C L O S E R

Closing the week 8 – A need to read list of the uprisings in the Middle East

Posted on February 27th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: Blogosphere, Society & Politics in the Middle East.

Most popular on Closer this week:

1. De Marokkaanse Uitzondering? door Nina ter Laan
2. Tunisia: From Paradise to Hell and Back? by Miriam Gazzah
3. Egypts Revolution 2.0 – The Facebook Factor by Linda Herrera

Previous updates: : Tunisia Uprising I – Tunisia Uprising II – Tunisia / Egypt Uprising Essential Reading I – The Egypt Revolution. See also the section Society and Politics in the Middle East (Dutch and English guest contributions).

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Essential readings again

Religioscope: Egypt: Islam in the insurrection

“Arab anger” in Egypt was no more Islamist than it had been in Tunisia a few weeks earlier. Islam was an ingredient, but no more than that. The various religious groups played a role that was politically very conservative. Few supported the protest movement, some were obliged to show some solidarity, many were frankly opposed. And this went for Copts as much as Muslims.

From anthropology to politics: the myth of the fundamentalist Arab Muslim mind | Islam, Muslims, and an Anthropologist

This revolt is not just against the tyrants but also against the ‘system’ and, as I will explain below, against how the “civilized” West feels entitled to manage the “civilizable” East. To understand this process, we need to make sense of how Arabs, Muslims (and in this case the Middle East) has been conceptualized. As we shall see, anthropology since the 1970s has had lots to say about it and, as some may be surprised to come to know, has directly – but even more so indirectly (nearly subconsciously) -deeply influenced political scientists and then politicians and policies.

Egypt and the global economic order – Opinion – Al Jazeera English

The strikers were responding to the fast-track imposition of neo-liberal economic policies by a cabinet led by Ahmed Nazif, the then prime minister who relentlessly implemented the demands of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). These measures included the privatisation of public factories, the liberalisation of markets, decreasing tariffs and import taxes and the introduction of subsidies for agri-businesses in place of those for small farmers with the aim of increasing agricultural exports.

‘Volcano of Rage’ by Max Rodenbeck | The New York Review of Books

Despite wide variations in the nominal forms of government in all these countries, as well as contrasting levels of wealth and education and urbanization, the pattern and shape of the unrest, and the grievances that provoked it, looked everywhere much the same. Arab rulers had grown too isolated, too inflated with pretense and hypocrisy, and too complacently confident in the power of their police. Their overwhelmingly youthful populations suffered perpetual humiliation at the hands of government officials, faced dim work prospects, and had little means of influencing politics. They felt, in the famous words of the Syrian playwright Saadallah Wannous, that they were “sentenced to hope.” More sophisticated and exposed to the world than the generation that ruled them, they had lost faith in the whole patriarchal construct that seemed to hem in their lives.

The Revolution Against Neoliberalism

To describe blatant exploitation of the political system for personal gain as corruption misses the forest for the trees. Such exploitation is surely an outrage against Egyptian citizens, but calling it corruption suggests that the problem amounts to aberrant behavior from a system that would otherwise function smoothly. If this were the case then the crimes of the Mubarak regime could be attributed simply to bad character: change the people and the problems go away. But the real problem with the regime was not necessarily that high-ranking members of the government were thieves in an ordinary sense. They did not necessarily steal directly from the treasury. Rather they were enriched through a conflation of politics and business under the guise of privatization. This was less a violation of the system than business as usual. Mubarak’s Egypt, in a nutshell, was a quintessential neoliberal state.

Women of the revolution – Features – Al Jazeera English

Egyptian women, just like men, took up the call to ‘hope’. Here they describe the spirit of Tahrir – the camaraderie and equality they experienced – and their hope that the model of democracy established there will be carried forward as Egyptians shape a new political and social landscape.

The Architects of the Egyptian Revolution | The Nation

While a new democratic regime might ensure civil and political rights within the framework of a liberal democracy, it is unclear whether the reforms necessary for addressing economic injustice and inequality can be implemented within this framework. Since the 1970s, the Egyptian economy has been increasingly subject to neoliberal economic reforms by the World Bank, the IMF and USAID at the behest of the United States government. Egyptian elites have been beneficiaries of, and partners in, these American-driven reforms. Will this sector of Egyptian society accommodate the demands of the poor, the unemployed and the workers who have so far been equal partners in their struggle against political corruption and autocracy? Will the protestors in Tahrir Square continue to fight for economic justice even as they gain political and civil rights in the months to come?

A private estate called Egypt | Salwa Ismail | Comment is free | The Guardian

There is a lot more behind Hosni Mubarak digging in his heels and setting his thugs on the peaceful protests in Cairo’s Tahrir Square than pure politics. This is also about money. Mubarak and the clique surrounding him have long treated Egypt as their fiefdom and its resources as spoils to be divided among them.

The Struggle to Define the Egyptian Revolution | The Middle East Channel

It is not that the old regime still remains (though it does; the junta and the cabinet are both still staffed by pre-revolutionary appointees and only vague hints of a cabinet reshuffle have been floated). It is clear that real change of some kind will take place. But the shape of the transition has not yet been defined. A more democratic, pluralistic, participatory, public-spirited, and responsive political system is a real possibility. But so is a kinder, gentler, presidentially-dominated, liberalized authoritarianism. In this post, I will discuss the state of play in Egypt; in future writings I hope to explore the implications for other regimes in the region.

Guernica / Nomi Prins: The Egyptian Uprising Is a Direct Response to Ruthless Global Capitalism

The revolution in Egypt is as much a rebellion against the painful deterioration of economic conditions as it is about opposing a dictator, though they are linked. That’s why President Hosni Mubarak’s announcement that he intends to stick around until September was met with an outpouring of rage.

Arab and American revolutions in history « The Immanent Frame

In this post, I will attempt to clarify my position by offering a historical view of how our celebration of what we now call the American Revolution requires us to support the maturation of what are now “mass protests” into the Arab Revolutions. The primary role in that process must be that of Arabs themselves, with each society acting in its own context. But the role of citizens of the United States is a matter of individual personal responsibility, because it is immediately connected to our attitudes and behavior. To the question posed in Thomas Farr’s title—“Where lies wisdom, where folly?”—I say that the universal measure is always the Golden Rule: Do unto others what you would have them do unto you. My strong opposition to the IRFA reflects my opposition to the United States’ failure to uphold the Golden Rule in its foreign policies. If the United States wishes to preach to others the imperative of protecting human rights, it must first apply that injunction to itself. My point is not that civil rights are violated in the United States, though there is sufficient reason for concern on that count; rather, the point is that domestic respect for the civil rights of citizens is not the same as the protection of human rights for all human beings equally, by virtue of their humanity and not their status as citizens. The United States does not have the moral standing and political legitimacy to uphold human rights anywhere in the world, unless it is willing to be judged by the same standards that it claims to apply to others.

Islam and the compulsion of the political « The Immanent Frame

My theoretical point concerns the compulsion of the political in discussing Islam more generally. What are the foreclosures of understanding Islam solely in political terms? Whether in Turkey, Egypt, or elsewhere, why does the analysis and assessment of Islam privilege, presuppose, and entail political argument? As Talal Asad has persuasively argued, the politicization of religion is a definitive feature of ‘the secular.’ From the secular perspective Asad describes, the supposedly fraught relationship between religion and politics (which secularism posits as necessarily problematic) exhausts the interest and importance of religion itself. My final point follows directly from this observation—the compulsion to discuss and comprehend Islam in solely political terms is a political fact in its own right. The compulsion of the political is a self-fulfilling prophecy, one that compels Muslims to account for themselves and their faith in strictly political language, because it assumes that Islam is inherently political. Rather than continue to ask how Islam relates to politics—rather than repeat the compulsion—I suggest that we begin to interrogate the difficulty of thinking of Islam non-politically. It is this question that urgently demands attention and address. The goal of this interrogation should not be to demonstrate, in antithetical fashion, that Islam is essentially non-political—to do so would be to remain within the binary logic that essentializes both Islam and politics. Rather, we should endeavor to speak truth to the powers that insist that Islam is necessarily, monolithically political, and that thereby render Islam itself monolithic and homogeneous.

The power of a new political imagination « The Immanent Frame

However, another wall is still standing: the widely perceived threat of the “Islamic state.” Observers in the U.S., Europe, and the Middle East worry that these revolutions could morph into “religious revolutions” and lead to “Islamic states.” They invariably ask: “What is the role of the Islamists?” “Will they take over the state?” These fears are based on a misunderstanding of the nature of the popular mobilizations in Tunisia and Egypt, of the relation between Islam and politics in the modern Arab Middle East, and on a narrow political imagination. These observers believe that Tunisia and Egypt can be one of only two things: a “secular” dictatorship or an Islamic republic on the Iranian model. This paradigm is plain wrong.

A Muslim revolution in Egypt « The Immanent Frame

Underlying the continuing utility of this trope is the presumption that Muslims as political actors face a stark choice. Secular, liberal democracy vs. Islamist, religious theocracy. There is no middle ground. It is for this reason that the AKP in Turkey continues to be called “mildly Islamist” by The Economist and other publications, while the GOP (which in many ways is far more Christian than the AKP is Islamic) needs no such qualifier. It is this same trope that Hosni Mubarak has used to great effect over the last three decades to justify his repressive regime to his friends in the West. In fact, when James Clapper, the Director of National intelligence, recently tried to make the case to Congress that the Muslim Brotherhood had disavowed violence for participation in democratic politics, he could find no other language to describe it except to call the group “largely secular”! Although he was immediately assailed by folks from the left and the right for this supposed faux pas, he was only giving voice to the internal contradiction built into the dualistic trope through which the West continues to miscomprehend both Islam and Muslims. Recent events in Egypt and elsewhere are unequivocal signs that Muslims will no longer be held hostage to this artificial and corrupt dualism. They are democratic and Muslim. Deal with it.

Five reasons why Arab regimes are falling – CSMonitor.com

Public protests in Egypt are not about minor changes or grievances. President Hosni Mubarak’s regime faces a deep process of legitimacy erosion – the same pattern of legitimacy erosion that exists across much of the Arab region. This erosion won’t simply go away with more protests or new governments, and it will be with us in the years to come. Understanding the larger societal and demographic factors eroding these regimes is vital to understanding the unrest in the Middle East and how the Arab world can move forward.

Egypt’s uprising: different media ensembles at different stages « media/anthropology

In the contemporary era when political actors (rulers, politicians, activists, journalists, citizens, etc.) have access to multiple media, when analysing a struggle it is crucial that we establish which media ensembles – or media mixes – came to the fore at which particular stages of the conflict. Although it is still early days to reconstruct the Egyptian uprising, it is already clear that indeed different stages have seen different constellations of media-related activity in Cairo and other sites of conflict. To illustrate this point, let us retrace the steps of the still unresolved dispute by means of a timeline drawn from Al Jazeera, the BBC, Wikipedia, and other sources.

Benhabib | Public Sphere Forum

What no commentator foresaw is the emergence of a movement of mass democratic resistance that is thoroughly modern in its understanding of politics and sometimes “pious,” but not fanatical – an important distinction that is permanently blurred over. Just as followers of Martin Luther King were educated in the black churches in the American South and gained their spiritual strength from these communities, so the crowds in Tunis, Egypt and elsewhere draw upon Islamic traditions of Shahada – being a martyr and witness of God at once! There is no necessary incompatibility between the religious faith of many who participated in these movements and their modern aspirations!

Chrystia Freeland | Analysis & Opinion | Reuters.com

They are being called the Facebook revolutions, but a better term for the uprisings sweeping through the Middle East might be the Groupon effect. That is because one of the most powerful consequences satellite television and the Internet have had for the protest movements is to help them overcome the problem of collective action, in the same way that Groupon has harnessed the Web for retailers.

The End of the Arab Dream – By James Traub | Foreign Policy

If Muammar al-Qaddafi falls, as seems increasingly likely, he will land with the rending crash of an immense, rigid object, like the statue of Saddam Hussein pulled down in Baghdad’s Firdos Square. This is not because, despite his own delusions, Qaddafi mattered to the world remotely as much as Saddam did. Rather, it’s because the Jamahiriya, or stateless society, he fostered in Libya constitutes the last of the revolutionary fantasies with which Arab leaders have mesmerized their citizens and justified their ruthless acts of repression since the establishment of the modern Arab world in the years after World War II.

Egypt
“I Saw God in Tahrir” « American Anthropological Association

while the Brotherhood will certainly play a formative role in post-revolutionary politics and governance in Egypt, it does not have a monopoly on Islamic discourse in the country.

Other important Islamic actors are Islamic televangelists, the most famous being Amr Khaled.

Jihadis Debate Egypt (3) — jihadica

What I find most interesting in the communiqué is the emphasis on the post-revolutionary phase and the character of the new regime. This is different from Abu Mundhir al-Shanqiti’s fatwa (see my earlier post) and Abu Sa’d al-Amili’s epistle (see below). The Mas’adat al-Mujahidin communiqué stresses the need for “preserving the fruits of your jihad”, not allowing the opportunists “to steal it”: “Any other rule but Islam will not protect you”. Furthermore, it states that “there is no excuse to delay the efforts to achieve this hope.” Failing to do so, it warns, the Egyptian brothers will face a new regime that “will be worse” and many times more corrupt than Mubarak’s. The international dimension of the post-revolutionary phase is not ignored: “you have not only broken your own shackles, but you will liberate the peoples of the other Arab countries from the tyrants of corruption and oppression. The hopes of the Islamic nations depend upon you.” The communiqué ends with a call to Egyptian clerics to forcefully declare their support for the Uprising and remove any doubt about its religious legitimacy.

Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood faces prospect of democracy amid internal discord

With President Hosni Mubarak gone, the Muslim Brotherhood is finding the prospect of democracy here a mixed blessing.

hawgblawg: More on Ahmed Basiony, Martyr of the Egyptian Revolution

AfricanColours has published Ahmed Basiony’s impressive Artistic C.V. with a few photos of some of his artwork. Basiony (or Bassiouni) died on January 28 at Tahrir, at the hands of Egypt’s security forces. Above is a sample of his artwork.

Muslim television preacher returns to Egypt – CNN Belief Blog – CNN.com Blogs

As Egyptians returned to Tahrir Square to push for the realization of more political demands, one of the world’s most influential Muslim television preachers delivered his first address in Egypt since President Hosni Mubarak left office.

“I don’t have a stronger message than this: Kill yourself working for Egypt,” Amr Khaled told a crowd of thousands.

Libya
On Libya: Why We Need Nuance « ZERO ANTHROPOLOGY

WARNING: Contains satire, mockery and travesty. Suitable for mature audiences only.

Reported events in Libya are very intriguing, to some extent. While one hopes that the following statements do not go too far over the top, we might say that unconfirmed allegations of loss of life may give one reason for pause. It is possible that some of us may entertain certain misgivings about the multifaceted and complex comments offered by the Libyan leader. While some may wish to argue that Col. Gaddafi is a “dictator,” a less tendentious characterization should suggest itself as the situation is neither black nor white, but grey.

It is important that the tone of discussion be kept serious, civil, and reasoned.

The Ancient Past of Libya and Libyans

Ancient Libya was defined as the rather large area in North Africa west of Egypt and west of the Nile River Valley, an area belonging to the afterlife.

Libya: Past and future? – Opinion – Al Jazeera English

Many believed that Colonel Gaddafi’s regime in Libya would withstand the gale of change sweeping the Arab world because of its reputation for brutality which had fragmented the six million-strong population over the past 42 years.

Its likely disappearance now, after a few days of protest by unarmed demonstrators is all-the-more surprising because it has systematically destroyed even the slightest pretence of dissidence and has atomised Libyan society to ensure that no organisation – formal or spontaneous – could ever consolidate sufficiently to oppose it.

Libya repression and protest: Long repressed, Libyans take a brave step toward freedom – latimes.com

Libyans thus had little opportunity to assemble components of civil society. Political associations, human rights organizations, independent professional associations or trade unions were all strictly proscribed, and organized opposition to the “ideology of the 1969 revolution” was punishable by death. On my first visit to Libya in 2005, the specially selected “civil society representatives” permitted to talk with us, and even government officials we met, displayed anxiety about expressing any opinions outside their sanctioned talking points. They literally recited chapter and verse of the Green Book, Kadafi’s small manuscript on governance. The performance was unmatched by anything I had seen in Syria and Iraq.

Robert Fisk with the first dispatch from Tripoli – a city in the shadow of death – Robert Fisk, Commentators – The Independent

While dark humour has never been a strong quality in Libyans, there was one moment at Tripoli airport yesterday which proved it does exist. An incoming passenger from a Libyan Arab Airlines flight at the front of an immigration queue bellowed out: “And long life to our great leader Muammar Gaddafi.” Then he burst into laughter – and the immigration officers did the same.

Exclusive Update from Benghazi: Inside Information on the Opposition Movement

This morning, I spoke to Mohammed Fannoush, an active dissident in Benghazi, who informed me that the liberated cities, in both the East and West, have come together and organized a committee which will serve as a collective organ from which they will continue to unwaveringly fight for the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi. Fannoush has been put in charge of communication and urged me and other Arab-Americans to be active in clarifying the situation of the anti-Gaddafi movement in Libya as being nationalist, as opposed to Gaddafi’s manipulative accusations of a radical Islamist, specifically Al-Qaeda, led opposition. This movement is one based in a struggle for freedom, social justice, civil rights, education, health, and human dignity, of which Gaddafi has deprived them for over 40 years.

tabsir.net » Gaddafi: odd and daffy to the end

The irony is that as much as Gaddafi is hated in the West, thus far little has been done to stop him. Perhaps Berlusconi will send a plane to spirit his friend out, but Gaddafi seems crazy enough to try and hold on to power no matter how many people are killed. The U.N. Security Council is meeting, but thus far only words have been hurled in Gaddafi’s direction. Swiss banks have frozen his assets. The oil fields have been taken over by protesters, supported by the army. The days of Colonel Gaddafi are nearing an end, but probably not before many more lives are taken.

The Libyan massacre: or rather protesters killed for Italian and European interests? | Islam, Muslims, and an Anthropologist

Is Gaddafi just defending his own interests? Is there something more than just a struggle to maintain power?

To understand this we have to move our attention from Libya to a European country: Italy, the gate to Europe for thousands of illegal migrants from Africa and in particular Libya.

Libya’s Significance

More to the point in the present context, Libyans have almost unanimously rejected the prospects of foreign intervention during or after their revolution, on the grounds that its objective will be to keep Libya and its oil safe from the Libyan people. Should they succeed in safeguarding their sovereignty, this may prove their best insurance against a “democratic transition” Iraqi-style.

Bahrain
Bahrain Then and Now: Reflections on the Future of the Arab Monarchies

But today, as authoritarian “republics” across the Arab world tremble and sometimes tumble, little Bahrain is the first kingdom to be challenged by the wave of popular democratic protest. It is bad enough when it has to cancel the Formula One racing event. But you know matters are getting really serious when the king’s police open fire on peaceful demonstrators, prompting protesters to escalate their demands and call for the abolition of the monarchy itself. That hasn’t happened before. Does the present king—and especially his entourage—still possess sufficient legitimacy to face the present crisis?

Notes from the Bahraini Field [Update 2]

The following constitutes a series of email reports (to be updated regularly) from Jadaliyya affiliates in Manama. They will be updated in the next few days to reflect the latest developments in Bahrain. For some important differences between Bahrain and Egypt/Tunisia, see our Jadaliyya article entitled “Is Bahrain Next.”

The Canadian Press: Protest marches fill Bahrain capital as pressure mounts on rulers

MANAMA, Bahrain — Thousands of protesters streamed through Bahrain’s diplomatic area and other sites Sunday, chanting against the country’s king and rejecting his appeals for talks to end the tiny Gulf nation’s nearly two-week-old crisis.

Misc.
Saba Mahmood: Democracy is not enough – Anthropologists on the Arab revolution part II

While the revolutions in Northern Africa and the Middle East are spreading and the Libyan people managed to get rid of another dictator, anthropologists continue to comment the recent events. Here is a short overview.

From fear to fury: how the Arab world found its voice | Music | Music | The Observer

Before the revolution, Egypt’s metal heads lived in fear of arrest. Bullet belts, Iron Maiden T-shirts, horn gestures and headbanging were closet pastimes for foolhardy freaks. Bands such as Bliss, Wyvern, Hate Suffocation, Scarab, Brutus and Massive Scar Era rocked their fans like the priests of a persecuted sect who lived in constant wariness of the ghastly Mukhabarat, Mubarak’s secret police.

Soundtrack to the Arab revolutions | Music | The Observer

Rapper El Général helped spark the uprising in Tunisia, and in Egypt musicians bravely played their part in their nation’s transformation with these impassioned and incendiary tracks

Egypt; The Unexpected (and Unfinished) Revolution « Fifp

I wanted to understand why we did not see in Egypt the kind of collective action we saw in Iran. As an insight as to my line of thought, here’s a section of my conclusion:

“The key factors in explaining the absence of collective action in the Egyptian context and the absence of an Egyptian protest movement lies in an appreciation of the difference trajectory that the country has and continues to develop in, as compared to Iran. Egyptian revolutionary zeal was at its prime under the British occupation and took on an anti-imperialist, nationalist character and is yet to embrace an ideology in the modern context enabling it to unite under a general banner in defiance to the country’s existing authoritarian regime. The Egyptians, unlike the Iranians, lack a history of a united collective successful movement. In addition, the Egyptian state has been much more consistent in its approach towards the masses than its Iranian counterpart. This has meant a long history of repression, blocking of avenues of participation and the undermining of Islam as a revolutionary force.”

The Syrian Style of Repression: Thugs and Lectures – TIME

It was a formidable show of force, clearly meant to intimidate. The security personnel easily outnumbered the small crowd of less than 200 that was prevented — by a human barricade of uniformed men — from gathering anywhere near the embassy to denounce violence against anti-government protesters in Libya. Instead, the demonstration moved to a nearby park some 100 meters away.

Lebanese youth protest to overthrow the sectarian regime [Photos] | Ya Libnan | World News Live from Lebanon

Lebanese youth demonstrated against the government, calling for an end to sectarian politics in Lebanon. The protesters marched from the Mar Mikhael church intersection to the Adliyeh area of Beirut on Sunday, called for a secular state. Initial reports indicate that as many as 4,000 protesters took part despite the poor wether conditions.

Robert Fisk: The destiny of this pageant lies in the Kingdom of Oil – Robert Fisk, Commentators – The Independent

The docile, supine, unregenerative, cringing Arabs of Orientalism have transformed themselves into fighters for the freedom, liberty and dignity which we Westerners have always assumed it was our unique role to play in the world. One after another, our satraps are falling, and the people we paid them to control are making their own history – our right to meddle in their affairs (which we will, of course, continue to exercise) has been diminished for ever.

After Iraq’s Day of Rage, a Crackdown on Intellectuals

BAGHDAD – Iraqi security forces detained about 300 people, including prominent journalists, artists and lawyers who took part in nationwide demonstrations Friday, in what some of them described as an operation to intimidate Baghdad intellectuals who hold sway over popular opinion.

Obama Is Helping Iran – By Flynt and Hillary Mann Leverett | Foreign Policy

We take billionaire financier George Soros up on the bet he proffered to CNN’s Fareed Zakaria this week that “the Iranian regime will not be there in a year’s time.” In fact, we want to up the ante and wager that not only will the Islamic Republic still be Iran’s government in a year’s time, but that a year from now, the balance of influence and power in the Middle East will be tilted more decisively in Iran’s favor than it ever has been.

Agency and Its Discontents: Between Al Saud’s Paternalism and the Awakening of Saudi Youth

Public life has been calmer than usual in Saudi Arabia for the last month. Invigorated by the people’s revolutionary movements in Tunisia and Egypt and anxious about the increasing violence in Libya, Bahrain and Yemen, Saudis have been following the news obsessively, perhaps for the first time in a decade. Salon talk has also shifted to serious discussions of the less than ideal role the Saudi government has played in the historic regional developments we are witnessing today. Within these discussions, predictions of what will happen next in Saudi Arabia vary, but all agree that the future course of events rests on what King Abdullah will do upon his return. In this context, two days ago, dubbed “Bright Wednesday” by Saudi media, marked a turning point in shaping the course that local movements for change will adopt.

Sacrifice and the Ripple Effect of Tunisian Self-immolation « American Anthropological Association

The years to come will certainly shed more light on the different local activities around Tunisia that served to turn Bouazizi’s act into a catalyst for national revolt rather than a localized incident. In the wake of Tunisia’s success, there were several cases of self-immolation across the Arab world, mainly in places like Egypt and Algeria. It is important to understand the Bouazizi sacrifice and the copycat cases, and to then reflect on the role of sacrifice to bring about change, the use of sacrifice in Egypt in particular, and why the other self-immolation cases did not engender the same reactions.

Dutch
Quote van de Dag: Elke islam-democratie is fake – GeenCommentaar

Volgens Wilders gaan islam en democratie niet samen, maar democratie en moslims wel. Maar dan wel moslims die soort van de islam niet meer aanhangen.

PVV, islam en vrijheid: De moslim als dhimmi | www.dagelijksestandaard.nl

Concluderend: de PVV, die met de aanval op de multikul opkwam voor de individuele vrijheid van de Nederlander, beschadigt met haar voorgestelde beleid de individuele vrijheid en daarmee verantwoordelijkheid van allochtonen en moslims. Is ze de partij van de individuele vrijheid van alle Nederlanders, of alleen van de communale vrijheid van autochtonen? Wordt het multikul, monokul, of liberalisme?

Onbedwelmd slachten III, de islamitische dhabihah « Kandigols Weblog

Het is me al vaker opgevallen dat vooral degenen met uitgesproken standpunten over moslims en islam, nooit met moslims verkeren, of zelfs maar eens in een islamitische slagerij komen. Men baseert zijn hele sociologische totaaltheorie op achterhaalde noties, halve verzinsels en angstvisioenen.

Henk Vroom schrijft beleidsadvies ‘Dialogue with Islam’ : Nieuwemoskee

Het research rapport Dialogue with Islam: Facing the Challenge of Muslim Integration in France, Netherlands, Germany bevat beleidsadviezen voor overheidsbeleid ten aanzien van moslims en moskee-organisaties. Het is geschreven op verzoek van het Centre for European Studies, het wetenschappelijk bureau van de Europese Volkspartij, te Brussel.

Mirjam Shatanawi, Islam in beeld. Kunst en cultuur van moslims wereldwijd | Eutopia Institute

Mirjam Shatanawi stelt heel wat pregnante vragen bij termen als ‘islamitisch’; ‘kunst’ en ‘cultuur’ en bij het verzamelen en exposeren ervan, zonder daar altijd duidelijke antwoorden op te kunnen of te willen geven. Het belangrijkste is dat de vragen een nieuwe discussieruimte openen, een aantal vastgeroeste betekenissen weer vlot maken, en doen nadenken over bewuste en onbewuste beeldvorming en over de ideologieën die onze manier van kijken bepalen. Wie dit soort studies ernstig neemt, kan het woord ‘islam’ niet meer gebruiken op de normatieve en eenduidige manier waarop dat op dit ogenblik in het Nederlandse islamdebat nog steeds gebeurt.

Volhoudbaar: Gekke koeien. Het moet niet dommer worden.

ChristenUnie is bondgenoot geworden in de strijd tegen de islam en door voor een verbod op de sharia te pleiten feitelijk nu ook tegen de moslims zelf.

De sharia in de grondwet – Hoe de ChristenUnie met een doldwaas voorstel de liberale rechtsstaat schaadt

Het is inmiddels nogal flauw om nog een spook door Europa te laten waren, maar de sharia zou je anders met een gerust hart een dergelijke verschijningsvorm toe kunnen dichten. Het is in ieder geval een mysterieus ding, die sharia, net zo geschikt voor een gesprek als het weer. Je hoeft er geen verstand van te hebben om er toch over mee te kunnen praten. Het verschil is slechts dat je het weer aan den lijve voelt en dus, ook als je geen meteoroloog bent, op zijn minst op enige eigen waarneming kunt bogen, terwijl het aardige van de sharia is dat het echt een Gespenst is, om de term van Marx en Engels maar aan te halen: werkelijk zien doe je het ding niet, maar je kunt er wel lekker voor griezelen.

Rouvoet en Kuiper: Anti-sharia-bepaling geeft duidelijkheid – Opinie – TROUW

opinie Een preambule in de Grondwet snijdt ook het pad af van populisten die de vrijheden van moslims teniet willen doen. Vrijheid en waardigheid worden niet per stemming bepaald.

3 comments.

Jadaliyya Interview with Ali Ahmida

Posted on February 25th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: Society & Politics in the Middle East.

One of the most interesting sites with updates and backgrounds on the revolts in the Arab world is Jadaliyya.com. Today they published their first interview conducted by Jadaliyya Co-Editor Noura Erakat with one of the leaders of the Libyan uprising: Ali Ahmida.

In this interview, Ali Ahmida (bio here) discusses how the recent civilian revolt began as a reformist movement and quickly transformed into a revolutionary one demanding regime change. Ahmida also places the opposition forces in their geo-political context in light of Libya’s legacy of post-colonial state building. Ahmida concludes by exploring the three possible scenarios in the next phase of Libya’s revolt. Please excuse the low quality audio at the outset of Ali Ahmida’s comments.

You can watch the interview HERE.

0 comments.

Jemen als 'Wild Card'

Posted on February 23rd, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: Guest authors, Society & Politics in the Middle East.

Guest Author: Annemarie van Geel

Terwijl er de afgelopen dagen op het internet gediscussieerd werd hoe de naam Mubarak omgevormd kan worden naar een Arabisch werkwoord en wat dat woord dan zou moeten betekenen, gingen in Jemen mensen de straat op om te protesteren tegen het regime van Ali Abdallah Salih, de man die de afgelopen 33 jaar Jemen heeft geregeerd. In het Midden-Oosten, maar ook elders, word uitgebreid gegist over de vraag ‘wie is de volgende’. Op het eerste gezicht lijkt Jemen (in casu: president Ali Abdallah Salih) kandidaat te zijn.

Als armste land van de Arabische wereld -bijna de helft van de bevolking leeft van minder dan $2 per dag- heeft Jemen te kampen met een werkloosheid van ongeveer 35%. Corruptie, analfabetisme, een qat-verslaafde bevolking en een laatste plaats in het meest recente Global Gender Gap Report van het World Economic Forum maken het plaatje niet rooskleuriger.

Jemen is een complexe mix van stammen, religieuze groeperingen, en overige groepen. Salih heeft de ingewikkelde onderlinge verhoudingen tussen de verschillende groepen de afgelopen 33 jaar danig in zijn voordeel weten te manipuleren. Desondanks wordt het regime geconfronteerd met tribale rebellie van de Houthis in het noorden, een afscheidingsbeweging in het zuiden (dat tot 1990 onafhankelijk was), en Al Qaeda in het oosten van het land. Zelfs vóór het begin van de protesten stond Salih dus al aanzienlijk onder druk.

Die druk kwam onder andere van de oppositie-alliantie “Joint Meeting Parties” (JMP), bestaande uit islamisten, socialisten en wat kleinere oppositiegroepen. De JMP had al verschillende malen aangegeven op te zullen roepen tot protesten tegen Salih en diens partij de “General People’s Congress” (GPC) als er vóór de Parlementsverkiezingen van april van dit jaar geen politieke en electorale hervormingen zouden worden doorgevoerd.

Echter, de JMP is de “officiële” oppositie en tot op zekere hoogte gecoöpteerd door het regime. Maar naast de waarschuwing van de JMP werden er in Jemen, net als in Egypte en Tunesië, protesten georganiseerd door studenten via Facebookgroepen zoals “Eyoun Shabbah” (Ogen van de Jeugd) en “Harakat al Shabaab li Tagheer” (Jongerenbeweging voor Verandering). Deze groepen zijn een alternatief voor zij die gefrustreerd zijn geraakt met de officiële oppositie. In Jemen echter is internetgebruik vele malen lager dan in Egypte, en deze Facebookgroepen hebben dan ook slechts enkele honderden leden.

Een van de leidsters van de studentenprotesten is Tawakkul Karma. Toen Saleh op 23 januari deze activiste, die voorzitster is van Women Journalists Without Chains en lid van de islamistische Islah partij, liet arresteren leidde dit tot ongekende studentenprotesten in Sana’a, de hoofdstad, en Ta’izz (zuid-westen).

Tawakkul werd gearresteerd toen zij uit een vergadering kwam met de Secretaris-Generaal van de Islah partij (die deel uitmaakt van de JMP-oppositiegroep). Zij werd ervan beschuldigd demonstraties te organiseren en geweld en chaos te veroorzaken in de maatschappij. Vanwege de demonstraties tegen haar arrestatie kwam ze echter snel vrij. Salih verhoogde onmiddellijk de salarissen van soldaten met $25 per maand – een aanzienlijk bedrag in Jemen. In ieder geval voorlopig kan Salih nog rekenen op de steun van het leger.

Tawakkul ging na haar vrijlating direct weer de straat op. Tijdens een van de studentendemonstraties die ze leidde scandeerden pro-democratie studenten, refererende aan de voormalige president van Tunesië: “Ali, Ali, ga weg, ga weg, ga je vriend Ben Ali achterna” terwijl pro-regime studenten riepen “Ali of de dood, Ali of de dood” en “Jongeren, jongeren, Islah is de terrorist”. Ook de leus “de mensen willen de val van het regime” – die we ook tijdens de protesten in Egypte hoorden – wordt gescandeerd.

Op 2 februari gaf Salih aan zich niet te zullen kandideren voor de Presidentsverkiezingen van 2013 – een claim die hij ook maakte voor de Presidentsverkiezingen van 2006. Ook gaf hij aan de macht niet over te zullen dragen aan zijn zoon. Salih’s aankondiging kwam een dag voor Jemen’s Dag van Woede (5 februari) die werd geïnspireerd door de gebeurtenissen in Egypte en Tunesië. De avond van tevoren maakten pro-regime demonstraten kwartier op het centrale plein van Sana’a -net als in Cairo Midan Tahrir (Bevrijdingsplein) geheten- gewapend met posters van de president.

Ook de afgelopen week is er geprotesteerd in Jemen. En niet alleen op straat: de website van de Jemenitische staatstelevisie werd gehackt en even was er enkel te lezen: “Ga weg.. de bevolking wil je niet. 33 Jaar honger zijn genoeg! Een geweldloze revolutie.”

Deze week noemde Salih de pro-democratie demonstranten “anarchisten”, terwijl hij vrijwel tegelijkertijd opriep tot een Nationale Dialoog. Welhaast als antwoord vond er afgelopen vrijdag, 18 februari, een “Dag van Woede” plaats na het vrijdaggebed. Net als in Egypte werden mensen via Facebook en Twitter opgeroepen om te demonstreren. Veel mensen gaven gehoor aan de oproepen en er vonden demonstraties plaats in Sana’a (de hoofdstad), Ta’izz (de stad die het centrum van de pro-democratie demonstraties lijkt te zijn geworden) en Aden (waar de seperatisten de laatste jaren zeer actief zijn), alsook ook in Ibb, Abyan, Al Beidha, Hadramout, Dhalie en Hodeida.

Maar Salih lijkt geleerd te hebben van het lot van zijn collega’s Ben Ali en Mubarak en grijpt in. Veel mensen echter, vooral de verschillende stammen, hebben wapens, die gewoon in de souq (de markt) te koop zijn. De situatie zou dus wellicht grimmiger kunnen worden.

De demonstranten zijn niet alleen studenten maar ook islamisten, separatisten en leden van stammen. Deelname van die laatste twee groepen is niet vanzelfsprekend. Pas afgelopen woensdag sloten de separatisten, die jarenlang voor afscheiding waren, zich aan bij de protesten, wellicht denkende dat het vertrek van Salih ook al een aanzienlijke verbetering is. Zij roepen nu op tot de val van Salih en willen democratie. Een belangrijke verandering van tactiek, aangezien het de positie van de pro-democratie demonstranten aanzienlijk versterkt.

