem hieronder integraal (in Engelse vertaling) weergeven:
Mohammed El Fazazi’s Letter: ‘Germany Is No Battle Zone’ – SPIEGEL ONLINE – News – International

My daughter has put to me a few questions with the aim of finding answers about the situation of Muslim immigrants in Germany and their relationship with the German state. I consider myself truly happy that she has raised these topics with me because it provides me with the opportunity to express my thoughts and opinions about these issues and provide answers to those who seek them.

I would like to declare firstly that I, Muhammad bin Muhammad El Fazazi, the writer of these lines, has not been forced to put these down. I am under no pressure to write this, because I am in prison or have been put under pressure to do so or because I want to pretend about something — and, as a proof of this, shall serve the logical arguments and the arguments of the sharia that I will put forward here.

In addition, my situation in a Moroccan prison is very unusual, given the rights that I enjoy here and the respect that I am met with. I am not lacking anything apart from my freedom, and I have appealed to the almighty Allah that it is given back to me as soon as possible. This is because everybody knows, including the Moroccan government, that the accusations against me, because of the attacks in Casablanca, are not true. They represent a big mistake on the part of the Moroccan secret service. This error must be corrected.

‘I Am a Muslim and Nothing More’

In terms of the questions about what my thoughts and religious points of reference where before I moved to the German city of Hamburg, here’s what I think:

I am a person whose personality is put together from different sources and maybe it is possible to say as a summary that I do not trust so much the way that certain people think as much as I rely on the arguments that these men bring forward. (…) I have no particular sheik whom I follow apart from the Koran and the sunna of the prophet. Apart from this I am a modern person. For 32 years I was a teacher of French and mathematics, and I have also for more than 30 years served Da’wa (editors’s note: mission) and I have devoted myself to preaching under the auspices of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs in Morocco. In other words: I am a Muslim and nothing more. I am not a Salafist jihadist and I am not a traditional Salafi. I am not a Muslim Brother or anything else. I am a Muslim and nothing more. (…)

As for my books and my speeches or talks — which partly contained thoughts that were terrible towards my opponents — one must put them into context in terms of the time and location and one must not more interpret more into them than they actually contained. I say here publicly that I was the object of vicious attacks by leftist circles in Morocco. I was insulted, coerced, I was wrongly quoted in newspapers and forums. And a lot of what I said in books was a reply to these attacks and an act of self-defense. And I admit that I went too far and overshot the target in my attempt to counter what I had to hear about myself by my leftist opponents and other forces. (…) So that’s the context in which my books and my articles must be understood. (…)

‘I Have Moved Away from Some of My Beliefs’

Without a doubt, the long years that I had to spend behind bars in prison have given me an opportunity to contemplate and soberly reflect. I am not ashamed that I have once again reflected on my world of thoughts and have moved away from some of my beliefs. This is a laudable thing and not to be lamented. (…)

As for the questions regarding Muslim immigrants and the German state or Western states in general: The first ones who should answer those questions are the learned people who have emigrated themselves, because they know more about the details and more about those particular relations, they are living the everyday life and they experience the behavior of state institutions and they have contact with the population.

But if I were to say something personally about it, as someone who has on only two occasions spent two weeks in Germany — not even enough time to allow me to really get to know the people and the country or even the Muslim community there — then I would say that a Muslim immigrant, no matter where he comes from, has generally come to Germany because he wants to learn something there or he wants to work, seek medical treatment or any number of things. Germany accepted him under certain conditions.

‘Germany Is Not a Battle Zone’

In order for these conditions to be formulated, certain forms have been filled out and certain contracts have been concluded. In these cases we are talking about real contracts that have to be adhered to. In reality this is what you would call an Ahd Amam, a security contract for both sides and Allah says in his beloved book: “You who have given security, keep the contracts.”

So it follows that anything that breaks these contracts — e.g. by declaring theft to be halal (editor’s note: something which is permitted under Islam) (…) or by allowing the killing of the population in the name of jihad (…) or by trying to build cells who put people into a state of fear and horror and so on (…) — in my eyes constitutes a breach of contract and betrayal in regard to what one has signed in the embassy, in the consulate or in the immigration office.

Germany is not a battle zone. Germany is a field for work, a school for learning, workshops for investments, hospitals for treatment and a market for the sale of goods. Put in another way, Germany is a place for peaceful coexistence and a good life — not least of which because German judges and police (…) protect foreigners and take care of them. (…)

Muslims Seen as ‘Group of Backward-Looking Idiots’

Of course there are people, and these are not learned people, who say that Germany is a NATO member state and that Germany is part of those states that fight against Muslims in Afghanistan and support the state of Israel (…) I say that this is right. An injustice is always an injustice and every one must stand up against injustice, including the German people. I know that (the German people) are against war and occupation and that they have more than once publicly expressed their rejection of the war in general.

It is the job of immigrants to debate and engage with such people. (This should be done) by means of peaceful demonstrations, strikes and protests that are far removed from indiscriminate attacks, the killing of innocent people with the argument of killing kuffar, or non-believers.

The rejection of German or other foreign policy must be organized through civilian, peaceful methods of resistance.

The strength of the argument lies not in a rifle bullet, in violence or in explosive belts. Those won’t bring about change. They will only reinforce the backwardness of Muslims and their image as a group of backward-looking idiots whose place is in the caves and not in the streets of Hamburg, Frankfurt, Berlin or wherever. That’s what this is about. (…)

‘I Advise all to Live Together Peacefully’

I also want to add, in clear Arabic, that Hamburg (because the question addressed to me was about Hamburg) is a city in which there is a plurality of religious sects, ideologies and political directions. Apart from that, Islamic religious communities — for the reasons that I already mentioned and other generally accepted reasons — have been established there. The mosques are open, there are many of them and they are protected. There is real freedom of religion which does not exist in many Muslim states. The things that educated people and preachers can say there cannot be said in some Muslim countries.

There are many ways and possibilities of expressing oneself, and they are open to everyone. That, again, is hardly the case in the Muslim world. There is no prohibition on the peaceful promotion of Islam. Within the scope of legal possibilities and general relations between host and guest, one can express his opinion and represent his faith. (…)

I do not believe even that the rulers there (Germany) would close there office doors or their ears to the requests of the Muslim community. This is why I advise all to live togther peacefully. The wide world of Allah is open to anyone who cannot. And those who don’t want anything but killing, blood, robbery and theft have nothing to do with the religion of Allah the Exalted — neither in Germany nor anywhere else.

‘The Bite of Food that He Earned Himself Is Tasteful and Sweet’

When it comes to earning a living, work and unemployment, I do not think that it is permitted to rely on the German state and to avoid working to make a living, and instead claim unemployment benefits or similar. It is true that there are some lines of employment that are inappropriate for Muslims (…) but it is also true that there are many, many other possibilities for working that, from an Islamic perspective, are halal and thus permitted. (…) It is better the he (the Muslim) live from the work of his hands and the sweat of his brow because the mouthful is flavorsome and sweet. (…)

As for those in the streets of Hamburg who think about jihad in the path of God, they should think about life, because this is the true jihad in the path of God. The mere fact that there are 46 prayer rooms in Hamburg is in and of itself evidence of the tolerance showed by the German state towards Muslims. There is no comparably large number of churches in a city in any Islamic country. I know quite a bit about the fragmentations between the founders of those mosques and even within particular mosque communities. It has gone so far that this fragmentation has become one of the outstanding characteristics of the Muslims. This sorrowful state weakens the Muslim’s power. (…) Even when they want to engage in dialogue with the German state over certain issues, they confuse the state with all these conflicts.

‘The German Chancellor Is Great’

It is only just that I say that the other side — and with that I mean the German government — without any doubt does not guaranty all rights to immigrants. And I hope that they will stand up and see to it that their demands are met and that their suffering is eased and that they are better protected from attacks by xenophobes. Money must be invested in order to improve living conditions for immigrants as well as their level of education, their health care and their housing.

It is rude to demonize and insult the German government or Chancellor Merkel (…) is an immorality. The principle of biting the hand that feeds you doesn’t fit with Allah’s saying: “Don’t insult those who call upon another God than Allah.” (…)

What is the use of insulting the chancellor and describing her as a Taghut (or despot)? That’s nonsense. It doesn’t lead anywhere. The German chancellor is great. Germany has its religion and you have yours. The chancellor has her work and you have yours. (…) Germany has opened its doors to you and you have received something from its treasury, while you at the same time have not received anything from your own people. (…)

‘I Want to Guide My Brothers’

Finally, I say these are some of my answers that I have given. (…) I have not said any of this in order to achieve something. I want to guide my brothers in Islam and to point their attention to what is useful for them, especially since I am suffering in prison and have been misunderstood.

It has already been six years now since I was unjustly jailed.

I also say this, because many of you hold me in high esteem and trust my opinion. This is my opinion and that is my view.

I promise my daughter that I will answer all her questions in order to serve justice in the first and the last instance. May Allah grant success.

This has been written by Muhammad bin Muhammad El Fazazi who is been kept as a prisoner in the Tangier city prison unjustly, July 21, 2009.”

Editor’s note: This text is based on a German translation of Fazazi’s original Arabic letter that was commissioned by German security authorities. SPIEGEL ONLINE does not possess a copy of the Arabic original. About one-third of the original document has been removed in this abridged version because the passages were either difficult to understand or redundant.

Het is mij nog niet geheel duidelijk wat ik ervan moet denken. De herziening die El Fizazi doet past dus wel in een breder patroon van mensen die (oprecht zo lijkt het toch) deels afstand hebben gedaan van hun oude ideeen. In El Fizazi’s geval dan vooral voor wat betreft het gebruik van geweld in Westerse landen. Strijden tegen wat hij ziet als onrecht blijft wel belangrijk en hij wijst (in de brief althans) geweld niet in alle gevallen af. Aan de andere kant het gegeven dat deze brief (zoals die in Der Spiegel) via de veiligheidsdienst naar buiten is gekomen, zal het vertrouwen in de authenticiteit niet bepaald vergroten. De weigering van sommigen om het te geloven of, wanneer ze het wel geloven, kan er ook op wijzen dat de radicalisering wat dieper zit dan menigeen denkt en dat men niet blind zomaar wat geleerden navolgt zoals ook al eerder duidelijk werd in de zaak van Al Maqdisi. In ieder geval wijst El Fizazi’s brief op belangrijke vragen die leven en die betrekking hebben op één centrale vraag: wat zijn de grenzen van gewelddadige Jihad?

1 comment.

Why young people radicalize

Posted on October 7th, 2009 by martijn.
Categories: International Terrorism, ISIM/RU Research, Religious and Political Radicalization.

The Dutch Coordinator for Counter-terrorism (NCtB) has published a report that tries to answer the question why young people radicalize and sympathize with terrorism. The research, by K. van Den Bos, A. Loseman and B. Doosje from Utrecht University, concentrates on radical Muslim youth and radical right wing youth in the Netherlands. It is a combination of quantitative and qualitative research focusing on the perspectives of youth themselves. The report is in Dutch (can be downloaded here) but an english summary is included and quoted here in total below:

In this report we study why young people engage in radical behavior and start sympathizing with terrorist movements. More specially, we examine the beliefs of Dutch youngsters (13-21 years) about muslim radicalism and rightwing extremism.

Following earlier studies on this topic, important demographic variables are identified that could lead to muslim radicalism and rightwing extremism. These variables include education, gender, age, religiosity, and etnic and cultural factors. We further note that it is impossible to give an “objective” demographic description of radicalization among young people. That is, factors that lead to radical behavior are complex and multi-faceted, and it is not possible to point out demographic variables that directly and straightforwardly impact on the radicalization process. Thus, when certain demographic conditions are met this does not imply that young people in fact will engage in radical behavior.

Therefore, this reports states that in order to obtain good insights into why people engage in radical behavior and start sympathizing for terrorist violence, careful attention should be paid to how young people perceive the situation they are in. After all, how people think, behave, and feel is affected to a large extent by how they interpret situations. This report, therefore, pays appropriate attention to important aspects of how young people perceive the modern society. To this end, we build on modern insights from the behavioral sciences in general, and social psychology in particular.

Social psychology is the scientific discipline that studies what people think, do, and feel, and what the influence of other people is on these reactions. In particular, we present a conceptual model that proposes that experienced injustice plays a crucial role in the psychological process that leads to radical behavior. For example, when a young person experiences that his/her own group is deprived compared to other groups, or when the person feels unfairly treated by important actors in the person’s society, then this can lead the person to start  engaging in radical worldviews or extremist behaviors. Our model suggests that injustice thus leads young people to hold more positive beliefs about radical belief systems, judge Dutch authorities as illegitimate, start to contrast their own group from other groups, feel superior to others, and are less committed to the Dutch society.

When people experience injustice this can easily lead to anger against society, as a result of which intentions to and actually engaging in violent and rude behavior can occur. This effect is particularly likely when people are predisposed to react in strong ways to experiences of personal uncertainty and when they experience that their own group is threatened by other groups. Thus, our model suggests that injustice, uncertainty, and threatened groups play a pivotal role in the process that may lead to radical (and perhaps even terrorist) behaviors We tested our conceptual model in an internet survey with 1341 Dutch persons who were between 13 and 21 years old. Chapter 3 describes this study and Section 3.1 presents the design of the study, the way in which our respondents were sampled, and how we analyzed our data (pp. 24-28). We note explicitly that the current sample was not a genuinely randomly drawn sample, so caution is needed when interpreting the results. This noted, the sampling did not affect tests of the relationships between the variables identified by our model.

Therefore, we focus on testing our model and Section 3.7 (pp. 61-67) summarizes the results obtained. The second study that this report describes consisted of in-depth interviews with 24 radical young persons. Chapter 4 describes this study and results are summarized in Section 4.3 (pp. 94-96). General conclusions following the model and the two studies presented are drawn in Chapter 5 (pp. 97-101).

The research findings of our two studies show that when basic aspects of a young person’s life are perceived as unjust this is likely to result in muslim radicalism and rightwing extremism. Together with sensitivity for personal uncertainty and group threats this can easily lead to externally oriented negative emotions (such as anger) and intentions to engage in radical and even violent behavior.

More generally, we suggest that careful attention to how situations are perceived and interpreted by young people can contribute to the understanding of radical behavior. Politicians and policy makers can use this insight, and the specifics described in our report, to better understand and predict the behaviors of young people in the Netherlands (and elsewhere). Using these insights can led to a better grouding of the prevention of radical and violent behaviors in one’s society.

As with most social-psychological research this report focuses on grievances and more in particular the perception of injustice. An interpretation of ones environment as unjust and unfair may change people’s sense of agency and identity which, in turn, influences the interpretation of ones local and global environment. The report show many similarities with an another recent report by Human Security Gateway on identity and radicalization of Muslim youth in Europe.
Human Security Gateway – Identity and Islamic Radicalization in Western Europe

This paper argues that both socio-economic disadvantage and political factors, such as the West’s foreign policy with regard to the Muslim world, along with historical grievances, play a part in the development of Islamic radicalized collective action in Western Europe. We emphasise the role of group identity based individual behaviour in organising collective action within radicalized Muslim groups. Inasmuch as culture plays any role at all in radicalization, it is because individuals feel an imperative to act on the basis of their Muslim identity, something to which different individuals will attach varying degrees of salience, depending on how they place their Muslim identity based actions in the scheme of their multiple identities. We also emphasize the role of the opportunistic politician, from the majority European community, in fomenting hatred for Muslims, which also produces a backlash from radicalized political Islam. We present comparative evidence on socio-economic, political and cultural disadvantage faced by Muslim minorities in five West European countries: Germany, the UK, France, Spain and the Netherlands.

The latter report show a little better how particular movements can be trapped into a movement-countermovement spiral; meaning that (some) Muslim radicals respond to actions and saying by so called Islam critics and vice versa resulting in both movements becoming constitutive to one another. What both reports do not answer (and are also not intended to do but is relevant nevertheless) is how all of this relates to radical actions. The group sharing the same type of radical interpretations about an unjust world is large; the group involved in radical actions remains very small.

2 comments.

A Purist Jihadi-Salafi: The Ideology of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi

Posted on October 2nd, 2009 by martijn.
Categories: Important Publications, ISIM/RU Research.

In the past I have written about Abu Muhammad al-Maqddisi here before. My colleague Joas Wagemakers is writing a PhD thesis about him and his work. Recently he has published a very interesting article about the three major themes in his work: al-wala’ wa-l-bara’, kufr and jihad:

Abstract
This article deals with the prominent contemporary Jihadi-Salafi ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. In what follows, three major tenets of his ideology (al-walamacr? wa-l-baramacr?, kufr and jihad) are discussed. These concepts show that al-Maqdisi more or less transcends the boundaries of Quintan Wiktorowicz’s division of Salafis into purists, politicos and jihadis. I contend that al-Maqdisi is relatively close to purist Salafism and can thus be seen as a ‘purist Jihadi-Salafi’. This implies that his ideas may resonate more easily with purists than the rhetoric of the likes of Osama bin Laden. At the same time, jihadis may take him more seriously because of his religious authority based on his close adherence to the purist creed. Although this article does not focus on explaining al-Maqdisi’s popularity, it seems obvious that his specific combination of purist and jihadi Salafism may account for at least some of his standing among Salafis.

A Purist Jihadi-Salafi: The Ideology of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi – British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies

Author: Joas Wagemakers –
DOI: 10.1080/13530190903007327
Publication Frequency: 3 issues per year
Published in: journal British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Volume 36, Issue 2 August 2009 , pages 281 – 297

0 comments.

Cosmo-Salafists in Europe and the Middle East

Posted on September 29th, 2009 by martijn.
Categories: ISIM/RU Research, Ritual and Religious Experience, Young Muslims.

Salafism can be seen as a transnational movement; originating in the Middle East it has acquired a more global outlook with local characteristics in Africa, Asia, America’s and Europe. This of course fuels the discourse of the Middle East as a hotbed for radicals but less well known is that there is a reverse influence as well. Salafis from other continents travelling to the Middle East, usually for two main reasons:

1. Study
2. Hijra

Study
Young men and women travel to the Middle East for Arab language courses and/or Islamic courses. The University of Medina in Saudi Arabia is a popular venue but not always easy to get in. Other countries also offer a variety of courses. In the past Syria has been very popular for such courses; it was relatively easy to get into the country and the course fees were low or in some case the courses were almost for free. People have different motivations for attending these courses: acquiring more knowledge about Arabic language and Islam, sometimes for personal use and within their family only but also sometimes in order to become one of the ‘daiya’ (one who practices da’wa) in their country of residence. Others use their time abroad as a period of time in which they can reflect on their current existence and contemplate on how they want to lead a more fulfilling and pious life. And probably other motives exist as well. Their stay abroad in this case is always temporarily; usually after a year (those studying in Saudi Arabia will stay longer) they return to their country of residence.

Hijra
Hijra is the wish, or for some the command of God to Muslims, to return to the world of Muslims and to leave the home of the infidels. It is part of Islamic tradition but the interpretation of this command differs. Are there truly Islamic countries? Is the West in some ways not more Islamic than the countries in the Middle East? Nevertheless talk about the wish to migrate to a Muslim country is abundant but few really make the step. Popular venues in this case are, for Moroccan-Dutch Muslims, Morocco, Egypt and Saudi Arabia although the latter is almost impossible. People expect life in those countries is easier for Muslims because Islam is embedded in daily life: one can hear the call for prayer, during the month of fasting many shops and restaurants are closed during the day and one expects they have to explain less about their lifestyle than they experience in the West. In some cases migration to the UK (in particular Birmingham, Leeds and Leicester) is seen as an alternative for or a first step towards ‘real’ hijra. Of those people who do make hijra to the Middle East, some of them return after a while. There are different reasons but often their experience in the Middle East is that they face a lot of difficulties adjusting to the culture of the country; they are more ‘Dutch’ than previously imagined or they did not prepare well enough. Other people develop some sort of ‘betwixt and between’ relationship with the West and the Middle East and travel back and forth several times a year. And of course there is a group who is perfectly happy in their new found residence and probably will stay.

Jihad
As has been reported over the years there is a group of young Muslims who (try to) go to the Middle East to receive training for engaging in a violent jihad such as in Iraq. In almost all of the cases this proves to be much more difficult than they had anticipated and many of these travels fail or do not even begin. In a few cases however people succeed to reach the battleground and really engage in, what they see as, a fight for justice. Some of them die doing so, others may return after a while.

Now it is difficult to determine what and how exactly their influence substantiates but a recent article by Dutch journalist Alexander Weissink for NRC/Handelsblad newspaper (in DUTCH and in ENGLISH) provides with some clues, also about the response of the local authorities in the Middle East who usually keep an eye on these euro-salafists.
nrc.nl – International – Features – Egypt suspicious of European language students

Young men with downy beards, caps, kneelength galabeyas and sandals sat chatting in a MacDonald’s restaurant in Nasr City, a large middle class district in the eastern part of Cairo. Women wearing concealing black garments and veils over their faces scurried around the small dusty streets between their apartments and the neighbourhood shops. They were not from here and they barely spoke any Arabic. Asking around revealed that every one of them came from Europe and most of them have North African roots.
Amidst the neighbourhood Egyptians, the European Salafists – Sunni religious fundamentalists – are outsiders. Ashraf (26), a Dutchman of Moroccan descent, came to Cairo a year ago. “To learn Arabic,” he said, “the language of my religion.” He had just visited the mosque, where many kindred spirits go to pray five times a day. A not-so-secret agent of the security service stood outside the mosque. The house of prayer is under surveillance. “We aren’t hurting anyone,” said Ashraf, whose apartment was recently searched. “We only come to study and pray.”

Apparently their is a risk of these import-salafists to become involved in illegal or even terrorist activities:
nrc.nl – International – Features – Egypt suspicious of European language students

Most students are mainly centred on themselves and their faith, but some come here with firm opinions about Islam and call anyone who sees it differently an infidel,” the director said. “We try to teach them the language so they learn to understand the true message of the Koran, but they often look for trouble. They get in with a bad crowd, visit the wrong mosque and listen to the wrong sheik.

But let’s also not forget Egypt is not a very democratic country and has in the past had major crackdowns aimed against particular Muslim groups (often related to the Muslim Brotherhood). And it indeed is probably not a coincidence that the latest crackdown occurred just before president Obama’s visit to Egypt.
nrc.nl – International – Features – Egypt suspicious of European language students

A number of students from France, Belgium and the United Kingdom for instance are suspected of involvement in a bomb attack in Cairo in February which killed a French tourist. The chief suspects – Dodi Hoxha, a French woman of Albanian descent, and Farouk Taher Ibn Abbas, a Belgian of Tunisian origin – have been subjected to heavy-handed interrogation since April, a diplomatic source reported on condition of remaining anonymous. Both studied at Al-Fajr, director Al-Gohari confirmed when asked.

The Belgian chief suspect reportedly confessed that he had been ordered to return to Belgium to prepare a bomb attack in Paris. Questions from this reporter about evidence were not answered. But an informal source in the Egyptian public prosecution department said the suspects had travelled from Egypt to the Gaza strip and became involved with extremist groups there.

Also in the past (as stated by Weissink) Egypt witnessed similar crackdowns in which European students (including one Dutch) were arrested and interrogated. One can only wonder about the role of the European intelligence and security services.

Egypt is important in this case since it seems to have replaced Syria as the most popular venue for studying Arab language and Islamic traditions. There are many schools, although the credentials are not always very clear, and certainly Cairo has a positive image as an easy to live in city. Most people I know who went there or are thinking about it, do not seem to have any violent intentions whatsoever. It would be interesting to record how these people experience their daily (religious) life over there, what they have learned from the whole experience when they return and what role (if any) they play in community life over there. Weissink’s article provides some clues but more research needs to be done about these transnational or even cosmopolitan citizens.

5 comments.

Whose body is it anyway? | Amsterdam mayor: No Benefit with Burqa

Posted on September 28th, 2009 by martijn.
Categories: Gender, Kinship & Marriage Issues, ISIM/RU Research, Public Islam.

It seems that, with a few notable exceptions, people in the Netherlands have been accustomed to the headscarf. The burqa or niqaab however is a different matter. A while ago there was a debate in the Netherlands about banning the burqa from public spaces. A proposal for this by Wilders’ Party of Freedom never made it, but in the mean time the burqa and niqaab have been banned for women in public service. Working for local or national authorities, at schools and universities, the burqa/niqaab is not allowed. a decision that has been implemented without any fuss, let alone a political debate.

Now the social democratic mayor of Amsterdam, famous for his attempts to ‘keep people together’ has stated in an interview in Dutch daily Trouw:

Contrary to france, the separation of church and state never meant that public space should be free of religious expressions. […]Personally I find it terrible to see a woman walk about in a burqa. But whether or not I like it is not a criterium by which to forbid it

In situations however when contact and interaction with other people is necessary, things are different according to him:

I agree with the notion that if you cannot find work because of the burqa you can also not turn up for benefits.

The idea is similar to what current Rotterdam mayor Ahmed Aboutaleb (also social democrat) said in 2006 in an interview with feminist magazine Opzij:

Nobody wants to hire someone with a burqa […] In that case, I say: off with the burka and apply for work. If you don’t want to do that, that’s fine, but you don’t get a benefit payment.

Now if Cohen says he thinks a burqa is terrible, but that is not a reason to ban it, he is right of course. But if other people hate the burqa too and therefore do not want women on the working place wearing it, that is a reason to cut benefit for women with a burqa? There are not that many women wearing niqaab, let alone burqa (not that both terms are used as if they are the same) so is it that difficult to come up with a solution that fits the individual case? Do we really need a law for this or a general measure?

In 2006 and 2007 a counter campaign was run by Muslim women opposing the proposed ban on the burqa. There was an online petition and a demonstration in the Hague. The demonstration took place and the slogans used focused on themes such as freedom, personal choice and emancipation. (Interesting at that time was that a few days before this demonstration, another demonstration took place in which Afghan women also used the burqa for their statement about freedom and emancipation, but then in order not to be expelled to Afghanistan where they would be forced to wear it). As I have shown in my PhD research and also in my current research on the Salafi movement, female behaviour and body, therefore, are important symbolic boundary markers. And not only for Muslims. The teenage girls and women in my research also experienced their behaviour and attire as an important factor in the attention of native Dutch people which leads them to the perception that not only do other Muslims try to tell them how to behave and what to wear, but so also do the native Dutch. By politicizing gender in relation to Islam, women become the core of the struggle between Muslims and native Dutch people over the control of the Muslims in the Netherlands. They have become the embodiment of the Islam debate and integration debate as well as many internal Muslim struggles.

Will be continued probably.

1 comment.

Whose body is it anyway? | Amsterdam mayor: No Benefit with Burqa

Posted on September 28th, 2009 by martijn.
Categories: Gender, Kinship & Marriage Issues, ISIM/RU Research, Public Islam.

It seems that, with a few notable exceptions, people in the Netherlands have been accustomed to the headscarf. The burqa or niqaab however is a different matter. A while ago there was a debate in the Netherlands about banning the burqa from public spaces. A proposal for this by Wilders’ Party of Freedom never made it, but in the mean time the burqa and niqaab have been banned for women in public service. Working for local or national authorities, at schools and universities, the burqa/niqaab is not allowed. a decision that has been implemented without any fuss, let alone a political debate.

Now the social democratic mayor of Amsterdam, famous for his attempts to ‘keep people together’ has stated in an interview in Dutch daily Trouw:

Contrary to france, the separation of church and state never meant that public space should be free of religious expressions. […]Personally I find it terrible to see a woman walk about in a burqa. But whether or not I like it is not a criterium by which to forbid it

In situations however when contact and interaction with other people is necessary, things are different according to him:

I agree with the notion that if you cannot find work because of the burqa you can also not turn up for benefits.

The idea is similar to what current Rotterdam mayor Ahmed Aboutaleb (also social democrat) said in 2006 in an interview with feminist magazine Opzij:

Nobody wants to hire someone with a burqa […] In that case, I say: off with the burka and apply for work. If you don’t want to do that, that’s fine, but you don’t get a benefit payment.

Now if Cohen says he thinks a burqa is terrible, but that is not a reason to ban it, he is right of course. But if other people hate the burqa too and therefore do not want women on the working place wearing it, that is a reason to cut benefit for women with a burqa? There are not that many women wearing niqaab, let alone burqa (not that both terms are used as if they are the same) so is it that difficult to come up with a solution that fits the individual case? Do we really need a law for this or a general measure?

In 2006 and 2007 a counter campaign was run by Muslim women opposing the proposed ban on the burqa. There was an online petition and a demonstration in the Hague. The demonstration took place and the slogans used focused on themes such as freedom, personal choice and emancipation. (Interesting at that time was that a few days before this demonstration, another demonstration took place in which Afghan women also used the burqa for their statement about freedom and emancipation, but then in order not to be expelled to Afghanistan where they would be forced to wear it). As I have shown in my PhD research and also in my current research on the Salafi movement, female behaviour and body, therefore, are important symbolic boundary markers. And not only for Muslims. The teenage girls and women in my research also experienced their behaviour and attire as an important factor in the attention of native Dutch people which leads them to the perception that not only do other Muslims try to tell them how to behave and what to wear, but so also do the native Dutch. By politicizing gender in relation to Islam, women become the core of the struggle between Muslims and native Dutch people over the control of the Muslims in the Netherlands. They have become the embodiment of the Islam debate and integration debate as well as many internal Muslim struggles.

Will be continued probably.

1 comment.