Ook de Houthis, de rebellerende stam in het noorden, hebben zich achter de demonstranten geschaard. Hoewel sommigen dit welhaast zien als een verkapte oorlogsverklaring hebben de Houthis (nog) geen strijders gemobiliseerd. Hussein al Ahmar, een leider van de Hashids (een van twee grootste stammen in Jemen) heeft aangegeven dat mocht de situatie in Sana’a uit de hand lopen zij zich achter de demonstranten zullen scharen. Zoals in Egypte en Tunesië het leger een centrale rol speelde in de protesten zouden in Jemen de stammen een bepalende factor kunnen zijn.

Tegelijkertijd riepen prominente geestelijken, zoals Abdelmajid al Zindani, op tot het vormen van een interim-eenheidsregering met leden van de oppositie op belangrijke ministeries en verkiezingen over 6 maanden. Tot deze oproep was Zindani één van de belangrijkste bondgenoten van Salih. Al Qaeda op het Arabisch Schiereiland houdt zich, afgezien van haar oproep tot jihad tegen de Houthis die shi’itisch zijn, afzijdig van de demonstraties.

De druk op Salih neemt dus toe en steun voor hem lijkt af te brokkelen. Later deze maand zou Saleh afreizen naar de Verenigde Staten, zijn belangrijkste bondgenoot. Maar gezien de recente ontwikkelingen in Jemen, en de toezegging van de oppositie om met hem te praten, heeft hij dat bezoek afgeblazen.

En de (nabije) toekomst? De oppositie is grotendeels verzwakt en/of gecoöpteerd door het regime. Onlangs accepteerde de JMP een initiatief van de regering voor politieke hervormingen, hiertoe aangemoedigd door de EU en de VS. De JMP echter heeft weinig geloofwaardigheid in het land. Gisteren verklaarde de alliantie niet meer bereid te zijn tot dialoog met het regime. Dat betekent niet dat de JMP niet wellicht straks tóch met Saleh aan tafel zit. Aan de andere kant lijkt de oppositie geen sterke leiders te kunnen leveren die ook nog de delicate balans tussen de stammen, religieuze groepen, en anderen zouden kunnen bewaren, hetgeen noodzakelijk is om het land politiek, economisch en sociaal bij elkaar te kunnen blijven houden.

De protesten houden vooralsnog aan. Jemen is een “wild card” en het is onduidelijk welke kant het op zal gaan in het land. Waarschijnlijk zal veel afhangen van hoe Salih de komende tijd omgaat met de protesten en de demonstranten en wat de uitkomst zal zijn van zijn eventuele gesprekken met de JMP.

Dus wat er gaat komen in Jemen – en in andere Arabische landen: “Allahu ‘alim”, ofwel, God mag het weten, zoals Arabieren soms zeggen.

Annemarie van Geel (1981) ontving haar Masterdiploma in Internationale Betrekkingen met het Midden-Oosten als specialisatie van de Universiteit van Cambridge in 2003. Ze heeft gewoond in Egypte, de Westelijke Jordaanoever, Syrië en Jemen en reisde uitgebreid door de regio. Ze heeft gewerkt bij Instituut Clingendael, het voormalig ISIM (International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World) en de Midden-Oosten afdeling van Amnesty International Nederland. Sinds 2011 begon is ze als promovendus verbonden aan de afdeling Islam en Arabisch van de Radboud Universiteit te Nijmegen waar ze onderzoek doet naar gender segregatie in Saoedi-Arabië en Koeweit. Annemarie van Geel heeft haar eigen website Faraasha.nl, waar dit stuk eerder is verschenen.

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Jemen als ‘Wild Card’

Posted on February 23rd, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: Guest authors, Society & Politics in the Middle East.

Guest Author: Annemarie van Geel

Terwijl er de afgelopen dagen op het internet gediscussieerd werd hoe de naam Mubarak omgevormd kan worden naar een Arabisch werkwoord en wat dat woord dan zou moeten betekenen, gingen in Jemen mensen de straat op om te protesteren tegen het regime van Ali Abdallah Salih, de man die de afgelopen 33 jaar Jemen heeft geregeerd. In het Midden-Oosten, maar ook elders, word uitgebreid gegist over de vraag ‘wie is de volgende’. Op het eerste gezicht lijkt Jemen (in casu: president Ali Abdallah Salih) kandidaat te zijn.

Als armste land van de Arabische wereld -bijna de helft van de bevolking leeft van minder dan $2 per dag- heeft Jemen te kampen met een werkloosheid van ongeveer 35%. Corruptie, analfabetisme, een qat-verslaafde bevolking en een laatste plaats in het meest recente Global Gender Gap Report van het World Economic Forum maken het plaatje niet rooskleuriger.

Jemen is een complexe mix van stammen, religieuze groeperingen, en overige groepen. Salih heeft de ingewikkelde onderlinge verhoudingen tussen de verschillende groepen de afgelopen 33 jaar danig in zijn voordeel weten te manipuleren. Desondanks wordt het regime geconfronteerd met tribale rebellie van de Houthis in het noorden, een afscheidingsbeweging in het zuiden (dat tot 1990 onafhankelijk was), en Al Qaeda in het oosten van het land. Zelfs vóór het begin van de protesten stond Salih dus al aanzienlijk onder druk.

Die druk kwam onder andere van de oppositie-alliantie “Joint Meeting Parties” (JMP), bestaande uit islamisten, socialisten en wat kleinere oppositiegroepen. De JMP had al verschillende malen aangegeven op te zullen roepen tot protesten tegen Salih en diens partij de “General People’s Congress” (GPC) als er vóór de Parlementsverkiezingen van april van dit jaar geen politieke en electorale hervormingen zouden worden doorgevoerd.

Echter, de JMP is de “officiële” oppositie en tot op zekere hoogte gecoöpteerd door het regime. Maar naast de waarschuwing van de JMP werden er in Jemen, net als in Egypte en Tunesië, protesten georganiseerd door studenten via Facebookgroepen zoals “Eyoun Shabbah” (Ogen van de Jeugd) en “Harakat al Shabaab li Tagheer” (Jongerenbeweging voor Verandering). Deze groepen zijn een alternatief voor zij die gefrustreerd zijn geraakt met de officiële oppositie. In Jemen echter is internetgebruik vele malen lager dan in Egypte, en deze Facebookgroepen hebben dan ook slechts enkele honderden leden.

Een van de leidsters van de studentenprotesten is Tawakkul Karma. Toen Saleh op 23 januari deze activiste, die voorzitster is van Women Journalists Without Chains en lid van de islamistische Islah partij, liet arresteren leidde dit tot ongekende studentenprotesten in Sana’a, de hoofdstad, en Ta’izz (zuid-westen).

Tawakkul werd gearresteerd toen zij uit een vergadering kwam met de Secretaris-Generaal van de Islah partij (die deel uitmaakt van de JMP-oppositiegroep). Zij werd ervan beschuldigd demonstraties te organiseren en geweld en chaos te veroorzaken in de maatschappij. Vanwege de demonstraties tegen haar arrestatie kwam ze echter snel vrij. Salih verhoogde onmiddellijk de salarissen van soldaten met $25 per maand – een aanzienlijk bedrag in Jemen. In ieder geval voorlopig kan Salih nog rekenen op de steun van het leger.

Tawakkul ging na haar vrijlating direct weer de straat op. Tijdens een van de studentendemonstraties die ze leidde scandeerden pro-democratie studenten, refererende aan de voormalige president van Tunesië: “Ali, Ali, ga weg, ga weg, ga je vriend Ben Ali achterna” terwijl pro-regime studenten riepen “Ali of de dood, Ali of de dood” en “Jongeren, jongeren, Islah is de terrorist”. Ook de leus “de mensen willen de val van het regime” – die we ook tijdens de protesten in Egypte hoorden – wordt gescandeerd.

Op 2 februari gaf Salih aan zich niet te zullen kandideren voor de Presidentsverkiezingen van 2013 – een claim die hij ook maakte voor de Presidentsverkiezingen van 2006. Ook gaf hij aan de macht niet over te zullen dragen aan zijn zoon. Salih’s aankondiging kwam een dag voor Jemen’s Dag van Woede (5 februari) die werd geïnspireerd door de gebeurtenissen in Egypte en Tunesië. De avond van tevoren maakten pro-regime demonstraten kwartier op het centrale plein van Sana’a -net als in Cairo Midan Tahrir (Bevrijdingsplein) geheten- gewapend met posters van de president.

Ook de afgelopen week is er geprotesteerd in Jemen. En niet alleen op straat: de website van de Jemenitische staatstelevisie werd gehackt en even was er enkel te lezen: “Ga weg.. de bevolking wil je niet. 33 Jaar honger zijn genoeg! Een geweldloze revolutie.”

Deze week noemde Salih de pro-democratie demonstranten “anarchisten”, terwijl hij vrijwel tegelijkertijd opriep tot een Nationale Dialoog. Welhaast als antwoord vond er afgelopen vrijdag, 18 februari, een “Dag van Woede” plaats na het vrijdaggebed. Net als in Egypte werden mensen via Facebook en Twitter opgeroepen om te demonstreren. Veel mensen gaven gehoor aan de oproepen en er vonden demonstraties plaats in Sana’a (de hoofdstad), Ta’izz (de stad die het centrum van de pro-democratie demonstraties lijkt te zijn geworden) en Aden (waar de seperatisten de laatste jaren zeer actief zijn), alsook ook in Ibb, Abyan, Al Beidha, Hadramout, Dhalie en Hodeida.

Maar Salih lijkt geleerd te hebben van het lot van zijn collega’s Ben Ali en Mubarak en grijpt in. Veel mensen echter, vooral de verschillende stammen, hebben wapens, die gewoon in de souq (de markt) te koop zijn. De situatie zou dus wellicht grimmiger kunnen worden.

De demonstranten zijn niet alleen studenten maar ook islamisten, separatisten en leden van stammen. Deelname van die laatste twee groepen is niet vanzelfsprekend. Pas afgelopen woensdag sloten de separatisten, die jarenlang voor afscheiding waren, zich aan bij de protesten, wellicht denkende dat het vertrek van Salih ook al een aanzienlijke verbetering is. Zij roepen nu op tot de val van Salih en willen democratie. Een belangrijke verandering van tactiek, aangezien het de positie van de pro-democratie demonstranten aanzienlijk versterkt.

Ook de Houthis, de rebellerende stam in het noorden, hebben zich achter de demonstranten geschaard. Hoewel sommigen dit welhaast zien als een verkapte oorlogsverklaring hebben de Houthis (nog) geen strijders gemobiliseerd. Hussein al Ahmar, een leider van de Hashids (een van twee grootste stammen in Jemen) heeft aangegeven dat mocht de situatie in Sana’a uit de hand lopen zij zich achter de demonstranten zullen scharen. Zoals in Egypte en Tunesië het leger een centrale rol speelde in de protesten zouden in Jemen de stammen een bepalende factor kunnen zijn.

Tegelijkertijd riepen prominente geestelijken, zoals Abdelmajid al Zindani, op tot het vormen van een interim-eenheidsregering met leden van de oppositie op belangrijke ministeries en verkiezingen over 6 maanden. Tot deze oproep was Zindani één van de belangrijkste bondgenoten van Salih. Al Qaeda op het Arabisch Schiereiland houdt zich, afgezien van haar oproep tot jihad tegen de Houthis die shi’itisch zijn, afzijdig van de demonstraties.

De druk op Salih neemt dus toe en steun voor hem lijkt af te brokkelen. Later deze maand zou Saleh afreizen naar de Verenigde Staten, zijn belangrijkste bondgenoot. Maar gezien de recente ontwikkelingen in Jemen, en de toezegging van de oppositie om met hem te praten, heeft hij dat bezoek afgeblazen.

En de (nabije) toekomst? De oppositie is grotendeels verzwakt en/of gecoöpteerd door het regime. Onlangs accepteerde de JMP een initiatief van de regering voor politieke hervormingen, hiertoe aangemoedigd door de EU en de VS. De JMP echter heeft weinig geloofwaardigheid in het land. Gisteren verklaarde de alliantie niet meer bereid te zijn tot dialoog met het regime. Dat betekent niet dat de JMP niet wellicht straks tóch met Saleh aan tafel zit. Aan de andere kant lijkt de oppositie geen sterke leiders te kunnen leveren die ook nog de delicate balans tussen de stammen, religieuze groepen, en anderen zouden kunnen bewaren, hetgeen noodzakelijk is om het land politiek, economisch en sociaal bij elkaar te kunnen blijven houden.

De protesten houden vooralsnog aan. Jemen is een “wild card” en het is onduidelijk welke kant het op zal gaan in het land. Waarschijnlijk zal veel afhangen van hoe Salih de komende tijd omgaat met de protesten en de demonstranten en wat de uitkomst zal zijn van zijn eventuele gesprekken met de JMP.

Dus wat er gaat komen in Jemen – en in andere Arabische landen: “Allahu ‘alim”, ofwel, God mag het weten, zoals Arabieren soms zeggen.

Annemarie van Geel (1981) ontving haar Masterdiploma in Internationale Betrekkingen met het Midden-Oosten als specialisatie van de Universiteit van Cambridge in 2003. Ze heeft gewoond in Egypte, de Westelijke Jordaanoever, Syrië en Jemen en reisde uitgebreid door de regio. Ze heeft gewerkt bij Instituut Clingendael, het voormalig ISIM (International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World) en de Midden-Oosten afdeling van Amnesty International Nederland. Sinds 2011 begon is ze als promovendus verbonden aan de afdeling Islam en Arabisch van de Radboud Universiteit te Nijmegen waar ze onderzoek doet naar gender segregatie in Saoedi-Arabië en Koeweit. Annemarie van Geel heeft haar eigen website Faraasha.nl, waar dit stuk eerder is verschenen.

0 comments.

Live Libya Uprising

Posted on February 22nd, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: Society & Politics in the Middle East.

A whole lot of things going in Libya. Too much to cover it all I think and with not that much background information. Trying to help you a little bit:
Background information
The Arab Revolts: Ten Tentative Observations

The extraordinary developments in Tunisia and Egypt during the first six weeks of this year, and more recently in Bahrain, Libya, Yemen and elsewhere, have inaugurated a revolutionary moment in the Arab world not experienced since 1958. If sustained uprisings continue and spread, it has the potential to develop into an Arab 1848. Based on what we have witnessed thus far, the following observations appear relevant:

EA WorldView – Home – Libya (and Beyond) LiveBlog: Qaddafi Hangs On With Fighter Jets and Bluster
Libya on the brink | FP Passport

Seif’s speech was certainly crazy, but he may be right about one thing: There is a nasty internecine conflict on the way in Libya. From all that we’ve seen, the regime will do anything to stay in power, including shooting people in cold blood with heavy-caliber weapons. It doesn’t look like there will be a nice, friendly “let’s all hold hands and clean up Tahrir Square” moment. After four decades of unspeakable tyranny, Libyans will be out for vengeance.

Seham’s Libya links #feb17 – Blog – The Arabist

The indefatiguable Seham has compiled a long list of links pertaining to Libya.

Updates:
Libya erupts as Gaddafi clings on – live updates | World news | guardian.co.uk

Live Blog – Libya Feb 22 | Al Jazeera Blogs

????????? ??????? – ????? ??? | World news | guardian.co.uk

Libya: The Violence of An Unraveling Regime [Ongoing Updates]

Despite the unmistakable signs of the fall of the regime, the severity of the situation seems only to be escalating. Confirmed reports describe shoot-to-kill policies in certain parts of the country as well as the use of helicopter gun ships, fighter jets, and other artillery to inflict mass violence. The death toll today, Monday February 21st, alone is currently at 250 with several thousands injured. One of the greatest difficulties in understanding what exactly is happening in Libya is the relative media blackout enforced by al-Qaddafi’s regime, who disabled internet service across the country and disconnected phone service in many parts. Reports have also confirmed the jamming of satellite signals for several news stations, including al-Jazeera, al-Manar, NBN, and New TV. Beyond the fact of the unraveling of a 42-year old authoritarian regime at the hands of a popular uprising and the regime’s massacring of the Libyan people, it is difficult to analyze the situation on the ground. However, there should be no lack of clarity as to both the legitimate aspirations and humbling courage of the Libyan people, as well as the blood that is on the hands of the Libyan regime. The complicity–by virtue of silence–of the broader community of state leaders and international institutions is equally clear.
Below begins an ongoing list of updates on the situation in Libya.

Twitter

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Tunisia: from paradise to hell and back?

Posted on February 21st, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: Guest authors, Headline, Society & Politics in the Middle East.

Guest Author: Miriam Gazzah

Tunisia is one of my two homelands. Even though born and raised in the Netherlands, I have been feeling more and more Tunisian lately. My father is a Tunisian from M’Saken, a town in the Sahel, near Sousse. Ever since I was a young girl, I have been visiting Tunisia every year during summer holidays. Known in Europe as a warm, Mediterranean holiday paradise, Tunisia is not just that, or maybe even far from that. My parents took us to see the whole country, from the Sahel to Cap Bon, from Carthago to Mahdia. During the four to six weeks spent there every year, my brothers and I got to know the country way beyond its touristic highlights.

I always knew that Tunisia was no paradise. I remember when I was little, I used to wonder why all the men and young boys sitting in the cafes were not at work. No matter what time we passed by – even in the middle of the night – the cafes were always full with men! Little did I know then, that there was no work for them. Luckily my family is relatively well off, but many Tunisians struggle to survive. Because family bonds and social control are strong, people are able to survive, helping each other every way they can. For example, every time we visited one of the sisters of my grandmother, we would bring her food, like a kilo of sugar, bread or meat. Something unheard of in the Netherlands but that is how people get by in Tunisia.

Experiences of repression
Almost all of my cousins have university degrees, but very few of them have jobs on university level. Some of them endured long visa-application processes or married French-Tunisian girls and have moved to France or Germany, in the hope to build a better live there. Life is hard for many Tunisians; unemployment being one of the biggest problems. But that is not all. As I grew older, I started to become aware of the more ‘subtle’ ways the Tunisian president and its accomplices kept the people in a choke-hold. Repression, censorship, the omnipresence of so-called ‘government informers’, the glorification of Ben Ali in public spaces and the media, the corruption of the regime, expropriation of land, and so on have kept Tunisians silent for 23 years. I have experienced the repression of the old Tunisian regime myself or witnessed it in my surroundings more than once.

One year – it was sometime in the 1990s – my second cousin who is also our neighbour, at that time around 25 years old, was not there to welcome us when we arrived from the Netherlands for our summer holiday. It turned out that he had been arrested and put into jail. Knowing him as a very gentle and smart young man, I was surprised to hear of his arrest. Through the grapevine we heard that he might have been arrested, because he had been hanging out with the ‘wrong’ people. The concept of ‘wrong’ people was used in the 1990s to point out ‘Islamists’ or ‘fundamentalists’ or, in short people who wore a beard. He was imprisoned for more than 3 years, without trial and without his family knowing why he was kept imprisoned. Ben Ali has used the fear of the rise of Islamism as an alibi for arresting people who are allegedly ‘against the regime’. A tactic that worked well. Even my own family, including my father, condoned the repression of so-called ‘fundamentalists’ at that time, because ‘we do not want Tunisia to become like Algeria, where people slaughter each other like lambs’. By feeding into the fear of rising fundamentalism and using Algeria as a horrific example, Ben Ali managed to repress a lot of anti-regime currents in the 1990s.

Another example of repression hit home a little closer: my older brother – a big fan of airplanes and airports – was filming an incoming airplane from a road around one kilometre distant from the airport of Monastir. A car drove up behind us and three men in plain clothes stepped out and claimed to be police men. They took the camera and started to interrogate my brother and father in a pretty aggressive and intimidating way. They took the passports of my father and brother, the camera and ushered us to drive with them to the police station. My father and brother were brought inside, my mom, little brother and I had to wait in the parking lot in the burning sun. We waited for more than 1,5 hours before they finally returned, with their passports and camera, but without the tape, of course. An upsetting experience, because of the degrading way they treated us and the helplessness you feel when they take your passports, and you don’t know whether you will ever get them back.

Direct update from M’Saken, Tunisia
As I write this paragraph my father is in Tunisia. It is his first trip to his homeland since Ben Ali has fled. Egypt has been dominating the media for some weeks now, but that does not mean that developments in Tunisia have come to a full stop. In my father’s first call to me, end of January 2011, he states that in our hometown M’Saken, the police station and the (former) office of Ben Ali’s political party RCD are burnt to the ground (see picture, all pictures taken by Hosni El Gourar). He also reports of the absence of the police, at least in M’Saken and surroundings – a very strange and quite frightening phenomenon. He also tells me that in the area there are robberies going on with deadly endings. Even worse maybe, he reports of Ben Ali supporters who join each other in militias – armed and well! – and try to stir up chaos; an attempt to launch a contra-revolution. The situation is thus far from calm.

In order to secure neighbourhoods, young M’Sakeni’s have volunteered to watch over area’s of the town. Committees of security have been founded. Young men safeguard important feeder roads and patrol the area (see pictures). Much to the surprise of many elderly, Tunisian youth have shown the country a new face. Whereas in the past, today’s youth was known as the ‘generation of nothing’, the Jasmin Revolution has turned this image completely around. As perceived by my father, the older generation is confused. Tunisian youth have shown a degree of responsibility that was unheard of. They took action and they changed things. The generation gap seems to have disappeared instantly, says my father.

It is now Wednesday February 16, 2011. My father has just returned from Tunisia. His updated report of the current situation in M’Saken and Tunisia confirms my earlier feeling that all is far from stable. The good news, he tells me, is that “the atmosphere is completely different from the last time he was there in November 2010. People are polite, not so edgy, even traffic has become far less stressful. Inter-human relations have improved enormously. Police are nowhere to be found, but, all in all, every day life seems to return to its ‘normal’ status.” But when he continues to tell of his short stay, it appears that Tunisia is not at all ‘back to normal’.

The Ben Ali aftermath: Rumours about endless enrichment
Ever since the departure of Ben Ali, stories and rumours about the enormous corruption of Ben Ali and the Trabelsi’s keep circulating among the Tunisian people. Especially Leila Ben Ali and her Trabelsi family members are hated for their incredible enrichment on expense of the Tunisian people. Leila, a second wife of Ben Ali, used to be a simple hair dresser, roaming around in nightclub circuits, where she supposedly met Ben Ali. Leila Ben Ali is in Tunisia also known as Leila Gin Tonic- what’s in a name?

Some of the remarkable rumours that my father picked up include the story that Ben Ali supposedly had some Roman pillars dating back a couple hundred years before Christ from the Bardo Museum in Tunis (http://www.informatique-tunisie.com/museebardo/) to be converted into wash bins to be put into his own home. Allegedly his wife Leila had very specific and extraordinary demands concerning the furnishing of her bath room. Replica’s of the original pillars were put back into the museum.

Another rumour that goes around on the streets is that some time after 9/11/2001 the United Nations had granted Tunisia a subsidy for the appointment of 150.000 extra police men to prevent and combat terrorism. It is said that only 50.000 police men were installed and that the funding for the rest disappeared into the pockets of one of the Trabelsi’s who was in charge of this project.

The Trabelsi’s are often said to be the real demons behind the regime. Many of Ben Ali’s in-laws were involved in corruption and illegal practices. Some of them have also been arrested in the mean while. It is often said in popular language that “they [the Trabelsi’s] are worse than the Maffia.”

These outrageous stories of how Ben Ali and his in-laws enriched themselves are the constant talk of the town. Whether all of these rumours are true or not, it is taken for a fact that Ben Ali made himself a very wealthy man. Nonetheless, the exact amount of his financial ability is not known yet. The possessions of Ben Ali and the Trabelsi family include houses (in Tunisia and abroad), cars (Ferrari’s and the like), businesses, stocks, gold, and so on. Watch this YouTube clip where two men ‘steal’ one of Ben Ali’s Ferrari’s with a fork lift:

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The huge wealth acquired by Ben Ali and his family, illegal or not, is a thorn in the flesh of the Tunisian people.

Tunisia…back to the future
Tunisia remains unstable. Many (young) Tunisians still want to emigrate to Europe. Several hundreds, maybe thousands still arrive regularly at the Italian isle of Lampedusa to try to enter Europe. Even though press and media present this as something new, it is not. Tunisians were fleeing the country also way before Ben Ali left. What will happen in the near future remains difficult to predict. In prospect of the elections in September 2011, people are trying to get back to business as usual. Ironically, ‘business’ is what Tunisia lacks: meaning work and especially work deriving from tourism. Work and freedom of speech and expression, that is all that Tunisian youth want. It is a simple request. But not easily achieved for a country where more than half of the population consists of people under 25 years old. Tunisia’s new government will hopefully find a way to give new impulses to the economy, with help of Europe and the United States. But most importantly: tourists must come back to Tunisia as soon as possible. Maybe then paradise will move a little closer to Tunisia.

Thanks to Hosni El Gourar from M´Saken, Tunisia for the pictures.

Dr. Miriam Gazzah is a postdoctoral fellow at the Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research (AISSR) at the University of Amsterdam. She is currently working within the research project: Islamic cultural practices and performances: The emergence of new youth cultures in Europe.
Read more about this research project here: http://home.medewerker.uva.nl/m.gazzah/
Visit Miriam Gazzah’s personal website and blog: http://www.miriamgazzah.nl

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De opstanden in de Arabische pers III – Bahrein

Posted on February 21st, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: De Arabische Pers, Guest authors.

Guest Author: Roel Meijer

Bahrein

De laatste paar dagen is een stortvloed aan interessante westerse commentaren verschenen over de situatie in Bahrein. Dit is een kleine bloemlezing daaruit. De opstand in Bahrein is uniek, zoals alle opstanden van elkaar verschillen. Maar het interessante van Bahrein is niet zozeer dat de 5de vloot van de Amerikanen er zijn thuisbasis heeft, of zelfs dat de meerderheid van de bevolking shi‘iet is (tussen 60 en 70 procent) en de heerschappij is in handen van de soennieten en het koningshuis, de Al Khalifa —twee zaken die voordturend benadrukt worden. Interessant is juist dat er al een tijd ontwikkelingen aan de gang zijn. In tegenstelling tot Egypte waren er in oktober 2010 tamelijke vrije verkiezingen die door de Wifaq Partij gewonnen werd (18 van de 40 zetels). In 2005 deed deze partij voor het eerst mee aan verkiezingen nadat politieke hervormingen waren doorgevoerd. Na het bloedbad van afgelopen donderdag is de Wifaq Partij uit het parlement getreden.

Daarnaast is, in tegenstelling tot Egypte, de shi’ietische oppositie gesplitst tussen de gematigde Wifaq Partij, geleid door sheikh Ali Salman, en de radicalere al-Haqq beweging. Omdat de eerste zo weinig concessies heeft losgekregen de afgelopen jaren wordt de partij door met name de shi’ietische jeugd—die ook hier zeer actief is—als te slap beschouwd. Het is de laatste groep die de demonstraties en bezetting van het Parelplein heeft georganiseerd in centraal Manama op 16-17 februari die zo bloedig uit elkaar zijn geslagen door het leger. Hierbij vielen 5 doden; in ieder geval één persoon werd geëxecuteerd—anderen werden in hun slaap doodgeschoten met hagel. Gedurende het afgelopen jaar zouden leden van de Haqq beweging opgepakt zijn en gemarteld.

Een ander verschil met Egypte is dat het koningshuis verdeeld is in twee kampen. Aan de ene kant staat de “verlichte koning”, Hamad bin Issa Al Khalifa (vanaf 1999 op de troon) samen met zijn zoon, kroonprins Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa. Aan de andere kant staat de conservatieve premier, de koning’s oom, Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa (aan de macht vanaf 1971) en een kliek om hem heen die alle belangrijkste posten in handen heeft: binnenlandse zaken, defensie, buitenlandse zaken. De conservatieve factie vindt ondersteuning van de Bahreinse Salafi beweging.

De Bahrein kenner Olivier Da Lage denkt dat vooral de premier achter de aanval van het huurleger en de politie zit. De premier zou daarin gesteund zijn door Saoedi-Arabië die onder geen enkel beding een situatie wil laten ontstaan zoals op Tahrir plein in Caïro dat 18 dagen is bezet. De Saoedi’s zijn vooral bang voor de eigen shi‘ietische bevolking (tussen de 5 en 11 % van de bevolking) die in het aangrenzende gebied woont met Qatif en Dammam als belangrijkste plaatsen, en waar de belangrijkste olievoorraden van het land zich bevinden. Een ander verschil met Egypte is de samenstelling van het leger dat eigenlijk een huurleger is dat uit Pakistani en andere buitenlanders bestaat, en in tegenstelling tot het conscriptie leger in Egypte geen enkele band heeft met de bevolking en uitsluitend een verlengstuk is van het regime—vooral de premier.

Afgezien van deze verschillen met Egypte zijn alle commentatoren het erover eens dat de eisen dezelfde zijn: eerlijke verkiezingen, gelijkheid voor de wet, einde van corruptie. Kenmerkend is de nationalistische inslag van de demonstraties en het streven het sektarisme en vooral de discriminatie van shi’ieten door het Salafisme op te heffen. Eén van de leuzen was “Geen Sunni, geen Shi‘a, alleen Bahreini”. Dit is geen nieuwe ontwikkeling. Al vanaf de jaren negentig is de shi’itische oppositie in Bahrein en Saoedi-Arabië sterk beïnvloed door liberale ideeën. Zie bijvoorbeeld de websites van de vroegere Saoedische shi’ietische leider Hasan al-Saffar, Tawfiq al-Saif en Muhammad Mahfuz. De Wifaq partij is voorstander van een constitutionele monarchie, de al-Haqq beweging zou na het bloedbad het aftreden eisen van de gehele Khalifa familie.

Inmiddels is het Parelplein opnieuw bezet door demonstranten en schijnen er onderhandelingen plaats te vinden tussen de Wifaq leider Ali Salman en het regime. Maar volgens Olivier Da Lage zal de uitkomst vooral bepaald worden door de interne strijd binnen het koningshuis. Een belangrijke eis van de demonstranten zal het vertrek van de premier zijn, Khalifa. Mocht hij toch de controle verwerven over het leger en geen gehoor geven aan de oppositie dan kan nog een bloedbad volgen. De Amerikanen gaan ervan uit dat een compromis gesloten wordt in het kleine land (500.000m inwoners). Vooralsnog is er geen sprake van anti-Amerikanisme (zo werden bijvoorbeeld geen Amerikaanse vlaggen verbrand) net zo min als van een pro-Iraanse houding, maar de hulp van Iran kan worden ingeroepen als de botsingen tussen leger en betogers uit de hand lopen.

Saoedische pers over Bahrein
Opvallend is dat Saoedische pers weinig te melden heeft over de situatie in Bahrein. Het liberale al-Watan heeft één artikel over de begrafenis van de slachtoffers van 18 februari. ‘Ukaz en al-Riyadh hebben niet één artikel over Bahrein. Al-Sharq al-Awsat, dat in Londen uitkomt, heeft evenmin veel te melden over Bahrein. Hieruit blijkt weer dat de machtige Saoedische pers tekort schiet wanneer het kwesties betreft die Saoedische belangen direct aangaan.

Saoedische pers over Egypte
De Saoedische pers heeft daarentegen opvallend neutraal gereageerd op de gebeurtenissen in Egypte. Al-Riyad heeft het over de 25 januari revolutie en analyseert de eisen van de demonstranten tijdens de massale herdenking van het verdwijnen van Mubarak op het Tahrir plein op 18 februari. Andere maatregelen, zoals die van de Hoogste Raad van Militairen om het parlement te ontbinden, worden gewoon genoemd.

Egypte
Vandaag heeft de Egyptische Raad van State/Conseil d’état (Majlis al-Dawla) bekend gemaakt dat eindelijk na 15 jaar de Hizb al-Wasat is gelegaliseerd. Ze verklaarde de laatste uitspraak van de speciale commissie van de Senaat (Majlis al-Shura) van 2009 ongeldig—het zou in strijd zijn met de geest van de grondwet (!). De Hizb al-Wasat is een liberale afsplitsing van de Moslim Broederschap, die in 1995 werd opgericht door een jonge generatie intellectuelen die genoeg had van de ondemocratische structuur van de partij en de gerichtheid op de shari ‘a. Het opvallende van de partij was dat ze kopten als leden had. Dat kwam doordat ze een inclusief beeld had van de islam, dat zij zag als een “cultuur/civilisatie” eerder dan een wet. Christenen konden lid worden van de partij omdat christenen in het verleden een cruciale bijdrage hadden geleverd aan de islamitische cultuur.

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De opstanden in de Arabische pers II

Posted on February 20th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: De Arabische Pers, Guest authors.

Roel Meijer maakt voor Closer een overzicht van de berichtgeving over de Arabische opstanden in de Arabische pers.

Optimisten
De onderzoekers naar de Arabische revolutie zijn verdeeld in optimisten en pessimisten. Maar iedereen is het erover eens dat het jaren zal duren voordat er een democratie gevestigd is. Hier een paar commentaren van optimisten. Adrian Crewe is een optimist. Hij zegt dat de democratische krachten niet genegeerd kunnen worden, maar dat er nog een lange strijd te wachten staat. Hij geeft een volledige lijst van eisen van de hervormers. Richard N. Haass, hoofd van het Amerikaanse prestigieuze Council on Foreign Relations, maakt de belangrijke opmerking dat timing van cruciaal belang is bij revoluties. Als Mubarak eerder had aangekondigd dat hij niet deel zou nemen aan presidentsverkiezingen, of eerder had afgetreden zou de coalitie niet zo sterk zijn geweest en was het leger hier sterker uit gekomen. Hij zegt dat de lange weg naar hervormingen gunstig kan zijn: het geeft civil society en nieuwe krachten de tijd zich te ontwikkelen. De Moslim Broederschap is nu in het voordeel omdat ze al zo’n lange ervaring heeft. Hij is bang voor splitsingen in de oppositie. Een recente analyse van Nathan Brown (17 febr.) van Carnegie Endowment is optimistisch en tegelijkertijd realistisch. Hij stelt dat het heel goed mogelijk is dat de grondwet slechts geringe veranderingen ondergaat, maar dit zou al een enorm verschil uitmaken als er geen meerderheidspartij is zoals de NDP van Mubarak. Hij vindt dat er al enorme veranderingen nu doorgevoerd worden. Egyptenaren zetten nu al directeuren van bedrijven af, kiezen nieuwe vakbondsleiders en hoofdredacteuren.

Pessimisten
De pessimisten bestaan vooral uit die commentatoren die zeggen dat het leger te sterk is en dat het regime nog helemaal in tact is. Robert Springborg, die al in de jaren tachtig een boek schreef over Mubarak, Egypt under Mubarak, behoort tot die groep. Op 2 februari schreef hij een kritisch stuk hoe het regime de oppositie zou verslaan. Daar is tot nu toe nog niets van terecht gekomen, maar het kan nog gebeuren. Als geen ander heeft hij inzicht in de militaire belangen in Egypte. Hij schat het aandeel van militairen bedrijven in het BNP op tussen 5 en 40 %. Dat loopt nogal uiteen, maar als het tweede cijfer zou kloppen is dat immens. Steven Cook die een boek heeft geschreven over militaire regimes in Turkije en Egypte, wijst op de verschillen tussen Egypte en Turkije. Hij heeft zeker gelijk dat in de jaren tachtig het Turkse leger veel repressiever was dan nu in Egypte. Marc Lynch is ook een goede bron in deze. Hij behoort tot de best geïnformeerde onderzoekers, die de laatste tijd meer bezig is “well-connected” te zijn met de hogere regionen van de Amerikaanse politiek, dan met wetenschap beoefenen. In zekere zin komt nu eindelijk zijn voorspelling uit dat de “Arab street” sinds Al Jazeera een rol gaat spelen. Op 3 febr. maakte hij al goede opmerkingen over de Amerikaanse politieke invloed en de rol van het leger. Een andere commentator is Abdurrahman Al-Shayyal. Zijn artikelen over het leger waren altijd goed. Veel van de speculatie over de rol van het Egyptische leger is gebaseerd op het WIKILEAKS “cable” van de Amerikaanse ambassade in Egypte over het leger en de ontevredenheid van de lagere en midden-kader over de leiding.