Protected: 'Innovators en Zondaars': kritiek en repliek

Posted on September 15th, 2009 by martijn.
Categories: Internal Debates, ISIM/RU Research, Religious and Political Radicalization, Young Muslims.

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Protected: ‘Innovators en Zondaars’: kritiek en repliek

Posted on September 15th, 2009 by martijn.
Categories: Internal Debates, ISIM/RU Research, Religious and Political Radicalization, Young Muslims.

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AIVD – Stagnatie groei salafisme?

Posted on September 10th, 2009 by martijn.
Categories: ISIM/RU Research, Religious and Political Radicalization, Young Muslims.

Volgens het journaal stelt de AIVD dat de groei van het salafisme in Nederland stagneert:

De groei van het salafisme, een ultraorthodoxe stroming in de islam, stagneert in Nederland. Dat concludeert de inlichtingendienst AIVD. Aanhangers van het salafisme willen terug naar de ‘zuivere’ islam van de begintijd (rond 600 na Christus) en leven strikt naar de wetten uit deze tijd.

Twee jaar geleden waarschuwde de AIVD nog voor de toenemende invloed van salafistische imams op Nederlandse moslims. Niet omdat ze oproepen tot geweld, maar omdat ze met hun afwijzing van de Westerse samenleving de integratie van moslims belemmeren. De AIVD vreesde toen dat het salafisme zou uitgroeien tot een beweging.

Uit een recent onderzoek van de AIVD blijkt dat dit niet gebeurt. “Onze belangrijkste conclusie is dat de groei stagneert. Het leidt niet tot een brede verspreiding en dat was vooral onze zorg”, zegt Wil van Gemert, directeur binnenlandse veiligheid van de AIVD.

Hypocriet
Volgens de inlichtingendienst zijn er verschillende oorzaken voor de afgenomen groei van het salafisme. Zo krijgen de salafistische centra nauwelijks meer subsidies. Ook wordt er vanuit de allochtone gemeenschap meer tegengas gegeven. Niet alleen door gematigde moslims maar ook door niet-gelovigen en orthodoxe moslims die sommige predikers hypocriet vinden omdat ze zich zelf niet aan hun strenge regels houden.

Verder ziet de AIVD dat jonge salafistische moslims na verloop van tijd weer uittreden. “Ze zeggen dat dit niet past in een Westerse samenleving, dat het niet aansluit bij de vrijheid en eigen mening die ze willen”, zegt Van Gemert.
De inlichtingendienst signaleert wel dat de professionalisering van de salafistische centra doorzet. Studenten kunnen cursussen volgen om de salafistische boodschap verder te verspreiden. Ook blijven de centra het gedachtengoed verspreiden dat moslims zich niet moeten vermengen met de Nederlandse samenleving.

Jihad
Een positieve ontwikkeling is volgens de AIVD dat de salafistische moskeeën radicaliserende jongeren de deur wijzen. Het gaat om jongeren die een stap verder willen gaan dan het politiek salafisme en bereid zijn tot de jihad en dus geweld niet schuwen.

Zo heeft het bestuur van de As Soenah moskee in Den Haag vorig jaar een groepje jongeren de deur gewezen. Enkele van deze jongeren doken deze zomer op in Kenia. Volgens het Openbaar Ministerie waren de jonge moslims op weg naar Somalië om deel te nemen aan een jihadistisch trainingskamp.

Stromingen
Het salafisme wordt onderverdeeld in drie stromingen waarvan de geloofsleer gelijk is, alleen de strategie verschilt. Het puritisme is een niet-politieke stroming die probeert volgens de wetten van de begintijd van de islam te leven. Het politiek salaisme wil het salafisme ook verspreiden en probeert in Nederland een beweging te vormen die op termijn ook invloed en gezag verwerft. Als laatste stroming is er het jihadistisch salafisme. Jihadisten gaan nog een stap verder. Zij vinden geweld gerechtvaardigd (vooral in moslimlanden).

In Nederlands zijn vier grotere salafistische centra in Den Haag, Amsterdam, Tilburg en Eindhoven. Het doel van deze centra is het herislamiseren van moslims. Dit leidt volgens de AIVD niet tot acute aantasting van de democratische rechtsorde, wel op langere termijn tot polarisatie. Dit is een sluipend proces, aldus de inlichtingendienst.

Bekijk HIER het journaal-item met daarin onder meer een interview met Nora die de salafistische kringen inmiddels grotendeels vaarwel heeft gezegd. Het volledige interview met haar is HIER te zien.

In bovenstaande tekst en ook in het journaal komen nogal wat aspecten voor waar vraagtekens bij te zetten zijn. Al eerder heb ik vraagtekens gezet bij de schattingen van de AIVD voor wat betreft het (potentiële) aantal salafisten. Het is volstrekt onduidelijk waar men de getallen destijds op baseerde en (dus) eveneens onduidelijk waar men de getallen nu op baseert. Bij iedere religieuze beweging is er een komen en gaan van participanten, observanten en activisten; dat is hier niet anders temeer omdat de salafistische prediking wel veel vraagt van het individu.

Over de driedeling die hier genoemd wordt zal ik binnenkort eens een apart stuk schrijven. Behalve dat lang niet alle salafisten deze driedeling erkennen, krijg ik er zelf ook steeds meer moeite mee.

UPDATE

Zie het stuk van Nasrah Habiballah en Mark Reuvers op FHJ Factcheck.

3 comments.

Kabinet: geen parallelle samenleving?

Posted on September 9th, 2009 by martijn.
Categories: ISIM/RU Research, Public Islam.

Kabinet: geen parallelle samenleving laten ontstaan

Persbericht | 01-09-2009

Het kabinet wil er geen misverstand over laten bestaan dat bepaalde elementen en interpretaties van de sharia haaks staan op de kernwaarden van onze democratische rechtsstaat. Strafbare gedragingen zullen worden vervolgd en in voorkomende gevallen kunnen rechtspersonen worden ontbonden of verboden verklaard. Het kabinet ziet het dan ook als zijn taak, te zorgen dat er geen parallelle samenlevingen ontstaan waar mensen het recht in eigen hand nemen of een eigen rechtssysteem hanteren dat zich buiten de kaders van onze rechtsorde begeeft. Dit schrijft minister Hirsch Ballin van Justitie in een brief aan de Tweede Kamer, mede namens minister Van der Laan voor Wonen, Wijken en Integratie.

Een vorm van geschillenbeslechting over geloofskwesties of passend gedrag van moslims in bepaalde situaties waaraan betrokkenen zich vrijwillig onderwerpen, hoeft niet in strijd met onze openbare orde te zijn. ‘Tegen dwang, ongeoorloofde druk of machtsmisbruik zal ik krachtig optreden’, aldus minister Hirsch Ballin.

Ook schrijft de bewindsman dat in Nederland geen polygame huwelijken kunnen worden gesloten met een juridisch bindend karakter, noch scheidingen op grond van de sharia worden uitgesproken die enig rechtsgevolg hebben. Naar de mogelijkheden om de strafbaarstelling van polygamie uit te breiden wordt nader onderzoek gedaan. De resultaten van een rechtsvergelijkend onderzoek naar de erkenning van polygame huwelijken worden niet voor eind november 2009 verwacht.

Verder gaat de brief in op de resultaten van een onderzoek naar informele huwelijken in Nederland. De indruk is, dat informele huwelijken op kleine schaal voorkomen en dat het aantal afneemt. Er is echter een toename te zien in informele huwelijken in islamitische kringen; waarbij tevens wordt geconstateerd dat het informeel trouwen met een imam in een moskee juist afneemt.

Behalve onwetendheid, die een enkele keer voorkomt, lijkt het belangrijkste motief voor het informele huwelijk in islamitische kringen het legitimeren van een relatie (en de daarmee gepaard gaande seksuele omgang) voor God en de sociale omgeving. Het vormt in islamitische kringen het alternatief voor ongehuwd samenwonen.

De relatiebevestigingen lijken aan te sluiten bij de in Nederland in het algemeen bestaande trend van informalisering van relaties. In de gevallen waar het hier om gaat is het echter twijfelachtig of er handelingen worden verricht die op een huwelijk betrekking hebben en of dat sprake is van een religieuze inzegening van een relatie. Tevens is onvoldoende duidelijk of de uitvoerder van een informeel huwelijk een religieus bedienaar is of niet.

De onderzoekers constateren tenslotte dat er geen goed zicht is op de omvang van het verschijnsel informele huwelijken en dat in het bijzonder over huwelijken in salafistische kringen en over geheime huwelijken in andere religies slechts oppervlakkige kennis beschikbaar is. Zij geven aan dat kennis hierover zeer moeilijk zal zijn te verwerven.

De bevindingen van de onderzoekers geven geen aanleiding tot beleidswijzigingen. Voorlichting over (het ontbreken van) de juridische gevolgen van relatiebevestigingen blijft nodig, met name ter bescherming van vrouwen die hier nog maar kort verblijven. Het kabinet ondersteunt diverse projecten die het verbeteren en versterken van de positie en weerbaarheid van migrantenvrouwen tot doel hebben, zoals rond huwelijksdwang en achterlating. Met deze projecten probeert het kabinet te bewerkstelligen dat met name migrantenvrouwen op de hoogte zijn van hun rechten en plichten in de Nederlandse samenleving.

Het is niet bekend of er door verenigingen of stichtingen shariarechtspraak wordt gefaciliteerd of georganiseerd die verder gaat dan advisering of geschillenbeslechting over geloofsregels. Of er imams bij shariarechtspraak zijn betrokken en hoeveel dit er zijn, moet ook blijken uit het onderzoek naar de mate waarin shariarechtbanken voorkomen in Nederland. De resultaten daarvan worden voor de zomer van 2010 verwacht.
Meer informatie

* Brief Tweede Kamer: Schriftelijk overleg over shariarechtbankenBrief / circulaire / beleidsregels | 01-09-2009 | pdf-document, 60 KB
* Studie: Informele huwelijken in NederlandRapport | 01-09-2009 | pdf-document, 3.20 MB

1 comment.

Migrantenstudies – Identificatie van migrantenjongeren

Posted on August 28th, 2009 by martijn.
Categories: [Online] Publications, ISIM/RU Research, Multiculti Issues, My Research, Young Muslims, Youth culture (as a practice).

Migrantenstudies is het enige Nederlandstalige wetenschappelijke tijdschrift voor onderzoek naar migratie, etnische minderheden en de Nederlandse samenleving. Tal van onderwerpen komen aan bod zoals huisvesting, gezondheidszorg, onderwijs, arbeidsmarkt, politieke participatie, discriminatie en identiteit. Het eerste nummer van dit jaar (dat sinds kort online staat) is een thema-nummer over identificatie van migrantenjongeren.

Jongeren nemen een belangrijke plaats in het identiteitsdebat in, omdat juist van hen verwacht wordt dat zij zich met Nederland identificeren; het is het land waar ze zijn opgegroeid en vaak ook zijn geboren. Dit themanummer brengt een aantal recente studies samen over identificatie van in het bijzonder Marokkaanse en Turkse migrantenjongeren. Deze studies besteden in het bijzonder aandacht aan de wijze waarop de migrantenjongeren in de context van de huidige Nederlandse samenleving hun identiteit construeren en welke factoren daarop van invloed zijn.
Ersanili & Scholten, p. 3

In dit nummer vindt u artikelen van Han Entzinger, Inge van der Welle en Virginie Mamadouh, Evelyn Ersanili, Susan Ketner, Simone Boogaarts en ondergetekende:

• Inleiding, Evelyn Ersanilli & Peter Scholten (red), pag. 2-8
• Integratie, maar uit de gratie. Multi-etnisch samenleven onder Rotterdamse jongeren, Han Entzinger, pag. 8-23
• Territoriale identiteiten en de identificatiestrategieën van Amsterdamse jongvolwassenen van buitenlandse afkomst. Over evenwichtskunstenaars en kleurbekenners, Inge van der Welle en Virginie Mamadouh, pag. 24-41
• Identificatie van Turkse migrantenjongeren in Nederland, Frankrijk en Duitsland, Evelyn Ersanilli, pag. 42-58
• Islam is islam. Punt uit? Marokkaans-Nederlandse moslimjongeren in Gouda en de culturele constructie van een ‘zuivere’ islam, Martijn de Koning, pag. 59-72
• “Ik denk niet in culturen… ik denk eigenlijk meer in mijn geloof’. Waarom jongeren van Marokkaanse afkomst in Nederland de moslimidentiteit zo sterk benadrukken, Susan Ketner, pag. 73-87
• Gedwongen of Vrije keuze? In- en uitsluitingsmechanisme in de etno-party scene, Simone Boogaarts, pag. 87-104

U kunt het hele nummer gratis downloaden: Themanummer ‘Identificatie van Migrantenjongeren’

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Radicalization Series Part II – What is it? A plea for critical radicalization studies

Posted on August 25th, 2009 by martijn.
Categories: Headline, ISIM/RU Research, Religious and Political Radicalization.

Introduction
This is part two of the radicalization series. In the first I gave a brief overview of different practices regarding counterradicalization, triggering (I think) the main question for part two: what the hell is radicalization.
Please consider the following statements:

• The authority of the goverment is not based upon the people. This would amount to sovereignty of the people but Muslims only recognize the absolute sovereignty of Allah, while the people’s sovereignty only recognizes that state and the will of the people as her God.
• If we will ever rule, we abolish democracy. There is not god but Allah and Allah is one. There is no room for other religions.
• The only distinction that really matters, is one between belief and unbelief, between the party upholding Allah’s rule and accepting his word, and the party rejecting it.
• If we ever rule, unbelieving journalists are the first who can enjoy their pension.

Would you consider the above statements as radical statements or perhaps even part of a radical ideology and/or movement?

What is it?
What is radical / radicalism / radicalization? There is a long standing tradition of evaluation and analysis of radicalization. The meaning of the term (political) radical usually pertains to a political orientation and/or means (sometimes including violence) that favor or promote revolutionary, fundamental changes in society. One of the first groups ever labelled (by themselves and others) as radical were the Radical Whigs whose writings played a major role in the American revolution with their ideas about democratic representation and taxes. Although nowadays radicalism is often linked to intolerance, anti-democratic views and means, the ideas of the Whigs their ideas will probably not considered as very radical in these days but rather as fair, Western and modern.

This example also shows that groups can call themselves radical. Another example is the Political Party of Radicals in the Netherlands in the past, which has merged with the Communist Party, Evangelical People’s Party and the Pacifist Socialist Party into the GreenLeft Party. Another term of used as a synonym to radical is extreme or extremism; but this is never (as far as I know) used by the groups themselves. Other similar terms are fundamentalist (in case of religion), subversive, fanaticism and far left or far right. Extremism or radicalism is not a prerogative from the fringes of society but can also occur in more mainstream parts of society.

Radicalism in Context: Bringing Cognitive Anthropology to Political Psychology

Political psychology research has recently converged on the realisation that any evaluation of ‘political radicalism’ cannot be undertaken in isolation, but must be done so with reference to specific social and cultural contexts (e.g. Haste, 2004; Marugesan, 2007). Meanwhile, developments in the field of cognitive anthropology offer a theoretical framework for capturing the interaction between universal cognitive modules and specific cultural contexts, the latter loaded with sets of ideological beliefs that can be taken on to differing degrees (Sperber, 1996). This paper presents the results of an attempt to utilise the lens of one such anthropological theory of belief maintenance, to analyse the arguments of those adhering to contextually radical beliefs: members of the UK Socialist Party. A combined qualitative and quantitative analysis of results reveals the negotiation of differing implicit and explicit beliefs, in a manner which sheds light on previous debates in cognitive functioning and socio-political ideology (e.g. Tetlock, 1984; Sidanius, 1985). It is concluded that useful theoretical insights can be garnered from the linking of political psychology and cognitive anthropology, while contemporary understandings of ‘radicalism’ will be enlightened by a sensitivity to differing socio-cultural contexts.

On Post-Fascism

As one of the greatest and most level-headed masters of twentieth-century political sociology, Seymour Martin Lipset, has noted, fascism is the extremism of the center.Fascism had very little to do with passéiste feudal, aristocratic, monarchist ideas, was on the whole anti-clerical, opposed communism and socialist revolution, and–like the liberals whose electorate it had inherited–hated big business, trade unions, and the social welfare state. Lipset had classically shown that extremisms of the left and right were by no means exclusive: some petty bourgeois attitudes suspecting big business and big government could be, and were, prolonged into an extremism that proved lethal. Right-wing and center extremisms were combined in Hungarian, Austrian, Croatian, Slovak para-fascism (I have borrowed this term from Roger Griffin) of a pseudo-Christian, clericalist, royalist coloring, but extremism of the center does and did exist, proved by Lipset also through continuities in electoral geography.

Today there is nothing of any importance on the political horizon but the bourgeois center, therefore its extremism is the most likely to reappear. (Jörg Haider and his Freedom Party are the best example of this. Parts of his discourse are libertarian/neoliberal, his ideal is the propertied little man, he strongly favors a shareholding and home-owning petty bourgeois “democracy,” and he is quite free of romantic-reactionary nationalism as distinct from parochial selfishness and racism.) What is now considered “right-wing” in the United States would have been considered insurrectionary and suppressed by armed force in any traditional regime of the right as individualistic, decentralizing, and opposed to the monopoly of coercive power by the government, the foundation of each and every conservative creed. Conservatives are le parti de l’ordre,and loathe militias and plebian cults.

Now lets turn to the Dutch situation and have a look at a publication by the Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (General Intelligence and Security Service – AIVD) I have blogged about earlier. The AIVD makes a useful distinction between terrorism and radicalism; both are obviously not the same but can occur together and being a terrorist would probably also mean being radical (but not the other way around I would add). One of the most striking findings is this one:
C L O S E R » Blog Archive » Terrorism and radicalization according to the AIVD

# A Moroccan national has been identified as a threat to national security because of his sympathy for the international violent jihad, has contacts with like-minded people abroad and support those people. He has been declared ‘persona non grata’ and will be deported to Morocco. In another report the AIVD concluded that an another man from the same family rejects the democratic order. This may prevent him to obtain Dutch nationality.
# The AIVD released a report about a Turkish man who travelled, via Turkey, to the Pakistani-Afghani border region to participate in the international violent Jihad. In the report the AIVD stated that he is a threat to national security and he also has been declared ‘persona non grata’.

It seems that ‘rejecting democracy’ is sufficient to label someone radical and declare him persona non grata. Also having plans to engage in global jihad (outside the Netherlands) is enough to be deemed a radical. Also the AIVD sees shared grievances as a main cause for (radical) activism but given the fact that the AIVD sees democracy and shared Dutch values as a yardstick for integration and radicalism, the danger exists that anyone Muslim who criticizes Dutch values or Dutch democracy is considered a radical.

For now the important thing is that radicalism is seen as a particular idea or act that goes against (a particular idea of) shared values and the existing (in this case democratic status quo) and that what is to be considered radical varies over time and across cultures. In an upcoming chapter in a volume on Politicization and Radicalization Roel Meijer and I have based ourselves upon a definition by Beach that captures the abovementioned aspects. He defines radicalization of social movements as

a change in one or more of the components of a social movement’s ideology and/or a change in the strategies and tactics employed or advocated by the movement such that the total of the change or changes brings the movement into a condition of lesser congruence with the values and means which are presented as legitimate by the dominant sector of the society in which the movement is acting.
Beach 1977, Social Movement Radicalization: the Case of the People’s Democracy in Northern Ireland. The Sociological Quarterly 19, pp. 305-318

This is a very useful definition, because it does not only focus on intra-movement developments but also on opinions and interests of other parties in society. Unfortunately in his worthwhile elaboration on this definition Beach (1977) conceptualizes the societally approved values as (‘initially’) static. Given the development of the Dutch Islam debate and the rise and toning down of the Salafi movement in the Netherlands it is however clear that what is approved in society can change rather rapidly in particular in the aftermath of shocking incidents such as 9/11. (See for example Van Bruinessen) In fact, what Meijer and myself are arguing that such a change was instrumental to the process of radicalization among young Muslims. We propose therefore a slightly changed and more precise definition of radicalization as

a change in one or more of the components of a group’s identity and/or ideology and/or a change in the strategies and tactics employed or advocated by the group such that the total of the change or changes brings the group into a condition of lesser congruence with the prevailing social arrangements, values and means which are presented as legitimate by the institutions and elites concerned with maintaining these social arrangements and values.De Koning & Meijer, forthcoming.

Instead of recognizing wider society and its institutions, radicalization involves a turn away from wider society into an exclusive in-group membership of a group with an anti-systemic ideology and/or tactics (see also Beach 1977: 313). This also means however that we should not only take into account the intra-movement developments but also wider society and ask ourselves why do particular institutions and elites consider and label particular individuals, social categories or social movements as ‘radical’, how does the process of labelling occur and what are the consequences? Neglecting the latter will, I think, inevitably mean that counter-radicalization policies, or even radicalization research, is state-centric and problem-oriented (with its focus on short-term imminent threats that take the state’s framing as self-evident – not very remarkable for policies of course) and moreover reducing issues of poverty, islamophobia, religionization and religion-based activism, lack of political influence into a matter of (the threat of) violence and/or a dangerous lack of cultural integration and social cohesion (or short; deviance). The fact that global inequalities and ucertainties, imperialism and (Western) interventionism in for example Iraq and Afghanistan (or the lack thereof in for example Chechnya) also play a role and provide fertile ground for militant oppositional ideologies and politics, is obscured in this way. In that sense labelling an individual, social category or movement as ‘radical’ is a political strategy that serves to protect particular interests.
Towards critical radicalization studies
What I mean by this perhaps becomes clearer when we have another look at the statements mentioned above. There is a major chance such public statements by Muslims would have been subjected to the label radical given the apparent concern of the Dutch government and institutions such as AIVD with seeing radicalism as something that is going against and/or threatening democracy. Those statements however, although made in public, were never considered as such. Maybe (I know I know, it is a trick and perhaps a little too obvious and simplistic) because they were not made by Muslims:

• The authority of the goverment is not based upon the people. This would amount to sovereignty of the people. The SGP (orthodox Christian party) only recognizes the absolute sovereignty of God, while the people’s sovereignty only recognizes that state and the will of the people as her God. SGP Program of Principles
• If the SGP will ever rule, we abolish democracy. There is only one God, there is no other way to receive salvation. The Lord Jezus says: I am the way, and the truth, and the life. There is no room for other religions.Ton Crijnen in daily newspaper Trouw.
• The only distinction that really matters, is one between belief and unbelief, between the party accepting God’s rule and his word, and the party rejecting it. Asking for Evangelist worshippers, then and now by G.J. Schutte, 2003, former leader of an orthodox Christian party, now part of the Christian Union with six seats in parliament and part of the government
• If we ever rule, Clairy Polak (Dutch journalist, accused of being a Leftie) is the first who can enjoy her pension. PVV Leader Wilders in magazine HP/De Tijd

Original Dutch versions:

• De overheid ontleent haar gezag niet aan het volk. Deze opvatting staat in verband met de volkssoevereiniteit. De SGP daarentegen erkent de absolute soevereiniteit van God, terwijl de volkssoevereiniteit slechts de staat en de algemene volkswil als haar god erkent. Beginselprogram SGP
• “Mocht de SGP ooit regeren, dan schaffen we de democratie af”, Er is maar één God. Op een andere wijze kun je niet zalig worden. De Here Jezus zegt: “Ik ben de Weg, de Waarheid en het Leven”. Er is dus geen ruimte voor andere godsdiensten Ton Crijnen. In: Trouw, 5.1.2002.
• het enige onderscheid dat echt ter zake doet, is dat tussen geloof en ongeloof, tussen de partij die het gezag van God en zijn woord aanvaardt en de partij die dit gezag verwerpt – Evangeliebelijders gevraagd, toen en nu”, G.J. Schutte, 2003.
• ’Als wij het voor zeggen krijgen, is Clairy Polak de eerste die van haar wachtgeld mag gaan genieten.’ Wilders in HP/De Tijd

Radicalization is not a stable and objective phenomenon out there to be studied in a self-evident and uncritical way. Radicalization research therefore not only needs to take into account the developments among radicalizing Muslims or radicalizing right wing youth (or left or center) but also needs take critically examine broader processes in society and the ideas and practices of elites and state-institutions involved in counter-radicalization policies. Both form different parts of the same medal and both (may) produce and reproduce each other.

Radicalization research also needs to consider the motivation of those apparently radicalizing individuals, groups or movement more seriously. The focus on deviance, lack of integration or even downright evil (as in the case of terrorists) lead to a situation in which the motivations and actions are only taken into account very superficially and/or one-sided. In the case of Muslim radicalization we now are faced with a situation in which the apparent radicalization of Muslim youth is unprecendented, more threatening than ever before and exceptional although the terrorism throughout the 1970s has been more serious in the Netherlands in terms of the people targeted and killed. Although the current motivations for radicalization differ from those in the past and the transnational connections also make Muslim radicalization much more complicated and unpredictable, an important difference is also that the motivations of for example the Moluccan radicals in the 1970s received recognition and understanding (although the means were disapproved of), but for radical Muslim youth there seems to be less understanding let alone sympathy. (See HERE for Fighting terrorism in the Netherlands; a historical perspective). The state’s policies, the politics of labelling and the ‘extremism of the center’ should therefore be as much part of radicalization research. Lacking in much of the analyses is a critical reflection on the role of the state and its institutions. Why do states and their institutions label particular individuals, groups and movements as radical and what are the consequences in terms of rights, policies and the position and daily lives of the targeted groups?

Researchers of radicalization can benefit from the critical terrorism studies as proposed by Gunning, Jackson and Breen Smyth. Consider for example the next statement by Jackson
e-IR » Why We Need Critical Terrorism Studies

an acute sensitivity to the politics of labelling and the acceptance of the fundamental ontological insecurity of the ‘terrorism’ label and thus extreme care in its use during research; a commitment to inter-disciplinarity and a willingness to engage with research from disciplines outside of international relations (there is some excellent terrorism research from anthropology, for example); a commitment to transparency regarding the values and political standpoints of researchers, particularly as they relate to the geo-political interests and values of the states they work in; a willingness by researchers to expand the focus of their research to include topics such as the use of terrorism by states, gender dimensions of terrorism, ethical-normative analysis of counter-terrorism, and the discursive foundations which make ‘terrorism studies’ possible in the first place; adherence to a set of responsible research ethics which take account of the various users of terrorism research, including the ‘suspect communities’ from which terrorists often emerge and the populations who bear the brunt of counter-terrorism policies; a commitment to taking the subjectivity of both the researcher and the researched seriously, particularly in terms of being willing to ‘talk to terrorists’; and a commitment to normative values and a broadly defined notion of emancipation. These commitments go beyond simply the call to engage in more rigorous and self-reflective research. In their normative dimensions in particular, these kinds of commitments amount to an orientation that shares many of the same attitudes and approaches as the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory and the Welsh School of Critical Security Studies.

The call for the establishment of a new, more reflexive ‘critical’ terrorism studies (CTS) is a self-conscious and deliberate attempt to try and overcome some of the problems that have been noted about the broader field of terrorism studies, and to attract scholars who study terrorism but are uncomfortable associating with a field that has historically been closely aligned with the state. The initial aim of CTS advocates has been to map out a new ‘critical’ set of approaches to the study of political terrorism, and to generate a new, broader research agenda.

Also work from social movement theory has, already, been very useful in treating different forms of radicalization as (for example) islamic activism. In particular an anthropological social movement approach can among others things take into account the differences in trajectories of radicalization and differences in commitment, levels of participation and motivations of radical actors and can offer a critique of state policies and actions (as does CTS). This should lead us to open up novel areas of investigation and interrogate wider processes, discourses, practices and experiences that produce, nurture and reproduce reframings of politics that appear to become anti-systemic and oppositional.

This was the second blog entry. In two months part three will be published here, which will focus more on my own research. After that part four will be published, focusing on the Dutch state institutions. If you want to stay updated, please register HERE.
C L O S E R » Blog Archive » Radicalization Series – Part I: The slippery slope of ethnic profiling

2 comments.

Ghuraba – De Vreemdelingen

Posted on August 20th, 2009 by martijn.
Categories: Arts & culture, ISIM/RU Research, Ritual and Religious Experience.

Een nasheed (mv anasheed) is een islamitisch lied, gewoonlijk a-cappella gezongen soms begeleid met percussie. Als er een anasheed-hitparade zou bestaan, zou de volgende ongetwijfeld erg hoog scoren:

In deze entry vind je alle versies die ik toegestuurd heb gekregen. Op verzoek vermeld ik erbij wanneer de nasheed muziek bevat.
De tekst van het lied verwijst naar hadith verzameling van Bukhari (Ar-Riqaq, boek 8, volume 76, hadith 425)
Hadith (Hadis) Books

Narrated Mujahid: ‘Abdullah bin ‘Umar said, “Allah’s Apostle took hold of my shoulder and said, ‘Be in this world as if you were a stranger or a traveler.” The sub-narrator added: Ibn ‘Umar used to say, “If you survive till the evening, do not expect to be alive in the morning, and if you survive till the morning, do not expect to be alive in the evening, and take from your health for your sickness, and (take) from your life for your death.”

En naar Muslim (Kitab Al-Iman, boek 1, hadith 270)
Hadith (Hadis) Books

It is narrated on the authority of Abu Huraira that the Messenger of Allah (may peace be upon him) said: Islam initiated as something strange, and it would revert to its (old position) of being strange. so good tidings for the stranger.