Moslim Broederschap
Veel pessimisten zien de Moslim Broederschap als het grootste gevaar voor de democratie in Egypte. Het argument is dat de MB beter georganiseerd is dan andere groeperingen. Dat is waarschijnlijk zo maar er spelen veel meer factoren een rol, zoals haar strategie, leiderschap, aanhang, vooral onder jongeren. Een van de best ingewijde commentatoren is de Egyptische Hussam Tamam, die in het Arabisch verschillende boeken heeft geschreven over de beweging. Af en toe worden zijn artikelen in het Engels vertaald en op de site van Carnegie Endowment gezet, sowieso de beste site over Egypte en de islamitische beweging. Zo ook dit artikel over de verklaring waarom de Moslim Broederschap zo traag heeft gereageerd op de laatste ontwikkelingen.
Het Palestijnse dagblad al-Quds al-‘Arabi meldt dat de Moslim Broederschap gisteren heeft aangekondigd dat ze haar mening over het vredesverdrag met Israël niet aan het volk zal opleggen. Isam al-Iryan, lid van de leidinggevende raad (Maktab al-Irshad), zei dat de Moslim Broederschap daar niet alleen over kon beslissen: “niemand kan het verdrag met een pennenstreep beëindigen.” Gisteren had de Moslim Broederschap al aangekondigd dat ze geen kandidaat zal stellen voor het presidentschap. De beroemde Egyptische geestelijke Yusuf al-Qaradawi, die volgens velen lid is van de Moslim Broederschap en in Qatar woont, sprak ter gelegenheid van de herdenkingsbijeenkomst van het vetrek van Mubarak op het Tahrir plein. Opvallend was zijn oproep tot het wegsturen van de huidige militaire regering en het instellen van een regering van nationale eenheid. Ook zouden alle politieke gevangenen vrijgelaten moeten worden. Tevens bendrukte hij de religieuze eenheid in Egypte door de revolutie van 25 januari de gezamenlijke revolutie van moslims en christenen te noemen (Al-Quds al-Arabi, 19-20 februari 2011., p. 2).

Het Egyptische dagblad al-Shuruq, drukt een fascinerend interview af met de tweede man van de Moslim Broederschap Rashad al-Bayumi, die een paar dagen voor het vertrek van Mubarak nog een gesprek aanging met Umar Sulayman over de toekomst van Egypte. In dit interview ging hij in op het plan een politieke partij op te richten. Hij zei: “politiek is een deel van de werkzaamheden van de MB; en de partij is slechts een onderdeel van de gehele politiek van de Moslim Broederschap.” Hij zei verder dat ook kopten lid konden worden van de nieuwe partij.

Verder ging hij in op het andere kritiekpunt op de Broederschap, het verbod op de kandidatuur van kopten en vrouwen voor het presidentschap, een issue waarvoor de Broederschap in 2007 zware kritiek te verduren kreeg toen haar voorlopige partijprogram uitlekte en waaraan de Carnegie Endowment een studie heeft gewijd. Blijkbaar is het punt nog niet opgelost want al-Bayumi’s antwoord was ontwijkend. Hij zei dat het een kwestie is van fiqh (islamitische jurisprudentie) waar specialisten zich over moeten buigen. Tevens herhaalde hij het standpunt dat “de Moslim Broederschap haar mening niet aan het Egyptische volk zal opleggen.” Op de vraag of de Broederschap haar mening aanpaste aan internationale druk zei al-Bayumi dat “er geen onwrikbare meningen bij de Broederschap bestaan en dat alle meningen herzien kunnen worden.”

Over de relatie tussen de nieuwe partij en de moederorganisatie zei hij dat de organisatie vele afdelingen heeft, en dat die tamelijk autonoom mogen opereren. Dit zou ook gelden voor de toekomstige politieke partij, maar uit de rest van het antwoord werd duidelijk dat de relatie hecht zou zijn en de organisatie controle zou uitoefenen op de partij. Interessant is dat hij het streven naar een islamitische staat volledig afwees, als “een vreemd idee”. Hij benadrukte dat alle groeperingen geaccepteerd zullen worden, seculieren, links, etc. Hij stelt dat de Moslim Broederschap een “civiele staat” nastreeft gebaseerd op “religieuze grondslag ”(al-marja‘iyya al-islamiyya). In die zin moet art. 2 van de grondwet (de shari ‘a is de hoofdbron van alle wetgeving) gehandhaafd blijven. Dit was overigens ook de mening van Tariq al-Bishri, in Al-Ahram van 16 februari 2011, hoofd van de raad die de grondwet binnen tien dagen moet herzien. Daarnaast stelde al-Bayumi dat de partij ook interne hervormingen tegemoet kan zien, een opmerking die vooral betrekking had op het statuut van de organisatie die alles behalve democratisch is. Het zou zelfs mogelijk zijn de leider van de beweging (al-murshid al- ‘amm) wordt gekozen (“ alles behoort tot de mogelijkheden”). Tenslotte stelde hij dat de Moslim Broederschap zich zal houden aan alle internationale verdragen, doelend op het vredesverdrag met Israël.

Ook de reactie van de Jama‘at al-Islamiyya op de revolutie is interessant, want velen denken dat zij weer het gewelddadige pad zal kiezen zodra de kans zich voordoet. In 1997 was zij verantwoordelijk voor de bloedige aanslagen in Luxor waarbij 58 toeristen omkwamen. Voor een uitgebreide beschrijving van de beweging zie een hoofdstuk van mij dat gewijd is aan de beweging. Later zwoor ze het geweld af. Bij monde van het ideoloog Najih Ibrahim heeft de JI zich achter de revolutie geschaard.

De beweging van 25 januari en hervormingen
Al-Quds al-Arabi maakt ook melding van de intentie van een groep jongeren om een politieke partij op te richten. Het Egyptische dagblad al-Shuruq, meldt dat de Nationale Vereniging voor Verandering (Jama’iyya al-Wataniyya li-l-Taghyir) , olv Baradei, heeft geëist dat er onmiddellijke een overgangsraad wordt aangesteld bestaande uit vijf neutrale personen, die de verkiezingen moeten voorbereiden. De Vereniging eist: opheffing van de noodtoestand, vermindering van veiligheidstroepen, opheffing van de ordepolitie (al-Aman al-Markazi), ontbinding van gemeenteraden, vrijheid politieke partijen op te richten en vereniging te stichten. De vereniging eist ook de oprichting van een grondwetgevende vergadering in plaats van de raad olv Tariq al-Bishri, die nu binnen tien dagen de meest essentiële artikelen gaat herzien.

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De Marokkaanse Uitzondering?

Posted on February 20th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: Featured, Headline, Society & Politics in the Middle East.

Guest Author: Nina ter Laan

Marokko staat in het westen bekend als één van de meest liberale landen van Noord Afrika. Wat wij in Nederland over Marokko te weten komen wordt vaak gezien door de lens van migratie en integratiedebatten. We moeten echter niet vergeten dat de economische drijfveren (armoede) van de Marokkaanse gastarbeiders (voornamelijk uit de Rif) in de jaren ‘60 en ‘70 van de vorige eeuw, destijds voortkwamen uit politieke onderdrukking. Dezelfde misstanden die nu door bevolkingen in het MO aan de kaak worden gesteld. Is er zoveel veranderd in de tussenliggende jaren in Marokko? Want tot nu toe krijgt de revolutionaire geest die momenteel over landen in het MO waart geen vat op het land. Er zijn wel reacties vanuit de bevolking gekomen. Kleine protesten werden al geïnitieerd in steden als Tanger en Fes en een viertal mensen stak zichzelf in brand, in de hoop een vergelijkbare protestactie als in Tunesië te ontketenen. Ook via sociale media roepen kleine groepen op tot protest. Maar dit alles heeft niet hetzelfde effect gehad als in Tunesië, Egypte of zelfs Algerije.

De overheid reageerde ook. De Marokkaanse minister van informatie Khalid Naciri zei tijdens een persconferentie dat de Marokkaanse regering de volken in de Arabische wereld steunt, maar benadrukte tegelijkertijd het belang van stabiliteit van Marokko voor de rest van de regio. Bovendien zei hij dat het koninkrijk al lang het pad van meer democratie en vrijheden is opgegaan. Het vertrouwen in het veronderstelde voltooide democratisering proces van Marokko staat echter haaks op de onmiddellijke verhoging van de subsidies op voedselprijzen en het verplaatsen van militaire troepen van de Westelijke Sahara naar de binnenlanden als reactie op de onrust in Tunesië.

Of Marokko daadwerkelijk al gedemocratiseerd is, zoals Naciri beweert, valt te betwijfelen. Wel is het het enige land in de regio dat reeds sinds eind jaren negentig van de vorige eeuw al een geleidelijk democratiseringsproces heeft ondergaan. Als antwoord op het einde van de koude oorlog en onder druk van internationale mensenrechtenorganisaties werden er aan het einde van het bewind van Hassan II, de toenmalige koning van Marokko, hervormingen doorgevoerd. De Marokkaanse bevolking ging onder zijn bewind namelijk gebukt onder repressie. Tijdens zijn bewind trad hij hardhandig op tegen binnenlandse tegenstanders van het regime. Deze periode wordt ook wel “De loden jaren” genoemd. In 1970 en 1972 werden er door het leger aanslagen gepleegd op de koning. Beide aanslagen mislukten en de daders werden geëxecuteerd en hun families gearresteerd en jarenlang vastgehouden in mensonterende omstandigheden. Ook de Berbertalige bevolking uit de Rif is meerdere malen in opstand gekomen tegen repressies van het regime zoals tijdens de opstand in de jaren vijftig en later de jaren 80. Beide opstanden werden hardhandig neergeslagen door het leger. Na de laatste Rif opstand zette Hassan geen voet meer in het gebied en liet de regio aan haar lot over. De hervormingen zetten een nieuwe koers in en kwamen in een stroomversnelling toen Mohammed 6 zijn vader na zijn dood opvolgde in 1999. Nu, na een decennium Mohamed 6 aan het bewind lijkt er meer speling te zijn, zeker in vergelijking met de buurlanden. De armoede in Marokko is niet onderdrukkend, de kosten van levensonderhoud zijn relatief laag, er heerst niet al decennia lang een noodtoestand (zoals bijvoorbeeld in Egypte of Algerije), waardoor protesten tot op zekere hoogte getolereerd worden.

Toch zijn ook veel Marokkanen ontevreden met de huidige situatie met name door armoede (15% leeft onder de armoede grens), werkeloosheid (10%), slecht onderwijs, analfabetisme (40%) en beperkte politieke vrijheid. Het is een harde klassenmaatschappij met een traditie van patroon-cliënt-relaties en de daarmee gepaarde corruptie. Er is een enorme kloof tussen rijk en arm en een relatief kleine hoogopgeleide middenklasse. Volgens het tijdschrift Forbes is de koninklijke familie in het bezit van ongeveer 2,5 miljard dollar en worden belangrijke posities steeds gedomineerd door dezelfde hooggeplaatste families. Het is niet vreemd dus dat er toch oproepen tot protest zijn. Een groep jonge Marokkanen genaamd “le mouvement du 20 fevrier” heeft afgelopen donderdag opgeroepen om op 20 februari massaal de straat op te gaan om economische hervormingen te eisen, maar ook om een politiek geluid te laten horen tegen de regering, tegen de clan die het koningshuis omringt, maar ook tegen de koning. De groep, die opereert via netwerksite Facebook, claimt nu al ongeveer 5000 aanhangers te hebben. Ze eisen: ontbinding van het parlement, een nieuwe grondwet, een overgangsregering, vrijlating van politieke gevangenen, en sociaal economische rechten.

Regeringsvorm: constitutionele monarchie
Eén van de verklaringen waarom Marokko anders reageert op de opstanden dan overige Arabische landen moet gezocht worden in de regeringsvorm van het land en de centrale positie van de koning daarin. Marokko is geen militaire dictatuur zoals Algerije of Egypte, maar een constitutionele monarchie waarvan de afstamming van het staatshoofd terugvoert tot de profeet Mohammed via de Alawieten dynastie die Marokko nu reeds sinds 400 jaar regeert. De koning is Amir al Muminin, leider der gelovigen. De politieke macht van de monarch in Marokko is groot en reikt ver. Naast koning is hij ook opperbevelhebber van het leger en voorzitter van de Hoge Raad. Via artikel 19 van de grondwet staat hij boven alle andere politieke partijen en hij heeft de bevoegdheden ministers persoonlijk te benoemen en fatwa’s uit te vaardigen. Ook in het bedrijfsleven heeft de koning een aardige vinger in de pap. De Koninklijke familiebedrijven, zoals o.a. ONA, zijn tezamen goed voor 6 procent van het Marokkaanse BBP. Parallel aan het koningshuis beschikt Marokko ook over een democratisch bestel, met een parlement, politieke partijen en een minister president en verkiezingen. Het democratisch gehalte van dit staatsbestuur is echter niet zo groot. Het parlement en de kliek rondom de koning zijn gebaseerd op patroon-cliëntrelaties waarbij giften en invloedrijke posities gegeven worden in ruil voor politieke loyaliteit. Ook al heb je in Marokko nog zo’n goede opleiding, wanneer je niet de juiste connecties hebt kom je niet ver.

Koning Mohammed VI, geliefd monarch, hervormer of despoot?
Onder de invloed van de revoluties in Tunesië en Egypte gaan er nu wel stemmen op om de macht van de koning in te perken tot een meer ceremoniële positie, zoals in Zweden of Nederland. Echter, tegelijkertijd wordt de koning als enig geloofwaardig en betrouwbaar lid van het parlement gezien. Ondanks de corruptie en de ongelijke verdeling van macht geniet de koning toch een enorme legitimiteit onder een groot deel van de Marokkaanse bevolking. Dit is bijvoorbeeld te merken in de reacties van Marokkaanse jongeren via de sociale media: op Facebook hebben jongeren allerlei foto’s van Egyptische demonstranten gepost met teksten en steunbetuigingen en liefdesverklaringen aan de koning. Er is zelfs een beweging tegen de “mouvement du 20 fevrier” opgekomen, genaamd “de mars van de liefde”, waarin facebookers werden opgeroepen om op Valentijnsdag hun profielfoto te veranderen in een foto van Mohammed VI. De nog jonge koning (nu 47 jaar) heeft zijn populariteit niet alleen te danken aan zijn religieuze legitimiteit en de breuk die hij heeft gemaakt ten opzichte van dictatoriale beleid van zijn vader, maar ook aan zijn ondernemersgeest. Koninklijke initiatieven en hervormingen, zoals ontwikkeling van infrastructurele projecten – de bouw van havens, en wegen – maar ook sociale hervormingen zijn op tijd klaar en worden efficiënt uitgevoerd. Met als gevolg dat de Marokkanen een betere infrastructuur hebben gekregen en er voor vrouwen meer rechten zijn dan voorheen dankzij de herziening van de moudawana. Ook is er meer persvrijheid dan voorheen, en sommige minderheden zagen hun eisen ingewilligd.

Dit alles maakt dat de koning door velen over het algemeen minder als een despoot wordt gezien en meer als een weldoener en een geliefd monarch. De loyaliteit van de bevolking naar de koning is dus groot, terwijl de regerende klasse vaak wordt gezien als een falende en corrupte kliek die elkaar al jaren lang in het zadel houdt, de bevolking armer maakt en eerlijke kansen op werk ontneemt. Deze regering wordt echter benoemd door de koning die zelf ook deel uitmaakt van deze eeuwen oude klasse (Makhzen). De keerzijde is dat de massa vaak nog niet van de hervormingen heeft kunnen profiteren en dat, hoewel slachtoffers van de loden jaren hun verhalen mogen doen voor het gerechtigheid en verzoeningscomité, er geen vervolging van de daders plaats vindt. Daarbij wordt oppositie of kritiek op de koning niet geduld.

Pers
Dit is onder andere te merken in de pers. Ondanks het feit dat de persvrijheid de afgelopen jaren is verbeterd, moeten journalisten toch nog regelmatig voor enkele dagen de cel in wanneer zij zich kritisch uitlaten over de onderwerpen waar je in Marokko absoluut niet kritisch over mag schrijven: de onafhankelijkheid van de Westelijke Sahara, de islam, en de positie van de koning. De toename van persvrijheid lijkt het afgelopen jaar echter weer tanende. In 2010 werden maar liefst twee liberaal kritische tijdschriften uit de lucht gehaald: “Le Journal Hebdo” en “Nichane. Nichane was in 2006 al in de problemen geraakt door een artikel over humor en de grappen die Marokkanen maken over islam, seks en de koning. De schrijvers van het artikel werden vervolgd en kregen een boete en voorwaardelijke straffen. Na een publicatie van een populariteitspoll van de koning werd in oktober vorig jaar het tijdschrift subtiel de nek omgedraaid door met name een advertentieboycot van ONA, het bedrijf dat in handen is van het koningshuis. Het enige liberaal kritische tijdschrift dat nu nog bestaat is het Franstalige Telquel.

Oppositie en co-optatie
Wat Marokko ook onderscheidt van andere landen in het MO is dat het land een breed scala aan georganiseerde protestbewegingen en culturele politieke bewegingen kent, waarvan sommige buiten het politieke systeem opereren. Zij bemiddelen tussen de politieke macht en het volk via cultureel politieke organisaties en oefenen een belangrijke invloed uit op het politieke beleid. In tegenstelling tot zijn vader onderdrukt de huidige koning deze bewegingen niet. Ze worden getolereerd en gecontroleerd en er wordt geprobeerd hen in de machtscirkel te trekken door middel van coöptatie-strategieën. Met andere woorden het regime organiseert haar eigen oppositie. Dit is onder andere bij de Berberse beweging gebeurd, door middel van de oprichting van het koninklijk berber instituut (IRCAM), waar sommige voormalige Berberse activisten een aanstelling hebben gekregen als ambtenaar of onderzoeker. Een goed voorbeeld vormen de hoogopgeleide werklozen. Deze groep organiseert sinds een aantal jaren driemaal daags demonstraties voor het parlement in Rabat om de regering om werk in de publieke sector te vragen. Het gaat hier om een doordacht systeem van georganiseerde afgestudeerde werkelozen die hun bestaan zichtbaar maken door middel van straatprotesten in de hoofdstad van Marokko met als doel een baan in de publieke sector te verkrijgen. De regering houdt de demonstranten afhankelijk door jaarlijks banen te verstrekken ( in volgorde van wie het langst en trouwst geprotesteerd hebben). Hierdoor wordt dit systeem in stand gehouden, er wordt de schijn van democratie gewekt zonder dat het structurele probleem wordt aangepakt.

Politiek en islam
Na 9/ 11 en de aanslagen door jihadisten in 2003 in Casablanca is Marokko een nieuwe koers gaan varen. Er werd hardhandig opgetreden tegen leden van islamitische bewegingen en tegelijkertijd werd er een nationale campagne tegen terrorisme georganiseerd, waarbij de nadruk lag op een tolerante en moderne Islam. Hiermee werd niet alleen aan de internationale gemeenschap getoond dat de Marokkaanse islam een moderne en liberale islam is, maar ook bood men op deze manier een tegenwicht tegen ´radicalisering´. De nadruk op het soefisme als de pacifistische variant van de islam, als een basispeiler in de herformulering van een Marokkaanse islam staat hierin centraal. Men hoopt op deze manier de islamistische oppositie die sterk groeit in populariteit, onder de duim te houden. Een deel daarvan is toegelaten in het parlement (PJD), gecoöpteerd in het regime, waardoor het redelijk controleerbaar blijft. Echter, de grootste politieke islamistische beweging de al ‘adl wa l Ihsane is uitgesloten van politieke participatie vanwege hun standpunt jegens de koning, wier religieuze legitimiteit zij in twijfel trekken.

Marokkaanse jongerencultuur, globalisering en liberalisering van de culturele sfeer
In 2003, vlak na de aanslagen in Casablanca, werd een aantal heavy metal artiesten gearresteerd op verdenking van satanisme. Na een juridisch proces werden de muzikanten op verzoek van de koning vrijgelaten. Dit was een doorbraak voor een jongerencultuur die daarvoor verborgen was gebleven. Rap, techno en heavy metal liefhebbers en muzikanten kwamen aan de oppervlakte en speelden hun muziek op festivals die plots gesponsord of zelfs georganiseerd werden door de overheid. Rappers die maatschappijkritische liederen opvoeren werden uitgenodigd op het koninklijk paleis. Na de aanslagen liet de koning de teugels verder vieren. Hij gaf daarmee ruimte aan een generatie jongeren die in een plek opeist in de geglobaliseerde wereld waarin ze leeft. Deze muziekscene, Nayda ( van het Marokkaans Arabische woord Nod, dat opstaan betekent) stond aan de wieg van een nieuw soort patriottisme, tegen terrorisme en voor vrijheid van meningsuiting, voor een eerlijk en vrij Marokko. Een patriottisme dat niet conservatief is, maar open naar de wereld. Wellicht heeft de koning getracht deze muziekscene (voornamelijk stedelijk) te beïnvloeden en te controleren door middel van financiële en morele steun. Tegelijkertijd echter, is er daarmee een belangrijke uitlaatklep gecreëerd waarin, net als bij de georganiseerde protesten, een gefrustreerde bevolking haar gevoelens tot uiting kan brengen. Hierdoor kunnen rappers als Don Bigg nummers uitbrengen als Baraka men al Khouf (Genoeg met de angst).

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What’s next?
Wat ook de uitkomst zal zijn, het is onwaarschijnlijk dat de koning zal vertrekken. De koning in Marokko heeft een haast goddelijke rol, en slechts weinigen durven hem te bekritiseren. Met zijn aantreden is er zeker modernisering en democratisering gekomen, maar vele van de door de koning geïnitieerde hervormingen lijken vooral symbolisch van aard aangezien ze niet altijd ten goede zijn gekomen van de massa. Toch hebben de Marokkanen slechtere tijden gekend van onderdrukking, volksopstanden en militaire coups. De herinnering aan de Loden jaren boezemt (zeker bij de nog oudere generatie) nog steeds angst in. Tegelijkertijd bieden de geleidelijke hervormingen zichtbare verbeteringen en vooral hoop en vertrouwen. Dit biedt zekerheid en stabiliteit en legitimiteit van de status quo. Misschien hebben de Marokkanen teveel te verliezen om aan een revolutie te beginnen? Daarbij zijn er sinds het aantreden van Mohammed VI meer uitlaatkleppen ontstaan zoals de mogelijkheden van (gecontroleerde) straatprotesten en muziekfestivals. Deze vrijheden werken als katalysatoren tegen mogelijke onrust en conflict. Marokko is misschien niet reeds gedemocratiseerd, zoals Naciri beweert, maar wel zijn er reeds sinds enkele jaren onderhandelingen gestart over de vrijheid van meningsuiting tussen de staat en de bevolking via cultuur, protest en politieke bewegingen over de grenzen van expressie van collectieve onvrede.

Of deze geleidelijke verbeteringen werkelijk richting een democratisering van het land gaan, of gericht zijn op de consolidatie van het huidige bewind valt te bezien. De vraag is of de pas der geleidelijkheid snel genoeg gaat voordat de onvrede over armoede, ongelijke machtsverdeling, corruptie en werkeloosheid wellicht toch ook overslaat naar Marokko.

Nina ter Laan is promovendus in het onderzoeksprogramma ‘Islam and the performing arts in the Middle East and Europe: from cultural heritage to cultural citizenship’aan de afdeling Islam en Arabisch van de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen . Haar onderzoek richt zich op nieuwe ontwikkelingen op het terrein van islamitisch entertainment en kunst in het Midden-Oosten, in het bijzonder Marokko.

Tekst: Baraka men al Khouf/ Genoeg met de angst
Artiest: Don Bigg ( Al Khasser)

Baraka!
Laten we stoppen met bang zijn
Hef je hoofd oh ware Marokkanen
En laten we stoppen met bang zijn
Hef je handen en laat de angst niet in jullie harten huizen
Jullie zijn bang voor de politie, voor de gemeenschap en voor de rijken
Jullie zijn bang voor iedereen maar niet voor God

Er zijn er die bang zijn voor de politie
Er zijn er die bang zijn voor de ambtenaar
En dan zijn er ook die immuun tegen hen zijn
Dan zijn er hen die bang zijn voor mij
En ook zij die bezorgd zijn om mij
Er zijn er die onrechtvaardigheid hebben doorleefd
En er zijn er die zichzelf opblazen
Er zijn er die een politieke partij representeren
En er zijn er die zichzelf representeren
Er zijn er die mensen voorliegen
Er zijn er die stelen en dan liegen dat ze hebben gestolen
Er zijn er die zich verloren voelen en God de schuld geven
Er zijn er die naar me luisteren en anderen die bang zijn voor mijn woorden
Er zijn er die dood zijn.
Er zijn er die mensen vermoord hebben en nog steeds vrij rondlopen
Er zijn er die de Koran kennen maar niets te zeggen hebben in de pers
Er zijn er die miljarden verdienen maar nog geen dirham spenderen
Er zijn mensen die in Tel quel schrijven en daarvoor gearresteerd worden.

We zijn met jullie broeders!

Vertaling: Nina ter Laan

2 comments.

De opstanden in de Arabische Pers I

Posted on February 20th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: De Arabische Pers, Society & Politics in the Middle East.

Voor Closer zal Roel Meijer met enige regelmaat een overzicht geven van de berichtgeving in de Arabische pers over de opstanden in het Midden-Oosten. Dit is deel 1.

Guest Author: Roel Meijer

Moslim Broederschap
De leider van de Moslim Broederschap Muhammad Badi‘ heeft aangekondigd dat de Moslim broederschap geen kandidaat naar voren schuift voor de presidentsverkiezingen. Ze zou ook niet streven naar een meerderheid in het parlement. Hij zei dat de MB “dienaars van het volk zijn” maar tevens waarschuwde hij dat de MB onderdeel van het “weefsel van het volk” is. Hij noemt de revolutie van 25 januari een “gezegende revolutie” (al-thawra al-mubaraka). Twee keer in zijn verklaring riep hij op tot eenheid tussen moslims en christenen.

Isam al-Iryan, prominent lid van het politburo (al-Maktab al-Irshad) verklaarde overigens dat de Moslim Broederschap wel degelijk vanaf het begin heeft deelgenomen aan de revolutie. Bemoedigend is dat het leger geen eigen kandidaten naar voren zal schuiven. Het leger heeft een facebook pagina geopend om beter contact te houden met de “nobele Egyptische broeders”.

Mubarak
Steeds duidelijker wordt de aftakeling van Mubarak. Net zoals de shah aan het einde van het regime aan kanker leed, zo had Mubarak “de relatie met de realiteit verloren”. Maar dit is het lot van alle absolute despoten stelt al-Misri al-Yawm. In Egypte worden ze de “nieuwe mamlukken” genoemd, de heerschappij van slaven die Egypte van 1250 tot de Osmaanse heerschappij hebben overheerst.

Eisen
Tijdens de demonstratie ter nagedachtenis van het aftreden van Mubarak, stelde de organisatie van de 6 april beweging opnieuw haar eisen: vrijlating alle gevangenen, invoering algemene vrijheden, opheffing noodtoestand, solidariteit met stakers en arbeiders. Al-Baradei eiste dat voor de verkiezingen de tijdelijke grondwet vervangen wordt en definitief die van 1971 vervangen wordt door een nieuwe.

Grondwet
Ook Rif’at al-Said, leider van de linkse Tajammu Partij, doet een duitje in het zakje in een interview met al-Sharq al-Awsat. Hij nam deel aan de besprekingen met Mubarak die duurden vanaf 6 februari tot een dag voordat Mubarak aftrad. Hij zegt dat het leger ontevreden was over de aanpassingen van de grondwet die ervoor dienden dat de zoon van Mubarak, Jamal, de macht kon overnemen. Verandering van de grondwet was het belangrijkste onderwerp van gesprek. Hij stelt dat corruptie die altijd heeft bestaan maar onder Mubarak helemaal uit de hand liep een van de hoofdoorzaken is van de opstand. De vervalsing van de verkiezingen eind 2010 gaf de nekslag aan het regime.

Corruptie

Zonder enige twijfel is corruptie een van de thema’s van de revolutie van 25 januari. Een van de eisen van de arbeiders die staken is dat vakbondsleiders en corrupte ondernemers verdwijnen.

Toekomstige president
Interessant is het beeld dat Egyptenaren zouden hebben van hun toekomstige president. Hij zou in dienst van het volk moeten staan, voor beperkte periode een bepaalde program moeten uitvoeren; hij zou “open moeten staan voor de publieke opinie”; hij mag vooral niet corrupt zijn en moet perse “schone handen hebben”. Een van de belangrijkste taken van de nieuwe president is dat hij de corruptie bestrijdt en de ministers van Mubarak vervolgt. Egyptenaren willen ook geen familie om hem heen die zich verrijkt. Transparantie is een andere eis; er mag geen geheimhouding meer zijn.

Het leger
Hoe dubieus deze ‘revolutie’ is blijkt uit de bewondering voor het leger die voor het volk is.

1 comment.

Utopische Moslimbroeders zijn realisten geworden

Posted on February 19th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: Guest authors, Society & Politics in the Middle East.

Guest Authors: Bertus Hendriks & Roel Meijer

Het is bijna onmogelijk een nuchter debat te voeren over de politieke islam, waarvan de Moslimbroederschap de belichaming vormt. Een voorbeeld is het artikel van Hala Naoum Nehme over de rol van de Moslimbroederschap in de omwenteling in Egypte (Opinie & Debat, 14 februari). Eens een dief, altijd een dief, zo zou je haar analyse kunnen samenvatten.

De Moslimbroederschap heeft in het verleden inderdaad een revolutionair islamitisch programma uitgedragen. Dit heeft overigens in Egypte nooit tot enig resultaat geleid. Toen de Broederschap in 1954 door de toenmalige Egyptische president Nasser beschuldigd werd van een poging tot staatsgreep, volgde een genadeloze repressie die veel heeft bijgedragen aan de radicalisering van de Broederschap en haar toenmalige chef-ideoloog Sayyid Qutb. Deze is een belangrijke inspiratiebron geworden voor de extreme en gewelddadige jihadstrijders van Gama’at Islamiyya, Jihad Islamiyya en de Al-Qaida variëteit.

Afstand genomen

Maar sindsdien heeft de Broederschap onder Hassan al-Hudeibi, de opvolger van oprichter Hassan al- Banna, nadrukkelijk afstand genomen van de gewelddadige opvattingen van Sayyid Qutb. En is de Broederschap begonnen aan een ‘lange mars door de instituties’ die karakter en opstelling van de Broederschap ingrijpend heeft veranderd.

De afgelopen dertig jaar heeft de Moslimbroederschap geleerd dat politiek bedrijven gepaard gaat met het sluiten van compromissen. Dat bleek niet alleen uit haar deelname aan de verkiezingen van 1984, 1987 en 2005, maar vooral uit de manier waarop de beweging opereerde in beroepsorganisaties als de Journalistenbond, de Artsenbond, de Orde van Advocaten en andere standsorganisaties. Daar heeft ze door haar pragmatische opstelling veel invloed verworven. Ook de wijze waarop de 88 in 2005 gekozen parlementariërs van de Broederschap hebben geopereerd bevestigt dit proces van geleidelijke hervorming. Dat ging niet zonder slag of stoot. Radicale facties hebben zich verbitterd afgescheiden, terwijl vooral jongere kaderleden voor wie de modernisering niet snel genoeg ging, zich afscheidden. Die richtten de Wasat-partij op, door Mubarak eveneens illegaal verklaard. Maar ook onder hen die de Broederschap trouw bleven, woedden discussies; tussen de oude garde en de generatie van mensen als Issam al-Ariaan die nu prominent naar voren treedt, en vervolgens ook tussen die generatie en de nog veel jongere Broederbloggers.

Ontwerpbeginselprogramma

De hervormingstrend en de obstakels daarbij komen ook tot uitdrukking in de heftige discussies rond een ontwerpbeginselprogramma waarin de Broederschap nadrukkelijk ingaat op economische en sociale kwesties en niet alleen de slogan ‘islam is de oplossing’ bezigt. Met deze verschuiving van utopisme naar praktische politiek en belangenbehartiging is het idee van een islamitische staat geleidelijk achter de horizon verdwenen.

Zelfs de invoering van de sharia is op de achtergrond geraakt. Dat was ook niet zo’n issue omdat de Moslimbroederschap zich makkelijk kon vinden in het door Sadat ingevoerde grondwetsartikel dat de sharia de voornaamste bron van wetgeving is. Dit illustreert nog eens de stelling van Olivier Roy, dat de regimes die hun dictatoriale optreden rechtvaardigen met de noodzaak de Moslimbroederschap tegen te houden, de secularisatie allerminst hebben bevorderd. Om het gras voor de voeten van de Broeders weg te maaien, werd de islamisering door het regime juist bevorderd. Daar kunnen de Kopten over meepraten.

18 karaats-democraten

Betekent dit dat de Moslimbroeders nu 18 karaats-democraten geworden zijn? Natuurlijk niet, en dat soort romantische illusies koesteren wij ook niet. Zo huldigt de Broederschap zeer problematische standpunten op het terrein van gelijke rechten voor vrouwen en niet-islamitische minderheden. De meningen zijn intern sterk verdeeld. Terwijl de meest liberale vertegenwoordigers bereid zijn een vrouw of een koptische christen als president te accepteren, is dit voor de oude garde nog een brug te ver.

Niet minder tekenend is de strijd om de voorrang tussen de twee principes van de beweging, namelijk de soevereiniteit van het volk en de sharia. Bepaalt de democratische wil van het volk de wet of moeten alle wetten uiteindelijk toch getoetst worden aan de sharia door een raad van geestelijken? De discussie daarover zal snel beslecht moeten worden nu de Broederschap besloten heeft met een eigen politiek partij aan de verkiezingen deel te nemen. Dat dwingt op deze en andere heikele punten met een concreet en duidelijk standpunt te komen.

Versleten

Al deze ontwikkelingen afdoen als met twee monden spreken van een wolf in schaapskleren is een versleten, maar ook niet te weerleggen argument. Harde taal bewijst immers het extremistische en fundamenteel ondemocratische karakter van de beweging, concrete en zichtbare hervormingen bewijzen alleen maar de geheime agenda van de beweging om de wereld zand in de ogen te strooien. In dit gesloten wereldbeeld heb je altijd gelijk. Maar steeds meer beleidsmakers, van het Arab Reform Project van de Carnegie Foundation tot de CIA, zijn ervan overtuigd dat het toekomstscenario van de Moslimbroederschap het Turkse model is en niet het Iraanse.

Het is belangrijk dat de Broederschap kan meedoen aan eerlijke en vrije verkiezingen waar ze de concurrentie moet aangaan met geloofwaardige, seculiere partijen, voor wie niet ‘islam’ maar ‘Tunesië’ de oplossing is. Die moeten dan wel de tijd krijgen zich te organiseren, dus geen overhaaste verkiezingen waarbij de Broederschap met zijn goed gewortelde netwerk een onevenredige voorsprong geniet.

Er is na de ‘revolutie van de jeugd’ die de Broederschap evenzeer heeft overvallen als het regime, voldoende reden de uitslag van die verkiezingsstrijd met het nodige vertrouwen tegemoet te zien.

Bertus Hendriks en Roel Meijer zijn beiden verbonden aan Clingendael. Roel Meijer is eveneens verbonden aan de afdeling Islam & Arabisch van de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen en redacteur (met Edwin Bakker) van de bundel The Muslim Brotherhood in Europe: Burdens of the Past, Challenges of the Future (2011).

0 comments.

Egypt's Revolution 2.0: The Facebook Factor

Posted on February 18th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: Blogosphere, Headline, Society & Politics in the Middle East.

Guest Author: Linda Herrera

The call for a Day of Rage on January 25, 2011 that ignited the Egyptian revolution originated from a Facebook page. Many have since asked: Is this a “Facebook Revolution?” It is high time to put this question to rest and insist that political and social movements belong to people and not to communication tools and technologies. Facebook, like cell phones, the internet, and twitter, do not have agency, a moral universe, and are not predisposed to any particular ideological or political orientation. They are what people make of them. Facebook is no more responsible for Egypt’s revolution than Gutenberg’s printing press with movable type was responsible for the Protestant Reformation in the fifteenth century. But it is valid to say that neither the Reformation nor the pro-democracy rights’ movements sweeping Tunisia, Egypt, Iran, and much of the region would have come about at this juncture without these new tools. Digital communications media have revolutionized learning, cognition, and sociability and facilitated the development of a new generational behavior and consciousness. And the old guard simply do not get it.

Around the globe, far beyond Egypt and Tunisia, we are witnessing a monumental generational rupture taking place around digital literacy, and the coming of age of Generation 2.0. They take for granted interaction, collaboration, and community building on-line. The digital “non-literate” or “semi-literate” tend to be either the very poor lacking means, access to, or time for digital media, or the older generation, the pre-digitals, who do not see the value in changing their communication habits. Many from the pre-digital generation are quick to deride innovations such as Facebook and Twitter as being tools that indulge the egoistic tendencies of the young or which are colossal time wasters. While these critiques hold some validity, they capture only one side, and a small side, of a complex and epic generational sea change that is underway and that is being facilitated—not driven in some inevitable process—by the availability of new communication technologies and social tools.

A youthful global digital generation is growing in leaps and bounds, and social media, of which Facebook is just one platform, is a decisively important factor in it. Youth use social media for a range of social, academic, political, leisure, personal, creative, sexual, cultural, commercial, and other activities. Some characteristics of this global generation are excessive communication, involving many people in decision making, multitasking, group work, blurring of public and private, sharing, individual expression, and collective identification. Another important distinction between the generations is that the digital generation take what media theorist Clay Shirky calls “symmetrical participation” for granted. In other words, they are not passive recipients of media and messages, as in the days when television and print media ruled, but take for granted that they can play a role in the simultaneous production, consumption, interaction with, and dissemination of on-line content. Youth in the Middle East and North Africa share the features of their global generational counterparts but with some important additions and differences.

In politically authoritarian states like Egypt, Tunisia and Iran, youth have been fashioning Facebook into a vibrant and inclusive public square. They also use it to maintain their psychological well being as a space to metaphorically breath when the controls and constrains of the social world become too stifling. A 22 year old blogger and avid Facebook user explains, “It’s such a release to go on Facebook. I feel so liberated knowing there’s a place I can send my thoughts.”

The Rise of the “El-Face” Generation

In October and November 2010 I was in Egypt conducting research with university students in Alexandria and Cairo from diverse social class backgrounds on their media use. Many of them were using a new colloquial term, “El-Face” when talking about Facebook. These Facebook users carry traits of being politically savvy, bold, creative, outward looking, group regulating, and ethical. And their numbers are fast growing. In March 2008 there were some 822,560 users. After the Arabic version of Facebook was launched in March of 2009 usership jumped. By July 1, 2010 there were some 3,581,460 Facebook members, making for an increase of 357.2% in a two year period. The site has become increasingly Arabized, though many users show dexterity in using both English and Arabic.

In the months running up to the parliamentary elections in November 2010 there was much speculation about a possible shut down of Facebook. Adult pundits in the more mainstream media (semi-governmental newspapers, popular Arabic television talk shows) took up the cause of Facebook. They expressed their paternalistic concern about the potentially corrupting force of Facebook on the youth in a familiar moral panic mode. On her popular television talk show, for instance, Hala Sarhan lamented the lawlessness of Facebook, asserting it to be a dangerously free zone in need of restrictions. Others argued that without adult supervision, youth could be lured and tricked by dangerous elements into sedition (fitna). They worried Facebook was fueling sectarian tensions between Christians and Muslims that could lead to violence.

These public Facebook experts are mainly sexagenarian and septuagenarian educators, policy makers, government officials, and academics of a pre-digital age. They are using a pre-digital political cognition and institutional understanding to discuss new media today, and they are direly off the mark. Drawing on older understandings of the media they view Facebook as the new space of ideological control, the place to capture the minds and hearts of the citizens; like state television but accessible through the internet. Some of them are sincere in their worry that dangerous elements, like radicals and criminals, will try to befriend youth on Facebook and lure them in subversive activities. Others are clearly more interested in maintaining raw power and want to find effective ways to keep youth in their fold and under their thumbs. The ones vying to maintain control of the youth reason that if youth are spending time on Facebook, then all the government needs to do is go in and set up its propaganda machinery there, capture and control the hearts and minds of youth on Facebook, it’s that simple. The government has established a presence on Facebook, though a somewhat pitiful one, setting up pages for the National Democratic Party (158 people “like” it), Gamal Mubarak (the page has been removed since the uprising), Hosni Mubarak, and other government figures and causes. But these are not picking up traction. The youth are not buying it, and the more the regime people interlope into Facebook the more they lose legitimacy.

The community of “El-Face” is developing a cultural, political, and ethical universe of its own. It has its own codes and is a regulated space to some degree. There are certain red lines, as Hoda and Amir, both 21 year old university students at Alexandria University, that should not be crossed: you should not use the space to insult each other’s religion, for pornography or sexual harassment, for advertising or selling things, for spreading false rumors, or for spying. When a Facebook friend crosses these lines others intervene by way of posting a corrective comment on their wall, starting a conversation on the post in question, or by defriending them.

Last October many youth were worried that the government would close down Facebook. In discussions with a group of students from the Political Science department at Cairo University, they explained that the government feared the flurry of critical political activity that would invariably precede an election. Though many expressed that turning off Facebook would be akin to suffocating them, as one young man put it, it would be like “blocking the air to my lungs”, they insisted they would not ease up on their pre-election Facebook activities. These included mocking the president, his son, the system, and the whole electoral process. They stood defiant. A 21 year old female student proclaimed, “We don’t care! We’re not afraid of them. What are they going to do, arrest millions of us?”

Their Facebook activities also included a commitment to demanding justice for the brutal killing of one of their own, Khaled Said. It was striking last October how every youth I encountered in and out of the university was talking about Khaled Said. His story, which came out of Facebook, not Al-Jazeera, the newspaper, or any other media, has by now received much international coverage. The events leading to Khaled’s killing originated when he supposedly posted a video of two police officers allegedly dividing the spoils of a drug bust. This manner of citizen journalism has become commonplace and youth are getting more emboldened to expose the festering corruption of a police force that acts with impunity. On June 6, 2010, as Khaled Said was sitting in an internet café in Alexandria, two police officers entered and asked him for his I.D.. He refused to produce it and they proceeded to drag him away and allegedly sadistically beat him to his death as he pleaded for his life in the view of witnesses. The officers claimed that Khaled died of suffocation after swallowing a packet of drugs. His family released a photograph to an activist of the broken, bloodied, and disfigured face from Khaled’s corpse. This photo, and a portrait of the gentle soft skinned face of the living Khaled, went viral. The power of photographic evidence combined with eyewitness accounts and popular knowledge of police brutality left no doubt in anyone’s mind that he was senselessly and brutally murdered by police officers, the very people who are supposed to act in the interest of public safety.

A Facebook page, “We are all Khaled Said” was set up and we now know that activists from the Facebook group 6 of April Youth Movement, and Google executive Wael Ghoneim who is becoming a national hero as instigator of the Day of Rage (see below), were involved in this. The page led to a movement, first for justice to bring the killers to court to pay for their crime, and then, something much bigger. On the heels of the Tunisian revolution and fleeing of the dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, the “We are all Khaled Said” group called for a Day of Rage, a march against “Torture, Corruption, Poverty and Unemployment” for January 25, 2011, the date the Regime designated to “celebrate” the police. Scores of Facebook users changed their profile pages to show their support for this march. Below are some of the samples of their profiles pictures.

The uprising took off in a way that no one anticipated. On January 27, Facebook, along with telephones and internet, went off. Nevertheless the revolution grew and persisted. When the internet came back up on February 2 there was a conspicuous fluttering of pro-Mubarak profile pictures scattered around college students’ friends’ lists that had the uncanny look of iron curtain style propaganda posters. Though this is pure speculation, it is highly likely that a committee from the Ministry of Information got together to try to decipher how to infiltrate and conquer Facebook. Operating on a pre-digital mindset, they designed and released a poster about 25 January to appropriate the Day of Rage and rewrite history. That poster (Image #4) reads: “Day of Allegiance to the Leader and Commander. We are all with you and our hearts are with you. The campaign for Mubarak, Security for Egypt.”

Another profile photo which showed up among university students after the blackout was one that reads: “With all my heart I love you Egypt, and I love you oh President.”

These posters lacked the spontaneity, show of emotion, creativity of the other profile posters, and smelled of infiltrators, something not well tolerated in the Facebook public square. This pitiable attempt to turn back history and try to capture the allegiance of youth through manipulating Facebook was a sign of how desperately out of touch the regime has become. It is also indicative that it has lost its grip on the ideological state apparatuses, and once that occurs there is nothing left at its disposal but the use of force; or surrender.

Within three days these images of 25 of January as a day of loyalty to the President disappeared from Facebook. On Feburary 8, a new profile photo among Egyptian youth began spreading spontaneously. It was the image of one of their own, Wael Ghoneim, on the day of his release after twelve days disappearance (he was detained by police). The image is from a game-changing interview conducted with him on February 7, 2011 on a satellite channel. This interview, where he admits to organizing the initial protest, set to rest doubts that the revolution was the plot of enemy foreign agents. His display of emotion for the martyrs of the revolution touched the nation, and beyond. That may very well have been the nail in the coffin of the state’s media wars.

What is happening in Egypt is not a Facebook Revolution. But it could not have come about without the Facebook generation, generation 2.0, who are taking, and with their fellow citizens, making history.

Linda Herrera is a social anthropologist with expertise in comparative and international education. She has lived in Egypt and conducted research on youth cultures and educational change in Egypt and the wider Middle East for over two decades. She is currently Associate Professor, Department of Education Policy, Organization and Leadership, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. She is co-editor with A. Bayat of the volume Being Young and Muslim: New Cultural Politics in the Global North and South, published by Oxford University Press (2010).

This post appeared on Jadaliyya. It is republished here with permission of Linda Herrera and Jadaliyya.

Read also Linda Herrera’s previous contribution: Two Faces of Revolution

4 comments.

Egypt’s Revolution 2.0: The Facebook Factor

Posted on February 18th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: Blogosphere, Headline, Society & Politics in the Middle East.

Guest Author: Linda Herrera

The call for a Day of Rage on January 25, 2011 that ignited the Egyptian revolution originated from a Facebook page. Many have since asked: Is this a “Facebook Revolution?” It is high time to put this question to rest and insist that political and social movements belong to people and not to communication tools and technologies. Facebook, like cell phones, the internet, and twitter, do not have agency, a moral universe, and are not predisposed to any particular ideological or political orientation. They are what people make of them. Facebook is no more responsible for Egypt’s revolution than Gutenberg’s printing press with movable type was responsible for the Protestant Reformation in the fifteenth century. But it is valid to say that neither the Reformation nor the pro-democracy rights’ movements sweeping Tunisia, Egypt, Iran, and much of the region would have come about at this juncture without these new tools. Digital communications media have revolutionized learning, cognition, and sociability and facilitated the development of a new generational behavior and consciousness. And the old guard simply do not get it.

Around the globe, far beyond Egypt and Tunisia, we are witnessing a monumental generational rupture taking place around digital literacy, and the coming of age of Generation 2.0. They take for granted interaction, collaboration, and community building on-line. The digital “non-literate” or “semi-literate” tend to be either the very poor lacking means, access to, or time for digital media, or the older generation, the pre-digitals, who do not see the value in changing their communication habits. Many from the pre-digital generation are quick to deride innovations such as Facebook and Twitter as being tools that indulge the egoistic tendencies of the young or which are colossal time wasters. While these critiques hold some validity, they capture only one side, and a small side, of a complex and epic generational sea change that is underway and that is being facilitated—not driven in some inevitable process—by the availability of new communication technologies and social tools.

A youthful global digital generation is growing in leaps and bounds, and social media, of which Facebook is just one platform, is a decisively important factor in it. Youth use social media for a range of social, academic, political, leisure, personal, creative, sexual, cultural, commercial, and other activities. Some characteristics of this global generation are excessive communication, involving many people in decision making, multitasking, group work, blurring of public and private, sharing, individual expression, and collective identification. Another important distinction between the generations is that the digital generation take what media theorist Clay Shirky calls “symmetrical participation” for granted. In other words, they are not passive recipients of media and messages, as in the days when television and print media ruled, but take for granted that they can play a role in the simultaneous production, consumption, interaction with, and dissemination of on-line content. Youth in the Middle East and North Africa share the features of their global generational counterparts but with some important additions and differences.

In politically authoritarian states like Egypt, Tunisia and Iran, youth have been fashioning Facebook into a vibrant and inclusive public square. They also use it to maintain their psychological well being as a space to metaphorically breath when the controls and constrains of the social world become too stifling. A 22 year old blogger and avid Facebook user explains, “It’s such a release to go on Facebook. I feel so liberated knowing there’s a place I can send my thoughts.”

The Rise of the “El-Face” Generation

In October and November 2010 I was in Egypt conducting research with university students in Alexandria and Cairo from diverse social class backgrounds on their media use. Many of them were using a new colloquial term, “El-Face” when talking about Facebook. These Facebook users carry traits of being politically savvy, bold, creative, outward looking, group regulating, and ethical. And their numbers are fast growing. In March 2008 there were some 822,560 users. After the Arabic version of Facebook was launched in March of 2009 usership jumped. By July 1, 2010 there were some 3,581,460 Facebook members, making for an increase of 357.2% in a two year period. The site has become increasingly Arabized, though many users show dexterity in using both English and Arabic.

In the months running up to the parliamentary elections in November 2010 there was much speculation about a possible shut down of Facebook. Adult pundits in the more mainstream media (semi-governmental newspapers, popular Arabic television talk shows) took up the cause of Facebook. They expressed their paternalistic concern about the potentially corrupting force of Facebook on the youth in a familiar moral panic mode. On her popular television talk show, for instance, Hala Sarhan lamented the lawlessness of Facebook, asserting it to be a dangerously free zone in need of restrictions. Others argued that without adult supervision, youth could be lured and tricked by dangerous elements into sedition (fitna). They worried Facebook was fueling sectarian tensions between Christians and Muslims that could lead to violence.

These public Facebook experts are mainly sexagenarian and septuagenarian educators, policy makers, government officials, and academics of a pre-digital age. They are using a pre-digital political cognition and institutional understanding to discuss new media today, and they are direly off the mark. Drawing on older understandings of the media they view Facebook as the new space of ideological control, the place to capture the minds and hearts of the citizens; like state television but accessible through the internet. Some of them are sincere in their worry that dangerous elements, like radicals and criminals, will try to befriend youth on Facebook and lure them in subversive activities. Others are clearly more interested in maintaining raw power and want to find effective ways to keep youth in their fold and under their thumbs. The ones vying to maintain control of the youth reason that if youth are spending time on Facebook, then all the government needs to do is go in and set up its propaganda machinery there, capture and control the hearts and minds of youth on Facebook, it’s that simple. The government has established a presence on Facebook, though a somewhat pitiful one, setting up pages for the National Democratic Party (158 people “like” it), Gamal Mubarak (the page has been removed since the uprising), Hosni Mubarak, and other government figures and causes. But these are not picking up traction. The youth are not buying it, and the more the regime people interlope into Facebook the more they lose legitimacy.

The community of “El-Face” is developing a cultural, political, and ethical universe of its own. It has its own codes and is a regulated space to some degree. There are certain red lines, as Hoda and Amir, both 21 year old university students at Alexandria University, that should not be crossed: you should not use the space to insult each other’s religion, for pornography or sexual harassment, for advertising or selling things, for spreading false rumors, or for spying. When a Facebook friend crosses these lines others intervene by way of posting a corrective comment on their wall, starting a conversation on the post in question, or by defriending them.

Last October many youth were worried that the government would close down Facebook. In discussions with a group of students from the Political Science department at Cairo University, they explained that the government feared the flurry of critical political activity that would invariably precede an election. Though many expressed that turning off Facebook would be akin to suffocating them, as one young man put it, it would be like “blocking the air to my lungs”, they insisted they would not ease up on their pre-election Facebook activities. These included mocking the president, his son, the system, and the whole electoral process. They stood defiant. A 21 year old female student proclaimed, “We don’t care! We’re not afraid of them. What are they going to do, arrest millions of us?”

Their Facebook activities also included a commitment to demanding justice for the brutal killing of one of their own, Khaled Said. It was striking last October how every youth I encountered in and out of the university was talking about Khaled Said. His story, which came out of Facebook, not Al-Jazeera, the newspaper, or any other media, has by now received much international coverage. The events leading to Khaled’s killing originated when he supposedly posted a video of two police officers allegedly dividing the spoils of a drug bust. This manner of citizen journalism has become commonplace and youth are getting more emboldened to expose the festering corruption of a police force that acts with impunity. On June 6, 2010, as Khaled Said was sitting in an internet café in Alexandria, two police officers entered and asked him for his I.D.. He refused to produce it and they proceeded to drag him away and allegedly sadistically beat him to his death as he pleaded for his life in the view of witnesses. The officers claimed that Khaled died of suffocation after swallowing a packet of drugs. His family released a photograph to an activist of the broken, bloodied, and disfigured face from Khaled’s corpse. This photo, and a portrait of the gentle soft skinned face of the living Khaled, went viral. The power of photographic evidence combined with eyewitness accounts and popular knowledge of police brutality left no doubt in anyone’s mind that he was senselessly and brutally murdered by police officers, the very people who are supposed to act in the interest of public safety.

A Facebook page, “We are all Khaled Said” was set up and we now know that activists from the Facebook group 6 of April Youth Movement, and Google executive Wael Ghoneim who is becoming a national hero as instigator of the Day of Rage (see below), were involved in this. The page led to a movement, first for justice to bring the killers to court to pay for their crime, and then, something much bigger. On the heels of the Tunisian revolution and fleeing of the dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, the “We are all Khaled Said” group called for a Day of Rage, a march against “Torture, Corruption, Poverty and Unemployment” for January 25, 2011, the date the Regime designated to “celebrate” the police. Scores of Facebook users changed their profile pages to show their support for this march. Below are some of the samples of their profiles pictures.

The uprising took off in a way that no one anticipated. On January 27, Facebook, along with telephones and internet, went off. Nevertheless the revolution grew and persisted. When the internet came back up on February 2 there was a conspicuous fluttering of pro-Mubarak profile pictures scattered around college students’ friends’ lists that had the uncanny look of iron curtain style propaganda posters. Though this is pure speculation, it is highly likely that a committee from the Ministry of Information got together to try to decipher how to infiltrate and conquer Facebook. Operating on a pre-digital mindset, they designed and released a poster about 25 January to appropriate the Day of Rage and rewrite history. That poster (Image #4) reads: “Day of Allegiance to the Leader and Commander. We are all with you and our hearts are with you. The campaign for Mubarak, Security for Egypt.”

Another profile photo which showed up among university students after the blackout was one that reads: “With all my heart I love you Egypt, and I love you oh President.”

These posters lacked the spontaneity, show of emotion, creativity of the other profile posters, and smelled of infiltrators, something not well tolerated in the Facebook public square. This pitiable attempt to turn back history and try to capture the allegiance of youth through manipulating Facebook was a sign of how desperately out of touch the regime has become. It is also indicative that it has lost its grip on the ideological state apparatuses, and once that occurs there is nothing left at its disposal but the use of force; or surrender.

Within three days these images of 25 of January as a day of loyalty to the President disappeared from Facebook. On Feburary 8, a new profile photo among Egyptian youth began spreading spontaneously. It was the image of one of their own, Wael Ghoneim, on the day of his release after twelve days disappearance (he was detained by police). The image is from a game-changing interview conducted with him on February 7, 2011 on a satellite channel. This interview, where he admits to organizing the initial protest, set to rest doubts that the revolution was the plot of enemy foreign agents. His display of emotion for the martyrs of the revolution touched the nation, and beyond. That may very well have been the nail in the coffin of the state’s media wars.

What is happening in Egypt is not a Facebook Revolution. But it could not have come about without the Facebook generation, generation 2.0, who are taking, and with their fellow citizens, making history.

Linda Herrera is a social anthropologist with expertise in comparative and international education. She has lived in Egypt and conducted research on youth cultures and educational change in Egypt and the wider Middle East for over two decades. She is currently Associate Professor, Department of Education Policy, Organization and Leadership, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. She is co-editor with A. Bayat of the volume Being Young and Muslim: New Cultural Politics in the Global North and South, published by Oxford University Press (2010).

This post appeared on Jadaliyya. It is republished here with permission of Linda Herrera and Jadaliyya.

Read also Linda Herrera’s previous contribution: Two Faces of Revolution

4 comments.

Uprising – Music, Images and The Tunisia and Egypt Revolution on Youtube

Posted on February 17th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: Arts & culture, Society & Politics in the Middle East.

Music, images and nowadays video have always been an important part of protest movements. These practices of making and spreading music videos can enhance the solidarity with a movement, its identity and ideas, values and goals. It makes distant sympathizers (feel) part of the movement, in this case global movement’ because they are actually participating in spreading the word (and image) and the express their own political position in public. Some of the music belonging to these videos can be experienced as extremely powerful; if the images are not strong enough to evoke the senses, the combination with the music will. Not only the number of people grows that can engage with the message of the movement, their excitement, anger, grievances can increase at the same time; on the ground creating what has been called by Elias Canetti a ‘rhythmic crowd’; what a movement may lack in numbers they make up in intensity. How this actually works with youtube videos remains to be seen nevertheless it seems clear that musicians and youtubers are inspired by the Egypt revolution.

I have had the pleasure of enjoying two fantastic concert by Muse. One of my favorite songs is Uprising. And now with the uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia and elsewhere I was actually waiting for these videos to appear:

well, apparently I can’t because the protest videos featuring Muse’s The Uprising have been blocked due to copyright violations…So have a look at the next ones”:

Take a Bow

Map of the Problematique

Thirteen Senses – Into the Fire

Globus – Europe (via Raafatology)

The next video shows photographs of the revolution and using the song Million Man March by Lowkey ft. Mai Khalil:

Of course, Egyptian artists are not silent either. Watch and listen to the next song; a very popular one by Mohamed Mouzir: Ezzay (How come?)

Next one of the first protest songs Sefr (zero) by Haitham Nabil. Hani Almadhoun has the lyrics at Hot Arab Music.

The next song is made by Arab-American and African-American musicians: January 25 or #jan25:

The song is a ‘testament to the revolution’s effect on the hearts and minds of today’s youth, and the spirit of resistance it has come to symbolize for oppressed people worldwide.’

While the videos featuring for example Muse use existing songs as background thereby creating a sort of soundwall that provokes the senses, the videos from Egyptian artists are different. Arabian Knightz recorded this song Rebel in the first week of the protests:

The next one is a very powerful one of Arabian Knightz featuring the Palestinian Shadia Mansour:

And here three videos from and about the Jasmin Revolution in Tunisia from El General:

The next song and video as actually made at Tahrir Square in Cairo:

One of the most well known artists, Sami Yusuf, whose Islamic pop songs aim at empowering Muslim youth and making them proud of their identity, has also released a song: ‘I am your hope’:

Before bringing this to a (sort of conclusion) I want to show you one more, this time by Master Mimz, a female rap artist from Morocco: Back Down Mubarak! (Note the difference in the footage shown in the video?):

See also this relevant piece on Jadaliyya: Imperial Feminism, Islamophobia, and the Egyptian Revolution* by Nadine Naber that refers to the video of Master Mimz.

What youtube and modern computer technology make possible is people using products of the culture industry (such as popmusic) and appropriate them to fit their own values, needs and goals. Youtube does not only enable people to escape the censorship by the Egyptian state but also the formats and models they are exposed to by the culture industry. Youtube therefore has become an important platform for what Fiske (building on De Certeau) has called ’semiotic resistance’and creativity; one that has profound cultural and political significance.

And ok, as an academic one should keep a certain distance but hey: long live the people of Egypt!

2 comments.

Verantwoordelijkheid en Schuldgevoel – Volksprotesten in het Midden-Oosten

Posted on February 14th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: Guest authors, Society & Politics in the Middle East.

Guest Author:  Evert van der Zweerde

Volksprotest in Tunis, Egypte, Amman en Jemen. Hoe lang hebben zij gewacht totdat ze in opstand kwamen tegen de gehate regimes die er enkel zitten omdat “het Westen” denkt dat dat het eigen belang dient? Wiens belang? Niet het mijne.

Twee jaar geleden was ik in Caïro. Ik at kip nuggets in de Kentucky Fried Chicken aan midan tahrir en keek mijn ogen uit naar de prachtige jonge Egyptische meiden, met kleurige hoofddoeken als ze moslima waren, zonder als ze kopt waren, in niqab als ze streng-gelovig waren. Arm-in-arm ondanks die verschillen, zoals ze nu zij-aan-zij staan. Zoals kopten nu tijdens het middaggebed een cordon vormen rond de moslims op het plein om te voorkomen dat het gespuis van Mubarak dat moment van kwetsbaarheid uitbuit.

Twee jaar geleden sprak ik met de hoofdredacteur van al-misri al-yawm, toen een in de marge getolereerd dagblad, nu de spreekbuis van het nieuwe Egypte. Ik sprak met de voorzitter van de oppositiepartij al-wasat, “het midden”, wiens grote voorbeelden de Duitse CDU en de Turkse AKP waren. Ik sprak met de hoogstbejaarde Gamal al-banna, wiens broer Hassan de Moslim-Broederschap oprichtte. Hij droomde van een liberale socialistische islamitische democratische republiek. Van zo’n soort republiek droom ik ook weleens. Hopelijk leeft hij nog en droomt hij verder. De gebeurtenissen hebben hem ingehaald.

De Egyptenaren die nu vrijheid en democratie willen zijn mensen zoals u en ik die afwillen van dictator en geheime politie, die corruptie en nepotisme beu zijn, die werk, betaalbare gezondheidszorg en goed onderwijs willen. Ja, de Moslim Broederschap levert dat al en ontleent daaraan haar populariteit. Ja, veel Egyptenaren vinden politieke inspiratie in islamitische idealen van rechtvaardigheid en gelijkheid. Ja, velen in het Midden Oosten zijn boos op de Westerse regeringen die, geplaagd door post-Holocaust schuldgevoel, al decennia lang met twee maten meten wanneer het om Israël en Palestina gaat. Ze zijn niet tegen Joden, ze zijn tegen zionisme en tegen de wijze waarop “wij” de compensatie van ons schuldgevoel op hen afwentelen. Dat schuldgevoel moeten wij, Hannah Arendt indachtig, omzetten in het nemen van verantwoordelijkheid voor een andere loop van de geschiedenis, voor zover dat in onze macht ligt.

Om te begrijpen wat de mensen in Caïro willen, en vooral: niet willen, hoef ik niet te weten of ze moslim zijn of iets anders en het maakt mij niet uit of een deel van hen gelooft in het ideaal van een hersteld kalifaat. De helft van de Franse résistance tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog geloofde in een door de Sovjet-Unie geleide wereldrevolutie en de komst van een communistische samenleving. Wat ze deden was het bestrijden van de Nazi’s en van het gehate Vichy-regime van maarschalk Pétain. Mij hoeft het niet uit te maken of een demonstrant een T-shirt met Che Guevara draagt of “Allahu akbar” roept. Wat zij of hij wil snap ik ook zonder die heilige grootheden.

De eerste versie van deze column schreef ik op een schrijfblok van een demokratski seminar dat ik 10 jaar geleden met mijn collega Machiel Karskens in Belgrado bezocht. Daar gingen toen, zoals ook nu, mensen de straat op om een einde te maken aan corruptie en nepotisme -daar heet dat “mafia”-, om werk en om een fatsoenlijk bestaan. Sommigen riepen en roepen daarbij dat het Orthodox-christelijke Servische volk al eeuwenlang slachtoffer is en dat dat afgelopen moet zijn. Dat klinkt eng, maar om te begrijpen wat de mensen in Belgrado willen, en vooral: niet willen, hoef ik niet te weten of ze Servisch-orthodox zijn of iets anders en het maakt mij niet uit of een deel van hen gelooft in een rechtvaardige theocratische heilsstaat. Wat ik wèl moet weten is dat “het Westen” mede schuld is aan de ontstane situatie door tijdens de burgeroorlog in voormalig Joegoslavië met twee maten te meten, het rooms-katholieke Kroatië klakkeloos te erkennen, Belgrado te bombarderen en de Bosnische moslims op een verschrikkelijke manier in de steek te laten.

Historische schuld leidt tot schuldgevoel, maar schuldgevoel is nooit een constructieve politieke passie. Waar het om gaat is verantwoordelijkheid nemen en versnelde opname van Servië en van Bosnië-Herzegovina in de EU na te streven. Waar het om gaat is de neerbuigende postkoloniale houding ten opzichte van regeringen en bevolkingen in Tunis, Caïro en elders te vervangen door principiële gelijkwaardigheid. Het gaat niet aan om te roepen dat democratie een recht van ieder volk is en vervolgens op de rem te gaan staan wanneer een groepering de verkiezingen dreigt te gaan winnen die “ons” om welke reden dan ook niet bevalt. Waar het ook om gaat, ten slotte, hier en daar en overal, is op te houden religie te misbruiken om af te leiden van werkelijke problemen.

Prof. dr. Evert van der Zweerde is hoogleraar Politieke filosofie aan de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen. Deze tekst sprak hij afgelopen donderdag uit als column tijdens het actualiteitencollege over de crisis in het Midden-Oosten. Afgelopen vrijdag hieldt Evert van der Zweerde zijn oratie, getiteld “Het is ook nooit goed…” Democratie vanuit politiek-filosofisch perspectief

1 comment.

Closing the week 6 – Featuring the Egypt Revolution

Posted on February 13th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: Blogosphere, Society & Politics in the Middle East.

Most popular on Closer last week

1. Two Faces of Revolution by Linda Herrera
2. ‘Now its gonna be a lone one’ – Some first conclusions on the Egyptian Revolution by Samuli Schielke
3. ‘Verandering komt eraan’ – De Arabische revolte in Jordanië door Egbert Harmsen

Previous updates on the uprisings in the Middle East: Tunisia Uprising I – Tunisia Uprising II – Tunisia / Egypt Uprising Essential Reading I

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(More) Essential Reading
The road to Tahrir by Charles Hirschkind – The Immanent Frame

These online activists have played a key role in transforming the conditions of political possibility in Egypt during the last decade, and of paving the way to Tahrir Square today. They have sought out and cultivated new forms of political agency in the face of the predations and repressive actions of the Egyptian state. They have pioneered forms of political critique and interaction that can mediate and encompass the heterogeneity of religious and social commitments that constitute Egypt’s contemporary political terrain. From the latest news reports, it is clear that many of them are now being arrested and beaten for their efforts. The regime has again shown itself implacable in its disregard for the people of Egypt.

Egypt, and the post-Islamist middle east by Asef Bayat | openDemocracy

In this incipient post-Islamist middle east, the prevailing popular movements assume a post-national, post-ideological, civil, and democratic character. Iran’s green movement, the Tunisian revolution, and the Egyptian uprising represent the popular movements of these post-Islamist times. They strive to achieve social justice, dignity, and a form of democratic governance that can protect citizens’ fundamental rights.

From the Blogosphere to the Street: The Role of Social Media in the Egyptian Uprising – by Charles Hirschkind – Jadaliyya.com

This new relation between bloggers and other media forms has now become standard: not only do many of the opposition newspapers rely on bloggers for their stories; news stories that journalists can’t print themselves without facing state persecution—for example, on issues relating to the question of Mubarak’s successor—such stories are first fed to bloggers by investigative reporters; once they are reported online, then journalists then proceed to publish the stories in newsprint, citing the blogs as source, this way avoiding the accusation that they themselves invented the story. Moreover, many young people have taken up the practice of using cell-phone cameras in the street, and bloggers are constantly receiving phone film-footage from anonymous sources that they then put on their blogs.

This event played a key role in shaping the place that the blogosphere would come to occupy within Egypt’s media sphere. Namely, bloggers understand their role as that of providing a direct link to what they call “the street,” conceived primarily as a space of state repression and political violence, but also as one of political action and popular resistance. They render visible and publicly speakable a political practice—the violent subjugation of the Egyptian people by its authoritarian regime—that other media outlets cannot easily disclose, due to censorship, practices of harassment, and arrest. This includes not only acts police brutality and torture, but also the more mundane and routine forms of violence that shape the texture of everyday life.

Good morning revolution: A to do list – by Hani Shukrallah – Ahram Online

The revolution has triumphed, but even as we celebrate, we need to begin at once with the most amazing job history has thrown our way, the building of an Egyptian democracy

Egypt’s Revolution 2.0: The Facebook Factor by Linda Herrera – Jadaliyya.com

What is happening in Egypt is not a Facebook Revolution. But it could not have come about without the Facebook generation, generation 2.0, who are taking, and with their fellow citizens, making history.

Imperial Feminism, Islamophobia, and the Egyptian Revolution* by Nadine Naber – Jadaliyya.com

Often ignored in U.S. discussions on Egypt is how protests led by labor unions—many women-based labor unions in the manufacturing cities of Egypt—have catalyzed the Egyptian revolution (Paul Amar, 02-05-11).[ii] The women now holding down Tahrir Square as we speak—are of all ages and social groups and their struggle cannot be explained through Orientalist tropes that reduce Arab women to passive victims of culture or religion or Islam. They are active participants in a grassroots people-based struggle against poverty and state corruption, rigged elections, repression, torture, and police brutality. They are leading marches; attending the wounded, and participating in identity checks of state supported thugs. They have helped create human shields to protect Egyptian Antiquities Museum, the Arab League Headquarters, and one another. They have helped organize neighborhood watch groups and committees nationwide in order to protect private and public property. They are fighting against dictatorship among millions of people-not guided by any one sect or political party—united under one slogan: we want and end to this regime.

More incomplete thoughts on the Algerian situation « The Moor Next Door

The RCD’s headquarters in Algiers was has already been surrounded by police after three hundred people reportedly congregated there to demonstrate their satisfaction with the fall of Mubarak. What kind of affect early obstruction might have will depend on how many people turn out in force to begin with: the masses of police on the streets may have a serious psychological impact on smaller demonstrators and if the demonstrations are as easily dispersed as on 22 January its unlikely that much else will follow. And while many Algerians are thoroughly dissatisfied with Bouteflika, most understand the real political challenge is the whole system, the politicized military leadership, the economic oligarchs, the not mere personalities. Many Algerians have been impressed by the fall of Mubarak, though. Buses of people are heading to Algiers from the surrounding cities and provinces, blocked by the police. By cutting out those seeking to protest peacefully (and with a limited popular appeal) the regime is increasing the likelihood of spontaneous, violent demonstrations which may indeed be to the government’s advantage. While the opposition is weak and without strong popular credentials (not wholly committed to the 12 February movement) there is more potential for something much bigger than previously anticipated as a result of recent events and the anxiety they may cause in the security services and the government at large. Mubarak’s fall has raised the stakes for Algeria’s 12 February march. But his fall does not necessarily make Bouteflika’s imminent. More to come.

Incomplete thoughts on the Algerian Situation « The Moor Next Door

The military and civilian elite learned the “lesson of April 2001,” when youths in Kabylia, and then the rest of the country, rose up and were brutally suppressed: higher levels of violence increase resentment and anger thereby making resistance more powerful. The Algerian response to the winter uprising netted far few deaths than those in Tunisia and Egypt where the deaths of demonstrators became galvanizing moments in struggles against local regimes. The Algerians were able to weather the uprisings without the kind of firm anti-government movement faed by their neighbors. Over the last ten years the Algerians have also grown adept at coopting ideological demands from popular and party forces: it met demands to give Berber a more exalted place within the state, recognizing it as a national language and including references to Berber identity in the constitution; it has included Islamists in the ruling coalition (the MSP) and adopted some of their recommendations in family law and education. But it has not taken on the social and economic contradictions that animate most social and political dissatisfaction among the population.