Hieronder volgt een lezing van Khalid Yasin met zijn interpretatie van ghuraba (en Nederlandse ondertiteling)

De tekst verwijst naar een situatie waarin een moslim zich onthecht (of zichzelf vervreemd) van het wereldlijke en alleen nog God aanbidt. Het is een opvatting die we in vergelijkbare vorm ook onder christenen kunnen terugvinden, en waarschijnlijk ook wel bij andere religies.
Ongelovige vrienden, hoever ga je? (printversie)

Gebed + luisteren naar God:

“Verlies uw hart niet aan de wereld of aan de dingen in de wereld! Als iemand de wereld liefheeft, woont de liefde van de Vader niet in hem. Want al wat in de wereld is, de hebzucht, de afgunst en het pronken met bezit, dat alles komt niet van de Vader maar van de wereld. En die wereld gaat voorbij met heel haar begeerlijkheid, maar wie de wil doet van God blijft in eeuwigheid.” (1Johannes 2:15-17)

“Trouwelozen, weet u niet dat vriendschap met de wereld vijandschap met God betekent? Wie met de wereld bevriend wil zijn, maakt zich tot vijand van God.” (Jakobus 4:4)

“Ik ben al niet meer in de wereld, maar zij, zij blijven in de wereld achter, terwijl Ik naar U toe kom. Heilige Vader, bewaar hen in uw naam, die U Mij hebt toevertrouwd, opdat ze één mogen zijn zoals Wij…. Ik vraag U niet hen uit de wereld weg te nemen, maar hen te behoeden voor de macht van het kwaad. Zij zijn niet van de wereld, zoals Ik niet van de wereld ben.” (Johannes 17:11, 15-16)

De vraag die ik kreeg voor deze workshop was: Hoe moet je omgaan met niet-christelijke vrienden? Waaraan kun je meedoen en tot hoe ver kun je mee gaan in wat zij doen? Volgens mij is dit een vraag die uit het spanningsveld komt wat we net in het laatste bijbelgedeelte hebben gelezen. Het spanningsveld tussen het in deze wereld zijn, maar niet van deze wereld zijn. Jezus noemt hier een enorm spanningsveld. Als mensen hebben we de neiging om uit dit spanningsveld weg te vluchten. Maar dit spanningsveld is zo bedoeld. Het moet er zijn en ook blijven. Door dit spanningsveld worden we namelijk geprikkeld om te luisteren naar God. Om samen met Jezus te worstelen over wat je moet doen en wat je moet laten. Ik heb geen kant en klaar pakketje met antwoorden voor jullie waardoor je weet wat je wel met je ongelovige vrienden kunt doen en wat niet. Ik denk dat dit ook per persoon verschillend is. Wat ik wel voor jullie heb is een eenvoudige boodschap: Blijf in het spanningsveld wat Jezus zo prachtig omschrijft. Blijf met Jezus worstelen over wat je moet doen en wat je moet laten. En stap niet in één van de valkuilen!

De valkuilen die hier staan zijn allemaal gevaarlijk:

1) Het ene uiterste: je helemaal uit de wereld terugtrekken, bang zijn om besmet te worden, waardoor je kunt geen zout en licht meer kunt zijn.
2) Het andere uiterste: gelijkvormigheid, er is geen verschil meer te zien tussen jou en je ongelovige vrienden, je bent zouteloos geworden en het licht in jou is verduisterd.
3) Gevaarlijke middenweg: de compromis (van twee walletjes eten), schijnheiligheid (dingen laten of juist doen om de schone schijn op te houden en door mensen bewonderd te worden), wetticisme (jezelf en anderen onmogelijke lasten opleggen en menen dat je daardoor een streepje voor hebt bij God).

* Welke valkuil vormt voor jou het grootste gevaar? Hoe komt dat zo?

De enige manier om te voorkomen dat je in één van deze valkuilen stapt en jezelf verwond is… in het spanningsveld blijven! Dit betekent dat je naar Jezus gaat luisteren en Hem vraagt wat je moet doen en wat je moet laten. Een vraag die je daarbij kan helpen is: “Here Jezus, kan u hier in en bij zijn?” Deze heiligingsvraag zullen we steeds weer moeten stellen. En het antwoord dat Jezus geeft kan heel goed per persoon verschillend zijn.

Preek van de week

Tenslotte bidt Jezus voor zijn leerlingen “dat zij God toegewijd mogen zijn in de waarheid”. Het feit dat Jezus daarvoor bidt, betekent dat het niet evident is, zelfs niet voor vrome christenen, om in de waarheid aan God toegewijd te zijn. Waarheid is hier de eigenschap van God zelf. Het is geen leersysteem, geen zaak van 1 + 1 = 2. Het is een weg om te gaan, Gods waarheid is zijn betrouwbaarheid, zijn waarachtigheid. Jezus bidt dus, dat wij mogen zijn als God zelf, waarheid, dat al wat wij zijn en zeggen en doen zonder leugen is, niet gehuicheld maar echt en vrij. Dit ‘Gode toegewijd zijn in de waarheid’ betekent hoegenaamd geen verwijdering van de wereld. “Ik bid niet dat Gij hen wegneemt uit de wereld, maar dat Gij bewaart voor het kwaad. Zij zijn niet van de wereld, wel in de wereld”.
Jezus bidt dat wij, juist in die onrustige en verwarde en dikwijls leugenachtige wereld die de onze is, staande zouden blijven, God niet uit het oog zouden verliezen, maar dat wij in waarheid aan God toegewijd zouden zijn.

vervolgalpha voorjaar 2008 | Jeugdalpha Papendrecht

De liefde van God vind je in Jezus. Elke vrees richting het oordeel moet uitgebannen zijn. Hoewel we nog in deze wereld zijn (we hebben last van onze zondige natuur en tekorten), zijn wij zoals Jezus.

Ghuraba lijkt hier ook naar te verwijzen en te stellen dat deze wereld niet het thuisland is voor moslims, maar dat zij hun thuis en waarheid kunnen vinden in de aanbidding van de enige en unieke God. Ghuraba is ook een oproep tot actie. Een oproep om niet teveel gehecht te raken aan de (materiële) zaken van deze wereld, maar om ook het spirituele toe te laten. De bedevaart naar Mekka raakt daarmee deels aan hetzelfde thema. Deze vijfde zuil is een oproep aan moslims om huis en haard te verlaten en daar te gaan waar de Quran geopenbaard zou zijn en Mohammed zich gevestigd zou hebben. Niet alleen de rituelen in Mekka zijn onderdeel van deze verplichting, maar ook de reis er naar toe als één van loutering en toenemende gerichtheid op God. Hoewel dit tegenwoordig allemaal wat makkelijker is en mensen meerdere malen (kunnen) gaan, was het vroeger vaak een lange eenmalige reis naar het onbekende waarbij het het bekende, wereldlijke, werd achtergelaten. Ghuraba met z’n voortdurende herhalingen in telkens hetzelfde ritme creëert zo een auditieve ruimte waartoe de luisteraar zich dient te verhouden en waarin deze vervolgens zijn of haar eigen verbeelding kan openstellen en creëren. Wat dat vervolgens is, verschilt natuurlijk van persoon tot persoon. Op Youtube zien we wel enkele voorbeelden van ghuraba-producties die enigszins laten zien welke betekenissen men hier aan kan hechten. Onmiddellijk valt dan de politieke lading op zoals in de volgende, misschien wel meest beroemde, variant van een gevangene in een Egyptische rechtszaal die ghuraba zingt, waarbij zelfs een rechter ge-emotioneerd geraakt zou zijn:

De volgende ghuraba versie brengt de oproep tot actie krachtig in beeld en verbindt het idee van ghuraba met de ideologie van Al Qaeda cs.

Soms gaat het daarbij om algemene (gewelddadige) strijd tegen onderdrukking, soms is het ook concreter zoals in de volgende nasheed voor Gaza waar ghuraba een onderdeel van is.

De volgende versie zoomt in op een hele serie landen/gebieden:

Anderen kiezen een nickname als ghuraba media en produceren zelf jihad anasheeds zoals deze (we marcheren voort als leeuwen, met Nederlandse ondertiteling):

Vreemdeling verwijst hier niet alleen meer naar een idee van onthechting of exclusieve aanbidding, maar het is ook een term voor uitverkorenen (die niet buigen, behalve voor God), de ware strijders of zelfs ware moslims; een idee waar zeker niet iedereen het mee eens zal zijn overigens.
De volgende ghuraba nasheed met Duitse vertaling maakt het idee van uitverkoren nog eens duidelijker:

Ook hierin komt het idee van huis en haard verlaten en het idee van de gelovige op doorreis weer terug. Beide kunnen betrokken worden op de gewelddadige jihad, maar ook spiritueel en sociaal gezien worden. Dit laatste omdat standvastig blijven in de godsdienst (dien) dan een zekere, spirituele en/of sociale, isolatie zou vereisen.
Uiteindelijk behoort het paradijs dan aan de vreemdelingen:

Naast uitverkoren heeft de notie vreemdeling ook betrekking op diegenen die op de proef gesteld worden zoals moslimgevangenen:

De vreemdelingen zouden dan mensen zijn die zonder acht te slaan op wat de wereld over hen zegt, doorgaan met hun religieuze verplichtingen en de Quran volgen om zo God tevreden te stellen.

De volgende nasheed (Liever de vreemden zijn) heeft betrekking op vrouwen in niqab, het begin bevat de ghuraba nasheed. Ook hierin vinden we thema’s als onthechting, afstand nemen van en op de proef gesteld worden terug. Deze is afkomstig van een Duitse moslima.

Ook de volgende video laat dit zien, maar dan veel breder (en zal volgens sommige lezers ongetwijfeld getuigen van een slachtoffermentaliteit)

Een mengeling van politieke, sociale en spirituele betekenissen vinden we terug in de volgende ghuraba nasheed met Spaanse ondertiteling (let op de boerkini afbeelding op het einde):

In de volgende versie van Soutus Salaim Beyond the Norm is het politieke evenmin afwezig (let op deze bevat muziek – het is een ‘popversie’ met daarin ghurabaa) maar toch op een andere manier dan bij de vorigen. Het bevat onder meer een oproep tot hervorming aangezien volgens de zanger de islam juist een vreemde is geworden.

It’s written in the history
Islam once ruled the world
But I’m standing here in melancholy
How can I claim of such word?

Those days have left us so far
Unreachable beauty like the star
History left ajar
Could I ever heal the scar?

c/o

What is happening to Islam today?
Why the feeling of me going astray?
Oh Allah, I plead and pray
Steadfast my faith in the righteous way

Ghurabaa..
Bada’al Islamu Ghareeban
Saya3oudul Islamu Ghareeban
Fathouba lil ghurabaa

Come on brothers let us reform
Stand united through blizzard storm
Let not our path be lured into darkness
We shall go beyond the norm

Contemplating my own fear
With this heart craving for a guidance
All the things I hold so dear
Put my dean in a distance

Islam is now estranged
Estranged from its former existence
For indeed we are strangers
Cause Islam’s our conscience

Repeat c/o

Song & Lyrics:
Mohammad Ihab Ismail

Clip Directors:
Imran, Hafidz

In de volgende ghuraba zijn bovenstaande thema’s ogenschijnlijk afwezig. De bijbehorende presentatie gaat namelijk over overspel, de gevaren en gevolgen ervan. Aangezien de remedie hiertegen, en het enige wat overspel kan voorkomen de aanbidding van God is, komt het thema van aanbidding niettemin toch terug.

Daarnaast kunnen de thema’s van ghuraba natuurlijk voorkomen in het persoonlijke leven van individuen zoals we kunnen zien in de serie van drie films van Omair Mazhar:



Muziek is een belangrijk, maar vaak onderbelicht, bestanddeel van iedere beweging of dit nu een traditionele sociale beweging is of een religieuze beweging. Muziek speelt een grote rol in pinksterkerken en de evangelische beweging, maar voorheen ook al in de Amerikaanse burgerrechten beweging. Muziek kan dienen ter mobilisatie van participanten en kan ook gebruik worden ter bemiddeling van een bepaalde religieuze of politieke boodschap. Met de anasheed wordt een eeuwenoude traditie nieuw leven ingeblazen door deze op sites als youtube te plaatsen, met niet alleen een tekstuele boodschap, maar ook een visuele. De beelden geven voeding aan de verbeelding van een gedeelde geschiedenis en hedendaagse situatie waarmee mensen geïnspireerd en gemotiveerd kunnen worden. De muziek en de beelden produceren een fusie tussen het spirituele, het politieke, sociale en individuele. Het gaat er daarbij niet om dat alle moslims deze boodschappen onderschrijven en zich gedragen als zijnde ‘vreemdelingen’, maar het luisteren ernaar lijkt een soort reminder voor het hoe eigenlijk zou moeten en kan door sommigen gebruikt worden als een manier om zich in gedachten af te zonderen en bij God te zijn.

Dit komt misschien nog wel het sterkst tot uiting in de volgende versie van ghuraba, waarin een collage ‘islamic legends’ wordt getoond. In mijn proefschrift heb ik over deze afbeeldingen geschreven als zijnde voorwerpen waardoor de alomtegenwoordigheid, almacht en barmhartigheid van God wordt gerepresenteerd en bemiddeld waardoor iets wat voor mensen niet te bevatten is, wordt geconcretiseerd en open komt te staan voor betekenisgeving zonder dat het ongrijpbare en onzegbare helemaal verloren gaat.

Dat een nasheed als deze sterke emoties kan oproepen blijkt wel uit het gegeven dat sommigen tot tranen geroerd zijn bij het luisteren ernaar.

Bovenstaand overzicht is allesbehalve compleet, youtube en andere videosites bevatten nog veel meer videos van ghuraba. De video’s die hier geplaatst zijn, zijn mij gestuurd door mensen uit mijn onderzoek; dank daarvoor. Het overzicht wil ik afsluiten met de meest opmerkelijke, a-typische toespeling op ghuraba die ik kon vinden op youtube. Let op deze video bevat popmuziek:

6 comments.

Nederlandse jongeren in Kenia

Posted on July 29th, 2009 by martijn.
Categories: ISIM/RU Research, Multiculti Issues, Religious and Political Radicalization, Young Muslims.

UPDATES ONDERAAN

Verschillende media weten vandaag te melden dat er in Kenia vier Nederlanders zijn ge-arresteerd op verdenking van het helpen van een moslimrebellenbeweging in Somalië.
Nederlanders gearresteerd in Kenia – Binnenland – Telegraaf.nl [24 uur actueel, ook mobiel] [binnenland]

Vier Nederlanders gearresteerd in Kenia
NAIROBI – De Keniaanse politie heeft vier mannen met een Nederlands paspoort gearresteerd bij de grens met Somalië. De Nederlanders worden ervan verdacht de islamitische opstandelingenbeweging al-Shabaab in Somalië te helpen, aldus een lokale functionaris woensdag.