The revolution is not over  by Adam Shatz « LRB blog

But the revolution in Egypt is not over: in fact, it has only begun. Mubarak’s removal from power was only the first objective of Egypt’s demonstrators. It was not just Mubarak but the regime that they want to dislodge, and to replace with a democratic government based on the rule of law. One of the pillars of the regime is the institution that is now improbably cast as the national saviour: the army. The army is respected, even admired by most Egyptians for its role in defending the country’s borders, and for its success in the 1973 war. It has always kept – officially – a discreet distance from the day-to-day running of the country, but it has also acquired a deep investment in the status quo, particularly in the country’s economy: the army is involved in the production of everything from washing machines and heaters to clothing and pharmaceuticals, and is estimated to own about a third of the country’s assets. Nor does it have much incentive to make any changes in foreign policy that might affect the terms of US aid: $1.3 billion per year.

Impressions from Egypt’s front line | Comment is free | guardian.co.uk

Hossam el-Hamalawy, an Egyptian journalist from Cairo, uses photographs to tell the inside story of protests on the streets of his city

The fall of Multiculturalism…again
Cameron Criticizes ‘Multiculturalism’ in Britain – NYTimes.com

LONDON — Faced with growing alarm about Islamic militants who have made Britain one of Europe’s most active bases for terrorist plots, Prime Minister David Cameron has mounted an attack on the country’s decades-old policy of “multiculturalism,” saying it has encouraged “segregated communities” where Islamic extremism can thrive.

Multiculturalism: not a minority problem | Tariq Modood | Comment is free | The Guardian

Notices of the death of multiculturalism began in Britain as far back as 1989, with the Salman Rushdie/Satanic Verses affair. It became clear that the minority-majority faultline was not going to be simply about colour racism, and that the definition of multiculturalism could not be confined to “steelbands, saris and samosas”. For some liberals that meant an end to their support for the concept, as angry Muslims muscled in on something that was intended only for the likes of gay people or black youth. Their protests were supported as “right on”, but a passionate religious identity was too multicultural for many.

Why Cameron’s speech on terrorism puts us more in danger | Liberal Conspiracy

David Cameron’s speech last week was primarily focused on counter-terrorism, even if excerpts released to the media highlighted the ‘death of state multiculturalism’.

This is a problem in itself because, by conflating counter-terrorism and integration, Cameron weakens internal security and makes all of us more vulnerable to terrorism. This isn’t limited to the Conservatives either; many others who define themselves as ‘muscular liberals’ make the same mistake.

Labour accuses Cameron of lining up with extremists on multiculturalism – UK Politics, UK – The Independent

Muslim groups, anti-racism campaigners and opposition politicians also questioned the timing of the high-profile speech, just hours before around 3,000 members of the far-right English Defence League (EDL) marched through Luton.

Blame consumer capitalism, not multiculturalism | Madeleine Bunting | Comment is free | The Guardian

David Cameron’s analysis is flawed; it’s individualism and globalisation that are undermining a strong national identity

Cameron Urges Immigrants to Integrate – WSJ.com

LONDON—U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron triggered a debate about multiculturalism in Britain over the weekend after arguing in a speech on terrorism for a “muscular liberalism” that confronts extremist Islam by forging a tighter national identity in multiethnic countries such as Britain.

France’s Sarkozy: Multiculturalism a failure – Israel News, Ynetnews

French leader: We’ve been too concerned about identity of new arrivals, not enough about identity of country receiving them

Misc.

Dutch populist Wilders returns to court for allegedly inciting race hate | Europe | Deutsche Welle | 07.02.2011

Nationalist politician Geert Wilders has claimed that he is being persecuted for his political views. The Dutch populist, who likens Islam to fascism, is charged with inciting hatred towards Muslims and others.

How Democracy Became Halal – NYTimes.com

When the legitimacy of theocracy started to unravel amid the regime’s corruption and brutality in the late 1980s, democratic ideas, including powerful democratic interpretations of the Islamic faith, roared forth. The explosion on the streets after the fraudulent presidential elections of June 2009 was just the most visible eruption of the enormous democratic pressures that had built up underneath the republic’s autocracy. More regime-threatening moments are surely coming.

Dutch
Een omstreden washok voor moslims – Trouw

Hogeschool Windesheim vond het gênant dat moslimstudenten zich voor het bidden moesten reinigen in het invalidentoilet. De school richtte een kleine wasruimte in. Reden voor de PVV om Kamervragen te stellen.

Mythbuster: Moslims toch ‘normaler’ | Wijblijvenhier.nl

Na 9/11 in New York is de kloof tussen moslims en niet-moslims groter geworden. Na 7/7 in London gold dit ook sterk voor de Britse moslims en niet-moslims. Of toch niet? In London werd hier een onderzoek naar gedaan door The Gallup Organization. Het resultaat (verrassend voor sommigen): de kloof is veel minder groot dan we zelf denken.

Quote du Jour | Moslims komen van Mars, Westerlingen van Venus? – Sargasso

Toch roepen de elkaar netjes overlappende dichotomieën die Almog aanwijst (de islamitische wereld vs. het Westen // tirannie vs. democratie // vrouwelijk vs. mannelijk) mijn argwaan op. Kan de werkelijkheid werkelijk teruggebracht worden tot zwart tegenover wit? En speelt er bij Almog niet een ideologisch belang mee; namelijk de Westerlingen overtuigen dat de kant van Israël moeten blijven kiezen, ook al gedraagt dit land zich als een koloniale onderdrukker?

Elsevier.nl – Nederland – Moslims lopen belastingvoordeel mis door lakse moskeeën

Mensen die doneren aan moskeeën lopen vaak hun belastingvoordeel mis, omdat partijbesturen van de gebedshuizen zich zelden laten registreren. Giften aan gebedshuizen zijn sinds 2008 niet meer automatisch fiscaal aftrekbaar.

Seks en de seculiere natie | DeJaap

Seksuele politiek (identiteitspolitiek gericht op emancipatie van minderheden als vrouwen en homo’s) was jaren het toonbeeld van progressiviteit. Het opkomen voor de rechten van seksuele minderheden ging toen gepaard met gevoeligheid voor het lot van andere minderheden, die op basis van bijvoorbeeld hun afkomst niet tot de mainstream behoorden. Seksuele politiek is nog steeds het toonbeeld van modern zijn, maar seksuele politiek wordt nu ingezet om een tegenstelling aan te geven tussen wij, het seksueel bevrijde Westen, en zij, de seksueel achterlijke Moslims. Een sexual clash of civilizations. Dit levert een duivels dilemma op voor de wetenschappers aanwezig op de conferentie. Zij hebben het gevoel dat ze moeten kiezen tussen vrouwen (en homo’s, lesbiennes en transgenders) of moslims.

2 comments.

Wilde Beweringen over de Opstand

Posted on February 12th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: Guest authors, Society & Politics in the Middle East.

Guest Author: Robbert Woltering

Het artikel dd. 8 februari van CIDI-medewerker Marthe Tholen, waarin deze waarschuwt tegen wat zij ziet als de gevaren van de democratische opstand in Egypte, bevat een aantal fouten. In tegenstelling tot wat zij beweert is Mohammed Ghanem niet een van de leiders van de Moslim Broederschap. Zijn vermeende uitlatingen op een Iraans televisiestation doen dus niet ter zake. De bewering dat de organisatie tot driemaal toe heeft opgeroepen dat het vredesverdrag met Israel moet worden opgezegd, staaft Tholen niet met verwijzingen. Dat komt omdat de bewering niet klopt. Tholen baseert zich waarschijnlijk op een interview dat een middelhoog bestuurslid van de organisatie, ene Rashad al-Bayoumi, zou hebben gegeven aan een Japanse televisiezender. Op basis van uitlatingen gedaan door een dergelijk middenkaderlid kan niet worden beweerd dat dit de mening is van de organisatie. Sterker nog, de gewraakte uitlatingen staan in contrast met de consistente lijn die al lang geleden is ingezet door eersterangs woordvoerders en leidinggevenden zoals Essam al-Erian, Mahmoud Ezzat en Muhammad Badi.

Waar de wilde beweringen voor nodig waren, blijkt wel uit de algehele toonzetting van haar artikel. Van de vele onoprechte en alarmerende reacties op de Egyptische revolte spant deze de kroon. De verwijzing naar de overwinning van Hamas in de Palestijnse verkiezingen toont hoezeer de auteur naar Egypte kijkt met een Israëlische bril, die haar beeld vervormt. De verkiezingen in de Palestijnse gebieden zijn onvergelijkbaar met eventuele verkiezingen in Egypte, omdat Egyptenaren in tegenstelling tot de Palestijnen niet in een oorlogssituatie verkeren, en niet al sinds decennia onder bezetting leven. Dat de auteur die context is ontgaan is wellicht tekenend voor de Israëlische verkleuring van haar kijk op de zaak. Haar voorstel aan het Westen om Egypte ‘dezelfde relatie aan te bieden’ als die het Westen heeft met Israël is tenslotte ridicuul en een gotspe, omdat ze ermee blijkt te bedoelen dat het Westen moet voorkomen dat de Moslimbroeders bij democratische verkiezingen hun politieke aandeel in gaan nemen. Het Westen heeft een bijzondere band met Israël, maar die bestaat er gelukkig niet uit dat het Westen in Israël de verkiezingen manipuleert. Dat Tholen dit voor Egypte wel wenst toont aan dat ze niet alleen de Moslimbroeders slecht kent, maar dat ze ook van democratie weinig heeft begrepen. Ik wil Tholen haar echt op vrije meningsuiting niet ontzeggen, maar van een kwaliteitskrant mag wel verwacht worden dat het ervoor waakt te fungeren als een doorgeefluik van desinformatie.

Robbert Woltering is universitair docent Arabische taal en cultuur aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam.

0 comments.

Egypte en het gelijk van de islambashers

Posted on February 9th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: Guest authors, Multiculti Issues, Religious and Political Radicalization, Society & Politics in the Middle East.

Guest Author: Roel Meijer

De Nederlandse islambashers, zoals Hans Jansen, moeten de afgelopen twee weken zich achter hun oren hebben gekrabd. Is het dan toch mogelijk dat moslims even vergeten zijn dat ze moslims zijn? Dat ze zo maar in opstand komen tegen een regime? Dat ze niet zoals altijd slaafs de bevelen van machthebbers volgen? Zijn Egyptenaren niet vergeten dat ze a) inherent passief zijn, dom, traditioneel, of nog liever, b) radicaal, haatdragend, antiwesters en gewelddadig? In plaats daarvan zijn de afgelopen twaalf dagen honderdduizenden mensen vreedzaam de straat opgegaan en hebben burgerrechten geëist: transparantie, gelijke rechten, eerlijke verkiezingen en een eind aan corruptie. Rationeler—lees westers volgens de islambashers—kan het niet.

Maar gelukkig duurde het niet lang of de critici hadden een verklaring voor dit merkwaardige fenomeen dat al hun vaststaande ideeën over moslims bevestigde. De demonstraties zijn geen inleiding tot hervormingen, maar een voorbode van een islamitische revolutie die moet leiden tot het aan de macht komen van de politieke islam, vertegenwoordigd door de Moslim Broederschap, die gezien wordt als de bron van het islamitische terrorisme. Daarmee waren de gebeurtenissen weer makkelijk te duiden in het apocalyptische wereldbeeld van de islamhaters die de islam zien als het pure kwaad, de antithese van het verlichtingsideaal dat de demonstranten eigenlijk vertegenwoordigden.

Eigenlijk spreken die islamhaters zichzelf op fundamentele wijze tegen. Hun gedachtegang is namelijk fundamenteel in tegenspraak met het zichzelf toegeëigende monopolie van de islamhaters op verlichting, namelijk dat je open staat voor nieuwe informatie en niet alles meteen in een goed-kwaad sjabloon plaatst. In plaats daarvan houden ze er een soortgelijke redenering op na als die van Mubarak: mij of de chaos. In feite stellen zij zich aan de kant van de autoritaire staat. Tegelijkertijd is dit ook de redenatie van Israel, die alleen interesse toont voor regimes in de regio die het vredesverdrag naleven; wat ze doen met de eigen bevolking is verder van weinig belang.

In het wij-zij beeld van de islamhaters komt het Westen op voor democratie en kent alleen het Westen een echte democratische gezindheid. En ook dat is niet meer dan een leeg cliché. De ondersteuning van de betogers door Barack en de eis voor het onmiddellijke vertrek van Mubarak is slechts in schijn een verdediging van de democratie. Daarvoor zijn de westerse belangen voor het voortbestaan van dit regime te groot. Hoe langer Mubarak blijft zitten, hoe groter zal de overwinning lijken als hij eenmaal vertrekt. Het is echter zonneklaar dat de Egyptische militairen hun lucratieve activiteiten evenals hun beleid ten opzichte van de Verenigde Staten en Israel zullen voortzetten. De militairen zullen immers hun belangen in de economie (door sommigen geschat op 40 procent van BNP) en hun inkomsten uit de VS, 1,3 miljar dollar, niet snel laten schieten.

Als reactie hierop zullen islamitische extremisten de kop weer opsteken, aanslagen plegen en chaos en ellende verspreiden. Iedereen kan weer opgelucht adem halen. De islambashers hebben hun gelijk gehaald dat de islam niet deugt en veranderingen onmogelijk zijn. De Egyptische militairen hebben het Westen ervan overtuigd dat zij het enige alternatief zijn voor de chaos. De westerse regeringen zullen zeggen dat ze geen andere keuze hebben dan deze regimes te ondersteunen. De oude Oriëntalistische clichés over de islam en het Midden-Oosten zijn weer in ere hersteld.

Dit zou jammer zijn, niet alleen omdat de Egyptenaren beter verdienen, maar vooral omdat de geschiedenis anders had kunnen lopen. In het positieve scenario is het heel goed mogelijk dat er nieuwe leiders voortkomen uit de demonstraties die niet gericht zijn op een islamitische oplossing. Daarvoor zijn er aanwijzingen genoeg. Bij geen van de protestgolven van het afgelopen decennium waren de Moslim Broeders sterk aanwezig. Dit gold voor de steundemonstraties aan de tweede Palestijnse intifada, de kifaya-beweging van 2004 en de arbeidersstakingsgolven in 2008.

Daarnaast zijn er aanwijzingen dat de parlementsverkiezingen van 2005, waarbij de Moslim Broederschap 88 van de 166 kandidaten won (van 444 zetels), het hoogtepunt was van de populariteit van de MB. Hoewel uit alle verslagen van de activiteiten van die leden in het parlement blijkt dat ze op allerlei terreinen actief waren en met wetsvoorstellen kwamen om burgerrechten te verbeteren en grotere controle wilden uitoefenen op de politiek van de regering, is deze tactiek uiteindelijk mislukt.

Dit is niet zo verwonderlijk. Uit allerlei aanwijzingen blijkt dat de islamistische beweging op zijn retour is. De laatste decennia zijn de tekortkomingen van de islamistische beweging duidelijk aan het licht gekomen. Bij gebrek aan een programma en een wezenlijke hervorming van de maatschappij was de Moslim Broederschap gedwongen steeds meer politieke ideeën uit het Westen over te nemen en verwaterde haar oorspronkelijke ideeëngoed. Een islamitische staat ging overboord, de toepassing van de shari’a bleek ingewikkelder dan men dacht en het toepassen van geweld was al veel eerder geen succesformule gebleken. De jihadisten spelen in dit verhaal dan ook geen enkele noemenswaardige rol.

De betogingen van de afgelopen tijd leken dat beeld te bevestigen. Jammer dat de islambashers graag hun eigen vijanden in stand willen houden en dat de belangen van het Westen zelden parallel lopen met die van de Arabische bevolking. Iedereen was eigenlijk wel toe aan iets anders. De Egyptische facebook generatie had juist een aardige combinatie weten te vinden tussen individualisme en flashmobs, prudentie en duivelse moed, rationalisme en pathos.

Roel Meijer is docent moderne geschiedenis van het Midden-Oosten aan de Radboud Universiteit, afdeling Islam en Arabisch, en senior onderzoeker aan Clingendael, Hij is redacteur van de bundel Global Salafism: Islam’s New religious Movement (New York, Columbia UP, 2009), en samen met Edwin Bakker, redacteur van The Muslim Brotherhood in Europe: Burdens of the Past, Challenges of the Future (Hurst, verschijnt later dit jaar)

Noot: In samenwerking met het Soeterbeeck programma houdt de afdeling Islam en Arabisch van de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen op donderdag 10 februari van 12.45 – 13.45 een actualiteiten college over de crisis in Egypte.

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"Now, it's gonna be a long one" – some first conclusions from the Egyptian revolution

Posted on February 8th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: anthropology, Guest authors, Headline, Society & Politics in the Middle East.

Guest Author: Samuli Schielke

Sunday, February 6, 2011

Today is my scheduled day of departure from Egypt. As I sit on Cairo airport waiting for my flight to Frankfurt, it is the first time on this trip that regret anything – I regret that I am leaving today and not staying. I have told to every Egyptian I have met today that I am not escaping, just going for my work at the university and returning soon. But perhaps it has been more to convince myself than them. My European friend who like me came here last Monday is staying for another two weeks. My American friend in Imbaba tells that for months, she has been homesick to go to America and see her parents and family again. But now when the US government would even give her a free flight, she says that she cannot go. This is her home, and she is too attached to the people, and especially to her husband. Two days ago, he was arrested on his way back from Tahrir square, held captive for four hours, interrogated, and tortured with electroshocks. He is now more determined than ever. How could she leave him behind? But today is my scheduled departure, and I only intended to come for a week and then return to do what I can to give a balanced idea of the situation in Egypt in the public debates in Germany and Finland. Tomorrow I will give a phone interview to Deutschlandradio (a German news radio), and on Tuesday I will give a talk in Helsinki in Finland. Right now, I feel that maintaining high international pressure on the Egyptian government is going to be crucial, and I will do what I can.

There remains little to be reported about the beginning day in Cairo, but maybe I can try to draw some first conclusion from this week.

The morning in Cairo today was marked by a return to normality everywhere except on Tahrir Square itself, where the demonstrations continue. Now that the streets are full with people again, the fear I felt in the past days on the streets is gone, too. If I stayed, today would be the day when I would again walk through the streets of Cairo, talk with people and feel the atmosphere.

From what I know from this morning’s short excursion in Giza and Dokki, the people remain split, but also ready to change their mind. As my Egyptian friend and I took a taxi to Dokki, the taxi driver was out on the street for the first time since 24 January, and had fully believed what the state television had told him. But as my friend, a journalist, told him what was really going on, the driver amazingly quickly shifted his opinion again, and remembered the old hatred against the oppressive system, the corruption, and the inflation that brought people to the streets last week. A big part of the people here seem impressively willing to change their mind, and if many of those who were out on the streets on 28 January – and also of those who stayed home – have changed their mind in favour of normality in the past days, they do expect things to get better now, and if they don’t, they are likely to change their minds again. This is the impression I also got from the taxi driver who took me to the airport from Dokki. He, too, had not left his house for eleven days, not out of fear for himself, but because he felt that he must stay at home to protect his family. He was very sceptical of what Egyptian television was telling, but he did expect things to get better now. What will he and others like him do if things don’t get better?

As I came to Egypt a week ago I expected that the revolution would follow one of the two courses that were marked by the events of 1989: either a successful transition to democracy by overthrowing of the old regime as happened in eastern Europe, or shooting everybody dead as happened in China. Again, my prediction was wrong (although actually the government did try the Chinese option twice, only unsuccessfully), and now something more complicated is going on.

This is really the question now: Will things get better or not? In other words: Was the revolution a success of a failure? And on what should its success be measured? If it is to be measured on the high spirits and sense of dignity of those who stood firm against the system, it was a success. If it is to be measured by the emotional switch of those who after the Friday of Anger submitted again to the mixture of fear and admiration of the president’s sweet words, it was a failure. If the immense local and international pressure on the Egyptian government will effect sustainable political change, it will be a success. But it will certainly not be an easy success, and very much continuous pressure is needed, as a friend of mine put it in words this morning: “Now, it’s gonna be a long one.”

In Dokki I visited a European-Latin American couple who are determined to stay in Egypt. He was on Tahrir Square on Wednesday night when the thugs attacked the demonstrators, and he spent all night carrying wounded people to the makeshift field hospital. He says: “What really worries me is the possibility that Mubarak goes and is replaced by Omar Suleyman who then sticks to power with American approval. He is the worst of them all.” Just in case, he is trying to get his Latin American girlfriend a visa for Schengen area, because if Omar Suleyman’s campaign against alleged “foreign elements” and “particular agendas” continues, the day may come when they are forced to leave after all.

A few words about the foreigners participating in the revolution need to be said.. Like the Spanish civil war once, so also the Egyptian revolution has moved many foreigners, mostly those living in Egypt since long, to participate in the struggle for democracy. This has been an ambiguous struggle in certain ways, because the state television has exploited the presence of foreigners on Tahrir Square in order to spread quite insane conspiracy theories about foreign agendas behind the democracy movement. The alliance against Egypt, the state television wants to make people believe, is made up of agents of Israel, Hamas, and Iran. That’s about the most insane conspiracy theory I have heard of for a long time. But unfortunately, conspiracy theories do not need to be logical to be convincing. But to step back to the ground of reality, if this revolution has taught me one thing is that the people of Egypt do not need to look up to Europe or America to imagine a better future. They have shown themselves capable of imagining a better future of their own making (with some important help from Tunisia). Compared to our governments with their lip service to democracy and appeasement of dictators, Egyptians have given the world an example in freedom and courage which we all should look up to as an example. This sense of admiration and respect is what has drawn so many foreigners to Tahrir Square in the past days, including myself.

As an anthropologist who has long worked on festive culture, I noticed a strikingly festive aspect to the revolutionary space of Tahrir Square. It is not just a protest against an oppressive regime and a demand for freedom. In itself, it is freedom. It is a real, actual, lived moment of the freedom and dignity that the pro-democracy movement demands. As such, it is an ambiguous moment, because its stark sense of unity (there is a consensus of having absolutely no party slogans on the square) and power is bound to be transient, for even in the most successful scenario it will be followed by a long period of political transition, tactics, negotiations, party politics – all kinds of business that will not be anything like that moment of standing together and finally daring to say “no!”. But thanks to its utopian nature, it is also indestructible. Once it has been realised, it cannot be wiped out of people’s minds again. It will be an experience that, with different colourings and from different perspectives, will mark an entire generation.

In a different sense, however, the relationship of transience and persistence is a critical one. A revolution is not a quick business; it requires persistence. Some have that persistence, and millions have continued demonstrating (remember that in Alexandria and all major provincial cities there are ongoing in demonstrations as well). Others, however, had the anger and energy to go out to the streets on the Friday of Anger on 28 January to say loudly “No!”, but not the persistence to withstand the lure of the president’s speech on Tuesday 1 February when Mubarak showed himself as a mortal human, an old soldier determined to die and be buried in his country. A journalist noted to me that this was the first time Mubarak has ever mentioned his own mortality – the very promise that he will die one day seems to have softened many people.

Speaking of generations, this revolution has been called a youth revolution by all sides, be it by the demonstrators themselves, the state media, or international media. Doing so has different connotations. It can mean highlighting the progressive nature of the movement, but it can also mean depicting the movement as immature. In either case, in my experience the pro-democracy movement is not really a youth movement. People of all ages support the revolution, just like there are people of all ages who oppose it or are of two minds about it. If most of the people out in the demonstrations are young, it is because most Egyptians are young.

Thinking about the way Egyptians are split about their revolution, it is interesting to see how much people offer me explicitly psychological explanations. The most simple one, regarding the switch of many of those who went out on the streets on the Friday of Anger (28 Jan) but were happy to support the president after his speech after the March of Millions (1 Feb), is that Egyptians are very emotional and prone to react emotionally, and in unpredictable ways. One of more subtle theories crystallise around the theme of Freud’s Oedipal father murder about which I wrote yesterday. Another is the Stockholm Syndrom that some have mentioned as an explanation why those who turn to support are favour of the system are often those most brutally oppressed by the same system. The Stockholm Syndrome, referring to a famous bank robbery with hostages in Stockholm, is the reaction of hostages who turn to support their abductors at whose mercy they are. There is something to it.

As I finish writing this, my plane is leaving for Frankfurt and I will be out of Egypt for a while. After these notes, I will upload also some notes from early last week which I couldn’t upload then due to lack of Internet in Egypt. Those are notes from the March of Millions on Tuesday 1 February. But unlike I was thinking at that moment, it was not the biggest demonstration in the history of Egypt. The biggest one was the Friday of Anger on 28 January when people in every street of every city went out to shout “Down with the system!” Due to the almost total media blockade by the Egyptian government, there is still much too little footage from that day. What I have seen so far, shows amazing crowds even in districts far from the city centre, but they also show very systematic violence by the police force, which shot to kill that day. Many were killed, and many more are still missing. I will try to collect image and film material from that day, and if you can send me any, your help is appreciated.

You can also see all my reports (one is still due to be uploaded later tonight) inhttp://samuliegypt.blogspot.com/ The content of the blog is in the public domain, so feel free to cite and circulate on the condition of giving credit to the original.

Greetings from revolutionary Egypt!

Samuli Schielke is a research fellow at Zentrum Moderner Orient (ZMO), Berlin. His research focusses on everyday religiosity and morality, aspiration and frustration in contemporary Egypt. In 2006 he defended his PhD Snacks and Saints: Mawlid Festivals and the Politics of Festivity, Piety and Modernity in Contemporary Egypt at the University of Amsterdam, Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences. During his stay in Cairo at the time of the protests at Tahrir Square he maintained a diary. The text here is part of that diary which you can read in full at his blog.

3 comments.

“Now, it’s gonna be a long one” – some first conclusions from the Egyptian revolution

Posted on February 8th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: anthropology, Guest authors, Headline, Society & Politics in the Middle East.

Guest Author: Samuli Schielke

Sunday, February 6, 2011

Today is my scheduled day of departure from Egypt. As I sit on Cairo airport waiting for my flight to Frankfurt, it is the first time on this trip that regret anything – I regret that I am leaving today and not staying. I have told to every Egyptian I have met today that I am not escaping, just going for my work at the university and returning soon. But perhaps it has been more to convince myself than them. My European friend who like me came here last Monday is staying for another two weeks. My American friend in Imbaba tells that for months, she has been homesick to go to America and see her parents and family again. But now when the US government would even give her a free flight, she says that she cannot go. This is her home, and she is too attached to the people, and especially to her husband. Two days ago, he was arrested on his way back from Tahrir square, held captive for four hours, interrogated, and tortured with electroshocks. He is now more determined than ever. How could she leave him behind? But today is my scheduled departure, and I only intended to come for a week and then return to do what I can to give a balanced idea of the situation in Egypt in the public debates in Germany and Finland. Tomorrow I will give a phone interview to Deutschlandradio (a German news radio), and on Tuesday I will give a talk in Helsinki in Finland. Right now, I feel that maintaining high international pressure on the Egyptian government is going to be crucial, and I will do what I can.

There remains little to be reported about the beginning day in Cairo, but maybe I can try to draw some first conclusion from this week.

The morning in Cairo today was marked by a return to normality everywhere except on Tahrir Square itself, where the demonstrations continue. Now that the streets are full with people again, the fear I felt in the past days on the streets is gone, too. If I stayed, today would be the day when I would again walk through the streets of Cairo, talk with people and feel the atmosphere.

From what I know from this morning’s short excursion in Giza and Dokki, the people remain split, but also ready to change their mind. As my Egyptian friend and I took a taxi to Dokki, the taxi driver was out on the street for the first time since 24 January, and had fully believed what the state television had told him. But as my friend, a journalist, told him what was really going on, the driver amazingly quickly shifted his opinion again, and remembered the old hatred against the oppressive system, the corruption, and the inflation that brought people to the streets last week. A big part of the people here seem impressively willing to change their mind, and if many of those who were out on the streets on 28 January – and also of those who stayed home – have changed their mind in favour of normality in the past days, they do expect things to get better now, and if they don’t, they are likely to change their minds again. This is the impression I also got from the taxi driver who took me to the airport from Dokki. He, too, had not left his house for eleven days, not out of fear for himself, but because he felt that he must stay at home to protect his family. He was very sceptical of what Egyptian television was telling, but he did expect things to get better now. What will he and others like him do if things don’t get better?

As I came to Egypt a week ago I expected that the revolution would follow one of the two courses that were marked by the events of 1989: either a successful transition to democracy by overthrowing of the old regime as happened in eastern Europe, or shooting everybody dead as happened in China. Again, my prediction was wrong (although actually the government did try the Chinese option twice, only unsuccessfully), and now something more complicated is going on.

This is really the question now: Will things get better or not? In other words: Was the revolution a success of a failure? And on what should its success be measured? If it is to be measured on the high spirits and sense of dignity of those who stood firm against the system, it was a success. If it is to be measured by the emotional switch of those who after the Friday of Anger submitted again to the mixture of fear and admiration of the president’s sweet words, it was a failure. If the immense local and international pressure on the Egyptian government will effect sustainable political change, it will be a success. But it will certainly not be an easy success, and very much continuous pressure is needed, as a friend of mine put it in words this morning: “Now, it’s gonna be a long one.”

In Dokki I visited a European-Latin American couple who are determined to stay in Egypt. He was on Tahrir Square on Wednesday night when the thugs attacked the demonstrators, and he spent all night carrying wounded people to the makeshift field hospital. He says: “What really worries me is the possibility that Mubarak goes and is replaced by Omar Suleyman who then sticks to power with American approval. He is the worst of them all.” Just in case, he is trying to get his Latin American girlfriend a visa for Schengen area, because if Omar Suleyman’s campaign against alleged “foreign elements” and “particular agendas” continues, the day may come when they are forced to leave after all.

A few words about the foreigners participating in the revolution need to be said.. Like the Spanish civil war once, so also the Egyptian revolution has moved many foreigners, mostly those living in Egypt since long, to participate in the struggle for democracy. This has been an ambiguous struggle in certain ways, because the state television has exploited the presence of foreigners on Tahrir Square in order to spread quite insane conspiracy theories about foreign agendas behind the democracy movement. The alliance against Egypt, the state television wants to make people believe, is made up of agents of Israel, Hamas, and Iran. That’s about the most insane conspiracy theory I have heard of for a long time. But unfortunately, conspiracy theories do not need to be logical to be convincing. But to step back to the ground of reality, if this revolution has taught me one thing is that the people of Egypt do not need to look up to Europe or America to imagine a better future. They have shown themselves capable of imagining a better future of their own making (with some important help from Tunisia). Compared to our governments with their lip service to democracy and appeasement of dictators, Egyptians have given the world an example in freedom and courage which we all should look up to as an example. This sense of admiration and respect is what has drawn so many foreigners to Tahrir Square in the past days, including myself.

As an anthropologist who has long worked on festive culture, I noticed a strikingly festive aspect to the revolutionary space of Tahrir Square. It is not just a protest against an oppressive regime and a demand for freedom. In itself, it is freedom. It is a real, actual, lived moment of the freedom and dignity that the pro-democracy movement demands. As such, it is an ambiguous moment, because its stark sense of unity (there is a consensus of having absolutely no party slogans on the square) and power is bound to be transient, for even in the most successful scenario it will be followed by a long period of political transition, tactics, negotiations, party politics – all kinds of business that will not be anything like that moment of standing together and finally daring to say “no!”. But thanks to its utopian nature, it is also indestructible. Once it has been realised, it cannot be wiped out of people’s minds again. It will be an experience that, with different colourings and from different perspectives, will mark an entire generation.

In a different sense, however, the relationship of transience and persistence is a critical one. A revolution is not a quick business; it requires persistence. Some have that persistence, and millions have continued demonstrating (remember that in Alexandria and all major provincial cities there are ongoing in demonstrations as well). Others, however, had the anger and energy to go out to the streets on the Friday of Anger on 28 January to say loudly “No!”, but not the persistence to withstand the lure of the president’s speech on Tuesday 1 February when Mubarak showed himself as a mortal human, an old soldier determined to die and be buried in his country. A journalist noted to me that this was the first time Mubarak has ever mentioned his own mortality – the very promise that he will die one day seems to have softened many people.

Speaking of generations, this revolution has been called a youth revolution by all sides, be it by the demonstrators themselves, the state media, or international media. Doing so has different connotations. It can mean highlighting the progressive nature of the movement, but it can also mean depicting the movement as immature. In either case, in my experience the pro-democracy movement is not really a youth movement. People of all ages support the revolution, just like there are people of all ages who oppose it or are of two minds about it. If most of the people out in the demonstrations are young, it is because most Egyptians are young.

Thinking about the way Egyptians are split about their revolution, it is interesting to see how much people offer me explicitly psychological explanations. The most simple one, regarding the switch of many of those who went out on the streets on the Friday of Anger (28 Jan) but were happy to support the president after his speech after the March of Millions (1 Feb), is that Egyptians are very emotional and prone to react emotionally, and in unpredictable ways. One of more subtle theories crystallise around the theme of Freud’s Oedipal father murder about which I wrote yesterday. Another is the Stockholm Syndrom that some have mentioned as an explanation why those who turn to support are favour of the system are often those most brutally oppressed by the same system. The Stockholm Syndrome, referring to a famous bank robbery with hostages in Stockholm, is the reaction of hostages who turn to support their abductors at whose mercy they are. There is something to it.

As I finish writing this, my plane is leaving for Frankfurt and I will be out of Egypt for a while. After these notes, I will upload also some notes from early last week which I couldn’t upload then due to lack of Internet in Egypt. Those are notes from the March of Millions on Tuesday 1 February. But unlike I was thinking at that moment, it was not the biggest demonstration in the history of Egypt. The biggest one was the Friday of Anger on 28 January when people in every street of every city went out to shout “Down with the system!” Due to the almost total media blockade by the Egyptian government, there is still much too little footage from that day. What I have seen so far, shows amazing crowds even in districts far from the city centre, but they also show very systematic violence by the police force, which shot to kill that day. Many were killed, and many more are still missing. I will try to collect image and film material from that day, and if you can send me any, your help is appreciated.

You can also see all my reports (one is still due to be uploaded later tonight) inhttp://samuliegypt.blogspot.com/ The content of the blog is in the public domain, so feel free to cite and circulate on the condition of giving credit to the original.

Greetings from revolutionary Egypt!

Samuli Schielke is a research fellow at Zentrum Moderner Orient (ZMO), Berlin. His research focusses on everyday religiosity and morality, aspiration and frustration in contemporary Egypt. In 2006 he defended his PhD Snacks and Saints: Mawlid Festivals and the Politics of Festivity, Piety and Modernity in Contemporary Egypt at the University of Amsterdam, Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences. During his stay in Cairo at the time of the protests at Tahrir Square he maintained a diary. The text here is part of that diary which you can read in full at his blog.

3 comments.

Closing the week 5 – Featuring the Tunisia & Egypt Uprising

Posted on February 6th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: anthropology, Blogosphere, Society & Politics in the Middle East.

Most popular on Closer this week

1. Two Faces of Revolution by Linda Herrera
2. Verandering komt eraan? – De ‘Arabische revolte’ in Jordanië door Egbert Harmsen
3. ‘Telefoon uit Tunesië’ – Een persoonlijk verslag van de Jasmijn-revolutie door Carpe DM

Previous roundups: Tunisia Uprising I & Tunisia Uprising II

• If you want to stay updated and did not subscribe yet, you can do so HERE

• You can follow me on Twitter: Martijn5155

Essential reading
Egypt’s Class Conflict | Informed Comment

Why has the Egyptian state lost its legitimacy? Max Weber distinguished between power and authority. Power flows from the barrel of a gun, and the Egyptian state still has plenty of those. But Weber defines authority as the likelihood that a command will be obeyed. Leaders who have authority do not have to shoot people. The Mubarak regime has had to shoot over 100 people in the past few days, and wound more. Literally hundreds of thousands of people have ignored Mubarak’s command that they observe night time curfews. He has lost his authority.

LRB · Adam Shatz · Mubarak’s Last Breath

Egypt has never been a democracy. The military has always dominated its political life. Even during the age of liberal nationalism after the First World War, when it had a lively parliamentary life, popular sovereignty was sharply curtailed by British power. Since the 1952 coup which brought Nasser to power, it has been ruled by military dictatorship, although the establishment of multi-party politics in the late 1970s brought a measure of cosmetic diversification. Still, autocratic though they were, both Nasser and Sadat ensured that what Egypt did mattered. Nasser’s failures were spectacular: the aborted union with Syria in the United Arab Republic; the disastrous intervention in the civil war in Yemen; the catastrophic 1967 defeat to Israel that resulted in the destruction of three-quarters of Egypt’s air force and the loss of the Sinai; the creation of a vast and inefficient public sector which the state could not afford; the suppression of dissent, indeed of politics itself. But he also carried out land reform, nationalised the Suez Canal, built the Aswan High Dam, and turned Egypt into a major force in the Non-Aligned Movement. When Nasser spoke, the Arab world listened. Sadat broke with Nasser’s pan-Arab vision, promoting an Egypt-first agenda that ultimately led the country into the arms of the US and Israel. But, like Nasser, he was a statesman of considerable flair and cunning, with a prodigious ability to seize the initiative. By leading Egypt to a partial victory in the 1973 war, he washed away some of the shame of 1967, and eventually secured the restoration of the Sinai. And though his peace with Israel infuriated the Arabs, whom Nasser had electrified, he made Egypt a player in the world. Under Mubarak, Egypt, the ‘mother of the earth’ (umm idduniya), has seen its influence plummet. Nowhere is the decline of the Sunni Arab world so acutely felt as in Cairo ‘the Victorious’, a mega-city much of which has turned into an enormous slum. The air is so thick with fumes you can hardly breathe, the atmosphere as constricted as the country’s political life.

The dignity of Egyptian youth « The Immanent Frame

As I listened, and watched the crowds listening, there were several moments in which a sense of disbelief was discernible amid the seething, boiling anger. Midway through the speech, I think that all Egyptians were asking themselves whether it was possible that their leader of thirty years did not hear his people’s demands. Is it conceivable that, despite the whole world having heard the demand for him to go, he would assert that he will remain in his position until his present term is over (in September 2011)? In other words, is it at all comprehensible that the message he is giving to his people is: “I do not care what you want . . . you do not know what is good for you . . . you have been manipulated . . . I will do as I see fit”? Does this Egyptian Nero not realize that he is burning his people?

Myths of Mubarak « The Immanent Frame

The term ‘secular’ and its conceptual affiliates are doing a lot of work in misrepresenting the uprising in Egypt. ‘Secular’ politics has been taken to mean ‘good’ politics (limited democratization, stability, and support for the peace treaty with Israel), and ‘Islamic’ politics is being translated as ‘bad’ politics (the myriad dangers allegedly posed by the Muslim Brotherhood and its allies). Accounts of the current situation in Egypt are handicapped by an inability to read politics in Egypt and Muslim-majority societies outside of this overly simplistic and politically distorting lens.

LRB · Adam Shatz · After Mubarak

From the Obama administration we can expect criticisms of the crackdown, prayers for peace, and more calls for ‘restraint’ on ‘both sides’ – as if there were symmetry between unarmed protesters and the military regime – but Suleiman will be given the benefit of the doubt. Unlike ElBaradei, he’s a man Washington knows it can deal with. The men and women congregating in Tahrir Square have the misfortune to live in a country that shares a border with Israel, and to be fighting a regime that for the last three decades has provided indispensable services to the US. They are well aware of this. They know that if the West allows the Egyptian movement to be crushed, it will be, in part, because of the conviction that ‘we are not them,’ and that we can’t allow them to have what we have. Despite the enormous odds, they continue to fight.

LRB · Issandr El Amrani · Why Tunis, Why Cairo?

When Ben-Ali fled from Tunis, he created a vacuum at the top of the state that was imperfectly but quickly filled. The initial interim government did not please many, but a sense of civic duty appears for now to have stabilised the situation without a resort to authoritarianism. Mubarak, on the other hand, created a security vacuum in order to spread panic. In agreeing to step down, he tried to ensure that the regime would survive. Egypt is not Tunisia, at least not yet.

Uprisings: From Tunis to Cairo by William Pfaff | The New York Review of Books

Dictators do not usually die in bed. Successful retirement is always a problem for them, and not all solve it. It is a problem for everybody else when they leave. What’s to be done afterward? The popular uprising that overturned the dictatorial Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali regime in Tunisia in mid-January sent a thrill of hope through Arab populations.

Leading Egyptian Feminist, Nawal El Saadawi: “Women and Girls are Beside Boys in the Streets”

Renowned feminist and human rights activist Nawal El Saadawi was a political prisoner and exiled from Egypt for years. Now she has returned to Cairo, and she joins us to discuss the role of women during the last seven days of unprecedented protests. “Women and girls are beside boys in the streets,” El Saadawi says. “We are calling for justice, freedom and equality, and real democracy and a new constitution, no discrimination between men and women, no discrimination between Muslims and Christians, to change the system… and to have a real democracy.” [includes rush transcript]

State Culture, State Anarchy

The central tenets of the “culture and anarchy” canard may be old, but they have taken on new urgency this week and now there is nothing subtle about the message: popular desire for the regime’s removal is ripping apart the Egyptian social fabric and hurting the Egyptian economy; the revolt isn’t authentically Egyptian, but the result of foreign agitation by the likes of Aljazeera and Hamas; the Muslim Brotherhood is behind the rebellion and they are the ones who will stand to gain the most from it; Muslim Brothers are radical Islamists; radical Islam is a threat to Western civilization. And so on. It does not matter whether the pieces of the argument are true. It does not matter whether they contradict each other. What matters is that they all point in a single direction: change = chaos and ruin, the end of civilization.

Yemen is not Tunisia or Egypt – CNN.com

“Yemen is not Tunisia.” These were the words that President Ali Abdullah Saleh spoke to his people on television last Sunday.

As street protests erupt in Yemen’s capital, it is not surprising that an Arab leader who has held power since a bloodless coup in 1978 would dismiss calls for his ouster.

But he was correct.

Informed views from the ground
The Egyptian Protests: A View from the Ground (The Beginning) | Waq al-Waq | Big Think

it has been an interesting week in Cairo. What follows is not analysis or expert opinion, but my own notes from the past several days.

The Egyptian Protests: A View from the Ground (Neighborhood Watch) | Waq al-Waq | Big Think

I sat in front of the bank, which has only one private guard, who is asleep inside. Megdi the guard keeps telling us to wake him up if anything happens. Still, I’m not sure what he can do. Megdi only has six bullets.

The Egyptian Revolution: First Impressions from the Field

This revolution, too, will leave traces deep in the social fabric and psyche for a long time, but in ways that go beyond the youth. While the youth were the driving force in the earlier days, the revolution quickly became national in every sense; over the days I saw an increasing demographic mix in demonstrations, where people from all age groups, social classes, men and women, Muslims and Christians, urban people and peasants—virtually all sectors of society, acting in large numbers and with a determination rarely seen before.

Shippensburg University professor recalls a roiled Egypt – Chambersburg Public Opinion

According to Dr. Karl Lorenz, Shippensburg University professor of anthropology, the people of Egypt have waited 30 years for government reform.

Lorenz lived in Egypt with his wife from August 2009 to July on a Fulbright Scholars Grant. As part of his proposal, he studied predynastic pottery style changes. Studying the pottery styles gave Lorenz insight into the unification of upper and lower Egypt and the rise to pharaohs. His wife researched and also taught at a university.

The rich symbolism of the square in Cairo – Philly.com

When she first traveled to Cairo for fieldwork in 1993, Farha Ghannam recalled, Tahrir Square was mostly used as a bus depot.

Today, it’s the battleground on which the future of Egypt is being fought – a space rich with symbolism and meaning, held and defended by protesters at the cost of some lives.

“There’s this feeling [among demonstrators] that ‘if we lose at Tahrir Square, we’re going to lose the fight,’ ” said Ghannam, an anthropology professor at Swarthmore College who studies the use of public space in Egypt.

tabsir.net » Dawn

I find it very difficult to assemble emotions, memories and impressions to respond to the events in Tunisia and Egypt. I have been responding sharply to others who seized the moment to offer their analysis. Certain characterizations of Egyptians did not sit well with me. I also fear that specific arguments are easily manipulated — that the centers of power who have so deftly dominated the media, huge sums of money and many segments of national elites will thwart the resurgence of popular resistance and demonstration of public will. But since those consulted by Barry and Joe and their “teams” are hard at work, spreading fear of a future Egypt non-compliant with the terms of Camp David, conjuring up the Islamist bogeyman, and (one fears) holding Hosni’s hand, we too should speak.

Tunisia
One Small Revolution – NYTimes.com

Tunisia has a relatively large middle class because of something so obvious it goes unremarked upon: it is a real state, with historical and geographical legitimacy, where political arguments are about budgets and food subsidies, not the extremist ideologies that have plagued its neighbors, Algeria and Libya. It is a state not only because of the legacy of Rome and other empires, but because of human agency, in the person of Habib Bourguiba, one of the lesser-known great men of the 20th century.

Tunisia analysis: Old guard, ‘new’ government | World news | The Guardian

The prime minister himself, 69-year-old Mohamed Ghannouchi, is a Ben Ali loyalist of long standing, having served since 1999. In Tunisia, he became known as “Monsieur Oui Oui” for always saying yes to the president.

To many ordinary Tunisians, these are worrying signs. In the words of a trade unionist quoted on Twitter: “Tunisia has got rid of the dictator but hasn’t got rid of the dictatorship yet.”

Egypt
The Egyptian Uprising: Facts and Fiction | Dissident Voice

There is really only one story here and it is ever so uncomplicated. This is an uprising against an octogenarian dictator who could have done us all a favor by retiring two decades ago. After he goes, the remaining 84 million Egyptians can sort things out among themselves. Everything else is fiction.

Brian Whitaker’s blog, February 2011

The situation in Egypt, as a friend from Alexandria described it to me in an email this morning, is “quite fluid and extremely scary”. It’s also very difficult to work out what is really going on behind the scenes.

Egyptian protesters: What I’m fighting for – Egyptian Protests – Salon.com

What’s too often lost in the coverage of Egypt’s violent clashes are the stories of the people fighting. This slide show offers a look at 10 individuals who make up the crowd of thousands gathered in Tahrir Square day after day. They are students, sailors, teachers, executives, government employees and members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Meet Egypt’s protesters — the people who are behind one of the greatest moments in modern Egyptian history.

Egypt Endgame | Marc Lynch

What now? I would say that the time has come for the Obama administration to escalate to the next step of actively trying to push Mubarak out. They were right to not do so earlier. No matter how frustrated activists have been by his perceived hedging, until yesterday it was not the time to move to the bottom line. Mubarak is an American ally of 30 years and needed to be given the chance to respond appropriately. And everyone seems to forget that magical democracy words (a phrase which as far as I know I coined) don’t work. Obama saying “Mubarak must go” would not have made Mubarak go, absent the careful preparation of the ground so that the potential power-brokers saw that they really had no choice. Yesterday’s orgy of state-sanctioned violence should be the moment to make clear that there is now no alternative.

Mubarak’s phantom presidency – Opinion – Al Jazeera English

The “March of Millions” in Cairo marks the spectacular emergence of a new political society in Egypt. This uprising brings together a new coalition of forces, uniting reconfigured elements of the security state with prominent business people, internationalist leaders, and relatively new (or newly reconfigured) mass movements of youth, labour, women’s and religious groups. President Hosni Mubarak lost his political power on Friday, January 28.

The Battle for Egypt | The Courier

Kuppinger: Before the uprising happened in Tunisia earlier in January few, including myself, would have foreseen the current events in Cairo. When the protesters in Tunisia were successful and ousted their dictator in a matter of days, it was clear that people in other Arab countries and here in particular, the vast ranks of the younger generation were watching these events very carefully. They took and compared notes. At that point it became increasingly clear that Tunisia could become a model.

The henchmen | Inanities

The use of hired thugs is classic Mubarak. The regime’s relationship with its people has always depended on intimidation and violence, which proved problematic with the wave of demonstrations and labour protests that have been a growing phenomenon since 2003 – acts of public police rage tend to put the tourists off. In 2005 elections young men were paid to sexually assault female protestors. Last year during the trial of two policemen accused of involvement in the death of Khaled Said a rowdy group of teenagers stood outside the courtroom and accused anti-torture protestors of being Israeli spies, before launching missiles at them. During the elections boys in matching t-shirts danced in front of polling stations while burly colleagues intimated voters on behalf of National Democratic Party candidates.

The who’s who of the has-beens – Blog – The Arabist

I know a lot of journalists (and even some normal, decent people) out there are wondering about the who’s who of the regime. As a person with a someone unhealthy obsession with the Egyptian regime for over a decade, I have been making charts of who’s who for a while.

Rich, Poor and a Rift Exposed by Unrest – NYTimes.com

Over the past several days, hundreds of thousands of Egyptians — from indigent fruit peddlers and doormen to students and engineers, even wealthy landlords — poured into the streets together to denounce President Hosni Mubarak and battle his omnipresent security police. Then, on Friday night, the police pulled out of Egypt’s major cities abruptly, and tensions between rich and poor exploded.

Egyptian Opposition’s Old Guard Falls In Behind Young Leaders – NYTimes.com

“Most of us are under 30,” said Amr Ezz, a 27-year-old lawyer who was one of the group as part of the April 6 Youth Movement, which organized an earlier day of protests last week via Facebook. They were surprised and delighted to see that more than 90,000 people signed up online to participate, emboldening others to turn out and bringing tens of thousands of mostly young people into the streets.

What’s Happening in Egypt Explained (UPDATED) | Mother Jones

What’s happening? Inspired by the recent protests that led to the fall of the Tunisian government and the ousting of longtime Tunisian dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Egyptians have joined other protesters across the Arab world (in Algeria, notably) in protesting their autocratic governments, high levels of corruption, and grinding poverty. In Egypt, tens of thousands of protesters have taken to the streets.

ZCommunications | Whither Egypt? by Gilbert Achcar | ZNet Article

The Egyptian opposition includes a vast array of forces. There are parties like the Wafd, which are legal parties and constitute what may be called the liberal opposition. Then there is a grey zone occupied by the Muslim Brotherhood. It does not have a legal status but is tolerated by the regime. Its whole structure is visible; it is not an underground force. The Muslim Brotherhood is certainly, and by far, the largest force in the opposition. When Mubarak’s regime, under US pressure, granted some space to the opposition in the 2005 parliamentary elections, the Muslim Brotherhood––running as “independents”––managed to get 88 MPs, i.e. 20 percent of the parliamentary seats, despite all obstacles. In the last elections held last November and December, after the Mubarak regime had decided to close down the limited space that it had opened in 2005, the Muslim Brotherhood almost vanished from parliament, losing all its seats but one.

“Revolutionaries on the Roof” « zunguzungu

Al Jazeera producer Evan Hill posted a (translated) video clip called ”Revolutionaries on the Roof” that deserves wide circulation. It is described as ”Young protesters occupying an apartment building near the site of fierce battles between pro- and anti-government crowds discuss their motivations, the events of the past two weeks, and the diverse make-up of Egypt’s democracy movement. (With reporting and translation by Lara el-Gibaly)”

Freedom, Democracy and the State
Too late for reform – Blog – The Arabist

I like Michele Dunne — she has been consistent for a decade on Egypt, and strikes the right tone here. I remember we sat together a couple of months ago and she laughed at the idea that Omar Suleiman could be a transition figure for Egypt. Here she argues that the US should not be backing Suleiman, it should be backing bottom-up transition.

Egypt’s two futures: Brutality and false reforms, or democracy

OVER THE past few days the world has seen a vivid portrait of the two sides in Egypt’s crisis. There has been the orchestrated brutality and cynical facade of compromise presented by the regime of Hosni Mubarak, who while clinging to his office until September is trying to destroy the opposition and ensure the perpetuation of 50 years of autocracy. In Cairo’s Tahrir Square and in other plazas around the country is the alternative: millions of mostly secular and middle-class citizens, led by the young, who seek genuine democracy and whose regular chant is “we are peaceful.”

Supporting democracy in the Middle East requires abandoning a vision of Pax-Americana

As the Mubarak regime turns to violence in a vain attempt to repress the peaceful protests that have swept Egypt’s streets for over ten days, the risks associated with current U.S. strategy for Egypt and the wider region continue to grow. In its response to the events, the Obama administration has subtly shifted its message, incrementally increasing pressure on the regime over the last week. But the more important story is the remarkable continuities reflected in the administration’s approach.

The Duck of Minerva: Egyptian “People Power,” Civil Society, and the U.S.

Notwithstanding the uncertainties, it is worthwhile to think more about the implications. In the long term, the events of last week would seem to mean more democracy or at least more democratic input into government in Egypt. Regardless, any new government will likely mean leaders less willing to do the bidding of the U.S., whether because of their own beliefs or because of the force of popular sentiment. (Certainly an important undercurrent in the journalistic reporting has been strong anti-American sentiments expressed by many of the protesters.) It is good that American policymakers seem to realize this. President Obama is quoted as stating several times at a high level meeting yesterday that “the outcome has to be decided by the Egyptian people, and the U.S. cannot be in a position of dictating events”–or, in my view, much influencing them.

David H. Price: Challenging America’s Pharaoh

Anyone who has lived in Egypt for an extended period of time or has traveled there for extended stays over the past thirty years should not be surprised at the current uprising. The only surprising thing is that this uprising didn’t happen years or decades sooner.

Johann Hari: We All Helped Suppress the Egyptians — With Our Taxes. So How Do We Change?

The old slogan from the 1960s has come true: the revolution has been televised. The world is watching the Bastille fall on 24/7 rolling news and Tweeting the death-spasms of Mubarak-Antoinette. This elderly thug is trying to beat and tear-gas and buy himself enough time to smuggle his family’s estimated $25bn in loot out of the country, and to install a successor friendly to his interests. The Egyptian people — half of whom live on less than $2 a day — seem determined to prevent the pillage and not to wait until September to drive out a dictator dripping in blood and bad hair dye.

ETHNOGRAFIX: Power, realpolitik, and freedom: Egypt and US Ideals about Freedom

What absolutely blows me away is how quickly some folks drop their supposed ideals about freedom and democracy when the people under consideration are far away (like in Egypt, for example). It’s shocking, actually, to hear some folks out there calling for the support of Mubarak as a close ally (check the comments section). I don’t get it. Democracy, it seems, only applies here at home. When it comes to a distant population like the people of Egypt, it seems that many people are willing to sidestep all of the rhetoric about political freedom and openly advocate supporting a repressive policy state, all in the name of “our interests.” Horribly ironic, no? Granted, the situation in Egypt is far from clear, but I definitely do not think that going back to the “support the nearest dictator who will toe the line” model is the way to go. Absolutely not. Anyway, here are some quotes that are apt for folks on all sides of the political spectrum here in the US:

But what about the Muslim Brotherhood?
Concerns about the Muslim Brotherhood: Israel Fears Regime Change in Egypt – SPIEGEL ONLINE – News – International

Israel is watching developments in Egypt with concern. The government is standing by autocratic Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, out of fear that the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood could take power and start supplying arms to Hamas.

Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt Opposition Party, In The Spotlight During Protests

In media coverage of the ongoing protests rocking Egypt, the phrase “Muslim Brotherhood” has cropped up more than once. Who is this group, and what role are they playing in the protests?

Why we shouldn’t fear the Muslim Brotherhood – War Room – Salon.com

To get some hard facts and context about the controversial Islamic movement, we spoke with Nathan Brown, a political science professor at George Washington University and director of its Institute for Middle East Studies, who has written extensively on the Muslim Brotherhood. What follows is a transcript of our conversation, edited for length and clarity.

5 Reasons the Muslim Brotherhood Won’t Turn On Israel | Politics | Religion Dispatches

These days, everybody’s in the business of panicking over the potential role of the Muslim Brotherhood. But rather than discuss where the Brotherhood has been in the past, I suggest looking to the future. Events on the ground are changing every few hours, so this is an exercise in informed speculation. Here are five reasons why the Muslim Brotherhood will find it very hard to decisively determine Egypt’s relationship with Israel. These five reasons complicate the assumption that if Mubarak goes, the peace treaty with Israel will come to an end.

Islamists at the Gates – NYTimes.com

But few Israelis really believe in that hopeful outcome. Instead, the grim assumption is that it is just a matter of time before the only real opposition group in Egypt, the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, takes power. Israelis fear that Egypt will go the way of Iran or Turkey, with Islamists gaining control through violence or gradual co-optation.

Muslim Brotherhood says it is only a minor player in Egyptian protests

The Muslim Brotherhood found its first martyr in Egypt’s popular uprising Friday, when a teenager named Mustafa Sawi was shot dead in front of the Interior Ministry. But the country’s oldest and best-organized opposition group had to take a back seat at his public funeral the next day, as the Muslim Brotherhood insists it is little more than a bit player in the outpouring of resistance to the regime of President Hosni Mubarak.

Don’t Fear Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood – Brookings Institution

Don’t Fear Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood

Egypt, Middle East Unrest, Middle East, Governance, Islamic World

Bruce Riedel, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

January 28, 2011 —
The Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia has sent a shock wave through the Arab world. Never before has the street toppled a dictator. Now Egypt is shaking, Hosni Mubarak’s 30-year-old regime faces its most serious threat ever. The prospect of change in Egypt inevitably raises questions about the oldest and strongest opposition movement in the country, the Muslim Brotherhood, also known as Ikhwan. Can America work with an Egypt where the Ikhwan is part of a transition or even a new government?

Egypt’s Islamist Riddle – WSJ.com

The 83-year-old Islamic movement, Egypt’s biggest opposition bloc, played a subdued role in the uprising. But its past performance in parliamentary elections and its dedicated following mean it will be a force to be reckoned with as Egypt moves toward open elections.

Washington’s Secret History with the Muslim Brotherhood by Ian Johnson | NYRBlog | The New York Review of Books

If this discussion evokes a sense of déjà vu, this is because over the past sixty years we have had it many times before, with almost identical outcomes. Since the 1950s, the United States has secretly struck up alliances with the Brotherhood or its offshoots on issues as diverse as fighting communism and calming tensions among European Muslims. And if we look to history, we can see a familiar pattern: each time, US leaders have decided that the Brotherhood could be useful and tried to bend it to America’s goals, and each time, maybe not surprisingly, the only party that clearly has benefited has been the Brotherhood.

Scott Atran: The Muslim Brotherhood Bogey Man

As Egyptians clash over the future of their government, Americans and Europeans have repeatedly expressed fears of the Muslim Brotherhood. “You don’t just have a government and a movement for democracy,” Tony Blair, the former British prime minister, said on Monday. “You also have others, notably the Muslim Brotherhood, who would take this in a different direction.” The previous day, House speaker John Boehner expressed hope that Hosni Mubarak would stay on as president of Egypt while instituting reforms to prevent the Muslim Brotherhood and other extremists from grabbing power.

And even more urgent, what about the jihadis?
Jihadis Debate Egypt (1) — jihadica

Not surprisingly, the jihadi online community is captivated by the uprising, but many are also bewildered about what this means for their cause, and their leaders have been slow to respond. Jarret Brachman has a point when he taunts Zawahiri: “Your Silence is Deafening.” As of Thursday afternoon, the leading jihadi forum Shamikh only featured a handful of authoritative responses to the events in Egypt, from pro-jihadi pundits, a legal scholar and other participants. However, not a word from the leadership. The closest thing to an official response is AQIM’s statement on the events in Tunisia (available also in translation).

Jihadis Debate Egypt (2) — jihadica

Such a response and the mere fact that this anonymous and murky EIJ figure, issues a message, and not a leading Egyptian al-Qaida member, is significant. Again, it demonstrates the jihadis’ irrelevance to the rapidly evolving situation in Egypt.

Uprisings and (new) media
What Al Jazeera Shows and Doesn’t Show | The Middle East Channel

But what television has brought to the world is only a partial reality. There is only Tahrir; the huge metropolitan expanse of Cairo and the families at home in neighborhoods are beyond the frame, oddly irrelevant. The participants in the revolution are the hundreds of thousands of demonstrators, not the equal numbers standing unpicturesque guard by night to ensure the safety of neighborhoods. TV shows a mass, not a massive group of individuals. This televised reality has become hugely controversial.

Wallflowers at the Revolution – NYTimes.com

Perhaps the most revealing window into America’s media-fed isolation from this crisis — small an example as it may seem — is the default assumption that the Egyptian uprising, like every other paroxysm in the region since the Green Revolution in Iran 18 months ago, must be powered by the twin American-born phenomena of Twitter and Facebook. Television news — at once threatened by the power of the Internet and fearful of appearing unhip — can’t get enough of this cliché.

Cairo Activists Use Facebook to Rattle Regime

ack in March, Maher and a friend launched a Facebook group to promote a protest planned for April 6. It became an Internet phenomenon, quickly attracting more than 70,000 members. The April 6 youth movement — amorphous, lacking a clear mission, and yet a bull’s-eye to the zeitgeist — blossomed within days into something influential enough to arouse the ire of Egypt’s internal security forces. Maher is part of a new generation in the Middle East that, through blogs, YouTube, Flickr, Twitter, and now Facebook, is using virtual reality to combat corrupt and oppressive governments. Their nascent, tech-fired rebellion has triggered a government backlash and captured the world’s attention.

Egypt protests: Police use Facebook and Twitter to track down protesters | Mail Online

Gabrielle’s dilemma is shared by many others whose activism, both online and on the streets, has brought them to the attention of the state security police.

While other protesters arrive and leave freely, thousands like Gabrielle – well-educated, middle-class idealistic young Egyptians who used social networking sites to ignite this protest – are beginning to feel trapped. Some say they are fighting for their lives, though they have thus far protested peacefully.

Why Tunisia Is Not a Social-Media Revolution | The American Prospect

commentators have held back with Tunisia, emphasizing that the uprising is a product of the passions and convictions of Tunisia’s people, not a 140-character status update. That’s a good thing. It means our conversations about technology’s transformative power are maturing past assumptions that the spread of the Internet means an inexorable spread of democracy.

But now is the time, perhaps, for a little backlash against the backlash. Scrubbing the Internet from the Tunisian people’s story leaves us with less than a full picture of this moment.

We’ve waited for this revolution for years. Other despots should quail | Mona Eltahawy | Comment is free | The Observer

But here now finally are our children – Generation Facebook – kicking aside the burden of history, determined to show us just how easy it is to tell the dictator it’s time to go.

tabsir.net » Streaming Revolution, Screaming Revolution

What happens when a revolution is not only screamed but streamed live? Can we reach a point where it gets as boring as a video game that we have played far too many times? Can our eyes become so glued to the riveting skirmish scenes in Cairo that we lose sight of all the other news that still gets generated. Sudan is having a referendum to separate south from north; Lebanon’s government has emulated Italy’s governing prowess once again (and Hizbollah has no Berlusconi figure in its ranks); world markets fear a closing of the Suez canal… and the list goes on but only with a few short notes at the bottom of the screen.

On The Media: Transcript of “Tunisia’s Twitter Revolution?” (January 21, 2011)

Demonstrators flooded the streets in Tunisia this week calling for an end to corruption and ousting President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. Many have attributed the wave of protests to the rise of the internet and social media in a country notorious for its censorship but Foreign Policy blogger Marc Lynch says it’s not that simple. He says the internet, social media and satellite channels like Al Jazeera have collectively transformed the information landscape in the Arab world.

Gladwell Still Missing the Point About Social Media and Activism: Tech News and Analysis «

In other words, as far as the New Yorker writer is concerned, the use of any specific communications tools — whether that happens to be cellphones or SMS or Twitter or Facebook — may be occurring, and may even be helping revolutionaries in countries like Egypt in some poorly-defined way, but it’s just not that interesting. This seems like an odd comment coming from someone who wrote a book all about how a series of small changes in the way people think about an issue can suddenly reach a “tipping point” and gain widespread appeal, since that’s exactly what social media does so well.

Thinking about the importance of communications “revolutions.” | Savage Minds

There has been a lot of talk about the importance of social media in recent world events. See for instance, here, here, and here. Some of the more astute commentators have referred to earlier technological revolutions and their impact on television: usenet, fax machines, television, cameras, telegraph, and even the printing press. One technology, however, always seem to get left out, maybe because it seems too “obvious,” and that is literacy.

Facebook and YouTube Fuel the Egyptian Protests – NYTimes.com

“Prior to the murder of Khaled Said, there were blogs and YouTube videos that existed about police torture, but there wasn’t a strong community around them,” said Jillian C. York, the project coordinator for the OpenNet Initiative of the Berkman Center for the Internet and Society at Harvard University. “This case changed that.”

While it is almost impossible to isolate the impact of social media tools from the general swirl of events that set off the popular uprisings across the Middle East, there is little doubt that they provided a new means for ordinary people to connect with human rights advocates trying to amass support against police abuse, torture and the Mubarak government’s permanent emergency laws allowing people to be jailed without charges.

Lecture Clarifies Social Media Usage in Recent Uprisings – CUA Tower – News

While many analysts point to “tweets” as the igniters of the recent revolution in Egypt, Dr. Jon Anderson of the Anthropology Department cautioned students on Wednesday night not to let social media hype drown out the human voices at the root of revolt.

His talk, entitled “Social Media and Politics of the Middle East,” sought to clarify the conceptions surrounding what has been termed a “twitter revolution,” regarding recent popular uprisings against long-standing dictators in Yemen, Tunisia, and Egypt.

Egypt may have turned off the Internet one phone call at a time | Technology | Los Angeles Times

Egypt’s shutdown of the Internet within its borders is an action unlike any other in the history of the World Wide Web and it might have only taken a few phone calls to do it.

MediaShift . What Role Did Social Media Play in Tunisia, Egypt Protests? | PBS

As the protests are playing out in the streets of Cairo and the rest of Egypt today, I have been glued to the live-stream of Al Jazeera English as well as the Twitter hashtag #Jan25, a top trending topic based on the big protests a few days ago. The Egyptian protests come on the heels of a similar revolution in Tunisia, where a longtime dictator, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, was ousted after young people organized protests via Facebook. We’ve heard about “Twitter revolutions” before in Iran after huge protests there in 2009, but how have things changed today? How much of a role has social media played in the turmoil happening in the Middle East? Will that continue to be the case? Vote in our poll below, or share your deeper thoughts in the comments below.

Other roundups
“A wonderful development” – Anthropologists on the Egypt Uprising (updated)

As you might have noticed, Wikan is argueing along siminar lines as the Western political elite who is about to lose an important ally in the Middle East. For them, “stability” is more important than people power, as Maximilian Forte and his co-bloggers on Zero Anthropology explain in several blog posts, among others The Fall of the American Wall: Tunisia, Egypt, and Beyond and Encircling Empire: Report #11, Focus on Egypt, Encircling Empire: Report #12, FOCUS ON EGYPT: Revolution and Counter-Revolution and The Song of the Nonaligned Nile (by Eliza Jane Darling).

Registering a revolution. Hail to the brave people of Egypt. A roundup. | Erkan’s Field Diary

Too soon to analyze, so here’s my outbox

Tunisia and Egypt uprisings – selected bookmarks « media/anthropology

Highlights on media, anthropology and the Tunisia and Egypt uprisings

anthropologyworks » Understanding Egypt

Political protests in Egypt are ongoing at the time of this writing, mainly in Cairo, Alexandria and some other cities. Who knows what will unfold in the near future? What do cultural anthropologists offer to inform our understanding of this new social movement?

Misc.
Yemen’s president says he won’t seek reelection, but he said that in 2005, too | Need to Know

Reality, however, is more than what happened in the last month. While some protesters in Sanaa have said they were inspired by the protests in Egypt and Tunisia, those two revolts did not inspire the protests anymore than my breakfast burrito did. There were protests in Aden during the Gulf Cup soccer tournament last November, protests over the parcel bombs in Sanaa in October, thousands of people protesting over the most recent round of fighting between the government and the Houthi rebels in the north in March. Yemenis protest routinely, and the last several months have seen a series of increasingly violent rallies across the entire country.

Top Ten Accomplishments of Egypt Demonstrators | Informed Comment

The protest movement in Egypt scored several victories on Friday, but did not actually succeed in getting President Hosni Mubarak to step down. Their accomplishments include:

Of people and things: Egyptian protest and cultural properties « The Berkeley Blog

In a post on the Berkeley Blog, Samuel Redman makes an argument that urges protection of antiquities be emphasized in the face of current events in Egypt, arguing that mummies are “shared global heritage”.

I addressed similar questions in writing a post on my Ancient Bodies, Ancient Lives blog about unconfirmed reports of possible damage to a unique tomb, that of the woman identified as the wet nurse of Tutankhamon. But in writing my post, I subordinated questions of the destruction of antiquities to the critical moment facing Egypt today, which concerns the future of living men and women.

Dutch
Egypte, een langzame revolutie – Vrij Nederland

Opeens is iedereen Egypte­deskundige. Een van de grappigste opmerkingen die ik, via Twitter, tegenkwam, was die van Elseviers René van Rijckevorsel dat ‘een langzame evolutie naar een eerlijker Egypte’ beter is. Voor de volledigheid haalt Van Rijckevorsel er het uitgekauwde doembeeld van veertig procent analfabete Egyptenaren en de alomtegenwoordige Moslimbroederschap bij. Volgens hem zijn er twee opties: het Iran- of het Algerije-scenario.

Frontaal Naakt. » Tunesië

Het opvallende aan Tunesië is dat het in zeer korte tijd geëscaleerd is, terwijl er in Egypte al jaren protest is tegen het presidentschap van Moubarak. Het laatste half jaar zijn er regelmatig zeer grote en ingrijpende demonstraties geweest, waarbij zelfs sprake was van een coalitie van de gehele oppositie. Desalniettemin zijn de Egyptenaren er nog niet in geslaagd af te komen van La Vache Qui Rit, zoals Moubarak wordt genoemd. De vraag is of dit door steun van de VS komt, of omdat er in Egypte ondanks alles meer uitingsvrijheid en ruimte was dan in Tunesië. Een organisatie als Kifaya, die strijdt tegen de heerschappij van Moubarak, zou tot voor kort ondenkbaar zijn geweest in Tunesië.

Best of Blogs: #25jan (links galore) | DeJaap

Wellicht ter compensatie voor de maanden(jaren?)lange media-afwezigheid zond de NOS vanmiddag live uit over Egypte. Maar in tegenstelling tot de Egyptenaren (tot vanmiddag) heeft u wel toegang tot internet en daarmee toegang tot dezelfde bronnen waar de NOS-correspondenten ook gebruik van maken.

Uiteengespatte droom stimuleert Egyptische opstand – de Volkskrant – Opinie

De afgelopen jaren kenden eigenlijk geen moment zonder protesten tegen het regime, maar de huidige volksopstand is ongekend en kan onmogelijk genegeerd worden. Het Tunesische voorbeeld gaf Egyptenaren hoop en de moed het veiligheidsapparaat te trotseren en hun al jaren breed gedragen afkeer van Mubaraks regime te uiten. Jongeren zijn de stuwende kracht achter de volksopstand in Egypte. Wat zijn de achtergronden van hun frustratie, woede en moed?

Wat is er aan de hand in de Arabische wereld? | Standplaats Wereld

Door Erik van Ommering … hoor ik u denken deze dagen! Nu eens geen heibel tussen Palestijnen en Israëliërs, maar revolutie in Tunesië, opstand in Egypte, rellen in Jemen, demonstraties in Jordanië, protesten in Libanon – waar gaat dat heen? Vanuit mijn positie als onderzoeker in het laatstgenoemde land zal ik een poging in de richting van een antwoord wagen – waarbij ik me bewust ben van de snelheid waarmee de huidige gebeurtenissen mijn relaas ongetwijfeld zullen inhalen. Hierbij nu eens een macro-analyse door een antropoloog!