Drie van de vier 21-jarigen zijn in Marokko geboren, de vierde in Somalië. Ze zijn maandag aangehouden, toen ze in een gehuurde truck onderweg waren naar de Noord-Keniase plaats Kiunga. De verdachten zeggen toeristen te zijn, maar volgens de functionaris zijn er in het gebied geen toeristische attracties.

Het viertal wordt voor het einde van week naar de Keniaanse hoofdstad Nairobi overgebracht.

Een woordvoerder van het ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken kon woensdag bevestigen dat op 24 juli drie Nederlanders en een Marokkaan met een Nederlandse verblijfstitel zijn opgepakt in Kenia bij de grens met Somalië. Volgens de woordvoerder heeft de Nederlandse ambassade in Kenia contact met de vier personen en zitten zij vast voor nader verhoor. Buitenlandse Zaken kon geen uitspraken doen over de reden waarom de vier zijn opgepakt en wacht het onderzoek af.

Nou lijkt mij de kans groot dat de Keniaanse autoriteiten ook afgaan op informatie van Nederlandse autoriteiten (AIVD?), maar voorlopig is het dus nog afwachten.

Wat is Al Shabaab eigenlijk? Al-Shabaab oftewel ‘de jongeren’ is een moslimrebellenbeweging in Somalië die ook wel bekend onder de naam Ash Shabaab, Hizbul Shabaab (partij van de jongeren) en Volksverzetsbeweging in het land van de twee migraties (PRM) ontstaan uit de ondergang van de islamitische raden in Somalië in 2006 als gevolg van het optreden van het Somalische leger (of wat daarvoor doorgaat) en het Ethiopische leger. De hardline jongerenbeweging binnen die islamitische raden gingen ondergronds en vormden de Al-Shabaab. Zij presenteren hun strijd vooral als een strijd voor rechtvaardigheid en orde in een land waar wetteloosheid en chaos de boventoon voeren. Zij willen de rechtvaardigheid en orde, naar eigen zeggen, terugbrengen door de sharia in te voeren. Vorig jaar kondigde de shabaab beweging aan in de regio van Lower Shabelle het islamitische provincie van Shabelle gevestigd te hebben, nadat men al eerder de Islamitische Provincie van Juba gevestigd zou hebben. Eén van de ideeen daarbij lijkt te zijn dat men erop gokt dat de bevolking zo blij is met de terugkeer van gezag en orde, en het verwijderen van de criminelen, dat ze de heerschappij van de shabaab beweging zullen accepteren. Dit zou best eens zo kunnen werken. Voor veel mensen in Somalië is de Al Shabaab een legitieme bevrijdingsbeweging tegen buitenlandse (Ethiopische) bezetting en geen terreurgroep. De shabaab beweging staat er inmiddels om bekend mensen van buiten Somalië te rekruteren voor hun strijd. Dit lijkt echter erg recent te zijn, vanaf 2006, en het lijkt vooral te gaan om Somalische jongeren buiten Somalië en veel minder om een mondiale jihad. De redenen voor jongeren om zich bij deze beweging aan te sluiten zijn onder meer zoeken naar een hoger doel in het leven en identiteit, drang naar avontuur en romantiek en een mengeling van jihadisme en Somalisch nationalisme.

Hieronder zie je een nasheed Ya Shabaab (Oh jongeren) met daarin beelden van de Shabaab beweging (met Nederlandse ondertiteling).

Dat mensen naar andere landen trekken om daar te vechten voor rechtvaardigheid en bevrijding (in hun ogen althans) is niets bijzonders. Dat gebeurde al tijdens de Spaanse burgeroorlog en we zien het klaarblijkelijk ook bij joodse jongeren uit Nederland. Verder hebben we natuurlijk ook onder moslimjongeren in Nederland diverse zaken gehad en de belangstelling voor Somalië is in bepaalde kringen zeker aanwezig en zeer levend(ig). Nou ja eigenlijk is het wel bijzonder want het gaat altijd om relatief kleine groepen; de overgrote meerderheid, als ze zich er al mee identificeert, blijft lekker in het land waar ze wonen en zelfs van degenen die erover praten (vaak in erg romantische termen) probeert maar een enkeling te gaan. Van diegenen die gaan, faalt ook nog eens gedeelte omdat het allemaal toch wat lastiger is dan in eerste lijkt.

Voor de goede orde of dit ook in dit geval zo is (dat er sprake is van jongeren die deelnemen aan de jihad aldaar) weten we niet. Wellicht waren ze inderdaad toeristen op weg naar Kiunga aan de Keniaans/Somalishe grens en bijvoorbeeld potentiele bezoekers van het Kiunga Maritiem Reservaat met mangroves, schildpadden en vogels. Rest nog de vraag hoe problematisch dit allemaal is en voor wie?

UPDATES

The Standard | Online Edition :: Dutchmen grilled over Al-Shabaab

Anti-terrorist police officers arrested four Dutch nationals on suspicion they were crossing to southern Somalia to join the Al-Shabaab militia group.

The Dutchmen, who were arrested at night in Kiwayu, Lamu District over the weekend, were taken to Mombasa and later flown to Nairobi for further interrogation.

[…]

“The four foreigners claimed they were tourists in Kiwayu but we doubted the authenticity of their documents so we took them to Nairobi for further interrogation,” Limo said.

He said the investigations would establish whether the four were tourists or were in the country on a different mission.

According to a police source, police had been looking for the foreigners for the last one week. The source said they had information the four had been recruited as Al-Shabaab members through the Internet.

Terreurverdachten Kenia aangehouden in Brussel – Trouw

Terreurverdachten Kenia aangehouden in Brussel

De vier mannen die in Kenia werden opgepakt op verdenking van terrorisme zijn donderdagochtend op het vliegveld van Brussel aangehouden.

RTL Nieuws.nl – Uitgezette mannen opgepakt in Brussel

Uitgezette mannen opgepakt in Brussel
Op verzoek van het Landelijk Parket in Nederland zijn vanmorgen op de luchthaven van Brussel de vier mannen aangehouden, die door de autoriteiten in Kenia gisteravond het land zijn uitgezet.

Openbaar Ministerie – Uitgezette mannen aangehouden wegens terrorisme

Uitgezette mannen aangehouden wegens terrorisme

30 juli 2009 – Landelijk Parket

Op verzoek van het Landelijk Parket zijn vanmorgen op de luchthaven van Brussel de vier mannen aangehouden, die door de autoriteiten in Kenia gisteravond het land zijn uitgezet. Ze zouden op weg zijn geweest naar een jihadistisch trainingskamp in Somalië.

Het viertal wordt verdacht van deelneming aan een terroristische organisatie. Door de Nationale Recherche zijn vanmorgen in Den Haag twee woonadressen van de mannen doorzocht. Daarbij is beslag gelegd op een grote hoeveelheid documenten.

De vier 21-jarige mannen zijn drie Nederlanders en een Marokkaan met een Nederlandse verblijfsvergunning. Zij zijn in België in verzekerde bewaring gesteld. De Belgische autoriteiten zullen later beslissen over de verzochte uitlevering.

Een van de mannen is in november 2005 aangehouden in Azerbeidzjan, omdat hij met twee anderen zou hebben willen deelnemen aan de jihad. Hij is destijds uitgezet naar Nederland.

Meer info over het eerdere Azebeidjan avontuur: (deels afschermd, behalve voor abonnees) De zonen zullen nu wel in Irak zitten, AD-Jihad? Nee, ‘t was vakantie, NRC – Ramazan Keskin ging ‘winkelen in Baku’, Ramazan, Said en Driss, Ibrahim ontkent ronselen voor jihad.

NOSJOURNAAL – Nederlandse moslimjongeren aangehouden

Huiszoekingen en arrestatie
In het onderzoek naar de jongemannen heeft de Nationale Recherche vanochtend in Den Haag twee huizen doorzocht. Er is een grote hoeveelheid documenten in beslag genomen.

Eén van de vier mannen werd in 2005 in Azerbeidjan opgepakt, omdat hij met twee anderen onderweg was om deel te nemen aan de jihad. Hij is toen uitgezet naar Nederland.

Geweigerd door moskee
Het viertal behoort tot een groepje jonge moslims die vorig jaar door de As-Soennahmoskee in Den Haag de deur zijn gewezen. Dat bevestigen bronnen aan de NOS.

Het moskeebestuur weigerde vorig jaar een groep jongeren de toegang om dat ze er te radicale denkbeelden op na zouden houden. Het zou gaan een groepje van 15 tot 20 jongeren, gedeeltelijk vaste bezoekers van de As-Soenahmoskee en gedeeltelijk afkomstig van elders. De groep verzorgde lezingen in verschillende moskeeen.

Gewaarschuwd
Het bestuur van de moskee waarschuwde de gemeente Den Haag voor de groep radicaliserende jongeren. De inlichtingendienst AIVD houdt de leden van de groep al geruime tijd in de gaten.

De As-Soenahmoskee in Den Haag kwam in het verleden regelmatig negatief in het nieuws. Volgens de AIVD is de moskee een bolwerk van het Salafisme, een fundamentalistische stroming in de islam.

Bij nader inzien betwijfel ik overigens of dit groepje inderdaad deel uitmaakte van de groep jongeren die problemen had met de As Soennah moskee of men überhaupt deze moskee (nog) wel bezocht.

UPDATE VRIJDAG 31 JULI 2009
nrc.nl – Binnenland – In de Schilderswijk kennen ze Driss wel

In de Schilderswijk kennen ze Driss wel
Gepubliceerd: 31 juli 2009 13:01 | Gewijzigd: 31 juli 2009 13:16
Door Brian van der Bol en Merel Thie
Driss D. uit Den Haag werd deze week opgepakt in Kenia. Was hij een moslimterrorist? Volgens zijn broer ging hij weer met meisjes om.

Den Haag, 31 juli. In de fundamentalistische As Soennah moskee in Den Haag kwam de 21-jarige Driss D. al tijden niet meer. Dat zegt bestuurslid Hamid Taheri van die moskee en dat zegt ook de broer van Driss, de 23-jarige Mimoen. Maar het betekent niet dat Driss D. niet meer met het geloof bezig was, juist niet.

In Kenia opgepakte man al eerder ‘op jihad’ – Binnenland – de Volkskrant

In Kenia opgepakte man al eerder ‘op jihad’

ANP
Gepubliceerd op 30 juli 2009 12:00, bijgewerkt op 30 juli 2009 12:59

ROTTERDAM –
Een van de mannen die door Kenia is uitgezet wegens mogelijke betrokkenheid bij terrorisme, is een oude bekende van justitie: in 2005 werd hij aangehouden in Azerbeidzjan, nadat hij met twee andere geronseld was voor de jihad. Het vermoeden bestond dat ze onderweg waren naar Irak om daar te vechten voor hun geloof.

Niemand had nog vat op ‘jihadisten’ – Binnenland – de Volkskrant

Niemand had nog vat op ‘jihadisten’

ACHTERGROND, Van onze verslaggeefsters Janny Groen, Annieke Kranenberg
Gepubliceerd op 30 juli 2009 23:49, bijgewerkt op 31 juli 2009 08:59

AMSTERDAM –
De vier door Kenia uitgewezen ‘jihadgangers’ raakten van hun familie en hun geloofsgenoten vervreemd. Zelfs hun radicale imam verstootte hen.
De Stichting As Soennah in Den Haag (Guus Dubbelman/ de Volkskrant)

Al bijna een jaar maakt de gemeente Den Haag zich zorgen over een groep geradicaliseerde jongeren waarvan de vier veronderstelde ‘jihadgangers’ die in Kenia zijn opgepakt, deel uitmaakten. Zo’n twintig jongeren trokken van wijk naar wijk, en van moskee naar moskee om daar een voet tussen de deur te krijgen. Niemand, ouders noch instanties, had vat op hen. Wel zagen ze hen ‘doorradicaliseren’ en naar het bos gaan om – zo was de vrees – in conditie te raken voor de jihad.

UPDATE 3 – 08 – 2009

Vier terreurverdachten komen naar Nederland

De vier terreurverdachten die vorige week uit Kenia zijn gezet en sinds donderdag in België vastzitten, worden woensdag overgedragen aan de nationale recherche in Nederland. Dat heeft het landelijk parket van het Openbaar Ministerie maandag bekendgemaakt.

Deze entry zal de komende dagen voortdurend bijgewerkt worden. Op de hoogte blijven kan door je te abonneren: HIER.

5 comments.

Radicalization Series – Part I: The slippery slope of ethnic profiling

Posted on June 5th, 2009 by martijn.
Categories: Headline, ISIM/RU Research, Religious and Political Radicalization.

The Open Society has published a report on ethnic profiling that I will discus here very briefly and give extensive quotes about the Dutch situation:
Ethnic Profiling in the European Union: Pervasive, Ineffective, and Discriminatory

Pervasive use of ethnic and religious stereotypes by law enforcement across Europe is harming efforts to combat crime and terrorism, according to this report released by the Open Society Justice Initiative.

Ethnic profiling occurs most often in police decisions about who to stop, question, search, and, at times, arrest. Yet there is no evidence that ethnic profiling actually prevents terrorism or lowers crime rates.

Throughout Europe, minorities and immigrant communities have reported discriminatory treatment by the police. From massive data mining operations to intimidating identity checks, ethnic profiling is often more of a public relations stunt than a real response to crime. The report, Ethnic Profiling in the European Union: Pervasive, Ineffective, and Discriminatory, details widespread profiling in France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, and other EU member states.

The report very clearly shows how and why ethnic profiling just doesn’t work and that conclusion has received much attention in the media. The report however also focuses on the way Franc, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands deal with the radicalization issue. Important in the policy theories of radicalization is the slippery slope paradigm:

Theories of Radicalization and the Slippery Slope into Extremist Violence (p. 93-94)
In practice, however, radicalization theories demonstrate a dangerous tendency to conflate an individual’s adoption of a conservative or “fundamentalist” practice of Islam with a willingness to resort to violence. Many radicalization theories rely on a “slippery slope” paradigm which posits a radicalization continuum along which individuals are believed to slide—gradually or rapidly—from increasing religious devotion, through conservative or “fundamentalist” streams of Islam, toward supporting terrorist activities and organizations until, in a limited number of cases, they end by directly participating in terrorist activities and organizations. The implication is that all conservative Muslims are potential terrorists; this constitutes a broad generalization that stigmatizes a group of persons on the basis of their religious beliefs. When such theories are the basis for police or other law enforcement operations without reliable supporting intelligence on terrorist threats, it is ethnic profiling. This “slippery slope” paradigm of radicalization is widespread in Europe and underpins counterterrorism practices of police and intelligence officials in many countries.