Turbulente week in Caïro | Standplaats Wereld

Verbaasd lees ik terug hoe één van mijn eerste veldwerknotities, van een paar weken geleden, de acceptatie en leegte in de ogen van de taxichauffeur beschrijft die me van het vliegveld naar de stad brengt. Dat lijkt een ander land een eeuwigheid geleden. Door Police Day (25 januari) begonnen dingen langzaam te veranderen met als climax en epicentrum de Miljoenen Mars op Midan Tahrir (2 februari).

4 comments.

Closing the week 5 – Featuring the Tunisia & Egypt Uprising

Posted on February 6th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: anthropology, Blogosphere, Society & Politics in the Middle East.

Most popular on Closer this week

1. Two Faces of Revolution by Linda Herrera
2. Verandering komt eraan? – De ‘Arabische revolte’ in Jordanië door Egbert Harmsen
3. ‘Telefoon uit Tunesië’ – Een persoonlijk verslag van de Jasmijn-revolutie door Carpe DM

Previous roundups: Tunisia Uprising I & Tunisia Uprising II

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• You can follow me on Twitter: Martijn5155

Essential reading
Egypt’s Class Conflict | Informed Comment

Why has the Egyptian state lost its legitimacy? Max Weber distinguished between power and authority. Power flows from the barrel of a gun, and the Egyptian state still has plenty of those. But Weber defines authority as the likelihood that a command will be obeyed. Leaders who have authority do not have to shoot people. The Mubarak regime has had to shoot over 100 people in the past few days, and wound more. Literally hundreds of thousands of people have ignored Mubarak’s command that they observe night time curfews. He has lost his authority.

LRB · Adam Shatz · Mubarak’s Last Breath

Egypt has never been a democracy. The military has always dominated its political life. Even during the age of liberal nationalism after the First World War, when it had a lively parliamentary life, popular sovereignty was sharply curtailed by British power. Since the 1952 coup which brought Nasser to power, it has been ruled by military dictatorship, although the establishment of multi-party politics in the late 1970s brought a measure of cosmetic diversification. Still, autocratic though they were, both Nasser and Sadat ensured that what Egypt did mattered. Nasser’s failures were spectacular: the aborted union with Syria in the United Arab Republic; the disastrous intervention in the civil war in Yemen; the catastrophic 1967 defeat to Israel that resulted in the destruction of three-quarters of Egypt’s air force and the loss of the Sinai; the creation of a vast and inefficient public sector which the state could not afford; the suppression of dissent, indeed of politics itself. But he also carried out land reform, nationalised the Suez Canal, built the Aswan High Dam, and turned Egypt into a major force in the Non-Aligned Movement. When Nasser spoke, the Arab world listened. Sadat broke with Nasser’s pan-Arab vision, promoting an Egypt-first agenda that ultimately led the country into the arms of the US and Israel. But, like Nasser, he was a statesman of considerable flair and cunning, with a prodigious ability to seize the initiative. By leading Egypt to a partial victory in the 1973 war, he washed away some of the shame of 1967, and eventually secured the restoration of the Sinai. And though his peace with Israel infuriated the Arabs, whom Nasser had electrified, he made Egypt a player in the world. Under Mubarak, Egypt, the ‘mother of the earth’ (umm idduniya), has seen its influence plummet. Nowhere is the decline of the Sunni Arab world so acutely felt as in Cairo ‘the Victorious’, a mega-city much of which has turned into an enormous slum. The air is so thick with fumes you can hardly breathe, the atmosphere as constricted as the country’s political life.

The dignity of Egyptian youth « The Immanent Frame

As I listened, and watched the crowds listening, there were several moments in which a sense of disbelief was discernible amid the seething, boiling anger. Midway through the speech, I think that all Egyptians were asking themselves whether it was possible that their leader of thirty years did not hear his people’s demands. Is it conceivable that, despite the whole world having heard the demand for him to go, he would assert that he will remain in his position until his present term is over (in September 2011)? In other words, is it at all comprehensible that the message he is giving to his people is: “I do not care what you want . . . you do not know what is good for you . . . you have been manipulated . . . I will do as I see fit”? Does this Egyptian Nero not realize that he is burning his people?

Myths of Mubarak « The Immanent Frame

The term ‘secular’ and its conceptual affiliates are doing a lot of work in misrepresenting the uprising in Egypt. ‘Secular’ politics has been taken to mean ‘good’ politics (limited democratization, stability, and support for the peace treaty with Israel), and ‘Islamic’ politics is being translated as ‘bad’ politics (the myriad dangers allegedly posed by the Muslim Brotherhood and its allies). Accounts of the current situation in Egypt are handicapped by an inability to read politics in Egypt and Muslim-majority societies outside of this overly simplistic and politically distorting lens.

LRB · Adam Shatz · After Mubarak

From the Obama administration we can expect criticisms of the crackdown, prayers for peace, and more calls for ‘restraint’ on ‘both sides’ – as if there were symmetry between unarmed protesters and the military regime – but Suleiman will be given the benefit of the doubt. Unlike ElBaradei, he’s a man Washington knows it can deal with. The men and women congregating in Tahrir Square have the misfortune to live in a country that shares a border with Israel, and to be fighting a regime that for the last three decades has provided indispensable services to the US. They are well aware of this. They know that if the West allows the Egyptian movement to be crushed, it will be, in part, because of the conviction that ‘we are not them,’ and that we can’t allow them to have what we have. Despite the enormous odds, they continue to fight.

LRB · Issandr El Amrani · Why Tunis, Why Cairo?

When Ben-Ali fled from Tunis, he created a vacuum at the top of the state that was imperfectly but quickly filled. The initial interim government did not please many, but a sense of civic duty appears for now to have stabilised the situation without a resort to authoritarianism. Mubarak, on the other hand, created a security vacuum in order to spread panic. In agreeing to step down, he tried to ensure that the regime would survive. Egypt is not Tunisia, at least not yet.

Uprisings: From Tunis to Cairo by William Pfaff | The New York Review of Books

Dictators do not usually die in bed. Successful retirement is always a problem for them, and not all solve it. It is a problem for everybody else when they leave. What’s to be done afterward? The popular uprising that overturned the dictatorial Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali regime in Tunisia in mid-January sent a thrill of hope through Arab populations.

Leading Egyptian Feminist, Nawal El Saadawi: “Women and Girls are Beside Boys in the Streets”

Renowned feminist and human rights activist Nawal El Saadawi was a political prisoner and exiled from Egypt for years. Now she has returned to Cairo, and she joins us to discuss the role of women during the last seven days of unprecedented protests. “Women and girls are beside boys in the streets,” El Saadawi says. “We are calling for justice, freedom and equality, and real democracy and a new constitution, no discrimination between men and women, no discrimination between Muslims and Christians, to change the system… and to have a real democracy.” [includes rush transcript]

State Culture, State Anarchy

The central tenets of the “culture and anarchy” canard may be old, but they have taken on new urgency this week and now there is nothing subtle about the message: popular desire for the regime’s removal is ripping apart the Egyptian social fabric and hurting the Egyptian economy; the revolt isn’t authentically Egyptian, but the result of foreign agitation by the likes of Aljazeera and Hamas; the Muslim Brotherhood is behind the rebellion and they are the ones who will stand to gain the most from it; Muslim Brothers are radical Islamists; radical Islam is a threat to Western civilization. And so on. It does not matter whether the pieces of the argument are true. It does not matter whether they contradict each other. What matters is that they all point in a single direction: change = chaos and ruin, the end of civilization.

Yemen is not Tunisia or Egypt – CNN.com

“Yemen is not Tunisia.” These were the words that President Ali Abdullah Saleh spoke to his people on television last Sunday.

As street protests erupt in Yemen’s capital, it is not surprising that an Arab leader who has held power since a bloodless coup in 1978 would dismiss calls for his ouster.

But he was correct.

Informed views from the ground
The Egyptian Protests: A View from the Ground (The Beginning) | Waq al-Waq | Big Think

it has been an interesting week in Cairo. What follows is not analysis or expert opinion, but my own notes from the past several days.

The Egyptian Protests: A View from the Ground (Neighborhood Watch) | Waq al-Waq | Big Think

I sat in front of the bank, which has only one private guard, who is asleep inside. Megdi the guard keeps telling us to wake him up if anything happens. Still, I’m not sure what he can do. Megdi only has six bullets.

The Egyptian Revolution: First Impressions from the Field

This revolution, too, will leave traces deep in the social fabric and psyche for a long time, but in ways that go beyond the youth. While the youth were the driving force in the earlier days, the revolution quickly became national in every sense; over the days I saw an increasing demographic mix in demonstrations, where people from all age groups, social classes, men and women, Muslims and Christians, urban people and peasants—virtually all sectors of society, acting in large numbers and with a determination rarely seen before.

Shippensburg University professor recalls a roiled Egypt – Chambersburg Public Opinion

According to Dr. Karl Lorenz, Shippensburg University professor of anthropology, the people of Egypt have waited 30 years for government reform.

Lorenz lived in Egypt with his wife from August 2009 to July on a Fulbright Scholars Grant. As part of his proposal, he studied predynastic pottery style changes. Studying the pottery styles gave Lorenz insight into the unification of upper and lower Egypt and the rise to pharaohs. His wife researched and also taught at a university.

The rich symbolism of the square in Cairo – Philly.com

When she first traveled to Cairo for fieldwork in 1993, Farha Ghannam recalled, Tahrir Square was mostly used as a bus depot.

Today, it’s the battleground on which the future of Egypt is being fought – a space rich with symbolism and meaning, held and defended by protesters at the cost of some lives.

“There’s this feeling [among demonstrators] that ‘if we lose at Tahrir Square, we’re going to lose the fight,’ ” said Ghannam, an anthropology professor at Swarthmore College who studies the use of public space in Egypt.

tabsir.net » Dawn

I find it very difficult to assemble emotions, memories and impressions to respond to the events in Tunisia and Egypt. I have been responding sharply to others who seized the moment to offer their analysis. Certain characterizations of Egyptians did not sit well with me. I also fear that specific arguments are easily manipulated — that the centers of power who have so deftly dominated the media, huge sums of money and many segments of national elites will thwart the resurgence of popular resistance and demonstration of public will. But since those consulted by Barry and Joe and their “teams” are hard at work, spreading fear of a future Egypt non-compliant with the terms of Camp David, conjuring up the Islamist bogeyman, and (one fears) holding Hosni’s hand, we too should speak.

Tunisia
One Small Revolution – NYTimes.com

Tunisia has a relatively large middle class because of something so obvious it goes unremarked upon: it is a real state, with historical and geographical legitimacy, where political arguments are about budgets and food subsidies, not the extremist ideologies that have plagued its neighbors, Algeria and Libya. It is a state not only because of the legacy of Rome and other empires, but because of human agency, in the person of Habib Bourguiba, one of the lesser-known great men of the 20th century.

Tunisia analysis: Old guard, ‘new’ government | World news | The Guardian

The prime minister himself, 69-year-old Mohamed Ghannouchi, is a Ben Ali loyalist of long standing, having served since 1999. In Tunisia, he became known as “Monsieur Oui Oui” for always saying yes to the president.

To many ordinary Tunisians, these are worrying signs. In the words of a trade unionist quoted on Twitter: “Tunisia has got rid of the dictator but hasn’t got rid of the dictatorship yet.”

Egypt
The Egyptian Uprising: Facts and Fiction | Dissident Voice

There is really only one story here and it is ever so uncomplicated. This is an uprising against an octogenarian dictator who could have done us all a favor by retiring two decades ago. After he goes, the remaining 84 million Egyptians can sort things out among themselves. Everything else is fiction.

Brian Whitaker’s blog, February 2011

The situation in Egypt, as a friend from Alexandria described it to me in an email this morning, is “quite fluid and extremely scary”. It’s also very difficult to work out what is really going on behind the scenes.

Egyptian protesters: What I’m fighting for – Egyptian Protests – Salon.com

What’s too often lost in the coverage of Egypt’s violent clashes are the stories of the people fighting. This slide show offers a look at 10 individuals who make up the crowd of thousands gathered in Tahrir Square day after day. They are students, sailors, teachers, executives, government employees and members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Meet Egypt’s protesters — the people who are behind one of the greatest moments in modern Egyptian history.

Egypt Endgame | Marc Lynch

What now? I would say that the time has come for the Obama administration to escalate to the next step of actively trying to push Mubarak out. They were right to not do so earlier. No matter how frustrated activists have been by his perceived hedging, until yesterday it was not the time to move to the bottom line. Mubarak is an American ally of 30 years and needed to be given the chance to respond appropriately. And everyone seems to forget that magical democracy words (a phrase which as far as I know I coined) don’t work. Obama saying “Mubarak must go” would not have made Mubarak go, absent the careful preparation of the ground so that the potential power-brokers saw that they really had no choice. Yesterday’s orgy of state-sanctioned violence should be the moment to make clear that there is now no alternative.

Mubarak’s phantom presidency – Opinion – Al Jazeera English

The “March of Millions” in Cairo marks the spectacular emergence of a new political society in Egypt. This uprising brings together a new coalition of forces, uniting reconfigured elements of the security state with prominent business people, internationalist leaders, and relatively new (or newly reconfigured) mass movements of youth, labour, women’s and religious groups. President Hosni Mubarak lost his political power on Friday, January 28.

The Battle for Egypt | The Courier

Kuppinger: Before the uprising happened in Tunisia earlier in January few, including myself, would have foreseen the current events in Cairo. When the protesters in Tunisia were successful and ousted their dictator in a matter of days, it was clear that people in other Arab countries and here in particular, the vast ranks of the younger generation were watching these events very carefully. They took and compared notes. At that point it became increasingly clear that Tunisia could become a model.

The henchmen | Inanities

The use of hired thugs is classic Mubarak. The regime’s relationship with its people has always depended on intimidation and violence, which proved problematic with the wave of demonstrations and labour protests that have been a growing phenomenon since 2003 – acts of public police rage tend to put the tourists off. In 2005 elections young men were paid to sexually assault female protestors. Last year during the trial of two policemen accused of involvement in the death of Khaled Said a rowdy group of teenagers stood outside the courtroom and accused anti-torture protestors of being Israeli spies, before launching missiles at them. During the elections boys in matching t-shirts danced in front of polling stations while burly colleagues intimated voters on behalf of National Democratic Party candidates.

The who’s who of the has-beens – Blog – The Arabist

I know a lot of journalists (and even some normal, decent people) out there are wondering about the who’s who of the regime. As a person with a someone unhealthy obsession with the Egyptian regime for over a decade, I have been making charts of who’s who for a while.

Rich, Poor and a Rift Exposed by Unrest – NYTimes.com

Over the past several days, hundreds of thousands of Egyptians — from indigent fruit peddlers and doormen to students and engineers, even wealthy landlords — poured into the streets together to denounce President Hosni Mubarak and battle his omnipresent security police. Then, on Friday night, the police pulled out of Egypt’s major cities abruptly, and tensions between rich and poor exploded.

Egyptian Opposition’s Old Guard Falls In Behind Young Leaders – NYTimes.com

“Most of us are under 30,” said Amr Ezz, a 27-year-old lawyer who was one of the group as part of the April 6 Youth Movement, which organized an earlier day of protests last week via Facebook. They were surprised and delighted to see that more than 90,000 people signed up online to participate, emboldening others to turn out and bringing tens of thousands of mostly young people into the streets.

What’s Happening in Egypt Explained (UPDATED) | Mother Jones

What’s happening? Inspired by the recent protests that led to the fall of the Tunisian government and the ousting of longtime Tunisian dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Egyptians have joined other protesters across the Arab world (in Algeria, notably) in protesting their autocratic governments, high levels of corruption, and grinding poverty. In Egypt, tens of thousands of protesters have taken to the streets.

ZCommunications | Whither Egypt? by Gilbert Achcar | ZNet Article

The Egyptian opposition includes a vast array of forces. There are parties like the Wafd, which are legal parties and constitute what may be called the liberal opposition. Then there is a grey zone occupied by the Muslim Brotherhood. It does not have a legal status but is tolerated by the regime. Its whole structure is visible; it is not an underground force. The Muslim Brotherhood is certainly, and by far, the largest force in the opposition. When Mubarak’s regime, under US pressure, granted some space to the opposition in the 2005 parliamentary elections, the Muslim Brotherhood––running as “independents”––managed to get 88 MPs, i.e. 20 percent of the parliamentary seats, despite all obstacles. In the last elections held last November and December, after the Mubarak regime had decided to close down the limited space that it had opened in 2005, the Muslim Brotherhood almost vanished from parliament, losing all its seats but one.

“Revolutionaries on the Roof” « zunguzungu

Al Jazeera producer Evan Hill posted a (translated) video clip called ”Revolutionaries on the Roof” that deserves wide circulation. It is described as ”Young protesters occupying an apartment building near the site of fierce battles between pro- and anti-government crowds discuss their motivations, the events of the past two weeks, and the diverse make-up of Egypt’s democracy movement. (With reporting and translation by Lara el-Gibaly)”

Freedom, Democracy and the State
Too late for reform – Blog – The Arabist

I like Michele Dunne — she has been consistent for a decade on Egypt, and strikes the right tone here. I remember we sat together a couple of months ago and she laughed at the idea that Omar Suleiman could be a transition figure for Egypt. Here she argues that the US should not be backing Suleiman, it should be backing bottom-up transition.

Egypt’s two futures: Brutality and false reforms, or democracy

OVER THE past few days the world has seen a vivid portrait of the two sides in Egypt’s crisis. There has been the orchestrated brutality and cynical facade of compromise presented by the regime of Hosni Mubarak, who while clinging to his office until September is trying to destroy the opposition and ensure the perpetuation of 50 years of autocracy. In Cairo’s Tahrir Square and in other plazas around the country is the alternative: millions of mostly secular and middle-class citizens, led by the young, who seek genuine democracy and whose regular chant is “we are peaceful.”

Supporting democracy in the Middle East requires abandoning a vision of Pax-Americana

As the Mubarak regime turns to violence in a vain attempt to repress the peaceful protests that have swept Egypt’s streets for over ten days, the risks associated with current U.S. strategy for Egypt and the wider region continue to grow. In its response to the events, the Obama administration has subtly shifted its message, incrementally increasing pressure on the regime over the last week. But the more important story is the remarkable continuities reflected in the administration’s approach.

The Duck of Minerva: Egyptian “People Power,” Civil Society, and the U.S.

Notwithstanding the uncertainties, it is worthwhile to think more about the implications. In the long term, the events of last week would seem to mean more democracy or at least more democratic input into government in Egypt. Regardless, any new government will likely mean leaders less willing to do the bidding of the U.S., whether because of their own beliefs or because of the force of popular sentiment. (Certainly an important undercurrent in the journalistic reporting has been strong anti-American sentiments expressed by many of the protesters.) It is good that American policymakers seem to realize this. President Obama is quoted as stating several times at a high level meeting yesterday that “the outcome has to be decided by the Egyptian people, and the U.S. cannot be in a position of dictating events”–or, in my view, much influencing them.

David H. Price: Challenging America’s Pharaoh

Anyone who has lived in Egypt for an extended period of time or has traveled there for extended stays over the past thirty years should not be surprised at the current uprising. The only surprising thing is that this uprising didn’t happen years or decades sooner.

Johann Hari: We All Helped Suppress the Egyptians — With Our Taxes. So How Do We Change?

The old slogan from the 1960s has come true: the revolution has been televised. The world is watching the Bastille fall on 24/7 rolling news and Tweeting the death-spasms of Mubarak-Antoinette. This elderly thug is trying to beat and tear-gas and buy himself enough time to smuggle his family’s estimated $25bn in loot out of the country, and to install a successor friendly to his interests. The Egyptian people — half of whom live on less than $2 a day — seem determined to prevent the pillage and not to wait until September to drive out a dictator dripping in blood and bad hair dye.

ETHNOGRAFIX: Power, realpolitik, and freedom: Egypt and US Ideals about Freedom

What absolutely blows me away is how quickly some folks drop their supposed ideals about freedom and democracy when the people under consideration are far away (like in Egypt, for example). It’s shocking, actually, to hear some folks out there calling for the support of Mubarak as a close ally (check the comments section). I don’t get it. Democracy, it seems, only applies here at home. When it comes to a distant population like the people of Egypt, it seems that many people are willing to sidestep all of the rhetoric about political freedom and openly advocate supporting a repressive policy state, all in the name of “our interests.” Horribly ironic, no? Granted, the situation in Egypt is far from clear, but I definitely do not think that going back to the “support the nearest dictator who will toe the line” model is the way to go. Absolutely not. Anyway, here are some quotes that are apt for folks on all sides of the political spectrum here in the US:

But what about the Muslim Brotherhood?
Concerns about the Muslim Brotherhood: Israel Fears Regime Change in Egypt – SPIEGEL ONLINE – News – International

Israel is watching developments in Egypt with concern. The government is standing by autocratic Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, out of fear that the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood could take power and start supplying arms to Hamas.

Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt Opposition Party, In The Spotlight During Protests

In media coverage of the ongoing protests rocking Egypt, the phrase “Muslim Brotherhood” has cropped up more than once. Who is this group, and what role are they playing in the protests?

Why we shouldn’t fear the Muslim Brotherhood – War Room – Salon.com

To get some hard facts and context about the controversial Islamic movement, we spoke with Nathan Brown, a political science professor at George Washington University and director of its Institute for Middle East Studies, who has written extensively on the Muslim Brotherhood. What follows is a transcript of our conversation, edited for length and clarity.

5 Reasons the Muslim Brotherhood Won’t Turn On Israel | Politics | Religion Dispatches

These days, everybody’s in the business of panicking over the potential role of the Muslim Brotherhood. But rather than discuss where the Brotherhood has been in the past, I suggest looking to the future. Events on the ground are changing every few hours, so this is an exercise in informed speculation. Here are five reasons why the Muslim Brotherhood will find it very hard to decisively determine Egypt’s relationship with Israel. These five reasons complicate the assumption that if Mubarak goes, the peace treaty with Israel will come to an end.

Islamists at the Gates – NYTimes.com

But few Israelis really believe in that hopeful outcome. Instead, the grim assumption is that it is just a matter of time before the only real opposition group in Egypt, the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, takes power. Israelis fear that Egypt will go the way of Iran or Turkey, with Islamists gaining control through violence or gradual co-optation.

Muslim Brotherhood says it is only a minor player in Egyptian protests

The Muslim Brotherhood found its first martyr in Egypt’s popular uprising Friday, when a teenager named Mustafa Sawi was shot dead in front of the Interior Ministry. But the country’s oldest and best-organized opposition group had to take a back seat at his public funeral the next day, as the Muslim Brotherhood insists it is little more than a bit player in the outpouring of resistance to the regime of President Hosni Mubarak.

Don’t Fear Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood – Brookings Institution

Don’t Fear Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood

Egypt, Middle East Unrest, Middle East, Governance, Islamic World

Bruce Riedel, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

January 28, 2011 —
The Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia has sent a shock wave through the Arab world. Never before has the street toppled a dictator. Now Egypt is shaking, Hosni Mubarak’s 30-year-old regime faces its most serious threat ever. The prospect of change in Egypt inevitably raises questions about the oldest and strongest opposition movement in the country, the Muslim Brotherhood, also known as Ikhwan. Can America work with an Egypt where the Ikhwan is part of a transition or even a new government?

Egypt’s Islamist Riddle – WSJ.com

The 83-year-old Islamic movement, Egypt’s biggest opposition bloc, played a subdued role in the uprising. But its past performance in parliamentary elections and its dedicated following mean it will be a force to be reckoned with as Egypt moves toward open elections.

Washington’s Secret History with the Muslim Brotherhood by Ian Johnson | NYRBlog | The New York Review of Books

If this discussion evokes a sense of déjà vu, this is because over the past sixty years we have had it many times before, with almost identical outcomes. Since the 1950s, the United States has secretly struck up alliances with the Brotherhood or its offshoots on issues as diverse as fighting communism and calming tensions among European Muslims. And if we look to history, we can see a familiar pattern: each time, US leaders have decided that the Brotherhood could be useful and tried to bend it to America’s goals, and each time, maybe not surprisingly, the only party that clearly has benefited has been the Brotherhood.

Scott Atran: The Muslim Brotherhood Bogey Man

As Egyptians clash over the future of their government, Americans and Europeans have repeatedly expressed fears of the Muslim Brotherhood. “You don’t just have a government and a movement for democracy,” Tony Blair, the former British prime minister, said on Monday. “You also have others, notably the Muslim Brotherhood, who would take this in a different direction.” The previous day, House speaker John Boehner expressed hope that Hosni Mubarak would stay on as president of Egypt while instituting reforms to prevent the Muslim Brotherhood and other extremists from grabbing power.

And even more urgent, what about the jihadis?
Jihadis Debate Egypt (1) — jihadica

Not surprisingly, the jihadi online community is captivated by the uprising, but many are also bewildered about what this means for their cause, and their leaders have been slow to respond. Jarret Brachman has a point when he taunts Zawahiri: “Your Silence is Deafening.” As of Thursday afternoon, the leading jihadi forum Shamikh only featured a handful of authoritative responses to the events in Egypt, from pro-jihadi pundits, a legal scholar and other participants. However, not a word from the leadership. The closest thing to an official response is AQIM’s statement on the events in Tunisia (available also in translation).

Jihadis Debate Egypt (2) — jihadica

Such a response and the mere fact that this anonymous and murky EIJ figure, issues a message, and not a leading Egyptian al-Qaida member, is significant. Again, it demonstrates the jihadis’ irrelevance to the rapidly evolving situation in Egypt.

Uprisings and (new) media
What Al Jazeera Shows and Doesn’t Show | The Middle East Channel

But what television has brought to the world is only a partial reality. There is only Tahrir; the huge metropolitan expanse of Cairo and the families at home in neighborhoods are beyond the frame, oddly irrelevant. The participants in the revolution are the hundreds of thousands of demonstrators, not the equal numbers standing unpicturesque guard by night to ensure the safety of neighborhoods. TV shows a mass, not a massive group of individuals. This televised reality has become hugely controversial.

Wallflowers at the Revolution – NYTimes.com

Perhaps the most revealing window into America’s media-fed isolation from this crisis — small an example as it may seem — is the default assumption that the Egyptian uprising, like every other paroxysm in the region since the Green Revolution in Iran 18 months ago, must be powered by the twin American-born phenomena of Twitter and Facebook. Television news — at once threatened by the power of the Internet and fearful of appearing unhip — can’t get enough of this cliché.

Cairo Activists Use Facebook to Rattle Regime

ack in March, Maher and a friend launched a Facebook group to promote a protest planned for April 6. It became an Internet phenomenon, quickly attracting more than 70,000 members. The April 6 youth movement — amorphous, lacking a clear mission, and yet a bull’s-eye to the zeitgeist — blossomed within days into something influential enough to arouse the ire of Egypt’s internal security forces. Maher is part of a new generation in the Middle East that, through blogs, YouTube, Flickr, Twitter, and now Facebook, is using virtual reality to combat corrupt and oppressive governments. Their nascent, tech-fired rebellion has triggered a government backlash and captured the world’s attention.

Egypt protests: Police use Facebook and Twitter to track down protesters | Mail Online

Gabrielle’s dilemma is shared by many others whose activism, both online and on the streets, has brought them to the attention of the state security police.

While other protesters arrive and leave freely, thousands like Gabrielle – well-educated, middle-class idealistic young Egyptians who used social networking sites to ignite this protest – are beginning to feel trapped. Some say they are fighting for their lives, though they have thus far protested peacefully.

Why Tunisia Is Not a Social-Media Revolution | The American Prospect

commentators have held back with Tunisia, emphasizing that the uprising is a product of the passions and convictions of Tunisia’s people, not a 140-character status update. That’s a good thing. It means our conversations about technology’s transformative power are maturing past assumptions that the spread of the Internet means an inexorable spread of democracy.

But now is the time, perhaps, for a little backlash against the backlash. Scrubbing the Internet from the Tunisian people’s story leaves us with less than a full picture of this moment.

We’ve waited for this revolution for years. Other despots should quail | Mona Eltahawy | Comment is free | The Observer

But here now finally are our children – Generation Facebook – kicking aside the burden of history, determined to show us just how easy it is to tell the dictator it’s time to go.

tabsir.net » Streaming Revolution, Screaming Revolution

What happens when a revolution is not only screamed but streamed live? Can we reach a point where it gets as boring as a video game that we have played far too many times? Can our eyes become so glued to the riveting skirmish scenes in Cairo that we lose sight of all the other news that still gets generated. Sudan is having a referendum to separate south from north; Lebanon’s government has emulated Italy’s governing prowess once again (and Hizbollah has no Berlusconi figure in its ranks); world markets fear a closing of the Suez canal… and the list goes on but only with a few short notes at the bottom of the screen.

On The Media: Transcript of “Tunisia’s Twitter Revolution?” (January 21, 2011)

Demonstrators flooded the streets in Tunisia this week calling for an end to corruption and ousting President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. Many have attributed the wave of protests to the rise of the internet and social media in a country notorious for its censorship but Foreign Policy blogger Marc Lynch says it’s not that simple. He says the internet, social media and satellite channels like Al Jazeera have collectively transformed the information landscape in the Arab world.

Gladwell Still Missing the Point About Social Media and Activism: Tech News and Analysis «

In other words, as far as the New Yorker writer is concerned, the use of any specific communications tools — whether that happens to be cellphones or SMS or Twitter or Facebook — may be occurring, and may even be helping revolutionaries in countries like Egypt in some poorly-defined way, but it’s just not that interesting. This seems like an odd comment coming from someone who wrote a book all about how a series of small changes in the way people think about an issue can suddenly reach a “tipping point” and gain widespread appeal, since that’s exactly what social media does so well.

Thinking about the importance of communications “revolutions.” | Savage Minds

There has been a lot of talk about the importance of social media in recent world events. See for instance, here, here, and here. Some of the more astute commentators have referred to earlier technological revolutions and their impact on television: usenet, fax machines, television, cameras, telegraph, and even the printing press. One technology, however, always seem to get left out, maybe because it seems too “obvious,” and that is literacy.

Facebook and YouTube Fuel the Egyptian Protests – NYTimes.com

“Prior to the murder of Khaled Said, there were blogs and YouTube videos that existed about police torture, but there wasn’t a strong community around them,” said Jillian C. York, the project coordinator for the OpenNet Initiative of the Berkman Center for the Internet and Society at Harvard University. “This case changed that.”

While it is almost impossible to isolate the impact of social media tools from the general swirl of events that set off the popular uprisings across the Middle East, there is little doubt that they provided a new means for ordinary people to connect with human rights advocates trying to amass support against police abuse, torture and the Mubarak government’s permanent emergency laws allowing people to be jailed without charges.

Lecture Clarifies Social Media Usage in Recent Uprisings – CUA Tower – News

While many analysts point to “tweets” as the igniters of the recent revolution in Egypt, Dr. Jon Anderson of the Anthropology Department cautioned students on Wednesday night not to let social media hype drown out the human voices at the root of revolt.

His talk, entitled “Social Media and Politics of the Middle East,” sought to clarify the conceptions surrounding what has been termed a “twitter revolution,” regarding recent popular uprisings against long-standing dictators in Yemen, Tunisia, and Egypt.

Egypt may have turned off the Internet one phone call at a time | Technology | Los Angeles Times

Egypt’s shutdown of the Internet within its borders is an action unlike any other in the history of the World Wide Web and it might have only taken a few phone calls to do it.

MediaShift . What Role Did Social Media Play in Tunisia, Egypt Protests? | PBS

As the protests are playing out in the streets of Cairo and the rest of Egypt today, I have been glued to the live-stream of Al Jazeera English as well as the Twitter hashtag #Jan25, a top trending topic based on the big protests a few days ago. The Egyptian protests come on the heels of a similar revolution in Tunisia, where a longtime dictator, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, was ousted after young people organized protests via Facebook. We’ve heard about “Twitter revolutions” before in Iran after huge protests there in 2009, but how have things changed today? How much of a role has social media played in the turmoil happening in the Middle East? Will that continue to be the case? Vote in our poll below, or share your deeper thoughts in the comments below.

Other roundups
“A wonderful development” – Anthropologists on the Egypt Uprising (updated)

As you might have noticed, Wikan is argueing along siminar lines as the Western political elite who is about to lose an important ally in the Middle East. For them, “stability” is more important than people power, as Maximilian Forte and his co-bloggers on Zero Anthropology explain in several blog posts, among others The Fall of the American Wall: Tunisia, Egypt, and Beyond and Encircling Empire: Report #11, Focus on Egypt, Encircling Empire: Report #12, FOCUS ON EGYPT: Revolution and Counter-Revolution and The Song of the Nonaligned Nile (by Eliza Jane Darling).

Registering a revolution. Hail to the brave people of Egypt. A roundup. | Erkan’s Field Diary

Too soon to analyze, so here’s my outbox

Tunisia and Egypt uprisings – selected bookmarks « media/anthropology

Highlights on media, anthropology and the Tunisia and Egypt uprisings

anthropologyworks » Understanding Egypt

Political protests in Egypt are ongoing at the time of this writing, mainly in Cairo, Alexandria and some other cities. Who knows what will unfold in the near future? What do cultural anthropologists offer to inform our understanding of this new social movement?

Misc.
Yemen’s president says he won’t seek reelection, but he said that in 2005, too | Need to Know

Reality, however, is more than what happened in the last month. While some protesters in Sanaa have said they were inspired by the protests in Egypt and Tunisia, those two revolts did not inspire the protests anymore than my breakfast burrito did. There were protests in Aden during the Gulf Cup soccer tournament last November, protests over the parcel bombs in Sanaa in October, thousands of people protesting over the most recent round of fighting between the government and the Houthi rebels in the north in March. Yemenis protest routinely, and the last several months have seen a series of increasingly violent rallies across the entire country.

Top Ten Accomplishments of Egypt Demonstrators | Informed Comment

The protest movement in Egypt scored several victories on Friday, but did not actually succeed in getting President Hosni Mubarak to step down. Their accomplishments include:

Of people and things: Egyptian protest and cultural properties « The Berkeley Blog

In a post on the Berkeley Blog, Samuel Redman makes an argument that urges protection of antiquities be emphasized in the face of current events in Egypt, arguing that mummies are “shared global heritage”.

I addressed similar questions in writing a post on my Ancient Bodies, Ancient Lives blog about unconfirmed reports of possible damage to a unique tomb, that of the woman identified as the wet nurse of Tutankhamon. But in writing my post, I subordinated questions of the destruction of antiquities to the critical moment facing Egypt today, which concerns the future of living men and women.

Dutch
Egypte, een langzame revolutie – Vrij Nederland

Opeens is iedereen Egypte­deskundige. Een van de grappigste opmerkingen die ik, via Twitter, tegenkwam, was die van Elseviers René van Rijckevorsel dat ‘een langzame evolutie naar een eerlijker Egypte’ beter is. Voor de volledigheid haalt Van Rijckevorsel er het uitgekauwde doembeeld van veertig procent analfabete Egyptenaren en de alomtegenwoordige Moslimbroederschap bij. Volgens hem zijn er twee opties: het Iran- of het Algerije-scenario.

Frontaal Naakt. » Tunesië

Het opvallende aan Tunesië is dat het in zeer korte tijd geëscaleerd is, terwijl er in Egypte al jaren protest is tegen het presidentschap van Moubarak. Het laatste half jaar zijn er regelmatig zeer grote en ingrijpende demonstraties geweest, waarbij zelfs sprake was van een coalitie van de gehele oppositie. Desalniettemin zijn de Egyptenaren er nog niet in geslaagd af te komen van La Vache Qui Rit, zoals Moubarak wordt genoemd. De vraag is of dit door steun van de VS komt, of omdat er in Egypte ondanks alles meer uitingsvrijheid en ruimte was dan in Tunesië. Een organisatie als Kifaya, die strijdt tegen de heerschappij van Moubarak, zou tot voor kort ondenkbaar zijn geweest in Tunesië.