[…]
The “ring model” of the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Services (AIVD) provides a similar illustration of this paradigm. The model consists of four rings, one inside the other, representing (from the core moving out): terrorists, supporters, sympathizers, society. An AIVD official described the model:

The innermost ring [terrorists] represents persons who are able and willing to commit attacks. The active supporters of terrorists can be put in the second ring [supporters]. These persons can and want to support terrorists, so they are aware of the connection between their activities and terrorist attacks. The third ring [sympathizers] represents the people who feel some sympathy for the cause and who are susceptible to recruitment. In general, persons in this third ring reject the Western, Dutch society. The area outside the third ring [society] encompasses the entire Muslim society. The people in this area are in no way involved in Islamist extremism, but may fall victim to its actions. In this ring model our focus should not only be on the groups to be distinguished, but also on the interaction between the rings.

As, rightly so, argued the slippery slope paradigm by definition turns every Muslim into a potential radical, even though it is contested by many experts:

Centripetal movements can be designated as radicalization processes.
According to this approach, observant Muslims, particularly those practicing conservative forms of Islam, are potential terrorists. Behaviors that indicate that an individual is becoming increasingly devout or adopting a more conservative form of Islam thereby become tell-tale “indicators” of radicalization. Individuals so identified may then become the focus of various antiterrorism measures.

This slippery slope paradigm is contested by experts. A French counterterrorism official with over two decades of experience recognized the differences:

A Muslim who is not radical in his practice, but who incites to violence is dangerous, and therefore of interest to us. On the other hand, a Muslim who is radical in his faith, but who is above all very pious, is not of interest for us. …[A]s far as Salafists, there are deeply pious Salafists who are radical but non-violent. You can compare them to Cistercian or Benedictine monks who are very pious, but not violent.

Saimir Amghar, a French researcher investigating radicalization processes among Muslim youth notes that the term “radicalization” covers several different phenomena, and argues that there are really three types of radicalization:
(1) nonreligious political radicalization;
(2) religious radicalization involving orthodox practice of Islam but rejecting violence;
and (3) political radicalization drawing from religious doctrine that manifests primarily through violent jihadism.
While similar factors may drive individuals toward each form of radicalization, they are distinct responses. Amghar argues that the second and third forms do not represent steps on a continuum but are in fact oppositional tendencies that are highly critical of one another. Under this view, the nonviolent forms of conservative Islam are in fact a bulwark against terrorism rather than a path toward violent jihad.

The Dutch agencies have been very active in operationalize slippery slope paradigm by using an approach that uses indicators to identify persons who could radicalize:

The Netherlands: Operationalizing the Theory of Radicalization (p.94-96)
The objective is to enable these actors to identify persons or organizations of potential interest to the police and intelligence services. In 2006, an official from the office of the National Coordinator on Counterterrorism, the institution responsible for developing policy and coordinating anti-terrorism measures in the Netherlands, explained their approach to profiling:

We are also working on some initiatives in Amsterdam and Rotterdam to develop indicators—some kind of criteria of what to look for—that can also be used by people that are not specialists in using profiles in a critical way so that they can understand what kind of behavior should or would be potentially of our interest…We are refining them and refining them—trying to put in an administrative system.

The city of Rotterdam took the lead with a program called “Join in or get left behind,” initiated in February 2005. According to this program, indicators of radicalization include particular behavior patterns, such as frequent travel or hosting gatherings at one’s home, and changes in behavior, such as a man of Arabic origin who suddenly acquires more traditionally religious Muslim approaches to hair style, dress, mosque attendance, or physical contact with women in public. Dutch officials have taken pains to avoid the inclusion of ethnicity or nationality as suspicious criteria, but the indicators developed nonetheless draw attention to individuals who are becoming more orthodox in their practice of Islam. Essentially, a Muslim who shows outward signs of more conservative practice would become suspicious. Likewise a non-Muslim who outwardly shows signs of Muslim practice, indicating that he is a convert, would also become suspicious.

Those trained to watch for these indicators are reportedly told to watch not just for one change in behavior, but several. When they believe someone is radicalizing, they are asked to report the individual to the information “switch-point,” which verifies the situation and determines the most appropriate follow-up action. According to an evaluation report by the information switch-point, the Rotterdam program alerted police to 17 cases during 2005. Although the numbers to date appear relatively few and the consequences of identification benign, the indicators of radicalization clearly target Muslims and are likely to stigmatize a far larger number of Muslims than those actually identified as at risk of radicalization.

The indicators of radicalization used in the Netherlands continue to conflate orthodox religious practice with a tendency to use violence. A government guide for companies on detecting radicalization among their employees gives this advice: In determining whether there are radicalized personnel in your employment, a combination of factors must be taken into consideration. The following list provides a number of indicators which might signal the presence of radicalized personnel:

• Possession of extremist literature, pamphlets, or sound and data recording equipment,
or the perusal of extremist literature by means of the internet. This can be difficult for
companies to assess, as such activities are often carried out in another language, such as
Arabic.
• Seeming approval of terrorist attacks.
• Travel to regions or countries in which a terrorist conflict is taking place or in which there
are terrorist training camps, such as Chechnya, Kashmir, Iraq, and Pakistan.
• A sudden aversion to “Western customs” such as mixed activities (male/female), or drinking
alcohol, and requesting specific Islamic meals.
• Wearing specific clothing and symbols, or a sudden change of clothing style.

The Open Society report is a bit to fast sometimes with its assessment of the Dutch approach but fortunately they also acknowledge a gradual change in the counterradicalization practices:

On a more positive note, some Dutch authorities are also distinguishing between  “extremism” involving support for violence and orthodox religious practice. The Amsterdam “switch-point on radicalization” has moved away from indicators focused on orthodox religious practice, and emphasizes the need to separate religious practice from political views—particularly whether an individual supports the use of violence.
Rotterdam is also moving away from the use of indicators of radicalization, although it remains in a process of flux. Across the Netherlands, there is a shift away from an approach that stigmatizes individuals and groups, and toward policies that address root causes of radicalization, such as discrimination, exclusion, and social polarization.

This move away from using stereotypical indicators is a good thing, and not only because the method itself is ineffective and reprehensible, but also, and perhaps most important, it creates an atmosphere of distrust that I have come across my fieldwork as well. This is something that the writers of the report also show very clearly:

Netherlands (p. 103-105)
According to some representatives of Dutch Muslims, Dutch intelligence services have used religion as a basis for monitoring, focusing their attention on Muslim organizations. Thus, it is alleged, monitoring has sometimes been conducted based on generalizations about the type of Islam that groups practice rather than specific information about activities in a particular mosque or organization. Such monitoring, some Muslims complain, has targeted even nonviolent streams of Islam, on the theory that they may be hotbeds of terrorist radicalization. Dutch authorities assert that surveillance has become narrowly targeted. There is wide gap between the perceptions of Dutch Muslims and Dutch law enforcement authorities of the scope and impact of surveillance practices.

Dutch Muslim organizations believe that Dutch intelligence services monitor many of the country’s mosques. Dutch intelligence services have argued in public reports that Salafist and other extreme streams of Islam are very active and in some cases are trying to influence or even take over less extreme mosques in the Netherlands. A 2005 Dutch General Intelligence Service (AIVD) report on the links among Saudi Arabia, Salafism, radicalization processes, and terrorism in the Netherlands, was based on information gathered from monitoring mosques considered radical. In a 2007 interview, Dutch counterterrorism authorities stated that very few mosques are under surveillance as “hotbeds of radicalization.” One official explained it this way:

We are not condemning the general thinking of a group… [T]his concerns less than one percent of mosques. It is really a very small number. And all of the mosques surveilled have Hofstadt group connections [and] imams who use violent rhetoric…”

In a June 2007 presentation, Deputy National Coordinator for Counterterrorism Lidewijde Ongering testified before a U.S. Senate committee:

A small number of locations in the Netherlands, such as a few Salafist centers and mosques, have been identified as potential gateways to radical milieus.…Experience has shown that for some young people, non-violent Salafism is a first step towards further radicalization. The Dutch authorities keep a close watch on the imams and governing bodies of these institutions and remind them of their social responsibilities. Our message is clear: we will not allow them to cross the line and publicly preach intolerance. We also expect them to exclude jihadist recruiters and stop young people from opting for violence. If people in or around these centers prove to be promoting radicalization or spreading hatred, we do not hesitate to prosecute them or deport them as a threat to national security.

Surveillance is largely conducted through direct contact with mosque authorities and individuals who attend mosques, and through established informants. However, in an unknown number of cases, intelligence services also tape record sermons, especially Friday prayers. A Muslim community leader from Rotterdam, Brahim Bursic, called attention to the taping:

We know that all Friday prayers in mosques are taped. I told the imams not to be afraid; we are a democracy and they are not doing anything against the law. I also publicly suggested that if the intelligence officials are interested in what is being said in the mosques, the Friday prayers could be broadcast on TV.

A senior Dutch police officer said that such recording only occurs in “very limited, specific cases.” In addition to mosques, Dutch intelligence officials monitor Muslim organizations they believe to be spreading or supporting radical Islam. In a 2004 report, the AIVD defined “radical Islam” as “the politico-religious pursuit of establishing—if necessary by extreme means—a society which reflects the perceived values from the original sources of Islam as purely as possible.” The report commented on the different views within “radical Islam”:

Radical Islam consists of many movements and groups that, although related (in particular concerning faith and anti-Western sentiments), may harbor very different views on aims and means. This means that various kinds of threats can emanate from radical Islam, one of which is terrorism. In addition to radical Islamic organizations and networks which concentrate on the jihad (in the sense of armed combat) against the West, there are other groups, which principally focus on “Dawa” (the propagation of the radical-Islamic ideology), while some groups and networks combine both.

Both organizations classified as “jihad-focused” and those classified as “Dawafocused” fall within what Dutch intelligence sources described as the AIVD’s “professional interest,” and some are kept under surveillance. While the AIVD recognizes that only “jihad-focused” groups pose an immediate threat of violence, it believes that the “Dawa-focused” groups pose a longer-term threat by feeding processes of radicalization. The AIVD’s 2006 guide for local authorities explains the Dutch approach of targeting “hotbeds of radicalization”:

A hotbed of radicalism is an organization, group or place that serves as a breeding ground for activities and views that are instrumental in radicalizing individuals and can ultimately result in terrorist activities. … Hotbeds of radicalism can also serve as an ideological breeding ground for extremists. They can function as a first step on a path that may lead to violence. This danger exists in particular in the case of organizations that advocate extreme, intolerant isolationism or promote an intolerant “us vs. them” mentality. …

The aim of the approach is to make clear through joint, coordinated government action to those in charge of the hotbed of radicalism and to its visitors that activities of a radical nature will not be tolerated and that the authorities are monitoring activities closely. It is not clear how often monitoring by intelligence services is founded on intelligence-based evidence and how often generalizations about ethnicity or religion are the determining factor. Nor is it clear how often more intrusive monitoring techniques are utilized. Certain Muslim places of worship and organizations are clearly viewed as suspicious, even without specific evidence indicating involvement in any terrorist activities or incitement to violence. They are instead held to be potentially dangerous due to generalizations about the stream of Islam that they practice, albeit peacefully, and the theory that such practices represent a first step in the process of radicalization. In the absence of information about support for terrorism, covert surveillance is inappropriate and law enforcement efforts should instead focus on outreach to Muslim communities and voluntary information sharing. There is a wide gap between the way Dutch intelligence officials describe their monitoring and the way it is perceived by Muslim organizations and individuals. Dutch authorities claim their practices have become more narrowly targeted over time, but this cannot be independently verified. To this day, many Dutch Muslims believe that discriminatory and profiling-based surveillance is widespread and this perception, accurate or not, has negative consequences for policing in the Netherlands.

(p. 110-111)
When individuals are stopped on the street for identity checks, when police surround a mosque, when a business is raided or an individual arrested, the general public naturally assumes that law enforcement officials are acting because there is a reason to do so—that these persons present a real threat. The lack of any significant counterterrorism outcomes—such as detection, charges, or convictions—as a result of ethnic profiling does not serve to mitigate the damage done; the bare fact of being singled out in the context of counterterrorism measures is sufficient to create the stigma. A representative of the Dutch Association of Moroccans and Tunisians described the change in perception:

Everyone thinks that when there is smoke, there is fire. Since 9/11 and the murder of Theo van Gogh, relations between Moroccans and the broader society have deteriorated. People look at each other with suspicion. When a Moroccan man walks in the street with a beard people look at him differently than before. When the police react in that way, it creates a bigger problem. It affects people’s perceptions. For instance, when a train was stopped recently and two men in Arabic dress were handcuffed and taken off the train by police, this image has a strong effect on those watching. And it makes big news in the media. Afterwards when it turns out that these men were not planning anything at all, they were just practicing Muslims, but it’s too late, the damage has been done.

The distrust among Muslims is very clear and many of them are very afraid of the negative consequences as was recently shown in the case of the ‘Ikea-threat‘ in Amsterdam which proved to be a false alarm. The information that lead to the arrests of the people was public information and could have been gathered by anyone. The fact that these seven people were Muslim, one of them being a relative of a person involved in the Madrid attacks was sufficient for the arrests. The hoax actually used ethnic profiling to make itself credible and probably the person making the fake call relied on his stereotype of the Dutch police using stereotypes. The Open Society institute refers to several reports that make clear that ethnic profiling doesn’t work because it is too static, too inclusive and too exclusive:

(P114-115)
[…]there is no single pathway to violent radicalization and the nature of Muslim practice is not a consistent or reliable factor in radicalization. These studies highlight a fundamental problem of using ethnic profiles: they are both overinclusive and underinclusive. They are overinclusive in that the vast majority of the people who fall into the category are entirely innocent; and they are underinclusive in that there are other terrorists and other criminals who do not fit the profile and who would escape attention if the profile were strictly applied. While overinclusion imposes
an unnecessary burden on “false positives” (persons who are innocent but match the profile), underinclusion may divert police attention from actual threats that lie beyond the prescribed profile. Thus, it was reported that, prior to the July 2005 attacks on the London public transport system, the leader of the bombers “had come to the attention of the intelligence services as an associate of other men who were suspected of involvement in a terrorist bomb plot. But he was not pursued because he did not tick enough of the boxes in the pre-July profile of the terror suspect.” The most authoritative report to date on the 7/7 London bombings concludes that “there is not a consistent profile to help identify who may be vulnerable to radicalization.” Another fundamental problem of profiling is its failure to account for the dynamism of its target: the subjects of profiling evolve in response to policing and law enforcement tactics. When a terrorist profile is known, terrorists can adapt to it through strategies of evasion and substitution. They may evade detection by recruiting individuals who do not fit the profile.

I think in general, besides being a little to black and white sometimes, the report is very good and gives a fair account of (at least) the Dutch situation. I do want to raise two issues: one about ethnic profiling and crime and the other one about radicalization.

First of all, although the report is not about crime, but the same questions can be asked. In the Netherlands professor Bovenkerk showed new statistics yesterday with an ‘alarming’ overrepresentation of ethnic groups.