Best of Blogs: #25jan (links galore) | DeJaap

Wellicht ter compensatie voor de maanden(jaren?)lange media-afwezigheid zond de NOS vanmiddag live uit over Egypte. Maar in tegenstelling tot de Egyptenaren (tot vanmiddag) heeft u wel toegang tot internet en daarmee toegang tot dezelfde bronnen waar de NOS-correspondenten ook gebruik van maken.

Uiteengespatte droom stimuleert Egyptische opstand – de Volkskrant – Opinie

De afgelopen jaren kenden eigenlijk geen moment zonder protesten tegen het regime, maar de huidige volksopstand is ongekend en kan onmogelijk genegeerd worden. Het Tunesische voorbeeld gaf Egyptenaren hoop en de moed het veiligheidsapparaat te trotseren en hun al jaren breed gedragen afkeer van Mubaraks regime te uiten. Jongeren zijn de stuwende kracht achter de volksopstand in Egypte. Wat zijn de achtergronden van hun frustratie, woede en moed?

Wat is er aan de hand in de Arabische wereld? | Standplaats Wereld

Door Erik van Ommering … hoor ik u denken deze dagen! Nu eens geen heibel tussen Palestijnen en Israëliërs, maar revolutie in Tunesië, opstand in Egypte, rellen in Jemen, demonstraties in Jordanië, protesten in Libanon – waar gaat dat heen? Vanuit mijn positie als onderzoeker in het laatstgenoemde land zal ik een poging in de richting van een antwoord wagen – waarbij ik me bewust ben van de snelheid waarmee de huidige gebeurtenissen mijn relaas ongetwijfeld zullen inhalen. Hierbij nu eens een macro-analyse door een antropoloog!

Turbulente week in Caïro | Standplaats Wereld

Verbaasd lees ik terug hoe één van mijn eerste veldwerknotities, van een paar weken geleden, de acceptatie en leegte in de ogen van de taxichauffeur beschrijft die me van het vliegveld naar de stad brengt. Dat lijkt een ander land een eeuwigheid geleden. Door Police Day (25 januari) begonnen dingen langzaam te veranderen met als climax en epicentrum de Miljoenen Mars op Midan Tahrir (2 februari).

4 comments.

Verandering komt eraan? – De ‘Arabische revolte’ in Jordanië

Posted on February 5th, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: Guest authors, Society & Politics in the Middle East.

Gastauteur: Egbert Harmsen

Wat vele jaren lang voor onmogelijk werd gehouden lijkt nu toch bewaarheid te worden: al decennialang heersende regimes in de Arabische wereld, allen gedomineerd paternalistische en autoritaire leidersfiguren die met hun eeuwige zitvlees op de stoel van de macht blijven en die het vaak zelfs presteren om hun zoon klaar te stomen voor hun opvolging, schudden op hun grondvesten. Ook de bevolking van Jordanië is aangestoken door deze protestkoorts, die daar zoals ook elders in de Arabische wereld het geval is, wordt aangejaagd door toenemende armoede, werkloosheid en gebrek aan vrijheid en burgerrechten. Maar hoever reikt dat Jordaanse protest nu eigenlijk en wat zijn de specifieke implicaties ervan?

Het tweeledige Jordaanse protest
Het begon op 7 januari jongstleden. In het stadje Tseiban, 60 km ten zuiden van de hoofdstad Amman, gingen dagloners de straat op om te protesteren. Tegen de prijsstijgingen. Tegen de privatiseringen die in het kader van een neoliberale regeringspolitiek zijn doorgevoerd. Tegen de overheidscorruptie. Binnen een week tijd sloegen deze protesten over naar andere kleine en middelgrote steden, zoals Karak in het zuiden en Irbid in het noorden. Sociaaleconomische eisen domineerden: er moest een nieuwe regering komen die er werkelijk toe bereid was om de massawerkloosheid, de hoge prijzen en de corruptie aan te pakken. Let wel: een nieuwe regering, in de zin van een ander kabinet. Met had het niet over regime change. Aan de top van de Jordaanse machtspiramide staat immers de koning. Deze heeft over alles het laatste woord, zou boven alle partijen staan en ook boven alle misstappen en wanbeleid van overheidsfunctionarissen, tot de minister-president aan toe.

De traditionele Jordaanse oppositie wordt gedomineerd door de uit de Moslim Broederschap voortgekomen Islamitisch Actie Front Partij (IAF), bestaat verder nog uit enkele kleine linkse en seculiere pan-Arabische partijen en daarnaast uit beroepsorganisaties. Deze groepen aarzelden aanvankelijk over zijn houding ten aanzien van de bovengenoemde protesten. Deze protesten werden immers geuit door leden van Jordaanse stammen die van oudsher zeer loyaal zijn aan het Hashemitische koningshuis en diens politiek. De traditionele Jordaanse oppositiepartijen werden door de Tunesische revolutie geïnspireerd om hun stem te verheffen, maar konden op eigen houtje relatief weinig demonstranten mobiliseren. Zij zochten daarom uiteindelijk toch aansluiting bij die nieuw ontstane Jordaanse protestbeweging met zijn sociaaleconomische eisen. Deze beweging, die dus begon in Tseiban, is bekend komen te staan onder de naam “Verandering komt eraan!”. Volgens politiek analist Muhammad Abu Ruman van het Center for Strategic Studies van Jordan University te Amman probeerden de traditionele oppositiepartijen daarmee ruimte te creëren voor hun eigen politieke eisen die vooral in de sfeer lagen van meer democratie en burgerrechten. Meer concreet willen zij, onder andere, een nieuwe kieswet die gebaseerd is op evenredige vertegenwoordiging (en de regimeloyale stammen niet langer bevoordeeld), vrijheid van vergadering en een gekozen premier.

De beweging “Verandering komt eraan!” en de traditionele politieke oppositie konden elkaar vinden in de eis tot aftreden van het kabinet van premier Samir Rifai omwille van de zo hoognodige “verandering”. “Verandering komt eraan!” voelt er echter niet voor om de politieke eisen van de oppositiepartijen over te nemen. Volgens het hoofd van de beweging, Mohammad Sneid, hebben de armen in Jordanië hun eigen prioriteiten, zoals het zeker stellen van voedsel en onderdak. Het zijn zulke eisen, in de sfeer van bread and butter issues, die de beweging aan de overheid wil overbrengen. “Politieke hervormingen vullen de maag immers niet”, meent Sneid. Leiders van traditionele oppositiepartijen, zoals Saeed Thiab van de Wihdat Partij en Munir Hamarneh van de Communistische partij, staan er echter op dat politieke hervormingen, zoals de instelling van een sterk en onafhankelijk parlement die de regering werkelijk controleert en daarmee corruptie tegen gaat, noodzakelijk zijn om sociaaleconomische verbeteringen te bestendigen. De Islamisten sluiten zich bij deze zienswijze aan. In de woorden van IAF-prominent Hamza Mansour, zoals geciteerd in de Engelstalige krant Jordan Times: “we want a government chosen by the majority of the Jordanian people and we want a balance of powers; we will protest until our demands are taken seriously”.

Nieuwe regering
Het verschil in visie tussen de nieuwe protestbeweging “Verandering komt eraan!” en de traditionele oppositiepartijen brengt ook meningsverschillen omtrent de vorming van een nieuwe regering met zich mee. Eerstgenoemde beweging wenst een “regering van nationale eenheid” die afrekent met het vrije marktgeoriënteerde beleid van het kabinet van Rifai. Die nieuwe regering dient de belangen van de tribale en provinciale achterban van de beweging te behartigen in plaats van die van het grote bedrijfsleven. Eerste prioriteit daarbij is een politiek van prijsbeheersing. De islamistische en de linkse oppositiepartijen, die hun aanhang vooral in de grote steden en de Palestijnse vluchtelingenkampen hebben, staan in principe niet afwijzend tegenover deze sociaaleconomische eisen van “Verandering komt eraan!”. Ze geven er echter de voorkeur aan zelf een beslissende stem in een nieuwe regering te hebben en vinden bovendien dat het vormen van een nieuwe regering weinig zin heeft zolang het Jordaanse politieke bestel niet in structurele zin veranderd in de richting van meer democratie.

Reactie van het regime
Geschrokken door de protesten heeft het regime initiatieven ontplooid om de protesten in het land te kalmeren. Zo bracht koning Abdallah II in het diepste geheim bezoeken aan arme streken in het land. Tevens riep hij het Jordaanse parlement op om sociaaleconomische en politieke hervormingen versneld door te voeren. Dit parlement ging zich vervolgens bezinnen op maatregelen om brandstofprijzen te verlagen en de transparantie bij het vaststellen van prijzen te bevorderen. Tevens word er gesproken over het opzetten van een nationaal fonds ter ondersteuning van de armen en van industrieën die veel werkgelegenheid creëren. Salarissen van werknemers en gepensioneerden zijn verhoogd. De politie kreeg de opdracht zich te onthouden van geweld tegen demonstranten, en deelde zelfs water en vruchtensappen aan de laatstgenoemden uit. Op 1 februari jongstleden ging de koning er uiteindelijk toe over om de regering Rifai te ontslaan, naar zijn zeggen omdat dit kabinet enkel bepaalde particuliere belangen had gediend en het naliet om essentiële hervormingen door te voeren. Marouf Bakhit is nu aangewezen om premier te worden van een nieuw kabinet. Bakhit heeft een militaire achtergrond, heeft tevens een leidende rol gespeeld in het Jordaanse veiligheidsapparaat en diende van 2005 tot 2007 ook al als premier. De oppositiepartijen, de islamisten voorop, hebben geen vertrouwen in hem. Hij zou in het verleden slechts lippendienst aan politieke hervormingen hebben bewezen en in werkelijkheid iedere poging tot verdere democratisering hebben gefrustreerd. Hij wordt door islamistische leiders zelfs verantwoordelijk gehouden voor grootschalige verkiezingsfraude tijdens de parlementsverkiezingen van 2007.

“Verandering komt eraan!” is naar aanleiding van de vorming van deze nieuwe regering voorlopig gestopt met demonstraties. Het wil eerst het programma en het beleid van die regering afwachten alvorens het de protesten eventueel hervat. De traditionele oppositiepartijen, en in de eerste plaats de islamisten, willen echter doorgaan met de protesten en die nu richten tegen de nieuwe regering-Bakhit.

Een oude tweedeling
Het verschil in opvatting tussen “Verandering komt eraan!” en de traditionele oppositiepartijen weerspiegelt in hoge mate een al zeer oude tweedeling in de Jordaanse samenleving. Deze tweedeling valt in belangrijke mate samen met het onderscheid tussen de provincie en de grote stad en tot op zekere hoogte ook met die tussen autochtone Jordaanse bedoeïenenstammen en het Palestijnse bevolkingsdeel. Traditioneel worden het overheidsapparaat, de politiek en in het bijzonder het leger en het veiligheidsapparaat gedomineerd door mensen afkomstig uit bedoeïenenstammen. Onder hen bestaat er een sterk besef van loyaliteit aan het “Jordaanse vaderland” onder het gezag van het Hashemitische koningshuis. Onder de Palestijnen is er gemiddeld gesproken sprake van een veel sterkere afwijzende houding ten aanzien van de Jordaanse staat, die altijd weinig ruimte heeft geboden aan uitingen van Palestijns nationaal identiteitsbesef. De bevolking van de grotere steden van Jordanië wordt sterk door Palestijnen gedomineerd.
Palestijnen, maar ook verstedelijkte en modern opgeleide autochtone Jordaniërs hebben altijd aan de basis gestaan van oppositiebewegingen tegen het regime en zijn conservatieve en pro-westerse politiek.

In de jaren ’50 en ’60 ging het daarbij nog hoofdzakelijk om seculier pan-Arabisch nationalisme en om linkse stromingen. Lange tijd kon onvrede onder de bevolking worden afgekocht door een groeiende welvaart. Deze was in belangrijke mate het gevolg van economische steun aan Jordanië door de golfstaten en door westerse mogendheden, en van geldovermakingen naar het thuisland van Jordaanse migranten in de golfstaten. Vanaf het moment dat de olieprijzen in de jaren ’80 in een vrije val belandden was deze welvaartsgroei niet meer mogelijk en verarmden grote delen van de bevolking zelfs. Rellen die in 1989 uitbraken naar aanleiding van prijsstijgingen en bezuinigingsmaatregelen bracht de koning er uiteindelijk toe om de toenmalige regering naar huis te sturen, weer verkiezingen toe te staan en de bevolking de mogelijkheid te bieden om zijn onvrede langs democratische weg te uiten. Dit laatste mocht echter alleen gebeuren op voorwaarde dat men loyaal bleef aan Jordanië als staat en aan het gezag van het Hashemitische koningshuis. Onvrede met het regime en zijn beleid werd inmiddels vooral door de islamisten van met name de Moslim Broederschap vertolkt. Om deze islamistische invloed in te dammen werden in de loop van de jaren ‘90 burgerrechten weer in toenemende mate door het regime ingeperkt en werd het kiesstelsel aangepast. Het gevolg van die aanpassing was dat de gebieden waar de oppositie het sterkst was (de steden) ondervertegenwoordigd waren in het parlement ten gunste van de gebieden waar loyalisten woonden (rurale gebieden).

De bewoners van deze landsdelen zijn echter zeer kwetsbaar voor neoliberale economische beleidsmaatregelen op het vlak van privatisering, bezuiniging en marktwerking, aangezien zij sterk afhankelijk zijn van (werk in) de overheidssector. Dit verklaart waarom de beweging “Verandering komt eraan!”, die deze bewoners in hoge mate vertegenwoordigd, in zijn protesten de nadruk wenst te leggen op het economische beleid en minder geïnteresseerd is in democratisering van het politieke bestel. Binnen dat bestel neemt de bevolking van tribale en rurale gebieden immers tot op de dag van vandaag een bevoorrechte positie in. De islamistische en de linkse oppositie, die zijn achterban hoofdzakelijk in de politiek benadeelde grote steden heeft, wil nu juist wel streven naar democratische hervormingen.

Conclusie
De protesten in Jordanië wijken af van die in landen als Tunesië, Egypte en Jemen aangezien men hier niet zo ver gaat om het vertrek van het staatshoofd (de koning) te eisen. De demonstranten houden zich aan de in Jordanië geldende politieke spelregel dat men hooguit op specifiek beleid van de regering kritiek zou kunnen uitoefenen, maar nooit op de monarchie zelf. In die zin lijkt er weinig nieuws onder de zon vergeleken met protesten en onlusten die zich eerder in het Hashemitische koninkrijk Jordanië hebben voorgedaan. De traditionele politieke en maatschappelijke verdeeldheid in het land, die zich weerspiegelt in enerzijds de nadruk op sociaaleconomisch protest van de beweging “Verandering komt eraan!” en anderzijds de nadruk op democratische hervormingen van de traditionele islamistische en linkse oppositie, zal de hegemonie van de Hashemitische monarchie enkel in stand helpen houden. Ondertussen blijft deze monarchie zichzelf het imago aanmeten dat het boven al deze partijen staat en de belangen en het welzijn van de gehele Jordaanse natie vertegenwoordigt. Dit imago stelt de monarchie in staat om desnoods een impopulair kabinet weg te sturen, de bevolking met wat beleidsaanpassingen te kalmeren en de eigen handen schoon te wassen. Mochten de huidige ontwikkelingen in Tunesië en Egypte echter een structurele verandering in democratische zin gaan behelzen, dan is het niet uitgesloten dat ook Jordanië op een gegeven moment deze weg in zal slaan.

Egbert Harmsen heeft een achtergrond in Midden-Oosten- en Islamstudies en is daarbij gespecialiseerd in de Palestijnse kwestie, het Israëlisch-Arabische conflict, sociale en politieke islam en Jordanië. In 1995 studeerde hij af op een doctoraalscriptie over de opvang en integratie van Palestijnen in Jordanië die tijdens en na de Golfcrisis en -oorlog van 1990/91 Koeweit waren ontvlucht. In 2007 promoveerde hij op een dissertatie getiteld “Islam, Civil Society and Social Work, the Case of Muslim NGOs in Jordan”. Na zijn promotie verichtte hij onderzoek naar islam en moslims in Nederland. Momenteel is hij werkzaam als Universitair Docent Midden-Oosten Studies aan de Universiteit Leiden.

2 comments.

Twitwa 4 – Achterlijke en barbaarse culturen

Posted on February 2nd, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: anthropology, Twitwa.

Via @bertbrussen

wat is dat toch een ACHTERLIJKE en BARBAARSE cultuur daar in Iran. Vrouwen ophangen voor “drugssmokkel”. BAH!

Zomaar een reactie op het verschrikkelijke lot van Iraans-Nederlandse Zahra Bahrami die in Iran is opgehangen. Misschien zou je verwachten dat een schrijver die stukjes bakt voor Geenstijl hier wel weer ergens de humor van zou inzien, zoals zijn companen Ambroos Wiegers en Marck Burema al eerder deden met dode Iraniërs. Zo ziek lijkt hij toch ook weer niet te zijn, maar (hoewel hij het ongetwijfeld niet zo zal bedoelen) wat hij hier in feite zegt is dat Zahra Bahrami barbaars en achterlijk is. Hij relateert het populaire cultuurbegrip aan een een afgegrensde geografische lokatie: Iran. Zonder daarbij natuurlijk onderscheid te maken tussen bijvoorbeeld mannen en vrouwen, jong en oud, Perzen en Arabieren, moslims en zoroastriërs, boeren, burgers, buitenlui en what have we more. Zahra Bahrami maakt deel uit of behoort in zo’n opvatting ook tot die cultuur, net zoals ze, in die opvatting ook deel uit maakt van de Nederlandse cultuur maar dat wordt dan of vergeten of Bahrami wordt gezien als alleen Nederlands. Verder is een dergelijke emotionele uitroep een teken dat cultuur gezien wordt als oorzaak; een soort van blaming the culture in plaats van blaming the system of blaming the victim. Dat het wellicht ook een poging is van het Iraanse regime om de bevolking te waarschuwen kan dan gemakshalve ter zijde geschoven worden.

Dit zijn vrij gebruikelijke opvattingen met betrekking tot de notie cultuur in populair taalgebruik. Het is een vrij prettige opvatting omdat het bijvoorbeeld in de zaak van Bahrami betekent dat we in ieder geval niet hoeven te kijken naar eventuele twijfels bij het optreden van de Nederlandse staat of naar de rol van mevrouw Bahrami zelf (die is immers zelf achterlijk of onmondig slachtoffer). Dergelijke ideeen over cultuur als duidelijke herkenbare, homogene systemen staan ver af van de huidige antropologie, maar zijn ook weer niet onbekend. We zien het bijvoorbeeld terug bij Talcott Parsons (die van de beroemde scheiding tussen normen en waarden). Cultuur is bij hem een domein of systeem dat onafhankelijk bestaat van andere domeinen zoals politiek en economie. In de opvatting van de beroemde antropoloog Boas was cultuur een gesloten en samenhangend geheel of systeem. Bij andere, onder meer Europese antropologen, ging het vaak meer om wat de essentie van een volk zou zijn; een unieke kern die ieder volk anders zou maken. Het populaire gebruik van cultuur lijkt op een mix van antropologische opvattingen over cultuur als samenhangende, gesloten systemen en over cultuur als essentie van een volk die dat volk anders zou maken dan andere volkeren. Bijvoorbeeld dus het idee dat Iran een eigen cultuur heeft die anders is dan die van Nederland.

Antropologen hanteren tegenwoordig een heel ander cultuurbegrip dat ervan uitgaat dat cultuur iets is dat betwist wordt (er zijn verschillende opvattingen over wat hoort en niet hoort of wat barbaars en beschaafd is of wat mooi is en lelijk), dat sterk verbonden is met macht (wie heeft de macht om te bepalen wie welke rol moet vervullen en wat de interpretatie moet zijn van bepaalde symbolen en wie controleert de instituties in een samenleving – zoals scholen – die die interpretatie beschermen en uitdragen). Culturele repertoires van symbolen, praktijken, conventies, houdingen, gezond verstand enzovoorts zijn niet strikt van elkaar gescheiden of gescheiden van mensen die uit andere ‘culturele groepen’ zouden komen, maar zijn vloeiend, lopen in elkaar over, zijn hybride en naast samenhang zit het ook barstensvol met tegenstrijdigheden. Een dergelijk cultuurbegrip legt de nadruk op het maken van cultuur, samenleving en instituties en de wijze waarop dit plaatsvindt binnen bepaalde situaties (plaats) en op bepaalde momenten (tijd). Een aardige illustratie van dit nogal complexe cultuurbegrip is het volgende.

Het Fotomuseum Rotterdam heeft een tentoonstelling: Angry over radicalisme in Nederland. Ik heb een keer met de makers van Angry gesproken en hun ideeën over radicalisme en hoe dit te verbeelden bevielen me wel en nog steeds. Het is een interessante voorstelling en zeker de moeite waard om een keer te gaan kijken.
(11 – tekst) Radicaal voelt zich…- di 18 januari 2011 | NRC Handelsblad | NRC Digitale editie

„We willen laten zien dat radicaal gedrag in alle lagen van de samenleving voorkomt. Bovendien geven mensen een verschillende invulling aan hun radicalisme: voor de een gaat het erom te leven volgens je idealen, terwijl een ander overgaat tot actievoeren of terreurdaden.”

De vraag wat is de radicaal is vergelijkbaar met de vraag wat is de Iraanse of Nederlandse cultuur. Het gaat op zoek naar de essentie van een bepaald verschijnsel. Weliswaar wordt dit positief ingevuld, maar dat gebeurt soms ook met het populaire cultuurbegrip bijvoorbeeld in wat al te idealistische multiculturele verhalen. Bij dat laatste gaat het er ook om te benadrukken dat we allemaal best vreedzaam kunnen samenleven want die Ander lijkt toch zoveel op ‘Ons’. Die gedachte lijkt er ook te zijn bij Angry. Kunstenaar Jonas Staal heeft afgehaakt bij deze voorstelling omdat:
(11 – tekst) Radicaal voelt zich…- di 18 januari 2011 | NRC Handelsblad | NRC Digitale editie

Staal had verwacht dat de expositie de mogelijkheid bood tot het tonen van „een radicaal ander wereldbeeld: de radicaal is een schepper”. Maar uiteindelijk, aldus Staal, gaat het de organisatoren er alleen om te laten zien dat de radicaal „niemand minder is dan wijzelf”.

Het gaat Staat zelf om de radicaal als betekenis gever, als cultuurmaker terwijl Angry, volgens Staal, toch nog teveel zou uitgaan van de radicaal als gevaarlijk, kwaadaardig, enzovoorts. Waar het eerste inderdaad meer te doen heeft met de uitbeelding van de radicaal die niet noodzakelijkerwijze iets zegt over de radicaal zelf, wil Staal zich juist richten op de inbeelding in de radicaal in zijn streven naar een andere rechtvaardigere wereld. Bij het populaire cultuurbegrip gaat het eveneens vooral om de uitbeelding van andere culturen en verbeelding ervan, maar niet om inbeelding in mensen die, zoals Staal benadrukt, scheppers zijn. Dat laatste is in het populaire cultuurbegrip vaak compleet afwezig en via dat begrip worden mensen dan ook gereduceerd tot willoze, machteloze en onmondige slachtoffers (vrouwen vooral) of willoze en onmondige agressievelingen (mannen, radicalen).

Een ander voorbeeld is de eeuwige discussie over de hoofddoek. Kijk wat CDA-er Schraal stelt:
Hoofddoekverbod splijt CDA – Binnenland | Het laatste nieuws uit Nederland leest u op Telegraaf.nl [binnenland]

Vorige week stak de Amsterdammer Schraal de Volendamse Don Bosco-school, die hoofddoekjes verbiedt, al een hart onder de riem. „Ik vind het heel consequent dat leerlingen die met een hoofddoekje naar school komen, worden geweigerd”, zegt hij. „Zelf ben ik geboren in Isfahan, toenmalige Perzië. Vanwege de val van de Sjah en de komst van de islamitische Republiek Iran, is in mijn geboorteland de islamitische wetgeving uitgangspunt van het staatkundige leven en zijn hoofddoeken zelfs verplicht. Waarmee de vrouw, door de verplichting een hoofddoek te dragen, als het ware verantwoordelijk wordt geacht voor de mate waarin de man in de publieke ruimte , zijn zelfbeheersing ten opzichte van vrouwen onder controle moet houden. Dat is een verwerpelijke gedachte, die achter deze symboliek schuilgaat.”

Schraal stelt hier inderdaad een belangrijk punt aan de orde. Volgens bepaalde interpretaties van de islamitische tradities is de hoofddoek verplicht om zo de lusten van de mannen te bedwingen. Dat de vrouw daarom een hoofddoek moet dragen, maakt haar inderdaad verantwoordelijk voor iets wat eigenlijk de verantwoording van man zelf zou moeten zijn is de gedachte van Schraal en vele anderen. Het idee dat het daarom gaat om een scheve verhouding tussen man en vrouw heeft dus  inderdaad enige grond, maar Schraal gaat voorbij aan de veranderingen die de betekenis van de hoofddoek krijgt door veranderingen in tijd en plaats. Er is een bepaalde druk op vrouwen om die hoofddoek te dragen, maar er is ook druk om hem niet te dragen. Zeker tegen dat laatste in benadrukken vrouwen juist dat hoofddoek (en voor niqab geldt hetzelfde) een eigen keuze is en ook moet zijn. En ook dat heeft grond in islamitische interpretaties aangezien een opvatting is dat als de hoofddoek met de verkeerde intentie gedragen wordt (omdat anderen het zeggen) de waarde ervan nul is. Jonge vrouwen hebben dit dan ook nog eens vermengd met de culturele opvatting dat men authentiek moet zijn, dat je jezelf moet zijn en uit moet gaan van jezelf. Voor de één betekent dit juist het niet dragen van een hoofddoek voor de ander juist wel (wanneer men er aan toe is, hoor je dan vaak). Wanneer men uit protest een hoofddoek dragen komt er weer een betekenis bij. Het gaat er niet om of Schraals stelling waar is en die van anderen niet (of andersom). Ook al lijken ze wellicht tegenstrijdig en zouden ze dan dus moeilijk kunnen samen gaan, de verschillende opvattingen hebben zo hun eigen plausibiliteit die niet zomaar terzijde geschoven kan worden.

Een laatste voorbeeld is de recente controverse over de docent van de Hogeschool van Amsterdam die, na terugkomst van de bedevaart naar Mekka, besloot om geen handen meer te schudden met vrouwen. Dat leverde aanvankelijk problemen op, aangezien de consensus lijkt te zijn dat handen schudden moet. In Nederland doen we dat nu eenmaal zou. Blijkbaar niet altijd dus want anders ontstaat een dergelijke discussie niet. Het weigeren van handenschudden zou een gebrek aan respect zijn. Volgens de desbetreffende docent is dat niet zo, maar hij lijkt wel te beseffen dat hij wat uit te leggen heeft; hetgeen hij heeft gedaan in een mail aan zijn collega’s.Havanaweb.nl | Nieuws / ‘Het heeft niets te maken met disrespect’

‘Nu ik terug ben gekomen van deze spirituele reis voel ik me herboren en voldaan,’ schrijft de docent aan zijn collega’s. ‘Ik denk dat dit de uitoefening van mijn functie als leraar erg ten goede komt.’

Verderop in de brief schrijft de docent: ‘Naar aanleiding van mijn ervaringen de afgelopen maand besef ik dat de profeet Mohammed in naam van de Islam verschillende zaken heeft voorgeschreven die ik nu wil gaan praktiseren. De profeet heeft nooit de hand geschud van vrouwen die huwbaar voor hem waren en hier regels over opgesteld. In dit opzicht wil ik dit ook navolgen richting mijn collega’s.’

Hij voegt eraan toe dat het niets te maken heeft met ‘disrespect of het niet waarderen’ van zijn vrouwelijke collega’s: ‘Er zal niets veranderen aan het goede contact tussen mij en mijn vrouwelijke collega’s. Het enige dat ik wil praktiseren, is dat ik mij onthoud van het schudden van handen met de vrouwelijke collega’s.’

Het gaat er voor een antropoloog niet zozeer om of de profeet daadwerkelijk nooit de handen van vrouwen heeft geschud en of het nu daadwerkelijk islamitisch gezien beter is om dat voorbeeld te volgen. Het gaat erom hoe de man tot dit idee komt of hoe anderen tot het idee komen dat zijn gedrag een teken van disrespect is. Tevens gaat het erom om te kijken hoe mensen met verschillende en soms tegenstrijdige opinies toch tot een werkbare relatie komen of juist niet. De docent in kwestie probeert de relatie overeind te houden door het respect te benadrukken. Hij wil laten zien dat hij wel degelijk respect heeft door in plaats van handen schudden een hoofdknik te geven en/of zijn hand op zijn hart te leggen bij wijze van begroeting. Geen nieuwe vondst aangezien meer mensen dat doen (ik doe dat soms zelf ook tijdens mijn onderzoekswerkzaamheden), maar wel een mooi voorbeeld van cultuur maken. De man had ook kunnen aangeven dat het weigeren van de hand juist zélf een teken van respect is, althans volgens zijn opvatting. Een teken van respect voor vrouwen tot wie hij de in zijn ogen gepaste afstand bewaart en een teken van respect voor God aangezien hij zich in zijn ogen houdt aan God’s wil. Voor anderen zal dit ongetwijfeld onzin zijn, zie bijvoorbeeld Ellian.

Juist dit soort betwistingen, conflicten en tegenstrijdigheden is waar de antropoloog oog voor heeft wanneer hij of zij naar cultuur kijkt. En dat geldt voor alle onderwerpen of het nu gaat om feesten, besnijdenis, straffen of wat dan ook.

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Two Faces of Revolution

Posted on February 1st, 2011 by martijn.
Categories: Featured, Guest authors, Headline, Society & Politics in the Middle East.

Guest Author: Linda Herrera

The events in Tunisia and Egypt have riveted the region and the world. The eruptions of people power have shaken and taken down the seeming unbreakable edifices of dictatorship. (At the time of writing Mubarak has not formally acknowledged that he has been toppled, but the force of the movement is too powerful and determined to fathom any other outcome). Events are moving at breakneck speed and a new narrative for the future is swiftly being written. In the throes of a changing future it merits returning to the stories of two young men, the two faces that stoked the flames of revolution thanks to the persistence of on-line citizen activists who spread their stories. For in the tragic circumstances surrounding their deaths are keys to understanding what has driven throngs of citizens to the streets.

Mohammed Bouazizi has been dubbed “the father of Arab revolution”; a father indeed despite his young years and state of singlehood. Some parts of his life are by now familiar. This 26 year old who left school just short of finishing high school (he was NOT a college graduate as many new stories have been erroneously reporting) and worked in the informal economy as a vendor selling fruits and vegetable to support his widowed mother and five younger siblings. Overwhelmed by the burden of fines, debts, the humiliation of being serially harassed and beaten by police officers, and the indifference of government authorities to redress his grievances, he set himself on fire. His mother insists that though his poverty was crushing, it was the recurrence of humiliation and injustice that drove him to take his life. The image associated with Mohammed Bouazizi is not that of a young man’s face, but of a body in flames on a public sidewalk. His self-immolation occurred in front of the local municipal building where he sought, but never received, justice.

The story of 28 year old Egyptian, Khaled Said, went viral immediately following his death by beating on June 6, 2010. Two photos of him circulated the blogosphere and social networking sites. One was a portrait of his gentle face and soft eyes coming out of a youthful grey hooded sweatshirt; the face of an everyday male youth. The accompanying photo was of the bashed and bloodied face on the corpse of a young man. Though badly disfigured, the image held enough resemblance to the pre-tortured Khaled to decipher that the two faces belonged to the same person. The events leading to Khaled’s killing originated when he posted a video of two police officers allegedly dividing the spoils of a drug bust. This manner of citizen journalism has become commonplace since 2006. Youths across the region have been emboldened by a famous police corruption case of 2006. An activist posted a video on YouTube of two police officers sodomizing and whipping a minibus driver, Emad El Kabeer. It not only incensed the public and disgraced the perpetrators, but led to their criminal prosecution. On June 6, 2010, as Khaled Said was sitting in his local internet café in Alexandria two policemen accosted him and asked him for his I.D. which he refused to produce. They proceeded to drag him away and allegedly beat him to his death as he pleaded for his life. The officers claimed that Khaled died of suffocation when he tried to swallow a package of marijuana to conceal drug possession. But the power of photographic evidence combined with eyewitness accounts and popular knowledge of scores of cases of police brutality left no doubt in anyone’s mind that he was senselessly and brutally murdered by the very members of the police that were supposed to protect them. The court case of the two officers is ongoing.

Mohammed Bouazizi was not the first person to resort to suicide by self immolation out of desperation, there has been an alarming rise in such incidents in different Arab countries. And Khaled Said is sadly one of scores of citizens who have been tortured, terrorized, and killed by police with impunity. But the stories of these two young men are the ones that have captured the popular imagination, they have been game changers.

For the youth of Egypt and Tunisia, the largest cohort of young people ever in their countries, the martyrdoms of Khaled Said and Mohamed Bouaziz represent an undeniable tipping point, the breaking of the fear barrier. The youth have banned together as a generation like never before and are crying out collectively, “enough is enough!” to use the words of a 21 year old friend, Sherif, from Alexandria. The political cartoon of Khaled Said in his signature hoodie shouting to the Intelligence Chief, also popularly known “Torturer in chief” and now Mubarak’s Vice President, to “wake up Egypt” perfectly exemplifies this mood (from the Facebook group, We are all Khaled Said). No longer will the youth cower to authority figures tainted by corruption and abuses. These illegitimate leaders will cower to them. The order of things will change.

And so on January 25, 2011, inspired by the remarkable and inspiring revolution in Tunisia that toppled the twenty-three year reign of the dictatorship of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Egyptian youth saw it was possible to topple their dictator, Hosni Mubarak, of 31 years. Activists used different on-line platforms, most notably the April 6 Youth Movement and the “We are all Khaled Said” Facebook group to organize a national uprising against “Torture, Corruption, Poverty, and Unemployment.”

It is not arbitrary that civil rights, as exemplified in torture and corruption (recall Khaled Said), topped the list of grievances, followed by economic problems. For youth unemployment and underemployment will, under any regime, be among the greatest challenges of the times.

No one could have anticipated that this initial call would heed such mass and inclusive participation. Youths initially came to the streets braving tanks, rubber bullets, tear gas (much of which is made in the US and part of US military aid, incidentally), detention, and even death. And they were joined by citizens of all persuasions and life stages; children, youth, elderly, middle aged, female, male, middle class, poor, Muslim, Christians, Atheists.
Contrary to a number of commentators in news outlets in North America and parts of Europe the two revolutions overtaking North Africa are not motivated by Islamism and there are no compelling signs that they will be co-opted in this direction. Such analyses are likely to be either ideologically driven or misinformed. In fact, Islam has not figured whatsoever into the stories of Bouazizi and Said. These are inclusive freedom movements for civic, political, and economic rights. To understand what is driving the movement and what will invariably shape the course of reforms in the coming period we need to return to these young men. Their evocative if tragic deaths speak reams about the erosion of rights and accountability under decades of corrupt dictatorship, about the rabid assault on people’s dignity. They remind us of the desperate need to restore a political order that is just and an economic order that is fair. Mohamed Bouazizi and Khaled Said have unwittingly helped to pave a way forward, and to point the way to the right side of history.

*Correction: The figure who appears cowering in the cartoon is former Minister of Interior, Habib al-Adly, NOT Omar Suleiman, Mubarak’s VP

Linda Herrera is a social anthropologist with expertise in comparative and international education. She has lived in Egypt and conducted research on youth cultures and educational change in Egypt and the wider Middle East for over two decades. She is currently Associate Professor, Department of Education Policy, Organization and Leadership, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. She is co-editor with A. Bayat of the volume Being Young and Muslim: New Cultural Politics in the Global North and South, published by Oxford University Press (2010).

This post also appeared at Thetyee.ca

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