Fact or stigma? Police registration of ethnic backgrounds in Rotterdam is highly disputed | Radio Netherlands Worldwide

Crime figures are normally compiled on a yearly basis. However, Professor Bovenkerk has looked at criminal behaviour spanning a number of years, between the ages of 18 and 24. His approach has resulted in an entirely different outcome. The professor linked information based on ethnicity to crime figures.

This is not permitted in the Netherlands, but the police department, youth care organisations and advisory groups in Rotterdam have been allowed to make the link, thanks to a special legal construction introduced in 2002.

Shock
Despite the multicultural projects, and the efforts of community leaders and youth services to promote integration, 55 percent of Moroccan youth between the ages of 18 and 24 are picked up by police as crime suspects.

The same goes for 40 percent of Antillean and Surinamese youth and 36 percent of Turkish youth. These statistics are based on the city of Rotterdam, but Professor Bovenkerk does not see any reason why the statistics would be differ for any other major Dutch city.

After being very reluctant to calculate the ‘ethnic dimension’ of crime in the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, since then it has become some sort of Dutch hobby to present new statistics every now and then which are in all instances very alarming. So we have the ‘fact’ here that we have an overrepresentation of migrant youth in crime statistics, in particular Moroccan-Dutch youth and than still ethnic profiling would not be useful? Is research like this not a particular modality of ethnic profiling? It indeed is and as professor Henk Effers says it can be useful to know exactly ‘where it hurts’ and subsequently base our policies on these findings. But just as the slippery slope paradigm turns every Muslim into a potential radical, ethnic profiling with regard to crime does something similar. It assumes or produces the image that the problem is in fact ethnic or cultural. And that is highly questionable as Effers (and Bovenkerk for that matter) argues:
Fact or stigma? Police registration of ethnic backgrounds in Rotterdam is highly disputed | Radio Netherlands Worldwide

Above all, he thinks it important that Professor Bovenkerk clearly points out the ‘ethnic explanation’. Saying that they are criminal because they’ve been brought up that way doesn’t make sense:

“On the one hand, there is the socio-economic question. Many Moroccans, but also other ethnic groups, are deprived socio-economically speaking. On the other hand, the social control within these groups is much lower than within the broader Dutch population.”

These two things are not unrelated, Professor Effers explains. When children are sent outside to play because there is not enough room inside, there is little social control on the street. The professor also remarks that his colleague’s report has brought to light the fact that almost 20 percent of native Dutch youth have had a brush with the law.

Scoring
Professor Bovenkerk’s report touches on a delicate subject within political circles. Politicians like anti-immigration proponent Geert Wilders could use these figures to score political points. Mr Bovenkerk would be greatly disappointed if his report were indeed to be used in this way. He has clear ideas on what a good method of tackling the problem would be:

“In any case, I think the job market plays an important role. There’s a lot possible but the youth need to be brought in. And then it’s really a question of stimulating more social control. Within the ethnic groups but also within the families.”

And I would like to add another thing to that. How long are we going to talk about the children of migrants as being ‘Moroccan’, ‘Turkish’ or in the case of people living in the kingdom of the Netherlands (but outside the Dutch state) as Antillians?

The second point I want to raise very briefly here is the issue of radicalization itself and the way it is treated in the report. The Open Society report takes radicalization among Muslims as a matter of fact. It does not really question the whole issue nor does it provide with a critical alternative for the radicalization theories prevalent in policy circles and counterterrorism agencies. It criticize the slippery slope paradigm but it does not ask the question what radicalization is according to them, what the actual developments are and how troublesome that may be (or not). Furthermore it only focuses on counterradicalization policies focused on Muslims. A different form of ethnic profiling however also occurs in the case of youth of the radical right, in particular in the past debates about ‘Lonsdale’ youth that designates white youth belonging to a particular youth culture as potential radicals. Furthermore by only focusing on Muslims it again appears that radicalization is only an issue when it comes to Muslims, thereby ignoring the violence and disturbance caused by radical left and radical right in the past 20 years.

I will come back on the issue of (defining) radicalization in a series of entries the coming weeks thereby (in the end) presenting my views and a possible working definition of radicalization. So, if you want to read that, stay updated and have not subscribed yet, you can do that HERE.

12 comments.

Criminalisering van islam?

Posted on May 20th, 2009 by martijn.
Categories: (Upcoming) Events, ISIM/RU Research, Religious and Political Radicalization.

Op de hoogte blijven? Abonneer je dan op Closer: HIER.

De Onderzoekschool Maatschappelijke Veiligheid van de Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam organiseert op 18 juni het symposium:

Juridische ontwikkelingen sinds 9/11: Criminalisering van islam?

Erasmus Universiteit

Expo- en Congrescentrum

Forumzaal M3-15

Zou het in een democratische rechtsstaat mogelijk moeten zijn om aanslagen te verheerlijken? Hoe ver mag de Nederlandse overheid gaan in het opleggen van kledingvoorschriften ten aanzien van moslims? Zijn er gronden waarop men verbodsbepalingen ten aanzien van uitingsvormen van islam kan legitimeren? Dit zijn vragen die tijdens dit symposium aan de orde zullen komen.

De afgelopen jaren heeft islam in Nederland in de spotlights gestaan van media en politiek. De dominante toon in het debat over islam was er een van zorg over ‘radicale islam’ die een opstap zou zijn naar islamitisch terrorisme. Bij het dreigingsbeeld heeft de AIVD in oktober 2007 in het bijzonder haar pijlen op het ‘salafisme’ gericht dat als gevaarlijk wordt aangemerkt vanwege een anti-democratische houding die daarin verscholen zou liggen. Politici als Wilders en Verdonk hebben dit beeld in versterkte vorm overgenomen en het indammen van islamitische uitingsvormen als een speerpunt in hun programma verwerkt.

De angst voor radicale islam heeft echter ook weerslag gehad op wetgeving en rechtspraak. De processen tegen de Hofstadgroep hebben laten zien dat een radicale interpretatie van het geloof met de nieuwe wet terroristische misdrijven bewijs kan vormen voor het deelnemen aan een terroristische organisatie. Naast het strafbaar stellen van meer extreme denkbeelden staat een aantal islamitische uitingsvormen op de nominatie om verboden te worden. Zo is er een wetsvoorstel op komst om het dragen van een burqa in de publieke ruimte te verbieden en pleit Wilders’ PVV voor een hoofddoekenverbod in publieke functies en een verbod voor het bouwen van nieuwe moskeeën.

Deze recente ontwikkelingen roepen de vraag op of Nederland als democratische rechtsstaat – waarin godsdienstvrijheid een belangrijk grondrecht vormt – niet bepaalde grenzen (dreigt te) overschrijd(t)(en) en of er geen sprake is van een ongewenste vorm van problematisering en zelfs criminalisering van bepaalde religieuze denkbeelden. Het is op deze kwesties dat de sprekers tijdens dit symposium in zullen gaan. Daarmee zullen ze de volgende vragen beantwoorden:

1. In hoeverre zijn de veronderstellingen die aan de verboden ten grondslag liggen juist? (dus: in hoeverre zijn deze problemen met islam er?)
2. In hoeverre worden islamitische geloofsuitingen (legitiem of illegitiem) gecriminaliseerd?

Programma

14.00

Welkom en registratie

14.30

Opening door Mr. Fiore Geelhoed, promovenda aan de Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam

14.35

Introductie door debatleider Prof. Maurits Berger, hoogleraar Islam in de hedendaagse Westerse wereld aan de Universiteit Leiden

14.50

Islam, radicalisation and radical Muslims
Prof. Tariq Ramadan, professor in islamstudies aan Oxford University en gasthoogleraar Identiteit en burgerschap aan de Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam

15.10

Vanuit compassie de ander zien
Mevr. Maimunah van der Heide, columniste voor Islamwijzer.nl en oprichtster van Stichting Vangnet. Ze heeft als missie het bouwen van bruggen tussen praktiserende moslims en niet-moslims.

15.30

Piranha’s in de Hofstadvijver: De Nederlandse strafrechter en radicale moslims
Mr. Victor Koppe, strafrechtadvocaat te Amsterdam die onder meer Samir A. heeft verdedigd

15.50

Plenaire discussie met het publiek

16.50

Afsluiting en borrel

1 comment.

House of Glass – New publications by Al-Maqdisi

Posted on May 14th, 2009 by martijn.
Categories: ISIM/RU Research, Religious and Political Radicalization.

Al-Maqdisi Book Cover

Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi was not only the mentor and teacher of Al-Zarqawi but his texts also played a major role in several Dutch jihadi circles, in particular that of the Hofstad network. The murderer of filmdirector and writer Theo van Gogh translated several texts of Al-Maqdisi such as Millat Ibrahim.

My colleague Joas Wagemakers at Radboud University referred me to a new book published by Al-Maqdisi: Man Kana Baytahu min Zujaj fa-la Yarmi ghayrahu bi-Hajar – Qira’a wa-Ta’ammul fi Asfar al-‘Ahd al-Qadim wa-Muqarana bayna Akhbariha wa-bayna l-Qisas al-Qur’an al-‘Azim (He whose house is made of glass should not throw stones at others – A reading and contemplation on the books of the Old Testament and a comparison between its message and the stories of the magnificent Qur’an), www.tawhed.ws, February 2008.

The book is dedicated to:

Dedication

• to the Pope of the Vatican Benedict XVI, who claims that our religion is spread solely by the sword.
• to Geert Wilders, the Dutch MP who criticizes Islam, demands a ban on the Koran and describes it as a fascist book.
• to Kurt Westergaard, the Danish cartoon illustrator whose pen only ridicules those who are different from the Westergaard family. In fact, all of Europe is a stone in his shoe.
• to Van Gogh, the Dutch director who connects rape with the laws of Islam.
• to Wafa’ Sultan, who speaks evil of Islam and the Koran but turns a blind eye to the extreme manifestations of insanity in the books of the Jews and the Christians!
• to all “ye who turn judgment to wormwood”

You are ignorant of your religion or you ignore it …

I will make you understand it through these contemplations..

I say to you and those like you:

He whose house is made of glass should not throw stones at others

Abu Muhammad

The last in the list, “Ye who turn judgment to wormwood” is an excerpt from the book Amos (5:7) from the Old Testament ( “Ye who turn judgment to wormwood, and leave off righteousness in the earth.”). The sentence pertains to justice which is the result of righteousness and seeking good. For more on this see HERE and HERE.  This refers Al-Maqdisi’s critique on Wilders, Wafa Sultan and others that Islam is different from the Islam as they present it.  With reference to the Old Testament, he points out that ‘Christians’ should not distort the ‘truth’.   Al-Maqdisi states that he will give a thorough analysis of the most sacred book of the Christians (but in his account its only the Old Testament).  By comparing the Bible texts with those of the Koran, Al-Maqdisi tries to show that in the Bible the original revelations of Moses and Jesus have been distorted.

Al-Maqdisi explains in the book how, according to his interpretation of Islam, people should reflect about God and how he is being described in the Old Testament.  He suggests that God in the Bible God is described rather antropomorphic, as a God with human characteristics; something that is inconsistent with Salafi thought. The same, according to Al-Maqdisi, can be said about how angels and prophets in the Bible are represented. In his book Al-Maqdisi gives examples of angels and prophets who would do things such as wine drinking, which according to Islam are prohibited. Also in the Bible King David is presented as very human, while in the Quran he is an almost perfect man. The end of the book contains several issues ( “Several rarities”) that struck him during reading the Bible, he writes about biblical names and addresses the “Texts I do not understand.”  Furthermore, he tries to show how texts in the Bible predict the prophet Muhammad.

According to Wagemaers Al-Maqdisi has written the book in prison following the remarks of the pope during his infamous speech in Germany.  On Al-Maqdisi’s website the book is presented along with an essay in which he attacks the pope: To the slave of the Cross … The English translation can be found on Tibyan or on Jarret Brachman’s website.

I do not know whether this book will reach the same popularity in jihadi circles as other writings of Al-Maqdisi, but the sneer to Wilders, Van Gogh and his analysis of the ‘distortion’ of the original message of Jesus and Moses will (although not new) undoubtedly be praised. We will probably have to wait for the English translation since the English version of To the slave of the Cross has been widely disseminated already (also among Dutch circles).

I would like to thank my colleague Joas Wagemakers for giving me the information. The information about the book of Al-Maqdisi in this post is based upon his information but the content and the representation in this post is my responsibility.

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MOI Lezing: Cartoons, minorities, freedom of speech and self-censorship in Denmark – Jørgen S. Nielsen

Posted on May 13th, 2009 by martijn.
Categories: (Upcoming) Events, ISIM/RU Research, Multiculti Issues, Public Islam.

MOI-Lezing

Datum: Maandag 18 mei, 19.30 uur
Plaats: Sweelinckzaal, Drift 21, Utrecht

The representation of religion in the public sphere can bring about major debates and conflicts. In the Netherlands, the limits of free speech and Dutch tolerance are to be tested in a court case after judges ruled that a right-wing MP Geert Wilders who compared the Koran to Mein Kampf and last year released the film Fitna, should be put on trial for inciting hatred and discrimination in his speeches. Similar issues can be found in other cases such as the “Muhammad Cartoons in 2005/2006. The Dutch Association for the Study of the Middle East and Islam (MOI) invites you to attend a lecture that will address the issues of freedom speech, self-censorship and the representation of religion:

“Cartoons, minorities, freedom of speech and self-censorship in Denmark“.

By Jørgen S. Nielsen

The publication on 30 September 2005 of the “Muhammad cartoons” by the Danish paper Jyllands-Posten is best known for the international crisis it provoked. Outside the country, however, less attention has been paid to the circumstances which led to the publication, at the centre of which was a debate about the balance between freedom of expression and self-censorship. The lecture will look at how the crisis developed domestically, the issues it raised and the following debate and locates it in the context of the mutual experiences of Muslim minorities and the national community.

Attendance is free, no registration required

Jørgen S. Nielsen is Professor of Islamic Studies, Faculty of Theology, University of Copenhagen, and currently a visiting professor at the University of Utrecht. He has previously held academic positions in Beirut, Birmingham (UK), and Damascus. Since 1978 his research has been focused on the situation of Muslims in Europe. He is author of Muslims in Western Europe (Edinburgh University Press, 1992, 2nd ed. 1995, 3rd ed. 2004; Arabic translation, Beirut: Saqi Press, 2006), and chief editor of the forthcoming Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, Leiden: Brill.

MOI
The Dutch Association for the Study of the Middle East and Islam (MOI) MOI is the main professional organisation involved in Arabic-Islamic studies, social scientists, students, policy-makers and journalists. MOI organizes workshops, lectures and is involved in ZemZem, the Dutch periodical on the Middle East, North Africa and Islam.

More information can be found on:
MOI
http://www.moistudies.nl
info@moistudies.nl

ZEMZEM
http://www.zemzem.org

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